HC Deb 22 March 1932 vol 263 cc897-948
Mr. LANSBURY

I wish to make a few observations on this Measure in order to get some information from the Foreign Secretary on the present position in Manchuria and Shanghai. The House is aware of the difficult situation which confronted the meeting of the Disarmament Conference when it met some months ago, and found itself faced with the fact that two of its members were at war with one another. The difficulties in connection with the Far Eastern question are very great, but it seems to my friends and myself that, after all the months which have passed during which very little progress has been made to wards a settlement of this question, it is necessary that our own country and the Dominions should know and understand exactly what policy the Government are pursuing. I should like the Foreign Secretary, when he comes to speak, to give the House, as far as he is able, the view of the Government in regard to the Disarmament Conference.

During the discussion of the Army and Service Estimates some of us were rather disquieted by the statement which appeared to be paramount in the discussion, that in another year it would possibly be advisable, in the view of the advisers of the Government, to increase expenditure, and thereby increase the volume of armaments throughout the world. On this side of the House we think—and most people who have studied the question will agree with us—if that is so, it is rather a disastrous ending, or will be a disastrous ending, to the very high hopes which were entertained of progressive disarmament in the world, hopes which were fostered at a famous meeting at which His Majesty spoke a couple of years ago. I disagree with a good many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen in this House on the question of armaments, and I think that there will be no real peace in the world until the nations give up relying on armaments. On the other hand, if I agreed with armaments, I should not think that it was either wise or desirable that an army should be ill-equipped or not perhaps properly manned and so on.

When the Foreign Secretary comes to reply, he might tell the House and tell the world who it is, in his judgment, that the various nations are arming against. During the late War and since a large number of people imagined that as a result of that War we should at least make some progress against the idea of war. We have now, according to the speeches which were made during the Debate on the Service Estimates, the extraordinary spectacle of Members of this House, and I expect of members in the Parliaments of other countries, making speeches which seem to imply that the allies of yesterday, the people who pledged themselves to follow the example of Germany in disarmament, are now arming against each other. I think the question which ought to be debated at the Disarmament Conference quite publicly and openly is against whom do we want these armaments? For what purpose do we want them? Why does France need super-submarines, and why do we need specially fast aeroplanes? Who are these weapons to be used against? On that question, I should like the Foreign Secretary to give us his views.

4.30 p.m.

Who is it that France, Italy, and ourselves are arming against? It cannot be Germany now. If we are arming against any particular nation what are the questions that are going to bring about war between those nations? At the other end of the corridor in the Royal Gallery there is a great picture of Waterloo, and you see the meeting of the Prussian Blucher with the British Wellington. That was in 1815. We were united then with Germany in fighting the French, and one hundred years later, and on practically the same spot, the French and the British united against the Germans. That may be in the natural order of things something to make a good joke about, but it seems to me absurd and ridiculous that we should be going along the same road now. Therefore, in asking the Foreign Secretary to deal with that subject I would also like to ask him to deal with another question which, although it was mentioned not long ago and a little discussion took place upon it, we did not get very far with. What is the attitude of the Government, have they any policy, or will they propose anything at the Disarmament Conference in support of the idea of an internationalisation of aviation, that is to say, the abolition of national aviation and the substitution for it of international aviation? I ask that question for a specific reason. In the old days, when the sea was said to be our bulwark, Great Britain was obliged to get a chain of coaling stations and ports all round the world into which at all times her ships could enter and be coaled, victualled, and so on. To-day the air routes of the world are of equal importance, and, before each country launches out into a campaign to secure for itself monopolies in regard to landing places, surely it -would be well for the nations to come together and discuss whether this new scientific business of flying should not be internationalised, and whether the aerodromes and landing places should not come under international control. Unless that is done, we may find ourselves engaged in war defending some out-of-the-way part of the world merely because it is on the direct route to Australia, India, and so on. There have been questions and answers on the subject in this House, both in the last Parliament and in this. There are difficulties in connection with the route to India—difficulties on which, I understand, negotiations are taking place, and which it is hoped to overcome. It seems to me, and to many other people, that it would be much simpler that these routes should be mapped out and the landing places arranged, and that they should be free and open to the aircraft of the whole world.

That is all that I wish to say at the moment on the broad questions connected with the Disarmament Conference, but, when we come to the Sino-Japanese dispute, I think the House ought to be reminded of the fact that since September last there has been war between Japan and China. This fact was laid down on the 2nd February by the Dominions Secretary, who, representing the British Government at a Council of the League, said: His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feels it is impossible that the present position in the Far East should be allowed to continue, Every day brings news of some fresh incident of the utmost gravity. Fighting over a wide area is practically continuous. Shanghai is the scene of a series of conflicts… War in everything but name is in progress. To such a state of things the Members of the League of Nations cannot be indifferent. He continued—and this is the point that I wish to emphasize in all that I am saying— If it is allowed to go on, the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine Power Treaty must inevitably lose the confidence of the world. He went on to say: It is not without significance to members of the League that the United States Government take entirely the same view of the situation. If I may be permitted to say so it is something to be very thankful for that the Government of the United States has taken the stand that it has on this subject in connection with the League of Nations. That was in February last but to-day—and I press this point on the right hon. Gentleman—Japan is in military occupation of the three Eastern provinces of China. I am told that the area of territory amounts to 200,000 square miles. Japan has established there a Government of sorts, which owes no allegiance to the Chinese Central Government at Nanking. There can be no question whatsoever that that Government which has been established in Manchuria could not last for 24 hours if it were not for the military support of Japan. That fact, I think, is indisputable.

The further fact to which I would draw the right hon. Gentleman's attention is that this has been done and continued in spite of the protests of China, in spite of the protests of the League of Nations, and, most terrible of all, in spite of the fact that both of these Governments are Members of the League, and both sit as Members of the Council of the League. They are both pledged to certain action in regard to disputes, and yet the Council has first to meet, and then the Assembly has to meet, to discuss what is in effect war brought about by the refusal of one party to the dispute to submit to the terms for the settlement of disputes which she herself has signed. Let us never forget that during the Great War this House rang with denunciations of those who refused to honour a scrap of paper. Japan, whatever may be said, has refused to honour what the League of Nations tells her is her duty, and to honour what the United States Government has also called upon her to honour. On the other hand, China from the very first has put her case wholly in the hands of the League. It may be said that there is a truce at Shanghai. I hope very much that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to-night to give us a full explanation of the position at Shanghai—where the Japanese troops are, how many are still there, and how events are moving towards the total evacuation of the Japanese Army. Although it was very late in the day when the League of Nations was able to get something done, I willingly and sincerely congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on whatever hand he took in helping to bring about that result, but I repeat that Manchuria is still held by the Japanese.

I want the right hon. Gentleman to tell us to-night what is the position of the British Government in regard to the new Government that has been installed in Manchuria. Before I proceed further on that subject, I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether any correspondence has passed, I do not mean with the League of Nations or through the League of Nations, but has the British Government made any communications direct to the Japanese Government or to the Chinese Government on this question of the new Manchurian Government; and, if so, will he lay on the Table of the House whatever dispatches there may be? The American Government have done so. The American diplomacy in this matter has been very open indeed. I think they have published almost all their documents on the subject. In any case it seems to me that, if our Government has said anything on the subject of the new Government of Manchuria, this House and the country are entitled to know what they have said. This is the position so far as the League of Nations is concerned, and, I think, so far as the American Government is concerned. The League has put it on record, and I think the right hon. Gentleman was present and had something to do with putting it on record, that: It is incumbent upon members of the League (this includes Japan and China) not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League or to the Pact of Paris. Nobody can say that what has happened in Manchuria is in conformity with either of those documents, and, therefore, I want to ask categorically of the Foreign Secretary: Does the British Government accept that statement; and, if so, how is it possible that any question can arise as to the recognition of the Government set up by Japan in Manchuria? I ask that question because the right hon. Gentleman said the other day that it was premature to give a decision. I cannot for the life of me see how it can be premature if the right hon. Gentleman agrees with the sentence that I have just read out in the statement by the League on the subject of recognising any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League or to the Pact of Paris. I want also to point out that Mr. Stimson, writing to Senator Borah on the 28th February, said practically the same thing, and he went on to expand that on another occasion, on which he wrote as follows: If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position be taken by other Governments of the world, a caveat would be placed upon such action "— that is, action by force— which we believe would effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title to right sought by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of the rights and titles of which she may have been deprived. I should like to know if the right hon. Gentleman agrees with that statement of Mr. Stimson and with the statement made by the League of Nations Council. If he does, I cannot see how there can be any question of recognising the Government set up by the Japanese in Manchuria, and it is very important that we should know the right hon. Gentleman's mind on that subject.

My reason for putting this question so categorically to him is that there is a general feeling—I put a question to him on this subject on a previous occasion, but I am going to repeat it now—an opinion is being expressed abroad—I do not mean outside our own country, but outside this House—that the right hon. Gentleman and the British Government are not averse, I will not put it any higher than that, to what is happening in Manchuria; that we are a little halfhearted in the matter, and that what I cannot help feeling are the long delays which are taking place in getting the League of Nations Commission to Manchuria are for the purpose of giving Japan time to consolidate her position in that country. The Commission was appointed months ago. It has visited Tokio on its way to Manchuria, and has been entertained there, and now I think it is somewhere in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, but has not yet reached Manchuria. I want the right hon. Gentleman to believe that I do not think that he himself would give any countenance to the idea that a Government set up in the manner in which the Government in question has been set up should be recognised by this country or by any other of the Treaty Powers. But the Japanese statesmen are not shy or backward in saying what is ill their mind. Mr. Sato, speaking at a public meeting of the Council of the League on 19th February, said: Our invested capital in Manchuria is too considerable to make it possible for us to accept any system of Government in that country. We cannot acquiesce in an arbitrary system of Government, one that jeopardises this capital, which represents large sums of money. That is why we welcome hopefully the new autonomous regime. which he knows perfectly well would not last 24 hours but for the Japanese soldiers. He goes on: When China has a properly organised and co-ordinated central government, Manchuria will perhaps enter into negotiations with this Government with a view to settling the status of Manchuria. What right has the Japanese Government of its own sweet will to say it will negotiate to settle the status of Manchuria? Manchuria is part of the Chinese Dominions, and neither Japan nor any one else has a right to settle that status It is already settled. He went on: But for that we must wait and see. The theory that is continually inferred from statements like this, that there is no settled Government in China, is to my mind, and I think to the mind of any reasonable person, beside the point. The Government at Nanking is recognised by all the States of the world. I think there is none which has refused recognition or acceptance of her representatives, or that does not send representatives. That Government is recognised by the League of Nations, and it is on the Assembly and the Council of the League. I cannot for the life of me understand how anyone can for a moment imagine that there can be any question but that there is a settled Government of China recognised by all the States of the world. I have often outside the House—I have very seldom had an opportunity of speaking on foreign affairs inside—made criticism of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain). But I always remember that in the dark days of 1926, when trouble arose between ourselves and China, and my friends here, led by the present Prime Minister, were taking certain action, and the same sort of statements were being made about the lack of central control in China, the right hon. Gentleman put it on record that the British Government adopts a policy of liberal and friendly co-operation with new China, and in a memorandum he said the principles on which he would act were that we should abandon the idea that the economic and political development of China can only be secured under foreign tutelage, and that it should be the policy of the Powers to endeavour to maintain harmonious relations with China without waiting for or insisting on the prior establishment of a strong central Government. I think that is the proper attitude to a country that is struggling, in the midst of civil disobedience, to maintain its position.

