HC Deb 10 April 1935 vol 300 cc1177-250

4.20 p.m.

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA (Mr. Butler)

I beg to move, in page 175, line 8, to leave out "his territories in Burma," and to insert: the territories in Burma for the time being vested in him. This is a drafting Amendment which brings the wording of this Clause into line with the wording of the corresponding Clause relating to India.

Amendment agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

4.21 p.m.

Sir REGINALD CRADDOCK

Burma did not really figure at all in the Second Reading Debate on this Bill, and it seems to me and some of my hon. Friends desirable that something should be said generally on the subject of Burma, in respect both of its proposed separation from India and of the form of government which it will have when it has been separated. I do not think that many Members of this Committee have any real acquaintance with Burma. I think there are only two, one being the hon. and gallant Member for the Ardwick Division of Manchester (Captain Fuller) and the other myself who have actually lived in Burma for some time. Otherwise, I do not think many Members have any personal acquaintance with that country beyond what they may have gained as the result of short visits. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) paid a hurried five-day visit to Burma when I was there as Governor, but I do not wish to tell tales out of school about what he did there. In the circumstances, it seems to me that I might be allowed a little latitude in dealing with the subject of Burma on this occasion, and what I have to say may be of interest to the Members of the Committee who are about to consider Part XIV of the Bill dealing with the new Constitution of Burma.

People do not always realise that Burma has a history very different from that of India. The Burmese are an entirely different people from the Indians, with an entirely different religion and an entirely different social system. In short, there is no real resemblance between the Burmans who come from a Mongolian race and the inhabitants of India. It is, indeed, only by a political accident that Burma ever came to be included in India. Although the old atlases show Burma, Siam and various other places under the denomination of "Further Indias"—whatever that may mean—it is not to be assumed that at any time Burma ever formed part of the Indian system, either before the British came or since the British rule was established. It is also noteworthy that no part of Burma came under British rule before 1826 and then only the maritime province of Arakan and the maritime division of Tenasserim, one in the North and the other in the South, were temporarily placed under the Government of Bengal. In 1852 when the second Burmese War occurred, the central part of Burma, the Pegu Province came under the Crown as a result of the war, leaving Upper Burma still under a Burmese King. The annexation of Upper Burma was accomplished in 1886 when King Thibaw was deposed and interned in India. Then Upper Burma and Lower Burma, that is to say, Upper Burma, the Arakan and Pegu Provinces and Tenasserim were all amalgamated together as one country under one government.

As a consequence of these changes, disturbances occurred and after the annexation of Upper Burma there was a guerilla warfare which kept things back for a great many years. In consequence the Burmese have been very backward politically as compared with the Indians and that backwardness continues to this day. There is a general idea that the Burmese are much more literate than the Indians and, therefore, more fit to undertake a democratic form of self-government. If one takes the elementary education in Burma, which is not of a very advanced kind, one finds that, in fact, in the matter of literacy, Burma is considerably ahead of India in as much as 71 per cent. of the men and 21 per cent. of the women can read and write in their own language. But in the monastic schools where they are taught the secular education imparted is not at all of a high character and though the people in considerable numbers may be able to read and write, they are riddled with superstitions of every description. They continue to hold all those animistic beliefs which prevailed among the people of that country before Buddhism established itself. Although Buddhism established itself, it never so permeated the people as to obliterate those older beliefs.

For instance, the belief in spirits in-habitating rivers and glens and trees and soforth—generally known as "nats"—continues all over Burma especially among the tribes on the border. It is actual truth to say that the people of many of these tribes lead a miserable existence on account of the fear of "nats." Whatever 'happens to them is attributed to the "nats," and they are always trying to propitiate these evil fairies who haunt the trees and the rivers. It will be seen, therefore, that for all social and political purposes they are an extremely backward people. Even the Buddhist in Burma has their superstitious fears in the background of his mind. Indeed, one finds great inconsistency among the practising Buddhists in Burma. They may be strict Buddhists nominally, but while they do not like taking life themselves, they do not mind eating something which has been killed, if somebody else is responsible for killing it. To give the Committee a very small instance, if a fisherman who was a Buddhist were asked why he took life, his answer would probably be that he did not take the life of the fish.; that he merely pulled it out of the water and the silly thing died of itself.

There is a great irresponsibility in the Buddhist mind. He is so engaged in acquiring spiritual merit that the Buddhist does not bother much about his brother, and that is the honest truth. You find it illustrated in all sorts of ways. If you go about Burma, you will find that all those charitable objects, like an additional ward in a hospital and charities of that sort, in which Indians are interested, are not found among the Burmans. You will find that nearly all the charitable institutions in Burma have been presented by Indians living there and carrying on business there, while the Burman confines himself mostly to religious objects with a view to acquiring merit for himself. I put these points before the Committee because it is well that they should understand that, although we do not get what are called communal questions, so far as religion is concerned, in Burma, we do get very acute distinctions between races, and, as the Bill itself will show, the provisions for communal elections have to be just as much introduced in Burma as in India. The total population of Burma, according to the last census, was 14,500,000, of whom 7,000,000 were Burmans and of the rest 1,250,000 Karens, 1,000,000 Shans, 1,000,000 Indians, and about 200,000 Chinese. There are all sorts of tribes, and the tribes from the headwaters of the Irrawaddy vary every few miles. There they have lived for centuries, and they have changed hardly at all.

It is true to say that no political movement at all occurred in Burma until Mr. Montagu went out to India, and then the question of Burma had to be considered. Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford never visited Burma, but they had a few people from Burma to come over and talk to them in a deputation. It then became apparent that, although the Burmans had not taken the slightest interest in politics, they began to fear lest they should come under the domination of India as India advanced towards self-government. They particularly urged that they were quite a different people, and that they did not want to be included in India. I have always held that the separation of Burma was necessary at some time, but not so long as the British Government of India governed them both together. Then they could stay as they were, but if the Government at the head of the Government of India became largely Indian, then, of course, there was no appropriateness in continuing Burma inside the Indian Empire at all. The only point now is not whether Burma is to be separated, but when that separation should take effect. All sorts of considerations apply there, namely, whether it should be done when the Federation is established in India, or whether it should be dome at some earlier date, and, if so, whether Burma should step at once into the constitution which the Bill provides, or whether more time should be given until the finances of Burma, which are at a very low state at ibis moment, have recovered. These are questions which are well worth consideration by the Government, and I do not know what the Government exactly intends to do. It must largely depend on the finance's of Burma.

Coming back to their political position, although, as I have said, in bare literacy they are more advanced than India, owing to the 'monastic schools, yet when it comes to literacy in English, there are a very small number of Burmans—1.4 per cent. only—who are literate, and of the women 0.2 per cent. only. It is therefore obvious that progress in Burma is not nearly so advanced as in India, and that you are really taking a much bigger step in giving the Burmans even the provincial autonomy that you propose to give to India than you are taking in India itself, because it standso to reason that when a country never had a politician in it until 1917, its politics must be extraordinarily immature. You find this in the very irresponsible sort of person who finds his way on to the Legislature. They had a general election specially to decide whether they should separate from India or not, but at that time the people, who had not been co-operating with the Government all those years under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, took it into their heads, no doubt under Indian inspiration, that they would be against separation, and a- campaign was conducted through the constituencies, for what it was worth. The monks took enormous pains to go round, and the chief argument used at the election time was that if Burma were separated from India, it would then become merely a. British Crown Colony. It was said that 3,000,000 unemployed British were to be settled in Burma to the exclusion of their own inhabitants, that no one in future would be able to keep food in his house more than three days, that their private sanitation would be inspected three times a day, and things of that kind.

This was how a large majority, a two-thirds majority, was obtained against the separation of Burma, but when the issue went before the Legislative Council they kept on talking it out, and although the anti-separationists were supposed to be two-thirds—as in fact they were, according to the returns—they have always talked it out from that day to this, and it has never been decided whether they want separation or not. It has only been inferred from what various people have said from time to time. Anybody who has lived in Burma and understands their sentiments knows that they fondly believe that but for the British they would have conquered India and reduced her people to slavery, and he knows, indeed is quite certain, that they really want separation, but for various reasons which have been given to them, as to how they would suffer if they were separated from India, that they would not get any sort of self-government, that they would be kept under as a Crown Colony, and so on.

That is how the matter stands at present, and I think the Committee should realise what an accident it was that they received what were called the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms at the time they did. They were later than the other Provinces, and when I was made Lieutenant-Governor of Burma at the end of 1917, I had orders to try to work out a system suitable for Burma, quite apart from the reform proposals for India. I waited until the Montagu-Chelmsford report was out, because naturally I should have to study that before I could work out a system of reforms for Burma, and when that report came out I consulted all the various officials and non-officials, the Young Burmans and the Old Burmans, and I devised a scheme. That scheme was duly sent up to the Government of India, who by that time were so busy with their own affairs, the Afghan war, and the framing of their own constitution, that it lay with the Government of India for about a year untouched. Of course, in the meantime Burmans had an opportunity of coming to England, sitting on the steps of the India Office, and interviewing Mr. Montagu, and they repeatedly sent telegrams reporting conversations, real or imaginary, with Mr. Montagu.

The result was that the whole thing was rushed, and the scheme sent up by me to the Government of India never had a chance of being considered in England. The reason given was that the then Joint Select Committee on India was prevailed upon by these delegates to see one Burman and one Karen, and having seen them reported that, after hearing evidence, the Committee was not advised that Burma could be included in the Indian reform scheme. They did not doubt but that the Burmese had deserved and should receive a constitution analogous to that provided by the Bill for India. The result of only two people making statements before them, which they called taking evidence, was that they queered the pitch for any scheme such as I had worked out. In the end what happened was that when the delegates came back, instead of their being crowned with laurels, everybody went quite cracked, and said that the Indian scheme was not good enough for them and they must have complete and immediate Home Rule. Therefore, the whole of Burmese political opinion, which was very crude, simply rushed into the Montagu-Chelmsford system of reforms, and it took about two years before all those details could be worked out, with the result that Burma has enjoyed the benefits, if you call them so, of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme for only 12 years. Before that, she was under the Morley-Minto scheme, in a truncated form, because she never had any elections and she had no District Board.

I mention all these facts because they show how inexperienced the Burmans are for any sort of self-government. They are by nature very irresponsible people, and the reforms do not seem to have made them any more responsible. They take no interest in other people's affairs and are all the time anxious to acquire their own spiritual merit on the lines of the picture displayed in Kipling's "Kim." With these problems before us we have to consider how far the system envisaged by this Bill can be applied to Burma. It may be said that the proposal of the Joint Select Committee is to give to Burma the same provincial autonomy as is proposed for the Provinces in India, and on top of that to give certain further responsibilities which, if put into effect at once, would put the Burman people in front of Indians pending the establishment of the Federal Government. It seems absurd to put Burma in advance of India with this political history and background, and it will cause awkward reactions in India if the Burman people are able to boast that, after all, they are better fitted to govern themselves than Indians.

Another point on which we have to dwell is that of defence. In that matter the case of Burma for any form of self-government is very weak, because the Burman people make no contribution to the defence of the country. There are no Burman regiments. We raised two or three battalions in the War and they are capable of being good soldiers when they are on service. They are not lacking in bravery or anything of that kind, but they are so completely undisciplined that they simply cannot learn to do their work in peace time. I will give an instance of a sentry in the military police. He was guarding a little post where there were a few arms, and his duty was to do sentry-go. He heard the noise of music and dancing in the village and, putting his rifle up against a wall, he left his post and went off to enjoy himself in the village. Someone must have seen him and brought the matter to the notice of the authorities. Of course, he had to have some discipline administered, but he could not understand why. He said: "When I came back I found my rifle where I had placed it, and the other rifles were still there. I could understand you being angry if somebody had stolen a rifle, but as nothing has happened what is all this fuss about?" The whole of the military police consist of Indians, Karens and ChinsKachins, more or less wild tribes of the frontier. They make good soldiers, so much so that a battalion of them was sent to Malabar, and they were engaged in the suppression of the Moplah rebellion because they were accustomed to hill work. The Burman people have no troops, their regiments having to be disbanded because they could not stand military discipline. They raided a bazaar and frightened the Indian shopkeepers. They stole the officers' revolvers and committed dacoity. They could not bear discipline and simply deserted to their homes.

The Burman people have a very bad history of disasters, so much so that governments are reckoned in Burma as one of the five great calamities. They have flood, pestilence, fire, and earthquake, and governments are another calamity. That is their idea, and we do not wonder at it when we know their history. It is a terrible history of chaos and bloodshed such as one can hardly imagine in any other country. The most surprising thing is that, after all this record, they are a race full of laughter, joy and brightness. They are great gamblers. Every man in Burma gambles because he is a Burman. Men in other countries gamble because they happen to be gamblers. In Burma they all gamble, down to the small girls who carry your clubs round at golf. With these pleasant people everybody is disposed to view favourably a political advancement, but that, of course, is not a very sound argument. You have to see how they will conduct their affairs, and, as they do not police themselves and do not supply troops, it becomes a problem whether a people which is so irresponsible should be given anything like the same political power as we are giving to Indians. The Indian does understand discipline thoroughly well; you have no trouble with them, but one cannot allow Burman policemen to escort treasure or prisoners because of their careless way of putting one prisoner in charge of the others while the police go off to enjoy themselves.

Therefore, it behoves the Committee carefully to consider how far we should advance in Burma at this stage. I think that it is very risky because they are very irresponsible people, and there are many dangerous elements in the country. There was a serious rebellion only three or four years ago which was conducted, not in some wild part of the country, but within 100 miles of Rangoon itself and in districts which are very well inhabited by ordinary industrious cultivators. These rebellions might recur at any time. In addition to the ordinary garrison, they had to get the military police arid no less than two brigades from India before the rebellion was finally subdued. These rebellions spring up very often on comparatively small pretexts, and the people are so superstitious that they are tattooed in order to make them bulletproof. The tattooers always get away with it for this reason when the men have a conflict with the police or the military, obviously the percentage of casualties will be very small. Everybody who is untouched is claimed as a success by the tattooer and they comprise the majority. If any are killed, it is explained that after the tattooing they committed a deadly sin and therefore entirely negatived the effect of the tattoo. The tattooer therefore gets away with it and the tattooing continues to command their belief, incredible as it may seem. The facts which I have stated with regard to the police and the military show, to my mind, that there is a considerable risk in entrusting law and order to Burma, even if you give her the same measure of provincial autonomy as the Indian Provinces. There is a grave risk in handing over to her any sort of complete power over law and order, including police and magistrates. We must bear in mind their short political history in the modern sense.

