HC Deb 20 March 1928 vol 215 cc239-85

1. "That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 153,500, all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom at Home and Abroad, excluding His Majesty's Indian Possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929."

2."That a sum, not exceeding £9,023,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of the Pay, etc., of His Majesty's Army at Home and Abroad (exclusive of India), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929."

3."That a sum, not exceeding £3,040,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Works, Buildings, and Lands, including military and civilian staff, and other charges in connection therewith. which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929."

4."That a sum, not exceeding £3,580,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Rewards, Half-Pay, Retired Pay, Widows' Pensions, and other Non-effective Charges for Officers, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929."

5."That a sum, not exceeding £4,329,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, and Kilmainham Hospital; of OutPensions, Rewards for Distinguished Service, Widows' Pensions, and other Noneffective Charges for Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Men, etc., which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929."

6."That a sum, not exceeding £232,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Civil Superannuation, Compensation, and Additional Allowances, Gratuities, Injury Grants, etc., which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929."

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I beg to move to leave out "153,500," and to insert instead therefor "153,400."

Mr. LAWSON

For the purposes of our discussion, Mr. Speaker, may I ask for your guidance? I understand that if the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) moves his reduction, we are limited to a discussion upon the number of men, and I was wondering whether you would allow a general Debate to take place on this Vote on the understanding that the Debate concluded at a reasonable time?

Mr. SPEAKER

This is the Report stage of the Supply Vote, and, according to the Rules of the House, the Debate ought to be confined strictly to each individual Vote as it comes up. I have been approached on this matter, and, in view of the fact that the time in the Committee stage on Vote A was limited, I think it would be fair to allow the House to have a more or less general discussion on the Vote, although it is the Report stage. In order to protect. myself against an abuse of this liberty, I have consulted hon. Members, and I understand that they have readily given me an assurance that they will not abuse the liberty if I take this course.

Mr. LAWSON

I take it that hon. Members can raise any question relevant to this particular Vote, although the hon. and gallant Member moves to reduce the number of men?

Mr. SPEAKER

Yes, it makes this Debate as wide as is usually the case on Vote A in Committee.

4.0 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I need hardly say, Mr. Speaker, that what you have said entirely meets my own requirements. I very rarely trouble the House on questions connected with the Army. I never venture to impinge on Army Debates or discuss the economy of the Service or the technicalities of the Army. I speak with great diffidence. The reason I am moving the reduction to-day is to draw attention to a matter which has been lost sight of by the House and the public, and I am afraid by the War Office itself; and that is the small British Army, very well staffed, that is stationed somewhere in Germany, I believe at a place called Weisbaden. From personal observation and conversations when I was in Cologne after the Armistice, when it was occupied by a larger Army, I found everywhere, without exception, high praise for the conduct and bearing of all ranks of His Majesty's Army. The British soldier, whether he is a private or an officer, when engaged in the difficult and delicate task of occupying former enemy territory behaves as a gentleman. In my own personal opinion the bravest feat of arms during the whole War was when the Earl of Cavan, who was in command of the British Army in Italy, sent a trainload of food through to the starving Austrians in face of the objection of certain Allies immediately the Armistice was signed. Having said that, I must point out that the position of this Army in Germany is difficult and dangerous. It is now 10 years after the Armistice and we are still keeping this small and inadequate army of some thousands of men in the Rhineland, in the middle of purely German territory.

I have certain questions to ask the Secretary of State for War about it. First, with regard to its numbers. I find in the Army Estimates that the total number is given as 7,252 men, and it consists of a number of very famous regiments. I believe they are still roughly as follow; the 8th Hussars, the 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers—I do not notice any cheers from Welsh Members—the 2nd Worcesters, the 2nd Berkshires, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, the 2nd Leicesters and the 2nd Dorsets. There are certain other units—Artillery, Engineers, Army Service Corps, Army Medical Corps, Army Dental Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, Army Veterinary Corps, 10 chaplains, nine officers and 39 men of the Army Pay Corps. Then there is a section of the Army Educational Corps. I am glad to say that there are no Colonial or Indian troops. All the troops, at any rate, are white men. That wa are not employing coloured troops there is, I think, all to the good. There are some batteries of Royal Artillery, some Royal Engineers and members of the Royal Corps of Signals and 143 military police.

I do not pretend to be any sort of a military expert, but the principles of strategy, as I have said before in this House, are of very wide application, and they do not change. I would ask, therefore, what on earth is the use of an army of two weak brigades in the middle of a nation of 60,000,000 people, a nation which is allowed, under the Peace Treaty, 100,000 troops, and which has millions of trained men of good military value, as we know? For military purposes, that army is useless, and, from a strategical point of view, is in a most dangerous position. It ought either to be a proper army of sufficient size for its work, or it should be withdrawn altogether. I would like to know what the right hon. Gentleman's personal views are on this matter. But while the Army is small, the staff is terrific. There is one cavalry regiment and some horse artillery units, and yet there are 17 remount officers. Do they buy horses locally? Do they have any system of farming out horses? Do they subsidise German light horses as we subsidise horses in this country suitable for cavalry? Why 17 remount officers?

Now compare the cost of this staff with that of the Home Commands. For Aldershot, the principal military command in this country, the cost is £46,400, and for the Eastern Command £41,400; while for the Army on the Rhine it is £31,750. For the large Northern Command it is only £23,600. I think that the staff on the Rhine is out of all proportion to the size of the Army, and I suspect that, as usual, the War Office is looking after officers of high rank, and especially staff officers. There are in the Army, as we know, two orders of human beings—staff officers and others, and, whatever happens, the numbers of the staff and their emoluments must not be altered. That is all very well from the point of view of the staff, but I am also thinking of the British taxpayer. Do not let any hon. Member say that the Germans are paying for this, because if he does, I would ask him to remember the two following points. In the first place, every penny Germany pays towards the cost of this Army is deducted from the reparation payments to the Exchequer, and the second thing is that the Germans are not paying. The Appropriations-in-Aid amount to £1,000,000 this year—"Receipts in connection with the Army of Occupation on the Rhine." I can only go by the Army List, and I can only find £1,000,000 mentioned, whereas last year the amount allowed was £l,500,000.

When I come to the cost of this Army, I find that the amount given in the Army Estimates is £1,299,700. So that even if the Germans pay the full £1,000,000, we lose £299,000, but, as I remarked before, every penny comes off the main reparations payment. But that is not all, because I have here the Minutes of the Evidence taken by the Select Committee of Public Accounts for the year 1927. My hon. Friend the late Under-Secretary of State for War was good enough to draw my attention to this, and I thank him very much, because I find here an extraordinary state of affairs. If hon. Members will look at page 532 of the 1927 Report they will find that there was continual bickering, trouble and friction about getting any money out of Germany at all. The machinery was very complicated owing to the right of appeal to the International Tribunal, presided over by a Dutchman, M. Patin, and, in actual practice, in 1925, according to this evidence, we only got £407,000. This is the sort of thing that happens. This is the evidence given by a prominent official called before the Committee. The hon. Member who was present will remember this evidence very well. After some details about belated charges, and so on, this is the description given of the difficulties: The German Government succeeded in getting a provisional allowance from the Reparation Receipts Office, so that there was no inducement from their point of view to put in their bill within a particular time. The Army cannot Move until they get the bill. When they get the bill they dispute a good many of the items. If those disputes cannot be settled between the two High Commissioners, they have to go to the Arbitral Commission presided over by M. Patijn. That takes up a great deal of time. The result is that there is obstruction, and the unfortunate Army Paymasters, or whoever do these things, are shuttlecocked and battle-dored between the various Commissions and authorities, the result being that we do not get the full amount we should have, and the evidence given was that the British taxpayer has to bear the cost, "in the sense that it is taken away from the annuity." What is clear is that we do not get anything like £1,000,000 or £1,500,000, and this year we get a little under £500,000. The same Committee asked about the size of the garrison, and this is where I make my next question to the right hon. Gentleman. Mr. Ellis asked: Were we bound to keep a definite number of men on the Rhine by Treaty, or is it within our power to reduce the number? This is the interesting answer given: I think there is a definite maximum, but the general attitude of the Government is that all three occupying States should reduce pro rata. That means that we shall not keep more than a certain number of men, but we can reduce the Army as much as we like, and, that being the case, if I am right in saying that for military purposes this Army of 7,000 odd, or whatever the numbers are, is useless, then for political purposes it ought to be very much less, and you could have one brigade instead of two brigades; you could have a battalion, a company, a consular guard, and there would be all that saving to the taxpayers of this country. There would be the extra amount accruing on Reparation account, and there would be avoided this otherwise unavoidable friction, annoyance and irritation caused to any people who have alien troops quartered upon them, however well those troops behave, and I pay a well-deserved tribute to the good behaviour and good bearing of the troops. But so long as you have that Army of Occupation, there is that feeling, and it is, of course, a degradation to the people who own the territory that they occupy. Therefore if the right hon. Gentleman cannot take this Army away altogether, I think he should reduce it still further.

