§ The following Amendment stood upon the Order Paper:
§
In page 33, line 38, at the end, to insert:
arising from subversive movements or the activities of any person or persons tending to crimes of violence."—[Mr. Mainwaring.]
§ The CHAIRMANSir Samuel Hoare.
§ 10.38 p.m.
§ Mr. COCKSOn a point of Order. Do I understand, Sir Dennis, that you are are not calling the Amendment standing in the name of the hon. Member for East Rhondda (Mr. Mainwaring).
§ The CHAIRMANThat is so.
§ Mr. COCKSFurther to that point of Order. We were informed, when we put down an Amendment on the federation side, that it was not called so that the subject might be discussed on the provincial side.
§ The CHAIRMANThe hon. Member is mistaken. The Amendment is not selected.
§ The CHAIRMANNo.
§ 10.39 p.m.
§ Mr. MORGAN JONESI gather in consultation with my friends, that a very definite pledge was given by the Chairman of the Committee at an earlier stage that this Amendment would be called at this stage. I should be very glad indeed if we could have a chance of discussing the matter and if you could reconsider your decision.
§ The CHAIRMANI do not know of and cannot admit any question of a pledge from the Chair that this Amendment will be called. As a matter of fact the hon. Member and others drew my special attention to their wish to move this Amendment and I looked at it with great care to see if I could meet their wishes. Without going to the extent of giving reasons I can assure the hon. Member that there were reasons which in my opinion make it quite impossible for me to select the Amendment.
§ 10.40 p.m.
§ Sir S. HOAREI beg to move, in page 34, line 1, after "to," to insert: 521
and to the dependants of, persons who are or have been.This is the same Amendment that I moved in the Federal Chapter to safeguard the dependants of members of the public services.
§ Amendment agreed to.
§ Further Amendment made: In page 34, line 2, after "provided," insert "or preserved."—[Sir S. Hoare.]
§ Mr. H. WILLIAMSI beg to move, in page 34, line 18, at the end, to insert:
(h) the safeguarding of the financial stability and credit of the Provincial Government.These words, as the Committee will remember, appear in paragraph (b) of Clause 12, where one of the special responsibilties of the Governor-General is the financial stability and credit of the Federal Government. I was rather amazed, when reading the special responsibilities of provincial Governors, to discover that they did not include the question of the financial stability and credit of any of the provincial governments. I realise that the provincial governments are not in quite the same financial situation as the Federal Government when we are considering the relationships of India as a whole to the world as a whole. As regards questions like those of exchange rates, the balance of trade, or borrowing outside India, India as a whole, and its financial stability and credit, are in a peculiar position, but strictly speaking that is not the case to the same extent with the Provinces. To take the analogy of this country, if what we may call the Federal Government of this country—the government which ultimately derives, its authority from the country—makes mistakes, the effect on the credit of this country as a whole, from the point of view of the world at large, may be disastrous. If, on the other hand, the right hon. Gentleman opposite inspires the Metropolitan Borough Council of Poplar to indulge in grave errors, as a result of which Poplar is reduced to a deplorable state, that would not necessarily wreck the credit of the British Government.[HON. MEMBERS: "Why single out Poplar?"] I was only taking Poplar as an example of what might happen. In this country we have, not a federal government, but a unitary government. We have, however, a great 522 many self-governing areas which get into a certain amount of financial trouble, and, remembering that the right hon. Gentleman once went to gaol because he did not quite like all these financial responsibilities, he seemed to be a useful example to quote. I did not go beyond that. I understand that Brixton was more comfortable than, he anticipated, but that is by the way.On the other hand, a provincial government in India is very much larger than any local government authority in this country. Some of the Indian provinces have populations of 50,000,000 or more. If the anticipations of some hon. Members are realised, and these provincial governments, with the real responsibilities that this Bill will give them, pursued an active policy of social reform of a kind that all of us would wish to pursue so far as we were financially able to do so—if they pursued such a policy to a point at which ultimately they involved the province in a grave financial responsibility, a condition might arise in which, for the sake of the reputation of India as a whole, the Federal Government might find itself called upon to come to the aid of a province, irrespective of any provisions that may be contained in this Bill. It is obvious that an important unit in the Government of the country cannot be permitted to crash, and yet conceivably a provincial government might pursue a financial policy which ultimately would bring the province into complete financial discredit. Nevertheless, under the Bill as it stands, the Governor has no special responsibility in the matter. I think that he ought to have a special responsibility, and it is for that reason that I have moved this Amendment.
§ 10.45 p.m.