China is not a small nation. We are told it has a population of 400,000,000, and it may very well be that, with the Powers intriguing one against the other, with the bribery and corruption which it is well known the Powers have used against each other in their dealings with the various chiefs in China, there are disorders—[Interruption]. There is nothing to laugh at in that. This country has had troubles with a certain little country, and may have more, and we are having considerable trouble in India, but those who laugh about that have to remember that even now when it is supposed that the Government is not very strong at the centre, it is still true that the trade done with China, and done under very satisfactory conditions, has increased during the last year. The people who supply China with goods from this country have something to be thankful for to the Chinese Government. It is said that Japan has very great interests in Manchuria. I understand her total, capital investments, which are very largely in the South Manchurian railway, mines and other undertakings, amount to some £200,000,000 and that she has a population in Manchuria of somewhere about 200,000 people. People talk nowadays as if Manchuria was occupied by Japanese. As a matter of fact, I understand the Japanese do not want to live in Manchuria. They are like the Englishman, who does not want to live in the hot parts of Africa. The climate and conditions in Manchuria have not invited the Japanese to colonise there, although it is so near their own home and there is freedom for them to go there. There are only 203,000 of them, while there are 28,000,000 Chinese there. You only have to reckon the small amount per head of the value of the property spread over the whole of this and you will very soon see who has the chief stake in the country. But I maintain that no nation has a right to say that, because it has chosen to invest money in a country, therefore, it has a right to control it.

I may he told that I ought to wait for the Lytton Commission before raising this question of the continued occupation of Manchuria by Japan. I am not at all unmindful of the fact that in certain areas, railway areas, in Manchuria there are treaty rights that Japan possesses, but, even so, the League, when appointing the Lytton Commission, laid it down very clearly, on 10th December, that: The appointment and deliberations of the Committee shall not prejudice in any way the undertaking given by the Japanese Government in the resolution of 30th September as regards, withdrawal of Japanese troops within the railway zone. That resolution need never have been passed, because Japan has taken not the slightest notice of it, her troops are just where she wants them to be and she has not withdrawn them, and the appointment of the Lytton Commission has nothing whatever to do with my case in regard to the fact that the Japanese troops have not been withdrawn. To show that the Japanese Government has no intention of withdrawing them you have only to read the statement of Mr. Sato, the Japanese representative in Geneva, that: In 10 years we shall establish order and security in Manchuria and there will have been a great expansion of prosperity. In these circumstances, I want to ask the Foreign Secretary what the League proposes to do to get the Japanese out of Manchuria. There was a question put to him the other day as to what the Japanese authorities are doing, and I understood his answer to be that he had no information. I should like to ask him about the communications of the Chinese delegates to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, dated 9th and 10th March, in which it is stated by the Chinese Government that, from information received from the Inspector-General of Customs, the Japanese Consul at Antung, Manchuria, has asked Mr. R. M. Talbot, the Commissioner of Customs, to be prepared to hand over his functions and that Japanese advisers would be appointed to assist in taking over. Will the right hon. Gentleman communicate to the House any information he may have on this matter and, in view of the terms of the resolution of the Assembly of the League, and in view of the fact that British and other foreign loans are secured on the Customs revenue, will he draw the attention of the Japanese Government to the fact that such action as is proposed is injurious to British interests and, what I think is of more importance, contrary to Article 10 of the Covenant and to Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Washington Nine Power Treaty? I have had these questions written out because it is important that the House should understand the attitude and the action of the Chinese Government.

There is another side to this question. There has been bloodshed and slaughter of innocent people and destruction of property. During the Debates on the Air Estimates, hon. Members made our blood curdle by telling us of the horrible things that would happen if London were bombed from aeroplanes, but people living in Manchuria and around Shanghai have had the terrible experience that we only know of by being told what may happen in the next war. No one denies that townships and villages have been wiped out. It is on record. No one at present can say what the material money damage may be. It may be £100,000,000. In addition, according to the estimate of the municipal authorities of Shanghai, Chinese civilian casualties resulting from the recent fighting in three places amounts to several thousands—and a Chinese woman or baby is as valuable as an English woman or baby. I do not know that there is anything to laugh about. I should not like my baby to be slaughtered.

Sir AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

The right hon. Gentleman is quite mistaken.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. LANSBURY

I can only see what I see through my eyes. I was not looking at the right hon. Gentleman. I feel just a little sick and bad about it, because I have seen children who have suffered in this way. The fact that they are Chinese babies, children, women or men does not make the slightest difference; they are human beings. There have been killed (civilian deaths) 6,080, wounded 2,000, and missing, believed to have been killed, 10,040. There are 160,000 families in the vicinity of Chapei, Kiangwan, and Woosung rendered homeless. Someone has a great bill to pay, not of money, but of mental and moral reparation to these victims of a war about which there was no notice whatever. If hon. Members think that I am saying extreme things about it, I will read what Lord Cecil has said in an interview printed in a newspaper last week. He said: A settlement which does not punish unjust aggressions, which does not reject a militarist policy, which does not assure to a loyal member of the League of Nations reparation for a wrong which it has sustained—such a settlement would be a disastrous blow to international moral. It is impossible to justify Japan for having bombarded and occupied Chinese territory before having attempted by all means to make good its claims by mediation and arbitration. The League of Nations as well as America must decline to pardon and must repudiate formally and openly the action so wrongly undertaken by the Japanese military authorities. I come to another point. When this question was first raised I described the action of the Japanese Government as an act of international piracy, and I was very severely criticised by some friends for having done so. I was then told—in fact I read it in the newspapers—that if any action was taken on the lines laid down by the Covenant of the League, that is to say, that if any attempt was made to withdraw credits or to withdraw ambassadors, Japan would in effect go to war with all the world. I cannot believe that. I cannot believe that it would have been possible for that to have happened. But were it to have happened, speaking as one who thinks that it is better to leave nations which want to run amok to do so, I should still have brought our troops, our ships and our nationals away. I think that Japan, or any other nation in those circumstances, would soon have discovered that there are more ways of bringing people to reason than by trying to destroy them by bloodshed.

It may be said of me that I have put the case, or a brief, for China. I am neither pro-Chinese nor pro-Japanese in this matter. I am pro-peace, pro-trade, and pro-co-operation. I am only criticising Japan because I think that she has made a ghastly blunder. I recognise to the full—as much as anyone in this House—the position of Japan. She is very much in the same position as Germany was before the late War. Germany came into the field of commercial capitalism later in the day than ourselves and some other nations. She found herself in a position that she must expand her markets somewhere for her people and find somewhere where she could exchange the goods which, in an ever-increasing amount, she was able to produce. Japan is shut out of Canada, America, and Australia. Japan has learned from us, from the Western world, all there is to know, I think, in the way of production, and is now, like all other capitalist countries, chocked with goods. It is not so much, as I understand it, that Japan wants to send her people abroad. She may want to send her travellers and her agents, but I am told—I have no authority for this—that it is not so much her people as her goods, and that she wants markets and more raw material.

There is China. China has suffered much—no one will deny it—at the hands of the Western world. Almost the first education I received in foreign politics was to read about Canton of 100 years ago and also to read the Debates in this House upon the opium war, and the speech by Mr. Cobden, delivered in Feb- ruary, 1857, about the action of our own Government at that day, which, if the speech were made to-day in reference to Japan, would apply equally well. Since that day China has again and again been invaded, but, in spite of what may be said at the moment about disorder and disunity, foreigners have not gone very far into the interior yet. There is a power of passive resistance about the Chinese, who are patient, who suffer and who work hard. Every one who has anything to do with them recognises them as straight-forward, honest and honourable people in the main. They have people who do wrong just as we have.

What is the world going to do with regard to the position in the Far East? What are you going to do with China? America wants the trade, we want the trade, Japan wants the trade, France, to a lesser degree wants the trade, and the Soviet Government wants the trade; and I expect that Germany will want a hand in it too. What are we going to do about it? Up to the present, as far as I am able to judge, the various Governments at times play one another off against each other. It may sound very Utopian to diplomatists and others, but I would suggest, as an ordinary person, that the statesmen of the world who are interested in China should try and look at China, not merely from the point of view of what the West can get out of her, but from the point of view of what the West may be able to give her in the arts of peace as well as in the arts of war.

When I hear things said about the Chinese Government, I cannot help remembering that it is estimated that there have been millions of people rendered homeless by floods. When I think of what might be done in China and of what might be done to balance trade and industry throughout the world, I ask myself: What is it that the Chinese people want from us and what is it that we want from them? Surely, if we really are in earnest in saying that we are friendly and only want to be friendly with them, there is enough civilisation, Christianity, and real humanity in the Governments of the Western world, including the United States, so that, instead of striving against each other in order to get the better of each other, either with Japan or with China, we may say to Japan, "Come into conference with us," not to share out China and not to get spheres of influence in China, but to agree to take the Chinese at their word and to abolish all extra-territorial rights, and wisely treat that great country, which has a civilisation much older than any other in the world, as an equal.