I want to ask another question. What is the effect of the life which is led by this lost legion at Wiesbaden. I say "lost legion" because we hear nothing about it. It has been there for 10 years. What is it doing? When is it coming away? What is the effect on military efficiency? Is it possible to manœuvre the troops to give them the requisite training? How many live in billets and how many in barracks? Are they occupying old German barracks or are they billeted? Troops billeted for a long time, my military friends tell me, lose part of their military efficiency and discipline. I can well understand it. I believe they get on so well with the civil population that many marriages are taking place between the young British soldiers and the young German women. [An HON. MEMBER: "It brings peace!"] My hon. Friend says that it bring peace. It does not always bring peace, but I hope these marriages are happy. If so, it will be because of the excellent domestic virtues of the German women. Think of the position. One day, when the soldiers return, these young women will come among strange people, and, if their husbands retire from the Army, will live in Wigan, in Ipswich, Birmingham, or wherever it may be, surrounded by people who do not speak their language and away from their own people. Marriages, I know, are made in Heaven, but I do not see why a temporary Heaven in Rhineland or Wiesbaden should be turned into domestic discomfort.

Mr. SPEAKER

Are these ladies carried on the Vote?

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

Yes, they are. They marry on the strength, and they receive the allowance that we vote in this House for them, but I dare say when they retire with their soldier husbands they do not receive it, and I do not want to pursue that. But I would rather see these young soldiers in England brought into contact with English girls and marrying English girls. There is in this country a great surplus of women who can never get husbands. That is well known. You cannot kill a million men and keep the balance between the two sexes, and many of this generation of English women will be deprived of their domestic opportunities. Is it not a, fact that some hundreds of these marriages have taken place on the strength? What is the exact number? I am told it is very considerable. I do not object to the marriages themselves, because they show that the relations between the troops and the civil population are good, but I have mentioned another aspect of the matter. This is one of the things that will inevitably happen if you keep the Army there indefinitely. How long is it going to be there?

I do not wish to touch on matters of high policy, but I hope the Secretary of State for War is using his great eloquence and influence in the Cabinet in favour of having this Army taken away from the Rhine at the earliest possible moment. In my opinion it has been there many years too long and I can see no advantages at all in keeping it there. It is bound to cause heartburnings and ill-feeling among a people who are members of the League of Nations with ourselves, and are parties, with us, to the Locarno Treaty. We were told that that Treaty opened up a new chapter in European relations and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs got the Order of the Garter for it. Why, then, is this force still kept on German territory? As a bulwark against invasion by France it is worse than useless. I say—with diffidence from the military point of view, but with certainty from the political point of view and from the point of view of good faith and fair dealing—that this Army ought not to be kept on the Rhine any longer.

Mr. KELLY

I beg to second the Amendment.

I trust the Secretary of State for War will give the House some reasons for keeping this Army on the Rhine. Why should it be necessary to do so after all these years since the Armistice? We have been told that peace now prevails between the various countries, but the existence of such a force as this would make it appear that only an armed peace exists between the nations, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will try to make this House and the people of the country understand why they are being called upon to maintain an Army in that part of the world. I leave that question for the reply of the right hon. Gentleman, but I understand that by your ruling, Sir, we are enabled to raise a number of other points on this occasion. There are many points in these Estimates which require clearing up by the right hon. Gentleman's Department. It is not a far stretch from the question of the army of occupation on the Rhine to the question of the conditions operating in various Departments under the control of the War Office. I do not know whether the term "army of occupation" is still applied to the Army on the Rhine but, if so, it seems strange, in view of the fact that that Army is in a land with whose people we are supposed to be at peace.

If one comes a little nearer home than the Rhine, one wonders why the War Department cannot treat the workers in its factories much better than it is doing at present. I am told that, at the Pimlico Clothing Factory, the wages, though not regulated by the trade board, are paid at a figure which is round about that operating under the trade board for industries of a similar nature outside. These trade boards are, presumably, set up to deal with sweated occupations, and I am told that the War Department refuses even to comply with the rates existing under this particular trade board. I quote but one case in reference to that factory. I am told that the War Department refused to pay to the warehousemen there the rate of wages which would be paid by outside employers and that they have changed the title of this class of workpeople, calling them "porters" instead of "warehousemen." I suggest that that is a poor way of getting behind the operation of the Trade Boards Act. While mentioning that particular case, I ask the War Department to look into the conditions generally operating in their factories and to endeavour to remove some of the difficulties and grievances of which one hears.

I wish to refer again to a question which I raised this afternoon concerning Singapore. I know the difficulty mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman, that his Department have not the figures as to the number of people employed on War Office work in that place, but surely, if the Department are employing civilians on this work—which so many of us think is unnecessary and wasteful—they ought to know the number of people for whom they are responsible at Singapore. Surely, also, they ought to be able to tell us of the conditions under which these people work. We hear rumours of a very unsettling kind, to the effect that these people who are either directly engaged by the War Office, or are engaged by a contractor who is doing War Office work, are living and working under conditions which are a disgrace to this country. It is bad enough when our people in this country are treated in a way of which we have reason to complain, but, in Malaya, the War Department should remember that they are responsible for the good name of this country. We expect the War Department to show a standard that will be an example to other people in that part of the world. We might also have an explanation of why such a large sum of money is being expended at Singapore. The original sum was something like £685,000. I wonder if the people of this country realise that during the year which will end 31st March next we have expended £30,000 and have arranged for the expenditure of a further £132,000. We ought to be told on what this money is being spent. There are other items in the Estimates regarding quarters and so forth about which the House and the country ought to know more.

In regard to the Stores Department, I am not at all sure that the Department itself is satisfied with the allocation of the various stores, particularly in view of the mechanisation of the Army. I am not at all convinced that these stores are placed in the best way, having regard to the conditions under which the Army operates. As to the conditions of those employed in the Stores Department, I would ask when are we going to have complete housing for those engaged at Didcot? A considerable sum of money was set aside for that purpose, and some of us who were on a committee dealing with the matter were given assurances that the housing arrangements would be expedited. When are these houses going to be completed, so that those engaged at Didcot may have home conditions worthy of the name? I should also like to know the reason for the considerable expenditure at Feltham. I see that we are going to spend something like £25,000 on new buildings at a place where we have already spent a considerable sum in the erection of workshops. I know that those workshops were erected because of the new condition of things in the Army. Why is it necessary to spend the further £25,000 which is in this Estimate?

