§ Postponed Proceeding resumed on Question, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."
§ Question again proposed.
§ Captain LODERWhen the Debate was interrupted, I was trying to elaborate the argument that the movement in favour of a Ministry of Defence and of greater co-ordination in the fighting Services was part of a general movement discernible throughout the whole machinery of Government. I had been trying to illustrate that point from what was happening in various fields of Government activity and I had come to the last of my illustrations, which was that of Imperial affairs. In Imperial affairs one Cabinet Minister runs two Departments, which have only just been separated, besides the Imperial Economic Committee, and so on, and I want to ask whether it would be really absurd to suggest that the time might come when there might he a Secretary of State for Imperial Affairs, and that Indian Affairs might come under a Secretary of State for Imperial Affairs and not have a separate Secretary of State as at the present time.
I have wandered some way from the question of a Ministry of Defence in order to bring out the point that a unified administration of the fighting Services is really only part of a much wider problem. The main aspect of the problem was touched on by the Prime Minister when he referred to the functions of the Cabinet. I am not at all sure that the time may not come when we shall have to choose between two quite distinct conceptions of the functions of the Cabinet. On the one hand, there is the prevailing view of the Cabinet as a group of small people—[Laughter]—I mean a small group of people acting as one man; people who are Cabinet Ministers first and heads of Departments second. If you hold the 1112 view that the essence of Cabinet Government is that the Cabinet should consist of a small number of people, it seems to me that the right thing to do is to have as many Under-Secretaries as you like, so long as you group all the work under the major heads. Recent Cabinets have consisted of something like 20 members. Anyone with experience of any sort of committee work knows that it is very difficult for 20 people to act as one, or at any rate not as easy as it is for halt a dozen or a dozen at the most.
The other view is that it does not matter much how big a Cabinet is, because you can split up the work into committees and you can co-ordinate the work of those committees by having a standing secretariat. I would not be so presumptuous as to give a definite opinion as to which of these two views of the Cabinet is the better one. I must say that my inclination is towards what I call the traditional view of the Cabinet. But, as a matter of fact, during and particularly since the War we have gone quite a long way in the other direction. If this is to be the future line of development, a Ministry of Defence is not so necessary; that is to say, if you are to have a large Cabinet and if all the committees about which the Prime Minister has been telling us are the right way to arrange these things, then I am not sure that a Ministry of Defence is so necessary on broad grounds, although it may very well be justified on technical grounds. But if you take the other view, if you take the view that your Cabinet ought to be a small body of people, then I think a Ministry of Defence is essential, because it is only by reducing the representatives of the fighting Forces in the Cabinet to one, and by making some similar reduction in the number of Ministers that attend to other services in the Cabinet, that you can possibly have a small enough body of men to be able to think and act together without the cum- 1113 bersome machinery of secretariat and sub-committees into which we are gradually drifting?
The Prime Minister mentioned the Haldane Committee on "The machinery of Government," and my recollection is that on the question of the? Ministry of D efence what they said was that they thought the thing had better remain as it was, because they sat at the end of the War and they recognised that war conditions could not end all at once and—I think it was in the latter part of 1918—they could not see their way to make definite recommendations on the subject. But conditions have changed a great deal since 1918. What I would like to ask the Prime Minister is this: Would he consider carrying on and bringing up to date the work of the Haldane Committee on "The machinery of Government"? The reason why I ask that question in this particular connection is this: It seems to me that it is only by examining the place of the fighting Services in the administrative machine as a whole that you can come to a conclusion as to whether or not a Ministry of Defence is worth while on the broad view, apart from the technical points which have been put by my hon. Friend.
§ 10.0 p.m.
§ Mr. ALFRED WILLIAMSI had hoped to take part in this Debate earlier in the day and to say various things, but I now find that most of them have already been said, and I will confine myself to one point. I would like, first of all, to thank the Liberal party for having given us an opportunity of discussing this very important question. Important as was the subject of discussion a few moments ago, the subject we are now debating is even more important, and, speaking for myself, I wish that we had been able to devote the whole of our time to it. My one point is this: My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Rear-Admiral Sueter) quoted one of my statements and rather challenged my contention that the battleship was the backbone of the Fleet. As it at present exists, it seems to me that the battleship, and nothing else, is the backbone of the Fleet. I do not mean to say that I believe the battleship cannot be defeated from the air. I do not know; I do not believe that anyone know whether a mass 1114 attack by dozens and perhaps hundreds of aeroplanes would demolish a Fleet or not. No one can be dogmatic about it. Put the matter the converse way. Supposing the First Lord of the Admiralty came to the House and said: "I am going to risk it, and to abolish all our battleships, even if other countries keep theirs." Should we then be safe?
§ Rear-Admiral SUETERYes, perfectly safe.
§ Mr. WILLIAMSI cannot contradict my superior officer, but I am bound to say that I am doubtful whether cruisers and aircraft could protect merchantmen in all parts of the world against an enemy battle fleet. It would be a very serious risk, and, while I am not in love with the battleship, I do not believe that as a nation we can abandon battleships before other people do so, without running very serious risks indeed. Let me add that the first thing I want to see abolished by common consent is the battleship. It is the most expensive engine that humanity has devised for destruction, not only in itself, but in its dockyards and all its various appurtenances. If the countries of the world cannot agree to promise never to fight each other again, they might at any rate agree to make peace time a little more pleasant by reducing expenditure on their most expensive arm, by reducing battleships. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer next year wants the race between revenue and expenditure to be a little more uneven and to have his revenue well ahead of expenditure, the best way to do it is to get on as far as possible internationally with the reduction of the size and fire and number, and the increase of the age of battleships of all kinds.