We should say to her Government, "We really want to help you. We really want to bring you into the comity of commercial nations, and the only thing which we will ask of you is freedom to carry on business and to trade. If it is help that you want, any advice to help your Government, or help to establish your factories or your life in parts which are now decimated, then we are willing to give you all the help that is possible." There have been great British administrators who have helped the Chinese in the past. About that there is no question. There have been great missionary societies of every sort and kind, dealing with the body as well as with the soul. We have given some hostages in that way of our sincerity, but always overhanging it all there has been the business of mere money making and also the business of competition between the various nations. I should like to plead for a conference of nations interested in China and Japan. I should like to see a conference called, and I should like to see my country call it in a disinterested spirit, and in order, not that we should exploit and dominate the Chinese, but that we might bring to her service in actual deeds the principle of comradeship and brotherhood.

Sir A. CHAMBERLAIN

If I rise to follow the right hon. Gentleman, it is not because I have any presumption that I can give him that satisfaction which he can receive only from a representative of His Majesty's Government, but I should like to comment on some of the observations which he has made and to make some observations of my own upon the topics that he has raised. I desire, in the first place, to recognise not merely the obvious sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman, but the care which he took to give due recognition to the powerful influence which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has exercised in the councils of the League at Geneva, in bringing together nations which at the outset were very widely divided. No less do I desire to recognise his obvious anxiety not to use any language which should make a settlement of the question more difficult by causing unforgiveable offence to one or other of the parties. That is very important. Therefore, I regretted all the more one or two harsh statements that the right hon. Gentleman made. He spoke of one or more acts of piracy by one of the parties. Hard words will never settle international conflicts. On the contrary, they are very dangerous. If, in fact, the difficulty has proved beyond peaceful settlement you may speak your mind freely, but when you are trying to secure agreement either between yourselves and another nation or between two other nations, every harsh word, every unduly harsh word, that you use is a further obstacle in your path, needlessly placed there by yourself.

There was one further observation of the right hon. Gentleman which I regretted. It was almost an aside, but he repeated, for the second time this Session, his desire that if trouble breaks out in the great international city of Shanghai, rather than protect our nationals or defend our interests there we should evacuate them from that city. I beg the right hon. Gentleman to think a little more of what the consequences would be. All that we desire in China is to see a strong Government, able to keep order and to protect foreigners going about their lawful avocations within its jurisdiction, and to defend itself and create those conditions in which our one interest, our one selfish interest, that we have there, namely, our trade, can alone thrive. To evacuate Shanghai is to destroy almost the whole of our trade in China. It is to deprive us of any influence in the councils of Asiatic Powers, and to mark us as a people who have forgotten our long traditions, a people who will neither lend help to those who need it, nor protect our own people when they are in danger. It is not in that way that you will spread the peaceful influence of Great Britain. It is not in that way that you will help to develop China or secure the gradual issue of China from her present difficulties, alike domestic and international. A great Empire like ours, with its great traditions and its great history, has obligations everywhere where it has rights. It can justify its rights only by the discharge of its obligations, and if it forgets the one it will deserve to lose the other.

I turn to a consideration of the actual conflict between Japan and China. May I say, first, a word about our own position in regard to both those countries? We welcomed the new birth of Japan. We were the first of the Powers to agree to the abolition of the extra-territorial rights which before that re-birth we, in common with other foreign Western nations, and the United States of America, enjoyed in the Empire of Japan. If my memory serves me alight, we were the first Power to send an Ambassador to Japan. We have never had any quarrel with Japan. In difficult times, when we had not too many friends in the world and when Japan herself was engaged in a great war, she was our ally, and when the greatest war of all came she played the part of a faithful and loyal ally. She valued that alliance with us not merely for any military assistance that we might give, but because it was an outward and visible sign of our recognition of her position in the world and our acceptance of her as one of the great Powers of the time.

When that Treaty was terminated, not without some hesitation but in the hope of serving the larger interests of peace, it was the wish both of the Japanese and ourselves, above all of ourselves, that although the Alliance ended the friendship should continue in full force. We have had every reason to remember with pride and with satisfaction our association with that Island race, in some of whose circumstances we can see so great a likeness to our own, and although we may, as one of the members of the League of Nations, take our part in judging this case and in bringing the moral influence of the world to bear upon Japan, I hope that in all our actions we shall do nothing to prevent the restoration to the full of the old Anglo-Japanese friendship.

With China our relations have been in recent times far more difficult. We have been in quite recent years the victim of actions by the Chinese Government which are not justifiable on any reading of international law. We showed a great patience and, I think I may say, an amazing moderation. When one of our settlements was invaded, we retired from it rather than fire upon the Chinese, who we thought were being incited by others into a quarrel with us, so that no more bloodshed should ensue. We were the first of the Powers, by the Note to which the right hon. Gentleman has already alluded—in spite of all the trouble, in spite of the fact that at that time China was the prey of civil war and there was no Government that could pretend to exercise any authority over the whole country—to lay down the liberal policy which we ourselves intended to pursue towards the new China, and which we invited other Powers also to make their own. Without waiting for the restoration of order we proceeded, in so far as the circumstances admitted, to translate our words into deeds and to give up some of the privileges which we enjoyed.

What was our object? A liberal nation like ourselves sympathises with a people trying to create a National Government, and with the rise of national hopes and aspirations. We have no interest in China except the trade which we do with her, a trade which is equally necessary and equally profitable to them as to us. We have no territorial ambition there or elsewhere. We want to see China united, strong and prosperous, and we are prepared to surrender the special position which we and other foreigners enjoy just as fast as China can constitute a Government with sufficient authority and sufficient force behind it to give us the protection which is given by every civilised and organised Government to the foreigner within its gates. Therefore, let us be careful in the language that we use. Let us do nothing to destroy the good feeling that has come back between the Chinese and ourselves, let us be ready, as the right hon. Gentleman says, to abandon the privileged position when our citizens can be secured in the ordinary rights of peaceful traders in a foreign country, and to give China whatever help she requires and asks for in the organisation of her affairs.

Those are the two nations, the two friendly nations, between whom these difficulties have arisen. The matter is brought before the League. Some people in this country, I would even say some of those who most often have the League on their lips, at once seem to forget the League and to think that it is for this country, by separate action, to take whoever is the wrongdoer by the scruff of the neck and to oblige him to do right. What is the future of the League to be if any nation acts like that? I The British policy in China is, I think, based upon the Note which I issued in December, 1926, and has remained so ever since, whatever the fate of our governments. British policy in international affairs is now, as it has been for years past, based upon the League, and our international action, whenever possible, is to be taken with the League and through the League. It is not in this new world, which comprises the League of Nations, for any country to intervene by itself, ignoring the League, and to take the question out of the League's hands.

5.30 p.m.

The right hon. Gentleman thinks that the League has moved too slowly. It has moved slowly, but I would invite the House to consider a little what its difficulties were. I would invite them to think of the immense distance at which these events were taking place and the difficulty, particularly in the early stages, of obtaining any accurate information, and the impossibility of disentangling the truth from the rival and conflicting stories told by the two Powers principally concerned. On the one side you have a very highly organised and very efficient Government; on the other side, the right hon. Gentleman really must not underrate the difficulties presented to every one by the disorganisation which reigns in China. In my earlier years at the Foreign Office armies were Marching backwards and forwards in civil war. Peking did not recognise the authority of Nanking. You never knew whether Nanking recognised or agreed with the authority in Canton, and even on the eve of these troubles, when it seemed as if the nationalist Government was gaining strength and beginning to take root, there were new internal troubles arising, new marchings of armies, and threats of civil war and a revolt by Canton against Nanking. To what Government, to what authority, was a nation requiring redress for deep grievances to address itself in China I What authority was there at Nanking, the seat of Government, which could guarantee protection for Japanese life in Manchuria What authority was there that could bind all China, as our Government can bind the people in this country and as the Japanese Government can bind their own citizens That disorganisation was much more serious than the right hon. Gentleman seems to suppose. It made the difficulties of a solution much greater, and, if there is any excuse, and I think there was some excuse to be made for the course of action taken by the Japanese, it was to be found partly in the disorganisation of the Government of China and its inability to give protection and satisfaction and partly in the provocation which China had given and was giving at that moment.

I have spoken of the attack on ourselves, and the boycott of our trade. The Japanese Government failed to perceive what was clear to us, in the phrase which I heard used in a Committee room of this House in the interesting address by Sir Frederick Whyte, that the bayonet is not a good answer to the boycott; but do not on that account underrate the provocation of the boycott of the goods of a particular nation by another—widespread, persistent, uninterrupted by the Government of that country, nay more, encouraged by the Government of that country—do not underrate the provocation which that gave.

The right hon. Gentleman, in some of his questions and in some of his sentences to-day, seemed to think that before now the Foreign Secretary ought to have moved the League of Nations to put in force Sanctions against Japan. What Sanctions would they have adopted? Would it have been Article 16 of the Covenant? The most powerful is the economic boycott, and it was that weapon out of the armoury of the Covenant which the Chinese were encouraged to employ, by their Government, against Japan, as they had previously employed it against us. I once ventured to say to the representative of a litigant nation, if I might so call him, before the Council of the League that we had a maxim in our courts of equity—I hope the Foreign Secretary will not say that I am inaccurate—that those who came for relief must come with clean hands. China claims fulfilment of the Treaty, and yet it is not so long ago that the Chinese Government announced that by unilateral action they would terminate international treaties and refuse thereafter to recognise rights which they had contracted to give. Those who come before the League and ask for the enforcement of Treaties ought to be careful to come with clean hands and be careful that they themselves are not open to the same reproaches which they bring against others.

In any international question I suppose it is hardly ever the case, probably never the case, that all the rights are on one side. It is seldom so in any political question. There are always two sides to a question—quite apart from the wrong side. The great difficulties of our domestic life, the great difficulties of international life, arise not because, where right is on one side and wrong on the other, the wrongdoer will not make redress, but because two irreconcilable but equally justifiable rights come into conflict, and that is rather the situation which has happened in the Far East. Do not let us be impatient if the League has taken time. Do not let us be angry and vexed if the League has shown a. consideration for both parties which some of us may think a little exaggerated. After all, the League is but 12 years old.