With regard to Bramley, I was left under the impression by speeches from representatives of the War Department that they had great regard for the education of those in their service. We have been led to believe that the Department is very anxious for improvement and education, but I am told that a very curious thing has happened at Bramley. A certain number of the employés there desired to attend classes and, in order to prove that they were genuine in their desire for education, they proposed to sit for certain examinations. The War Department took exception both to their attendance at the classes and to their sitting at the examinations. I hope we shall have an explanation of this curious procedure. I observe that the amount under the heading of "Compassionate Gratuities" is reduced and one would like to have some explanation of this fact. I would also like to know why the War Department are dispensing with the services of pensionable civilians before the time comes for these civilians to receive pensions. I am sorry to put so many points, but there are a great many others with which I should like to deal. There are one or two matters affecting the Stores Department, which I have not mentioned in detail, but I trust that if the Financial Secretary is replying he will tell the House something about this Department and particularly the points which I have raised. Apart from these questions of detail I hope the country will learn that we are going to be eased from the burden of maintaining a wholly unnecessary army on the Rhine—a burden which falls upon the people of the country, whether the cost comes directly out of their pockets or whether it is deducted from the amount paid to us by Germany.

Lord APSLEY

I share with the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) his diffidence in taking up the time of the House, but there are a few matters which, in view of the great changes that are taking place in the Army to-day, it would be well if the House could hear something about, either from individual Members, from the Secretary of State for War, or from the Financial Secretary to the War Office. In the first place, we are told in the Vote that the organisation of the Tank Corps consists of four battalions at home and one armoured corps company, and that the four battalions consist of 52 tanks each. We are not told with what type of vehicle they are supplied. I understand—my right hon. Friend will correct me if I am wrong—that there are three of these battalions which consist of the Vickers tank and one of them of the light tank, which I believe is being renamed an armoured machine-gun carrier. If that be the case, will that third battalion also consist of 52 tanks like the others, or will there be a very much greater number of tanks in it? Further, with regard to the Vickers tanks themselves, it appears to me to be rather a pity that there should be three battalions of 52 tanks, each having all the same type of tank.

A tank is a very expensive weapon indeed. Perhaps my right hon. Friend will tell us the cost of a Vickers tank, and also the cost of its track and of renewing it when the original one is worn out, and the amount of petrol that it uses up per mile, because, from what information I have, the Vickers tank, though a very nice spectacular weapon, is not an economic one, and some opinions are to the effect that it is not going in the right direction for mechanical warfare. It has done very well for spectacular displays when my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer goes to Windmill Hill, and sees a display, or when the King of Afghanistan goes down to Lulworth. I understand that the Vickers tank, on ground which is well tried and previously reconnoitred, gives a very good performance, but when it comes to using it on ground that has not been reconnoitred, and you have to imagine that you are under fire, and every porthole has to be closed down, and you can only drive by periscope, then the Vickers tank, they say, is not such a good weapon to manœuvre in difficult country as even some of the older types of tank. Indeed, as regards gun practice, it is not quite so accurate on rough ground.

It appears to me that there is a danger that the Tank Corps may be running amok with the idea of shock tactics, which perhaps may not be altogether the right one, a thing which has happened before, with other arms, notably cavalry. After the charge at Waterloo, shock action was everything, and the other duties of cavalry were neglected until the next war found them wanting. There is no doubt that the Tank Corps at present are rather taken up with this idea of shock action by mechanical vehicles, regardless of the fact that at the end of the last war shock action by tanks was beginning to become more and more impossible. The Germans were producing anti-tank guns, which, although only improvised affairs, gave a measure of security to infantry against tank attack and shock action, and it is probably the fact that shock action by armoured fire vehicles is only possible, as with cavalry for that matter, on certain rare occasions when the machine can be utilised at the right place and at the right time. If you are too early or too late, it is impossible to use it as a shock weapon.

The French make no bones about it, and they call their tanks Artillerie d'Assaut, and they use them more as mobile protected artillery than as a shock weapon. I understand the Fourth Battalion is equipped with the light tanks, which are an improvement on the Carden Lloyd tank, and that they are going to be used practically as machine gun carriers. Napoleon, when he reorganised the French cavalry, did away with the old regimental idea and formed them into three distinct corps, the Hussars, Dragoons, and Cuirassiers, and he did not do this in order to provide picturesque uniforms which their lady friends admired, but for a definite reason; and it would appear to me, as a very humble disciple in these matters, that the mechanical force is going through exactly the same stage. The Hussars of Napoleon were used for reconnaissance, particularly over long distances, and pursuit. Those are the functions of the armoured car units which are being provided in these Estimates. The Dragoons were mounted rifles, pure and simple. They were used to bring additional fire power into the firing line or to extend the flanks if necessary, or to form a defensive flank if it had to be done when the enemy manœuvred, and as soon as the men were brought up to the firing line the horses were sent back to bring up fresh men. Every regiment of Dragoons had three dismounted men to every horse, by which means they were reinforced from the reserve whenever and wherever they were required.

In addition, he had a corps called the Voltigeurs, a small, highly trained infantry corps from the South of France, trained to jump on to the horse as it went by, so that two men could be taken up into the firing line on one horse. That was the way in which Napoleon used his Dragoons. The Cuirassiers were purely shock action troops, and were used at certain critical moments when either the enemy or his own troops were on the verge of breaking and only an extra push was required to force a decision. That is the function, I gather, of the Vickers tank. It is not a strategic weapon; it is not a weapon of manœuvre. These mechanical columns with which we have been experimenting on Salisbury Plain are all right as long as they are on good ground, but I confess that on really difficult ground and under enemy observation and fire the Vickers tank, in my humble opinion, is not a weapon that can be successfully employed for any prolonged operations. It would have to be taken to the battle zone possibly by rail and only used for special purposes, the opportunities for which may be fleeting. On the other hand, the light machine gun carrier, the light tank, will perform the function of Napoleon's Dragoons. It is not a shock unit but a mobile protected fire unit, and the infantry carriers, which should be armoured only as much as to enable them to keep their mobility, would still further perform the function of Napoleon's Dragoons. It would appear to me that those are the lines an which the Tank Corps should be working, more than on the lines of shock action and nothing but shock action, which they may seldom be able to bring into operation.

Further still, there is brought now into perfection a gun known as a self-propelled gun, which my right hon. Friend mentioned in his speech on the Second Reading, and that gun is apparently proving very successful. It is an ordinary 18-pounder field gun, but can be used as an anti-aircraft gun. It has an all-round traverse and a high rate of fire and a shield to protect its crew from shrapnel and machine gun bullets, and in every way it is proving a most successful weapon. Is it a gun or a tank? When is a gun not a tank, and when is a tank not a gun? Would it not be better rather than to have three battalions of Vickers tanks, at any rate to convert one of them into self-propelled guns of various calibre in order that experiments may be conducted with the various types of these armoured fire vehicles? I believe the function of tanks, apart from occasional opportunities that they may have for shock action, will prove more and more a question of manœuvring armoured artillery as best we can and as quickly as we can, possibly under fire, from place to place. They must be carefully camouflaged, or they will be subject to air attack, and hon. Members must remember, before becoming too enthusiastic about mechanical forces in war, that all mechanical arms are very much subject to aeroplane attack. You may camouflage your tanks or your self-propelled guns or any track vehicle as much as you like, but over wet ground and over sandy ground they leave a track which you cannot conceal, and it is an easy matter for a skilled Air Force to track you out to the spot where you are hiding and then drop bombs on you. That is one of the difficulties with which the Tank Corps have to deal.