The trade and commerce in Burma is in the hands of Europeans and Indians. and they have carried on between them the commercial development of the country. The Burman people themselves have taken very little hand in it, the reason being that although the Burman women are very good in the little retail shops, the men are very idle. They have never troubled themselves about trade and commerce and leave it to their wives. Not only in regard to the military and the police, but in commerce and trade the Burman people have taken a back seat entirely, while the Indians and Europeans have developed it. Very few Burman people have been merchants in any big way, and therefore the whole question of trade between Burma and India and between Burma and the United Kingdom has become one of great difficulty. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State will doubtless remember that the idea recommended by the Joint Select Committee was that there should be a trade agreement between the present Government of India and the present Government of Burma so as to make some temporary arrangement between the two countries while affairs settle down and during the rather difficult period which would intervene before the two new governments come into existence. In paragraph 431 of the Joint Select Committee's Report we find their recommendation on this subject: We recommend, therefore, that the Act should contain provision for an Order in Council empowering the Governor-General of India and the Governor of Burma respectively in their discretion (i) to apply for a prescribed period to the exchange of goods and commodities between India and Burma a scale of customs duties which shall have been mutually agreed between the existing Governments of India and Burma, or determined by His Majesty's Government in default of agreement, the scale not to be susceptible of variation during the prescribed period except by mutual consent; and"— this is very important for the United Kingdom— (ii) to apply to specified classes of goods and commodities imported into either country from outside sources such variations of the duties imposed by the Indian Tariff Schedules at the date of separation as may have been mutually agreed by the existing Governments of India and Burma before separation, or determined by His Majesty's Government in default of agreement, or as may be mutually agreed thereafter by the two Governments during the prescribed period. There is not much light on that to be obtained from the Bill. Discussions have been going on, about which the Secretary of State is the only person who can give any information. What I would like to emphasise is that the idea of the Joint Select Committee, on such information as they had then from India and Burma, was that there should be light revenue duties of that kind arranged between India and Burma, and also light duties between Burma and the United Kingdom. So far as I am aware the United Kingdom participation in this seems to have fallen out, and at present the agreed idea is to get free trade, which naturally exists at present so long as Burma is part of India, established over a period of some time; but the risk is that while India and Burma agree, Lancashire and everybody else will be left out in the cold, and have to pay the Indian tariff in respect of Burma. I cannot feel that that is right. I admit and understand, as I think most hon. Members will, that British firms who are operating or conducting industries in Burma and India, or both, should join hands to secure free trade for themselves in both countries, and they are not a bit keen on what happens either to Lancashire or any other industry in this country which exports its produce to Burma. What I feel, and I hope it is the feeling of both the Government and those Members who are interested in trade and desire the progress of trade in this country, is that there must be some limit; otherwise, what is the position? India will be not only allowed to continue her own tariffs, but by threatening Burma with duties on Burmese imports into India will force Burma to adopt a high tariff against British goods, because otherwise India denies Burma free trade.

It is really going too far for the United Kingdom to sit as a silent spectator of these negotiations and to play no part in determining what kind of tariff shall be established. It must be remembered that a country which defends and polices Burma has some claim to consideration. It is not a tyrannical thing to claim that the trade with this country, without which Burma would have collapsed between the pressure of China and India., should receive consideration. That was the original idea. It was what the Joint Select Committee thought would be the case, but it is not, I am told, the development that has taken place. I think that whatever may happen in the case of India, in the case of Burma no such agreement should be accepted by the Government here, merely because Indians and Burmese, and British, too, who have commercial undertakings in India, have put their heads together and paid no heed whatever to the interests of the industries in this country. I conclude by putting before the Committee the appropriateness, the desirability, and the fairness and equity of holding that they should not be putting their heads together, and that they should not have an agreement with which His Majesty's Government is not concerned. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government should take part, and there should be a tripartite arrangement, otherwise, if Burma and India agree to anything, however detrimental it may be to this country, as framed in these proposals the Government does not come into it at all. As it stands now, the Government decide if the parties do not agree among themselves, but if they agree the Government should intervene to see that equitable arrangements are come to between India and Burma and between Burma and the United Kingdom. I am afraid I have trespassed greatly on the time of the Committee and I simply beg to move the Amendment in my name.

The CHAIRMAN

To put the matter in order, the hon. Member does not move. The question is, "That the Clause stand part."

5.7 p.m.

Mr. MORGAN JONES

I think I may on behalf of all hon. Members assure the hon. Member who has just sat down that there was no need for him to have expressed apology for having engaged our attention for the time he did. If there is anyone in this House who has a right to speak with an intimate knowledge of India, it is the hon. Gentleman and we are grateful to him for having enlarged our knowledge by presenting us with that very interesting historical background to the subject on which we are now engaged. I do not say that I agree with the conclusions he has drawn, but that does not minimise my gratitude to him for his contribution to this debate. For our purpose we can confine our attention, so far as the historical background is concerned, to a comparatively few years.

It will be remembered that this question of the future Government of Burma became the subject of discussion at a special Round Table Conference some years ago, and at that conference discussion we of the Labour party were invited to be represented, just as other political parties in the House were. We, in fact, were represented by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdare (Mr. G. Hall) and Major Graham Pole. That Round Table Conference sat for some time and examined the subject, I have no doubt, very thoroughly. I have no personal knowledge of, nor intimate personal acquaintance with, any of their discussions, except in so far as they were presented to us in the report. I hope the hon. Member for Aberdare will later in the Debate participate in our discussions, because I am sure he will have something to tell us regarding his own impressions of the problem as they presented themselves to his mind.

When the Round Table Conference had completed its labours, in due time the problem came before us at the Joint Select Committee. On that occasion I, as one humble Member of the Committee, had to apply myself to the problem of what was to be done in relation to the future of India and Burma. It is necessary for me, I am afraid, to invite the Committee to extend its toleration for a minute or two, because I confess that I speak with some little difficulty in this matter. I think it will be clear to the Committee before I have done. When the Round Table Conference concluded its labours, the members of the Committee will recollect that it was addressed by the Prime Minister, and in a fairly long statement to the delegates before they left this country, he used words which have subsequently assumed very great importance in connection with this controversy. I quote one or two passages from his address, because it is very relevant that we should have these in our minds. I want to be perfectly frank with the Committee and to say that I am now quoting for the purposes of this Debate the passages which are relied upon by one section of the Burmese delegates.

Earl WINTERTON

Would my hon. Friend say which Round Table Conference? It was not the Burma Round Table Conference, but the Third Round Table Conference.

Mr. JONES

The passage which is relied upon by one section of the delegates who actually appeared before the Joint Select Committee—

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

Was the statement made at the Third or the Burma Round Table Conference?

Mr. JONES

The Burma Round Table Conference. I thought I had made that clear. If not, I apologise. The passage relied upon in this connection I take from the general memorandum prepared by U Chit Hlaing for submission to the Joint Select Committee. It is in paragraph 12 in the Record B.2 of the Volume of Records of the Joint Select Committee's Report: The chief points in the Prime Minister's Declaration were contained in these words: The first step is to ascertain whether the people of Burma endorse the provisional decision that separation should take place … The people of Burma will be in a position to decide whether or not they are in favour of separation from India. His Majesty's Government consider that the decision might best be taken after a general election at which the broad issue had been placed before the electorate.… That decision will determine whether, on the one hand, Burma should be in-dependent of India with a Constitution on the lines set forth above or, on the other hand, should remain a Province of India with the prospects indicated in the proceedings of the two Sessions of the Indian Round Table Conference—and in this connection it should be remembered that if an Indian Federation is established it cannot be on the basis that members can leave it as and when they choose.' I have taken the trouble to read that passage, because it is important, if we want to do justice to the two sides in this controversy, and I am sure we all do, that we should have in our minds the very pronouncement made by the Prime Minister which is relied upon by one side in this controversy. As I listened to this discussion in the Joint Select Committee., I am bound to say that, looking at it, out of relation to this pronouncement, I was driven to the conclusion, as my own conclusion in the matter on the merits of the case, that the case was overwhelmingly in favour of the separation of Burma from India. That was my own conclusion. The hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the Committee has called our attention to obvious differences which exist in the characteristics of the Burmese people and those of the Indian people. I need not traverse that ground again, because he has made it clear to us all that they differ in race, in religion, very largely, and there are other characteristics which as a race of people make them differ entirely from those who inhabit the mainland of India.

In expressing my individual judgment on the problem, I am bound to confess that my reaction was that there must be separation of Burma from India. If Burma still remained one of the Provinces attached to India and represented in the new Federal legislature at Delhi, I should feel that in practice the interests of Burma. would tend very largely to be submerged by the interests of the other Provinces. It would be difficult for Burma to retain any effective contact between itself and its representatives some 1,200 miles away, I suppose, in Delhi. That is o, long distance for the centre of government to be removed from the people. If my surmise be true that the tendency would be for Burmese affairs to be submerged by the affairs of other parts of India, the case is all the stronger for attention to Burmese matters to be concentrated within the confines of Burma itself, and so, for my part, I am quite convinced that the decision of the Joint Select Committee in favour of separating Burma from the rest of India is a sound decision and I must support it.

But I said there was a, difficulty, and I will be perfectly frank, because there is no disgrace involved in making the point I am about to make. Some of my hon. Friends on this side are very much disturbed by the fact that this pledge was given by the Prime Minister. They say, truly, that our party takes its stand upon the broad principle of self-determination, and that that principle was embodied in and implied in the pledge given by the Prime Minister at the end of the Burma Round Table Conference. That pledge was given, and accordingly there was an election upon the point. The hon. Member opposite has told us of some of the incidents during that election. I gather that elections in Burma are not always conducted on lines of strict political honesty. I believe that elections elsewhere show similar characteristics. We are told that the issue was not stated quite clearly to the Burmese people. I have no details of the matter, but my impression is that this is an accurate statement of the position. While it is true that there was a strong body of anti-separationists, who presented the anti-separation case to the Burmese electorates, I have been driven to the conclusion that it was presented somewhat in this way: We can vote for the preservation of our association with India, because we can elect to go out of the Federation if it pleases us so to do. If the issue of separation was presented in those terms—I say "if," and I have nothing either way to point to in the matter—then it was not presented strictly in accordance even with the pledge which is cited by the anti-separationists themselves, because the last words of the Prime Minister's pledge say: In this connection it should be remembered that if an Indian Federation is established it cannot be on the basis that members can leave it as and when they choose. That issue is vital. Those of us who were members of the Joint Select Committee— I think I am giving away no secret that I ought not to disclose—will know that we could not go far with the discussion of the principle of federation without arriving at a final conclusion upon this question of principle, namely, whether it should be open to a unit of the Federation, once in the Federation, to withdraw from it if and when it chose. If it were once agreed that a Province or a State, having gone into the Federation, could withdraw from it if and when it chose, that freedom must apply to them all. If Burma is allowed to enter the Federation and to withdraw from it five years hence, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply to every single unit in the Federation. If I remember rightly, we had to determine that issue quite early in the discussion, and I gave my vote in favour of the principle that once units had entered the Federation they should not be free to leave it if and when they chose. Having joined it they joined it, and there, was an end of the matter. It must necessarily follow that if Burma elected to join the Federation it could not withdraw from it at some future time. If, therefore, it was represented to the Burmese people that they could withdraw after a lapse of time, the issue was represented to them on a basis that was impossible of realisation.

Major MILNER

Who represented it in that fashion?

Mr. JONES

I cannot say that Mr. So-and-so said—that I cannot say; but of this I am quite sure, that an impression was certainly given to me, not only in the Joint Select Committee, but in private discussions too, that it was so presented to the electors in Burma. I speak now subject to correction—my memory may fail me—but I do not remember that that was successfully controverted even by the anti separationists themselves. That is my honest impression. If I have given a wrong impression I hope I may be corrected. I therefore take the view that it is possible that this vote against separation was given, so far as many electors are concerned, under the misconception that if they went into the Federation, they could get out of it when it suited them. On general grounds, and apart from that, I think it would be much better for the Burmese people to start on their own right away. I am convinced that they can build up a polity of their own much more successfully if they start now, at this appropriate line of demarkation, on their own lines and in accordance with their own ideas, than if they are tied to the chariot of India, if I may put it that way.

I have said that some of my hon. Friends take a different view from mine on this matter. It all arises from the fact, which cannot be denied, that the Prime Minister gave a very definite pledge, and some of my hon. Friends argue that in accordance with that pledge Burma has given its vote in favour of preserving contact with India by becoming a Province represented in the Central Legislature. I hope my hon. Friends will agree that the difference between us is not one that need give rise to any acrimony. It is a difference that is natural, it arises over the question whether we are acting in good faith towards the Burmese people in insisting upon separation having regard to the result of the election. For myself, I am profoundly convinced that the merits of the case are overwhelmingly in favour of separation here and now. I am sure that in the long run, and perhaps in the short run, it will prove to be beneficial to the Burmese people, and I hope that the Burmese people will feel that those who vote for the Government and in support of the decision of the Joint Select Committee are doing so in the confident belief that they are best serving the interests of the Burmese people.

5.27 p.m.

Sir S. HOARE

I am very glad that the Committee should engage in an important debate upon these great issues concerning one of the most attractive parts of the British Empire. It is all to the good that we should discuss this question this afternoon, and show to our friends in Burma that we have just as great an interest in both their present and their future as we have in that of the greater Indian sub-continent. There are two main reasons on the side of separation. First of all, there is the reason of Burmese sentiment. Hon. Members will recall that the Statutory Commission came very definitely to the view that the great weight of opinion in Burma was in favour of separation from India. The result of the earlier Round Table Conference was to confirm that view, and the Joint Select Committee further confirmed it. I am aware that circumstances arising between the Round Table Conference and the present time have led some people to doubt whether sentiment in Burma is still in favour of separation. I have made what inquiry I could make, and am convinced that there is still a strong feeling in favour of separation. It is true that after the Prime Minister's statement at the Round Table Conference an election was held in Burma which appeared to go against separation. My information about that election confirms the comments made upon it just now by the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones). The issue was very confused; the issue, as always happens in general elections everywhere, was sometimes misrepresented. A majority was returned to the Council as a result apparently against separation. The issue was then specifically put to the Council, but we could get no definite reply from the Council at all. The effect of the discussions show that even the anti-separationists, or anyhow, many of them, were in favour of separation, if they could get separation upon their own terms.

