CLAUSE 11.—(Objections to and appeals from valuations.)

HC Deb 01 July 1931 vol 254 cc1359-403

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

I beg to move, in page 9, line 39, to leave out from the beginning to the word "he," in page 10, line 1, and to insert instead thereof the words "the period hereafter in this section limited."

This Amendment really goes with two further Amendments which appear later on the Paper, one of which is a large insertion of two new sub-paragraphs, the design of which is to provide machinery for objections and appeals. As originally drafted, the Bill provided only for objection against valuation. In the course of the Committee stage, an Amendment was moved by the hon. and gallant Member for Oxford (Captain Bourne) to give a right of objection to any action of the Commissioners under Clause 8, Sub-section 3 (c), in valuing two or more pieces of land with separate occupations but in the same ownership, as a single lot. I promised to bring in an Amendment which would carry out the proposal which he made. The present Amendment is in order to introduce the two Amendments to which I have referred, and which carry out that promise. In paragraph (3) in that Amendment, the opportunity has been taken of extending the time limit for objections to notice of valuation. I shall have to insert two further Amendments in order to carry out the promise which I gave to inquire into that matter.

Captain BOURNE

I should like to express my gratitude to the hon. and learned Gentleman for this concession which he has given, and also for one which he gave earlier, and for which I have not yet had the opportunity of thanking him.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: In page 10, line 5, leave out from "therein," to the end of line 9:

In line 18, leave out the word "and," and insert instead thereof the words: (2) If the owner of two or more pieces of land in different separate occupations objects to their having been treated by the Commissioners as one land unit in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act relating to the ascertainment of values, then, within the period hereafter in this Section limited, he may give to the Commissioners notice in writing of his objection, stating the grounds thereof. (3) No such notice of objection as aforesaid shall be of any effect unless given by the owner within forty-two days after service upon him of a copy of the entries in respect of the unit, or, where no such service is required by this Part of this Act, within sixty days after the first day of August on or before which the register is so required to be deposited, or, in either case, within such further time as the Commissioners may, on application made within the period aforesaid, allow, but upon any such objection being made to them within the period limited by this Sub-section, the Commissioners shall either cause the entries objected to to be amended in agreement with the objector or give notice to him of their refusal to do so:

Provided that:"

In line 20, to leave out the word "forty-two," and insert instead thereof the word "sixty."

In line 37, leave out the word "forty-two," and insert instead thereof the word "sixty."—[The Solicitor-General.]

Sir THOMAS INSKIP

I beg to move, in page 10, line 35, to leave out from "1910" to the end of line 36.

When this Bill was in Committee Clause 11 as then drafted provided for an appeal on what were called questions of law, from the referee to the High Court and, in Scotland, by virtue of the application Clause, to the Court of Session and the question which arises in this connection is of great importance. It applies not only to England but to Scotland, and, for that reason, we are gratified to have the genial presence of the Lord Advocate to-night. He has not been able to afford much time to the consideration in Committee of this Measure, but we are glad to have him with us this evening. There is no doubt that the Bill as drafted gives only an appeal on questions of law, and, as any hon. Member who has even a nodding acquaintance with the law knows, there are some questions of law which necessitate the consideration of matters of fact. To use a lawyer's expression, there are mixed questions of law and fact in some cases, and when an appeal is given on questions of law, that of course covers mixed questions of law and fact.

Hon. Members will forgive me for giving an illustration which may help the layman to follow this discussion as far as it is necessary for legal questions to intrude in it. The Derating Act only gives an appeal on questions of law, and the question arose under that Act as to whether or not a beer-bottling store was an industrial hereditament. At first sight, that would seem to be a question not of law but of fact. It is what lawyers call a mixed question of law and fact, calling for the interpretation of a legal phrase with reference to a particular set of facts. That is an illustration of the kind of question which would have been appealable under the Bill as originally drafted. The Bill was regarded as unsatisfactory in that respect, and I, on behalf of the taxpayers in England, and the hon. Member for Leith (Mr. E. Brown) on behalf of the taxpayers in Scotland——[HON. MEMBERS: "Some of them!"]—made proposals to enable the taxpayer to have an appeal not only on mixed questions of law and fact, but on questions of fact also. Everybody understood that that was the purpose of our respective proposals. When I moved an Amendment providing for an appeal on questions of fact with regard to the English taxpayers the Solicitor-General said that I had made it quite clear that there should be a perfectly open appeal on all questions of fact as well as of law."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th June, 1931: col. 1314, Vol. 253.] The Solicitor-General resisted the Amendment, quite clearly understanding that what we wanted was to extend the provisions of the Bill to appeals on pure questions of fact. When we reached Clause 31 which applies the Bill to Scotland the hon. Member for Leith moved an equally explicit Amendment and made it plain that he intended that there should be an appeal, as he said, not merely on points of law but on points of fact. As will be seen from the OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th June he suggested, as a convenient tribunal the judges of the Lauds Valuation Court in Scotland—one being the Senior Lord Ordinary and the other the Lord Ordinary who takes Exchequer cases or what we now call revenue cases—and it was quite plain to the Lord Advocate and to everybody that the intention was to give an appeal on questions of fact in Scotland. The Lord Advocate made it plain that he understood the matter in that sense because he said that the first objection to the Amendment was that by it: you would be allowing appeals on questions of fact in Scotland, whereas in England yon are only going to allow appeals on questions of law. There was no mistake in the Lord Advocate's mind as to what we desired, any more than there had been in the mind of the Solicitor-General. The Lord Advocate had another objection to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Leith and it was that, in any system which applied equally to Scotland and England, it was necessary to have same central final court of appeal, where all questions could be knit up, as it were; not as, in questions of rating, where two different systems obtain, one in Scotland and one in England, and you have a final court of appeal in Scotland, namely, the Lands Valuation Court and a final court of appeal in England, namely the House of Lords. The Lord Advocate clearly and cogently pointed out that under an Act of Parliament which applied the same law to both countries, yon could not have two courts acting side by side and giving possibly inconsistent decisions. Therefore, he said, that if we were to have an appeal on questions of fact we must at any rate have some arrangement by which the two countries could have the questions which arose decided in the same court, so as to prevent trouble arising from inconsistent decisions. He then said: This is pre-eminently a matter on which the Government are prepared to take the sense of the Committee. If it is the will of the Committee that this should be considered, we are prepared to give an undertaking to consider the matter and to embody the collected views in a Clause which would deal with the whole situation. Then he proceeded to make the offer which would clinch the bargain and make plain the understanding: If that would meet the wish of the Committee then I suggest that the Amendment should be withdrawn. There was a clear offer to the hon. Member for Leith to withdraw his Amendment, if the general sense of the Committee appeared to be in favour of the proposal to give an appeal on questions of fact. The Lord Advocate went on to say: We are willing to take the substance of this Amendment but it is undesirable to take it in the form in which it now stands because we are anxious to correlate the position in the two countries. In other words, "We accept the principle of the appeal on questions of fact, but we cannot take it in the form proposed by the hon. Member for Leith. We must have a final court which will knit up the law of both countries in the same place." I ventured then to intervene——

Mr. E. BROWN

May I point out to the hon. and learned Gentleman that before he intervened I put this point to the Lord Advocate: I am much obliged to the Lord Advocate. He may find it undesirable to have these amateur words in the Bill but on the understanding that he will meet the point of substance, both with regard to England and Scotland, I beg leave to withdraw.

Sir T. INSKIP

I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. That made plainer, if possible, what was already plain, but as the Lord Advocate did not respond immediately, I ventured to ask whether it was to be made plain as the hon. Member had anticipated, that the same position was to apply to Scotland and to England and the Lord Advocate, beside whom was seated the President of the Board of Trade, replied that he must not be tied down to details. The word "details" does not appear in the OFFICIAL REPORT but I have a clear recollection of its use. However it is not vital to my argument and I take the OFFICIAL REPORT. The Lord Advocate said: The hon. and learned Member must not tie me down in a matter of this Kind because there are important differences as between the procedure in England and the procedure in Scotland. In England there is an appeal to a single judge but in Scotland an appeal of this kind is an appeal to three judges. I cannot give any undertaking in matters of this kind "— meaning procedure— but I am prepared to give the undertaking that we appreciate the importance of securing uniformity in matters of this kind. I hope the hon. and learned Member will not press me further."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th June, 1931; cols. 2022 to 2025, Vol. 253.] I immediately accepted what I feel sure the whole Committee understood to be intended, and I said that what the Lord Advocate had stated was quite suffcient for me. It is not necessary to argue the question afresh, I advanced some arguments in Committee which did not appeal to or convince the Solicitor-General, but the hon. Member for Leith was more fortunate, more happy, more successful, as one would expect from his greater powers of penetration. He secured from the Lord Advocate the assent which I had not been able to obtain from the Solicitor-General. The Lord Advocate was on the bridge that night. The Solicitor-General had well earned his relief and the Lord Advocate was in charge.

If it were necessary to argue the question, one might point with assurance to the experience under the 1909–10 Finance Act. That Act provided that any party aggrieved in relation to the taxation of land under that Act, might appeal both on questions of fact and of law. I well remember the Solicitor-General replying, as the OFFICIAL REPORT will show, that that was one of the chief causes of the breakdown of the 1009–10 legislation— that the taxpayer availed himself so readily of the rights which Parliament had given him, that, in practice, it was found to amount, as the Solicitor-General said, to obstruction. That is the complaint which bureaucrats have always made against people who defend liberty. I mention the 1909–10 Act to show that there is ample precedent on this point. The Solicitor-General, it is true, described it as an unhappy precedent but unhappy for whom? Not for the taxpayer. Unhappy for the Solicitor-General and his friends undoubtedly, but there it is. It is a precedent and any hon. Member who considers the Bill in its present form will realise how valuable it may be for the taxpayer, who does not want to obstruct but who wants to have his rights established, to have an appeal on questions of fact.

8.0 p.m.

I remember a very important piece of litigation which arose under the Income Tax Acts with reference to the meaning of the word "residence." It was the ease of a gentleman who was really resident in the Irish Free State, but who came to this country once a month to attend meetings of a hoard of directors and 011 each visit slept for two nights at, I think, the Spa Hotel, Bath. The Commissioners found that he was resident in this country for the purposes of taxation in England. The case went to the House of Lords and the final tribunal held, I think perhaps a little unwillingly, that they were precluded by the finding of the Commissioners and that there was no appeal on the question of fact but only on the question of law, and that this unfortunate gentleman, who came to this country nine or ten times a year for a couple of days on each occasion, was resident in this country, although his home, his establishment, his property, and everything else were in the Irish Free State. Any hon. Member will agree that it would have been a very valuable right for that gentleman to have had an appeal on the question of fact beyond the Commissioners, who are in the same position as the Referees in relation to the Income Tax Acts. Let me take an illustration from this Bill. There was a notorious definition, which we had not an opportunity of discussing with regard to excavations. Imagine a referee deciding that a particular excavation is not a work executed for the purpose of bring- ing the configuration of the soil to its actual formation. The unfortunate litigant will be precluded from appealing against the decision of the referee, who may have his own peculiar views about a very peculiar definition. There will be no appeal to any superior court.

I do not seek to argue this question afresh. The Lord Advocate has concluded the question. The Lord Advocate—I say it in complete sincerity and with sincere admiration for the right hon. and learned Gentleman's qualities—is well known as an honoured Member attending in the Parliament House in Edinburgh. I am not fortunate enough ever to have been opposed to him, but I well know his reputation for honour and candour. The Solicitor-General shares the same qualities. I would take the word of those two learned gentlemen rather than their bond. Their word is not only as good as their bond but it is better than their bond. When you take the word of those two hon and learned Gentlemen you may be quite sure that you will not have the spirit of the transaction bettered by any legal phrase which a lawyer may invent. The undertaking will be carried out in the spirit as well as in the letter. It is for that reason that we are so delighted to see the Lord Advocate as well as the Solicitor-General here prepared to implement their promise and to carry out as clear a Parliamentary bargain as was ever made.