§ Sir S. HOAREI am afraid that I must resist this Amendment. I am taking my stand on the solid and unshakeable rock of the Simon Commission. Hon. Members will remember that in the report of the Statutory Commission there is a long paragraph upon this subject in which it is clear that the question is very fully considered as to whether the safeguard was necessary for the Provincial Governments. Hon. Members of the Committee will find that there is an overwhelming case set out in the paragraph against the proposition 523 urged by my hon. Friend the Member for South Croydon (Mr. H. Williams). The position is that in the case of the Federal Legislature at the Centre there are several reasons for responsibility of this kind. There is the reason of the credit of India and of the large charge upon the Indian revenues for services like the service of debt, the maintenance of the Army and other services, like the maintenance of the provision for pensions. Those special conditions do not exist in the ease of the Provinces. As they do not exist, there seems every reason against entrenching so widely upon the field of provincial autonomy as would be the result of imposing upon the Provincial Governments a safeguard of this kind. I was under the impression that almost all of us wished to make provincial autonomy a real autonomy and put as much responsibility as possible upon the shoulders of the ministers. If an Amendment of this kind is carried it will, for no good reason, as far as I can judge, very seriously entrench on that responsibility, and on that account I recommend very strongly to the Committee that they should abide by the carefully considered recommendations of the Simon Commission and of the Joint Select Committee and by the view that I strongly express to the Committee to-night, that an Amendment of this kind would strike at the very root of provincial autonomy.
§ 10.49 p.m.
§ Mr. H. WILLIAMSThe right hon. Gentleman will remember that six or seven years ago he and I voted for a Bill which enabled special commissioners to be put into West Ham and one or two other places, and I would ask him if he can give any reason why the Federal Government of India should not have the same power which this Parliament definitely conferred upon the Minister of Health to interfere with certain authorities who were running a financial rake's progress.
§ The CHAIRMANThe hon. Member is now getting back to the Federal question, which cannot be discussed on this Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Mr. CHURCHILLI notice that the Amendment standing in the name of my 524 hon. Friend the Member for Oxford University (Sir C. Oman) is not taken. May I ask for a Ruling as to when this most important and substantial point can be raised?
§ The CHAIRMANI have already told the right hon. Gentleman that I would prefer not to do so. I do not fancy the idea of having to advise Members on how to conduct their business.
§ Mr. CHURCHILLMay I assume that responsibility and assume that a new Clause would be the proper way?
§ The CHAIRMANI would not venture to say that in public, at any rate.
§ Further Amendments made:
§
In page 34, line 23, leave out "Bengal and the Governor of Assam," and insert:
any Province which includes an excluded area.
§ In line 25, leave out "their," and insert "his."
§
In line 27, leave out "the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province," and insert:
any Governor who is discharging any functions as agent for the Governor-General.
§ In line 29, leave out from the second "of," to "is," in line 31, and insert, "those functions."—[Sir S. Hoare.]
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
§ 10.53 p.m.
§ Mr. COCKSAlthough on this side of the Committee we have many objections to this Clause, chiefly because we think that the Governor's special responsibilities are too widely defined, I want to concentrate my remarks on one point only in the hope that the Secretary of State may at a later stage meet us on this matter. The point I want to address my remarks to is of great importance, one which was supported by every delegate from British India to the Joint Select Committee. In paragraph (a) the Governor has a special responsibility for the prevention of any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of a Province or any part thereof. It is the opinion of the Indian delegates, of myself and those on this side of the Committee, that that power was too widely drafted. A great many do not object to the Governor 525 having special responsibility for anything causing a grave menace, such as a terrorist movement, a movement of violence, a movement against the law and order of the Constitution, but we feel these words cover a much wider sphere than that—that they cover a sphere described earlier in the evening by the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee). The point that was urged upon the Joint Select Committee was this: Suppose the Indian Government bring forward a Measure, desired by the majority of the members, that impinges to some extent upon the rights, liberties or feelings of another section of the population. It may be a case of temple entry, of child marriage or of land legislation. The fact that the Bill had been produced and that arguments were put forward strongly in support of it, might cause a very active opposition, which might not confine itself to the ordinary arguments of the chamber, but might cause communal and social disturbance. We feel that in a case of that sort the Governor might be approached by the representatives of the minority, who might say: "This is a Bill which the Government are forcing forward which is causing certain disturbance in a part of the Province. We feel that it is causing great menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, and therefore we urge you to use your powerful hand to see that the Bill is withdrawn." In our opinion, that is a wrong thing.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Limehouse said, in the earlier years of the last century the object of the British Government was to remove any grievances which arose from deep-rooted customs in India. Under Lord William Bentinck and the Marquess of Dalhousie a forward policy was pursued to put an end to certain Indian customs which were thought not to be fitting in civilised society, but after the mutiny we were afraid to go on in that way, and it was considered that the English people ought to confine themselves to administration and not to interfere with these Indian customs. One of the arguments for putting more power into the hands of the Indians was that they would be able to deal with these problems which we ourselves felt that we could not do; that we must not interfere with these things but leave the Indians to deal with them when they had control. Now we are giving 526 India control in this Bill. This particular Clause would enable the Governor-General to say: "You must not go on with that particular Bill, because it is causing wide disturbance, which may be a menace to the peace and tranquillity of the realm.
The second point is this, and we think it is very important—I know that the Secretary of State shares my view in regard to it—that the ministers should learn responsibility by the old method of trial and error. If they bring in a measure which is unpopular they should face the consequences of the unpopularity of that measure. If the Governor is given this particular power in this Clause what will happen will be that those who are opposed to this particular thing will throw the blame not upon the ministers but upon the Governor. Therefore, instead of building up a responsible ministry such as we have in this country, understanding what the difficulties are and tackling them, we shall have ministers throwing responsibility upon the Governor, and the Governor will have to take the blame and the responsibility.
§ It being Eleven of the Clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to make his report to the House.
§ Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.