HC Deb 13 December 1932 vol 273 cc286-96

The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1895, shall not apply to the board constituted by this Act.—[Mr. Atkinson.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

8.7 p.m.

Mr. ATKINSON

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

8.7 p.m.

The object of this Clause is very simple. The Act cited provides two things—that any action against a public authority shall be brought within six months, and also that if in any action brought against a public authority the plaintiff fails, the costs which he shall pay shall be costs as between solicitor and client. As probably most hon. Members of the Committee know, the ordinary plaintiff in an action only pays costs as between party and party, the costs are taxed and the Master allows only those costs which he thinks are properly and necessarily incurred. There is a more extravagant scale, and that is the costs for which a client is liable to his own solicitor. If he chooses to have matters conducted more extravagantly than is strictly necessary, that scale of taxation is much more severe. Obviously the great number of claims likely to arise under this Bill will be for personal injury. You cannot con- trol a huge transport organisation of this kind without such claims arising. Unless the operation of that Act is excluded from this Bill, it means that no one will be able to claim damages unless he brings an action within six months. Very often the injured person is wholly unable even to think about proceedings for a much longer period than that. When you have been knocked down by a motor omnibus, frequently you are in hospital for some months and unable to contemplate proceedings. Therefore, there will be a number of hard cases where people will have found their time has gone by because their writ has not been issued within six months from the time of the occurrence, That seems to me a very unfair position in which to put people who are injured by the negligence of those who are in control of omnibuses, trams, trains or whatever it may be.

That is one reason why, I submit, we ought to insert a Clause excluding the operation of that Act. The other reason is the question of costs. Why should a person who brings an action against the board, and who fails, be under an obligation to pay not the ordinary costs but the extravagant scale taxed as between Solicitor and client? When that Act was passed no one contemplated it applying to matters of this sort. The matters then contemplated were cases in which there might have been very good reason for wishing to discourage claims against local authorities. Here the first object ought to be to secure justice for people who may be injured by the carelessness of those employed by the board, and difficulties ought not to be put in the way of injured people getting compensation to which they are entitled. I do press the Government to accept this Clause, not only in the interest of justice and to help to secure reasonable opportunities for injured persons getting compensation, but also so as not to impose such heavy liabilities on them in the matter of costs. It would be a strange anomaly if, when you wanted to bring an action against some railway company operating outside London, that you should have six years in which to bring an action, but that if you want to bring it against one of the railways covered by this Bill or in respect of an omnibus operating in London, that you should have to bring it within six months. It does not seem reasonable, and I hope the new Clause will be accepted.

8.13 p.m.

Mr. THORP

I rise to support the proposed new Clause. I would like to remind the Committee that it not in- frequently happens that relatives of people who are fatally injured in traffic accidents have to recover from the shock of the breadwinner being killed, that they have to raise funds in order to bring proceedings, and may not have been able to get their solicitor's advice and their position regularised in order to bring the proceedings within six months. The result is that, although the breadwinner may have been killed, none the less the answer that the six months' period has gone by is a complete answer, and the relatives would not be entitled to recover any relief at all. Furthermore, it sometimes happens that when people are injured they do not appreciate the extent to which they are injured. Sometimes they think it is only a small injury and they need not prosecute any claim, but, after a lapse of time, the injury is found to have been far more serious, and then they find they have let the six months go by and are precluded by the Public Authorities Protection Act from bringing proceedings. There is a third alternative that frequently occurs—the case of a person who happens, unfortunately, to he one of many people who have been injured in an accident, and who waits to see the result of the one question that has to be decided, namely, whether there was negligence or not, in a particular action before deciding whether to launch his proceedings. If this Clause is not included in the Bill, these unfortunate people will be driven to issue a writ within the six months, and will then have to wait for a trial of the main action in which the same question will have to be decided in their own case. For these three reasons, I submit that there should be no question about this Clause being put in.