Unfortunately, we are dealing with this Bill under circumstances in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not had the opportunity or time to give the necessary thought to the devising of an Amendment to carry out the intention which the two hon. and learned Members are here to implement. The Bill having been only printed on Friday, the Government being much occupied with the Amendments about double taxation and playing fields, have not yet had time to draw up an Amendment to give the appeal on fact which the Lord Advocate promised in the name of the Government. With great respect, we have come to their assistance. We have ventured to put down words, my hon. Friend the Member for Leith (Mr. E. Brown) for Scotland and myself for England, which will save the Government any further trouble, except in so far as they may think it necessary to add words or to alter some of the words to meet the true situation. I claim no peculiar sanctity for my Amendment, and I do not imagine that my hon. Friend the Member for Leith will claim sanctity for his particular form of words, but there is one thing that they do achieve, and that is that both Amendments carry out the intention which was held out to the Committee as the promise of the Lord Advocate.

Without labouring the matter further, I say that the two hon. and learned Members are here this evening, and I want them, if they will, to consider what I am about to say as a very serious statement. The Lord Advocate promised, in the most explicit fashion ever known, ever possible in this Chamber, to give an appeal on questions of fact both in Scotland and in England. It is quite true that he reserved the right to consider how it should be done, or whether it would be necessary to provide for an appeal, which at present does not exist, from the Lands Valuation judges in Scotland to the House of Lords. We are not here to reargue the question. We have little doubt that the two hon. and learned Gentlemen will implement the promise that was given. It was a promise made for good consideration. My hon. Friend the Member for Leith had moved his Amendment in a Committee which was obviously prepared to support him. It was the expression of the opinion of the Committee which, I think, compelled the Lord Advocate, in spite of what had happened on Clause 11, to yield the point. In a word, it was a bargain. I do not choose to use that word when I come to an understanding with a right hon. and learned Gentleman who, I know, intends to carry out what is understood as well as expressed. We did not draw up a memorandum of agreement between the parties, with signatures at the end and a seal to make it seem more formal; but for good consideration the right hon. Gentleman gave the promise and we are here to see how good temperedly and how honestly English gentlemen carry out a promise which they have given.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

The hon. and learned Member's fulmination may have surprised some hon. Members in regard to matters of which they had, perhaps, little knowledge. I understand that when I was not here on a day when a Scottish Member was occupying the Floor of the House, the Corporation of Edinburgh, feeling themselves desirous of having some particular form of procedure in Scotland, as in other matters, thought that they might as well impress their opinion upon the country in the southern part of the Kingdom.

Mr. E. BROWN

That is not so. I moved my Amendment, it is true, after consultation with the Corporation of Edinburgh, but it had no relation to England. May I call the Solicitor-General's attention to certain paragraphs in the Debate? England was not raised by me but by the Lord Advocate. He said that he wanted to allow appeals on questions of fact in Scotland whereas in England we were only allowing appeals on questions of law. I replied that it ought to be done there, too.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

I have read the Debate and I have noted the words to which the hon. Member has now referred. He said, "Why not do it for England as well"?

Mr. BROWN

I said that it ought to be done there.

The SOLICITOR - GENERAL

It ought to be done for England as well. I need not go into the history of the matter, but may I sketch it in a little more fully than has been done by the hon. and learned Member for Fareham (Sir T. Inskip)? A little fuller sketch will perhaps be better appreciated. The first thing that one has to bear in mind is that this matter was fully discussed in the Committee on the English side, if I may put it in that way, and the Committee, on the 11th June, by a large majority, turned down this precise suggestion. Of course, it would be wholly impossible after that vote of the Committee to replace that which they had definitely negatived.

Mr. MARJORIBANKS

On Report? After a promise?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

Certainly. If the hon. Member will allow me to proceed I will explain. Hon. Members will remember that the discussion at that time in regard to the English procedure turned a great deal on the form of the case. The hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Croom-Johnson) said: …. it does not follow that what we are pressing for is a complete appeal upon every conceivable little point of fact that will arise under these valuations. I can quite see that that would give rise to all sorts of difficulties."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th June, 1931; cols. 1313–1314, Vol. 253.] That is what the hon. and learned Member for Fareham is now suggesting that we should do. On 18th June the matter came up when the Committee was dealing with the Scottish adaptation of the Clause, and an Amendment was put down by the hon. Member for Leith (Mr. E. Brown). I am not certain that it is not on the Order Paper for the Report stage.

Mr. BROWN

Yes. I put it down, not seeing any words on the Order Paper to deal with the point.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

It is important to see what was proposed in the hon. Member's Amendment, The Amendment was as follows: (2) Within such time as may be proscribed by rules made under this Section, after a notice of refusal has been served upon any person under the last foregoing Sub-section, that person may appeal from the refusal to one of the panel of referees appointed under Part I of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910 "— No question arises on that— and any party to such appeal, if aggrieved by the decision of the referee, may appeal therefrom to the lands valuation judges appointed under the provisions of the Lands Valuation (Scotland) Acts, whoso decision shall be final "— The important sentence for the House to notice follows: and the provisions of the Lands Valuation (Scotland) Acts in regard to stating and signing a case on appeal shall apply to the referee in the same way and to the same effect as they apply to a land valuation appeal court under the provisions of the said Acts. Those provisions enable a case to be stated on questions of law and to be decided by the Lands Valuation judges on questions of law. I note that the hon. and learned Member for Rusholme (Sir Boyd Merriman) does not entirely agree with me there, but if he will consult the Statutes and the well-known text-books on Scottish law, as I have done, he will see what matters can be raised in the Lands Valuation Appeal Court. He will find that it has been said again and again by that Court that it cannot go into questions of fact; that it is there solely to determine questions of law.

Sir ROBERT HORNE

In support of that view I think it will be necessary for someone to give us the references.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

I am sorry that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will not take my word.

Sir R. HORNE

As the hon. and learned Member knows, questions of procedure in the Courts are always subject to much interpretation and debate, and in the broad way in which the hon. and learned Member stated it, I entirely dispute the statement that he has made.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

If the right hon. Gentleman had waited until I had finished my statement it would have been well. Perhaps the qualification I am going to make is the one which he has in mind. The Lands Valuation Court in Scotland is a court from which there is no appeal. Therefore it is impossible for anyone to appeal from that Court on the ground that the Court have wrongly considered a question of fact when they ought only to have considered a question of law. It may be that in some cases there has been an appeal on matters which the Lands Valuation Court judges have taken into account which covered mixed questions of law and fact, but I hope the right hon. Gentleman will take it from me—if he will look up the authority; I have forgotten the name of the author, but it is a standard work on the Lands Valuation Court of Scotland—that he will find that it is expressly and clearly stated, and there are extracts from most eminent judges, that they are not to go into questions of fact in the Lands Valuation Court.

Sir R. HORNE

These judgments are very considerably qualified, and the hon. and learned Member will keep in mind that one of the processes connected with the Lands Valuation Court procedure is that the evidence taken before the Commissioners has to be transmitted along with the Commissioners' case, and that is not done simply for purposes of philanthropy, but with a very definite idea.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

That is true. The evidence is transmitted.

Sir R. HORNE

And it is not done for nothing.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

What I was dealing with was the principle which has been laid down by the Lands Valuation Court Judges, that they are not there to decide matters of fact, and I think I can fairly challenge the right hon. and learned Gentleman to show any judgments of Judges of the Lands Valuation Court in which they say that they are there to judge matters of fact.

Sir R. HORNE

I quite agree.

The SOLICITOR - GENERAL

The right hon. and learned Gentleman quite agrees. Having got to that point then, it is now clear what it was that was being discussed.

Mr. E. BROWN

indicated dissent.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

The hon. Member for Leith shakes his head, but——

Mr. E. BROWN

May I put this to the hon. and learned Gentleman? Surely the last thing that a Committee of this House pays attention to merely is the technical terms of an Amendment. Quite often an Amendment is merely used as a peg in order to put an argument in order, and surely the Solicitor-General is not, in face of my own speech and my reference to the amateurish way in which the thing was drafted, going to ride off on a technical definition of that kind.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

Will the hon. Member be a little more patient? I had got as far as saying that that was the Amendment which was being discussed, and I do not think he is prepared to deny the accuracy of that statement.

Sir T. INSKIP

Come to the point.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

The hon. and learned Member says, "Come to the point," but one must start in these things at a starting point, and I cannot be blamed if I go back to deal with the Amendment that was before the Committee; and I dare say there were a few hon. Members who went into the Lobby, or would have gone into the Lobby, having only read the Amendment and not having heard the whole of the discussion. That may even be so this evening—I do not know. The discussion proceeded on the basis that there was, in the appeal to the Lands Valuation Court of Scotland, some evidence certainly of appeal on facts. That is clear from the discussion, and the passage which the hon. and learned Gentleman read from the Lord Advocate's speech said this: This is pre-eminently a matter on which the Government are prepared to take the sense of the Committee."—[OFFICIAL REPOET, 18th June, 1931; col. 2023, Vol. 253.] The sense of the Committee had already been taken on the English side. [HON. MEMBRES: "No!"] Hon. Members say "No," but when a specific point has been put and argued before the Committee and it has been decided upon, hon. Members cannot say that the sense of the Committee has not been taken. The Lord Advocate then proceeded to say: We are willing to take the substance of this Amendment, but it is undesirable to take it in the form in which it now stands, because we are anxious to correlate the position in the two countries."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th June, 1931; col. 2024, Vol. 253.] That is the position from which we have started to consider this matter, and, in considering it, we have attempted to get a procedure—and there are Amendments on the Paper which carry this out—in Scotland which employs the Lands Valuation——

Mr. MARJORIBANKS

On a point of Order. When a Minister says he is prepared to take the sense of the Committee, does it mean the Commit tee which he is addressing, or——[Interruption].

Mr. SPEAKER

That is not a point of Order.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

What I was suggesting was that the sentence there means, of course, that the speaker was willing to take the sense of the Committee on the matter then before the Committee, and that was the Scottish procedure. What I said was that, as regards the English procedure, that had been dealt with at an earlier stage. Proceeding upon the basis of seeing whether, first of all, one could correlate the two procedures in Scotland and England and, secondly, whether one could give an extended power as regards matters upon which an appeal could be given, the first matter was to consider the Lands Valuation Court of Scotland as being the appellate tribunal which apparently the hon. Member desired. That had been made an appellate tribunal under an Amendment to Clause 31, and an appeal had been given from that court to the House of Lords in order to get over the difficulty which was experienced under the De-rating Act that you had two different tribunals—the Lands Valuation Court in Scotland and the House of Lords in this country—of appeal from the Court of Appeal.

The right hon. Gentleman did mention the question of the de-rating appeals, and those, of course, have all been decided upon cases stated, and on cases stated, in a great number of cases, from quarter sessions in this country, going to the Divisional Court, then to the Appeal Court, and then to the House of Lords; and, as far as I know, there has never been any difficulty in those eases in raising any point that it was required to raise. In fact, a good many of them, probably the hon. and learned Member opposite will agree, raised points which it was not necessary or desirable to raise, because they really were in the end pure questions of fact.