In conclusion, let me say that it does not seem to me that the Prime Minister was quite clear on one matter. Undoubtedly what the man-in-the-street feels to-day is that we are spending a tremendous sum on the Navy and on battleships, and that we are spending a very much smaller sum on the Air Force. He feels uneasy about it, and he feels that the relative expenditure between the three Forces is settled in rather a curious way. He feels that it is settled by a wrangling between the three Ministers concerned. In other words, the relative strength of the three Services of this nation is decided when the Prime Minister decides which wrangler he is going 1115 to put into office. If it be a question of wrangling, and the devil takes the hindmost, the Secretary of State for Air seems to me to be in the clutches of the devil at the present time. From the national point of view—and I hope the right hon. Gentleman in winding up the Debate will make this clear—how is the decision come to with reference to the relative expenditure of the three fighting Forces? As a naval officer, I rather think we are spending too much on the Navy and not enough on the Air Force, that there is a threat to the centre of our Empire from aerial attack which is greater than the threat to our battleship and sea supremacy. I think I am expressing the feelings of a great number of Members on this side of the House when I say that we are not satisfied that this decision on the relative expenditure on the three fighting Forces is come to in a cool, calm and clear atmosphere. The decision seems to be come to by a wrangling between the three Departments.
Major-General Sir JOHN DAVIDSONI would like to offer one or two comments on this subject, which is, to my mind, a question of unity of control—whether it is desirable to have complete unity of control or not. Let me refer for a moment to what happened during the War. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), who was in control at the time, was very anxious to achieve unity of command during the War, but, from our point of view, there was only one way of achieving it and that was by appointing a Generalissimo. The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs would not have that, and in this House, in November, 1917, he stated that it was his definite conviction that that solution was unthinkable—that was the expression he used—for this reason, that if he put the British Army under a French Generalissimo the responsibility for the safety of the British Army would really devolve upon the Cabinet and not upon the British Commander-in-Chief, and it would make extraordinary difficulties for the British Cabinet. He much preferred to have Committees to effect the unity of command. We find precisely the same thing to-day. It has been described this afternoon that the unity of control in the 1116 three Services is being secured by Committee, a multitude of Committees, which is a weakness. When these Committees are really co-ordinated by a very powerful Secretariat, I think they make for still further weakness.
I am not one of those who advocate running straight into a Ministry of Defence right away. I think it is quite impossible to do so. I am one of those who believe very strongly in the Report of Lord Haldane's Committee on the machinery of Government. I believe it is absolutely sound, but there, again, we cannot get that straight away. I think that we have to make greater progress towards a Ministry of Defence, which is the obvious solution, never mind what anybody thinks. Obviously, we have to get to it in course of time. We are going too slowly at the moment. We have to make greater progress. I congratulate the Government upon taking one step, and a very important step—the establishment of the Imperial College in Buckingham Gate. It is a step in the right direction. I have always advocated the construction of a combined General Staff, or whatever you like to call it—a staff which will study the naval, military and air problems. It is essential that we should train people up to it, and I am glad that the Government have established such a college. But we are not going quickly enough. A greater pace is required.
I asked the Prime Minister—I think it was two years ago—whether he would not give a day in this House for the discussion of Service Estimates as a whole, and the answer he gave, as far as my recollection goes, was that on that particular occasion it was impossible, but he would think about it on another occasion. We have not had it this year. I say that we want it next year. We want some evidence of progress towards this end, which we all know must come in the establishment of a Ministry of Defence. I feel very strongly that the Government ought to promise us a day for the discussion of Imperial Defence as a whole. If I were to get up on the Army Estimates and talk on naval matters or on air matters I should be ruled out of order, and on the Air Estimates and the Navy Estimates I should be limited to those subjects. This question is one whole question. You cannot 1117 divide it into parts; you have to discuss it as a whole. We have to get this unity of control, and the sooner we realise that the better. My whole object in rising to-night is not to say that we ought to have a Ministry of Defence at once, which I believe is impossible, but to urge that we should make some progress towards it. Let us next year have a chance of discussing the subject as a whole and not in the watertight compartments as we have been forced to do in the past. I certainly think that Ministry of Defence is the ultimate solution, and we have to work towards it gradually, but regularly and systematically.
§ Commander BELLAIRSA discussion on this question as a whole certainly was promised to us in the past. There may have been reasons why that intention could not be carried out, but I certainly think that it is desirable that we should have such a discussion before the Service Votes are disposed of. I venture to think that if this question of a Ministry of Defence were submitted to a free vote of the House, it would be carried by an overwhelming majority. I do not think that would be because the question would be carried entirely on its merits. One reason is that we do not trust the multitude of confidential committees to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman referred. We have never been given since the War a public inquiry into the question of the unity of the Services for war purposes, and how to bring about economy and efficiency in the three fighting Services. In the old days we referred to the evils of being insured in two offices. Now we are insured in three offices, and the question has become more complex. With regard to those confidential committees, of which the Prime Minister told us so much, we know nothing about witnesses or about the terms of reference. I think we have had quotations from the Colwyn Committee given in the Debates in this House and we have had quotations in the House of Lords, and quotations against the Navy and in favour of the Air. Then it emerged that Lord Colwyn had never even asked the Chief of the Naval Staff to give evidence. What is the value of a Committee of that kind?