It has made astonishing progress. It has already won the respect of the nations. See what happened. When the trouble became acute everyone pointed to the League of Nations as the proper judgment seat to which the quarrel should be taken. No longer was there any talk of a repetition of the old scramble that took place when if one Power obtained a settlement all the other Powers had to be compensated, and, whether the trouble was the fault of the Chinese or not, it was always the Chinese that had to pay. The quarrel has been confined to the two parties, and, with growing assent, other nations of the world have come together to express what is the moral judgment of the world upon the quarrel.

I am no believer in the development of the League of Nations by force. The less we hear of the Sanctions of the League the stronger its moral authority will be, and unless its moral authority be strong, whatever the Sanctions are there will not prevent war, but will only come into force as acts of war after war has broken out. If you want to keep the peace, you have to rely on the conciliatory procedure provided in the Covenant.

The experience of these 12 years shows that the effect, slow perhaps, but sure, of argument before the Council, the formation of a world opinion, which requires time, and even a long time, brings a solution of the problem which could not have been reached in any other way.

When I ceased to be the British representative on the Council of the League of Nations I remember saying that I had one great regret. I had been the rapporteur of the Council on the subject of the Hungarian Optants, and how many hours I had spent listening to the arguments on the one side and the other or attempting to reconcile and bring the two parties together, I would not like to say. That work I had to leave unfinished. The committee of which I was chairman had to report that they had found no settlement, but the question was always before the Council and before the world, and the year after I left, this question was settled at The Hague. If we had attempted to risk everything and settle it by force in the early days it would never have been settled at all. Patience, consideration, conciliation, time, those are the weapons of the League and its Sanction is the moral condemnation of the world which gradually finds out which is the party that is unreasonable and brings its condemnation to bear upon that party. That is all I want to say about the Far East situation, except that I hope the Secretary of State will be able to confirm the more hopeful reports which we have been reading in the papers the last few days and tell us that real progress has been made. In spite of all disappointments, and in spite of all that has happened, I still believe that the League will do great service to the world and to the two countries specially engaged in settling this question, and that in so doing it will strengthen its own position and authority for meeting the next crisis which may arise. For that you must give it time, and again time, and you must use no hard or insulting language while the case is before it.

One word about the other subject with which the right hon. Gentleman dealt at the beginning of his speech, namely, the Disarmament Conference, or rather the Disarmament question. The right hon. Gentleman asked my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to tell him against whom the forces of this or that country were directed. That is a rather dangerous question to put across the Floor of the House, and it would be more dangerous for my right hon. Friend to answer it. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will agree that I do not exceed the bounds of discretion if I say that it is my confident belief that none of these armies or naval forces are being piled up against us and, indeed, so far from that being the case, that there is not a nation on the Continent of Europe which would not like to see the British Navy stronger, and which would not be glad if we had something like the old Expeditionary Force in existence today.

I will try to put it briefly. What is the trouble? Moral disarmament has got to proceed and not to follow effective physical disarmament. Nations do not keep armies for the pleasure of wasting their money. In these days, when wars are every man's and every woman's business, nations do not want war, and if they could be assured of safety they would gladly lessen the contribution which they have to make out of the life of the nation in order to conscript armies and to meet military expenditure. It is the lack of security which is the curse of our conditions in Europe to-day. It is the lack of security, or rather the lack of a sense of security—it is not quite the same thing, and sometimes it is quite a different thing—that makes the problem so difficult to settle. There was a passage which the right hon. Gentleman quoted from the Resolution adopted by the Assembly on the Far Eastern question on 11th March, and it is specially noticed and emphasised in the American Note which concludes the White Paper: The Assembly proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above, and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement, which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris. If all nations knew that those from whom danger to them could possibly arise would honour their signature to the Covenant and to the Pact, you would have settled disarmament. It would have settled before now questions like Reparations and War Debts, which are held up only because this question is not settled. It is not the least of the services of the League, in connection with the Far Eastern trouble, that it has reaffirmed the sacredness of treaties pledging the members of the League, in association with the United States, which is not a member of the League, not to recognise changes brought about by force or forceful pressure. If you can get that into the hearts and minds and practices of nations, if you get that, say, between the two great nations of Europe whose relations with one another are so difficult, so inconvenient for the rest of the world, you would get back to the policy that Herr Stresemann and M. Briand pursued together, which gave Europe four years of peace and progress—the firm sanctity of treaties, only to be changed by the assent of all parties. When that is not merely the spoken word but has the moral behind it, conviction of the peoples of all nations, your disarmament will become easy, your troubles will disappear, and you will find that the problems which perplex us so greatly to-day have almost solved themselves before your eyes.

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon)

Everyone who has been in the House to hear the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) will recognise the value of the contribution that he has made, and I must express my personal obligations to him both for the kind references he has made to myself and for the clearness and authority with which he has expounded some of the principles that lie at the very base of British foreign policy, whoever conducts it. I will do my best to limit what I have to say in point of time, for the field is a very large one and I know that there are other Members who would like to take part in the Debate. Therefore, I begin by taking up a certain number of the questions put to me by the Leader of the Opposition, and I will do my best to give a matter-of-fact account of two or three recent occurrences about which he asked me.

First of all about Shanghai. The House will remember that the Special Assembly of the League of Nations on 4th March adopted a Resolution which did this: It recommended that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civil authorities of Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. I think the House will wish to have the latest information which is available about that matter. The first thing to note is, of course, already appreciated. After a, few days of doubt the cessation of hostilities was, in fact, established. That, of course, is a very different thing from making the cessation of hostilities fixed and definite, and still further is it removed from regulating the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. There have been a number of meetings and discussions since the date of the resolution at Shanghai, for this purpose. They have been carried out for the most part under the auspices of Sir Miles Lampson and his colleagues representing the other Governments which I have named. I do not wish to speak too hopefully, for one has learned from Rudyard Kipling of the dangers that lie in wait for anyone who tries to hustle the East, but the latest news is quite definitely encouraging, and this is what it is: Sir Miles Lampson reports that last Saturday was occupied in long and friendly meetings both in the morning and afternoon, as a result of which an agreed formula was reached covering the three essential points that were under discussion. This was drawn up and referred to the two Governments. A further meeting was provisionally fixed for yesterday.

Until a few moments ago, when the First Lord gave me some news, I had not received any official news of this further meeting, though I dare say that Members will have noticed in the "Times" this morning indications that the discussions were bearing fruit. But I am now able to say something more. The Japanese Ambassador came to see me this morning. He told me that orders had been given from Tokio to withdraw from Shanghai waters the greater part of the Japanese warships, whether cruisers, or destroyers or aircraft carriers. Orders have already been given from Tokio to withdraw some of the Japanese land forces, and we have definite information that some of the Japanese troops have been re-embarked. I have just received news that, besides the mixed brigade which has been sent back, the 11th Division of the Japanese army has re-embarked. The re-embarkation began yesterday and should be finished to-day.

The First Lord has been able to inform me now of another matter which is of interest—that the preliminary peace discussions, to which I have just referred, are reported to have closed satisfactorily, and that the formal conference is to take place to-morrow. I should have added, perhaps, that my information is that of the Japanese navy in these waters five cruisers, 16 destroyers and two aircraft carriers are leaving Chinese waters. Japan is reducing her naval forces to something which is not very much greater than what they are in normal times in that part of the world. The First Lord tells me that the First and Third destroyer squadrons and the First aircraft squadron have actually sailed. I am very far from saying that this news, encouraging as it is, is the same thing as having secured the final arrangements which will be necessary before this part of the Far Eastern trouble is at any rate terminated so far as the definite stopping of fighting is concerned. I quite agree with the right bon. Gentleman that that is not the only thing to be considered. Still it is a definite and a satisfactory piece of news. I am very glad that the information has come to hand at this moment.

6.0 p.m.

The British policy in this matter has really been consistent throughout. I am perfectly aware that in some quarters it has been supposed that the action has been too slow. It is the privilege of the critics, and it is quite right that they should exercise it, to point out that there might be, in their view, other and better ways of conducting a very critical subject. But I would define British policy in this way: We have done our utmost, with the invaluable assistance on the spot of our own representatives, diplomatic and consular, naval and military, to hold the scales fairly in a very difficult controversy, and to carry out faithfully the principles of the League of Nations. We have supported and carried out its principles and provisions to the uttermost. It is some satisfaction for a man who has been representing his country at Geneva to know that at every stage when the Council or the Assembly of the League reached a decision which involved the giving of aid on the spot, they never failed to turn to this country, among others, as the country which they knew was both able and willing to assist them. In the second place, I would say that British policy has consisted in this. We have very earnestly striven to co-operate with the other Powers especially interested in Shanghai. No advantage at all was to be gained if we were to take up a sort of position of priority or special virtue. The duty of a. faithful member of the League is to be available and ready to help to carry out the policy and the purposes of the League, as a member of the League. Whereas, some weeks ago I read many criticisms suggesting that British policy had failed to keep step with the United States, there is nothing from which the House of Commons as a whole can take more satisfaction than the last document which is printed in this new White Paper. There, after the Resolution of 11th March, for the carrying of which this country was in a large degree responsible, we have an official communication from the United States Government in which, through their representative, they express their gratification at the action taken by the Assembly of the League. The communication goes on to say: My Government as one of the Powers which has special interests in the Shanghai Settlement has already authorised its representatives at Shanghai to assist in co-operation with the representatives of other Powers, similarly situated toward the consummation of those objectives. I have the best reason for saying that now, after what I know has seemed to some an unhappily long period, we have reached a point in this matter where we are able to say that the United States are joining with ourselves and other great Powers in the Far East in endeavouring to promote the essential purposes which belong to the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) said a word or two, and I am very glad he did so, on his view of the way in which the League of Nations can most properly act in a case like this. Patience, time, conciliation—he expounded that philosophy. I wish to associate myself with him in this way. My own view has been, from the time I first studied this question, with all my might and main, that this Far Eastern case was a case where the League of Nations was most likely to be useful as a mediating force. Constant references to the stick that the League is supposed to have in the cupboard, is not the very best way to secure compliance with advice, or to exert influence as a great world organisation; and I would say with great respect to those who, for a moment, thought otherwise, that it is, I think, a mistake to assume that the League of Nations necessarily gains in effective strength in a case like this, by constant references to the fact that in its armoury there is the weapon of sanctions.