Mr. SCOTT

In the Bill, the form is "a special ease," whereas in the Amendment to be moved from the Government side the term is "a case." Is there any difference between these two terms?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

I think the phrase in the Bill is an award stated "in the form of a special case," and that is one of the matters on which an objection was taken by the hon. Member for Bridgwater when we were discussing the English Clause, as being a much more curtailing form of procedure than a case stated in Income Tax cases. The experience that nearly everybody has had in Income Tax cases warrants my saying that in those eases you do have every reasonable and fair opportunity of dealing with cases of law; and not only that, but it has been held over and over again, in the House of Lords and elsewhere, that on all mixed questions of law and fact you can have an appeal. So far as pure questions of fact are concerned, where there is no mixture of law at all, there is no appeal, and under our proposal in those cases we do not propose to give any appeal; and the reason is the reason which was stated by the hon. and learned Member, a reason which I think everybody knows, and that is that if you allow everyone to appeal to the High Court on any question of fact, it entirely defeats arbitration or referee proceedings or proceedings of that sort. There is no example that I know of where an appeal has been allowed on questions of that sort, or analogous to that, where an appeal has been allowed to the High Court on any question of fact unmixed with law.

Sir T. INSKIP

The hon. and learned Member means in the Income Tax Acts?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

No, in any Acts.

Sir T. INSKIP

What about the 1909–10 Act?

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

With the exception of the 1909–10 Act. The hon. and learned Member has already referred to the argument I put up in regard to that, and that seems to me to be a sufficiently good argument. As regards any other Act that has survived in practice, or any other method that has survived in practice, I do not think that there is any example where a person who has an appeal to commissioners or referees or whoever they may be, has an appeal from them to the High Court on any point of fact he likes to raise. It has either been a pure question of law or a question of mixed law and fact. I think that the most generous measure of appeal is probably that laid down in the Income Tax Clauses. Everyone who knows what happens in those cases knows that you can in fact get any mixture of law and fact determined on appeal. That is why we suggest that this use of the land valuation court in Scotland can best be met by introducing, instead of the procedure we suggested, the precise procedure of the Income Tax Acts, using the same words with regard to a person being dissatisfied with the decision of questions of law, and introducing as regards Scotland the land valuation judges, because they are judges who understand and have to deal constantly, I understand, with matters of land valuation, but altering the constitution of the Scottish Court by adding to that court an appeal on all points to the House of Lords in order that you might not get into the difficulties that were created under the De-rating Act of having one final court in Scotland and a different final court in England.

If hon. and learned Members or hon. Members opposite think that that is not a carrying out of the undertaking by my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate, I alone am responsible, because having taken into consideration the whole of the discussion upon the Committee stage on both of these Amendments, I myself inserted this form of alteration in the procedure in the two countries in the endeavour to carry out the spirit of what was promised, knowing quite well that hon. and learned Gentlemen opposite agree that it was impossible in this country, as they had said, to have appeal on points of fact allowed if you were to make this a workable proposition.

Mr. E. BROWN

I listened to the Solicitor-General's speech with more uneasiness than that with which I have listened to any speech which I have ever heard in the six years I have been in this House. I quite appreciate, as the whole House does, the attempt of the Solicitor-General to take responsibility for what has happened, but I suggest that that is quite irrelevant. The Government is a Government as a whole, and if there has been a want of liaison in this matter between those responsible for Clause 11 and Clause 31 as it now stands, that surely is not the fault of the Committee or the House, but is the responsibility of the Government. Surely we are not to be told at this stage, after a definite undertaking had been given by one Member of the Government—a very distinguished Member—that several days afterwards, when we come to consider the implementing of that undertaking, that another Member of the Government is to come down here in the name of a third Member who is not here—the Chancellor of the Exchequer—and throw over the first obligation.

I do not wish to continue to argue the case for Scotland. I may be allowed to say in passing that, having examined the Amendments, I was not quite clear, being a layman, whether or not the Amendment on Clause 31 accurately carries out the undertaking given on behalf of Scotland, and what the Solicitor-General says now has filled me with the most intense disquiet. Let me come back to the English point, which is the point we are discussing now. I cannot allow the Solicitor-General to mislead the House or the country into believing that the discussion took place merely in terms of the Amendment which I moved. Any hon. Member who takes the trouble to read the Debate of 18th June, will only come to this conclusion, after hearing the speech of the Solicitor-General, that the hon. and learned Gentleman has been put up to make a perfectly accurate legal speech in terms of legal discussion on what was said, but that he throws over the whole substance of the promise given.

The LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. Craigie Aitchison)

indicated dissent.

Mr. BROWN

The Lord Advocate shakes "his head, but we may be able to argue this out in terms of Scotland tomorrow night. I am now arguing with the Solicitor-General. Let me ask the House these four questions—first, what was in the mind of the Committee on 18th June; second, what was the promise of the Lord Advocate——[Interruption.] There was a fairly large Committee and an exceptionally large Committee for a Scottish Bill; and more than that, there is no question but that on the discussion the Lord Advocate himself was distinctly uneasy as to how the result would go if a Division had been taken. My own judgment is that if a Division had been taken, the Amendment would have been carried after the discussion that had taken place. The fact that a Minister of the Crown asked a Private Member to withdraw his Amendment on giving an undertaking, shows that there must have been substance in the case or apprehension as to the result of the Division. Everyone knows that such a request to withdraw an Amendment is only made in one of these two eventualities. I ask what was in the mind of the Committee; what was the promise of the Lord Advocate; why was the Amendment withdrawn, and what do the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Amendments mean?

What was in the mind of the Committee had nothing to do with the exact form of tribunal. Immediately the Lord Advocate mentioned the difficulty of the House of Lords, I was prepared to concede the House of Lords as the final court as between England and Scotland. I was not concerned with the exact procedure of the valuation judges, but only with putting up the ease which was put before me by the Edinburgh Corporation, and I was only concerned to say that the valuation judges were the appropriate tribunal because they had for nearly 60 years been the tribunal in Scotland which dealt with cases of valuation. I did not even mention the kind of procedure adopted before, but I based my argument on the fact that they had dealt with all cases of valuation, and that there were principles clearly understood and precedents and practice established.

What was the argument about? The argument on which the promise of the Lord Advocate was given was based on one simple issue which I placed before the Committee. It was that it was unjust to start a new tax of this kind and give to the aggrieved taxpayer only the right to appeal on points of law, and that he ought to have the right of appeal on points of fact. I went so far as to point out that in great cities in Scotland, like Glasgow and Edinburgh, there would be not one valuer but scores, and since they all started without any previous practice or precedents laid down for them, they might quite easily come to quite different conclusionson points of fact. Therefore it was thoroughly unjust. That was the substance of my argument, as it is the substance of the case put to the Government by the Edinburgh Corporation. Perhaps I ought to read what the Edinburgh Corporation said. Let me quote from page 10 of their Memorandum, so that the Lord Advocate can verify it before to-morrow night: It is a matter of grave concern that owners—particularly in the very special circumstances of valuations under the provisions of the Bill—will not be entitled to invoke the Courts in the event of their being aggrieved by the decision of the referee on points other than points of law. No doubt there is a risk of considerable litigation if an appeal to the Courts is allowed, but that appears to he inevitable in proposals of this nature. On the balance it appears to the reporters "— that is, the reporters of the Corporation— that the advantages of granting an appeal to the Courts on any ground outweigh the disadvantages. The experience of the derating cases under the recent Local Government Acts is sufficient by itself to justify this opinion. I pointed out, as a middle course, that the valuation judges under Scottish law might be a proper tribunal in order to get that established. My judgment is that the Committee understood, and the Lord Advocate understood, that what we were asking for was not a tribunal to deal either with points of law, or points of mixed fact and law, but a tribunal to which an aggrieved taxpayer under this new Act could appeal so that all his case might be put, and he might get justice against any valuer who might, in, his judgment, do him despite under this procedure. Speaking for myself, I say with a most profound sense of shame that, for the first time in my experience in this House, an undertaking given—unless some more light can be thrown upon the subject—by a responsible Member of the Government, a man whose word of honour is without reproach, has been turned down, now, at a future stage of the Bill, and we are not getting, at least for England, what was promised. My sense of shame is deepened because I myself did not raise the case of England. Those words were put into my mouth. The Lord Advocate stated, as one of his reasons for turning down my appeal, that England had no such appeal on a question of fact, and then I said, "It ought to be possible there, too." In face of a statement like that, how the Solicitor-General can come down and ask the Committee to believe that all that was decided on the night of the 18th of June was that we were to have an appeal in the terms of the present procedure of the land valuation judges in Scotland is beyond me as a layman trying to do fairly by my fellow Members in this House, and it will be beyond those who read the Debates next morning in Scotland, where they were published at great length. It is beyond me to know how the Solicitor-General can reconcile his position in this House as a guardian of legal honour and the honour of the Government in throwing over the Lord Advocate in the way he has done.

The LORD ADVOCATE

It is very unfortunate if there has been any misconception in this matter. For my part I do not think there has been misconception. I take the view, and I hope the hon. Member for Leith (Mr. E. Brown) will agree with me after I have stated my reasons for saying so, that we have implemented the undertaking which was given to accept the substance of the Amendment which stood in the name of the hon. Member for Leith on 18th June. If he disagrees he is entitled to his own view, but I propose to put the position before the House and let the House judge. I hope it is quite unnecessary to say that if an undertaking is given by any Member of the Government the Government will honour that undertaking in the letter and in the spirit. If I thought that in what we are proposing to-day we were in any material respect not implementing an undertaking, I should come to the House and say that I had gone too far in giving it, and ask the House to release me from the obligation; but I do not take that view and I hope to convince the House that the whole misunderstanding is due to the fact that the hon. Member for Leith and the hon. and right hon. Members who supported him did not understand the Amendment they were moving. If they had understood what an appeal meant under the provisions of the Valuations of Lands Amendment Act, 1879, there could have been no misunderstanding.

I propose to satisfy the House that we have accepted the substance of the Amendment which the hon. Member had tabled. I can state the substance of it quite shortly. It involved three things. Two of them relate to Scotland only, and accordingly I am not going to discuss them, as they would not be germane to the question under discussion. The first point in the Amendment was that appeals should be allowed, so far as Scotland was concerned, to the Land Valuations Appeal Court. We are implementing that request. If the hon. Member for Leith has looked at the Amendment in the name of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Clause 31, he will find that that part of the Amendment is being given effect to; but it does not arise here and I do not propose to discuss it. In the second place the hon. Member, as I understood his position, was anxious that there should be finality so far as the Valuation Appeal Court was concerned. I pointed out at the time that there was a very grave objection to allowing finality to attach to the judgment of the Land Valuations Appeal Court as you have an appeal to the House of Lords in England, that uniformity was essential and that this was a point in the Amendment which we could not accept. On the third point, the position of the hon. Member for Leith, as I understood it, was this. He desired to broaden the basis of appeal—that is how I understood him—and I am here to say to the House that the undertaking which was given in that matter has been honoured and implemented. We have put appeals in this matter on precisely the same footing as under the practice prevailing in the matter of land valuation appeal in Scotland. As I have said already, if the hon. Member for Leith had understood what the practice in Scotland was he would have realised, and so would the hon. and learned Member for Fareham (Sir T. Inskip), that we have given him the substance of the Amendment which he moved on 18th June. [An HON. MEMBER: "No."] If my hon. Friend will just wait a minute before he interrupts with his negatives he will find that I am right. Appeal in the matter of land valuation in Scotland is regulated by the Valuation of Lands (Scotland) Amendment Act, 1879. Section 7 of that Act defines the ground upon which one can appeal and provides this: it shall be lawful for such person appealing or for such assessor, if he shall apprehend the determination of the Commissioners.… to be contrary to the true intent of the said Acts, and 6hall then declare himself dissatisfied with such determination, to require the said Commissioners or magistrates to state specially and to sign the case upon which the question arose, setting forth the facts proved, together with the determination thereupon. "Let the House observe the phrase: setting forth the facts proved, together with the determination thereupon. The position in Scotland is that under the procedure of that Act the Valuation Committee sets forth specifically the facts that are found proved. When you come to the actual hearing of the appeal the judges have invariably said that they will not go behind the facts which have been specifically found by the Valuation Committee and they accept those facts. There are only two cases in which a valuation may be interfered with by the Valuation Appeal Court. One case is where it can be shown that the Valuation Committee have proceeded upon a wrong principle of valuation. In that case the Valuation Appeal Court will intervene and put the matter right. The other case is where the committee in arriving at their finding have had no evidence on which that finding can be supported. That is where the whole misconception has arisen.