Then there was the Salisbury Committee. I only know of two of the conclusions at which they arrived. One was 1118 that the menace of a military invasion had become less. I say that the menace of a military invasion never even existed. They also said that the air menace had become greater. That is true; and yet it is not exactly true. Aircraft have become so powerful that no army would part with it for the purpose of raiding cities. They want it in order to destroy the enemy army's communications and to protect their own; and that is now in the French war plans. Therefore, I say that the air menace has become even less than it was during the War, because it is so valuable that aircraft cannot be spared for the purpose. We have been told of the working of the Committee of Imperial Defence. It has done very valuable work indeed, but on the major propositions the Committee of Imperial Defence utterly fails. It failed on the major proposition of providing the machinery for the conduct of war. What happened on the outbreak of the War? On the 5th August, 1914, the Committee of over 30 assembled, consisting of 22 Cabinet Ministers and a number of officers of the. Army and of the Navy. There were great differences of opinion. The Committee sat a long time and ultimately arrived at the conclusion that the Army should go to France. Thereupon, the whole of the General Staff fled to France, and when Lord Kitchener arrived at the War Office he found no General Staff there. Then there was set up a Committee of the Departments, presided over by an Admiral. That Committee was superseded in 1914 by the War Council.
In May, 1915, there came the Dardanelles Committee, with 12 Cabinet Ministers on it, and following that came another War Council, and then at last we reached the right solution, referred to by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), the War Cabinet, of Ministers without portfolio. These changes took place. because the Committee of Imperial Defence had not prepared on the important question of the conduct of war. The reason why we have such great difficulties, it seems to me, is that we will not face facts during peace. We have to learn during war. I take the Crimean War. The only use that was to us was that it taught us the impossibility, as the Secretary of State for War knows, of 1119 having a separate artillery and engineering force under the Master-General of Ordnance. That was stopped in 1855; but we have repeated that mistake in connection with the Air Force in having a separate Air Force independent of the Army or Navy. The South African War taught the Army to form a General Staff, but it did not teach the Navy. Then came the Agadir crisis, and Mr. Asquith decided that the Navy must have a war staff. He sent a, Cabinet Minister to the Admiralty, but all he did was to form an Intelligence Department, not a war staff, and it was not until after the Great War had taught us the lesson that the Navy got a war staff. I could refer to the wrong conclusions arrived at by the Committee of Imperial Defence with regard to invasion in 1912 and 1913. The Committee of Imperial Defence considered the question of invasion, and they decided to tie up a large part of the Army in order to resist invasion. It was not until the disaster in March, 1918, that this policy was finally stopped, and within two weeks we had thrown across the Channel 287,000 men in order to retrieve that disaster.
I turn for a moment to what the Prime Minister has said about the Chiefs of Staff Committee. They have, he said, reached agreement on many points, but is it not because the main questions referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committee are questions on which they are likely to reach agreement? They have not referred to them questions on which there are likely to be differences of opinion; and I put it to the Secretary of State for War, if the Chiefs of Staffs have ever had referred to them the important question of the defence of commerce in the Mediterranean? It is largely an air question, because the declared policy of France is to apply the air menace to merchant ships, just as the Germans applied the submarine menace to merchant ships. Therefore, the Navy must know, in connection with the defence of commerce in the Mediterranean, what possible assistance it can get from the air, and that is a very important question. It is often said that a Minister of Defence would be in exactly the same position as a Cabinet Minister is in now, that is to say, that he would have to be guided by experts, but he would have the 1120 advantage of choosing his own experts, and I am not sure that, if the right men were chosen, he would not be an expert himself.
The leader of the Liberal party, when he was Prime Minister, asked the question, "When does a man become an expert?" and he answered it himself by saying that it was when a man had had experience. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman anticipated another answer which one might have made. I felt inclined to tell the story of Frederick the Great who, when discussing with his generals the value of experience in war, said he had two mules which had been through 20 campaigns, but, he added, "They are still mules." You will find mules among generals, and among admirals, and among politicians too. I acknowledge the difficulty of getting the right man as Minister of Defence, but types of men have been produced in this country like Cardinal Wolsey, Cromwell and Chatham—all men who could conduct war and impose their will on their experts. In the old days of Greece and Rome, when they were in their primacy, they produced men of this type, who were statesmen in times of peace and commanded armies in the field in times of war. It was only when they began to specialise that Greece and Rome fell. Then the statesmen became politicians and the generals became technicians. But quite recently in our own history we have produced these men. In south Africa, Botha was one of them, and so was Smuts; and if we could only bring Smuts home he would make a very good Minister of Defence indeed, but I venture to say that he would have to be freed from the trammels of being elected to Parliament. When we introduce our House of Lords Bill we will have to provide for Ministers from the other Chamber coming to speak in this Chamber.
§ Mr. ERNEST BROWNThat will be never.
§ Commander BELLAIRSWe would also have to do another thing. A Minister of Defence would be of no use in a Cabinet of 21 members. You cannot conduct affairs in connection with a war with 21 members. Such a Cabinet is only a debating society, and it would 1121 be necessary to reduce the Cabinet to an efficient working force of five members.
§ Lieut.-Colonel HENEAGEI think hon. Members must be thankful that we have had a Debate of this kind introduced in a non-party spirit. That has been the spirit not only of those who introduced the Debate but also of those who have followed. I was extremely interested to find that the vast majority of speakers in the Debate have been in favour of a Ministry of Defence. Speaking in favour of the proposal have been representatives of the Navy, of the Army, of the Air Force, and, if I may say so, of the civilian population. It is a most remarkable achievement that Members of such divergent views should be brought to agreement upon this matter. I think we ought to examine the reason for this great change over of opinion since the Haldane Commission of 1918. I think we must realise that the Haldane Commission was set up at a time when we were overcome by war problems, and when we were thinking in terms of the Great War. We have had time to forget that, and to disabuse our minds of a great deal of prejudice and false doctrine that we generated in that War. Now we realise, perhaps, that the three forces in that War are not separate forces, but one force.
