SILK TRIAL, EDINBURGH. (Hansard, 9 May 1932)

§ Mr. McGOVERN
I desire to raise a question concerning the granting of bail to two directors after conviction in a trial at Edinburgh. They were liberated on bail after giving notice of appeal. Mr. Young was sentenced to three years' and Mr. Todd to six months imprisonment. These men were convicted after a long trial and, after having put in an appeal, they were liberated. They were tried for a fraud amounting to nearly £1,000,000, and were liberated by the judge on bail amounting to £10. The public is very strongly against such a low amount of bail. It is out of the question for me to go into the trial and the incidents connected with it, but when the appeal has been decided and the full facts come to light, it may be necessary for my hon. Friends and myself to put down a Motion for the removal of the judge. I content myself at the moment with saying that in this case originally 12 men were arrested on various charges connected with this gigantic fraud. At the outset it was stated that the case was so serious that none of the 12 men arrested could be granted bail. After a period one man was released because of illness and age— a man of 57—and then others were released, and finally eight men were charged and brought to trial. I think all eight men were released on substantial bail. When they were brought to trial one man was discharged from the dock, being ill; and finally two men were convicted and sentenced as I have stated.
Responsible people in this country have always looked with contempt on the ability of gangsters and racketeers in America to overstep the law, and this and similar events are causing grave concern in the minds of the people that all is not well. Men of influence and position have been charged. We were told that this case was undermining the confidence of the business community and the investing public, and yet we find that these men, pending their appeal, have been liberated on £10 bail, although no word of the amount of the bail appears in any newspaper. It may be denied, but my information is that the judge specifi- 1686 cally requested the Press not to publish the amount of the bail.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
As to several points which the hon. Member is raising, I am not sure that the Minister to whom he is presenting his case has any responsibility.

§ Mr. BUCHANAN
May I make this submission? The hon. Member has raised various points, the last one, on which you interrupted him, concerning the question of bail. In the Scottish courts bail is fixed, generally speaking, with the Lord Advocate and the counsel for the defence meeting and arranging that bail. The question of bail can be opposed by the Lord Advocate, and consequently the hon. Member is entitled to raise this question, because the responsibility of fixing bail is a part responsibility of the Lord Advocate's.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
The hon. Member may be right, but I am rather ignorant on these matters, and I should like to hear the Lord Advocate's statement on that point.

§ The LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. Craigie Aitchison)
The matter of bail in criminal appeals under the Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act, 1926, is a matter entirely in the discretion of the court, and is regulated by Section 9, Sub-section (1) of this Act, which provides: The court may, if it seems fit, on the application of an appellant "— that is, the convicted person— admit the appellant to bail, pending the determination of his appeal. The question is entirely one for the court. As a matter of courtesy a representative of the Crown attends, but, strictly speaking, has no locus, and intervenes only if invited by the court to do so.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
That being the case, I do not see what object the hon. Member has in raising this question.

§ Mr. McGOVERN
On any point that you are prepared to rule out of order, I am prepared to obey your decision, but I want to submit that on this question of bail I understand that the Lord Advocate could oppose liberation on bail for such a small amount in the case of a man sentenced to three years imprisonment. The point I wish to raise is that there 1687 ought to be sufficient guarantee that the man will present himself at the appeal Court in due course. A man with a three years sentence hanging over him is most unlikely to present himself if he does not think further consideration will be given to him. The grant of such a small amount of bail by the judge raised the question whether he could be certain that the individual would present himself. The certainty of the man presenting himself must be that he was absolutely convinced that he was going to be liberated on appeal. I am not entitled to go into the question of the bail, but I want a reason from the Lord Advocate as to the difference between bail for rich men and poor men.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
I understand that the Lord Advocate has no responsibility whatever in regard to bail.

§ Mr. MAXTON
The Lord Advocate was the prosecutor for the Crown, and therefore he has some responsibility. The Lord Advocate fixed the bail at a very high sum at a time when the men in the eyes of the law were innocent. Now they have been sent to three years penal servitude and the Lord Advocate has stood idly by, although he is prepared to accept now £10 bail. If we are not able to raise a question like this of court procedure, then the House is being reduced to an impossible position. Since the Lord Advocate has been representing, and is representing the Crown up to now, it is appropriate for us to raise matters which have arisen in the eleventh hour in connection with this case.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
It is not a question whether the hon. Member ought to raise the question, but whether raising it would do any good, because the Lord Advocate is in no way responsible for fixing the bail. This is entirely a matter for the court.