In dealing with the Amendment of the hon. Member for Leith I used the expression "appeal upon fact." I think that was a loose expression to use and when I used that expression I was not suggesting that we were going to empower the Appellate Court to go beyond the specific findings of fact. I could not have had any such thought in my mind because I was familiar with the practice in land valuation appeals in Scotland where, as I have already stated, it is clearly established that the Appellate Court does not go beyond findings of fact.

Mr. SMITHERS

I have a copy in my hand of the original Act under which the land valuation court was appointed and the last paragraph says: And accordingly to such opinion the valuation or assessment which shall be the cause of the appeal shall be altered or confirmed. Is that not giving power to the High Court to determine a question of fact if they can alter or confirm the valuation of an assessment?

The LORD ADVOCATE

I think the question which the hon. Member has just put to me illustrates the ambiguity of the expressions "questions of fact" and "questions of law." Of course the valuation Appeal Court can alter a valuation if the valuation committee which made the valuation has proceeded on a wrong principle of valuation or has drawn an inference which cannot be supported by the facts. Similarly under the appeal provisions with which we are dealing here, does anyone imagine that if the commissioners have applied a wrong principle of valuation to a unit of land that that valuation is going to stand. The whole purpose of the appeal provision is to alter the valuation if good cause can be shown. In this matter a finding of the referee for the purposes of this Bill is in precisely the same position as the findings of the Valuation Court for the purposes of land valuation in Scotland.

The Amendment moved by the hon. and learned Member for Fareham is to allow an appeal on law and on fact. If the Government were to accept that Amendment as it stands the result would be that the Appellate Court could challenge the specific findings of the referee. If you give the Appellate Court that power you are not putting it in the same position as the Valuation Appeal Court in Scotland but you are putting it in a more favourable position because the Valuation Appeal Court has no power to go beyond specific findings of fact. A good deal of the criticism which has been made seems to have proceeded upon a misconception of what are the powers of the Valuation Appeal Court. The hon. Member for Leith is quite entitled to say that I used the expression "an appeal on facts." I think that that was a loose expression to use. I ask the House not to believe that in using that expression I meant that there should be an appeal upon every specific finding that might be made by the referee because no such intention was present in my mind and I do not think that any such intention was present in the mind of the hon. Member for Leith. I find in column 1314 of the Debate in Committee when Clause 11 was under discussion, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Fareham was arguing for a less restricted right of appeal and he said: I think, however, that the High Court may be trusted not to entertain appeals merely on questions of values about which they have had no experience and upon which they must depend on the evidence of the responsible people."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1lth June. 1931: col. 1308. Vol. 253.]

According to that the position of the hon. and learned Member for Fareham was that if you give an unrestricted right of appeal your Appellate Court will not interfere.

Sir T. INSKIP

What I was saying was that it would not entertain appeals apart from the evidence, that is they would not allow the appeals to act on the evidence of valuers but on people of experience. I was not saying that they would not deal with questions of fact because my argument was that there was an appeal on questions of fact.

The LORD ADVOCATE

The hon. and learned Gentleman, like myself, used the expression appeals on fact. On these questions of fact you cannot judge and an Appeal Court is bound to accept the findings arrived at, it may be by an arbitrator under the Workmen's Compensation Act or by an arbitrator under some other Statute.

What I had in view was that the appeal would not be limited merely to principles of valuation, but that it would be wide enough to cover the case where the Commissioners or the Referee purport to draw an inference of fact where there is no evidence to support it. That was what I had in view——[Interruption.] My hon. and learned Friend is very unsure of his ground, or he would not be holding these constant consultations. The position is perfectly plain. I accused the hon. and learned Gentleman of not knowing what valuation appeal in Scotland meant when he made his speech this evening. I doubt if he knows it now. Valuation appeals under the Act of 1879 do not mean appeals upon specific findings in fact. They mean a review of facts in this sense, that if the Commissioners have drawn an inference of fact which there is no evidence to support, then the valuation appeal Court would interfere, and that is precisely the position of the Government under the Chancellor's Amendment.

Let me remind the hon. and learned Gentleman of what the position is under the corresponding provision of the Income Tax Act. It has been said that in the matter of Income Tax appeals the appeal Court will not go behind specific findings in fact; but it is equally well said that if the Commissioners in an Income Tax matter draw an inference of fact which cannot be supported by the evidence the appeal Court will interfere with that finding, and that is precisely the position which is defined in this Bill. I do not think that my hon. and learned Friend can challenge that proposition, but as there has been so much obscurity in this matter I will read to him two very short passages from two distinguished Judges. Let me first read to him a passage from a judgment of the Master of the Rolls, Lord Cozens-Hardy, in the case of Gramophone, Limited v. Stanley. The reference is 1908, 2 K.B. 89. The Master of the Rolls was dealing with an Income Tax appeal under Schedule D, and he said this: It is undoubtedly true that if the Commissioners find a fact it is not open to this Court to question that finding unless there is no evidence to support it. If, however, the Commissioners state the evidence which was before them, and add that upon such evidence they hold that certain results follow, I think it is open, and it was intended by the Commissioners that it should be open, for the Court to say whether the evidence justified what the Commisioners held. Similarly, Lord Chancellor Loreburn, in the case of Farmer v. Cottons Trustees, in 15 Appeal Cases, 922, said this—it was an appeal under the Income Tax Act— The Commissioners have given us the relevant facts in detail and we can see for ourselves that taking those facts as found there are no materials at all upon which the conclusion they reach can be based. If the facts were such that on a true construction of the Act a different conclusion could reasonably be drawn, there would be no power for the Court of Appeal to interfere. 9.0 p.m.

The position seems clear beyond argument. Under the system of appeal in Income Tax matters presently obtaining, the appellate court will not interfere with specific findings of fact; but, on the other hand, the appellate court will interfere if an inference of fact is drawn that cannot be supported by the evidence, and that is precisely the position which you have under the Valuation Appeal Act in Scotland, as defined by the Act of 1879 and as interpreted by a long series of decisions with which I do not trouble the House; and it is precisely the position which we have under the Amendment which stands next on the Paper, in the name of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Accordingly, I submit to the House that we have implemented the undertaking both in the letter and in the spirit, and that this distorted and ill-instructed criticism which has been directed against the Government would never have been levelled by the hon. and learned Member for Fareham to-night, or concurred in by the hon. Member for Leith, if either of them had taken the trouble to know what the provisions as to appeal are in Scotland; but in their anxiety to seize upon any weapon with which to beat the Government—[Interruption]—they have treated the House for a period of nearly an hour and a half to a demonstration in which I venture to say to the House that there is not one iota of substance.

Sir R. HORNE

I am afraid that after I have spoken I shall be included in the category of those who are described as of distorted imagination and ill-informed criticism, but at least I do not suffer from the disability with which the right hon. Gentleman has charged my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Fareham (Sir T. Inskip) and the hon. Member for Leith (Mr. E. Brown), in respect of ignorance of the practice of the valuation courts in Scotland. It has been my fate in the past to appear many times in those courts, and as I think the Lord Advocate will agree, the forms which are in use there are just as familiar to me as they are to him.

This matter cannot be decided on the question of the technique of the valuation courts in Scotland, nor upon the particular form which is taken by the Amendment put down by my hon. Friend the Member for Leith. He is not a person familiar with the procedure of the Court in Scotland, but it was perfectly obvious from his speech what he wished to achieve. It was also perfectly obvious that the Lord Advocate understood it, and I would Venture to say that the Lord Advocate on that occasion was really not riding off upon a technical matter, as, indeed, it would have been very ungenerous of him to do, but that he was endeavouring to the best of his ability to meet a very formidable and reasonable case which had been put before the Committee, which obviously was largely sympathised with on both sides of the House, so far as one could gather from the interest that was taken, and which brought the position of the Lord Advocate into some little risk so far as the carrying of his Clause was concerned.

I was present throughout the discussion, and it is perfectly proper for me to intervene to-day. It would be quite appropriate upon an English Clause, because, after all, we are still one Kingdom; but, apart from that, the Clause now presented to the House rules the Scottish Clause. The Clause that will be fobbed off upon us to-morrow night follows upon the English Clause, and applies to the particular Clause adopted in Scotland the procedure of England, and gives the same rights so far as appeal is concerned as are going to be given by this Clause in the case of England, if the Clause be adopted.

Therefore every Scottish Member is interested in this Clause in so far as its main principles are concerned. When one considers that to-morrow night, for all the questions that arise in connection with Scottish procedure and an entirely different system of land holding, we are to have an hour and a half for the whole of the problems that Scotland raises, it is very natural that we should discuss this question now. I am not going into the merits of the case, because they have been sufficiently explained, but I wish to bring the Lord Advocate back to the character of his undertaking. That, after all, is a thing in which every one in the House is interested, no matter on which side he sits, because nothing worse can happen than that people should begin to distrust pledges that are given from the Government Benches, and obviously Debates would be prolonged to a very much greater extent than they are now if we had in every case to go into the Division Lobby before we were going to be assured that our particular point was accepted. Accordingly, may I refer to the speech of the hon. Member below me and to the answers that were given to him by the Lord Advocate. I cannot imagine that anyone can read these and have any doubt in his mind as to the conclusion that was reached. In putting forward his Amendment, the hon. Member modestly disclaimed any knowledge of the forms of procedure. He said he had suggested it as something that might be adopted, but, obviously, if there was any question about words or processes, he was willing that the Government should put the matter into proper shape. But he made his point perfectly plain, and what he said was: I propose that there shall he an appeal not merely on points of law hut on points of fact. The Lord Advocate knows the difference between an appeal on a point of fact and an appeal on a point of law. It is a phrase with which we are perfectly familiar. The general phrase "appeal on a point of fact" means that all the facts are open, and that the evidence comes before the Appeal Court in the shape in which they are entitled to judge it completely for themselves without any regard to the conclusions that have been arrived at in the Court below. The other thing that he has been talking of to-day, the special case, is also perfectly well known and we know that, when a special case is stated, and the facts are found and disclosed in the stated case, although there is only an appeal on a point of law, if the facts disclosed do not found any reasonable ground for the conclusion at which the Court has arrived, that is treated as a point of law and may be upset. That kind of appeal by special case, or stated case, upon a point of law is poles asunder from what we know as an appeal on fact and law, which throws everything open. The phraseology which the hon. Member used was perfectly plain. He wanted an appeal upon fact as well as upon law, and he proceeded to give illustrations of what he meant. He said: "This is a new system and it is plain that there will be a great many differences which will agitate the minds of the people who are dealt with under it and, accordingly, they want to be satisfied that the facts have been properly judged as well as the law." He gave his illustration in this way. He said: There will be legitimate differences between the valuator and the taxpayer as to matter of fact. The valuation of land, especially in the large, areas where the circumstances are very diversified, are bound to be intensified. Where the valuation is to be made on the assumption that the buildings on the site are non-existent, there will be no exact science in the valuation and, therefore, there must be a very large scope for legitimate differences of opinion as between the valuator on the one hand and the taxpayer on the other. That is again on the question of fact. The Lord Advocate completely understood what the hon. Member meant and this was his reply. He did not dispute that he was not giving any appeal upon questions of fact. He did not say, "The English system, which is to be applied to you, is one," as he has been saying to-day, "in which the facts are looked at along with the points of law. If it is clear to the Court that there was no reasonable ground for arriving at that result upon the facts as stated that would be open." No explanation of that kind was ever forthcoming.