The authority which the League really exercises is founded upon its position as the authorised exponent and interpreter of world opinion, and that is one of the most terrific forces in nature. As my right hon. Friend has well said, the League has gathered in the last 12 years an immense fund of authority and of strength in that respect. It concentrates and gives expression to the better and calmer judgment of the civilised world in a way which was quite impossible in the days before the Great War. But, if I may speak quite frankly, anybody who has been in close touch with the proceedings and the discussions at Geneva during the last few months must be conscious of this—that the existence in certain events of powers of a coercive character, lodged in the League by its Constitution, does not necessarily add in every instance to the effective strength of the League as a mediating force. Some States may hesitate to join whole-heartedly in a declaration of principle for fear of the ultimate liability that may come upon them in taking action. Other States may feel less inclined to accept the guidance of the League because they resent the suggestion of such intervention.

The truth is that when public opinion, world opinion, is sufficiently strong and unanimous to pronounce a firm moral condemnation, sanctions are not needed. Yet that is the class of case in which sanctions would be most likely to be applied and while, therefore, Britain will stand most firmly by its obligations under every Article of the Covenant—and nothing that I have said in the least degree suggests the opposite—I suggest to all who study this subject that it is best to keep the coercive and the mediatory functions of the League distinct, and that this has been proved to be a case in which the effective action of the League is best applied by mediatory and conciliatory action. I think there were a great many people some weeks ago who believed that this view, which I have held throughout, might lead to some weakness in the pronouncement which the League would make. Not at all. The Resolution carried by the special Assembly on 11th March—and I am most grateful to the Leader of the Opposition for what he very kindly said about my part in it—contains some extremely strong expressions and they are expressions that this country will stand by, and that every member of the League is bound to stand by. It is a Resolution which proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris. I invite the attention of the House to the fact that the Assembly of the League included a reference to the Pact of Paris, and that that reference was deliberately made by the members of the Assembly, and was the circumstance which brought to us the comforting assurance of the strong support and sympathy of the United States. In the same way, this Resolution, passed without a dissentient voice, affirms: That it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either party. It is exactly for that reason that I have been very glad to see that, as far as Shanghai is concerned, there is this very considerable withdrawal of Japanese forces at the present time. It is perfectly plain that in this extremely complicated matter no one can pronounce a judgment, in five minutes and without considering all sorts of complications. It is clear that if you are going to reach a fair conclusion, wherever the rights and wrongs may lie, it cannot be reached under the immediate pressure of military force. I agree that this method of procedure which has been followed has been slower, and has been less exciting. I think I noticed that a distinguished critic of it the other day was pleased to describe it as "nothing but feebleness and poltroonery," but I am prepared to stand here and defend it, and to say that I believe that it is by far the most effective way in which to exert the influence which this country rightly exerts, instead of by attempting less practical and I dare say more spectacular methods.

May I say a word about Manchuria—a very, very, difficult question which will require, and I have no doubt, receive, on a later occasion, much more elaborate discussion than is possible to-day in this comparatively short Debate. Let me first say that while I recognise—nobody more sincerely—that the Leader of the Opposition took no side, that he was merely presenting matters as he knew them, and was doing so, certainly, in the fairest spirit, at the same time I am a little surprised that his information should coincide with what is said by one side on this matter, but does not include what is said on the other side. The right hon. Gentleman asked me just now what I had to say with reference to a communication from the Chinese delegation to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in which it is stated by the Chinese Government that according to information from the Inspector-General of Customs the Japanese Consul at Antung in Manchuria had asked Mr. Talbot, the Commissioner of Customs, to be prepared to hand over his functions and so forth. Obviously the right hon. Gentleman did not know of it, but I have in my hand an equally public document on the other side, which at least ought to be put into the scale. This is a communication which was sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and was circulated to the Assembly a few days afterwards, from the Japanese delegation. It refers to this communication from the Chinese delegation. It says: I have the honour to inform you that our Consul in that town informed Mr. H. M. Talbot, Customs Commissioner, of the contents of the Chinese communication and that the latter has replied to the following effect: (1) That he had been officially informed by the Superintendent of the arrival of the Japanese adviser; (2) that paragraph (1) of the Chinese communication is incorrect; (3) that the last part of paragraph (2) concerning the declarations of the Consul also incorrect; (4) that he (Mr. Talbot) in his telegram to Inspector-General Maze had expressed a personal opinion and had reported current rumours but that he had certainly not attributed to the Japanese Consul the statements which Mr. Soong's telegram alleged him to have made. I am not more anxious than the right hon. Gentleman to defend one side rather than the other but it is just as well that we should realise that in this as in so many other matters there is a considerable challenge as to the facts between the two sides.

Mr. LANSBURY

May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that a question was put to him yesterday, and I think his answer was that he had no information on this matter?

Sir J. SIMON

No, I think not. I think I gave the right hon. Gentleman all the information which I could give him.

Mr. LANSBURY

But if the right hon. Gentleman had not the information why should I have it?

Sir J. SIMON

I am not criticising anybody. I am only saying that, in fact, these two documents stand side by side and we must realise that we are in the presence of a clash of statements, for and against. The matter actually stands, as far as I can discover, in this way. The House probably knows that the administration of the Chinese maritime Customs is an exceedingly important matter, not only for China, but for others also, because the Chinese Customs are, to a certain extent, charged with the liability of paying on foreign loans. There is an Inspector-General of Customs, who is a British subject, and under him are a number of Commissioners, but the actual administration of the Chinese Customs is in Chinese hands. It has happened more than once—it is not very unusual in China—that some section or province announces that it proposes to set up a separate government, but when that has happened questions have arisen, as is now the case, as to how the unity of the Chinese Customs administration was to be preserved. Hitherto I believe it has been effected in this way: A certain portion of the receipts of the Customs in the area in question is transmitted according to a standing arrangement to the banks which receive it. I think it amounts to the equivalent of a 5 per cent. import or Customs duty on what passes through those ports, and that is the fund out of which the foreign loans are primarily served. The balance, whatever it is, is retained by the Chinese authorities. I have no information to suggest that that, which is an arrangement which has been made in other cases, is not an arrangement which is capable of being made in the case of Manchuria. It is the fact that there has been some communication to the Customs representatives there suggesting that Japanese advisers should be sent; it is not the fact, so far as I know, that anyone has attempted to dispossess the present authorities, and certainly we should take, and I think other countries would take, very grave and serious notice indeed of any suggestion that the Customs service of China was going to be so dealt with as to interfere prejudicially with the undoubted rights which various foreign interests have over the Customs which are charged with the repayment of the loans.

As to the suggestion that there is to be set up in Manchuria some separate State, let me put that matter in its true perspective. The right hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate appeared to assume, because he said it several times over, that as a matter of fact this new authority, whatever it is, is simply an authority set up by and under the support of Japan. It may be so, but no one is entitled to say so as an accepted fact, except on the principle that one is at liberty to pronounce judgment without waiting for an inquiry and in the face of the denial of one of the parties.

Mr. LANSBU RY

But she has occupied the territory.

Sir J. SIMON

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman wishes to take up the position that, because he does not himself accept a particular proposition as true, therefore he scouts it as ridiculous. I would merely point out that in fact the Japanese Government has declared that it is no more likely to recognise that administration than any other, and does not admit that it is an administration which it has itself set up. I say nothing one way or the other. I am not defending the one side or the other, but it really will not do in these matters to accept as gospel information which is prejudicial to one side and to refuse to wait for an inquiry, if the inquiry is necessary. When the right hon. Gentleman spoke just now about waiting for the report of the Commission, I do not ask him to wait so far as regards the influence and the advice of the League of Nations—not at all—but I do say that in these matters of controversial facts it is quite manifest that we ought to wait, and certainly the League of Nations must wait, for the report of its own Commission, which was appointed with the authority and by the vote of both China and Japan. It did not, so far as I know, waste any time in getting to work, and very naturally in the circumstances it has gone to Shanghai first, because its terms of reference cover Shanghai as well as Manchuria.

In the meantime, the right hon. Gentleman may rest perfectly assured that this alleged new administration in Manchuria is not an administration which I should think any country is likely prematurely to recognise. In the first place, nobody does recognise a Government which is set up in a portion of an area which has previously been regarded as one, not even in the case of China, without the fullest inquiry as to all the circumstances. We should need to be quite certain, as a matter of fact, that you had a responsible Government, that you had a Government which would really administer the territory, that you had a Government which would really enter into relations with foreign States, and that you had a Government which really was the genuine expression of the decisions of the neighbourhood to which you refer. In our case we are parties to the Nine Power Treaty, and it is a matter of the greatest importance that we, as well as every other party to that Treaty, should see to it that we do not encourage or countenance what might be a disregard or a violation of Chinese territorial administration. At the same time, there is no law, and there is no common sense in saying, that in no conceivable circumstance can there ever be a subdivision of an enormous area like China, for as a matter of fact the rising up, in this province or that, of an administration claiming to have a certain amount of independence is by this time a commonplace in Chinese matters, and I have never heard the matter challenged before.

May I, in conclusion, say a word as to what I claim that the policy which I am defending has helped to establish? I am not at all anxious to contend that Britain in this matter has been playing a lone hand. On the contrary, I think it to be part of the justification of our policy that, in accordance with the advice given from some quarters, we have endeavoured to co-operate with others. I will put the matter in this way, and anyone who has been in Geneva during the last two or three months will be conscious of this: There have been four very considerable topics of anxiety and difficulty, each of them difficult, but still more difficult to reconcile one with another.

First of all—-and I deliberatey put it first—there is the duty, which was on this country as well as upon other countries, so to use its influence as to support as best it could, loyally and effectively, the principles of the League. Secondly, there is the duty, which I think every Foreign Secretary for Britain should regard as resting upon his shoulders, of so conducting his part of the matter as not to involve his own country in a situation which could only extend the difficulty. Thirdly, there is the difficulty, which constantly arises at Geneva, and of which I make no complaint, but which none the less has always to be watched and guarded against, of the possibility of a fissure arising, a difference arising, between the small States and the great States which have special responsibilities or opportunities. Fourthly—and the House will always bear this in mind—there is the tremendous question of whether the policy which Britain pursues at Geneva can be so conducted as to earn and to secure the sympathy of the United States of America.