There is that question which corresponds to musketry training in the infantry, and that is artillery training for the Tank Corps. At the present moment they have only one range, which is a very limited one, at Lulworth, and they can only use direct fire at short range at a fairly large target, which does not give good opportunity for training, Would it not be possible to make an arrangement with the artillery by which the tanks and the new self-propelled guns could do their practice on artillery ranges on Salisbury Plain or wherever they can be found? Could not the Tank Corps at Lulworth be moved to Salisbury Plain, and give Lulworth up to the senior officers' school, which at present is at Sheerness, a most unsuitable place? Could not my right hon. Friend do a deal with the Air Force—I believe they would like it—and move the senior officers' school to Lulworth, giving the Air Force Sheerness?

Now, to come to artillery, there is a reference in this Vote to five brigades and six batteries of light guns, which I understand replace what were formerly called pack guns. What precisely are these guns? They are put down as 3.7 howitzers, but are they still pack guns or horse guns, or are they drawn by mechanical tractors? It seems to me that they must, if they are anti-tank weapons, play an important part, and I think hon. Members would like to know exactly what they are. I notice there are four brigades and two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery. Is it not really time that the question of the Royal Horse Artillery was revised altogether? I do not know whether it is other hon. Members' experience, but in my own opinion the 13-pounder gun is not really an effective or necessary weapon compared with what it used to be in the South African war. It is not more mobile than the 18-pounder gun. When we have had cavalry operations through difficult country, the 13-pounder gun was no more able to follow our cavalry than the 18-pounder gun. When General Bulfin's corps and two cavalry divisions made the first unsuccessful attack on Jerusalem, he only had two pack batteries to support him. The rest were unable to follow in wet weather till the roads had been repaired. When the cavalry broke through the Turkish lines in Palestine in 1918. no artillery were able to follow except one battery, also a pack battery.

In view of that, it would appear either that the Royal Horse Artillery should be converted into field artillery, and armed with 18-pounder guns, which give better fire effect, and have a better shell, both shrapnel and high explosive, or else that they should be armed with pack artillery, which would follow mounted troops in whatever zone they were expected to act. I know that pack artillery have not been well reported on, but in my humble opinion it is largely because of the fact that they have not the right kind of pack horse and are not sufficiently mobile. If you are to have pack guns you do not want to have a gun on a horse which has to be led by a man on foot. That method is much too slow and you will not get your guns anywhere in time, except in mountainous country. You want to put the packs on Canadian light vanners. and have one man riding one horse and leading another. Then it is possible for artillery to follow the mounted troops in exactly the same way as machine gun and pack transport can follow them wherever they go.

One must remember that in the warfare of the future, whether a small war in a distant country or a big war nearer home, the use of roads and railways will be at a discount and may cease altogether. Every increase in numbers of the Air arm and every increase in its efficiency will make it more and more nearly impossible to use roads or railways by night or by day, such roads and railways being constantly subject to bombing. If the war is in a civilised country where there are metal roads, the enemy long-range guns will shell every road that is within range and it will be quite impossible to use any road as a means of transport. That was found to be the case in France. The Air Force will he constantly bombing roads and railways, and it will be almost impossible to create dumps either for ammunition or for food because of the heavy and continuous bombing by day and night. Therefore it would appear that the armies of the future will be smaller and much more mobile and, as in the middle ages, will have to rely on living on the country or getting supplies as best they can by air. If supplies have to be put on packs, the pack should not be so arranged that one man will lead one pack. It would be better to adopt the Australian scheme of pack transport, or that adopted in the East, where you have two men with 30 pack horses and a certain number of spare horses, all being driven along. The animals, after due training, all keep together, and you never lose one in such an arrangement with a good pack team.

There are a few notes I have made on the reorganisation of cavalry, and on them I would like to ask the Secretary of State some questions. New mechanised squadrons are to be supplied to each of the cavalry regiments at the expense of horse squadrons. Are the men of these mechanised squadrons still being taught ordinary cavalry training? Are they still taught to ride, to do training in reconnaisance, in inter-communication, outpost duties and in all the many branches of ordinary cavalry training? If not, and if they are merely made into machine gunners and mechanics, suppose that it happens that a cavalry force is required to operate in a country where there are marshes, forest or mountains, or in any place where track vehicles could not follow at the same pace, and suppose that the machine guns and transport had to be put on packs. Would these men be able to work their transport on packs? If not, there is the danger of a cavalry regiment being left with two squadrons and being deprived of its chief fire power just at the moment when it may be wanted. I am not quite certain of the value of the Vickers gun for cavalry regiments. It is excellent in trench warfare, as we found in France. It was useless in the South African War, nor was it of great value to mounted troops in Palestine. To manœuvre the Vickers gun about is not easy. It cannot be used for repetition fire, but relies principally on automatic fire, for which reason we found it easy to spot an enemy's Vickers gun and knock it out with artillery or automatic rifle fire. They are very slow in getting into action and in getting out of it.

It appears to me that in view of these objections and difficulties, the automatic rifle would be a better weapin. Repetition fire in open warfare is more effective and more economical with ammunition. Consequently the automatic rifle would probably give better results in the ordinary duties of the mounted troops. Suppose also that a cavalry force has to be swum across a river. The bridges have been blown up by the Air Force or a retiring rear guard. Your Vickers gun will be a very awkward thing to get over the river, and special rafts will be necessary. Any delay may cost the advanced guard the possibility of effecting the crossing in safety. On the other hand automatic rifles, because they are very much lighter, would be very much easier to transport.

Those are the several things that appear to be outstanding on these Votes. There is the further question of co-operation between mounted troops and tanks, especially in the manœuvres that are about to take place. Whether the value of special troops attached to tank units for ground reconnaissance and for protection by day as well as at night has been really recognised, and whether it would not be possible to have either cavalry or yeomanry trained for this work as mounted scouts, has to be decided. Perhaps there are present some hon. Members who served with divisional cavalry in France and they will know the difficulty that they had to undergo. The wretched cavalry regiment had to find men for every kind of duty. A troop was wanted as an escort to a convoy, or another troop to dig a well; the Divisional Commander wanted to go on reconnaissance and required a troop; a staff officer wanted a batman, and another staff officer wanted an orderly. For every blessed small task they always came down on the divisional cavalry to supply the men. The cavalry were always on outpost day and night and had to do fatigues and other duties at the same time. I suggest that with the introduction of the mechanical force we should, at any rate, remedy that difficulty by allotting to every tank battalion or unit a certain number of mounted troops to assist them in these various jobs, so that they also will not apply to the divisional cavalry! These are various points on which I would like my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to throw some light in his reply. I beg to thank the House for having listened patiently to a rather long and technical speech.

Mr. TINKER

I beg to support the Amendment of my hon. and gallant Friend. I want to deal with the reference which has been made to the cavalry. We heard of this controversy when the Estimates were introduced, and there were then definite sides taken on the subject. Members on the Government side wish to keep the cavalry; we on this side of the House wish to do away with them. The reply given by the Financial Secretary to the War Office was not quite as definite as I would have liked it to be. He stated that there were two strictly divergent views, and that the best thing for the War Office to do was to take the middle course. Therefore it was not intended to cut down the cavalry as quickly as I would like, nor did the War Office intend to maintain the cavalry as the other side would like. I do not think that attitude is altogether right. The Financial Secretary and the Secretary of State ought to realise that the time has come for a complete change in the methods of war. The mechanised part of an army is to play a greater part than ever before and greater attention should be paid to it. We need not go back to Napoleon for guidance, nor even to Hannibal. Although cavalry has played a part of great usefulness in the past, it is of no use at all now. I am expecting that the Secretary of State will not be influenced by men who have held positions in cavalry regiments. I am hoping that he will take a wider view of the question and build up on what he finds is the necessity to-day. I would draw the attention of the House to what the right hon. Gentleman said last year: Where in the past cavalry moved perhaps 20 miles ahead of an Army in order to search for the enemy, armoured cars will possibly be able to move more than 100 miles. That proves conclusively that the time has come to do away with cavalry. The right hon. Gentleman said further: For holding the enemy, these machines and others, such as mechanised machine gun units, will be able to circle round an adversary, and tanks, which are impervious to bullets, will have it in their power to hit and smash with far greater effect than the existing arms. That goes to show that the time has come when there is no use at all for cavalry. If we are to have economy in the Army Estimates, something has to be cut away, and there is only this one arm that can be cut away. We ask the Secretary of State to bear that fact in mind. Recent events point to what is happening. Here is a statement in a newspaper of yesterday from a special correspondent in Iraq: Great Britain's Air Force is now bearing the brunt of the battle. We have something like 100 fighting machines in the country, and they are being flown from early dawn till long after the sun descends over the burning desert. Reconnaissance patrols are now penetrating far into, Nejd country on the necessary operation of securing intelligence of forward movements of Wahabis. Forward air stations have been established at strategic points far in the desert along the whole length of Mesopotamia. Ten great Victoria double-engine bombing machines, capable of carrying enormous loads of supplies of water to outlying stations are standing by at Ur. Every available flying officer in the country is on duty, and in my air journey from Cairo I was accompanied by six officers recalled from the middle of leave from England. Four more arrived by air to-day. He is saying there that in Iraq the Air Force is all important.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