The LORD ADVOCATE

I assume that the hon. Member who moved the Amendment was familiar with the kind of appeal that was open under the Valuation Appeal Act.

Sir R. HORNE

I regret to say so but I heard the whole discussion and I propose to give the Lord Advocate's answer. He said: If this Amendment were given effect to, the result would be two-fold. In the first place, you would be allowing appeals on questions of fact in Scotland, whereas in England you are only going to allow appeals on questions of law. He made his answer perfectly explicit and the matter was further exposed when he said: I think it would be wrong to allow appeals on fact in Scotland and refuse them in England. This is pre-eminently a matter on which the Government are prepared to take the sense of the Committee. If it is the will of the Committee that this should be considered, we are prepared to give an undertaking to consider the matter and to embody the collected view in a Clause which would deal with the whole situation. If that would meet the wish of the Committee, then I suggest the Amendment should be withdrawn."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th January, 1931, col. 2023, Vol. 253.] The hon. Member withdrew the Amendment upon that understanding. Every one was perfectly assured in his own mind that questions of fact were to be open

The LORD ADVOCATE

The right hon. Gentleman is, of course, familiar, as he has informed the House, with our practice in the matter of land valuation appeals. I want to ask him this question. Does he take my words as meaning that there was to be an appeal on specific findings of fact in a larger sense than there is under the Valuation Appeal Acts, and, if so, on what does he base that construction of the words that I used?

Sir R. HORNE

I can assure the right hon. Gentleman in complete sincerity that I understood that he was throwing open the whole question of fact and law on the appeal. Let us have clearly in recollection that that was not such a wide assumption. The Act of 1909–10 embodied an appeal both on fact and on law in the sense that I am now putting before the House, and not in the restricted sense in which the Lord Advocate is now interpreting the undertaking that he gave. Every lawyer certainly understands the difference between an appeal on fact and on law. I was perfectly familiar with the position under the Land Valuation Appeal Acts. I knew also exactly what the procedure was as the right hon. Gentleman has expounded it to-day, but that is a totally different thing from what you call an appeal on fact and on law, the appeal that was given under the Act of 1909–10. I have found no one who had any doubt at all as to what the Lord Advocate had done. My recollection is that in the following morning's papers attention was called to the fact that the Lord Advocate had given away a position which was maintained most vehemently in the other sense by the Solicitor-General, and that something would require to be done in order to bring these two attitudes into some kind of consonance, but no one had any doubt at all as to what the undertaking meant, neither publicly nor privately.

Then my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Fareham intervened and got, as he understood, an undertaking that England was to be considered in the same way as Scotland and, of course, the Lord Advocate's anxiety to bring the two systems of procedure into co-relation was perfectly understandable. It would be an inconvenient thing that you should have appeals stopping at the Land Valuation Appeal Courts in Scotland and going on to the House of Lords in England because then you might have decisions given in those two separate cases with no appeal to an ultimate body fitted to overrule both. The Lord Advocate's chief anxiety was to discover a way in which that could be met. But that difficulty is perfectly easily met by doing what they did in the Statute of 1909–10. There the appeal in Scotland was to the same body as formed the Land Valuation Appeal Court, but constituted under that particular Statute as, not the Land Valuation Appeal Court, but the Valuation Appeal Court. The appeal to that body of judges, being the same as under the Land Valuation Appeal Court, was still open to further appeal to the House of Lords.

The method of obtaining the co-relation which the Lord Advocate desiderated was open and obvious, and all that the Government required to do in order to bring the two countries under the same method of appeal was to apply some such arrangement as that. I make the observation which I have made today with a grave feeling both of perturbation and of disappointment. Nothing can be more unacceptable to me than that I should have to rise in my place and make this criticism of what I regarded as an absolutely definite and honourable undertaking on the part of the Lord Advocate, and was so regarded by everybody, certainly those sitting on this side of the House and by everybody outside who commented upon it in the public Press. It is a great misfortune to the House that our traditions should be called into question in any shape or form, and I beg the Government to reconsider their attitude upon this matter and to give full implement to the undertaking which the Lord Advocate gave.

Sir BOYD MERRIMAN

I am bound to say, having listened to every word of this discussion, that I think it is one of the most disquieting incidents that have taken place in the House of Commons since I have been here. Let me say at once that I am not in the least concerned as to whether, so far as Scottish law is concerned, there has been any complete implementing of what the Lord Advocate indicated he would possibly do as regards Scotland. What we are concerned with is that there has been the plainest possible breach of the clearest possible Parliamentary bargain. The Solicitor-General and the Lord Advocate have dealt with this matter, I am sorry to say, with a levity which is a little unfortunate. The Solicitor-General said, among other things, that there might be Members going into the Division Lobby who had not heard the Debate and because at the time when the Solicitor-General was speaking the House was empty and many Members have since come in, I am venturing to restate from the OFFICIAL REPORT what was the nature of the bargain. Both the Law Officers who have addressed the House on this matter have put forward a sort of special pleading. About the nature of the Amendment put forward for Scotland by the hon. Member for Leith (Mr. E. Brown), the Lord Advocate asserted that he did not understand his own Amendment, and that was the explanation of the form the discussion took. I am going to read with the permission of the House—they have been referred to before—four passages which make the position absolutely plain. The hon. Member for Leith——

The LORD ADVOCATE

rose—— [Interruption.]

Sir B. MERRIMAN

The Lord Advocate and the Solicitor-General addressed the House at considerable length, and I have less than 10 minutes to deal with the matter. The hon. Member for Leith ended his speech in these words: I hope we shall not be told that it is not necessary to have an appeal or that, if it is necessary, it should be brought into conformity with the Income Tax appeal in Great Britain. And may I point out that the whole controversy was, in this case as far as England was concerned, that we wanted to have the sort of appeal allowed under the old Land Tax Act and not the sort of appeal allowed under Income Tax. The hon. Member went on: This is a case where Scottish law and practice demand a separate Court, and I shall have the sympathy of the Committee with me on the major point, namely, that there ought to be an appeal on such vast new procedure, not merely on points of law but on points of fact. That concluded the hon. Member's speech. The Lord Advocate, after one of my hon. Friends had addressed the Committee, said that the Amendment undoubtedly raises a point of very great importance, upon which the Government would be quite prepared to take the view of the Committee, but we think it right that the Committee should appreciate what exactly this Amendment means. If this Amendment were given effect to, the result would be two-fold. In the first place, you would be allowing appeals on questions of fact in Scotland, whereas in England you are only going to allow appeals on questions of law. Mr. E. BROWN: It ought to be done there.

The LORD ADVOCATE: At any rate, it has not been done "—

referring, of course, to the discussion on 11th June— What I am concerned to point out to the Committee is that you will be making an anomaly on that point. After the hon. Member for Leith had intervened again, the Lord Advocate said: We are willing to take the substance of this Amendment, but it is undesirable to take it in the form in which it now stands, because we are anxious to correlate the position in the two countries. The hon. Member for Watford (Sir D. Herbert) then intervened to make it perfectly plain. He said: I hope the Government will make some arrangements which will give the citizens in England the same right of appeal on questions of fact as it is proposed to give to the people of Scotland."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th June, 1931; cols. 2020–24, Vol. 253.] Then the hon. Member was prepared to withdraw his Amendment on the understanding that the Lord Advocate would meet the point of substance, both with regard to England and to Scotland. If ever words can make a thing plain, I submit that it was as plain as words could make it that the Government were prepared to reconsider the matter both for England and for Scotland, because we cannot have one law for England and another law for Scotland, and that they were prepared to reconsider it according to the substance of the matter which has been put forward in the Amendment by the hon. Member for Leith. The Solicitor-General, if he will forgive me, gave us a lecture on the Scottish law upon which he is, like myself, a layman. I would like to remind him that the English discussion on this subject ended in those words. I ventured to address the Committee about this matter, and in dealing with the question of who should have the right of appeal I gave certain instances. The discussion went on to the question of feu duties, ground landlords and the rest. The Solicitor-General then said that wild horses would not drag him into a discussion of Scottish law. It now appears perfectly plainly from this discussion—I am not in the least concerned about Scottish law—that in Scotland, according to what the Lord Advocate has said, the evidence is presented on appeal and not merely a statement of what the Commissioners have found, and it is reviewed, whereas in England the facts are stated in concise form and behind that statement of fact there is no investigation. The Solicitor-General said that on mixed questions of law and fact there is an appeal. In one sense that is true, because there is an appeal on law, but in so far as the facts are stated there is no sort of appeal on the case stated into the questions of fact which emerge. It is absolutely common knowledge that over and over again a point of law cannot be raised on the cases stated, because they are stated out of Court. I am perfectly certain that the Solicitor-General would not dispute that position.

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL

I certainly disagree.

Sir B. MERRIMAN

That is a case on which the Solicitor-General's superior officer—for the Lord Advocate is senior to him—has given, later than he has, a definite undertaking to the House. To tell this House that the Lord Advocate, when he was talking about taking the sense of the Committee, meant that the sense of the Committee as far as England was concerned had already been taken some time before, is simply to trifle with the House of Commons. The Solicitor-General said that if the Lord Advocate went further in this matter, then he, the Solicitor-General, at any rate took the full responsibility for what was being done now. Where is collective ministerial responsibility if this is the way in which the House of Commons is to be treated?

Mr. SCOTT

In the few moments which remain, I should like to say, as one who has had very considerable experience of valuation appeals in Scotland, that I accept the Lord Advocate's statement of the law in Scotland. I entirely appreciate the indignation of my hon. Friend the Member for Leith (Mr. E. Brown), because he was thinking

of a different thing from that of which the Lord Advocate was thinking. If the Lord Advocate had used the language to me which he used to my hon. Friend, I should certainly not have misunderstood him at all. What the House at the moment has to consider is whether we are to accept the Amendment which has been moved from the Conservative benches, namely, to admit an appeal to the Appeal Court on questions of fact; in other words, whether the Appeal Court is to have before it witnesses who have already appeared before the court of first instance or whether they are to confine themselves solely to the statement of the evidence.

It being half-past Nine of the Clock, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER proceeded, pursuant to the Orders of the House of 4th and 29th June, to put forthwith the Question on the Amendment already proposed from the Chair.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out, stand part of the Bill."

The House divided: Ayes, 276; Noes, 238.