That view came out in the discussions of the Joint Select Committee. It was clear to rue, and I think it was clear to my colleagues on the Joint Select Committee, that even the protagonists in the election who were against separation were yet in favour of separation if they could get separation upon what we regarded as impossible terms, the first term being that Burma would be a kind of in- and-out member of the Federation; they could go out of it whenever they felt inclined. That was obviously an impossible position to accept with a permanent Federation, and it was unanimously turned down by every member of the Joint Select Committee. Secondly, the Bur-mans, those who tended towards anti-separationist views, made a demand that, if Burma did enter the Federation, Burma must be given preferential treatment both in the matter of finance and in the matter of the powers that were to be assigned to the Burmese unit. That contention again was rejected by every member of the Joint Select Committee. We felt it impossible that in any permanent Federation there should be this kind of preferential treatment for one particular unit.

It was therefore clear to the Joint Select Committee that even the anti-separationists were against a permanent union with India, and that the only difference, so far as we could judge, between the two parties was whether the conditions of Federation were to be, roughly speaking, the kind of conditions that we lay down in the Bill, or conditions of what we regarded as an impossible character. Let the Committee once and for all disabuse themselves of any idea that there is any breach of pledge, made either by the Prime Minister or by the Government, in accepting the separation position. The Prime Minister's pledge was quite specific. He said that there was to be an election and that we were to take a decision afterwards. We tried to take a decision after the election. We put the issue clearly before the Burma Council.

Major MILNER

The electors had decided.

Sir S. HOARE

My hon. and gallant Friend is really confusing two issues. The Prime Minister's pledge was quite specific. It was: The decision might best be taken after a general election at which the broad issue had been placed before the electorate. My answer is that the broad issue was not placed clearly before the electorate, and secondly, whether the hon. and gallant Member opposite agrees with me or not—he cannot disagree with me, I think, on this—that the issue was put after the election to the Burma Council. We failed entirely to obtain an answer from them.

Major MILNER

The issue had been decided by the electors.

Sir S. HOARE

The hon. and gallant Member must develop his argument in his own way. I say that that was the position, and I challenge anybody to deny it. Let me turn to an equally important reason that seems to us to confirm us in the view that there must be separation. Here again, I think all my colleagues on the Joint Select Committee will agree with me when I say that, suppose there were no separation, it would be almost impossible to fit Burma into the Indian polity. There you have a country, as we have heard in the very interesting speech from my hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities (Sir R. Craddock) and a former Governor of Burma, differing socially, economically and historically as well as from the points of view of religion and economic outlook, from India; a country so far distant and so definitely remote geographically that a sea voyage of between 700 and 800 miles is needed to get from Rangoon to Calcutta, It takes something like a week for Burman representatives on the Indian Assembly to get to that Assembly to attend its deliberations. It is sufficient to state those facts to show to the Committee how impossible it is to fit into a permanent Indian Federation a country that differs in every respect from India and is geographically so remote.

I said just now that there were great differences with India, but none the less there is the fact that Burma and India 'have, for 50 years, been governed as a single unit, and it is not to be wondered at that during those 50 years very strong bonds of union have grown up between the two countries. There has been the constant inflow into Burma, for instance, of Indian capital and Indian labour; on the other hand, Burma has found in India the best market for its products, rice, timber and oil. As a result of this economic connection, a state of affairs has been created that it would be disastrous to see destroyed, and even more disastrous to see destroyed in a short period of time. Many of us—here again I think I am speaking for practically every member of the Joint Select Committee—while we were in favour of separation, were none the less insistent that if there is to be separation every possible step must be taken to avoid a sudden dislocation of those economic bonds that have grown up between India and Burma.

Accordingly, the Committee recommended that for an interim period, that is to say a short period of time, before the new Governments have become established, there shall be a temporary arrangement made to avoid the possibility of that dislocation. It was contemplated that this interim arrangement should cover, in the first place, Burma-Indian trade and, in the second place, the immigration of Indian labour into Burma. It was frankly to be an interim arrangement. We felt that it would not be proper permanently, or indeed for a long duration of time, to tie the hands of fiscally autonomous units, but we did feel that, both in the interests of India and of Burma, there was every advantage to be gained by the existing Governments making some kind of interim arrangement for those very important matters.

Since the Committee made their report, discussions have been going on in India between the two Governments, and I will now describe the result to the Committee. At first, the attempt was made to maintain the status quo between the two countries, with a certain latitude for revenue duties of a light character, to be imposed by one country, let us say, against the other, but when those Governments came to consider the topic, they came to the conclusion that, in the first place, those revenue duties were likely to he negligible from the point of view of revenue, and, secondly, that they were likely to interfere with the regular flow of trade between Burma and India. During the negotiations therefore the idea of revenue duties passed from the picture, and it then became a problem as to whether you could continue complete status quo between the two countries for this interim period.

The negotiators have come to the view that it is possible to continue this status quo, that is to say that Burmese exports, particularly rice, timber and oil, should be treated in India just as they are treated now, and, in the same way, Indian imports into Burma should be treated just as they are treated now. The present position with the negotiators is that they have reached a provisional agreement upon the basis of this status quo, and they suggest, as the period of time, a period of five years. I should like to hear the views of this Committee upon the period of time. On the one hand, there is everything to be gained by avoiding dislocation of the economic relations between the two countries, and for as long a period as possible; on the other hand, there is the obvious disadvantage of tying the hands of the two future Goverments, each of which is fiscally autonomous, for any substantial period of time. My own view is that it would be a mistake.

Earl WINTERTON

May I interrupt the right hon. Gentleman. It is merely on a point of detail. Is it to be five years from the coming into operation of the Constitution, or five years from now?

Sir S. HOARE

Five years from the coming into operation of the separation of Burma.

Sir BASIL PETO

Will the period be settled by agreement between the two Governments?

Sir S. HOARE

It will be a matter of mutual agreement between both parties. My own view would be that it would be a mistake to attempt to make this period too long, and I am also very definitely of opinion that it would be equally a mistake from the point of view of British trade to attempt during the interim period to obtain conditions which the two Governments are not willing of their own volition to contemplate. I have a feeling, myself, that if we try to intervene in an arrangement which would obviously be to the advantage of both Burma and India for this interim period —I am not now talking about any permanent arrangement for the future—the only effect would be to prejudice the future of British trade after the interim period. Moreover, if we attempted to obtain advantages outside India in the interim period, in Burma, Indian opinion would certainly react very adversely to an arrangement of that kind, and there would be a risk that what we might gain in Burma in the interim period might be permanently lost on a much greater scale in the Indian market in the future. My own advice, therefore, to the Committee would be that it is wise, for the interim period, to leave the two Governments to make the best arrangements they can both for Burma and for India, provided— and I think it is a fair proviso to make—that in the arrangement British trade does not suffer as compared with the present position; and I would emphasise the fact that that has always been accepted in these discussions between the representatives of India and of Burma.

Mr. HAMMERSLEY

I am perfectly clear about the suggestion that there should be a customs union between India and Burma; but I am not quite clear, from What the right hon. Gentleman has said, whether he envisages a continuation of the present high Indian tariff rates in Burma as regards this country.

Sir S. HOARE

During the interim period that must be a matter between India and Burma. The whole basis of the interim period is a continuation of the status quo. If outside the field in which imports from the United Kingdom to Burma compete with Indian imports —if there is a field outside the field in which there is competition with India—then there will be a latitude for negotiation; but in the case of United Kingdom imports that compete with Indian imports, there we leave the position exactly where it is for the interim period; and I believe, myself, that, the more the Committee consider the problem, the more inevitable they will find it to be. As for the future, when the interim period comes to an end the British Government will of course be free to make whatever arrangements it can with the Burma Government, and it may then be that the economic tendencies of Burma as compared with India will emerge, and there will be wider opportunities for British trade in the Burma market. But I am sure, myself, that if there is to be an interim period which is to be accepted by India on the one hand and Burma on the other, it can only be on the basis of the status quo. If we try to introduce into it other considerations, all that will happen will be that there will be no interim agreement at all, that there will be a catastrophic dislocation of economic relations between India and Burma, and very serious reactions in the future upon British trade. As I have said, the agreement has not been ratified, and I myself have not had the final details of it. In' any case it will have to come before the House in the form of an Order in Council under a later Clause of the Bill, and we can discuss it in detail when we come to the Order in Council; but I thought that at this early stage it was well to put the position before the Committee, in order that they might see that we are trying to avoid, while going forward with separation, the risk of a dislocation of economic relations between the two countries. I have said nothing about the immigration side of the agreement. There again we have tried to tide over this interim period with an arrangement that would leave the immigration conditions from India into Burma substantially as they are now.

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

For the same period?

Sir S. HOARE

For the same period I come now to the final conclusions that I desire to put before the Committee. I would first of all repeat what I said at the beginning of my speech, namely, that I believe it to be impossible to include Burma in a permanent Indian federation. Secondly, I believe it to be impossible to impose upon Burma a system of government substantially different from the system that we are proposing for the provinces and the centre in India. Our pledges on that point are quite explicit. More than once we have made it clear that, if there is to be separation, Burma will not suffer as a result of the separation as compared with the Provinces and the Central Government of India. Thirdly, I believe that, try as we may, realising the difficulties as we may, taking into account all the considerations urged by my hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities, a constitution upon the lines we are proposing is really the only kind of constitution that is likely to work and likely to be accepted. During these years we have often considered the possibility of alternative constitutions, taking into account all the different characteristics of Burma, but we have come back to the conclusion that, looking, at the political history of the last 20 years, and looking, again, at the present conditions of Burma, it is wise to make our advance in Burma on the general lines of the Indian Provinces and the Indian Central Government. I am afraid I have taken up a great deal of the time of the Committee, but I was particularly anxious to show to the Committee what we have been trying to do in order to avoid an economic dislocation, and to make it clear that, while we are definitely in favour of separation, we wish to take no action that is going to endanger the economic relations between the two countries, or is going to endanger the large amount of British capital—I believe amounting to £40,000,000 or 250,000,000—that has been sunk in Burma, and that has been mainly instrumental in the past in making trade easy between the two countries.

5.51 p.m.

Major MILNER

As one who has endeavoured to take some little interest in the future of Burma, I am glad that at long last the Committee have come to discuss the subject of Burma. The principal question before the Committee is, of course, whether Burma should be separated from India, or whether, as at present, Burma should continue to be what in effect is a Province of India. It is a remarkable fact that my hon. Friend in front of me and the right hon. Gentleman have spent, with the exception of some few minutes which the right hon. Gentleman devoted to the subject of trade, the greater portion of the last hour in justifying the action of the Government in insisting—as I submit, against tine wish of the Burmese people —on the separation of Burma from India; and I cannot help being reminded of the French proverb which, being translated, says that those who excuse themselves accuse themselves. While paying a tribute both to the right hon. Gentleman and to my hon. Friend in front of me for what I am sure is their perfect sincerity and good faith in this matter, I want briefly to examine some of the arguments which they have put forward in favour of separating Burma from India.

My hon. Friend in front of me had two principal arguments. One was that there was such an immense difference in religion, race and language between the Burmese and the population of India that for that reason alone it would be desirable that Burma should be separated from India. I assure him, and I am confident that the right hon. Gentleman will not contradict me in this, that there is no more difference between the Burmese and the Indian people than there is between certain different races in India itself. For example, there is no more difference between the Burmese and the Madrasi than there is between the Madrasi and the tribes on the North West Frontier.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK

Is it not a fact that anthropologically there is a clear-cut difference between Burma and India?

Major MILNER

The hon. Gentleman has his views, which, I recognise, have the force of authority, but I am submitting to the Committee, and I do not think the Under-Secretary will contradict me, that there are immense differences between the different races in India. Admittedly there is an immense difference, just as great as in Europe, and there is admittedly a similar difference between the Burmese and the Indians; but there is no greater difference between the Burmese and the Indians than there is between certain races in India and other races in India. That is the point that I wish to make. Similarly, there is as great a difference in religions in India itself as there is between the religions of Burma and the religions of India; and the same applies to languages also. I believe that the Report of the Statutory Commission stated that no fewer than 220 different vernacular languages were spoken in India, and I am sure the Committee will accept that as being true. But there is no more difference between Burma and India as regards language than there is between certain languages which are in use in India itself.

My hon. Friend's arguments, therefore, are only superficial; there is no real substance in them, particularly when one bears in mind the fact that the Burmese are to-day, and have been for years past, associated with the Indians, and that Burma to-day is in effect a Province of India, and indeed for years past has been sending its representatives to the Legislature at Delhi; and yet, to-day, my hon. Friend and the Government want to put an end to that state of affairs and to separate Burma from India. My hon. Friend also mentioned, as did the right hon. Gentleman, the question of distance. I have not an atlas by me, but I think that I shall be quite safe in saying to my hon. Friend that if he compares the distance between Delhi and Rangoon with the distance between Delhi and Travancore, the latter distance will be the greater. There is, therefore, no serious point in that-and I desire to be fair to my hon. Friend-except that in proceeding to and from Rangoon there is a sea voyage which takes something like 48 hours. But to-day the representatives of Burma are sitting in the Assembly at Delhi, and, therefore, that again is not a good reason for insisting upon the separation of Burma from India.

My hon. Friend put forward another argument. He said that what convinced him that the case was overwhelmingly in favour of separation was that the Burmese, as he understood it, desired the right, if they joined the Federation, to leave the Federation more or less at their own sweet will. Therefore, I would remind my hon. Friend of what, I am quite sure, he has forgotten, that the Prime Minister, in the paragraph which my hon. Friend read, said, in December, 1932: the first step is to ascertain whether the people of Burma endorse the provisional decision that separation should take place. But the Prime Minister went on to say: That decision will determine whether, on the one hand, Burma should be independent of India, with the constitution on the lines set forth above, or, on the other hand, should remain a Province of India, with the prospects indicated in the proceedings of the two sessions of the Indian Round Table Conference, and in this connection it should be remembered that if an Indian Federation is established— that is, if Burma comes into such a Federation— it cannot be on the basis that members can leave it as and when they choose. That declaration was made prior to the election which took place, which is to say that the electors knew that if they voted in favour of going into the Federation they could not leave the Federation as and when they chose. Therefore, again my hon. Friend is quite wrong in his premises. That decision was taken on one issue, and one issue alone. The Prime Minister said that the people of Burma should decide, and I am here speaking for the right of the Burmese people to determine their own future. I say that, notwithstanding what my hon. Friend has said, the Burmese people have decided, at the election which was held after the Prime Minister's declaration, by an overwhelming majority, by no fewer than 500,000 against separation to 270,000 votes for separation, that they desire to remain associated with India. The Burmese people came to that decision knowing, by reason of what the Prime Minister said, that once in the Federation, always in the Federation.