Those are four things not very easy to reconcile in any case and, in connection with the Far East, perhaps almost more difficult to reconcile than in any other case that you could imagine, with the principles of the League, a thing which we all stand by; and it is useless to deny what Lord Grey pointed out in his speech a few days ago, that as a matter of fact the Far East provides in some respects very special difficulties. The duty of seeing that British policy is conducted along the ways which promise peace and security is a duty which presses specially upon us, when one thinks of the special relations of Britain with the Far East. The difficulty that arises when the small States of the League tend to take a different line from the great States of the League is at its maximum when you have a very large number of small States, from South America and other parts of the world, which are just as devoted to the principles of the Covenant as the rest of us and which, in the nature of things, have no conceivable direct and immediate interest or risk in these Far Eastern problems. Lastly, it is not an easy thing to find a course which can be steered between your duty as a member of the League of Nations and the interest of preserving the full sympathy and respect of the Americans across the sea, who have declined to sign the Covenant.

I make this claim, not in the least for myself, but for the Assembly of the League itself, that the result to-day, imperfect as the accomplishment may be in many respects, anxious as the future is, has been to reconcile those four considerations. No man who fairly examines the Resolution of the Special Assembly of the League could dream of disputing that it is a sturdy, firm assertion of the essential principles upon which the Covenant of the League is based, and of the application of those principles to the matter in hand. In the second place, I am very happy to think that British policy to-day, whatever may be its shortcomings and its imperfections, at any rate is a policy which has kept us on terms of perfectly friendly relations both with China and Japan. In the third place, though I have no doubt of the special anxieties of the smaller States, I report to the House, and it is a literal fact, that when on the 11th March the Resolution of the Assembly was carried, there was a very happy indication of a reconciliation between the views of small States and great, and an acknowledgment that the great States had not, out of timidity in respect of their own responsibilities, failed to affirm what ought to be affirmed by everybody who believes in the League of Nations.

Lastly, while representatives of America are at Geneva in connection with the Disarmament Conference, and therefore sitting there as part of the audience while the debate was proceeding on the floor of the Assembly, I am entitled to claim, because it is officially reported now, that the Government of the United States recognise that the declarations which the Assembly made are declarations entirely in the spirit and along the lines which America would like to see adopted and, as I have reminded the House, with which the United States in this matter is prepared to co-operate and associate herself. There is a very great deal of difficult work to do still, but I am very glad that this Debate has taken place, because it has given me the opportunity of making this report to the House, of thanking the right hon. Gentleman opposite and my right hon. Friend behind me for the kind references which they made to our efforts, and of asking that the House and the country shall put some confidence in this great organisation, much the best hope for peace in the world that is to be, which I agree has gone to work sometimes slowly and sometimes disappoints those who are its keenest friends, but which has shown itself in the present instance an invaluable influence on the side of peace and of reconciliation.

6.30 p.m.

Mr. COCKS

The right hon. Gentleman in his opening remarks said that on an occasion like this it was natural to remind oneself of the fate of the man who, in Kipling's phrase, "tried to hustle the East." I do not think that right hon. Gentleman need fear that fate, or that there will be erected upon his grave the "tombstone white" inscribed with the "epitaph drear" of Mr. Kipling's poem. When he suggests that the action of the League has not been too slow, I would point out that, although we are very pleased to hear of what has happened at Shanghai, and, although the resolution that was passed by the League of Nations in respect of Shanghai is quite satisfactory in every way, yet if this dispute had taken place between two well-equipped Western Powers and the League had not been able to bring about a result by mediatory action until after six months, and alter several thousands of people had been killed, it would not have had in all likelihood any opportunity of mediating at all. I will adopt the suggestion of the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain) and avoid the us of harsh terms which would make the situation more difficult. I have no intention of doing that. But I wish that the right hon. Member for West Birmingham had not in his speech, which was supposed to be an impartial summing up of the situation between the two Powers, shown so much sympathy for Japan; it was, I thought, to use his own phrase, a little exaggerated. After all, it was China which was attacked, and the Chinese people who were slaughtered.

However, we all ought to take part in this discussion with a feeling of great responsibility, and I do not intend to say anything which might possibly render the task of His Majesty's Government any more difficult than it is. We have other responsibilities in this House; we have responsibilities towards the League of Nations, towards international peace, and towards the security of the Empire of which we form a part, and it may be necessary sometimes for a private Member to say things which it would be very inconvenient for a Minister of the Crown to say. The Foreign Secretary said certain things about the League of Nations with which I am in wholehearted agreement. On 22nd February, he said in this House: The British Government will direct the full influence of Britain, in conjunction with other Powers, whether they are members of the League or not, to support the moral authority of the League of Nations. … I say on behalf of the British Government, and on my own behalf, with deep conviction, that it is only by affirming with boldness and sincerity the principles of the League that we shall find the best means of restoring peace."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd February, 1932; col. 181, Vol. 262.] At Geneva on 7th March he said: The preservation of the authoritative influence of the League is the best hope for the future of the world. He said much the same thing to-night in his concluding remarks. We on this side of the House support that wholeheartedly. The League of Nations is the one good thing which came from the War. It is the one hope in the international field for the future of humanity. There are certain people in this country who, unfortunately, wield a very great power who always seem to be trying to crab the League of Nations. The newspapers under their control, with large circulations, give very little space to the proceedings of the League, and their actions show that it would fill them with exultation if the League of Nations disappeared altogether. Such men as these are enemies of reason, if not enemies of civilisation. They are like a couple of intoxicated men in a garden trampling on the flower-beds, and crushing with their clumsy feet the buds and the promise of spring. We know that the League is weak and young, and that it is not so strong as it will be one day, but it is the one secure thing we have in a shifting and changing and always dangerous world. It is our duty to build it up as a strong tower, to garrison it with the forces of democracy, and with its help to set up a system of international law and international peace.

Therefore, it was with some feelings of consternation that those of us who feel like that about the League of Nations realised last Autumn that certain actions that were taking place seemed, to say the least, rather inconsistent with the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. We feel that if these actions had been condoned, and if the results had been accepted, it would have been very dark for the future of the world. In saying that, I am not criticising the Japanese people. They are a very fine race and have fine qualities. The Germans also have fine qualities, and I am given to understand that the Japanese constitution in some respects is like that of Germany before the War, that is to say, that the Army and the Navy are not entirely under the control of the civil authorities, and that the leaders of the Army and Navy have direct access to the Emperor and are able to take action which is not wholly supported by their Government. That is a point which ought to be borne in mind in considering this question, because it makes it much more difficult than it would otherwise be.

With regard to Manchuria, contrary to the opinion which has been expressed in many newspapers and by many people, that country is not, and never can be, an outlet for the growing surplus population of Japan. A great many people say that the Japanese population is increasing rapidly and that there is nowhere for them to go, but that Manchuria is near and a very suitable place for them. As a matter of fact, the climatic conditions are unsuitable to the Japanese, who are very susceptible to extremes of temperature. Manchuria is extremely cold in winter and hot in summer, and for that reason the Japanese will not go there. A great deal of Japanese capital has been invested there, however, and Japanese business men have helped to develop the country, but only about 300,000 Japanese are there among a population of nearly 30,000,000 Chinese. This Chinese population is growing at the rate of nearly 1,000,000 a year, which is about equal to the increase of the population of Japan. Manchuria, then, can never be a Japanese colony. It is a Chinese province and cannot be regarded as an outlet for the Japanese. It is a country with very rich resources, both mineral and vegetable, and has a complicated diplomatic history into which I do not intend to go.

Again, I must bring to the notice of the House, as I did the other night, a particular treaty which affects this question —that is, the Nine-Power Treaty. I want to refer to three Clauses of the first Article of the Treaty. By this Treaty, to which Japan, America and ourselves are parties the signatories agree to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government; and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and countenancing action inimical to the security of such States. That, as the "Times" said the other day, is a self-denying ordinance. The "Times" on 11th March went on to say: Other countries that signed with them"— that is, the Japanese— the self-denying ordinances of the China treaties cannot afford to let one country gain selfish advantages by disregarding conditions Which they commonly imposed upon themselves. We shall all agree to that. The next point I want to mention is Article 7, by which the parties agreed that there shall be full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned whenever a situation arose which involved the application of the Treaty in the opinion of any one of them. In 1928, Count Uchida came to Europe to sign the Kellogg Pact. While he was here he visited London in order to explain Japanese policy. On his return to Japan, rumours spread that there had been some alteration in policy and a closer rapprochement between ourselves and Japan. It was even rumoured that it was possible that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was to be renewed. Colour was given to that rumour by a speech which was given by the Lord President of the Council, who was then Prime Minister, at the Lord Mayor's banquet, in which he said: The spirit of the historic Anglo-Japanese alliance still flourishes, and constitutes one of the strongest guarantees of peace in the Far East. As a result of that statement, questions were put in the House to the then Foreign Minister, who replied in this way on 28th November: Relations between Great Britain and Japan …. are based on the obligations of full and frank communication specified in Article 7 of the Washington China Treaty, of 1922 …. In these circumstances the two Governments have agreed informally"— I suppose that that was on the occasion of the visit of Count Uchida— that the close contact which they desire to maintain can best be promoted and developed by constant communication and consultation between their respective Ministers at Yekin."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th November, 1928; col. 395, Vol. 223.] Has this full, frank and constant communication taken place between this country and the Japanese Government during the last nine or 12 months? If it has regarding Manchuria, then we have a certain responsibility for what has been happening. If it has not taken place, it means that the Japanese Government have infringed the special pledge to us as well as the public pledge given in the Nine-Power Treaty. I put that question the other night, but the Under-Secretary did not reply owing to pressure of time, and if he replies to-night I shall be grateful.

