§ Mr. LANSBURYI do not think I need apologise to the House for raising the question which I now propose to raise. I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary for his courtesy in making this Debate possible, especially since the rush of business that has overwhelmed him during the last few days. I am sure that he will agree with me that the people of this country and of the world are watching the situation in Manchuria with a very great foreboding. Those of us who sit on these benches have very clear arid definite notions about the rights of the League of Nations, and about the value of the League of Nations. At the beginning, when the League was first formed, we, myself among the number, had not as much confidence in it as its proceedings and its work have given us as the years have passed. I confess that the League, in its handling of this very big Manchurian question, will either prove itself of value in preventing war, or will have to confess its inability to 461 restrain a powerful Power when that Power makes up its mind to go its own way.
The situation, As it has been revealed to us, both in the Press and by statements which have been made in this House and at Paris, appears to be that Japan has refused an independent inquiry by the League of Nations into the incidents which have accompanied her occupation, in spite of the fact that there are very violent differences of testimony concerning those incidents. I understand that Japan has refused China's offer to arbitrate outstanding points, particularly the existence and meaning of the Treaties between the two Powers. She has, so far as I have been able to judge, taken no account of the decisions of the Council of the League of Nations, decisions uanimously come to, except for her own vote, which invited her to evacuate Manchuria before 10th November. Instead of evacuation, hostilities have continued on a fairly large scale, according to the reports, and the area of occupation has greatly extended. She has insisted upon direct negotiation with China concerning the substance of the dispute. That means denying the right of the Council of the League to discuss the subjects of the dispute, or to take part in its settlement. That is a very serious decision, if my reading of the matter is correct. Japan has refused to evacuate until China has accepted certain political demands. This plainly violates the principle of the Kellogg Pact, since it is "using war as an instrument of national policy."
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The League, if it is to maintain its position, must maintain its own principles against all the opposition which Japan can put up against it. If the League is unable to do this, it will mean that Japan will be able to do with Manchuria as she has already done with Korea. According to Press statements, she is really in practical occupation of Manchuria by sheer force of arms. If it is left like that, what will the people of the East think of the great Powers of the world, formed together in a League, of which Japan is the greatest Eastern Power? What will they think of the other great Powers of the world if they are not able to exercise sufficient moral influence over Japan to prevent her continuing along this path? What becomes of all the paper treaties, and the verbal declarations, and all the solemn 462 statements that have been made by the white statesmen of the world? It seems to me that it must very seriously damage the League also in America. America is outside the League, although her representative is in Paris and she takes a more or less unofficial part in these matters, but I should think public opinion in America would be very seriously disturbed and alarmed et the thought of America joining a League of Nations which proved itself so incapable of dealing with a situation such as this.
So far as Europe generally is concerned, if this is allowed to go by, it means that one great Power can exercise its force of arms against a weaker Power that is part of the same combination, the same League of Nations, and can carry through its will without let or hindrance. Japanese military imperialism would receive a tremendous advantage and, I should think, a. very big development. I cannot imagine that that could be to the advantage of the world, because a further thing which I think would happen is that if the League could not protect her own laws and covenants, China would go out of the League and consider it worthless to remain with the rest of the great Powers.
It may be argued that the Japanese had full right under their treaties to do what they have done. On that, I do not propose, in the presence of the right hon. Gentleman, to offer an opinion. I will only say that there are two points which in my judgment arise. These incidents having happened and the dispute having arisen, where does the responsibility lie out of which the occupation arose, and what should be the future relationship between the two Powers in Manchuria? Neither of these points arise at the moment.
The issue which I wish to press on the right hon. Gentleman, though I hope it does not need pressing, is the question whether this dispute shall be settled by war and the pressure of military occupation, or whether it shall be settled by the methods of conciliation provided by the Covenant of the League and contemplated in the Kellogg Pact. If Japan succeeds, it will probably be impossible in the present generation to persuade the world that this will not be the method adopted in every serious dispute in which 463 great Powers may be involved. I press that upon the right hon. Gentleman because it seems to me it is the outstanding point in this matter. Alter all the solemn obligations which we have entered into, it is quite impossible that this country should allow Japan to secure acceptance of her demands without taking every step possible and utilising every possible resource to prevent it. In saying this, I do not want to be considered as urging that the moment has come for the application of sanctions, but it does mean that Article 15, which in effect says "a dispute likely to lead to rupture which has not been submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement having arisen," certainly does apply to the present condition of affairs.