In what paper was that?

5.0 p.m.

Mr. TINKER

The "Daily Express" of yesterday. When I was speaking last time, I was challenged by hon. Members opposite because I said that the Cavalry was played out, and here is the proof of it. In view of that we want to impress on the Secretary of State that, when we are moving a reduction of 100 men, it is not for the purpose of doing away with the Army, but to make effective, the force that we have, to carry it on as economically as possible, and to draw attention to the various ways in which we think it may be done. Last year there was a reduction, but the Cavalry regiments did not fall very much. There was a reduction of only 55 men in an arm of the Service that ought to be cut down more quickly than any other. If there is to be no reduction in this direction, where is the reduction to take place? We ask seriously that the Secretary of State and his Department should give full consideration to this matter, and do what they can. I want the Army to be as efficient as possible, if fighting has got to take place. I am not one of those who say that we can do without an Army altogether; I believe that we must have an Army, but we do not want to keep an arm of the Service, which is of no use at all, simply because it is particularly attractive to some people. I hope the Secretary of State will take our action in urging this reduction in the best spirit; we do it because we want to cut away something which we think can be done, away with. The late Secretary of State for War, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ince (Mr. Walsh), last year made the remark that the horse should be relegated to the museum as far as its usefulness was concerned. He is a man who has had a period in the Army Council, and his opinion ought not to be turned away lightly. I share that opinion, because I feel confident that much economy can be effected in that direction.

Brigadier-General CLIFTON BROWN

I did not intend to say anything in this Debate, but the hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House has said that Cavalry are useless, and I must say a word about that. I do not think that he or the House realises how many leaders in modern times the Cavalry has provided in the Army. At the end of the South African War there were 70 columns, one-half of them commanded by Cavalry officers. In any war that we have had, Cavalry officers have come out on top. In the last War, the big leaders at the end were Cavalry officers—the late Earl Haig, Lord Byng, Lord Allenby and Sir Philip Chetwode. The Cavalry had far more than their proportionate share of the big leaders in the War, and they will have in future wars. It is not for me or the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken to judge what is necessary to make the Army the best in the world, and whether Cavalry are necessary. I leave it in the hands of the Army Council, who are in touch with what is necessary abroad. In countries like India you will find Field-Marshal Sir William Birdwood and others refusing to diminish their cavalry to any great extent, because it is necessary for the situation which they have to meet. The hon. Member quoted the case of Iraq. The Air Force, of course, at the present time, is the chief arm in that country, but there must be Cavalry even there. The Air Force when they come down must have the support of cavalry or of mounted troops. There are many in Iraq or on the northern outposts, for they are needed for protection during rest time. I do not say for a moment that we ought to increase our Cavalry, but we ought to be careful not to reduce it to such an extent that the Army will lose by it, as I am sure they would in many of the situations that occur in war.

All the time that I was in India 75,000 was the number of British troops in the Indian Army regarded as absolutely necessary. Since the Mutiny that was considered the minimum, but now the number has gone down to 68,000. My right hon. Friend the Secretary for Stare for War has just come back from India, and he knows the dangers, not only on the frontier but internally, and I hope that the Indian authorities are in agreement with the reduction of British troops in the Indian Army to this comparatively small number. I was told by an Indian Army officer last year that, if you happened to have a Cavalry regiment in the plains during the hot weather, it was far more effective to send some British troops where trouble might be going on, for a native cavalry regiment could not be used to stop a row between Hindus. British troops are worth more in that country than a brigade of native troops to stop bloodshed, for they have the power, as they have in Germany or wherever they may be quartered, of being trusted by those among whom they live. I hope that matter will be carefully considered.

I want to ask one other question, which was put by the hon. and gallant Gentleman who moved the Amendment. What does the right hon. Gentleman intend to do with the remount depots, and have the War Office thought out how many remounts they want? Is it not about time that they should make up their mind how many cavalry regiments they are going to keep mounted, and how this is going to effect the remount depots? The War Office have done very little for the remount depots, and the housing in some cases is a disgrace. If they are not to have mounted troops, they may be able to make some reduction there. Lastly, I want to ask about the conversion of two cavalry regiments into armoured car regiments. In the Army Debate the other day, I inquired of the Secretary of State which were the two regiments, and he asked me not to press him on the subject. A few days afterwards, it was in the papers that my old regiment was one of the two. I think that that information might have been given in Parliament before it was published in the papers, and as I did not press the point, at the right hon. Gentleman's own request, it was all the more reason why it should have been given to the House before it was allowed to get into the Press, and before the regiments themselves knew about it. They are to be armoured car regiments, and I should like to know what that means. How many armoured cars are they to have? I understand that the officers are still to have some of their horses, for a time at least. How are they to be organised? The organisation must have been arranged, otherwise it would have been quite wrong to demobolise the horses.

Mr. HARDIE

I am going to take no part as between the cavalry and other sections of the Forces, but when the hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke last was asking his question about horses being attached to the armoured car regiments, I wondered whether the Minister would be able to tell us if the horses have to be carried on these cars, or are they to be kept for dragging the cars when they break down? I cannot see what is going to be the use of horses unless it be for some expected process of dragging or carrying something. If the horses are not to be carried in the cars, at what distance are they to be from the cars, for their own safety, and who has to look after the horses? Are they to be a special detachment, apart from those engaged in the work of conducting the cars?

The question of the mechanisation of the Army has led me to consider some important points. I regret that the gifts of knowledge, which have been given to the human race, should ever be applied in the foul way that they are being applied by nations for the destruction of human life, and it is from that point of view that I wish to put some questions, in the interests of those, who by choice or compulsion, take up this class of work, as it is called—a misnomer, in my opinion. I wonder if the right hon. Gentleman has ever thought out this question, and whether he will be able to give me an answer. The covered car is driven by petrol. We know what takes place in the ordinary car in the open with certain kinds of that which is sold as petrol, but, which is not petrol. Those who use petrol know that, when there is an escape by evaporation, it does not go up into the air, but down, and I would like to know what protection there is for the men inside the car. Of course, I shall be told that everything will be made as secure as possible, but the vibration in a tank is such that the most skilled engineer would find it difficult to make everything proof against unexpected vibration or shock. Have any ideas been put forward for the protection of the men operating the tanks? I should think that if those who want to kill other men could direct those deadly fumes wherever they wished, they would use them as part of their forces for murder; but what I want to know is whether any protection is provided for the men working in the armoured cars?

