HC Deb 29 April 1935 vol 301 cc118-33

The functions of the Governor in relation to the Provincial Intelligence Bureau and all matters connected therewith shall be exercised by him in his discretion under the general superintendence and control of the Governor-General exercised by him in his discretion.—[Sir R. Craddock.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

7.42 p.m.

Sir R. CRADDOCK

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

The question whether it is advisable to transfer law and order in the Provinces was decided in the affirmative, but in Clause 57 there is a provision under which in the event of terrorism arising the Government may take over certain functions of the police. Whether those functions are taken over or not, it is at least desirable that over every provincial intelligence bureau the Government should exercise supervision and that they should be under the control of the Governor-General acting in his discretion. It is often said that terrorism is confined to Bengal. That is not the case. Other races in other Provinces have been found guilty of committing terrorist crimes, and in any case this kind of crime is very apt to spread and find imitators in other Provinces. The information which is collected in these Provincial bureaux may be collected from the ordinary police, but they are to be put together by a limited number of men who are to be employed at the bureau as specialists for this purpose, and may contain information of very great importance, extending far beyond the boundaries of the Province. Efforts to seduce troops from their allegiance, civil disobedience, and other kinds of subversive movements will find imitators in other Provinces, and anyone with experience of India will realise to what extent the Provinces are interdependent for information of an important and often secret kind.

It may be that certain information which comes in this way should be communicated to the local military authorities. It may sometimes be merely the officer commanding the regiment in the neighbourhood in which these cases arise. The utmost secrecy is necessary where the communication must pass from one Governor to another and from the Governor to the Governor-General. Therefore, however much the risk may be taken of entrusting elected Ministers with the carrying on of the ordinary administration of police and of the criminal law, it is most important that this branch at all events shall be kept closely under the control of the Governors themselves, and of those officers who are responsible under them for executive action if peace is disturbed or the country is threatened with conspiracy and attempts to overthrow authority.

As everyone knows, large results have followed the initiative of simple and apparently rather innocent movements, and it is quite certain that for purposes of that kind you will not ordinarily get a Minister in charge of law and order who is sufficiently in touch with the country at large, outside his own province; you will not get a Minister of that kind who is really in a position in which he can exercise all that co-ordination with other provinces and with the centre; you will not find him for many years to come because you are limited in your Ministers to those who have been elected by the electors. It is highly probable, therefore, that for a long time to come the kind of Minister who will be elected to the legislature will not be the genuine choice of an intelligent electorate, but will be pushed on that electorate by the influence of his own class and the prompting of his own Press.

For that reason, with such experience as I have had, I do not believe very much in the doctrine that responsibility will create responsible action. There are many reasons why these things which have worked with us for centuries simply do not work in a country like India. I shall not dwell at length on that, because I might be going beyond the scope of the Amendment, but I do wish to say that there are great dangers if the whole of these secret movements, these subversive movements, are not kept under the very strict control of the Governor at the head of the Province. I hope it is possible and likely that the Government will see fit either to accept the new Clause as I have moved it, or to provide for the same object in some other form of language.

7.50 p.m.

Duchess of ATHOLL

I wish to support this new Clause. Everyone who has followed the proceedings of the Joint Select Committee must realise the very great importance that was attached by several witnesses to keeping intact the intelligence branch of the Criminal Investigation Department, on which the lives of so many important officials, both Indian and British, depend to-day. I was very interested to realise, only this morning, that this question was the subject of a recommendation by the Statutury Commission. I had not realized that they had made recommendations on the matter. I find that in paragraph 190 of the second volume of their Report they state: That the provincialisation of the Criminal Investigation Department, not merely of the Intelligence Department, but of the whole Department, should be carried out, subject to such conditions regarding organisation as the Governor-General in Council might determine. In other words they want the Governor-General to have considerable powers of direction and control, not merely for the Intelligence Branch, as the new Clause suggests, but for the whole Criminal Investigation Department, of which it is a very important part. The desirability of putting the Intelligence Branch under the Governor-General was very strongly stressed before the Joint Select Committee by representatives of the European Association, who showed great anxiety about the question of law and order as a whole. They said that if any one thought that self-government for India was going to end terrorism, they were living in a fool's paradise, and they expressed great anxiety as to what would happen to the Intelligence Branch in the event of the transfer of law and order. The President of the European Association in a speech in January of last year again referred to the importance of centralising the administration of the Intelligence Branch in order to keep it intact and carried on with the secrecy which is absolutly essential if it is to be of any use. The Joint Select Committee as a result of the evidence which they heard recommended that: Should the Governor-General find that the information at his disposal, whether received through the channel of the Governors or from the Provincial Intelligence Department or the central Intelligence Bureau, is inadequate, he should, in virtue of recommendations which we make later, possess complete authority to secure from the Governor the correction of any deficiency, and indeed to point out to the Governor and require him to set right any shortcomings which he may have noticed in the organisation of activities of the Provincial Intelligence Branch. That recommendation seemed rather like shutting the stable door after the horse is gone, because the Governor-General was not to have power to act in regard to the Provincial Intelligence Department until he had found that the information supplied to him was deficient. If information is ascertained to be deficient, the probability is that that ascertainment has not been made until after some tragedy has occurred. Therefore, I have always thought that this recommendation of the Joint Select Committee was very inadequate. In effect it said, "Let us see what happens first, and if anything goes wrong we will give the Governor-General power to require the Governor to supplement a deficiency in the information." Will it be very easy for the Governor to supplement a deficiency of information unless he has himself adequate control over the work of the branch, whereas the branch is to be transferred to the charge of an Indian Minister with the rest of the police department? Will it be very easy for the Governor to remedy a deficiency in the organisation of the activities of the Intelligence Branch?