Before the War, we had only the Army and the Navy, and there was a very nice distinction between the two. The Navy took charge of everything below high-water mark and the Army of everything above high-water mark, and even then there was often difficulty as to how the coastal defence batteries were to be dealt with. Now we have more confusion between the three forces. I am interested in anti-aircraft, and I should like to draw the attention of the Government to the difficult state of confusion that exists in air defence, as an illustration of the necessity of a Ministry of Defence. If hostile airships ever came over the North Sea, they would presumably be attacked by the Navy, but the moment they crossed dry land, they would probably come under the aircraft guns of the Army. If they went to the north coast of Lincolnshire and along the Humber, they would fly about first over the sea, and then over land, and they 1122 would come under the Army and Navy alternately every few seconds. We cannot control the defences of the country with a complicated system like that. We must have one Minister in charge during peace time to co-ordinate the policy of air defence.
I should like to issue a distinct caveat against dealing with defence by committees as against putting it under one person, such as a Minister of Defence. However efficient, willing, and competent committees are in peace time, they can be no more than advisory bodies. We want someone to take charge of the defence of this country, and for that reason, we are, sooner or later, bound to come to a Ministry of Defence. The difficulty of saying whether we want more cruisers or more airships has been mentioned, but we have to decide what is to be the future of the personnel of these Services. We see the Army becoming mechanised. Are we going to train separate mechanicians for the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, or are we to have one school, so that we can transfer the men from one Force to another as they are required; the same with signals and wireless telephony, with clerical staffs, the hospital staffs, and the general administration services.
It is time we stopped suggesting to ourselves that we have three Forces. It is essential that we should concentrate on the idea that we have one force to deal with, a force that is split up into three parts. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) said that it was impossible to say where we were journeying, and he gave the instance of gunners in the War who were trained more quickly than we thought was possible. As an old gunner, I agree that it is amazing how quickly gunners were trained, and they were perfectly all right as long as it was trench warfare, but once the guns began to move it was difficult for them to carry out their duties. It is perfectly true, as he said, that we do not know on what courses we are moving. Therefore, we must have one head to say how the three Forces are to divide the money. We are all interested in economy, and we have considerable doubt whether at present the money is expended in the right direction. For myself, I take the view that competition 1123 among the three equal heads is not the right way of deciding to which services the money shall go. Therefore, I wish to associate myself in a non-party spirit with those who hope that the future of defence of this country will be in the hands of a Minister of Defence.
Colonel CROOKSHANKI wish to take this opportunity of congratulating the Liberal party on bringing forward this subject, and I would support the remarks of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chatham (Lieut.-Colonel Moore-Brabazon) in regard to the lack of opportunities for dealing with this question. When my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Louth (Lieut.-Colonel Heneage) and I tried to bring this subject up on a certain occasion, we were talked out, and therefore this is an opportunity which we welcome. I would recall a point to which I referred on that occasion. In 1922 the hon. and gallant Member for Hertford (Rear-Admiral Sueter) had brought in a Bill to deal with this question. The Geddes Committee, after considering the subject, had reported in favour of a Ministry of Defence, and on that occasion the late Sir Henry Wilson, who was a Member of the House, dealt with the subject in this way. He said the air is not to be under the Army or the Navy nor is the Navy to be under the Army or the Air, nor is the Army to be under any body except itself, but they are all to co-operate. The word "co-operation" translated into action in this way, means to lose the war. The Prime Minister at that time, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), said such a Minister was impossible because a super-Minister would be necessary. From his remarks this afternoon, to which I listened with great interest, I am glad to see that he has altered his opinion on that subject. We all welcome the statement made by the Prime Minister, because at last we have some idea of the workings of this subject. I trust he may be prepared to consider this question rather on the lines I propose to develop. One recognises that a Ministry of Defence may not be possible at once and must develop, and that from a strategical point of view probably in the present Committee of Imperial Defence the best solution. We all recognize— 1124 all who happen to know anything of the general staff—that that committee has done valuable work and is now in a position to put forward a considered case. Further, the establishment of the Imperial College will enable an Imperial trend of thought to be developed, which was not possible before, when they have produced an Imperial General Staff to deal and to think imperially.
if the Prime Minister will allow me to say so, I think he is really the Minister of Defence, but we must all recognise that with his enormous responsibilities and duties it is quite impossible for him to be able to devote sufficient time to study the very contentious questions which are put up to him by the three chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, who, in virtue of the positions they occupy as representing their own particular arms, are bound to differ on important subjects, and it is impossible for the Prime Minister to study their minutes with sufficient care to form an opinion as detailed and concise as he would wish to do. Therefore, I suggest that under the present organisation there ought to be a Deputy-Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, say either the Lord President of the Council or somebody in a very high position, who would be able to balance the considered knowledge of three officers in the position of the chiefs of the Imperial General Staff and be able to co-ordinate their opinions sufficiently to present a case to the Cabinet. I feel that something of this kind might be a possible solution of the qestion. In the case of the Administrative Service I cannot help feeling that the House will agree that the details which have been given by the Prime Minister were particularly necessary. I have known many who have served on some of the Committees which dealt with the various subjects referred to by the Prime Minister, and I know that the Departments have been criticised a good deal in regard to overlapping. Accordingly, in this connection, I do not think that the Committee of Imperial Defence can be the final body. It has already been pointed out that that body is advisory and consultative, but it is necessary to have an executive body represented in the House of Commons.
Without wishing to suggest anything which would unduly upset the present 1125 arrangement, I feel that we might continue the present system, giving more power, say, to a Deputy-Chairman of the Imperial Defence Committee; but I think we should also have some Minister who can deal with the Services, and who would be able to co-ordinate all the problems which have been criticised in this House. Perhaps the Minister who is going to reply to these questions will be able to consider my suggestion. Generally, it is quite easy to suggest a Ministry of Defence, but, as the Prime Minister pointed out, we shall have to rely upon the present organisation, and I hope the points I have put may be a stepping stone towards achieving that object. I think more power should be given to a Deputy-Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and that there should be a Minister to co-ordinate the Administrative Services.