My second point is whether any special precautions are being taken over the quality of the petrol used in these armoured cars. As an individual I have been putting questions to the Home Secretary; I have been fobbed off when speaking of the addition of certain substances to petrol. I notice in this House that when an hon. Members starts a subject, especially if it be of a technical nature. hon. Members at first laugh and sneer at it, but when they have lived a few weeks longer and find that it is a reality they are all like parrots, trying to say the same thing, not because they know anything about it but because they are all anxious to steal the plot. This never disturbs anyone who knows his subject, but only disturbs those who do not know it. In my second question I am asking whether precautions are being taken against the addition of, say, "tetra." Have the War Department made investigations into the effects of these fumes of which I am speaking?

During the consideration of the Navy Estimates it was shown that consumption attacked men owing to the conditions under which they were compelled to live, and I shall be dealing with that point when those Estimates come up again. I may be told that whereas the naval man has no choice in the matter of where he lives, being confined to his ship, that men in an armoured car crew will have some chance to recruit in the fresh air even if a leakage of petrol does take place. I wish to inform those who may not know it that anyone who gets even the smallest dose of tetra-ethyl, no matter how small it may be, does not lose it, and that if he gets a second dose it is an addition to the one he has already got, because this substance is cumulative in its effects. If you got one dose to-day and another dose a year or two afterwards, the effects of the second one would be added to the other, so that any idea which may be passing through the minds of hon. Members opposite as to tank men recuperating in the fresh air is not to the point. If this subject has not been investigated by the War Department I should like to be told so frankly, and perhaps they might indicate also whether they intend to inquire into it or not, because I wish to secure the protection of the individual in this mechanisation of the Army.

When we were dealing with the Air Estimates a question arose of the effect of shells dropped on to a given object from a certain height. I wish to know whether those concerned with the design of tanks have investigated the best materials for the shell back, as I would call it—the covering of the back of the tank? Have any experiments been made with various metals, on the lines of what will happen in ordinary warfare, by dropping high explosives on them from a good height? In dealing with the mechanised part of the Army we are inclined to forget the human part. I have just spent two hours in writing letters to men who were broken in the last War, and here we are to-day, in the British House of Commons, with 23 or 24 hon. Members present, dealing with what is a cause of great destruction of men's lives. It seems to me to be an inhuman type of mind that can go coolly on with the consideration of means for the further destruction of human life while at the same time disregarding the broken men who are making appeals to us to-day by every post. I hope the Minister will try to answer these questions and will realise that a plea coming from one who is against War is put forward in all sincerity, in order to secure the protection of individuals. If we are to have the mechanisation of the Army we ought not to adopt methods which put human life last and the machine first. It is all very well to talk of the efficiency of the tank, and to tell us what horse-power it can develop and to what angle it can rise or fall—that is all very well from the mechanical side, but I am pleading for the human side. What has been the experience of the men in some of the tanks? What has happened to their nervous systems? All these points must be considered if we can claim to be members of a Christian nation, not to speak of being civilised, and I hope the Minister will be able to give us some reply on these points.

Mr. LAWSON

We are discussing today the question of voting something like £20,000,000 and ultimately, I believe, about £41,000,000. I have been thinking while this discussion has been going on that we are considering this expenditure of £41,000,000 in almost a cloistered atmosphere. As one who has faithfully tried to read through the 300 pages or so explaining all the items which go to make up this figure, as one who has gone through the Estimates Vote by Vote, page by page and item by item, I have been struck not so much by the colossal amount of money which is to be spent on the war machine as by the efficiency of the organisation for the perfection of that machine, and the calm, patient, concentrated, deadly purpose which is characteristic of all war machines in the world to-day. I know that I should not be allowed to discuss policy and the party to which I belong have very definitely made up their minds to a policy of a reduction of armaments by international agreement, but I think I speak the mind of the party when I say that while we will give all the help we can towards improving the efficiency of the Army in the world as it is we are far more concerned about world disarmament than about the mechanisation of the cavalry.

Having said this much, I wish to support the Amendment which has been moved by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Ken-worthy), and also to ask the right hon. Gentleman if he can tell us something about the Army on the Rhine, which my hon. and gallant Friend described as "the lost legion." Neither in the Estimates nor in the Army Report have we very much information about the Army on the Rhine. My hon. and gallant Friend paid a well-merited tribute to the conduct of the men there under difficult circumstances. When we recollect that they have been there—at least the Army has been there, with changes in the individuals composing it—for something like 10 years, and when we understand that there have been practically no complaints, at any rate very few, it is a great tribute not only to the conduct of the men of our forces, but is a tribute to human nature, as showing how people can be friendly in difficult circumstances and under conditions which are the result of a great war. Cannot the right hon. Gentleman give the House some information which will show that the Army is not going to stay there indefinitely? They have been there now for 10 years and they are costing the country money. The country cannot afford a great part of the money spent upon other items in these Estimates, apart from this expenditure in a direction which appears to be scarcely necessary now.

I have also a question to ask with reference to Vote 10. I raised this question of the reorganisation of the Department when the Estimates were previously before us. I said then that I spoke with diffidence about the allocation of duties and all the effects which would follow from the reorganisation. I also said that anyone who spoke about the results of that reorganisation must step very carefully, because it might have quite unexpected results. The House will remember that certain duties which were under the Quartermaster-General have been handed over to the Master-General of the Ordnance, and certain duties carried out by the Master-General of the Ordnance have been handed over to the Quartermaster-General. The Minister for War did not seem very sure about this process. We have had the White Paper telling us exactly how and why this took place and this is what it states: On 26th November, 1926, the Army Council formulated some provisional decisions for the purpose of being advised by a Committee, representing the departments concerned, as to the nature and extent of the alterations in the existing organisation which would result. The Committee, which reported in May, 1927, failed to reach a complete agreement. The Secretary of State referred this Report to the Military Members of the Army Council and the Permanent Under-Secretary, and received their advice in June, 1927. He approved the changes they advised, and his decision was recorded at a meeting of the Army Council in June, 1927. It cannot, therefore, be said that any change has been made hastily or without due consideration. What happened was that the Army Committee set up by the Army Council could not agree. The Quartermaster-General and the Master-General of the Ordnance certainly could not agree. The right hon. Gentleman then referred the matter to two of the military members of the Army Council and the Permanent Secretary. In effect the right hon. Gentleman says, "I do not know very much about this matter, but I leave it to you to settle by a majority." The result was that the Quartermaster-General had works, buildings and lands under his charge. The Quartermaster-General had also to provide supplies, road transport, food and remounts. That means that he has to provide food, housing, barracks and other accommodation, and he has to arrange for the transport of the troops and the rest of it and then he is handed over the works, buildings and fortifications. The result is that the Quartermaster-General not only has to deal with the quartering, movements and supplies, but he has actually to deal with submarine communications as well as fortifications. He has also to look after the buildings for research and the ordnance buildings in which those who are responsible to the Master-General of the Ordnance are going to do the work of carrying out designs for the provision of all kinds of mechanical arrangements which are necessary for army purposes.

I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he intends those arrangements to be permanent? Does he intend that the Quartermaster-General should actually be responsible for fortifications, more especially such great fortifications as those at Singapore? Has he to be permanently responsible for submarine communications, and the re-organisation and renewal of submarine communications? is that arrangement to be permanent? On the other hand, the Master-General of the Ordnance not only has to supply tanks and guns for the offensive side of the needs of the Army, but he is also responsible for the clothing of the troops. I think the Secretary of State for War must agree that that can only be a kind of makeshift arrangement, and that it cannot remain for any length of time. I am not going into the further question of the possible appointment of a deputy Master-General of the Ordnance in case of active operations. There are those, who are in a better position than I am to judge in these matters, who question the wisdom of that action. Certainly it was laid down very definitely by one of the most famous committees that have ever dealt with War Office organisations, the Esher Committee, that operations should not be bothered in time of war with questions relating to administration.