At least within the limitations that I have indicated, the Joint Select Committee did want the Governor-General to have some control over the Provincial Intelligence Branch, but so far as I can make out no effect has been given to that recommendation in this Bill. Other recommendations which were made by the Joint Select Committee, designed to meet the dangers foreseen in the transfer of law and order, have been given effect to in the Bill. Some of us think the provisions inadequate, but they are in the Bill. This, however, is a definite recommendation which I cannot find anywhere in the Bill. Therefore I attach great importance to the new Clause. It endeavours to remedy the danger of the Intelligence Branch being rendered largely ineffective. The only action that the Bill proposes to take to that end is in Section 58, where the Governor will have the power to prevent anyone seeing the records of the information sent in. He is to have the power to say what persons are to see the information. That power will also be possessed by the Inspector-General of the Police with regard to members of his service. But it is evident that if the Governor has not felt able to give directions that information in regard to a particular case shall be shown to the Minister for law and order, and if the Minister for law and order is questioned or attacked in the Provincial Legislature in regard to action taken by the police as a result of information which has not been given to the Minister, he will be in a very difficult position. He cannot possibly give any effective answer. He will indeed be in a position of great humiliation, in which he might well say, "Where is the responsibility about which so much was said in the British Parliament?"

It has been said to me that there will be many people concerned with terrorist activity who will utterly refuse to believe that secrecy is possible if the Intelligence Branch is under an Indian Minister. They will say that the Inspector-General is subordinate to the Indian Minister, and they will ask how it is possible that the subordinate has seen information which his chief, the Minister, is denied? They will say it is impossble. It has, therefore, been represented to me that Clause 58 will probably be utterly ineffectual in securing the secrecy which all experts say is absolutely essential if we are to continue to get any information of terrorist activities. If information is not given from the only source from which it can come, that is from inside the terrorist ranks, the first and most effectual protection for the lives of British and Indian civil servants in India will have gone. Sources of information will have dried up and there will be nothing on which any action can be taken.

The Committee is asked to pass a Bill which does nothing more than I have indicated to safeguard the Intelligence Service at a time when those of us who have read the Memorandum presented by the Secretary of State to the Joint Select Committee have learned that terrorism is not confined to Bengal, as we had been led to understand from the fact that the Secretary of State has never mentioned that there was any terrorism outside Bengal. On the last occasion on which he spoke on this, in July, 1933, my right hon. Friend gave an account of terrorism, and he led us to believe that things were much better, but he confined his remarks entirely to Bengal. Therefore, it was a shock to many of us to read the Memorandum submitted some six months later by the right hon. Gentleman to the Joint Select Committee in which he showed that terrorism, far from being confined to Bengal, had been existing in most of the Provinces of British India since 1930. Yet the Bill does not even give effect to the recommendations which the Joint Select Committee themselves made. We feel a very grave responsibility in this matter. To-day we have been discussing the question of giving protection to civil servants against possible charges, criminal or civil. We have had before us the memorial in which they tell us of the dangers under which they carry on their work and how those dangers may be much greater in the future; and yet it is proposed to allow these provincial Intelligence Departments to operate practically entirely under Indian ministers without the direct control from the Centre which the Joint Select Committee themselves recommended. I hope that the new Clause will be agreed to.