I do not want to say anything that will cause ill-feeling either in Japan or in China. When two nations fall out, I think the proper attitude for people like myself, who never want nations to fall out in this way, is not to act as a judge. I do not want to act as a judge in this matter, except to say that in this particular case Japan is the great Power in the Pacific, and has enormous military resources, while everyone knows that China has been torn and distracted for the last few years in a very terrible manner. I know that a great Power invading the territory of a weaker Power usually has very good reasons for doing so in an economic sense. We were all told, and the world was told, when the League of Nations was formed that no economic advantages, no fact that a weaker nation could not develop rich territories, should ever again be allowed to bring about the sort of conditions which are prevailing in Manchuria to-day. Those who arc cynics may contend that all the facts and all the treaties and declarations were eye-wash.
There may be some people who think that, but I stood one day at the other end of this building, when representatives of a good many countries had come together on the question of disarmament. I heard the speeches and I read the declarations made in the gallery of the House of Lords, and I had a feeling that perhaps after all I had been wrong in my judgment that economic forces would compel the nations to fight and try to 464 destroy one another again. I believe there are many more people as simpleminded as I was at that time who to-day are feeling very unhappy that this dispute should have broken out in the East. I would hope, and I say this to the right hon. Gentleman with all sincerity, that he, as representing Great Britain, will be able when he goes back to Paris—as I understand he is going—to tell the Japanese and the Chinese that the British nation wants to be friends with them, and wants to do everything possible to do justice as between the two nations, but that, in face of everything we have pledged ourselves to, we cannot and dare not give the least sanction, direct or indirect, to any nation, Japan or any other, who wilfully for whatever reason refuses to stop the fighting. It may be that they cannot see their way to withdraw the troops absolutely, though that I think should be done, and all fighting stopped. The troops should be held back, and the whole question referred to an impartial tribunal for settlement. Some other way may be found, but for our country some other way must be found, and I think if we cannot find it by persuasive means we ought to say to whichever of these Governments refuses to honour the obligations of the League, that for us there cannot be the same sort of relationship as has existed before. That is a matter which J suppose ought to come later.
I will tell the house something else. I sat in the big hall in Versailles when the Peace Conference took place, and I remember hearing Mr. Wilson. I can see him standing now in that magnificent hall, and I can almost bear his voice when he said that we must satisfy the common people; if we satisfied them everything would be all right. I believe the common people of the world are terror-stricken at the thought of war any time, and to me it makes no difference whether it is a yellow nation, or a white nation, or a black nation. They are all in my view God's people—as I hope we all are—and bloodshed and destruction among them is as wicked and cruel and foul as among ourselves. I hope and pray that the right hon. Gentleman will use all his great powers to see that this fearful business is stopped and that the two Powers are brought to accept arbitration.
§ The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon)I have no reason whatever to regret that the right hon. Gentleman should have thought well to raise this most grave matter on the Adjournment. The whole House will recognise, and the country will recognise, the restraint and that sense of responsibility which the right hon. Gentleman has shown. There is no Member of the House of Commons who has better reason than the right hon. Gentleman, if we have regard to the convictions of a life time and sincerity of advocacy, to raise any question which has to do with the promotion of international peace. In what he has just said I know that the right hon. Gentleman is only voicing a feeling which is very deeply and sincerely felt by a very large part of our population and in America, and indeed in many countries of the world. The right hon. Gentleman, I am sure, will see that I too have to speak with the greatest possible reserve and restraint. I do not at all take the view that because a Foreign Secretary attends the Council of the League of Nations that in the least discharges him from his full responsibility to account to the House of Commons. Not at all. This is the right place in which he should be asked on proper occasions to expound the view of the Government on such a matter. At the same time, when the Council of the League of Nations is actually in session and is endeavouring to act with the force which can he exercised only by a collective body, it is obviously a very anxious matter for the Foreign Secretary here to make a personal statement.
I will do my best in all frankness, but the House will appreciate why I do not go further than I do on one or two points. First of all, I entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman when he defined the principles for which the League of Nations stands. The Covenant of the League of Nations does stand for this principle, and we shall do very poor service to the cause of peace if we avoid saying that the Covenant does stand for the principle that, whatever may be the merits of a particular dispute, nations should submit that dispute to peaceful settlement. I hope that as long as I hold this most responsible office it will never be laid to my charge that I have failed to state that and state it publicly. That 466 being the basis, it is necessary to remember this also: The very fact that that is the principle for which the League of Nations stands involves the consequence that as long as there is any chance of the Council of the League operating usefully, we have to avoid taking up a position which might seem to prejudge or condemn. Let us take due note of palpable facts; do not let us shut our eyes to things which are as plain as anything can be.