Let me come to some of the difficulties in Manchuria. I am not one of those who say that the Japanese in Manchuria have no grievance. As the Foreign Secretary said, until we have full evidence we have no right to say that. I have no doubt that they have many grievances in connection with their treaties, with the land question, and with a certain amount of trouble with some of the people with whom they have to deal. Our contention is that all those disputes could have been settled by reference to arbitration or the League of Nations, but the Japanese Government persistently refused to agree to this course. It is not a matter of waiting for the evidence, but a question of the attitude of the Japanese Govern- ment on that point of principle. If the Japanese had agreed to arbitration upon this case we could suspend judgment, but when they say, "We will not arbitrate at all," we reply that up to now, at any rate, judgment must go against them, because they have failed to use the machinery for dealing with such cases set up by the League of Nations to which they had agreed as a member of the League.

Anyhow, these grievances resulted last summer in a great many regrettable incidents. There was a dispute between Korean farmers and Chinese farmers in Manchuria, and certain people were killed, and following upon that there were rather serious anti-Chinese riots in Korea in which many Chinese were killed, and, it is alleged, a great deal of damage was done to Chinese property. Then there was the case of the Japanese officer who, while on some mysterious errand in the interior of Manchuria, was killed—it was thought, he was murdered. Nobody knows what he was doing there at the time. That led to strained relations between the two States. On 18th September, the Japanese alleged that certain sleepers had been taken from the railway, that some slight damage had been done. I have not been to the place, but I have seen photographs which show that it was a quite trivial thing, and, of course, the Chinese stated that they had not done it. Anyhow, on that night the Japanese military authorities seized Mukden and the chief places on the railway, and by the way they acted it looked as though the whole thing had been carefully planned beforehand.

The Chinese immediately appealed to the League—on 21st September. On the next day the Council of the League, showing that they did not altogether mind trying to hustle the East, appealed to the two Governments to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation, and resolved, in consultation with China and Japan, to find means to enable the Japanese troops to be withdrawn to the railway zone. The Japanese troops have a right by treaty to occupy the railway zone to guard the railway, and not the right to go beyond it, as they had done on that occasion. China agreed to that, but Japan said, "No, we are acting in self defence—although we have withdrawn part of our troops to the zone and we intend to withdraw more as the situation improves." The Council adjourned till 14th October. The Japanese did not withdraw, because presumably the situation did not improve. It was not likely to improve as long as Japanese soldiers were going to places where the inhabitants did not wish them to go.

Repeated protests were made by the League and the United States, but Japan extended her operations and bombarded Chin Chow from the air. Chin Chow had become the seat of Government after the Japanese had captured Mukden. The Japanese military authorities stated that they would not recognise Chinese administration in Manchuria. Whether they were authorised to do so by the civil Government of Japan I do not know, but the Japanese military authorities made that declaration as far back as the beginning of October. On 13th October the Council met again. They called upon Japan to withdraw to the railway zone before 16th November, and upon China to take measures to ensure the safety of the lives of the Japanese people. China accepted that request, but Japan said that any evacuation would have to depend upon a preliminary agreement on certain fundamental principles. As the House knows, they would not for some considerable time state what those fundamental principles were, but eventually it was discovered that what they regarded as fundamental principles were certain treaty rights which they had with China regarding Manchuria. Japan refused to lay those treaties on the table of the League of Nations, and stated that they were going to settle the matter by direct negotiations. On 26th October, China offered to refer all these principles to arbitration, but again Japan refused. Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese representative of the League and now the Japanese Foreign Minister, said in a speech in Paris: The Japanese Government is determined to arrive at an understanding which will compel China to fulfil the treaty obligations before the withdrawal of troops to the railway zone is begun. Meanwhile, troops were continuously moved forward, and it was reported then that a new State was to be set up and that the boy ex-Emperor of China, who was in Japanese territory, was to be appointed President.

On 16th November, the date by which Japan had been requested to withdraw, the Council met again. There was a complete deadlock. It was the first meeting of the Council which our present Foreign Minister had attended. A long discussion took place, but Japan refused to allow these particular treaties which were in dispute to be discussed by the League or have the matter settled by arbitration. The peculiar thing about these treaties is that it is not clear to anybody what they are. Certain of them were secret treaties, and certain of them the Chinese say they have never signed. Perhaps the most important treaty was that in which, as Japan alleged, China had signed an agreement to say that she would not construct any railways in Manchuria without first consulting Japan. Japan has suggested that other railways have been constructed by the Chinese and by other people with foreign capital which will cut across the interests of their own railway in Manchuria and take trade from it. The Chinese say they have never signed that particular treaty, and are willing to go to arbitration about it or to submit it to judicial arbitrament at The Hague, but the Japanese refuse to agree to that. Eventually the League decided to send a Commission to Manchuria to find out all about the dispute, but it was a Commission with limited powers—powers which had been limited as a result of Japanese pressure which had been brought to bear to alter the original terms under which it had been suggested the Commission should act.

Without wishing to be hypercritical, most of the criticisms I have heard and read of the action of the Foreign Secretary centre about that Council. It has been stated, and I am sure the Foreign Secretary knows it has been stated, that he should have taken a stronger line at that particular Council. That Council meeting almost stultified itself by its action at that moment. I read in a paper, although I do not say whether it is true or not, that his attitude was that although the Japanese were technically wrong they were morally right—that that was the line of action which he was taking. On 24th November another incident of an unhappy character occurred. The Japanese Government had given a formal undertaking to Mr. Stimson not to occupy Chin Chow, but in spite of that they ordered the Chinese troops to withdraw beyond the Great Wall and occupied Chin Chow, and so, by the beginning of this year, practically the whole of Manchuria was occupied by Japanese military forces. The Chinese had withdrawn. It must be said on behalf of the Chinese Government that they did not use military means to stop the Japanese advance. They put their whole case into the hands of the League of Nations, and in many cases their troops were ordered not to resist but to withdraw peacefully.

As bearing on the question of the independent State which has been set up in Manchuria, during all this time there were continual rumours of an independent State being formed. They came from Japanese sources; indeed, there was hardly anybody else in Manchuria who could say anything, because most of the news about Manchuria came through Tokio. Confirmation was furnished by the Japanese commander-in-chief of the fact that an independent State was going to be formed in a statement that all relations with China were to be cut off. It was not a statement by a, minor commander, but by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in Manchuria, General Honjo. Questions were asked in this House, and I submit that the Government, being apprised of these things, and knowing it was probable that an independent State was to be formed, which would complicate matters very much indeed, ought to have used certain diplomatic influences to inform the Government of Tokio that we should not regard the formation of that State in a friendly way but would think it undesirable. On 9th March the new State was actually formed.

My criticism of the Foreign Secretary is summed up in this way. We regret that at the Council meetings in November he did not take a stronger line. We regret that on 7th January, when the American Note was issued, and America warned Japan that she would not recognise the legality of any situation de facto or any treaty or agreement entered into between the two Governments as a result of force, that we in this country did not support her action. We feel that by our not supporting America at that time encouragement was given to the extreme military party in Japan. If we had supported America then the new State might not have been proclaimed, as it was on 9th March. This is possible too—this is something which if it is true we must regret—that if stronger action had been taken at that time Shanghai would not have been invaded, and many lives would have been saved. Anyhow, whether it was due to our inaction or not, a peculiarly difficult situation has been created by the establishment of this new State.

7.0 p.m.

I do not want to say very much about Shanghai, but there is one thing I would like to say. The operations of the Japanese in Manchuria naturally caused a great deal of indignation in China. We have heard a good about the boycott, but the action of a Japanese army in seizing a whole province naturally caused very great indignation and a severe boycott of Japan did follow; perhaps it was the only weapon, as it was the most powerful weapon, which China could use. As a result there were disturbances in Shanghai—a very small affair which could easily have been localised. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Office itself said that it was an affair which could be settled on the spot by the Japanese Consul-General and the Mayor of Shanghai, and, in fact, it was so settled, for when the Japanese Consul-General sent his ultimatum to the Mayor of Shanghai it was accepted by the Mayor and not only accepted by him but accepted to his satisfaction. When the Foreign Secretary made the admirable statement he did make on the Shanghai situation a few weeks ago, I rather regret that he omitted, by inadvertence, I am sure, to mention that the Japanese Consul-General had accepted the reply of the Mayor of Shanghai as satisfactory. We all know what has happened since then. In spite of the repeated protests from the League, from America and from the local authorities at Shanghai, Shanghai was invaded, troops were poured into the place, reinforcements were sent and an attack was made on a large scale. On 25th February, after the attack had started, there came that remarkable letter from Mr. Stimson which, I dare say, had considerable influence at the March meeting at the Assembly. What happened then was that the Japanese were faced with the united disapproval of the world and by the heroic resistance of the Chinese troops, whose action must not be under-estimated in this matter. As I have had to criticise the Foreign Minister, I would now like to say that I congratulate him upon his efforts in carrying the resolution which was eventually adopted by the Assembly. I believe that he had a good deal to do with the form actually taken by that resolution, which brought the League of Nations into line with the position taken up by the United States.

I want to say a word about the position of Manchuria as it is to-clay. What is the position there? What is the treaty position, and what is the position of His Majesty's Government? There is the Nine-Power Treaty, and there is the gloss or the explanation which has been put upon that Treaty by the Foreign Minister at that time, the right hon. Member for West Birmingham, who said on 13th July, 1928: The Government regard Manchuria as being part of China; they do not recognise Japan as having any special interests in that territory, other than those conferred by Treaty."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th July, 1928; col. 2637, Vol. 219.] On 30th July, in the same year, he said: We do not recognise Manchuria as anything but a part of China. We recognise that Japan has great interests in Manchuria …. But our interest is in a united China under one Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th July, 1928; col. 1835, Vol. 220.] Then we have the Note from America: The United States Government does not intend to recognise any situation or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris. Then we have Mr. Stimson's letter which visualises the possible revision of the Washington Treaty and of the London Naval Treaty, if the situation in the Far East is not rectified in accordance with the principles which he has enunciated. Finally, we have this League Assembly declaration: Any infringement of territorial integrity or any change of political independence brought about in contravention of the Covenenat is not to be recognised by members of the League. Similarly, having regard to the article of the Pact of Paris it is incumbent upon members of the League not to recognise any settlement or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant. Having regard to that series of statements, the British Government should, I think, acting, of course, in conjunction with the League of Nations and the United States of America, refuse to recognise at any time and in any circum- stances what seems to me, in spite of the fact that the legal mind of the Foreign Minister asks us to suspend judgment, to be a Japanese puppet state.