8.2 p.m.

Mr. BUTLER

I appreciate the importance which hon. Members attach to this Clause, but I do not wish to transgress the bounds of order by referring unduly to the question of the reservation of law and order, with which this new Clause is so intimately bound up. Therefore, I shall have some difficulty—I hope that you will be lenient with me—in endeavouring to adhere to the new Clause. The Clause says that the functions of the Governor in relation to the Provincial Intelligence Bureau shall be exercised by him in his discretion, and it goes on to say under the general superintendence and control of the Governor-General. The first point to which I apply my criticism is the words "the Provincial Intelligence Bureau." I ask myself what this means. Is there in fact in any Province a particular intelligence bureau? The answer to that is that it is certainly not the case. That is one of the difficulties which the Government came up against in considering this point so exhaustively in the Joint Select Committee and in earlier debates in this House. We found it quite impossible to define in such simple words the actual arrangements which do exist in Indian Provinces with regard to secret intelligence. Some have a Special Branch, some have a portion of the Criminal Intelligence Department set off apart to control intelligence, others have rather looser arrangements.

The first difficulty which we come up against is to define in such simple terms the Provincial Intelligence Bureau, which in most Provinces does not exist as it has existed for some time at the Centre. Were this Clause to refer to the Centre the situation would be quite easy to define. There is there an intelligence bureau, and it is proposed in future that the intelligence bureau at the Centre shall continue to be under the Governor-General in his discretion, and it has been suggested that it shall be part of the department of defence and continue to do valuable work in informing the Governor-General of the intelligence from all parts of India. The Noble Lady referred to the report of the Joint Select Committee, notably paragraph 97, where the Committee ask that the Governor-General shall superintend the Governor in the Province who shall in his discretion supply the Governor-General with his information, but in an earlier paragraph, 194, they considered and rejected the proposal that the Special Branch should be reserved.

Let me consider these two propositions. They suggested that the Special Branch should not be reserved, partly for the reason that I have given, that it is impossible so easily to define it, and partly because the work of the Special Branch in an Indian Province without exception is intimately bound up with the ordinary work of the police. In any Province of which I personally have had experience or any Province on which we have received exhaustive reports, we have been told that the intelligence arrangements or office or whatever there may be in a particular Province, must depend on the day to day working of the police in that Province. For instance, if the intelligence bureau desire information they must acquire it very often through an ordinary police constable who may be operating in some distant part of the district. They may acquire it, as the hon. Member for the English Universities (Sir R. Craddock), with his great experience, has already told us, through military means. It is impossible to isolate the department in a watertight compartment.

It was for that reason that the Joint Select Committee discarded the idea of the reservation of the Special Branch under the Governor. They proceeded to describe the arrangements which should be made to see that the Governor-General has information in the case of a conspiracy which might lap over the boundaries of one particular Province into another Province, and therefore they proposed that the Governor-General should have the power of superintendence and control, which, incidentally, he would have in any case, because we have always understood that the chain of discretion is from the Governor to the Governor-General and the Secretary of State. In Clause 54, which is entitled "Superintendence of Governor-General," there are set out quite plainly powers specifically mentioned which makes it clear that the Governor-General has the power on other occasions to obtain this information from Governors or to give them instructions.

I appreciate, as the Joint Select Committee did, the danger of a conspiracy in a particular Province, and that is why the Committee, instead of recommending the reservation of the special branch, recommended in paragraphs 96 and 97, and we have inserted in the Bill in Clause 57, special powers for combating terrorism: "Provisions as to crimes of violence intended to overthrow the Government." The hon. Member for the English Universities and the Noble Lady the Member for Kinross and Western (Duchess of Atholl) both desire to achieve this end by simply isolating the special branch, an operation which we have found on inquiry, much as we may have considered doing it, impossible. We have therefore, instead, given the Governor much more effective power. Instead of merely saying that he can isolate the Special Branch, we have said that in cases of necessity the Governor can take over such departments of government as he may deem necessary to combat terrorism or crimes intended to overthrow the Government.