§ Mr. BUCHANAN
The judge must be satisfied that these persons are likely to turn up. The judge can only be satisfied if the Crown gives him the necessary information showing that these people will turn up. The argument is that at the beginning the Lord Advocate held that substantial bail was necessary because the men might not turn up. The only thing we say now is that the Lord Advocate must supply the information on which he based that statement. If the 1688 Lord Advocate had supplied the information at the beginning that high bail was necessary, it was more necessary for him to supply the information when more substantial bail was asked for at the courts. The Lord Advocate was wrong either in asking for too large an amount at the beginning or in not seeing that the judges were supplied with the information that these people are now less likely to turn up than before.

§ Mr. NEIL MACLEAN
If the Lord Advocate, before these individuals were brought to trial—that is to say, when they were looked upon as innocent persons— insisted upon very substantial bail, in one case as much as £1,000, why did he not, after one had been sentenced, and therefore had become in the eyes of the law a criminal, put forward a plea for heavy and substantial bail?

§ Mr. SPEAKER
I understand that it is not for the Lord Advocate to say, and that, therefore, he has no responsibility in the matter.

§ The LORD ADVOCATE
I regret very much that this matter has been raised at all. I am extremely reluctant to intervene, because the matter is really sub judice, and I cannot conceive of anything more unfortunate, either from the point of view of the men whose appeals are pending or of the public interest, which the hon. Members claim to represent, than that a matter of this kind should be publicly discussed at this stage on the Floor of the House; but, as it has been raised, I will, with your permission, Mr. Speaker, reply now.

§ Mr. McGOVERN
If the Lord Advocate can reply, I must be allowed to finish my speech. I was held up on a point of Order.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
I thought the point was quite clear; three hon. Members have already spoken.

§ The LORD ADVOCATE
I thought that the hon. Member had nothing futher to say. At any rate, I am satisfied, from what I have already heard, that anything further that he might have to say would not be more relevant than what he has already said. The hon. Member is under a complete misapprehension, first as to what actually occurred, and, secondly, as to the pro- 1689 cedure and practice usually followed in criminal appeals. I think it is in the highest degree unfortunate that the hon. Members did not think it worth while to ascertain what is the ordinary procedure and practice before endeavouring, no doubt with the best of motives and in the public interest, to stir up controversy over a matter of this kind. [Interruption.] Under the provision of the Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act, 1926, a person convicted on indictment way appeal to the High Court of Justiciary. Where the ground of appeal involves a question of law alone he does not require the leave of the court. Where the ground of appeal involves a question of fact alone, or a question of mixed law and fact, he requires the leave of the court. I want to emphasise the fact that these statutory provisions, which the hon. Members will find in the Act of 1926, are not illusory, but are substantial. They were enacted by Parliament in order to confer a material right, which is jealously guarded by our courts of law, and also by the Crown. I have already referred, in answer to you, Sir, to Section 9 of the Act of 1926. I will paraphrase that Section in order to make it plain to hon. Members opposite. The court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of a convicted person, admit him to bail pending the determination of the appeal. There is no restriction on the class of offence to which the Section applies. The only qualification is that the offence is bailable.
What happened in the present case? Following the conviction of the two men concerned, appeals were immediately intimated, and the question arose, on the application of counsel on behalf of the two men who were convicted, of liberation, pending the appeal. That was the real question to be decided. The question of the amount of bail turned out to be really a subsidiary question. The real question to be decided was whether there should be liberation pending appeal. 1690 That matter was decided, I humbly think rightly, in favour of the appellants. It must never be left out of account that the whole purpose of bail is this. It is supposed to afford some security against accused or convicted persons absconding from justice. Of itself there is no particular virtue in bail at all. There are many other securities which are as effectual to prevent a person absconding from justice as the imposition of a bail which he is unable to pay. All these matters were matters for the very careful consideration and judgment of the court. I have pointed out the matter was one in the discretion of the court under Section 9 of the Act, but in practice the court may ask the view of the Crown upon the particular matter. Strictly speaking, the Crown has nolocus standi at all in this matter, but out of courtesy to the court a representative of the Crown attends and the attitude of the Crown has been that it will not oppose any application be the amount moderate or modest if it is satisfied that the main purpose can be secured in some other way equally effective which will enable the convicted men to be liberated. There was no departure from practice in the present case. I would also say that the largest sum exacted as bail in appeals under the Act of 1926 has been £25, with the exception of one case where a sum of £200 was exacted. In that case, the hon. Member may not know that the man had eight previous convictions, and that fact justified a very much larger sum.
As regards the appeal being taken in camera, the position is that bail appeals are normally taken in camera. There was no departure from the ordinary practice and no discrimination of any kind, and any insinuations that have been made are entirely unfounded.