I am not going to deal with that question except to say that there is a considerable body of opinion which believes that what is now being done is a great mistake, and this was definitely emphasised at the time by the Esher Committee as the cause of many of our misfortunes in the time of test and trial. Whether we consider the question of organisation or the ultimate effects of that organisation in a time of conflict, it does seem to me that if the right hon. Gentleman could not trust himself to decide upon a matter of this kind, there is good ground for holding an inquiry similar to the Commission which examined this question before. In any case, there is certainly some necessity to reconsider the duties of the Quartermaster General, as compared with the duties of the Master-General of the Ordnance.

I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question about the cost of the camp at Catterick. We have an item of £140,000 in this financial year for accommodation at Catterick. I understand that the original estimate for the accommodation of troops at Catterick was something under £1,000,000. After this the housing of the troops in this new command was reconsidered, and it was discovered that the probable cost would be about £3,000,000 to house the troops at Catterick in new accommodation. It was afterwards decided that the old huts should be reconditioned, and the cost of that amounted to £1,000,000. The total estimate is £1,438,000, and I should like to ask the Secretary for War how much the reconditioning of the accommodation for the troops is to cost? It is now costing the nation a very large sum; in fact, I regard the cost as a colossal sum of money. The amount of this item has been increasing from time to time, and we ought to know what is going to be the ultimate cost of the reconditioning of the huts in this camp.

Is the right hon. Gentleman quite satisfied in his own mind that this reconditioning of the huts will last for any length of time, and will prove satsifactory for permanent accommodation purposes? There have been rumours to the effect that this accommodation will not last for any length of time, and that it is not ideal. I know that some of the housing accommodation there was passing comfortable after the reconditioning took place, but I wish to know what is to be the total cost. I also wish to refer to the question of vocational training which used to take place at Catterick. The right hon. Gentleman says that the cost to the average ranker is not at all prohibitive, but I am not so sure about that. Neither the Army Council nor this House would desire that anything should be done to interfere with the successful and necessary training in this new camp, where there are now something like 200 men, most of them non-commissioned officers.

I admit that the Army has done one very good piece of work for its men in the realm of education and vocational training, and I am sure this work would recommend itself to anyone who has seriously considered this question of the training of the men. I should say that by far the most efficient training centre in this country is that which at first was at Catterick, but which has now been transferred to Chisledon. I hope the restrictions which have been placed upon that training centre and the standards which have been settled are not going to interfere with efficient training in that camp. Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether this 7s. 6d., which has been laid down as a training fee, is to be set aside for the purpose of encouraging rankers to come in under this scheme? At Chisledon there are facilities for training 1,000 men at a time when many men are being turned out of the Army. My opinion is that we should be training as many men as possible in those camps in order that they may have an opportunity of becoming efficient and adaptable workmen, so as to fit themselves once more for civilian duties.

The Army has been called a blind-alley occupation. Men enlist for five years, or seven years, or whatever the period may be. They are isolated from the rest of the community; they lose touch with the ordinary civilian occupations, and, when they have finished their service, they certainly stand less chance than the average man of getting work in the ordinary industrial field. Some enlightened persons in the Army set out to remedy that, and they did first-class work. I am really afraid that the new arrangements at Chisledon are going to interfere with the efficient training of men, and certainly they are affecting the number of men that are being taken into that camp for that purpose. I should like the right hon. Gentleman, on this occasion, to take seriously, not only this question of training at Chisledon, but also the question of reorganisation, and the duties which have been allotted to the Quartermaster-General and the Master-General of the Ordnance. I repeat that, while we on this side of the House are certainly not enthusiastic about war—and I do not believe that anyone in the House at all is—and while we do not welcome having to pass Votes of this kind, yet, when we do vote this money, we at any rate want to see that the best possible use is made of it. I repeat what I said at the beginning, that all that we can wish is that these Estimates, and the Estimates of the armies and navies of the world, could be read calmly by every citizen, so that he might see, with cumulative effect upon his mind, the deadly purpose that is revealed behind them, everyone doing the best he can to realise the effect, not only of the mobilisation of men, but of the mobilisation of money and brains to one end. The result of that would be that not only would this reduction in the number of men be agreed to, but the world would hasten on its plans and the realisation of its desires for disarmament.

Mr. MARDY JONES

I notice, from the Vote that is now under consideration, that the War Office propose to spend on the Singapore defence forces a total sum of £685,000, the first £30,000 of which is to be spent by the 31st March of this year, and a further£132,000 by the end of the next financial year. I should like to know from the Secretary of State for War what part of this constructional work is going to be completed within the next two or three years, and over what total period the total sum will be spread. I did not gather, from the right hon. Gentleman's reply to a question about the Singapore base this afternoon, whether this work is being done by a Government Department or by contractors, nor did I gather from his reply what are the labour conditions of the men employed. It seems to me to be very important that the War Office should be able to assure us this evening that the Britishers, at any rate, who are out there on that work to-day, are not only provided with adequate housing conditions as we understand them in this country, but that extra provision is made for them in that tropical climate. What are the provisions for their health and comfort in regard to the type of houses and bungalows?

Then I wish to know whether the War Office is making any special provision in the way of social amenities for these men. Singapore and its defences are in a very lonely spot. These men are living and working under very difficult conditions of climate, and I want to know why it is that the Government have neglected the question of social amenities for these people who are in that part of the world. I also wish to know whether it is intended that any portion of this total sum of £685,000 shall be spent on the protection of the present causeway which links up the island of Singapore with the State of Johore on the mainland of the Malay Peninsula. This causeway is the only connecting link between Singapore and the mainland for railway and road transport. Is the Secretary of State for War aware that a number of Japanese have bought up large tracts of land in the State of Johore, which command a view of the batteries of these Singapore defences? Is he aware that these Japanese planters, as they are called, happen to have bought this land at a point which might be useful from a military point of view?

The whole of Malaya is well adapted for rubber plantation work, and it is rather curious that these few Japanese firms should have bought these particular sites which command the battery defences of Singapore; and I think it is of the utmost importance, if we are to spend countless millions of money upon this naval base and upon military defences for that base, that we should make absolutely sure that the money is not idly spent. I wish to ask who is responsible—whether it is the right hon. Gentleman's Department or some other Department, or whether, in their joint consultations, they are all jointly responsible for the stupidity of building this causeway as it now is, blocking up the channel at this point and making impossible, if anyone should blow up the causeway, the transport of troops from the island of Singapore to the mainland or vice versa. We have heard a great deal from this Government about the need for this Singapore base and for land defences for it. Before it is completed, it will have cost this country a very sorry sum of money, and there are many traders and commercial men in Singapore today who are getting very anxious about this mad adventure. It is very doubtful indeed whether local opinion on the spot really strongly supports it at all. I think it is the duty of the Secretary of State for War to clear up these, points, because they are of very great importance to us in regard to this question of Singapore.

The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Sir Laming Worthington-Evans)

I think that I have about enough questions from hon. Members to take a little time in replying, and that I had better intervene now. The hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) opened this Debate by moving a reduction of 100 men. He complained that there was a force still in Wiesbaden, and that it was either not adequate as a force or, if it were adequate as a force, that it was so large that he desired it to be reduced. He gave us a good deal of good-humoured chaff about the constitution of the force —about 17 remount officers being out there buying German horses upon which to mount British cavalry. That was one of his suggestions. I do not blame him in the least, but he was looking at the wrong page of the Estimates. He was reading a note on page 47, and, if he will read that note again, he will see that the 17 remount officers are not on the Rhine, but in England. Actually there is one remount officer on the Rhine, and he is being withdrawn on the 31st March of this year. The actual reason, therefore, put forward by the hon. and gallant Gentleman for reducing this Vote by 100 men is not a valid one, but that, no doubt, will not prevent him from voting for the reduction and being supported by his hon. Friends.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not wish to misrepresent me, but was he paying so little attention to my poor speech that he thought that my only ground of complaint was in regard to the 17 remount officers? Does he not know that my whole objection is to having this army there at all 10 years after the War?