I do not wish to say anything which would cause the task of His Majesty's Government to be harder. I will not refer therefore to what has been published in books and papers, and especially broadcast in America, as to the aims of, shall I say, the military party in Japan in occupying Manchuria. As everybody knows, certain very grave statements have been made. It might not be wise to go any further into that matter at present. If those statements are correct, it would mean that unless a satisfactory settlement is made now of this question, and if the position in Manchuria is not regularised according to the Covenants of the League of Nations and of the Treaties that have been contracted by ourselves and by Japan, a very serious situation might arise in the future, which would affect the safety and integrity of the British Empire. Let this country stand very firmly on the side of international law. Let us show to the Japanese people that their grievances can best be dealt with by relying upon the common justice of the world; that the grievances both of Japan and China may be removed in that way by reasonable settlement and by quiet discussion of their aims round a table, or by judicial arbitration; that the Japanese people can get better results from such a proceeding, and that the future will be more satisfying in every way if they will rely upon arbitration by reason, rather than upon the self-slaying weapon of the sword.

Sir RENNELL RODD

Opportunities for discussing foreign questions are very rare in this House, but when they do occur, the field of range is generally retricted. The subjects under review, Manchuria, Shanghai and Disarmament, appear to me to be an invitation to consider the position of the League of Nations, which has been, to some extent, on its trial, for this country and for the world. I do not think that one really can consider the armaments question without going a little more deeply than has been done to-day into the position of the League of Nations as it stands. I have risen to defend the League of Nations in its action, which has been very widely criticised by opposing schools of feeling which appear to do so without very much consideration for the history of the recent crisis, and without any due recognition of the very great benefits we have already received from the existence of the League of Nations. Having been twice a delegate to the League of Nations, I have formed an opinion, to which to some extent I still adhere, as to the obstacles which must exist in the realisation of the ideal conception of the League of Nations, at any rate for the present. The first is inherent in the constitution of the League itself, which has to be composed of nations in different stages of the national development, exhibiting very varying degrees in their social, ethical and moral evolution.

Another obstacle which is certainly not inherent, has been the introduction into the League of Nations of the group system, owing to the contraction almost immediately after the War of a great system of alliances, which naturally constitute a very dominant factor in the equation in Europe, and which may be expected to act as a single bloc. I have always believed that alliances were contrary to the best conception of the League of Nations. However, there they are. They have had certain very distinct results. They mean the encircling, and not only the encircling, of a certain number of Powers, against whom they were in the first instance directed in the interests of security. They have almost meant the isolation of other States. This is incidental only, but that very isolation has compelled those other States to contemplate forming counterbalancing groups, and it has tended to make them increase instead of diminish their armaments. It is particularly in the interests of the Disarmament question, that I have drawn attention to the danger to the League of Nations of the group system which grew up almost with its first inception. That is not all, because a system of alliances which might be able, on a mobilisation order, to put something like 6,000,000 men in the field in a very few days, must constitute a very dominant factor in the councils of an international assembly, and it must even affect economic questions and economic issues. Therefore, we naturally tend to increase the exasperation and the resentment of those countries which felt that they are excluded, and tend therefore to diminish the prospect of any permanent settlement in Europe.

In directing attention to this conception, I am not dealing with the Eastern question, but rather with the European question, and with the general aspect of the League of Nations with regard to Disarmament. The formation of those groups is really the return to the old game of the balance of power, of which we, in the old days, were considered to be the most zealous exponents. In the fundamental principles of the League of Nations, there should be no room for the old game of the balance of power. Those considerations affect principally the question of Disarmament and the European situation. They do not touch the very complicated issue which has arisen in the Far East, in regard to which there has been very much criticism—unjust as I regard it—of the action of the League, especially in recent months. We notice in this country two opposing sections that have recently combined in criticising the action of the League of Nations. The one group has evidently never had any real sympathy with the League of Nations, derives a sort of malicious pleasure from the League having failed to prevent military action and maintains that the impotence of the League has been practically demonstrated. The views of the more earnest supporters and partisans of the other group generally find expression on the platforms of the League of Nations Union, or in letters to the Press through the officers of the League of Nations Union. Those views affirm that Japan has deliberately violated the Covenant and credit her with far-reaching ambitions of Asiatic dominance. It is even suggested that her action is a menace to British Dominions, and we are called upon to take measures, and to institute an economic blockade—a first act of war—and in the interests of the world's peace to incur the risks and let lose the rancours of international conflict. In their view, the League must either act on those lines or acknowledge defeat; and action in the present instance could, it seems to me, only be contemplated by one Power within the League.

What has been the action of the League? Has it not been in accordance with its legitimate and most essential functions, namely, to gain time and to bring the moral opinion of the world to bear upon a serious conflict, with a view to finding an ultimate solution? I do not propose to enter into the merits of the Manchurian dispute, and I would only commend those who jump at facile conclusions to study its historical antecedents over some 30 years since the Sino-Japanese war and the Russian-Japanese war before coming to a decision. Mean while, the League has despatched a Commission there to collect evidence, and we shall be best advised to await their report. When the unsolved Manchurian issue brought about the unfortunate development of Shanghai the League did all that was possible to circumscribe the area of hostilities, and I think no one can doubt that, but for the action of the League and the zealous co-operation of those representing its most influential members, the range of the conflict would have been considerably extended. In an issue so involved, with the additional complication of an economic boycott which has been enforced over a number of years, with the gravely perplexed internal situation and lack of supreme central authority in China, any immediate and clean-cut settlement could hardly have been anticipated. There were bound to be checks and resumptions of activity in negotiations, and the only wise policy is patience, and the avoidance of any measures likely to aggravate the intensity of feeling on the one side or on the other among peoples with both of whom we desire to be on the best of terms.

That hostilities have been suspended, that negotiations continue, that the parties to the dispute have been brought together, and important progress made is no small achievement. I for one can only congratulate the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the part he has so ably played at Geneva, seconded on the spot by the efforts of Sir Miles Lampson and Admiral Kelly in one of the most difficult issues which has arisen for many years. We, and not least the influence of the British Navy, have been the essential peacemakers on the spot, acting as the interpreters and agents of the League of Nations at Geneva. I have yet further reason for congratulating the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the part which he has played in the preliminary phase of the Disarmament Conference. On this issue but few words are necessary from me, because I have, more than once, in this House and many times outside, expressed my opinion that there can be no real disarmament in the spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant while the system of universal manhood conscription is maintained by the majority of other nations. It would be easy to demonstrate that the claim they have advanced that their effectives have been diminished by shortening the term of military service cannot be seriously sustained, and that in reality it only means an even larger number of men, sufficiently trained for this purpose, passing on into the three categories of immediately revocable, and of first and of second line reserves with a liability to recall for 28 years. You have only to look at the proportion of artillery to infantry in effective Continental armies to realise that that proportion means a provision for an army three or four times greater than that under arms at any given moment in peace. I have, therefore, rejoiced to see that the British delegation has, in its disarmament proposals, advanced as apostulate the limitation or restriction of conscription. Without sonic such restriction I do not see any great immediate hope for practical results in the all important issue of disarmament. What does seem to me perfectly clear is that, until other nations show some more definite disposition to follow the lead which we have already abundantly given, it is impossible for us to advance any further along a road on which we have perhaps already overstepped the bounds of security.

Finally, Disarmament leads me back to the consideration of the position in Central Europe—for the moment perhaps the most urgent of all questions for solution—apart from the fact that the inequalities of armaments are one of the chief causes of unrest in Europe. We welcome the decision, as yet unconfirmed, but apparently a national one in Germany, in favour of that great patriot who has wisely guided the destiny of his country through phases of unprecedented difficulty, and we deplore the loss to France of another illustrious patriot over whom the grave has closed in the midst of his work for the pacification of Europe. Let us hope, however, that those invaluable influences will remain active still, for in that is the only hope of the regeneration of the world. The conflict between the two peoples is a very ancient one. It is nearly 2,000 years since the great historian Tacritus pointed out that the Gauls and the Germans were separated by a river, a mountain range, and their mutual distrust of one another. Europe to-day is menaced by other and even graver issues, against which the soundest insurance would be the elimination of that ancient conflict. Do not doubt that agreement between these two peoples would find an echo, and arouse a spirit of co-operation all over the world. After the Great War, with its long record of passions and convulsion, it was impossible for many years to expect any serious movement towards reconcilation, but we should remember that the masses of the people were only the instruments of war who followed, and obeyed, and suffered. Are they not entitled to peace? Since then nearly a decade and a half has passed. The prolongation of the spirit of war into an era of peace must have its reactions on the welfare and happiness of all mankind. I trust and believe, Mr. Speaker, that that great people who have been proud to call themselves the most generous of nations will, at the forthcoming Conference in June, make that noble gesture which is expected of them to assist in ending the unrest of the world.

Mr. PICKERING

I intervene in this Debate, although I believe the time for Adjournment is very near. I hope that I shall have an opportunity of continuing my remarks when this Debate is resumed. I should not have risen on this occasion but for the fact that I hold a unique position in regard to this Debate which has been mainly upon Japan. I lived in Japan for four years, not as an alien serving alien interests, but along with other foreigners under the Japanese Government, and very much as one of the Japanese themselves. At one time I was a ratepayer in Japan and had a vote, and voted at a municipal election in Japan. I think that is a unique experience for any Member in this House. Living with the Japanese As I did, and having some very intimate friends there who are now leading statesmen in Japan on the more Liberal side, I felt that I might be able to contribute something of interest to this Debate. In the first place, what astonishes me most is the difficulty which the people of this country seem to have in understanding what all this dispute between China and Japan is about. Of course, it is impossible for us to know the full history of every foreign nation, but what we do want is some knowledge of the history of Japan, China and Manchuria, and I think I shall be able to state briefly the most recent events which led up to this crisis.

It is important to remember that Manchuria, which China now speaks of as being an integral part of herself, has had a very uncertain existence for quite a generation as a member of the Chinese nation. Not only was Manchuria once under Russian influence, but the Manchurian railway was a Russian railway until Japan, by her victory, acquired the right which Russia had got up to that time—

It being Half-past Seven of the Clock, and there being Private Business set down by direction of the Chairman of Ways and Means under Standing Order No. 8, further Proceeding was postponed, without Question put.