§ Brigadier-General CHARTERISBefore I say anything about administration and defence, I want to refer to a remark which was made by the hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs), who spoke about the Gough disaster in 1918. No doubt the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not mean to impute anything to General Gough, but, in case there should be any such impression, may I say that so far as my own knowledge goes it was not General Gough who was responsible for anything that happened in the spring of 1918. I do not want to suggest that we should find a scapegoat, but, if we did, it would not be Sir Hubert Gough.
I think anyone who has been concerned in any way with the conduct of war must have been very unimpressed by the description which was given by the Prime Minister of the mechanism of the Committee of Imperial Defence as a means of organising for war, and far more so for carrying on a war. I never thought when I entered this House that I should ever find myself in accord with the views expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), but this afternoon, in reference to almost everything he has said, I find myself in complete agreement, and the same applies to what was said by the hon. Member for Fareharn (Sir J. Davidson). He and I were associated in the conduct of the War in France on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief. 1126 He knows better than I do, but I know, perhaps, as well as other Members of the House how much one was hampered all through those operations by the lack of unity of control and unity of purpose.
It is a question not only of unity of command but of unity of purpose, and that is one thing that you can never achieve by committees. However formidable the names of their members may be, however assiduous may be their work, they can never achieve promptness and unity. A committee will either report as a compromise or will waste time, which is valuable in war and nearly as valuable in peace, in trying to come to agreement. That is not the way in which war can be organised, conducted or run. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs pointed out, I think with complete justice, that the three Service Departments, as we know them now, are only in fact one part, and perhaps not even the most important part, of the whole machinery that has to be brought into play to conduct and win a war. But, at the same time, although they are only one part of the machinery, they must be directed together. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs referred, again with complete justice and truth, to the loss of the Channel ports in the earlier stages of the War. I can hardly conceive of a General Staff, comprising Naval, Army, and Air Force officers, losing sight as completely as they did lose sight of the importance of these Channel ports to the future of the War.
Then there was another point which, so far as I know, has not been brought into evidence in this Debate, and here, perhaps, I may part company with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs. If, in the conduct of war, you find a Minister of the Crown, whether he be the Minister for War, or the Prime Minister, or any other Minister, who may have some ideas on the conduct of war which are not in accord with military principles or practice, then, in one or other of these committees, he will find the means of getting people to support him for technical reasons in carrying out his scheme, which may be entirely unsuited to the conduct of these operations. That in itself, I think, is a sufficient reason why these innumerable committees, all of them independent of one another, can 1127 never be successful in organising or carrying out a war. It is quite true that the control of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force may require what the Prime Minister called a super-man, by which I think he meant a man out of the ordinary. That is perfectly true, but it is equally true that war, above all things, does throw up men who are out of the ordinary, and I have not the least doubt that the British nation would throw up, in due course, a man competent for such a big thing as the control of the three integral parts of war, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Fareham pointed out that it was really a question of the pace at which we advance. He and other hon. Members have also pointed out, and I think it is quite true, that the great majority of the Members of this House are already convinced, as, indeed, any student of history must be, that the ultimate solution of this problem lies in a Ministry of Defence. The question is not what we are aiming at, but how fast we can advance towards the goal which is not only aimed at by us but is inevitable, and I admit that there is room for great diversity of opinion. It would not be possible at the present moment, by any Resolution of this House, to institute an active Ministry of Defence. The first step, or one of the steps, has been taken by the present Government in the organisation of the college which is now in Buckingham Gate, but I do not think we should wait until that college itself produces a scheme for the transition before we take the initial steps. The ultimate scheme no one now living can foresee; it must be the result of experience, it must be the result of mistakes. But the sooner we begin to start an organisation, to get that experience, to make those inevitable mistakes, and so gain knowledge, the better.
The committee of the Chiefs of the General Staff, to which the Prime Minister referred, is undoubtedly a step forward as compared with anything which has existed before in giving what may be called a General Staff view to the Cabinet; but that committee of General Staff officers, like all committees, will probably only consider questions on which they are more or less in agreement 1128 already. No one can imagine the Chief of the General Staff of the Army or the First Lord of the Admiralty, or the Chief of the Naval Staff, bringing to the committee some point on which he knows he is directly and strongly at variance with either or both. He will keep it away as far as he can from the committee. It seems to me that the committee, existing as it does and doing good work, remains the basis on which we can make the next step forward, and one of the first steps should be to give that committee a small staff and say to it, "You will continue to be a committee, but, instead of being co-equal, one of you, selected by the Prime Minister, shall be the head and the chief and the presiding person at the committee and with due responsibility."
There is a great danger, which has not been emphasised in this Debate, but which became very obvious during the War, that in a permanent staff committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence you may obtain a dangerous rival to the General Staff, a rival, not in knowledge, not in study of the subject, but in influence, and it may well be that at some stage or other, either in preparation for war or in the conduct of war, you may find the Committee of Imperial Defence urged one way by their permanent staff, who are in the main drawn from the fighting Services, and the other way by the permanent technical advisers of the Navy and Army and Air Force. That ought not to be. There ought to be one, and only one, definite source of technical advice to the Ministry, and the technical advice ought to be in a unified form from one staff representing those three most important parts of the great machine which represents the defence of the country.