Division No. 367.]	AYES	[9.30 p.m.
Adamson, Rt. Hon. W. (Fife, West)	Calne, Hall-, Derwent	Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton)
Adamson, W. M. (Stall., Cannock)	Cameron, A. G.	Graham, Rt. Hon. Wm. (Edin., Cent.)
Addison, Rt. Hon. Dr. Christopher	Cape, Thomas	Gray, Milner
Altchison, Rt. Hon. Craigle M.	Carter, W. (St. Pancras, S. W.)	Greenwood, Rt. Hon. A. (Colne)
Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V. (Hillsbro')	Charleton, H. C.	Grenfell, D. R. (Glamorgan)
Alpass, J. H.	Chater, Daniel	Griffith, F. Kingsley (Middlesbro' W.)
Ammon, Charles George	Church, Major A. G.	Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)
Angell, Sir Norman	Clarke, J. S.	Groves, Thomas E.
Arnott, John	Cluse, W. S.	Grundy, Thomas W.
Aske, Sir Robert	Clynes, Rt. Hon. John R.	Hall, G. H. (Merthyr Tydvil)
Attlee, Clement Richard	Cocks, Frederick Seymour	Hall, J. H. (Whitechapel)
Ayles, Walter	Compton, Joseph	Halt, Capt. W. G. (Portsmouth, C.)
Baker, John (Wolverhampton, Bilston)	Cove, William G.	Hamilton, Mary Agnes (Blackburn)
Baldwin, Oliver (Dudley)	Cripps, Sir Stafferd	Hardie, David (Rutherglen)
Barnes, Alfred John	Daggar, George	Hardie, G. D. (Springburn)
Barr, James	Dallas, George	Harris, Percy A.
Batey, Joseph	Dalton, Hugh	Hastings, Dr. Somerville
Beckett, John (Camberwell, Peckham)	Davies, E. C. (Montgomery)	Haycock, A. W.
Benn, Rt. Hon. Wedgwood	Davies, D. L. (Pontypridd)	Haydey, Arthur
Bennett, Sir E. N. (Cardiff, Central)	Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)	Hayes, John Henry
Bennett, William (Battersea, South)	Day, Harry	Henderson, Right Hon. A. (Burnley)
Benson, G.	Denman, Hon. R. D.	Henderson, Arthur, Junr. (Cardiff, S.)
Bevan, Aneurin (Ebbw Vale)	Dudgeon, Major C. R.	Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick)
Birkett, W. Norman	Dukes, C.	Henderson, Thomas (Glasgow)
Blindell, James	Duncan, Charles	Henderson, W. W. (Middx., Enfield)
Bondfield, Rt. Hen. Margaret	Ede, James Chuter	Herriotts, J.
Bowen, J. W.	Edmunds, J. E.	Hirst, G. H. (York W. R. Wentworth)
Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W.	Edwards, E. (Morpeth)	Hirst, W. (Bradford. South)
Broad, Francis Alfred	Ekniey, Viscount	Hoffman, P. C.
Brockway, A. Ferner	Foot, Isaac	Hollins, A.
Bromfield, William	Gardner, B. W. (West Ham, Upton)	Hopkin, Daniel
Bromley, J.	George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)	Hudson, James H. (Huddersfield)
Brooke, W.	George, Megan Lloyd (Anglesea)	Isaacs, George
Brothers, M.	Gibbins, Joseph	John, William (Rhondda, West)
Brown, C W. E. (Notts. Mansfield)	Gibson, H. M. (Lancs, Mossley)	Johnston, Rt. Hon. Thomas
Brown, Rt. Hon. J. (South Ayrshire)	Gill, T. H.	Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown)
Buchanan, G.	Gillett, George M.	Jones, Rt. Hon. Leif (Camborne)
Burgess, F. G.	Glassey, A. E.	Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
Burgln, Dr. E. L.	Gossling, A. G.	Jowett, Rt. Hon. F. W.
Buxton, C. R. (Yorks. W. R. Elland)	Gould, F.	Jowitt, Rt. Hon. Sir W. A- (Presten)
Kedward, R. M. (Kent, Ashford)	Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Hackney, S.)	Sinkinson, George
Kelly, W. T.	Morrison, Robert C. (Tottenham, N.)	Sitch, Charles H.
Kennedy, Rt. Hon. Thomas	Mort, D. L.	Smith, Ben (Bermondsey, Rotherhithe)
Kenworthy, Lt.-Com. Hon. Joseph M.	Muff, G.	Smith, Frank (Nuneaton)
Kinley, J.	Muggeridge, H. T.	Smith, Lees-, Rt. Hon. H. B. (Keighley)
Kirkwood, D.	Murnin, Hugh	Smith, Rennie (Penistone)
Knight, Holford	Naylor, T. E.	Smith, Tom (Pontefract)
Lansbury, Rt. Hon. George	Noel Baker, P. J.	Smith, W. R. (Norwich)
Lathan, G. (Sheffield, Park)	Noel-Buxton. Baroness (Norfolk, No	Snowden, Rt. Hon. Philip
Law, Albert (Bolton)	Oldfield, J. R.	Sorensen, R.
Law, A. (Rossendale)	Oliver, George Harold (Ilkeston)	Stamford, Thomas W.
Lawrence, Susan	Owen, Major G. (Carnarvon)	Stephen, Campbell
Lawrie, Hugh Hartley (Stalybridge)	Palin, John Henry	Strauss, G. R.
Lawson, John James	Paling, Wilfrid	Sullivan, J.
Lawther, W. (Barnard Castle)	Palmer, E. T.	Sutton, J. E
Leach, W.	Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan)	Taylor, R. A. (Lincoln)
Lee, Frank (Derby, N. E.)	Perry, S. F.	Taylor, W. B. (Norfolk, S. W.)
Lee, Jennie (Lanark, Northern)	Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.	Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plaistow)
Lees, J.	Phillips, Dr. Marlon	Tillett, Ben
Leonard, W.	Pole, Major D. G.	Tinker, John Joseph
Lewis, T. (Southampton)	Potts, John S.	Toole, Joseph
Lloyd, C. Ellis	Price, M. P.	Tout, W. J.
Logan, David Gilbert	Pybus, Percy John	Townend, A. E.
Longbottom, A. W.	Quibell, D. J. K.	Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles
Longden, F.	Ramsay, T. B. Wilson	Vaughan, David
Lunn, William	Raynes, W. R.	Viant, S. P.
Macdonald, Gordon (Ince)	Richards, R.	Walkden, A. G.
MacDonald, Malcolm (Bassetlaw)	Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)	Walker, J.
McElwee, A.	Riley, Ben (Dewsbury)	Wallace, H. W.
McEntee, V. L.	Ritson, J.	Watkins, F. C.
McGovern, J. (Glasgow, Shettleston)	Roberts, Rt. Hon. F. O. (W. Bromwich)	Watson, W. M. (Dunfermline).
McKinlay, A.	Romeril, H. G.	Wedgwood, Rt. Hon. Josiah
MacLaren, Andrew	Rosbotham, D. S. T.	Wellock, Wilfred
MacNeill-Weir, L.	Rowson, Guy	Welsh, James (Paisley)
McShane, John James	Russell, Richard John (Eddisbury)	Welsh, James C. (Coatbridge)
Malone, C. L'Estrange (N'thampton)	Salter, Dr. Alfred	West, F. R.
Mander, Geoffrey le M.	Samuel, H. Walter (Swansea, West)	Westwood, Joseph
Manning, E. L.	Sanders, W. S.	White, H. G.
Mansfield, W.	Sandham, E.	Whiteley, Wilfrid (Birm., Lady wood)
March, S.	Sawyer, G. F.	Whiteley, William (Blaydon)
Marcus, M.	Scott, James	Williams, David (Swansea, East)
Markham, S. F.	Scurr, John	Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)
Marley, J.	Shaw, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Preston)	Williams, Dr. J. H. (Llanelly)
Marshal, Fred	Shepherd, Arthur Lewis	Williams, T. (York, Don Valley)
Mathers, George	Sherwood, G. H.	Wilson C. H. (Sheffield, Attercliffe)
Matters, L. W.	Shield, George William	Wilson, J. (Oldham)
Maxton, James	Shiels, Dr. Drummond	Wilson, R. J. (Jarrow)
Messer, Fred	Shillaker, J. F.	Winterton, G. E. (Leicester, Loughb'gh)
Middleton, G.	Shinwell, E.	Wise, E. F.
Mliner, Major J.	Short, Alfred (Wednesbury)	Wood, Major McKenzie (Banff)
Montague, Frederick	Simmons, C. J.
Morgan, Dr. H. B.	Simon, E. D. (Manch'ter, Withington)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Morley, Ralph	Sinclair, Sir A. (Caithness)	Mr. Charles Edwards and Mr. Thurtle.
NOES.
Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel	Broadbent, Colonel J.	Colville, Major D. J.
Ainsworth, Lieut.-Col. Charles	Brown, Ernest (Leith)	Cooper, A. Duff
Albery, Irving James	Brown, Brig. Gen. H. C. (Berks, Newb'y)	Courtauld, Major J. S.
Alexander, Sir Wm. (Glasgow, Cent'l)	Buchan, John	Courthope, Colonel Sir G. L.
Allen, Sir J. Sandeman (Liverp'l., W.)	Buchan-Hepburn, p. G. T.	Cowan, D. M.
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.	Bullock, Captain Malcolm	Cranborne, Viscount
Ashley, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Wilfrid W.	Burton, Colonel H. W.	Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H.
Atholl, Duchess of	Butler, R. A.	Crookshank, Capt. H. C.
Baillie-Hamliton, Hon. Charles W.	Butt, Sir Alfred	Culverwell, C. T. (Bristol, West)
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley (Bewdley)	Cadogan, Major Hon. Edward	Cunliffe-Lister. Rt. Hon. Sir Philip
Balfour, Captain H. H. (I. of Thanet)	Campbell, E. T.	Dalkeith, Earl of
Balniel, Lord	Castle Stewart, Earl of	Dalrymple-White, Lt.-Col. Sir Godfrey
Beamish, Rear-Admiral T. P. H.	Cautley, Sir Henry S.	Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. (Hertford)
Beaumont M. W.	Cayzer, Sir C. (Chester, City)	Davies, Dr. Vernon
Bellairs, Commander Carlyon	Cayzer, Maj. Sir Herbt. R. (Prtsmth, S.)	Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)
Betterton, Sir Henry B.	Cazalet, Captain Victor A.	Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.)
Bevan, S. J. (Holborn)	Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox. Univ.)	Dawson, Sir Philip
Birchall, Major Sir John Dearman	Chadwick, Capt. Sir Robert Burton	Despencer-Robertson, Major J. A. F.
Bird, Ernest Roy	Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. Sir J. A. (Birm., W.)	Dixey, A. C.
Boothby, R. J. G.	Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Edgbaston)	Dixon, Captain Rt. Hon. Herbert
Bourne, Captain Robert Croft	Chapman, Sir S.	Dugdale, Capt. T. L.
Bowater, Col. Sir T. Vansittart	Christle, J. A.	Eden, Captain Anthony
Bowyer, Captain Sir George E. W.	Clydesdale, Marquess of	Edmondson, Major A. J.
Boyce, Leslie	Cobb, Sir Cyril	Elliot, Major Walter E.
Bracken, B.	Cockerill, Brig.-General Sir George	Erskine, Lord (Somerset, Weston-s-M.)
Braithwaite, Major A. N.	Cohen, Major J. Brunei	Everard, W. Lindsay
Brass, Captain Sir William	Colfox, Major William Philip	Falle, Sir Bertram G.
Briscoe, Richard George	Colman, N. C. D.	Ferguson, Sir John