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

Has the hon. and gallant Gentleman any reason to know—I know that he is acquainted with the matter—that the Prime Minister's stipulation was brought before the people at that election?

Major MILNER

I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State would deny it. I think that there is no question that that election was decided on that one issue alone. I have not been to Burma, and I am not in a position to prove that, but I cannot think that that declaration, which was made at the Burma Round Table Conference when Burma delegates were present, was not brought fully to the attention of the Burmese people. At any rate, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State can correct me if I am wrong, but I feel confident that that was so.

Mr. KIRKWOOD

According to the figures which the hon. and gallant Member has just quoted, under 1,000,000 people voted. He says that Burma has been consulted, but, if my information is correct, there are about 25,000,000 people in Burma alone.

Major MILNER

I am obliged to my hon. Friend. I believe that the population of Burma is in the region of 14,000,000, but I do not know exactly what proportion of the 14,000,000 have the vote.

Mr. BUTLER

Seventeen per cent.

Major MILNER

Seventeen per cent. have the vote and, therefore, I think that a vote of 770,000 in all is fairly representative of the population of Burma, or, at any rate, that proportion of the population who have the vote. That vote, I would remind my hon. Friend, who, I know, stands for self-determination, was two to one in favour of continuing association with India and against separation. According to my information, it can be described as a signal victory. Notwithstanding a good deal of misrepresentation by the separationists, and in spite of the fact that the separationists had official support, as they had before and have had since up to quite recent days when a vote was taken a month ago, from the officials in Burma for separation as against anti-separation, that they had a powerful press in favour of separation, the large funds which were used to further the separationists' cause, and also the very natural feelings and aspirations on the part of many Burmese to have independence and so on—notwithstanding all these considerations, the vote went overwhelmingly in favour of the continuance of the association with India. One would have thought that the Government, having appealed through the Prime Minister to Caesar, would have accepted the decision of Caesar.

Sir S. HOARE

Caesar would not give a decision.

Major MILNER

In my submission, and according to the evidence given before the Joint Select Committee, that decision was given on that one issue alone. Having appealed to Caesar, as the right hon. Gentleman told us to-day, the Government did not accept that decision. They put the matter before the Council, but the pledge of the Prime Minister was not that the Government would accept the decision of the Council but the decision of the Burmese people as a whole.

Sir S. HOARE

No, it was not.

Major MILNER

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman desires to be perfectly fair in this matter. This is what the Prime Minister said: The first step is to ascertain whether the people of Burma endorse the provisional decision that separation should take place. The people of Burma did not endorse that decision and, therefore, the Government had the matter submitted to the Council and admittedly there has been a good deal of indecision. There have been many questions that were not. clearly submitted to that Council, and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would not claim that that Council had decided in favour of separation or non-separation, because, in my submission, the people had so decided beforehand. The Government have, apparently in the eyes of that majority of the Burmese electors, decided to ignore their decision. According to my instructions a memorandum signed by no fewer than 44 elected members representing a majority of the Council was submitted to the right hon. Gentleman expressing their view against separation. So that, first, there was the decision of the people secondly, there was the memorandum to the right hon. Gentleman signed by a majority of elected members; and, thirdly, there was the evidence of two Burmese representatives—I am afraid I cannot very satisfactorily pronounce their names—Dr. Ba Maw and another. Dr. Ba Maw, in reply to the Archbishop of Canterbury, when before the Joint Select Committee said: If our choice is limited to separation on the basis of the Prime Minister's proposed Constitution and an entry into the Indian Federation on the same terms as the other Indian provinces, we unhesitatingly choose the federal alternative as being in keeping with the very clear mandate we had obtained from the country. There, again, that expresses the views of the Burmese people. There is another point, and I wonder why the right hon. Gentleman did not refer to it. It may be that he overlooked it. According to my information, this issue was placed before the Burmese Legislature on 21st February of this year. I wonder why the right hon. Gentleman did not refer to this vote. There was a special session of the Council, beginning on 14th February, and there was a, proposal before it that Burma should remain as a Province in the new Indian Federation. I should like the Committee to mark this: The decision of the Burmese elected representatives was, by 37 votes to 31, in favour of remaining in the Indian Federation, but the Government threw in the official Members, the nominees of the British Government in Burma, with the result, of course, that that vote was reversed. There was finally a vote in favour of separation of 47 against 37. I believe that it must be clear to the Committee, that, first, by the vote of the people, secondly, by the memorandum to the Secretary of State, and thirdly, by the vote of the Burmese elected representatives on 21st February last, the people of Burma have decided that they desire to remain in the Federation.

I do not want to labour this matter further, but I wish to point out one or two disadvantages under which the Burmese will suffer if the Government insist upon carrying through the proposal in their Bill. The right hon. Gentleman, as did other speakers, said something with regard to the proposed trade agreement, and I think I am not misquoting the Joint Select Committee when I say that the matter of trade between the two countries was the greatest difficulty which was in the minds of the Joint Select Committee in coming to a decision on this matter. The Joint Select Committee rather hesitatingly, I think I might say after reading that report, came to the decision to recommend separation on the understanding that there should be a trade agreement for a period of years to enable difficulties to be solved, no doubt, during the interim period, but the Burmese people want to know what is to happen at the expiration of that interim period, whether it be five years or any other period. Are they going to be left, with a powerful neighbour like India with whom they have been associated in free trade for a number of years, on the expiry of the period, in an unenviable position? What is their position to be?

Mr. RADFORD

Like what we have been.

Major MILNER

That may be. The hon. Member for Rusholme (Mr. Radford) is well able, I know, to speak for Lancashire. As a Yorkshireman I should not presume to do so. At the moment, I am representing what I believe to be the feelings of the Burmese people. They are naturally troubled, as the Joint Select Committee were troubled, in regard to trade between the two countries. It is possible against a great and near neighbour like India that Burma may find herself at the expiration of that agreement in a very difficult situation. On the other hand, if she were a member of the Indian Federation, she would have an added sense of security both in the economic and the political spheres.

What is Burma's position going to be in regard to the League of Nations? At the present time Burma sends, or can send, her delegates to Geneva or elsewhere along with the Indian delegation. She is a Province of India just as the other Provinces are. What will be her position in regard to the League of Nations when she is separated from India? In my submission her status will be reduced. She will be a mere colony of the British Empire, and will only be entitled to be represented through the British delegation, and not be able to send her own representatives to Geneva as at present. Does the right hon. Gentleman propose to make any provision so that Burma shall have separate and independent representation at international and other conferences?

There is one point which I should like to bring before my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) —I hope that he will change his mind-and other Members of our party. We on this side of the House and the Indian people are not satisfied with what the Government of India Bill does for the Indian people. What is going to be the position of Burma? It is inconceivable that Burma, with a small population of 14,000,000, as a separate entity, can hope for success in her struggle for political and economic emancipation where India has failed. Burma is a small place while India is an immense subcontinent. The only hope of the Burmese people is to identify themselves with the struggle of the people of India towards that goal which inspires the people of both countries. I still hope that the Government may think fit to carry out what is unquestionably the expressed desire of the Burmese people that they should continue as part of the Indian Federation.

6.18 p.m.

Earl WINTERTON

I hope that the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones), with whom I have had some little dispute, will believe that I speak in all sincerity when I say that he made a most fair and impartial presentation of the case which arises on this Clause. He is in the same position as some of us on this side of the House in regard to other parts of the Bill, namely, that he is in disagreement with those who normally act with him.

Mr. MORGAN JONES

With some of them.

Earl WINTERTON

With some of those who normally act with him. With regard to the question of the separation of Burma, I am one of three present Members of this House who was a member of the Burma Round Table Conference. Whatever may be said about the extent to which some of us have spoken about India, no one can complain that members of the Burmese Round Table Conference have spoken over much on the Burmese question. I think the hon. Member for Caerphilly has made one speech, the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) has made one and I have made one. The question of Burma is a vast one, and but for the fact that we are considering a vaster question, that of India, it would require great discussion and consideration. On that I think we are all agreed. I should like to make a frank and personal confession in regard to the Burma Round Table Conference. At that time I was by no means convinced that the circumstances justified the pledge which was given on behalf of His Majesty's Government by the Prime Minister to the Conference.

There can be no doubt that the case of Burma presents features of far greater doubt as to the wisdom of a great extension of self-government than does India. Burma has been under British control and influence only for some 50 years. The country is in many respects far more backward than India, and there is little or no cohesion among Burmans themselves. Nevertheless, came to the conclusion eventually that the course suggested by the Government was the right one, for reasons that I will give in a moment, but before I come to that matter which essentially arises on this Clause, namely, the form of the new government, I want to say a word about the question of separation. I fundamentally disagree with the last speaker, and I agree with the argument of the hon. Member for Caerphilly and the Secretary of State. Burma is ethnologically deeply separated from India. The differences of the Indian people which the hon. and gallant Member quoted, which were quite naturally and reasonably cheered by the hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft) and which exist in India between people from one end of the peninsula to the other, are not as great as the differences between the Burmans.

Sir H. CROFT

I was not agreeing with the hon. and gallant Member. I merely cheered because his statement showed the great differences of opinion that exist between the people of India, which I submit are as great as the differences of opinion between the people of Europe.

Earl WINTERTON

I think it would be difficult, without saying something that might appear to be wounding to the feelings of both Burmans and Indians, to explain what the differences are between them. The Burmans have some virtues which the Indians do not possess, and they have some disadvantages of character which the Indians do not possess, and vice versa. Their whole outlook is different. I am convinced that the hon. Member for Caerphilly is right when he says that because of these ethnological differences the majority opinion among the people of Burma is in favour of separation from India. I do not say that the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner) did not give a fair presentation of a case that he was trying to make, in fact I think it was a fair presentation, but it was vitiated by the fact that he was speaking, and he claimed to speak, for one set of politicians in Burma. He used the words "I am instructed."

Major MILNER

No; I said that I was speaking for the Burmese people. That was the expression I used. I am not instructed by anyone, and I did not use the word "instructed," as the Noble Lord will discover when he reads the QFFICIAL REPORT. If I did use it, it was in error, and I hope the Noble Lord will accept that assurance.

Earl WINTERTON

Certainly. I am much obliged to the hon. and gallant Member. If he was not instructed, if he has not been in touch with any particular set of politicians in Burma, the fact remains that he was representing the point of view of a certain party in Burma. I want the Committee to realise, as the hon. Member for Caerphilly made clear, that the Burmese people are most deeply divided on this question. There is as much difference between them as there is between those of us who sit on these benches and hon. and right hon. Members opposite on general questions of British politics. You cannot talk about the people of Burma wanting this or that. You may say that the electors by a majority were in favour of a certain course, but no one can say that they are anything like united. There is a most deep division of opinion on this question. The hon. and gallant Member said—I am sorry to have to pursue the question in detail—that there had been misrepresentation on the part of the party in Burma which is in favour of separation. If he will read the accounts of the election, he will see that misrepresentations were not confined to one side. For example, one of the charges made by the anti-separationists was, I believe, that it was intended by the British Government to bring the British unemployed to Burma in order that they might obtain work at the expense of the Burmans. There were other charges of that kind made by one side against the other. I think it is broadly true to say that the deision at that election did not represent the real views of Burmans as a whole. One thing should be remembered, and that is the very small electorate. The Shan States and other areas which were naturally interested in the matter had no opportunity of expressing their views. Perhaps the most important fact of all is that so disunited were the anti-separationists that after the election they found it impossible to form a government. They were utterly unable to agree among themselves and they could not even agree as to what the result of the election had been. I do not want to pursue the matter further, but I thought it necessary to correct the impression that the hon. and gallant Member gave to the Committee. I range myself on the side of the hon. Member for Caerphilly, who has given a more accurate description of what has occurred.

The economic and financial reasons for the separation of Burma are, I think, very substantial. I think that Burm—I know that this is a matter on which there is a great deal of controversy—has suffered in some respects from her connection with India because of the financial and fiscal policy of the Government of India. I think that is admitted by people who have lived in Burma, not by all of them, but certainly by Europeans. On that point I should like to make a reference to the very important announcement which my right hon. Friend has made with regard to the fiscal relationship between Burma and India. As I understand it, the present fiscal status quois to remain for five years after the coming into operation of the Act and the coming into operation of the new Indian Constitution. My comments on the right hon. Gentleman's announcement, without the consideration which it is necessary to give to this all-important matter, would be, first, that it is very important that the period should not be made a year longer than five years. Again, I base myself on evidence given before the Joint Select Committee and the Burma Round Table Conference.

There are many respects in which, if the Burmese Government had a free hand to frame a tariff, they could assist both Burmese and British trade to a greater extent than they are able to do to-day. There is no doubt whatever, despite what interested parties say to the contrary, that there are great opportunities for an extension of British trade in Burma, and that there is a very considerable body of opinion among Burmans in favour of that extension, which need not necessarily be at the expense of India. That is not the opinion of those who are interested, as many Indians and some Europeans are, purely in Indo-Burmese trade. You will not get a man, whether he be a European or an Indian, whose livelihood depends on trade between India and Burma, to take an interest in trade between Burma and Great Britain or between Burma and other parts of the Empire. As one who sat both on the Joint Select Committee and on the Burma Round Table Conference I would ask the Committee to accept with reserve sonic of the opinions which have been given on these matters. There are a great many cross currents and cross opinions in regard to Burmese trade. There are certain big firms in Burma whose interests are one way, and there are smaller firms whose interests are another way, but, broadly speaking, the examination of the facts lead me to believe that, under a free fiscal system by which I mean a free hand fiscally for the Burmese Government there will be considerable opportunity for a. big expansion of British-Burmese trade. One further word on the financial and economic position. I have said that in the past Burma has unquestionably suffered economically in some respects from her connection with India, and therefore I hope the interim period mentioned by my right hon. Friend will not be longer than five years. I was glad to hear the Secretary of State say that, as far as he was concerned, there would be an important proviso that British trade does not suffer from this interim arrangement.