These powers will enable the Governor to take over such branches of the administration as he thought necessary and no limit has been placed on that, because it cannot be clear now exactly what departments of government it may be necessary for the Governor to take over. Therefore, we find that the hon. Members who moved this Clause and the Government have the same object in mind. Both wish to combat terrorism if unfortunately it should be necessary to do so. They think that by isolating the department they will achieve the objectives which they have in mind. We say that the powers we have in our Bill are much nearer the facts of the Indian situation and give the Governor wide powers in unfortunate cases of necessity. I think that these, combined with the general provision that the Governor-General will be able to communicate with the Governor, obtain information from him and give him instructions, are therefore satisfactory for the purposes we have in view, and since this matter was so exhaustively considered on the Joint Select Committee and has already been mentioned in the House, I am afraid that I cannot accept the new Clause.

8.12 p.m.

Duchess of ATHOLL

I hope that my hon. Friend will remember that the reason why in this proposed new Clause we deal with this subject in a rather piece-meal manner is because of the decision in the Bill to transfer the police force as a whole. Our wish was that it should be made a reserved subject and if I might say so, a great deal of my hon. Friend's speech was an argument for reservation. He admitted that secrecy was essential, and he pointed out also how intelligence work is mixed up with the general work of the police. We say that, if secrecy is essential and if it is difficult to secure secrecy if the force is to be under an Indian Minister that is an argument for reservation.

The CHAIRMAN

I hope the Noble Lady will realise that she started by saying that this was a matter which had already been decided.

Duchess of ATHOLL

I do not wish to transgress. My hon. Friend said that this matter had received exhaustive consideration from the Joint Select Committee. I wish that we could say that this House had exhaustively considered this question of the transfer of law and order. Only three hours have been allotted to this very important subject.

8.14 p.m.

Colonel GRETTON

There seems to be one great defect given by the Under-Secretary for India in that there is no linking up of the various intelligence systems in the Provinces. I know that I cannot go into that matter. Intelligence comes from various sources. The Government have rejected the proposal contained in the new Clause. But, surely something ought to be done to meet emergencies which may arise from time to time, involving sending to a Governor of a Province stating that information is wanted about this or that matter and the proposal in the new Clause is a much more systematic way of dealing with intelligence than anything else which has been suggested here. There is no indication in the explanation which has been given on behalf of the Government that if the new Clause is set aside, there is any means whatever of linking up the intelligence service of one Province with that of another. A person who is suspect in one Province might escape the observation of the agents of the police and go over the border into another Province and apparently no action could be taken as between the one Province and the other. Surely, the Government have something more in mind about this matter than they have explained.

I know that there is great difficulty about discussing in this House questions relating to intelligence services. When these matters become the subject of discussion the result often is to destroy means of information and to break up the chain of existing services. But I would ask the Government to give us a general assurance on this matter. We are not so suspicious that we would not accept an assurance from them that they are fully alive to the importance of this matter and that they intend that the Governor-General shall maintain an efficient intelligence service at work throughout India in order that the Government may be able to keep itself properly informed of developments. If we had some assurance of that kind we should feel easier in our mind but what the Government have done has been to reject every proposal which we have put before them and to give us only very unsatisfactory vague and indefinite assurances. Apparently when certain intelligence is desired inquiries will have to be made to see whether the information is in this or that Province—a most unsatisfactory state of things. There could be nothing more objectionable than that the Central Government should set up a service in an autonomous Province and it would be equally objectionable to set up a service in a native State. The only way is to keep what you have and not to hand it over to anybody else. I greatly regret that the Government have not either accepted the proposed new Clause or put forward proposals of their own adequate to fulfil the purpose which I, myself, believe they have in view.

8.20 p.m.

Sir R. CRADDOCK

I do not wish to repeat the arguments which have already been used, but I want to refer to one or two points in the Under-Secretary's statement. He said that this service whether called a Central Intelligence Bureau or by any other name varied a great deal from Province to Province. But such a service exists in a number of Provinces, according to the scale of the crime or unrest or suspicion with which it has to deal. In a Province where the C.I.D. intelligence branch is a small one it is an indication that the developments of inter-provincial crime and conspiracy in that area have not been very great and that there has not been much to ruffle the surface of things in that Province. But it is easy to bring into existence the kind of branch to which this new Clause applies—call it by whatever name you like. It is the intelligence branch in some Provinces and the special branch in others but it consists of a very few people. It generally begins with an inspector-general of police getting one of the superintendents to be his personal assistant for the purposes of dealing with particular information. It is true that the information comes from all sources civil and military, including the ordinary constable. Everybody who has any information to impart has to give it. But how it is dealt with and what action is taken upon it remains a close secret in that little branch at the top. As the information becomes more serious or the state of the country becomes more agitated then the strength of the branch is increased. Difference Provinces have hitherto called it by different names but there is no reason why the practice should not continue and why the special branch should not be described in every Province under the same name so as to avoid confusion. I feel that we must press this new Clause.