From the logical point of view, I believe I am right in saying that this is the first occasion upon which a Statute of limitations, because that is what the Public Authorities Protection Act is, is going to be dependent upon a geographical limit, and not on any other legal grounds. It is perfectly ridiculous to suggest that this Act was passed for the purpose of preventing stale claims. It was not passed for anything of the kind. The reason why it was passed was that in various Acts of Parliament—I speak subject. to correction—Acts dating from the time of Queen Elizabeth, various exemptions had been made, and the object of the Act was to codify them in one Statute. It was never intended for one moment to limit the right of a person who, rightly or wrongly, considered that he had a cause of action, and to penalise him in his having to bring his action within six months.

A very famous judge, now deceased, pointed out that this Act was an Act which was penal in its operation and an Act which placed the people who were protected by it in a privileged position. These are not the days when we should extend privileges, and especially to extend privileges for the benefit of, if I may use the term, a large hydra-headed body like the London Traffic Board, at the expense of the unfortunate people who have to use the streets and are frequently injured as a result of the negligence of drivers. The majority of people who are injured and bring these actions are in humble walks of life. Very often the result of the accident is that they have not the money with which to bring the litigation, and they have to save up in order to issue the proceedings. The Public Authorities Protection Act will have the effect of protecting this big traffic body which is carrying on its work, at the expense of small people who may not have the money to bring proceedings. In these circumstances, I support the new Clause.

8.18 p.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL

My hon. and learned Friends have advanced many excellent reasons for objecting to the Public Authorities Protection Act. They call it a Statute of limitations. The hon. And learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Thorp) says that he has never known a case where a Statute of limitations has been applied by reference to a geographical limit. Perhaps he has forgotten the case of the Port of London Authority, the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board and one or two other authorities which might be cited as practically on all-fours with this proposed Traffic Board. The two hon. and learned Members attack the Act on the ground that it is a Statute that has the effect of preventing poor people from making their claims in accordance with the rights that they would otherwise possess; a right otherwise up to a period of six years. The object of the Public Authorities Protection Act was really to prevent stale claims being made against public authorities in circumstances in which investigation was impossible.

Mr. THORP

With respect, I would point out that Lord Justice Farwell said that that was not the object of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL

With all deference to the great authority of Lord Justice Farwell, I think that, on the whole, I probably have more experience of the cases with which my hon. and learned Friends are proposing to deal than even Lord Justice Farwell, who was a Judge in the Chancery Division. The Public Authorities Protection Act was passed in 1893. Hon. Members will remember what party was in power then. The object was not to interfere with the rights of people, but it was intended to provide a proper opportunity for a person to bring his action against a public authority but not to allow him to do what in practice was found to be inconvenient and embarrassing, namely, to bring his action a year or two perhaps after the events had happened. I agree that the argument seems a good one on the face of it that you may have a person suffering from concussion who is not in a position to bring his mind back, in time, to the circumstances of the accident, in order to recover damages at law; but the answer to the objection seems to be that the Act in practice has not produced the unfortunate circumstances which any hon. and learned Friends have described. I was expecting one or other of them, from their great experience, to tell the Committee of cases which have happened within their own experience where the unfortunate results which they described have followed.

This Act applies to a large number of authorities somewhat like the London Transport Board, except to this extent that their area of operations is not so large as the area of the London Traffic Board will be. For instance, many of the public authorities' tramways that will be amalgamated in the Traffic Board are now enjoying the protection, such as it is, of the Public Authorities Protection Act. It has been in force ever since those tramways were set up by the local authorities. There are local authorities all over the Kingdom enjoying the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act. It is an old practice in the north of England in particular, as well as in the south, for great corporations to run tramways and omnibuses, and every one of them has enjoyed the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act. Those corporations are very sensitive to the appeals of what may be described as the industrial classes, and if in practice it had been found that there was an interference with the real rights of the people who were injured by the running of omnibuses and trams, I should have expected some outcry, some protest or some citation of judgments brought to the attention of the Committee to-night.