But side by side with the principle of the League, that nations should submit their disputes to peaceful settlement, is a second proposition which follows from the first—that while the Council of the League is doing its utmost to promote that result, we must abstain from what might be regarded as partial judgment. For the same reason very great care was taken by the most distinguished statesman, M. Briand, one of the great figures of the League who is now presiding over it, to see to it that, say, in the absence of the Chinese representative, nothing whatever was said which would reflect upon the Chinese view, and, in the same way, that in the absence of the Japanese representative nothing should be said to reflect on the Japanese. That is justice. After all, the principle of the League is, "We are endeavouring to substitute the principle of peaceful settlement for the principle of force."
Will the House let me make one or two matter-of-fact statements as to how this most serious matter has arisen and what is the background that we ought to keep in view? There has been, I suppose, what you may call an unsolved problem as between China and Japan in Manchuria for over 20 years, ever since the Japanese succeeded to Russian rights in that region after the Russo-Japanese War, I do not mean by that statement to cast any doubt on the view that the provinces which make up Manchuria are part of China. They are part of China. But there is this very unusual feature about it, and I have no doubt that hon. Members who have studied the matter will know it. There is a railway called the South Manchuria Railway, which runs down to Port Arthur and connects Port Arthur through the Manchurian city of Mukden almost as far as Harbin. This 467 South Manchuria Railway, though it is entirely within the boundaries of Manchuria, belongs to Japan by treaty. Not only so, but as is the case with some of the other great railways in the world, the strip of land through which it runs is also by treaty to be regarded as Japanese.
This difficulty and anxiety did not begin by the troops of one country sailing across the seas and marching across the frontier of another country to invade it. In fact, it began because Japan, exercising her undoubted treaty rights—this is not disputed by China—to have armed forces on either side of this railway as guards, declared, and as far as one can see with good reason, that the railway just north of Mukden was attacked and that it had been broken by Chinese troops. Undoubtedly, there is a great deal of very ill-organised Chinese banditry in the neighbourhood. It was out of that origin that there proceeded what has become a more and more serious feature of the situation, namely, the spreading of Japanese forces, not in very large numbers, but none the less extremely effective, to strategic points in different parts of Manchuria, which is undoubtedly Chinese territory. As I have said, I am certainly not going to stand here or at the Council of the League or at Geneva or anywhere else, and question the fact that the principle of the League of Nations, when troubles threaten conflict between two nations, is the principle of peaceful settlement.
The story then goes on like this: It was on the 21st of September, I think, that China called the attention of the Council of the League to this situation, as it was her right to do. One Article of the Covenant expressly declares that in any of these matters that is the right of anyone who is threatened. The Council at once addressed an urgent appeal to both Governments to refrain from aggressive action. The Council endeavoured, in consultation with the Chinese representative and the Japanese representative, to find means by which, under agreement, troops might be at once withdrawn; and the Council at once decided to supply complete information to the Government of the United States, because, as the 468 right hon. Gentleman said, these matters not only raise questions under the Covenant of the League, but they raise questions under the Kellogg Pact, and, I think, also under what is called the Nine Powers Pact.
I told the House the other day, in answer to a question, what I am sure the whole country is very glad to observe, that General Dawes, the United States Ambassador, had been instructed to go to Paris. He has been there since then and is there now. He has indeed, though behind the scenes, devoted all the influence which America can exert in these matters—that influence is very considerable—to try to bring the parties together and to stop further bloodshed. I am sure that I need not labour the point which the House will accept from me at once: I have devoted myself with constant and most anxious attention to assisting towards that end ever since this matter has been in my hands.
How does the situation stand now I think that the right hon. Gentleman's account of the position taken up by Japan, in one or two respects went rather beyond what my information is, and I know he will be very glad that that is so. For instance, I do not think it is a correct statement to say that Japan takes up the position and declares that she will not evacuate until China has satisfied her demands. It was certainly a question some short time back as to what was the proper meaning of one of the conditions which Japan said she wished to have observed. One great advantage of having a Japanese representative with the Council at Paris is that we have been able to ascertain more exactly what is meant by these ambiguous questions, and it is now quite clear that the Commission under discussion is not to be, and could not be, any possible reason for postponing or delaying evacuation at the earliest moment, and Japan has never withdrawn—it is very important that we should be reminded of this—her assurance that she will withdraw her troops at the earliest possible moment consistent with order.
7.30 p.m.