I come again to the point about the status of Burma. When I was a member of the Round Table Conference my instincts would not differ widely from any Conservative in this respect. We have to examine carefullythe possible alternative between Burma remaining a part of India—which, for the reasons I have given would have been a wrong decision—or some status not so advanced as that proposed under the Bill. It seems rather, shall I say, a tall order, in view of the short connection of Burma with the British Empire and its rather unfortunate history in recent years, to give it the status which it obtains under the Bill. Only after long consideration did I come to the conclusion that it was necessary. I do not think at this time of day it would be politically possible to give Burma the status of a Crown colony. In the minds of the Burmans the words "Crown colony" connote a position of inferiority. It is unfortunate that it should be so. The constitutional conditions in Crown colonies differ widely. Some of the Crown colonies in the West Indies are in a, position almost analogous to that of a Dominion in their constitutional freedom, while other Crown colonies in Africa are Crown colonies in the old-fashioned sense of the word. But in the opinion of the Burmans the status of a Crown colony would have been below that which they occupy as a province in the present government of India, and nothing would have got that out of their heads. You would not have got a single Burman at the Conference willing to accept for Burma under the new constitution the status of a Crown colony. I therefore came to the conclusion that, provided proper safeguards were put in, it was desirable to make Burma independent of India and give her a constitution roughly analogous to that which it is proposed to grant.

I believe that there are great opportunities in the future for a closer working between Burma and this country. The Burmans are divided, like so many Eastern races, into different races. The term "Burman" is perhaps a generic term in its widest sense, but, generally speaking, I think there is considerable good will in Burma towards Great Britain. In some respects, I am sorry to have to make this rather odious comparison, but, it is fair to make it, Burma is better off in its relationships with Great Britain than India because there is not the bitterness which in some quarters and provinces of India has been displayed towards Great Britain. That does not exist in Burma. There are, in my opinion, very good opportunities in the future for this most important part of the Empire becoming a flourishing State within the Empire, and I hope that the Committee will accept the principle of the Clause.

6.35 p.m.

Sir H. CROFT

I have listened to most of the speeches on this question, and I take note particularly of the fact that the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner) described a condition of affairs in Burma which should cause us to think seriously before passing this chapter. The fact has been mentioned that after the election had taken place the legislators could not even form a Government, even after having received the great and overwhelming mandate of the electors, as it was described by the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds. He said that the people of Burma voted on this great question, but I think that only 38 per cent. of them went to the poll, and even that was an increase on the numbers who voted in the previous election. You cannot call that an overwhelming vote on a great national issue, and even so think it is very doubtful whether the full issues were understood by the Burmans. There were many of them who did not realise that the Prime Minister had made this great declaration and had suggested that the Burmese people should decide the question. Is it seriously suggested that a large proportion of the electors had ever heard of the Prime Minister of Great Britain? I ask whether that is not the case I It may be contrary to the opinion of many hon. Members, but I think it would be found that there are many people in Burma who really do not know much more about this country than the people in the villages of India. I associate myself with those hon. Members who have spoken in favour of the separation of Burma from India. What have the Burmans done that they should be brought into this Federation? It has been said that they are a lovable and amiable folk, although sometimes they have shown little differences. In fact, we are told that since democratic influences have spread themselves through this part of the world murder is rife and crime general and, therefore, I do not think we can claim that they have been exactly amiable and lovable people in days gone by.

Mr. KIRKWOOD

That must have been before we mixed with them.

Sir H. CROFT

The hon. Member is younger than I and, therefore, will not remember the time to which I am referring. What I feel—and in this I am expressing the opinion of many hon. Members—is that we are offering a constitution to Burma which from every point of view is undesirable at the present time. The Secretary of State has told us that in this great monumental measure we are considering, under which Burma is smuggled in in a corner—I had almost said smothered—we are engaged in a great experiment. Can anyone who has any political knowledge deny that the people of Burma are at least 50 or 100 years behind the people of India? Is not that the case? Why should we take this enormous leap in the dark? Actually under the Bill we are giving a greater measure of responsibility to the people of Burma, more complete self-government than we are to the people of India.

Sir S. HOARE

That is not accurate.

Sir H. CROFT

I think the Secretary of State will agree that Burma under the Bill has the full powers of a provincial government proposed for a province of India, and has a central form of government which is certainly greater than that which is going to apply to the average province in India. If you must go forward with the India Bill, why is it necessary immediately to go to this extent in regard to the constitution of Burma? Surely it would be wiser to see how the great experiment in India is going to work. We have heard that there is a possibility that the great reforms at the Centre are not to come into operation for some considerable time. In 1932 we were told that no Bill would be presented to Parliament until the Princes had given their consent. [Interruption.] I think the right hon. Member opposite may take that from me, at any rate, I think that the Secretary of State will take it from me—

Sir S. HOARE

No, I will not.

Sir H. CROFT

In that case I must read a quotation from the Debate of 27th June, 1932. The Secretary of State said: No one … can say that an All-India Federation Bill can be produced until we know in detail and for certain that the Indian States are going to be an effective part of the Federation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th June, 1932; col. 1495, Vol. 267.]

Sir S. HOARE

I explained that quotation a week or two ago, and I will therefore not trouble the Committee with a repetition. I will only refer the hon. and gallant Member to my explanation.

Sir H. CROFT

I did not hear the right hon. Gentleman's explanation, and I know that sometimes, two or three years afterwards, we have to change the exact phraseology of what appears in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I take it that those words do not mean what I took them to mean and that I must not accept them. I am sorry that I have been led away from the main subject of the Debate. From our discussions it is quite clear that it may take some considerable time before the full Measure is operative in India. Why then go on with this Burmese constitution until we know for certain that it is not going to be a failure in India, and why, above all else, should we not wait to see whether it is going to be a success? Let me say one word as to the pace at which we are going. I would ask the Committee in considering the constitution of Burma to make themselves conversant with the real facts in Ceylon under State government. Everyone must agree that the cases are similar. Perhaps Ceylon is a little nearer to Western civilisation than Burma, but in other respects as regards population they are much alike. The Ceylonese—the population of Ceylon includes Cingalese and Tamils, those described as Cingalese—are Buddhists, of the same religion as the people of Burma. I do not think it is wrong to suggest that the conditions in these two countries are similar.

We rushed through a constitution for Ceylon without discussion in this House, and it has been my business to read every debate that has occurred in the last three years. I take an interest in the affairs of that once prosperous Crown Colony, and I humbly suggest that we should realise what it has meant, what has been the result in Ceylon. For a whole day there was a debate on my villianies in the State Council of Ceylon. The position there is comparable with that in Burma. The people of the two countries are of the same religion and of about the same advancement in education and ideas. We have seen that Ceylon has not gone forward; it has gone back. It has recently been swept by a terrible disease, and white doctors have been largely withdrawn. The "Observer" of last Sunday said that Ceylon was becoming a second Chicago, a Chicago of the East, on account of the terrible increase of crime.

Earl WINTERTON

Really, if my hon. and gallant Friend is going into the question of Ceylon, and ventilating charges against the Ceylonese, I shall have to ask the Chair whether there will be an opportunity to answer those charges.

Sir H. CROFT

I was merely quoting what appeared in the "Observer" in one of those magnificent articles written by a gentleman whom I should have thought the Noble Lord supported.

Earl WINTERTON

I must raise a point of Order. Is it in order to discuss the Ceylon Constitution on this Clause, and, if so, shall we be permitted to give an answer to the charge that has been made?

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN (Captain Bourne)

It is obvious that we cannot discuss Ceylon on this Clause, if for no other reason than that the Secretary of State for India is not responsible for Ceylon. It is only by way of analogy that reference may be made to another part of the Empire. The Debate must be kept to the question whether Burma should be kept separate from India.

Mr. KIRKWOOD

On that point of Order. The hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft) raised the question of Ceylon, and by implication stated that the Government of Ceylon is responsible for the terrible conditions that prevail in the island. He also by implication drew attention to the fact that Ceylon got self-government from the Labour party. All that has been said time after time on the Floor of the House has been complimenting the Labour party for introducing Home Rule into Ceylon.

Sir H. CROFT

I apologise for referring to Ceylon at all. I did so only because of its similarity to Burma in religion and so forth, and I was merely quoting an article from the "Observer." I would not on any account prevent the Members of the Socialist party receiving congratulations on their granting of self-government to Ceylon. I come to the only other question with which I wish to deal, and that is the attitude with regard to British Imperial Trade. I have searched every part of the Bill for some indication that the British race is still determined to keep the great trade which has been built up overseas. In this chapter I can find nothing except the same old defeatist outlook—the statement that the people of Burma must not be allowed to discriminate against British goods or to penalise British trade. It was not that spirit with which the Empire was won. I know the difficulties of the Secretary of State. He says that the fortunes of India and Burma are very largely interdependent. We know that. He also said that we must not try to intervene in this interim period in the interests of British trade.

Sir S. HOARE

There were other words I used which have not been quoted.

Sir H. CROFT

The statement was that we must not try to intervene in this interim period in the interests of British trade, because that might ultimately react not only against Burma but against our own country. I think that that is a fair description of my right hon. Friend's statement.

Sir S. HOARE

Yes, as long as the second part is taken in connection with the first part. When I said that I was looking at the wide interests of British trade, and taking as keen an interest in it as my hon. and gallant Friend or any other Member. I was under the impression that British trade might be embarrassed by unwise action connected with the interim period, and might be used permanently in the future.

Sir H. CROFT

The interim period may be five years. During those five years, or whatever the period may be, you are standing aside. My right hon. Friend said also that his advice for the interim period was to leave the two countries to make the best arrangement. We all understand that it is desirable for the two countries to make some reciprocal arrangement, but this country should also come into it, and it should be a tripartite arrangement, the advantages of which should be extended to this country. Since the War, in country after country we have been moving out, without any attempt to ensure the future of British trade and of British workers. Burma is not an unimportant country or a little country. It is a country of 230,000 square miles and with a population of 13,000,000. I have not the figures with me, but is not that twice the population of Australia? In Burma there is a, vast area not yet developed. Three-fifths of the country is still jungle and forests. Yet there are only 2,000 miles of railway and 2,000 miles of metalled roads. That is where we ought to be turning our energies, the "New Deal." Take your millions to Burma, instead of saying that we leave it to India and Burma to decide about trade, while 2,000,000 people are walking the streets of this country.

I urge the Government to reconsider the whole trade outlook of this Bill, and especially in relation to Burma. There you have no fiscal convention to stand in your way. In framing this new Constitution, as long as we are still providing for the defence of the country, which cannot defend itself, we have a right to demand that we shall have some entry into that country on prior grounds to other countries which are not giving those services. That is the point I emphasise. The Government are going far too fast in this Measure. I agree that it is wise to keep Burma out of the Federation of India, but I cannot understand why the Government are smuggling through this great advance in self-government for the people of Burma, and I hope that they will reconsider the position. Instead of going so far ahead they should see that the British trader, the British shipper and the British commercial undertaking have a preferential entry into that country.

6.55 p.m.

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

No one wishes to surrender the rights of this country in relation to trade, but the question is how best that trade can be secured. The hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft) says that demands should be made. Perhaps he will tell us later how those demands in relation to trade are to be enforced if there is resentment against us. If resentment grows up and you have people in Burma who think they have been wrongfully treated and do not want to trade with this country, the Committee would be helped if we could be told how in the course of five years or 10 years the Burmese people can be compelled to trade with us if they have no wish to do so. If there is no machinery for that I do not know why we should insist on demands. The best way to get the trade is to ensure a desire to trade with us. I am certain that the best way to defeat trade is to incur resentment and, if there is a, demand on the part of these people for a certain measure of self-government, to resist that demand. That is not the way to encourage trade between ourselves and Burma. Later it would help us if we could be told how a demand can be enforced.

Sir H. CROFT

I think the hon. Member is quite wrong. I have not heard that there is any hostility to British trade in Burma. I think the feeling is the other way round. I am not arguing for any advantage to us, but that the Burmese, the Indians and ourselves should all give advantages to each other.

Mr. FOOT

I hope it will be done, but there is a lot of difference between that suggestion and the demand of which the hon. and gallant Member spoke just now, a demand which he intended to be a statutory demand. There is all the difference in the world between a statutory demand, which must have penalties attached to it, and the arrangement of which he has just spoken. By all means let there be that arrangement, based on good will and a common desire for trade. But the subject of trade can be dealt with better by other Members who are more conversant with the subject.

I think that the attitude of my friends on these benches should be declared in relation to this important part of the Bill. Also I have had an opportunity of serving, with the Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) as a colleague, upon the Burma Round Table Conferences in the years 1931 and 1932, and I had the opportunity on the Joint Select Committee of considering the further relation of this matter, when we had the advantage for many weeks of the direct representation of those who came thousands of miles from Burma to assist us. I am as conscious as others must have been of the complete difference of atmosphere when we were meeting our Burmese colleagues and when we were meeting the Indian delegates. Nothing would indicate more the marked differences between the two countries than the method by which our debates were carried on. At the Round Table Conference in relation to India and that in relation to Burma the debates were in a wholly different atmosphere, and the method of approach was very largely characteristic of the difference.

It would be a pity if those in Burma were left to think that their country was being dealt with parenthetically in relation to this Bill. It is true that we have to deal with Burma at the same time as India. Yet if India were not being discussed now we should regard this Burma, proposal as a first class Measure. Burma has a population very much larger than that of Ireland, and our relations with Ireland were a dominating factor in our politics for many years. We are dealing with a country that has very great potentialities. Whatever may be the differences of opinion in this House, all of us are very anxious that this new Constitution may lead to a very prosperous chapter in Burma's history. The Noble Lord spoke of the difficulties that there are in Burma. It is true that Burma has difficulties which are not found in India, but fortunately Burma is free from some of the difficulties that have affected Indian life. The sharp communal divergence which overshadows every part of the Indian controversy has practically no place in Burma. How light our burdens would have been, if, in dealing with India, the communal differences could have been lifted out of the conferences. That communal difference does not exist in Burma except to a negligible extent. There is a less keen political outlook in Burma, which may be some advantage in considering Burmese questions.