Fermoy, Lord	Leighton, Major B. E. P.	Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)
Fielden, E. B.	Lewis, Oswald (Colchester)	Samuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney)
Fison, F. G. Clavering	Little, Graham-, Sir Ernest	Sandeman, Sir N. Stewart
Ford, Sir P. J.	Llewellin, Major J. J.	Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.
Forestler-Walker, Sir L.	Locker-Lampson, Rt. Hon. Godfrey	Savery, S. S.
Frece, Sir Walter de	Locker-Lampson, Com. O. (Handsw'th)	Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.
Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.	Lockwood, Captain J. H.	Shepperson, Sir Ernest Whittome
Galbraith, J. F. W.	Long, Major Hon. Eric	Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Ganzonl, Sir John	Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.)	Skelton, A. N.
Gibson, C. G. (Pudsey & Otley)	Maitland, A. (Kent, Faversham)	Smith, Louis W. (Sheffield, Hallam)
Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Ht. Hon. Sir John	Makins, Brigadier-General E.	Smith, R. W. (Aberd'n & Kinc'dine, C.)
Glyn, Major R. G. C.	Margesson, Captain H. D.	Smith-Carington, Neville W.
Gower, Sir Robert	Marjorlbanks, Edward	Smithers, Waldron
Graham, Fergus (Cumberland, N.)	Mason, Colonel Glyn K.	Somerset, Thomas
Grattan-Doyle, Sir N.	Merriman, Sir F. Boyd	Somerville, A. A. (Windsor)
Greene, W. P. Crawford	Millar, J. D.	Somerville, D. G. (Willesden, East)
Grenfell, Edward C. (City of London)	Milne, Wardlaw-, J. S.	Southby, Commander A. R. J.
Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. John	Monsell, Eyres, Com. Ht. Hon. Sir B.	Spender-Clay, Colonel H.
Gritten, W. G. Howard	Moore, Lieut.-Colonel T. C. R. (Ayr)	Stanley, Lord (Fylde)
Gunston, Captain D. W.	Morris, Rhys Hopkins	Stanley, Hon. O. (Westmorland)
Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.	Morrison, W. S. (Glos., Cirencester)	Steel-Maitland, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur
Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich)	Morrison-Bell, Sir Arthur Clive	Stewart, W. J. (Belfast South)
Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)	Muirhead, A. J.	Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)
Hanbury, C.	Nail-Cain, A. R. N.	Sueter, Rear-Admiral M. F.
Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry	Newton, Sir D. G. C. (Cambridge)	Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A.
Hartington, Marquess of	Nicholson, O. (Westminster)	Thomas, Major L. B. (King's Norton)
Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)	Nicholson, Col. Rt. Hn. W. G. (Ptrsf'ld)	Thompson, Luke
Haslam, Henry C.	O'Connor, T. J.	Thomson, Mitchell-, Rt. Hon. Sir W.
Henderson, Capt. R. R. (Oxf'd, Henley)	Oliver, P. M. (Man., Blackley)	Titchfield, Major the Marquess of
Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.	Oman, Sir Charles William C.	Todd, Capt. A. J.
Hennessy, Major Sir G. R. J.	O'Neill, Sir H.	Train, J.
Herbert, Sir Dennis (Hertford)	Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. William	Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Hills, Major Rt. Hon. John Waller	Owen, H. F. (Hereford)	Turton, Robert Hugh
Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G.	Peake, Captain Osbert	Vaughan-Morgan, Sir Kenyon
Hope, Sir Harry (Forfar)	Penny, Sir George	Ward, Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Lambert
Horne, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert S.	Percy, Lord Eustace (Hastings)	Warrender, Sir Victor
Howard-Bury, Colonel C. K.	Perkins, W. R. D.	Waterhouse, Captain Charles
Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)	Peto, Sir Basil E. (Devon, Barnstaple)	Wayland, Sir William A
Hunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen. Sir Aylmer	Pownall, Sir Assheton	Wells, Sydney R.
Hurd, Percy A.	Purbrick, R.	Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)
Hurst, Sir Gerald B.	Ramsbotham, H.	Wilson, G. H. A. (Cambridge U.)
Hutchison, Maj.-Gen. Sir R.	Rawson, Sir Cooper	Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
Inskip, Sir Thomas	Reid- David D. (County Down)	Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl
Iveagh, Countess of	Remer, John R.	Withers, Sir John James
Jones, Sir G. W. H. (Stoke New'gton)	Rentoul, Sir Gervais S.	Womersley, W. J.
Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)	Reynolds, Col. Sir James	Wood, Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley
Kindersley, Major G. M.	Richardson, Sir P. W. (Sur'y, Ch'ts'y)	Wright, Brig.-Gen. W. D. (Tavist'k)
Knox, Sir Alfred	Roberts, Sir Samuel (Ecclesall)	Young, Rt. Hon. Sir Hilton
Lamb, Sir J. Q.	Rodd, Rt. Hon. Sir James Rennell
Lambert, Rt. Hon. George (S. Moiton)	Ross, Ronald D.	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Lane Fox, Col. Rt. Hon. George R.	Ruggles-Brise, Colonel E.	Sir Frederick Thomson and Captain Wallace.
Latham, H. P. (Scarboro' & Whitby)	Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)
Law, Sir Alfred (Derby, High Peak)	Salmon, Major I.

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER then proceeded successively to put forthwith the Questions on any Amendments moved by the Government of which notice had been given to that part of the Bill to be concluded at half-past Nine of the Clock at this day's Sitting.

Amendment proposed: In page 10, line 37, to leave out from the word "that," to the second word "of," in line 40, and to insert instead thereof the words:

"immediately after the determination by the referee of an appeal under this Subsection any party to the appeal may, if dissatisfied with the determination as being erroneous in point of law, declare his dissatisfaction to the referee who heard the appeal, and having done so, may, within such time as may be limited by rules of Court, require the referee to state and sign a case for the opinion thereon."—[The Solicitor-General.]

Question put, "That the Amendment be made."

The House divided: Ayes, 280; Noes, 236.

Division No. 368.]	AYES.	[9.41 p.m.
Adamson, Rt. Hon. W. (Fife, West)	Aske, Sir Robert	Benn, Rt. Hon. Wedgwood
Adamson, W. M. (Staff., Cannock)	Attlee, Clement Richard	Bennett, Sir E. N. (Cardiff, Central)
Addison, Rt. Hon. Dr. Christopher	Ayles, Walter	Bennett, William (Battersea, South)
Aitchison, Rt. Hon. Craigle M.	Baker, John (Wolverhampton, Bilston)	Benson, G.
Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V. (Hillsbro')	Baldwin, Oliver (Dudley)	Bevan, Aneurin (Ebbw Vale)
Alpass, J. H.	Barnes, Alfred John	Birkett, W. Norman
Ammon, Charles George	Barr, James	Blindell, James
Angell, Sir Norman	Batey, Joseph	Bondfield, Rt. Hon. Margaret
Arnott, John	Beckett, John (Camberwell, Peckham)	Bowen, J. W.
Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W.	Johnston, Rt. Hon. Thomas	Pybus, Percy John
Broad, Francis Alfred	Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)	Quibell, D. J. K.
Brockway, A. Fanner	Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown.)	Ramsay, T. B. Wilson
Bromfield, William	Jones, Rt. Hon. Leif (Camborne)	Raynes, W. R.
Bromley, J.	Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)	Richards, R.
Brooke, W.	Jowett, Rt. Hon. F. W.	Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)
Brothers, M.	Jowitt, Rt. Hon. Sir W. A. (Preston)	Riley, Ben (Dewsbury)
Brown, C. W. E. (Notts. Mansfield)	Kedward, R. M. (Kent, Ashford)	Ritson, J.
Brown, Rt. Hon. J. (South Ayrshire)	Kelly, W. T.	Roberts, Rt. Hon. F. O. (W. Bromwich)
Bychanan, G.	Kennedy, Rt. Hon. Thomas	Romeril, H. Q.
Bargess, F. G.	Kenworthy, Lt.-Com. Hon. Joseph M.	Rosbotham, D. S. T.
Burgin, Dr. E. L.	Kinley, J.	Rowson, Guy
Buxton, C. R. (Yorks. W. R. Elland)	Kirkwood, D.	Russell, Richard John (Eddisbury)
Calne, Hall-, Derwent	Knight, Holford	Salter, Dr. Alfred
Cameron, A. G.	Lansbury, Rt. Hon. George	Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir H. (Darwen)
Cape, Thomas	Lathan, G. (Sheffield, Park)	Samuel, H. Walter (Swansea, West)
Carter, W. (St Pancras, B. W.)	Law, Albert (Bolton)	Sanders, W. S.
Charleton, H. C.	Law, A. (Rosendale)	Sandham, E.
Chater, Daniel	Lawrence, Susan	Sawyer, G. F.
Clarke, J. S.	Lawrie, Hugh Hartley (Stalybridge)	Scott, James
Cluse, W. S.	Lawson, John James	Scurr, John
Clynes, Rt. Hon. John R.	Lawther, W. (Barnard Castle)	Shaw, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Preston)
Cocks, Frederick Seymour.	Leach, W.	Shepherd, Arthur Lewis
Compton, Joseph	Lee, Frank (Derby, N. E.)	Sherwood, G. H.
Cove, William G.	Lee, Jennie (Lanark, Northern)	Shield, George William
Cripps, Sir Stafford	Lees, J.	Shields, Dr. Drummond
Daggar, George	Leonard, W.	Shillaker, J. F.
Dallas, George	Lewis, T. (Southampton)	Shinwell, E.
Dalton, Hugh	Lloyd, C. Ellis	Short, Alfred (Wednesbury)
Davies, E. C. (Montgomery)	Logan, David Gilbert	Simmons, C. J.
Davies, D. L. (Pontypridd)	Longbottom, A. W.	Sinclair, Sir A. (Caithness)
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)	Longden, F.	Sinkinson, George
Day, Harry	Lunn, William	Sitch, Charles H.
Denman, Hon. R. D.	Macdonald, Gordon (Ince)	Smith, Ben (Bermondsey, Rotherhithe)
Dudgeon, Major C. R.	MacDonald, Malcolm (Bassetlaw)	Smith, Frank (Nuneaton)
Dukes, C.	McElwae, A.	Smith, Lees-, Rt. Hon. H. B. (Keighley)
Duncan, Charles	McEntee, V. L.	Smith, Rennie (Penistone)
Ede, James Chuter	McGovern, J. (Glasgow, Shettleston)	Smith, Tom (Pontefract)
Edmunds, J. E.	McKinlay, A.	Smith, W. R. (Norwich)
Edwards, E. (Morpeth)	MacLaren, Andrew	Snowden, Rt. Hon. Philip
Elmley, Viscount	Maclean, Sir Donald (Cornwall, N.)	Sorensen, R.
Foot, Isaac	MacNeill-Weir, L.	Stamford, Thomas W.
Gardner, B. W. (West Ham, Upton)	McShane, John James	Stephen, Campbell
George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)	Malone, C. L'Estrange (N'thampton)	Strauss, G. R.
George, Megan Lloyd (Anglesea)	Mander, Geoffrey le M.	Sullivan, J
Gibbins, Joseph	Manning, E. L.	Sutton, J. E.
Gibson, H. M. (Lancs. Mossley)	Mansfield, W.	Taylor, R. A. (Lincoln)
Gill, T. H.	March, S.	Taylor, W. B. (Norfolk, S. W.)
Gillett, George M.	Marcus, M	Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plalstow)
Glassey, A. E	Markham, S. F.	Tillett, Ben
Gossling, A. G.	Marley, J.	Tinker, John Joseph
Gould, F.	Marshall, Fred	Toole, Joseph
Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton)	Mathers, George	Tout, W. J.
Graham, Rt. Hon. Wm. (Edin., Cent.)	Matters, L. W.	Townend, A. E.
Gray, Milner	Maxton, James	Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles
Greenwood, Rt. Hon. A. (Colne)	Messer, Fred	Vaughan, David
Grenfell, U. R. (Glamorgan)	Middleton, G.	Viant, S. P.
Griffith, F. Kingsley (Middlesbro' W.)	Milner, Major J.	Walkden, A. G.
Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)	Montague, Frederick	Walker, J.
Groves, Thomas E.	Morgan, Dr. H. B.	Wallace, H. W.
Grundy, Thomas W.	Morley, Ralph	Watkins, F. C.
Hall, G. H. (Merthyr Tydvil)	Morris, Rhys Hopkins	Watson, W. M. (Dunfermline)
Hall, J. H. (Whitechapel)	Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Hackney, S.)	Wedgwood, Rt. Hon. Josiah
Hall, Capt. W. G. (Portsmouth, C.)	Morrison, Robert C. (Tottenham, N.)	Wellock, Wilfred
Hamilton, Mary Agnes (Blackburn)	Mort, D. L.	Welsh, James (Paisley)
Hardie, David (Rutherglen)	Muff, G.	Welsh, James C. (Coatbridge)
Hardie, G. D. (Springburn)	Muggeridge, H. T.	West, F. R.
Harris, Percy A.	Murnin, Hugh	Westwood, Joseph
Hastings, Dr. Somerville	Naylor, T. E.	White, H. G.
Haycock, A. W.	Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter)	Whiteley, Wilfrid (Birm., Ladywood)
Hayday, Arthur	Noel Baker, P. J.	Whiteley, William (Blaydon)
Hayes, John Henry	Noel-Buxton, Baroness (Norfolk, N.)	Williams, David (Swansea, East)
Henderson, Right Hon. A. (Burnley)	Oldfield, J. R.	Williams, E. J. (Ogmore)
Henderson, Arthur, Junr. (Cardiff, S.)	Oliver, George Harold (Ilkeston)	Williams, Dr. J. H. (Llanelly)
Henderson, Joseph (Ardwick)	Oliver, P. M. (Man., Blackley)	Williams, T. (York, Don Valley)
Henderson, Thomas (Glasgow)	Owen, Major G. (Carnarvon)	Wilson, C. H. (Sheffield, Attercliffe)
Henderson, W. W. (Middx., Enfield)	Palin, John Henry	Wilson, J. (Oldham)
Herriotts, J.	Paling, Wilfrid	Wilson, R. J. (Jarrow)
Hirst, G. H. (York W. R. Wentworth)	Palmer, E. T.	Winterton, G. E. (Leicester, Loughb'gh)
Hirst, W. (Bradford, South)	Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan)	Wise, E. F.
Hoffman, P. C.	Perry, S. F.	Wood, Major McKenzie (Banff)
Hollins, A.	Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.
Hopkin, Daniel	Phillips, Dr. Marlon	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Hudson, James H. (Huddersfield)	Pole, Major D. G.	Mr. Charles Edwards and Mr. Thurtle.
Isaacs, George	Potts, John S.
John, William (Rhondda, West)	Price, M. P.