We were discussing in Committee this morning a Bill in which every fault of this system of Committees and Boards and advisers without responsibility was contrasted with a system in which there was. one responsible Department giving one system of responsible advice. No words I can say could have been more eloquent and forcible than those that fell from a Member of the Ministry in favour of the single system and against the Board system. Every word that fell from that Member of the Cabinet is equally applicable when one is considering the question 1129 of this system of Committees as against a unified staff representing the three Fighting Services, representing an educated and a considered opinion on a Service problem to the Cabinet. I quite realise that in this Debate we shall probably go no further forward. We have talked it out, and we must wait until next year before some active step can be taken. I hope by the time the Debate is renewed, as I trust it will be next year, the Prime Minister will have seen his way to take another step forward towards the goal which is quite inevitable and whereby we can alone obtain not only the security of our country but true efficiency and true economy.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSThe Government are very glad that the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Sir R. Hutchison) has raised this question. I do not propose to repeat the very complete statement made by the Prime Minister earlier in the day. As there has been a great number of speeches mostly in favour of some form of Ministry of Defence—[Hon. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]—there is great variance between the conceptions of hon. Members who have spoken, but I admit that they were mostly in favour of some form of Ministry of Defence—I think it is right that I should at least endeavour to reconcile the position of the Government with the aspirations of many of those who have spoken. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who opened this discussion did not pledge himself to a Ministry of Defence. Those who were present will have observed the care with which he shied at the name Minister of Defence. As he developed his argument, he showed that really he had in mind a super Minister who was to be in complete control of the three Fighting Services. He called it a Central Control Board under a Minister, with a grant of money from Parliament for its services, indistinguishable from a Minister of Defence except in this one particular—Which was rather noteworthy—that this Minister of Defence was to be one of the lucky individuals who were to escape Treasury control. He was to be so much superior to any Chancellor of the Exchequer that he himself was to be the sole arbiter in the expenditure of the money voted to him.
§ Sir R. HUTCHISONNo.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSIt was so noticeable that I invite the hon. and gallant Gentleman to see what he did in fact say in his speech. However, the main argument was that there should be a Minister of Defence called by some other name, such as a Board of Control. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) was quite outspoken. He was in favour of a Ministry of Defence. He admitted, of course, that committees were useful, but he said they were futile in action. Of course, we never have supposed that committees were to have executive powers, but that they were in fact to be advisory. In fact the Prime Minister made it quite clear that the Committee of Imperial Defence and all the other committees were advisory and advisory only. It was not intended that they should supersede the responsibilities of the three Ministers who now represent the defence services. The right hon. Gentleman complained of these committees nevertheless.
I think it was highly desirable that the Prime Minister should have informed the House of the amount of co-ordination which has already taken place, and the amount of examination which has already been made into the overlapping which the War showed up and which would take place if no such co-ordination was in fact in operation. The committees have examined the different questions and have reported to the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Committee of Imperial Defence have made their recommendations to the Cabinet and the Cabinet have come to a decision. The decision binds the various departments, and when these decisions have been accepted by the Cabinet the various Fighting Departments are bound to, and do, in fact, carry them into operation. I think it is most useful that Members of the House should realise that the Departments are not careless of overlapping and are not competing with each other and duplicating services. On the contrary, where there is any suspicion of such duplication, the Committee of Imperial Defence has made an investigation, and executive action has followed in the way which I suggest is the right way, on the decision of the Cabinet 1131 through the Departments which are responsible to this House for administration.
It is odd to find the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs jeering at these Committees—and he was supported by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy)—because, if there is a sinner in this matter, the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs is the greatest sinner of all. At the end of the War there were in existence over 200 Committees which had been doing exactly this work, which has been co-ordinating the various services in the War, and which had been reporting to the War Cabinet, so that the War Cabinet should take action in those matters. That is what we want in peace as well as in war, and more in peace than in war, and it is precisely for that reason that these Committees have been set up, so that appropriate action shall be taken, on the responsibility of the Cabinet, by the various Departments.
§ Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHYBut you have not got your super-Cabinet now.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSIt may not be a super-Cabinet according to Members of the Labour party, but from the point of view of the Conservative party, whether or not it is super, it is a Cabinet which makes decisions, which puts the various Departments into action, and in which these overlappings or other evils are dealt with.
§ Sir R. HUTCHISONThe right hon. Gentleman represents a Department, and is putting out the Departmental point of view.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSIs it not right that the House should hear the, other side? The House has heard quite a number of speeches by very well-informed hon. and gallant Members giving one point of view, and is it not well that the House should hear what the hon. and gallant Gentleman calls the Departmental point of view, though I should have said it was rather a wider point of view myself? I do not understand what the hon. and gallant Member's complaint is.
§ Sir R. HUTCHISONThat it is from the narrow point of view.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSIs the complaint that I am too narrow? Let us develop that. Whether or not there is a Minister of Defence, it is not suggested that the personnel of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force should be amalgamated, nor is it suggested that they should be entirely interchangeable. Presumably the Army will continue to be an Army, the Navy will continue to be a Navy, and the Air Force will continue to be an Air Force. It is true that strategy and some part of the administration might be unified, but it is not proposed that each organisation should be either scrapped or amalgamated. Then their functions, to a certain extent, will continue, and there will be overlapping unless it is cured, and the Committees of which we are speaking will still be necessary, whether there is one Minister or whether there are three Ministers, unless yon scrap separate Services altogether and amalgamate them as one, which you cannot do. Then why complain of the Committees? Why say it is an excrescence of three Ministries? It is not. It is a necessary part of a great administration.
11.0 p.m.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) asked whether, amongst all these Committees, the problem of the Mediterranean had even been considered. Yes; there has been an inquiry into that very question by a Committee of the Imperial Defence Committee. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is the nearest approach towards a Ministry of Defence that has yet been made. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to which questions are referred, especially questions which relate to joint action by the three Services. Over and over again questions, for example, of what should be done in regard to the position in Shanghai have been referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and they have given us not three separate advices, but one advice. [An HON. MEMBER: "A compromise!"] Not a compromise. Who says a compromise? Why a compromise? Not a compromise at all. It is advice given by the responsible chiefs of the three Services, who will not compromise, but who will give fair and proper advice, according to their merits.