I want to deal only with the point raised by some of my hon. Friends on the other side. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner) says he is satisfied there is no demand for separation in Burma. As far as I could see back in 1931 and 1932, from conversations with those who came to represent Burma at that time, there was an overwhelming desire for separation. That was the impression I then got. I think when the election to which reference has been made was held the issues were very confused. I was very impressed when I heard the result of the election, but I think that if the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds had had the opportunity given to us, and had been brought face to face with those who had been returned on the anti-separation ticket, and had had the opportunity of putting direct questions and answers, he would have satisfied himself that the plea of anti-separation was not surely grounded. Whatever the figures and conditions of that election, I believe that if the Members of the House had had the opportunity of meeting the delegates and questioning them on what had happened at the election, they would have come to the conclusion to which everyone on the Joint Select Committee came in this matter. I would refer anybody still in doubt on this point to paragraph 421 of the Report of the Joint Select Committee, which states We have satisfied ourselves by discussion with the delegates from Burma representing the anti-separationist parties that they have no real desire to see Burma included in an Indian Federation; and indeed they frankly admit that on their own terms they would unhesitatingly prefer separation. The whole matter is dealt with there at some length. I am sure Members of this Committee are in some difficulty in this matter because they were denied the opportunity given to others. Those on the Joint Select Committee were unanimous in coming to the conclusion that there was a, general desire in Burma for separation. I believe that if the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds had had the opportunity given to his colleague, the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones), it would be different, for it is very difficult to decide this matter on written communications from those who are keen propagandists in Burma. It was not as if we gave this matter only a few hours consideration: we gave day after day for a period of two or three weeks with very able representatives of different opinions in Burma, and the conclusion at which we arrived is one which is borne out by the hon. Members for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks), Caerphilly, and Limehouse (Mr. Attlee), the opinion of the last-named being reinforced from his experience with the Statutory Commission, which a few years ago stated that as far as they could ascertain there was an overwhelming desire on the part of the Burmese people for separation.

Major MILNER

Was not that the reason why the Prime Minister offered to take the decision of the Burmese people, because he believed the Statutory Commission and the Governor of Burma that the Burmese would be in favour of separation? In fact, they were not in favour of separation, and hence the action since?

Mr. FOOT

Before the hon. and gallant Member returned to the Committee I dealt with the question of the election and the information we had in connection with it. From inquiries, and questions that I put to the leaders of the anti-separation movement, this was the presentment of a case as much as a plebiscite, for when the express question was put people were asked whether they would prefer to be separated or to go into the Indian Federation with no opportunity of coming out when they wished. The answers then given at least satisfied my mind on this very difficult question. We can only arrive at a conclusion on the evidence before us. Before the hon. and gallant Member came in I pointed out that if he had had that opportunity of personal contact with those qualified to speak he would not have dissented from this proposal.

May I say, further, that we have listened with some interest to what was said by the Secretary of State in relation to the proposed five-year agreement. He asked for the opinion of the House on this matter. I would like to point out that the association of India and Burma, in the first place, was only an accident. In taking away Burma from India it would not be like separating Bengal or Madras from. India, for between Madras and the rest of India there is an association running over thousands of years. There is no such history behind the association of Burma and India, for it is an association with no past of history, but a past of accident, a result of war, and certainly not based on religion. I should have thought that between the religious philosophy of Burma and the great majority in India there was no community of thought whatever. I should have thought that if there were any kinship, any blood relationship in religious life, it would have been between Burma and the Eastern parts of Asia, for example, China. The greatest tie in life is religion. The Holy Roman Empire was based on religion. If there were a close religious tie between Burma and India it would be different, but geographically and politically the association is the result of accident, war and conquest, and has no religious sanction. I can hardly see how the hon. Member could press his case in view of the unanimous conclusion of the Statutory Commission and the Joint Select Committee that went into the matter so closely.

I was speaking of the five-year term which has been mentioned. I have not had the opportunity of thinking over this five-year proposal, but there ought to he some interval for thinking things out. It would be a great difficulty if we decided on trade matters in a moment of high political emotion, when political questions are being discussed. Let there be a gracious interval, during which these trade questions and permanent issues can be thought out more clearly. It may be thought that five years is the best time. I hope that between the two countries there may be something like free trade. If there should arise between Burma and India in years to come differences, they would find expression in tariffs. It may be that at the end of five years they will still be able to maintain that free entry which is to the advantage of both countries, but that will be for them to decide—they will have five years to think it over. There are also financial questions to be settled between one country and the other. All these questions can best be dealt with in an atmosphere of peace.

Generally speaking, India does not resent the separation of Burma. I do not think there is any strong expression of feeling in India against separation. That being so, I think this House can do no other than adopt the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Select Committee. I have confined myself to the broad issues. I know questions of detail will arise later, but I think that the course recommended in the Bill and in this chapter which we are asked to reject is the only course possible from the inquiries that have been made, and, whatever may be the differences in this House, we shall all agree in hoping that when this Constitution is given to the Burmese people—lighthearted, good hearted people—that between them and ourselves there will be the happiest of relations for generations and centuries to come.

7.13 p.m.

Sir ROBERT HORNE

I intervene only because certain general questions have been raised. I assume that when questions of detail are raised, the Committee will have opportunities to discuss those matters. I do not wish to say much with regard to the question of the separation of Burma from India. I have not the particular knowledge that two of the speakers have gained in close contact with Burmese representatives dealing with this constitutional matter. On the other hand, for many years I have had interests in Burma and paid visits to that country, so that I can claim some knowledge of it. No one who knows Burma can speak of the political opinion of Burma at any point of time, because, indeed, that opinion changes. When I went to Burma first the whole of the population, both native and European, were of the opinion that Burma should be separated from India. They had good reason for that, for they regarded themselves as over-taxed, as paying far greater contributions to Indian needs than they could get back on their own expenditure. Opinion at that time was unanimous as far as I could discover. Later, European opinion—by which I mean the opinion of those commercial people who carry on large businesses in Burma—-shifted a good deal. They felt that Burma was based upon too narrow an economy to support the full expenditure which a separate Burma would require. They saw that certain industries were going down; they saw the teak forests being to some extent denuded; they realised that the possible development of the country was not being achieved as fast as had been anticipated, and they began to wonder whether separation would be to the advantage of Burma. On the other hand, as far as I could gather, native opinion remained in favour of separation and I believe that native opinion to-day is in favour of separation.

The hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner) referred—quite properly—to an election which ended in an anti-separation vote, but the representatives who were elected on that occasion were so frightened by the result at which the community seemed to have arrived that they did not feel any confidence in putting it into operation. Indeed, they ran away from the supposed decision of the electorate. The question was discussed backwards and forwards among the representatives who had been elected, each of them trying to take refuge beind the opinion of somebody else, but it became apparent that native politicians in Burma were not prepared to assert dogmatically that they were in favour of an anti-separation policy. On the contrary, it appeared to persons like myself who were interested in the country and were watching these various movements, that what the Burmese really had voted for was an opportunity to remain in the Federation until such time as they could command terms more favourable than those which were then being granted to them.

I have no doubt as to the decision at which we ought to arrive on this question. I think that in the midst of all these variations in popular opinion and all these fears one comes back to the primordial question of race. As has been said, it was only an accident that ever brought Burma into union with India. Lord Randolph Churchill when he was Secretary of State for India having got this baby placed in his arms did not know on whose doorstep to leave it. He chose to make India the nursing mother of this new estate which he had acquired. Since then there have grown up relationships between the two countries which have to be taken into consideration to-day and that brings me at once to the question: What ought to be done with regard to the future economic relations of the two countries? I cannot agree with everything that has been said by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bournemouth (Sir H. Croft) but everybody in the Committee knows by this time that in fiscal matters and on questions of British trade, my views and his are very closely allied and I certainly agree that we ought to take every opportunity of getting British trade in any part of the world and particularly in those parts of the world over which we have a certain control.

I also agree with the Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) that there are opportunities for increasing British trade with Burma, though I am not sure that at this particular time I am as optimistic as he indicated himself to be in that respect. In any case, we ought to do everything in our power to make arrangements for British trade with Burma under special entry, but we must realise the condition of things which has grown up so to speak under our umbrella. We have reinforced the trade of India and Burma together. We have made Burma dependent economically upon India. On the other hand, we have induced large numbers of the population of India to go to Burma to do work there which the Burmese themselves were unwilling or at all events not very ready to do. A corporation of which I am chairman has large numbers of Indians working in Burma. They come from the most distant parts of India. We have Gurkhas working in the shops, we have Sikhs—who appear always to be the best engineers one can get among the native races—and we have a large number of Hindus working far up in the North of Burma. It would probably startle the Committee to know the extraordinary amount of the contributions which they send back through our post office from their savings in order to succour their relatives in India. You have not only this intermixture of the inhabitants of the two realms but you have also the fact that 60 per cent. of the rice grown in Burma goes to India and that a very large quantity of the oil extracted in Burma is sold in India under special terms.

In that way there is a dependence of Burma upon India which we ought not to interfere with lightly. Before any action is taken there ought to be serious consideration. These two peoples ought to be given time in which to turn round and make such arrangements as may be mutually beneficial to them. If we are anxious to encourage British trade in Burma or in India or in both, I cannot imagine our taking any action which would, for example, weaken Burmese purchasing power. What would be the advantage of getting good terms of entry for British goods if the people were unable to buy the goods. I may say that as far as the corporation with which I am connected is concerned, this is not a material consideration to us. We do a far larger trade in what we produce in Burma, outside of India than we do in India. The Indian part of the trade is infinitesimal as compared with what we sell outside, and, therefore, I hope the Committee will realise that I am not putting forward any prejudice point of view. I am arguing entirely on behalf of Burma, a country for which everybody who has visited it has a certain affection and for the welfare of whose people I have the greatest possible desire.

From that point of view I would strongly urge the necessity for taking time before we decide on what the ultimate economic relations between Burma and India are to be. I would not break off the existing relation if we can avoid doing so. I would assent to the suggestion which the Secretary of State has—I think, wisely—made that there should be a period of time during which the present relations would continue until satisfactory new arrangements had been made. At the same time I agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth that we ought to try to make the best arrangements we can for our own country as well. In the interval we must not disrupt the existing trading relations between India and Burma if we want to do our best for Burma. That, generally speaking, is my opinion. Whether the term should be five years or not is a point upon which I hesitate to pronounce. Apparently the Noble Lord the Member for Horsham regarded it as an extreme period. Possibly it might be less. Possibly something might be done in a shorter time. But an adequate period must be provided and in all the circumstances I think that five years is not too much. Those are the views which I would place before the Committee as one who knows a little about conditions in Burma and is anxious for the future prosperity of that country.

7.25 p.m.

Mr. GEORGE HALL

I do not propose to follow the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Home) in dealing with the trading position in Burma but as one who spent a short time in the Burma Round Table Conference I may be permitted to take up some of the time of the Committee in dealing with the general question. I regret that as a result of domestic difficulties, chiefly illness, I was prevented from taking that amount of interest in this question which I should otherwise have taken at the time of the Round Table Conference and I feel pleased that this opportunity has arisen of debating it. Previous speakers have referred to the importance of Burma and I need only say that I share the views expressed by them on that point. I have heard it said too that Burma is not divided as India is, by race, caste, religion or national feeling and I think it is accepted that there is a higher percentage of literacy in Burma than in India. That was pointed out by the hon. Member for the English Universities (Sir R. Craddock) in a very interesting speech. At the sittings of the Burma Round Table Conference I gained a very clear impression of the desire of the people of Burma in this matter, and, as a result of all the evidence put before us, from the various points of view of race, caste, geographical position and economic conditions I felt that Burma would be better separated from India. But I think that more attention ought to be paid to the definite pledge given by the Prime Minister to the Conference in December, 1931. I listened carefully to the Secretary of State to-day and he has not convinced me that the great bulk of opinion in Burma is in agreement with the proposals of the Bill. The pledge which has already been mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner) is specific. The Prime Minister said: The first step is to ascertain whether the people of Burma endorse the provisional decision that separation should take place. His Majesty's Government consider that the decision might best be taken after a general election at which the broad issues have been placed before the electorate. The election took place and a very large majority of the electorate voted against separation from India. It is no use the right hon. and learned Member for Hill-head or even the Secretary of State saying that these persons who were elected upon this mandate have refused to put their mandate into operation, or have been afraid to do so. What is the risk? There was a constitution which had been worked out by the Round Table Conference, after months of consideration, a constitution which differed very little from the proposals contained in this Bill. There was no greater risk at that time, in 1932, than there is at the present time in giving this amount of self-determination or self-government to Burma. As a matter of fact, I am not so sure that the increase in the electorate under the proposals varies very much. I do not think they were quite as generous as they are under this Bill, because at the time of the election in 1932 only some 17 per cent. of the population of Burma were entitled to vote, while under the proposals of this Bill something like 23 per cent, will be entitled to vote. The hon. Member for the English Universities, who served with a good deal of credit to this nation as Governor of Burma, admitted that 71 per cent. of the male population of Burma can read the Burmese language and that a very large proportion of the female population of Burma can also read.

I am not one of those who think that only on special occasions can an electorate be gulled to vote for something quite different from what they are expected to vote for. I rather expected the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State to give some information to the Committee as to whether any representation has been made to him, as Secretary of State, since the election in 1932 as to what is the real desire of the people of Burma upon this matter. Has he endeavoured to obtain the will of the people of Burma, or is it that the representatives of the Burmese people, when they carne to the Joint Select Committee, and his own official the Governor of Burma convinced him that separation was the most desirable thing for Burma? I do not know that we can question the political knowledge of the people of Burma at this time. I was very interested in what was said by the hon. Member for the English Universities that in Burma government was regarded as one of the five calamities. He played a very influential part in the Government while he was there, and it may be that it was because of the type of Government which they had at that time that government was regarded from that point of view. We are very anxious to change that, and that the people of Burma should have that confidence in their Government which all people in a democratic country should really have.

Sir R. HORNE

I can assert that there was great confidence in my hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities (Sir R. Craddock).

Mr. HALL

I thought that confidence was shared by most of the people, but I was quoting the words which the hon. Member himself used. I did not know that the people of Burma felt it a calamity to have the hon. Gentleman there until I heard it from the hon. Gentleman himself. As far as I can see, the visible evidence that we have had as to the desires of the people of Burma is that they should not separate from India but should remain a part of India. I was hoping that we should have had some further evidence from the Secretary of State. After all, we did meet half a dozen or so of the Burmese who sat on the Round Table Conference, and the impression I had from those with whom I came in contact was that they desired separation.

Mr. ISAAC FOOT

Were there any among the Burmese who were opposed to it?