NOES.
Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel	Elliot, Major Walter E.	Newton, Sir D. G. C. (Cambridge)
Ainsworth, Lieut.-Col. Charles	Erskins, Lord (Somerset, Weston-s-M.)	Nicholson, O. (Westminster)
Albery, Irving James	Everard, W. Lindsay	Nicholson, Col- Rt. Hn. W. G. (Ptrsf'ld)
Alexander, Sir Wm. (Glasgow, Cent'l)	Falle, Sir Bertram G.	O'Connor, T. J.
Allan, Sir J. Sandeman (Liverp'l., W.)	Ferguson, Sir John	Oman, Sir Charles William C.
Amery, Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S.	Fermoy, Lord	O'Neill, Sir H.
Ashley, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Wilfrid W	Fielden, E. B.	Ormsby Gore, Rt. Hon. William
Atholl, Duchess of	Fison, F. G. Clavering	Owen, H. F. (Hereford)
Baillie-Hamliton, Hon. Charles W.	Ford, Sir P. J.	Peake, Capt. Osbert
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley (Bewdley)	Forestler-Welker. Sir L.	Penny, Sir George
Balfour, Captain H. H. (I. of Thanet)	Frece, Sir Walter de	Percy, Lord Eustace (Hastings)
Balniel, Lord	Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.	Perkins, W. R. D.
Beamish, Rear-Admiral T. P. H.	Galbraith, J. F. W.	Peto, Sir Basil E. (Devon, Barnstaple)
Beaumont, M. W.	Gazonl, Sir John	Pownall, Sir Assheton
Bellairs, Commander Carlyon	Gibson, C. G. (Pudsey a Otley)	Purbrick, R.
Betterton, Sir Henry B.	Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir John	Ramsbotham, H.
Bevan, S. J. (Holborn)	Glyn, Major R. G. C.	Rawson, Sir Cooper
Birchall, Major Sir John Dearman	Gower, Sir Robert	Reid, David D. (County Down)
Bird, Ernest Roy	Graham, Fergus (Cumberland, N.)	Remer, John R.
Boothby, R. J. G.	Grattan-Doyle, Sir N.	Rentoul, Sir Gervais S.
Bourne, Captain Robert Croft.	Greene, W. P. Crawford	Reynolds, Col. Sir James
Bowater, Col. Sir T. Vansittart	Grenfell, Edward C. (City of London)	Richardson, Sir P. W. (Sur'y, Ch'ts'y)
Bowyer, Captain Sir George E. W.	Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. John	Roberts, Sir Samuel (Ecclesall)
Boyce, Leslie	Gritten, W. G. Howard	Rodd, Rt. Hon. Sir James Rennell
Bracken, B.	Gunston, Captain D. W.	Ross, Ronald D.
Braithwaite, Major A. N.	Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.	Ruggles-Brise, Colonel E.
Brass, Captain Sir William	Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich)	Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth)
Briscoe, Richard George	Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)	Salmon, Major I.
Broadbent, Colonel J.	Hanbury, C.	Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)
Brown, Ernest (Leith)	Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry	Samuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney)
Brown, Brig.-Gen. H. C. (Berks, Newb'y)	Hartington, Marquess of	Sandeman, Sir N. Stewart
Buchan, John	Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)	Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip A. G. D.
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.	Haslam, Henry C.	Savery, S. S.
Bullock, Captain Malcolm	Henderson, Capt. R. R. (Oxf'd, Henley)	Shepperson, Sir Ernest Whittome
Burton, Colonel H. W.	Heneage, Lieut.-Colonel Arthur P.	Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Butler, R. A.	Hennessy, Major Sir G. R. J.	Skelton, A. N.
Butt, Sir Alfred	Herbert, Sir Dennis (Hertford)	Smith, Louis W. (Sheffield, Hallam)
Cadogan, Major Hon. Edward	Hills, Major Rt. Hon. John Waller	Smith, R. W. (Aberd'n & Kinc'dine, C.)
Campbell, E. T.	Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G.	Smith-Carington, Neville W.
Carver, Major W. H.	Hope, Sir Harry (Forfar)	Smithers, Waldron
Castle Stewart, Earl of	Horne, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert S.	Somerset, Thomas
Cautley, Sir Henry S.	Howard-Bury, Colonel C. K.	Somerville, A. A. (Windsor)
Cayzer, Sir C. (Chester, City)	Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)	Somerville, D. G. (Wittesden, East)
Cayzer, Maj. Sir Herbt. R. (Prtsmth, S.)	Hunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen. Sir Aylmer	Southby, Commander A. R. J.
Cazalet, Captain Victor A.	Hurd, Percy A.	Spender-Clay, Colonel H.
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox. Univ.)	Hurst, Sir Gerald B.	Stanley, Lord (Fylde)
Chadwick, Capt. Sir Robert Burton	Hutchison, Maj.-Gen. Sir R.	Stanley, Hon. O. (Westmorland)
Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. Sir J. A. (Birm., W.)	Inskip, Sir Thomas	Steel-Maitland, Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Edgbaston)	Iveagh, Countess of	Stewart, W. J. (Belfast, South)
Chapman, Sir S.	Jones, Sir G. W. H. (Stoke New'gton)	Stuart, Hon. J. (Moray and Nairn)
Christle, J. A.	Kindersley, Major G. M.	Sueter, Rear-Admiral M. F.
Clydesdale, Marquess of	Knox, Sir Alfred	Taylor, Vice-Admiral E. A.
Cobb, Sir Cyril	Lamb, Sir J. Q.	Thomas, Major L. B. (King's Norton)
Cockerill, Brig-General Sir George	Lambert, Rt. Hon. George (S. Moiton)	Thompson, Luke
Cohen, Major J. Brunei	Lane Fox, Col. Rt. Hon. George R.	Thomson, Sir F.
Colfox, Major William Philip	Latham, H. P. (Scarboro' & Whitby)	Thomson, Mitchell-, Rt. Hon. Sir W.
Colman, N. C. D.	Law, Sir Alfred (Derby, High Peak)	Titchfield, Major the Marquees of
Colville, Major D. J.	Leighton, Major B. E. P.	Todd, Capt. A. J.
Cooper, A. Duff	Lewis, Oswald (Colchester)	Train, J.
Courtauld, Major J. S.	Little, Graham-, Sir Ernest	Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Courthope, Colonel Sir G. L.	Liewellin, Major J. J.	Turton, Robert Hugh
Cowan, D. M.	Locker-Lampson, Rt. Hon. Godfrey	Vaughan-Morgan, Sir Kenyon
Cranborne, Viscount	Locker-Lampson, Com, O. (Handsw'th)	Ward, Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Lambert
Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H.	Lockwood, Captain J. H.	Warrender, Sir Victor
Crookshank, Capt. H. C.	Long, Major Hon. Eric	Waterhouse, Captain Charles
Culverwell, C. T. (Bristol, West)	Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.)	Wayland, Sir William A.
Cunliffe-Lister, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip	Macquisten, F. A.	Wells, Sydney R.
Dalkeith, Earl of	Maitland, A. (Kent, Faversham)	Williams, Charles (Devon. Torquay)
Dalrympie-White, Lt.-Col. Sir Godfrey	Makins, Brigadier-General E.	Wilson, G. H. A. (Cambridge U.)
Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. (Hertford)	Marjorlbanks, Edward	Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
Davies, Dr. Vernon	Mason, Colonel Glyn K.	Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl
Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)	Merriman, Sir F. Boyd	Withers, Sir John James
Davison, Sir W. H. (Kensington, S.)	Milne, Wardtaw-, J. S.	Womersley, W. J.
Dawson, Sir Philip	Monsell, Eyres, Com. Rt. Hon. Sir B.	Wood, Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley
Despencer-Robertson, Major J. A. F.	Moore, Sir Newton J. (Richmond)	Wright, Brig.-Gen. W. D. (Tavlst'k)
Dixey, A. C.	Moore, Lieut.-Colonel T. C. R. (Ayr)	Young, Rt. Hon. Sir Hilton
Dixon, Captain Rt. Hon. Herbert	Morrison, W. S. (Glos., Cirencester)
Dugdale, Capt. T. L.	Morrison-Bell, Sir Arthur Clive	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Eden, Captain Anthony	Mulrhead, A. J.	Captain Margesson and Captain Wallace.
Edmondson, Major A. J.	Nail-Cain, A. R. N.

Further Amendments made: In page 11, line 6, leave out the word "unit."

In line 11, leave out the word "unit," and insert instead thereof the word "land."

In line 33, leave out from the word "which" to the word "any" in line 35.

In line 40, after the word "under," insert the words "Sub-section (1) of."

In page 12, line 18, at the end, insert the words: (7) The Reference Committee for England constituted by Section thirty-three of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, shall, in relation to the powers and duties of the Committee under this Part of this Act, consist of the persons mentioned in that Section, together with the President of the Law Society."—[The Solicitor-General.]