8.23 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel APPLIN

I think the reasons given by the Under-Secretary for not accepting the new Clause are extraordinarily weak. The fact that the Governor-General has power to take over the department makes it all the more

necessary to adopt this proposal. We do not want to wait until a crisis before the Governor-General takes over the service. We want to avoid the crisis. The whole object of the new Clause is to enable the Bill to work and to try to obtain for the new Government of India, when it comes into existence, peace, order and tranquillity. Therefore, it is essential to have a central bureau collecting information on the various Provinces.

Mr. BUTLER

I made it clear that the Central Intelligence Bureau would continue to function; that it would be reserved in the discretion of the Governor-General and would almost certainly be attached to the Department of Defence. The Central Intelligence Bureau in the past has been extremely efficient and I do not doubt that the Central Intelligence Bureau in the future will be equally efficient.

Lieut.-Colonel APPLIN

I accept that statement, but the point is, will the Provinces come into the general scheme and will the Centre be able to collect the necessary information from the Provinces? Unless that is assured the whole thing is useless. There must be co-ordination in collecting the information from the Provinces. In the last resort, in the event of a breakdown of law and order the Army will be in the hands of whoever has the Intelligence Bureau. The military cannot move and cannot act until they get the information and they will have no means of collecting the information for themselves. For that reason alone it is essential that the Governor-General should have the provincial services of information at his disposal. He should be the head and front of the whole system. Unless he is in that position, how can the Commander-in Chief take action when asked to do so? I beg of the Under-Secretary to accept the new Clause. It can do no harm and may do an infinite amount of good. It may be the means in the future of preserving peace and order in India.

Question put, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 25; Noes, 167.