§ Brigadier-General CHARTERISSuppose that one of these three members holds diametrically divergent views from the others. What is he to do? Is he to sign a minority report, or is he to compromise?
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSMy hon. and gallant Friend hardly does credit to the Chiefs of the Services. They are men who are considering a question which takes the form of what is the best kind of force to apply to a particular situation.
§ Brigadier-General CHARTERISThey may differ.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSWhy should they differ? The reason why they should not differ is that the occasion does require a decision which is clearly plain among instructed people, and they are instructed men. I do not know of any case, although a great many references have been made to that Joint Staff Committee, where there has been a difference of opinion between them. It is a most valuable Committee, which is now advising the Cabinet, and whether there were a Ministry of Defence or not I cannot believe that anyone would scrap a Committee of that sort. It does co-ordinate, in a degree which has never been surpassed, the force at the disposal of the Government, and does bring into operation the force most suited for the occasion.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs accuses us of not having learned the lessons of the War, and he proceeded to illustrate that. He said that there was competition between the Army and the Navy for supplies and for manufactures during the War. I am very well aware of that fact. I was at the Ministry of Munitions for some part of the time, and I know very well that we always found the Navy was getting ahead with various supplies which the Army and the Air Force would well have liked to have. It is precisely because of that experience that some of these Committees, which hon. Members are inclined to deride, have been set up, so that the supply, where there is a limited amount of supply, shall be properly allocated between the requirements of the Services. We have now set up an organisation which, should there, unfortunately, be a war, could be 1134 put into operation, which will prevent the sort of competition to which my right hon. Friend referred. Already, these Committees have been considering these questions, and from them, if necessary, should the war be big enough, a Ministry of Munitions or a Ministry of Supply could be formed, and some part of the permanent personnel is actually being formed in the work of these Committees, so that, instead of having the scramble and the muddle which we had at the beginning of the last War, we shall have men who have been following up the work in these Committees, and can take their place in a Ministry of Supply. The right hon. Gentleman next asked us to remember that not only the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, but that foreign affairs came into war. It was hardly necessary to remind us of that, but never-the less he did. He explained to us that Turkey and Bulgaria were lost and the United States and France had been retained; also that finance and the power of manufacture took a part in war. He advanced all this as evidence that there should be a Ministry of Defence. Is the Minister of Defence to govern the finance and foreign affairs as well as the Navy, Army and Air Force?
§ Sir R. HUTCHISONMy right hon. Friend never suggested that. He used the argument that if the three Services were combined in one Ministry of Defence it would not be an overpowering Ministry in the Government, but the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would be as important, and that during the War we failed in that we did not get in Turkey and Bulgaria and other powers. My right hon. Friend was only giving an illustration, that a Ministry of Defence would not be over-powerful in the Cabinet.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSI accept that statement from my hon. and gallant Friend, but I do not quite know why the right hon. Gentleman advanced that argument, nor do I think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman has succeeded in making it much clearer to me. I understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that there was a great danger that we had not learned the lesson of the War, that dual control was a serious thing, and that all these results had followed because of dual control in the War and the want of concentration in 1135 the hands of a Ministry of Defence. The truth is that all those things are undoubtedly essential for the winning of a war. Finance is an extremely powerful weapon. The getting or losing of allies is also an extremely important affair. But that is not an argument in favour of a Ministry of Defence; it is an argument in favour of a strong War Cabinet; it is an argument in favour of a strong central control which will control finance, foreign affairs, the Army and the Navy and other services.
But whether there were three Ministers or one Minister, that form of central control would be just as much required, and I cannot see the argument of the right hon. Gentleman. He painted another picture, in his inimitable way, of the three Ministers on this Bench all struggling to share what he called the loot—an odd phrase. What was the loot to which he referred'? Is it money which apparently in a lump sum the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day can spare? Was that it? Who are the three Ministers who are all scrambling for a share of it? I do not know whether that is going to be what will be done by a future Labour Government, or a Liberal Government for that matter, if there is one. If that is what is going to happen I can tell the right hon. Gentleman this: That is not the way in which the Conservative Government conduct their business. It is not a question of a lump sum which is thrown at three Ministers and of the cunning or obstinate getting the share that they deserve. On the contrary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this Government is most careful to examine every estimate, and he does not allow the Admiralty or the War Office or the Air Ministry to have a penny more than they can show is absolutely essential for the purpose of the Service. Do I not know it? It is not a question of sharing the loot. I would not mind that, probably, from my own point of view. I try and get my share. But that is not what happens in our Government.
Sir J. DAVIDSONI think we know of that. If the right hon. Gentleman were the Secretary of State for Air, would he be very pleased to see six 1136 heavy batteries in the South of Ireland scrapped? That is much more important.
Sir L. WORTHINGTON "EVANSPerhaps my hon. and gallant Friend will allow me to proceed in my own way. I am answering questions that have been put, not questions which, on second thoughts, can be put, because that is a process which would keep us all up very late. The right hon. Gentleman said one single Minister would be the arbiter, and an impartial arbiter, between the three Services under his control and I see some assent to that view. At first sight, it is rather attractive that there should be a Minister who is not specially the Navy nor specially the Army nor specially the Air Force but who should have an equal responsibility with regard to all of them and should thus be the sole arbiter of how much of the lump sum he had extracted from an unwilling Exchequer should be devoted to the three Services. On consideration, I think hon. Members will see that what would happen is that the so-called fight between the three Ministers would be transferred from them to the three staffs under the single impartial Minister.