I have no very strong view about this particular Act, but, on the whole, my experience shows that it has worked well, without any harshness to the people affected by it, and it does prevent those speculative and stale claims which everybody knows are one of the minor evils associated with accidents on our roads. It has not in practice been found to be oppressive. Parliament enacted it in 1893 and not in 1895, as appears on the Order Paper.

Mr. THORP

That is a misprint.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL

I am not suggesting that my hon. and learned Friend was not aware of the date. I was only saying that it appears on the Order Paper as 1895. When it enacted the Statute, Parliament presumably intended that it should apply to all public authorities. If this Committee is to say that it is not to apply to this Bill, I should not feel that any great injury has been done to it. I am very much in the hands of the Committee, but I am bound to say that I have not heard from my hon. and learned Friends any convincing reasons why that which Parliament enacted in 1893 should not be applied to this particular local authority. If this new Clause is read a, Second time and added to the Bill it will mean that the London Transport Board will be an exception to the general rule, and I think from the lawyers' point of view that it is undesirable to make such an exception to general legislation unless there is some very convincing reason why you should do so. For these reasons, I suggest that the Clause should not be read a Second time, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act should apply to this board as it does to every other public authority with which I am acquainted.

Mr. ATKINSON

Does the learned Attorney-General defend the provision as to costs?

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL

It would be almost impertinent for me to profess either to defend or to protest against something which has been on the Statute Book for 38 to 40 years. It is no good my hon. and learned Friend shaking his head. It has been on the Statute Book since 1893, and omnibuses and trams have been running for the greater part of that period. I am asked to defend the provision about solicitors' and client costs, but that does not apply to any action in which the plaintiff succeeds, and in nine cases out of ten the plaintiff does succeed in running-down cases. If a speculative action is brought against the public authority, it is in the public interest that there should be some deterrent to prevent people who are interested in these actions from trying to get something to which they are not properly entitled.

8.26 p.m.

Captain FRASER

In these times, whether we like it or not, there is a tendency for these great monopolistic enterprises to be brought into being. The State and the municipalities more and more are taking part in our daily affairs and conducting monopolistic enterprises for the citizens. The State has always had a privileged position in relation to the citizen, and it has been extremely difficult for the citizen to get his rights. All down the pages of history we see the citizens seeking to reduce these privileges. It is in the minds of all Members of this Committee that the citizen has a very poor chance against the State in Income Tax matters, and there are scores of other examples that could be given where the privilege retained by the State is to the citizen's disadvantage. If it is a tendency of modern times for the State and the local authorities and new authorities of this kind to interfere more and more in the private life of the citizen, and to take charge of his affairs and business, surely we ought at some stage to put a stop to the special privileges which these governmental and local authority monopolies enjoy.

It seems to me that the new Clause is a reasonable one. What reason can there be why a privately-owned company should be sued after six months while this organisation, because it happens to be controlled by a board though still privately owned, should be free and have a particular privilege? This is a very queer kind of public authority. It is privately owned; it is merely publicly controlled. When the citizens set up something which they themselves control, why they should have less rights against it than against private enterprise I cannot see. In view of the Attorney-General's generous suggestion that he would place himself in the hands of Committee, and that it would not hurt him to accept this new Clause, I hope that the Committee will take advantage of his offer and show him that he would be doing a reasonable thing in reconsidering his position between now and Report.

8.30 p.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL

My hon. and gallant Friend has asked why public authorities should be protected and not private enterprise. The Public Authorities Protection Act does not in terms refer to a public authority. The reason for the protection given by the Act is that the person concerned is carrying out a public duty, and it is thought that such a person should not be exposed to the sort of action that I have described. The distinction is not between a publicly-owned and a privately-owned body, but between a person performing a public duty and a person who is not. The first person is protected and the second is not.