Division No. 156.] AYES. [8.24 p.m.
Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel Broadbent, Colonel John Dawson, Sir Philip
Atholl, Duchess of Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Berks., Newb'y) Emmott, Charles E. G. C.
Bailey, Eric Alfred George Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry Goodman, Colonel Albert W.
Balfour, George (Hampstead) Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H. Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. John
Hepworth, Joseph Marsden, Commander Arthur Thorp, Linton Theodore
Keyes, Admiral Sir Roger Remer, John R. Wayland, Sir William A.
Lennox-Boyd, A. T. Sanderson, Sir Frank Barnard Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)
Levy, Thomas Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)
Lockwood, Capt J. H. (Shipley) Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A. (Pd'gt'n, S.) TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Colonel Applin and Mr. Raikes.
NOES.
Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.) Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford) Patrick, Colin M.
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G. Hammersley, Samuel S. Peat, Charles U.
Albery, Irving James Haslam, Henry (Horncastle) Penny, Sir George
Anstruther-Gray, W. J. Haslam, Sir John (Bolton) Percy, Lord Eustace
Aske, Sir Robert William Heilgers, Captain F. F. A. Petherick, M.
Attlee, Clement Richard Henderson, Sir Vivian L. (Chelmsford) Pickering, Ernest H.
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston) Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet) Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H. Powell, Lieut.-Col. Evelyn G. H.
Banfield, John William Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.) Power, Sir John Cecil
Barton, Capt. Basil Kelsey Jamieson, Douglas Ramsden, Sir Eugene
Batey, Joseph Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth) Rathbone, Eleanor
Beauchamp, Sir Brograve Campbell Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly) Reed, Arthur C. (Exeter)
Bernays, Robert Kerr, Hamilton W. Reid, James S. C. (Stirling)
Bossom, A. C. Kirkpatrick, William M. Reid, William Allan (Derby)
Boulton, W. W. Kirkwood, David Rhys, Hon. Charles Arthur U.
Bower, Commander Robert Tatton Lamb, Sir Joseph Quinton Robinson, John Roland
Bowyer, Capt. Sir George E. W. Law, Richard K. (Hull, S. W.) Ropner, Colonel L.
Braithwaite, J. G. (Hillsborough) Leckie, J. A. Rosbotham, Sir Thomas
Brass, Captain Sir William Leech, Dr. J. W. Ross Taylor, Walter (Woodbridge)
Burgin, Dr. Edward Leslie Lewis, Oswald Ruggles-Brise, Colonel Sir Edward
Butler, Richard Austen Lindsay, Kenneth (Kilmarnock) Russell, Hamer Field (Shef'ld, B'tslde)
Campbell, Vice-Admiral G. (Burnley) Lindsay, Noel Ker Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Liverp'l)
Campbell-Johnston, Malcolm Lister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip Cunliffe- Salt, Edward W.
Cayzer, Maj. Sir H. R. (Prtsmth., S.) Llewellin, Major John J. Salter, Dr. Alfred
Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. Sir J. A. (Birm., W.) Logan, David Gilbert Savery, Samuel Servington
Clayton, Sir Christopher Lovat-Fraser, James Alexander Selley, Harry R.
Cleary, J. J. Lumley, Captain Lawrence R. Shaw, Captain William T. (Forfar)
Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D. Lunn, William Simmonds, Oliver Edwin
Cocks, Frederick Seymour Lyons, Abraham Montagu Smiles, Lieut.-Col. Sir Walter D.
Colville, Lieut.-Colonel J. Mabane, William Smithers, Sir Waldron
Cook, Thomas A. MacAndrew, Capt. J. O. (Ayr) Somervell, Sir Donald
Croom-Johnson, R. P. McCorquodale, M. S. Somerville, D. G. (Willesden, East)
Cross, R. H. Macdonald, Gordon (Ince) Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.
Crossley, A. C. MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Seaham) Spender-Clay, Rt. Hon. Herbert H.
Daggar, George MacDonald, Malcolm (Bassetlaw) Spens, William Patrick
Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. C. C. Maclay, Hon. Joseph Paton Stewart, J. Henderson (Fife, E.)
Denman, Hon. R. D. McLean, Major Sir Alan Stones, James
Denville, Alfred Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R. Strauss, Edward A.
Despencer-Robertson, Major J. A. F. Martin, Thomas B. Strickland, Captain W. F.
Ellis, Sir R. Geoffrey Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Elmley, Viscount Mills Major J. D. (New Forest) Sutcliffe, Harold
Emrys-Evans, P. V. Milne, Charles Thorne, William James
Essenhigh, Reginald Clare Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (Streatham) Tinker, John Joseph
Fleming, Edward Lascelies Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale Todd, A. L. S. (Kingswinford)
Foot, Isaac (Cornwall, Bodmin) Moreing, Adrian C. Train, John
Fox, Sir Gilford Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univer'ties) Tufnell, Lieut.-Commander R. L.
Gardner, Benjamin Walter Morrison, William Shepherd Wallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)
Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir John Muirhead, Lieut.-Colonel A. J. Ward, Sarah Adelaide (Cannock)
Gower, Sir Robert Munro, Patrick Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.
Griffith, F. Kingsley (Middlesbro', W.) Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H. West, F. R.
Griffiths, George A. (Yorks, W. Riding) Nicholson, Godfrey (Morpeth) White, Henry Graham
Grigg, Sir Edward North, Edward T. Whiteside, Borras Noel H.
Grimston, R. V. O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh Worthington, Dr. John V.
Groves, Thomas E. Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William G. A.
Grundy, Thomas W. Orr Ewing, I. L. TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Gunston, Captain D. W. Palmer, Francis Noel Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Lambert Ward
Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H. Parkinson, John Allen and Major George Davies.

8.33 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN

The next new Clause which I propose to select is that standing in the name of the hon. Member for Middleton and Prestwich (Sir N. Stewart Sandeman), the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Thorp), and Others—(Establishment and constitution of Indian Tariff Board). Before I call that Clause, I want to point out to the Committee that though this is mainly a machinery Clause, it involves questions of principle, which would make it extremely difficult for me, without unduly narrowing the debate, to rule out arguments which apply more particularly to other new Clauses, which will be called later, dealing with Imperial preference or preference for the United Kingdom. I think, therefore, it would be in accordance with the general ideas of the representative Committee which has been sitting if I allowed the widest possible debate on this new Clause, so as to cover questions relating to the new Clause on page 1731 of the Order Paper—(Imperial Preference)—in the names of the hon. Member for South Croydon (Mr. H. Williams) and others, and the two new Clauses at the bottom of page 1734—(Provisions as to Bills imposing or increasing the duties on imports) and (Higher duties not to be imposed on United Kingdom imports than on other imports)—both in the names of the hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft) and others. If we took the discussion on this first Clause to cover all those, it would, of course, be permissible to divide on the others when they were called, but I suggest that it would be more in accordance with the arrangement made in the Committee if, unless it is thought that some special point is not covered, it were understood that there would be no further discussion on those three later Clauses when they were reached. I hope that will meet with the general assent of the Committee.