Mr. HALL

Yes, I think there were. There was a definite pledge given to them. It was a constitution which was worked out by the Burmese Round Table Conference, and they could have that or continue as a Province of India. My hon. Friend will not deny that there was the definite pledge and that upon that pledge the people of Burma voted. There is no doubt about the decision of the people of Burma—anti-separationists, 42; separationists, 29; and neutrals, 9. The figures of the actual electors were: anti-separationists, over 500,000; separationists, 270,000; or a majority of almost two to one against separation. As I say, there you have this visible evidence of the desires of the people of Burma. I am not suggesting that it is impossible, as the right hon. Gentleman said, to fit Burma into the politics of India because they differ so fundamentally and historically. Is it not a fact that for 50 years the Burmese have been very largely under Indian rule? They have been part of the Indian Empire, they have had their own Legislature, and they have sent representatives to the Indian Council of State and Legislative Council. It can truly be said that for about half a century Burma has been part and parcel of the Indian Empire, and so much so that the right hon. and learned Member for Hillhead, following what was said by the Secretary of State himself, admitted that we have made Burma economically dependent upon India. The right hon. and learned Gentleman also expressed very great concern that nothing should be done which would in any way interfere with the great trading interests between Burma and India. I think no better evidence can be given of the way that nations can ally themselves together than the evidence which the right hon. and learned Gentleman himself frankly admitted as to the interests that have grown up between the peoples of Burma and of India. I wonder how far it is true that it was the fact that there are between £40,000,000 and £50,000,000 of British capital invested in India that really prompted the Government to reverse the decision of the Burmese people.

Sir S. HOARE

The people with capital in Burma are most anxious about separation—not so much about separation as about the danger of great dislocation between the economic interests of both sides.

Mr. HALL

I think the will of the people of Burma ought to be carried out and that they should act in the closest co-operation with India and this country. I have come to a definite conclusion concerning the desire of those representatives of Burma whom I met at the Round Table Conference with regard to the separation of Burma from India, and I have since been somewhat convinced with regard to the desire of the people. I think the people of this nation and of the Empire desire to cultivate the best relationships between ourselves and the people of Burma, and you will not get that good will from these people if you foist upon them a constitution or a policy which, as far as we have been able to see up till the present time, they do not desire to have. I should have thought that from 1932 till the present time the India Office, if they were not satisfied with the decision of the election which took place during that year, would have taken some steps—that is not impossible—to ascertain the desires of the people of Burma.

Whatever may be the desires of trading interests as to the economic position between ourselves and Burma, if we are going to get the best out of Burma we must satisfy ourselves that, as far as it is humanly possible, we are giving the Burmese people something which they desire. The choice was to be theirs. In 1931, four years ago, a specific pledge was given by the Prime Minister of this country, who said, "It is for you to decide." An election was fought—I will not deal with the issues which arose during that election—and a majority of two to one was against separation; and, as far as I can see, that is the attitude of the people of Burma at the present time. I am not quarrelling to any great extent with the view put forward by those who sat on the Joint Select Committee. They again, after the election, came into contact with certain Burmese representatives and came to their conclusion, quite sincerely, as I came to the conclusion in 1931, but notwithstanding the fact that my colleagues who served on the Joint Select Committee came to that conclusion, I feel that something more should have been done to ascertain the views of the people of Burma, especially as a good deal of discussion has taken place concerning the clouded issues which were put before them in the election of 1932. I shall, with my colleague the hon. and gallant Member for South-East Leeds (Major Milner), have no hesitation in going into the Lobby against this Clause.

7.43 p.m.

Mr. HAMMERSLEY

I have listened to all of the speeches in this Debate, and I shall not traverse the main political grounds which have been so eloquently dealt with already. It is not my intention to discuss at any length the arguments for and against separation. The statement of His Majesty's Government has been referred to on more than one occasion—the statement made through the mouth of the Prime Minister at the Burma Round Table Conference to the effect that when the Government was satisfied that the desire of the people of Burma was for self-government, then the Government would take steps to entrust the responsibility for the Government of Burma to a Legislature responsible to the people of Burma, and to a Ministry responsible to that Legislature, subject to certain safeguards.

To-day we are implementing that promise. I accept that the Government is right on the merits of the question in coming to the conclusion that the separation of Burma is in fact the wish of the people of Burma, but my purpose is not to discuss that matter, but to inquire whether this separation, when it takes place, will be a real and effective separation; whether in future Burma will play its part as a separate dependency of the British Crown fitting into the ordered framework of the British Commonwealth of nations; whether we are erecting a facade of constitutionalism behind which Burma will remain an appanage of India, an economic serf of India, a country with no vita] direct link with the United Kingdom. It is that issue which concerns me most vitally. We learned this afternoon from the Secretary of State that Burma and India, with the consent and connivance of His Majesty's Government, had arranged for a private Customs agreement as the result of which India will be in a position to send into this new and separate country manufactured goods on terms which show a preference of 25 per cent. over the duties which similar goods from the United Kingdom will have to pay.

I am not arguing the expediency of that situation, but the principle of it, when we are proposing to set up a new constitution for Burma as a separate part of the British Commonwealth, seems to me to be so unfair and so out of proportion to the general scheme of the economic arrangement within the British Empire, and so preventive of proper opportunities for vital manufacturing interests in this country, that I must be careful not to use extreme language in my denunciation of the position. There are certain agreed economic policies in the development of the British Empire. There are, for instance, the Ottawa Agreements, the policy of which aims at the development of reciprocal economic conditions between the United Kingdom and constituent parts of the Empire. Of course, it is understood that, in accordance with this policy, there may be import and export duties between constituent parts of the Empire for purposes of revenue or to ensure reasonable protection. The question we have to ask ourselves in connection with this matter, however, is why are import duties imposed at the present time against United Kingdom manufactured goods imported into Burma? The answer is because up to now Burma has to be considered a part of India. No longer is Burma to be a part of India, and yet the very duties which are put forward by reason of her association are, according to the Secretary of State, to remain for a period of five years. I consider the prin- ciple of that situation to be unjust. We are asked to consent to a private deal which, from the point of view of economic Empire development, has no justification.

There is another mainstay of the British Government's economic policy which is very dear to the heart of the Board of Trade. It is the most-favoured-nation clause. We have made many sacrifices—sacrifices which many people have considered to be too great—in order to ensure for this country the position that goods should be exported from Great Britain to any civilised part of the world on terms which are no more onerous on the United Kingdom exporters than the terms from the most favourable importing country importing similar goods. That is a position for which the President of the Board of Trade has fought hard and still continues to fight; but what has become of the most-favoured-nation clause in this proposed Indo-Burma trade agreement? Where is the President of the Board of Trade? Has he fought for the right of entry of British goods into constituent parts of the British Empire under the same terms—not more favourable terms—as goods coming in from any other part of the world including the British Empire? It is astonishing that in the course of these negotiations he should have sat down like a lamb without making some struggle to get most-favoured-nation terms for the United Kingdom within the British Empire.

Several reasons can be urged in justification of a temporary agreement, but, in my view, most of them are specious, and are reasons which His Majesty's Government ought to reject. It has been pointed out, by the hon. Member for the English Universities (Sir R. Craddock) that Burma is under a special obligation to India, particularly in relation to defence. Is not Burma under a special obligation to the United Kingdom for its development, its financial stability and its credit? Who is responsible for the sea defences of Burma? Surely this country. We have claims on Burma just as much as India has. Again, it may be said—and it is true—that a large proportion of the exports of Burma are taken by India. This is perhaps the crux of the whole situation, but is this to be the sole ground on which a matter of this character is to be decided? Let me give an example. The United Kingdom take the majority of the exports of Ceylon. Do we therefore say that we shall demand from Ceylon better terms for our imports into Ceylon than the terms of similar manufactured goods coming from India? We do not.

The policy which we put forward is a policy of saying that manufactured goods coming from any part of the British Empire should go into British Empire markets under equal terms. I contend that the principle of the right to most-favoured-nation terms within the British Empire should be laid down, and that, if necessary, some temporary agreement, which would only be in mitigation temporarily of that situation, should be brought forward to deal with the particularly close association which now exists between India and Burma. We have recently seen tabled a British-Indian trading agreement, and part and parcel of the terms of that agreement are that whatever conditions this country can obtain in its colonial markets it is willing and anxious to share with India. Surely, in these matters we are entitled to ask for a little reciprocity. India may have this close association with Burma, but the United Kingdom has even closer association with many other parts of the Empire and it is willing to share them. India at the present time is getting markets in Africa which it has only been able to obtain through the good will of the United Kingdom.

Another argument which has been used is the conflict of British interests in Burma, and that there are people in this country who are so closely connected with Indo-Burman reciprocal trade that it would be unwise to do anything to disturb the valuable commissions which the merchants obtain on that trade. It is unworthy to put forward that argument and to set these two sections of India against each other. Nobody wants to stop or to injure Burma's Indian trade—the desire is to increase it—but surely the merchants' commissions can be just as advantageously obtained by trade generated in this country as trade that goes from India to Burma. I would not like it to be understood that one does not realise that during this transitional period some duties will be necessary. The finance of the country must be safeguarded, but why should the rate of duty for Burma be a rate which has been imposed by India in relation to her imports for India's own specific purposes? Take, for example, the rate of import duty on piece goods into India. It is 25 per cent., which is made up of 15 per cent. of protective duty and 10 per cent. of revenue duty. What is the proper figure which Burma ought to impose? Surely it is a figure which Burma itself, in accordance with its financial requirements, ought to indicate, and not the figure which is imposed on it by India.

The Secretary of State suggested that he was open to argument in respect to the length of time for which this temporary agreement should be operative. Five years has been mentioned, but in my view that is too long. I think that three years is ample time in the present position of Burma, realising the fluid and variable nature of the trade. It is ample time for the readjustments of the position, which must be made arising out of the separation of Burma, to be brought to fruition. This quasi-private, secret deal between. India and Burma seems to me to be lacking in those essential principles which ought to commend it to the House. The only principle it seems to have is that of expediency. It indicates much too clearly the use of the big stick by Indian commercial interests. It shows how in face of this big stick His Majesty's Government are prepared to tear up some of their most cherished economic policies, and it goes a long way towards making the next hundred Clauses in this voluminous Bill very disappointing to many sections of the British community.

8.0 p.m.

Sir S. HOARE

My hon. Friend, as. I hope I shall show in the course of my speech, is not justified in drawing the conclusion which he did in his speech. Let us set aside generalities and let us face the actual facts of the position. Let us all face these facts, realising that everyone of us is equally anxious to promote British and Imperial trade. Let us begin with that assumption and let us not assume that one section in this House is less anxious on that point than any other section.

What are the facts of the position? The facts are these. First of all, that India has fiscal autonomy under the fiscal convention. Burma as a part of India has at any rate some share in that fiscal autonomy. The conclusion that I draw from this fact is that in the interests of British trade, holding the views that I do hold, it would be a great error to attempt to undermine that convention and to impose a mercantile policy upon India in negotiations of this kind. When I say a mercantile policy I mean a policy of the old 18th century mercantile theory. Secondly, let us keep in mind the essential fact that if there is to be separation between India and Burma it is absolutely necessary to prevent economic catastrophe resulting from the dislocation of those interests. That goes to show that it is essential to have a modus vivendiof some kind between the time when Burma is separated and an autonomous government in Burma is in a position to make some permanent trade arrangement for the future.

Thirdly, let us remember the fact that there are, in spite of what the hon. Gentleman has just said, two different points of view as far as British traders are concerned. On the one hand, there is the point of view just expressed by the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr., Hammersley), and, on the other hand, there is the point of view expressed equally strongly by British firms operating in Burma, representing £40,000,000 or £50,000,000 of British capital, who wish to see the status quocontinue not for a short period of time but for ever. We have got to take these three groups of facts into our consideration, and I think that the only conclusion at which we can arrive is the conclusion suggested earlier in the Debate by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne), namely, that we have got just as much in the interests of British trade as in the interests of Burmese and Indian trade to make a temporary agreement that will remain in existence for a period long enough to prevent some catastrophe happening as a result of some sudden emotion either in Burma or India.

The Committee can take it from me that if there is to be a temporary agreement of this kind it can only be done on the kind of basis I have sketched to the Committee. I am quite sure that on any other basis the agreement is impossible. Neither India nor Burma will make it, and if indeed we had the power of forcing them to make it the inevitable result would be that as soon as the temporary agreement was over the new Governments, both in Burma and India, showing their resentment against an agreement being thrust down their throats, would immediately adopt a contrary policy to the great disadvantage of British trade. That being so, I suggest to the Committee that first of all there must be a temporary agreement. If there is to be a temporary agreement it must be on the lines of the status quo, a status quowhich keeps the position as it is between India and Burma and also between India and Great Britain. The question for the Committee if they agree with my line of argument so far is how long is to be the duration of that agreement. I agree with my hon. Friends from Lancashire that that agreement ought not to be of undue length. It should be of sufficient length to enable the new Governments to settle down and to enable the Indian Government and the British Government to enter into negotiations with the Burma Government and to make what agreements are possible. I hope then that the British Government and the Burma Government will come together, and we shall see that we have much in common between us in the future. For the moment there must be this interim agreement, and it can only be on the lines I have suggested. How long that agreement should last is a matter for argument. The negotiators in India have suggested five years. If my hon. Friends from Lancashire or hon. Friends representing any other substantial sections of British trade think that the period should be a shorter period, and they will discuss the question with me or the Board of Trade, let us by all means have a discussion on those lines. We are not to-night taking a final decision. The agreement has not been placed before me yet in detail. Even if it had been placed before me in detail it would have to be ratified by the House of Commons.

Mr. CHORLTON

Has the agreement been seen by any of the Lancashire interests?

Sir S. HOARE

I cannot tell whether that is so or not, but it does not anyhow affect the argument I am now making, namely, that the agreement must come up for ratification before the House of Commons under the Order-in-Council procedure. Let us then in the meanwhile think of the practical difficulties that I put before the Committee. Let us face those difficulties, and, facing them, let us discuss with each other the question as to how long this temporary agreement may continue.

8.9 p.m.

Duchess of ATHOLL

I do not wish to enter into the question of the desirability of the separation of Burma from India. It has been very fully discussed and I am quite ready to accept the balance of opinion which seems to be in favour of that course. Nor do I wish to say much on the trade question, which has been very ably discussed by many hon. Members. I wish mainly to speak on the question of whether Burma is ready for these wide powers which the Bill proposes to give her. I think that all the hon. Members who heard the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for the Combined English Universities (Sir R. Craddock) must have felt that they learned a great deal from the hon. Gentleman. He put clearly before us in an illuminating manner the fact that Burma's political development is behind that of India, and yet the Bill proposes to give to Burma more powers than it proposes to give to the Provinces of British India. This question of the political development of Burma being younger than that of India is a very material one, particularly from the point of view of those who sit on these benches, because no argument has been used more frequently by supporters of the Government proposals than that for 100 years we have been preparing India for some change of this kind. It has been said that from the days of Macaulay's Minute on Education, 100 years ago, repeated promises have been made to Indians by prominent Englishmen in India leading them to expect self-government. I do not know of any promise of that kind that was really authoritative until Mr. Montagu's declaration in 1917, nor do I know of any declaration that was unconditional. The Act which gave effect to Mr. Montagu's declaration, as we know, made all further advance depend on the use made of the powers given under the Act, and I believe that no one ever meant to leave out of account the question of efficiency.