The Admiralty would naturally through their staff, having been deprived of a Minister, struggle hard, and I assure you the War Office would do the same and the Air Force would not be backward. And you would transfer from the Ministers, whose business it is to deal with finance and political arguments, to the technical staff the very duties of which you are trying to relieve the Ministers.
§ Brigadier - General CHARTERISWould it not be possible ultimately to have one combined General Chief of Staff to give the responsible Minister considered advice?
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSThat is exactly what the Chiefs of Staff do now. It is a representation of the combined Staffs. The hon. and gallant Member smiles. He has not the slightest idea that the Chiefs of Staff are doing the precise thing which he, with his want of experience, does not seem to realise is being done at this very moment. The right hon. Gentleman thought that there ought to be a great reduction in the expenditure on the defence forces. He said 1137 that Europe was exhausted and that with regard to the United States and France it was unthinkable that they should be in a position of antagonism; that there should be a force to police the Empire, and that there should be a power of expansion. As far as the Army is concerned, it is not greater than that; it is a force only just sufficient to provide the Empire garrisons and to keep a force in existence for expansion, if expansion should be necessary.
The House should realise the great reductions that have been made. I should welcome a Debate when the major questions could be considered, because I do not think hon. Members realise the great reductions which have been made. Although the atmosphere is peaceful and the outlook good we have to remember that emergencies may arise—it is not long since there was an emergency at; Shanghai—and we have to keep a force which can operate at short notice. The problem has been envisaged by hon. Members in quite different ways. The hon. and gallant Member for Hallam (Sir F. Sykes) suggested that the Ministry of Defence should be directly under the Prime Minister. The hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone saw the possibility of an expert Minister, of a Cromwell or a Chatham, who would be expert as Minister of Defence. These suggestions are so far from possibility that hon. Members have not really thought out the position. How can you put the Ministry of Defence under an overworked Prime Minister? It is impossible. Where, are you to get your Cromwells and your Chathams? How long are they going to take to be expert in their job? I happen to have been in one of the Ministries of Defence longer than most men. I have been Secretary of State for War for four years, and in the last 15 years, before I was appointed to this office, there were 10 Secretaries of State for War. Are you going to get 10 Cromwells or 10 Chathams in 15 years?
Colonel CROOKSHANKI was rather developing that line myself. The present Prime Minister has to come to these decisions himself in addition to all his enormous responsibilities as head of the Government of this country and Empire, and I suggest that there should be a Deputy-Chairman of the Committee 1138 of Imperial Defence, who should study and consider the reports of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee, and possibly deal with them with a more intimate knowledge than the Prime Minister could possibly possess.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSI understand that; it is an alternative. One is a superimposed Minister, and the other is a Minister on the loose. My hon. and gallant Friend wants to have a Minister on the loose, who will be studying these questions but not taking responsibility for expenditure or be responsible to this House. He is to be a fourth Minister; a Minister of Interference. He is going to interfere with all the other Ministers who are trying to do their duty and who are responsible to this House. There are two ways of doing it.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe Chair would like to see the Minister's face occasionally.
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSI assure you that no disrespect to the Chair is intended. I must refrain from following my hon. and gallant Friend, except most furtively, and try to conclude what I have to say to the House. There is this difficulty, that, if this Minister is to be a super-Minister, although we were asked not to imagine that he would be too powerful, I am not at all sure that there is not a great deal in that criticism. It was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs that as things stood now the Chancellor of the Exchequer was overwhelmed by three Ministers, who conspired together to bring pressure to bear upon him. I believe the truth is that one Minister would be much more powerful than three. As it is now, the Chancellor can always play one Department off against the other, to a certain extent. The idea that all three Ministers combine against the Chancellor of the Exchequer is a myth. In my experience it is not so. In my experience the Chancellor of the Exchequer, taking each one of the Ministers separately and one by one, probably does a great deal better than he would do if there were one Minister, who had three staffs all acting together and willing to support him in demanding that such and such a sum should be allowed for the Defence Service.
§ Brigadier-General CHARTERISDoes that conduce to efficiency?
§ Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANSIn my judgment such a Minister would be infinitely stronger and more likely to obtain what he desires, but I myself think we have not yet got to the time when we can have a Ministry of Defence. I will not say that at no time will it be possible to have a Ministry of Defence. Great progress has been made towards the unifying of policy and administration of the three Services. The Committee of Imperial Defence has been evolved, as most of our institutions have been evolved, by the neceesities of the case.
We have to remember that here we are at the centre of an Empire. We cannot dictate to the Empire forces, but the Empire is frequently willing to have these problems considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and is willing to consider the advice given by the experts there. But it might be quite different if it appeared to the Ministers of the Empire that, instead of getting advice, they were being asked by a Minister of Defence to conform to the views of a Ministry set up in this country. The Committee of Imperial Defence has already had the advantage of Dominion Ministers sitting with British Ministers and conferring together upon the policy of the Empire. That is a delicate instrument, which it is highly desirable should be maintained in being, and should not be brought to naught. I do not disagree 1140 with the hon. and gallant Member for Hallam that if there is to be a Ministry of Defence, it can only be one which is brought in step by step, and the Committee of Imperial Defence, as it now stands, is a useful instrument which, should war break out, can be rapidly converted into a war cabinet with all the essential committees already in existence for the purpose of carrying out war work; and, while we are willing to consider all the suggestions which have been made, while we are not desirous of prophesying for the future, or of saying that certain progress has been made and that no more can be made, I cannot do more to-night than say that we believe that we have an organisation best suited for the position in which we find ourselves, and any advance on that must be gradual, and such as experience justifies.
§ The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.