Captain FRASER

A railway company performs a public duty.

8.31 p.m.

Mr. CAPORN

The learned Attorney-General has suggested that the real distinction is between the body that is performing a public duty and the body that is not performing a public duty. Is there any other case that he knows of in which an authority making private profit for the benefit of private shareholders is protected by this Act? Speaking from memory I should say that every case to which the Act is at present applied is a case in which the authority or the person is carrying out a public duty at the expense of ratepayers or, if there is any benefit to accrue from the public duty, for the benefit of ratepayers. The real object of providing for the six months in the case of this Act is to enable people who have to provide for the rates each six months to have some knowledge of the possible extent of their liability before the period of the next rate. This board is only a public authority because the Act happens to call it so, because it happens to be appointed, not by the shareholders as many of us think it ought to be, but by the President of the Law Society and various other bodies got together ad hoc for the purpose.

If the profits that are made are for the benefit of shareholders, people who have been injured ought to receive compensation out of those profits, whether they have brought their claim within six months or not. The learned Attorney-General made a great deal of the statement that the Act was to prevent stale claims. If people who have been injured and have not brought their claims within six months are to be deprived, then let everyone be deprived, not merely those who happen to have a claim against a great public body like this London Traffic Board. No one suggests that the owner of a private motor car should have protection after six months, or that the small omnibus owner who happens to be running outside the London area should have this protection.

Speaking for myself I fail entirely to see why this body should receive this protection. The Act was passed in 1893 to codify 180-odd Acts at a time when no public authority was running omnibuses in the streets. It was never applied to railway companies running trains under Acts of Parliament for the benefit of the public, and I submit that it ought not to be applied in this case. The Attorney-General asks whether any of us has had experience of hardship having accrued to individuals through this Act. There is no lawyer in junior practice, who has been at the Bar for more than five years, who has not had at least one case brought to his notice in which people through ignorance have been deprived of their rights because of this Act.

I have come across cases in which clerks to local authorities have deliberately encouraged people to allow six months to go by without taking action. They have corresponded with those people and encouraged them to think that their cases were going to be settled, and then when the six months had elapsed the injured parties found that they had no remedy. I shall be surprised if the Committee refuse to accept the proposed new Clause. It is in the interests of poor people who have to travel daily on the streets of London and who may be injured. These people if they are injured may be detained in hospital for months without the opportunity of getting legal advice, and yet, if they fail to bring their claim within six months against this great statutory company, which is dependent on private capital and is working for private profit, they will be deprived of their rights of action. I appeal to my right. hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, if he cannot accept the new Clause, to give us the hope that between now and the Report. stage he will give this matter further consideration.

8.38 p.m.

Mr. ESSENHIGH

It seems to me that in connection with this matter a great deal of pother is being made about very little. The hon. Member for West Nottingham (Mr. Caporn) says that great hard-ship may be incurred by poor people who suffer injury. What does it all amount to? They have six months in which to bring proceedings. It is said that there are clerks to local authorities and other people who will put obstacles in their way, but the injured parties have a remedy right away. If they have a capable solicitor a writ or a county court summons will be issued at once. To suggest that they can do nothing for six months is rather playing with the issue. In my respectful submission, there is no reason why public authorities who are using public money, should be deprived of the protection of this Act. The hon. Member for West Nottingham said he doubted whether there was any junior member of the Bar who had not come across cases of hardship in this respect. I have had some years' experience as a junior member of the Bar in a fairly busy provincial city and I have not come across a single case of hardship of this kind. On the other hand, I have found cases in which this Act has proved a great protection. The Attorney-General has painted out that it is a protection against speculative solicitors. I can unhesitatingly confirm the statement that it is a protection for public authorities against actions of the purely speculative sort, and I earnestly support the Government in their resistance to the attempt to foist this proposal upon the Committee.

Question, "That the Clause be read a Second time," put, and negatived.