It is therefore an important matter for consideration that Burma's political development is so much younger than that of India. I think that it must have come as a shock to many Members who heard my lion. Friend to learn that local self-government only dates in Burma from 1922. In India it began in 1885, and we know that in India municipal and district boards have still a great deal to learn. There is ample evidence to that effect in the annual reports of Provincial Governments. It is therefore not surprising to find that the Government of Burma in their memorandum to the Statutory Commission were very frank about defects in the work of their local authorities. They speak for instance about frequent frauds and embezzlements, and lack of action against men who had been proved guilty. They also said that authorities too often ignored auditors' comments, and showed themselves indifferent to the qualifications, antecedents, and behaviour of their officers. It was a very damning account for any Provincial Government to give to the Statutory Commission of those local authorities, and it does not give the idea that the Burma Government of that day felt that the province was ready for very much wider powers.

Then my hon. Friend spoke of the importance of the defence of Burma, of Burma's great needs in regard to defence, and he pointed out how dependent, she was, not merely on this country for naval defence, but on other than Burmans to man the military police. It is very interesting to see the evidence that was laid before the Statutory Corn-mission on that point of the dependence of the Burmese military police on recruitment in India, by the Chief Secretary and the Inspector-General of Police. It endorses what he said as to Burmans resenting the high standard of discipline that is necessary for military police, and not caring to serve on that body.

Evidence was also led with regard to disturbed conditions in the country internally. Cognisable crime was said to be about three times as high as in Bihar and Orissa or Madras. The reasons given for it in the Government's memorandum were lack of self-control engendered by the absence of parental discipline, and by the decay of religious feeling, and to the "boredom of village life," which induces the village youth to join a dacoit band— at first with little criminal instinct but chiefly to add a little excitement to his humdrum village life. The general apathy and indifference toward crime were also cited, and it was said that the lack of public opinion against crime and the tendency to assist the criminal and to thwart justice was marked, especially in Upper Burma. It made detection and successful prosecution very difficult.

That little quotation serves to illustrate what my hon. Friend said as to a certain lack of responsibility shown by a good many Burmans, which is a part of their lack of political ability. The Statutory Commission heard very strong evidence against the transfer of law and order to a responsible Minister. It was admitted, of course, that there was not the communal difficulty which is one of the great difficulties in the way of maintaining police efficiency in India in the event of such a transfer, but the witnesses were quite clear that there were political influences which would press on a Minister in charge of law and order, with great detriment to the force. The then Inspector-General of Police told the Commission that it would be a very bad thing for law and order to be transferred, because law and order was an important subject and should not be subject to political influence, and that local influence could be brought to bear on the Minister. Morale and discipline would be considerably affected, he said, as this influence got to be known and its effects were perceived. It was said to him. "But you have now a Burman member of the Governor's Council in charge of law and order, and why, therefore, should you object to a Burman Minister?" His reply was prompt. He said: The Minister has got more or less to keep in with his party. If he is constantly flooded with petitions from members of the Legislative Council from the various constituencies to do this and to do that, it will bring discouragement to the whole force from top to bottom. He went on to say that if there were a Minister the Inspector-General of Police would cease to function, because he would be simply flooded with orders to do this and to do that and would not know where he was. When pressed he repeated that an elected Minister would be subject to much more pressure than a nominated member, and said that he was voicing the feeling throughout the force. He admitted that there was a good deal of bribery in the police force, but in a rather illuminating manner he went on to say that there was not more of it than in any other service. That seems to me to be a remarkable statement to be made by one who was actually Inspector-General of Police. I regard this evidence as of the more importance because I cannot recollect that the Joint Select Committee heard any police evidence from Burma, and I shall be glad if my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary can tell me whether I am wrong. I cannot remember that among the police witnesses who gave evidence before the Joint Select Committee—evidence of a striking nature—there was one from Burma. If there was any police witness from Burma, I should be glad if the Under-Secretary would tell me whether that witness was asked his opinion of the proposed transfer of law and order and what his opinion was.

I believe that no witness was heard, and therefore the Joint Select Committee had no expert opinion to put alongside or to contrast, if necessary, with the evidence I have just quoted of the late Inspector-General of Police before the Statutory Commission. Indeed, so far as I understand, the Joint Select Committee did not hear any expert or independent evidence in regard to the Burman question at all. They heard only the views of the Burmese delegates and of the official advisers, and that is not the same thing as hearing the independent evidence of men who had served in Burma and who, having retired, were free to speak their mind, as was the case with several witnesses who had formerly served in India and who gave evidence before the Joint Select Committee. Therefore, I am afraid that I cannot regard the opinion of the Joint Select Committee in regard to the powers to be handed over to Burma as really informed. It cannot be put alongside the opinion expressed to-day by my hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities, who can speak out of his great and first-hand knowledge of Burma and after many years spent in work in India.

In conclusion, I wish to say a word about the trade question. I confess that I am gravely concerned to hear that no attempt is apparently to be made to ensure any favourable terms for British trade with Burma for upwards of five years. I recognise, of course, that my right hon. Friend has just said that the period might be less than five years, but it is a very serious matter that there should be any question of so long a period elapsing without any attempt to open up favourable conditions for mutually advantageous trade with a country of such great, possibilities, for which we have done so much, and whose defence, by sea at least, we continue to guarantee. Having some idea of how the 25 per cent. duty on cotton goods into India has damaged trade in Lancashire I cannot but feel that is will be a very serious matter if there is a continuance of such a duty on British cotton goods entering Burma. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, in dealing with this subject just now, used as his first argument in favour of the proposal to do nothing for five years, that India has fiscal autonomy, in which Burma shares, and that it would be a great blunder to attempt to undermine the present Fiscal Autonomy Convention. That statement ignores the safeguards in the Convention, and as those safeguards have never, so far as I know, been explained to the House by my right hon. Friend I hope the Committee will forgive me if I remind them of what they are.

According to the Simon Commission Report the safeguards are three in number. The first is that the Secretary of State can intervene if the Government of India does not approve of a tariff proposed by the Indian Assembly. That safeguard, I understand, has been well recognised by the Indian Assembly itself as a safeguard that can be used extremely effectively by the Secretary of State, because under present conditions the Governor-General is responsible to the Secretary of State. It is recognised by the Assembly that he is not a free agent, and that the Secretary of State could intervene to mitigate or veto any tariff. Then he also has power to veto any tariff which would bring India into conflict with any other part of the Empire. Finally, and this seems the most important of all, he has power to veto any tariff which is contrary to the general line of Empire policy. This third safeguard may not have meant very much in 1922, when this Convention reached its final form, but I submit that it has had a very great value since 1932, when the Empire agreed on a policy of mutual Imperial Preference. That safeguard would enable the Secretary of State to ensure that a preference was given us on all tariffs imposed by the Indian Assembly. He has the power to do so.

It is important that the Committee should realise these safeguards in the Fiscal Autonomy Convention, and realise, also, that if this Bill passes into law that Convention goes by the board. I do not think that fact has been made clear to the House by my right hon. Friend, nor do I believe that the safeguards in the Convention and the fact, that the Convention goes by the board are fully understood in Lancashire. So little has been said about this that I feel there is really widespread ignorance on the subject, and therefore I have felt it necessary to draw the attention of the. Committee to the position, I feel obliged to say that if the country realised the safeguards that there are to our hand, which have been utilised—anyhow the first has been utilised occasionally—but which certainly have not been utilised fully, and that these safeguards are to be given away by the proposals in the Bill, I am certain what the verdict of the country would be. The country would say that a great deal too much was being given away, and would entirely refuse assent to the proposals. I am sure also that there will be very great disappointment in Lancashire on lemming that the right hon. Gentleman seems to find it so difficult to do anything to reduce the 25 per cent. tariff which, I understand, has added so much to the unemployment in Lancashire.

8.26 p.m.

Mr. RADFORD

I have had an experience this afternoon, which is no doubt common to many Members of the Committee, of sitting for five hours and then hearing what I was going to say said with much greater ability and clarity than I could possibly have said it. The hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Hammersley) has put before the Committee most of what I wanted to say, but there are one or two things still left unsaid. First, I should like the Committee to understand how strongly Lancashire will feel about the status quo agreement which the Secretary of State has announced. I do not think that any duties with which Lancashire has had to contend have aroused more resentment in the county than those on the goods which Lancashire has tried to send into Burma. Burma, as stated in the Simon Commission's Report and as is admitted on all sides, does not constitute any part of India. It is a separate country, separated by an impenetrable barrier of mountains and forests, but because, for the purposes of convenience of administration, it was decided some time in the past, that Burma should be treated as part of India, one result is that a cargo boat goes to Burma from England with cotton goods to be landed at Rangoon and another cargo boat goes from Madras or Calcutta with Indian manufactured cotton goods. The latter boat travels 700 miles from Calcutta or 1,000 miles from Madras, but when the boats reach Rangoon the Lancashire goods have to pay 25 per cent. duty, and, on certain lower priced cloths, a specific duty of four and three-eighths annas per pound in addition, while the Indian goods go in duty free. It is bad enough for our manufacturers to have to face a high tariff barrier in India proper, but that, owing to the accident in the past, when British trade was not thought of and when tariff barriers were not as high in India as they are now, and it was deemed for administrative purposes that Burma should be considered as part of India, Lancashire should have that barrier to get over, is regarded as an injustice which has rankled badly among the cotton goods manufacturers of Lancashire.

The five-year period which the Secretary of State 'has adumbrated should certainly be materially restricted. The Joint Select Committee in 1919, upon whose recommendations the fiscal autonomy convention was adopted, which convention has been adhered to, said that one thing was most desirable, and that was that there should be no feeling of suspicion in India that India was being administered from Whitehall in the interests of Great Britain. I agree, but there are limits to the altruistic way in which we should carry out those things. What Government department, such as the Board of Trade or the India Office, has been responsible for or has taken any part in these discussions in regard to the agreement, which as the Secretary of State has said, has nut been absolutely settled but is, at any rate, in embryo? Surely our Board of Trade, or the India Office, has taken a hand in the discussions. We are not trying to exploit either India or Burma, even after separation, but let the Committee look at what we have done within the last few months, in the face of acute competition, principally from our friends and competitors the Japanese. Quota arrangements have been made in various British Crown Colonies, and India has been allowed to participate in them, and to share in those quotas on level terms with ourselves; yet here is a proposition which, as the hon. Member for Stockport said, introduces for the first time a new principle into the economics of our Empire. There is actually not even to be most-favoured-nation treatment between the Mother country and the other parts of the Empire.

A further point which I would like to put to the Under-Secretary in the hope that he will be good enough to consider it himself, or in conjunction with his right hon. Friend, is that earlier in the Bill there was a definite provision—in Clause 12, to be exact—-that one of the duties of the Governor-General should be to prevent any discriminatory treatment in regard to British or Burmese goods imported into India. I do not know whether I should incur your displeasure, Sir Dennis, if I said, without specifying the Clause, that there is a. similar provision very shortly after the Clause which we are now considering. You referred to it earlier on. It gives an instruction to the Governor of Burma that he shall similarly prevent any discrimination against Indian or English goods. What is the meaning of "discriminatory treatment"? Would not the admission of other goods into India at more favourable rates of duty than were afforded to British goods, constitute discriminatory treatment against the goods of Britain? Would not the admission of goods into Burma, from some other source at lower rates of duty than were charged upon British goods, be a discrimination against British goods?

I put it to the Under-Secretary that the agreement which is under consideration, although not finally completed, and which proposes that Burmese goods shall go into India on more favourable terms than British goods and that Indian goods shall go into Burma on more favourable terms than British goods, justifies our objection to it that it constitutes discriminatory treatment against the goods of Britain. I will not press my hon. Friend to give a reply now, but I should be glad if lie and his right hon. Friend would consider the point. Discriminatory treatment is difficult to define, but it seems that the proposed arrangement would involve discriminatory treatment against British goods in both directions.

8.34 p.m.

Sir R. CRADDOCK

I want to say a few words upon the trade question and as to what fell from the Secretary of State for India. He said that India enjoyed the fiscal autonomy convention and that Burma also enjoyed it. If there is one thing which Burma has complained about all these years it is that her tariff policy has been forced upon her by India. Consequently, it seems a bit far fetched to suggest that Burma is to follow India in respect of British goods. I should like to put this point, and it is a point which is contained in the Joint Select Committee's Report, that the tariff which Burma, as part of India, had to impose was a severe hardship on her people, because she had no interest in Indian industries like Tata's iron and steel works or the textile industry. She had no such industries herself, but, in order to protect India, she was subjected to tariffs which made all these goods extremely expensive for her, and that has been the burden of her complaint. Now it is contended that under this agreement Burma may be dictated to by India as to what duties she shall impose, when she is separated, against United Kingdom goods. It is true that as long as she is part of India she has free trade with India, but the condition which makes United Kingdom goods mare expensive to Burma is dictated to her by Indian interests, and that is why I object to the whole thing. Why should India dictate to Burma as to what duties she shall impose on United Kingdom goods after she has got her own constitution?

8.37 p.m.

Mr. MORGAN JONES

Before this Clause is put, I should like to add one or two words. At the beginning of the Debate I indicated what our reactions were to the general question of separa- tion and non-separation, but, whether the decision be in favour of separation or of non-separation, Burma will be a province. On previous occasions we have put down, with respect to various provincial matters, a number of Amendments. We have only two Amendments on the Order Paper with regard to Burma as a province. It is not, however, because we regard Burma as of less importance than a province of India, but because we have felt that the issues have already been decided on the previous Clauses, that we have felt that it would not be necessary to traverse the ground again by putting down the same Amendments. I would like the Government to understand, however, that our attitude towards the various details in relation to the establishment of Burma as a province is exactly the same, or is in most particulars the same, as it was with respect to each separate province in India.

Clauses 299 to 302 ordered to stand part of the Bill.