Then, again, I do not think the right hon. Gentleman is quite correctly informed in stating that Japan refused an inquiry into the circumstances of her occupation. On the contrary, if we can arrange, as I trust we may, for a Com- 469 mission to make an inquiry and report under the authority of the League, I take it to be quite clear that that Commission's report would give a full account of these matters, and it is very important that it should, not because at present there is very considerable dispute as to the facts, but because the real force which the League of Nations can exercise depends on the opinion of the world. It does not really depend on anything else but that. One of the great difficulties about this Manchurian problem is that these grave events taking place so far off the circumstances are difficult to ascertain and some international instrument to ascertain the facts and present them to the world would, I believe, be serving a really good purpose.
There is just this further observation which I wish to make. The information which has reached me since I had to return—though I, certainly, shall not fail to take my full part in any further proceedings in connection with this matter—the information which reaches me to-day is rather more encouraging, and I think we may now assume that there is no desire on the side of Japan to insist on the recognition of disputed or disputable treaty rights as one of the terms on which she is prepared to assent to a League inquiry. At the same time, I think we may assume that there is no opposition offered by Japan to a League inquiry. Here may I point out to the House the real relation between Article 11 and Article 15 of the Covenant. The right hon. Gentleman referred to both. At present this dispute is before the Council of the League under Article 11, It was under Article 11 that China referred it to the League and the significant fact about Article 11 is that in all matters of substance, action under Article 11 has to be taken by the unanimous consent of the Members of the Council. As the House knows Japan is a permanent member. China is, for the time being, an elected member. We have the advantage, therefore, of both disputants being present there at the Council table and that is a very great advantage which could never have been secured without the Covenant of the League. But, as long as we proceed under Article 11, the appointment of the 470 Commission which is now being discussed must be agreed upon unanimously.
I would like to tell the House that the view which I have taken was that if that could be secured, and secured promptly, that it was really much the hest course, because if the League is going to conduct an inquiry that inquiry is much more likely to be effective if the Commission has been appointed by the votes and the good will of both contestants than if the League, exercising its own inherent authority, appoints an inquiry of its own. It is quite true that under Article 15, as the right hon. Gentleman said, it is then possible for a Commission to be appointed, but that would be done by a majority vote, and, assuming that too much time is not taken, assuming that we can exercise influence in order to hasten evacuation and help to stop bloodshed, then I am quite convinced that it is really to the advantage of all concerned that we do get the assent of Japan and China to the inquiry and to the terms.
I cannot at the moment go further. It would not be right for me to say that I think that there is a happy issue out of this trouble in the course of the next day or two. It is the first occasion on which I have attended a sitting of the Council, and it is a very impressive experience. Nothing could be more striking to a newcomer like myself than the single-minded devotion with which the Members who are sitting there, and M. Briand himself at their head, are working all through the day by various means in order to try to bring the parties together. I wish I could report now more definitely and more favourably but I have done my best to give the House a perfectly straightforward account of the situation as it stands.
I would say this in conclusion. This is, indeed, as the right hon. Gentleman says an event which will test the machinery of the League very gravely. It is a misfortune, perhaps, that it should have arisen early in the League's history, and in the circumstances which I have described, which are not quite the ordinary case but are very exceptional. Let us at least take this amount of comfort. There have been occasions before in which after a great deal of dispute and controversy the Council of the League has successfully intervened, and inter- 471 vened sometimes by the machinery of a Commission of inquiry. There was the dispute between Greece and Bulgaria and the dispute about the frontier between Turkey and Irak. Both were extremely combustible propositions, which, under the old regime, might very easily have led to the most fearful consequences. While at the moment every good friend of the League—as we all are in this House—is hoping most earnestly that its efforts will on this occasion produce success, we are entitled to take some comfort from the fact that in its earlier history, in very intractable and difficult circumstances, it has really contributed something of great value.
I am greatly obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has put his inquiries to-day. If I may suggest it with great respect to my colleagues in the House, I question whether a prolonged and general Debate would be advisable. I do not wish in the least to 472 presume to stop anybody but I make that observation. At any rate I have done my best to convey to the House how the matter stands. I can assure the House that it will be my most earnest and constant effort to do what I know the House and the public opinion of this country so earnestly desire—to do, in the name of my country, the utmost that can be done to bring an early and peaceful solution of this most alarming situation.
§ Mr. LANSBURYWith the permission of the House may I be allowed to thank the right hon. Gentleman and also to say that, while I know that some of my hon. Friends here did wish to carry on the discussion, I hope they will not do so. I should like to join with everybody else in wishing the right hon. Gentleman God speed in his work.
§ Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-three Minutes before Eight o'Clock.