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

I was only giving that as one of the difficulties that, I appreciate, the hon. and gallant Gentleman has in going through these Estimates without a very much longer study than he, with his many other occupations, can possibly give to them. He asked why there should be this army on the Rhine at all. It is a part of the international force which is there under the Treaty with which the War terminated, and the policy of keeping an army there is one which we cannot discuss on this occasion. The hon. and gallant Gentleman is entitled to say that it is too expensive, or is not efficient, or to try to get its composition reconsidered, but I am afraid that the policy of keeping an international force there is a matter which we cannot discuss to-day. The hon. and gallant Gentleman also spoke of the number of the force, and I want to make a correction in regard to that, because otherwise it might appear that I agree with him. He said, quoting from page 29 of the Estimates, that there were 7,252, but again he omitted to read quite correctly the footnote, which would have warned him that that figure includes all the recruits belonging to the particular regiments that are on the Rhine, the recruits being at home in the depots. Therefore, the actual figures that the hon. and gallant Gentleman would have found on the page which I gave him in answer to a question to-day, namely, page 294, show that the establishment is 6,328, and that includes a small detachment of 93 on the Saar. That is the number, and by agreement the British Army on the Rhine has been reduced within the last year by over 1,000. Excluding the Saar, the actual establishment now is 6,250, and, as a matter of fact, we are a few hundreds under establishment at this moment. The hon. and gallant Gentleman asked whether these troops were in barracks, and whether their comfort was looked after. They are in barracks. I myself visited them in July or August last—

Mr. MARDY JONES

Is that a comfort?

6.0 p.m.

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

It was a comfort to me to realise that they were properly treated, and I thought it was part of my duty to visit them. They are in barracks, and, taking it all round, they are not badly housed or badly looked after. All the conditions are not ideal. Their training conditions are not the best. If there were more room and less agriculture it would be more possible to have training. Training facilities are not what I could wish, but nevertheless both divisional training and collective training were carried out last autumn. If they were in England, their training would, no doubt, be more easily arranged. On the whole, the conditions are not so bad that the hon. and gallant Gentleman need fear the Army is deteriorating. I should like to join with him in his tribute to their conduct. It is remarkable, not only how well they behaved—because that is not remarkable—but how well they are liked by those with whom they come into contact. They are, no doubt, not unwelcome at this moment in the position that they occupy.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

Why is it necessary for a hotel to be used for general headquarters for this little army?

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

The hon. Member also called attention to the staff. It is not like a staff at home. A staff in one of the commands at home with which he was comparing them is a self-contained staff, dealing, it is true, with the War Office, but having no allies to deal with. On the Rhine the army has a great many duties to carry out which are not carried out by a staff at home. They have to act in concert with the French and Belgians, and they have, for example, a good deal of extra work in connection with billeting or the requisitioning of their requirements. All of that has to be done with great care and by experienced officers if friction is to be avoided. I have looked into the question of staff, because, without understanding what the duties of the staff are, it looks heavy, but, having regard to the duties they have to carry out, I am satisfied that it cannot be released. The hon. and gallant Gentleman says: Why take a hotel for headquarters? There are not many large buildings available for headquarters, and there is nothing so uneconomical as to have your staff spread about in small buildings at widely-separated distances. It is far better to have them concentrated and the work more economically and efficiently done.

With regard to Singapore, again I am only entitled to discuss the expenditure that falls on the Army Votes. I cannot accept the invitation of the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Mr. Mardy Jones), and begin to discuss the whole question whether or not we ought to be there or whether we should have a fortified base there or not, but I can tell him the total expenditure that will fall upon the Army Vote is £685,000, and this year about £132,000 is to be spent. That expenditure is under the control of the local general officer commanding. When I am asked details about the number of civilians employed, I cannot possibly be expected to know. As to the rate of wage and the conditions of employment, again I cannot say, except that the general instructions are that labour is to be employed in these circumstances in accordance with the fair local market rate, and I have not the least doubt that general instruction is being carried out.

Mr. MARDY JONES

There are a number of British employed on this constructional work. They are living under tropical conditions, away from all social amenities. Surely the right hon. Gentleman could give us an assurance that special provision is made for these people under these exceptional circumstances, that they are not only well paid, but that in their leisure time, when the day's work is done, there is something to relieve their monotony in a strange land, away from home surroundings.

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

That is too all-embracing an assurance. I cannot tell how they employ their leisure time. I can only say that they are free men. They are not there under compulsion. Presumably, like everyone else who takes up employment, they consider the pay that is going to be offered and the conditions under which they are going to be employed and make up their minds whether or not they will accept the employment. I could not give more information without notice, but, as the question has been raised, I will ascertain what the general conditions are.

The hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Kelly) asked about Pimlico and why we had turned warehousemen into porters? The reason is that the work they do is porters' work. He asked under what conditions they were employed? They are employed under the fair wage conditions, and those conditions, of course, are binding upon all Departments of State, and they are observed at Pimlico. The hon. Member complained of the housing at Didcot. We are providing in these Estimates for £25,000, being part of a total of £75,000, which is intended to give housing for 105 civilians. These are payments which are being made out of the Army Votes. I know because, as far as I have been able, I have helped a housing scheme which is being carried out not by Army Votes I am as anxious as the hon. Member to see that our employes at Didcot are well housed and at reasonable rents and within a reasonable distance of their employment. I know very well that for some years past they have been suffering the greatest inconvenience, having to come long distances and to pay high rents for their indifferent houses, and so far as it has been possible without taking upon the Army Votes the whole burden of housing, which I cannot do, I have done all that I can to help them. I am asked why we are spending £25,000 this year at Feltham? We are doing that, because we are remodelling existing buildings for the Royal Amy Service Corps repair shops, which have been concentrated for some time at Feltham. I was asked, also, why compassionate gratuities were lower? I am glad that they are lower. The reason is because there will be fewer discharges.

My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Southampton (Lord Apsley) gave us, as he frequently does, a welcome addition to our knowledge, because he put very searching questions which no one to-day can possibly answer. I can, however, say that the general staff are studying a great many of these questions, and for that purpose an experimental armoured force was operating last year and will operate again this year. He asked whether the Third Battalion of tanks would have 52 tanks. That is the present intention. He raised a very interesting speculative question whether it would not be better, instead of putting these tanks on chassis, to put them on something that would carry artillery of various calibres. That is exactly one of the questions that is being considered, and I hope an answer will be found. I do not think he need be afraid that the Tank Corps would run amok with the Vickers tank. They are not pinning their faith upon the tank for shock tactics to replace the shock tactics of cavalry. That is not the conception that we have developed of the tank and the mechanised force.

I was asked also whether the light batteries were pack or mechanised. They are pack, and they will remain pack for the present. I am asked; Why should not the Royal Horse Artillery be re-armed? Why keep the 13-pounder? Why not find them a better gun? That is largely a question of money. The 13-pounder is waiting for the moment, but within a not-too-longtime we shall he able to re-arm when the money becomes available. The hon. and gallant Gentleman wished to know whether the men of the Cavalry Machine Gun Squadron were being trained as cavalrymen—and he explained what he meant by training as cavalrymen—or being used as mechanics. No, they are being used as cavalry, and they are being sorted out after they have been trained as cavalrymen, and, should they be in a country where vehicles could not carry machine guns, and animals had to do so, they will be capable of functioning under those circumstances. My hon. and gallant Friend also suggested that we should replace the Vickers gun by an automatic rifle. An automatic rifle is a thing we have been searching for for a considerable time, and I rather hope that we have got it. I do not want to say that positively, and I do not at the moment see where the money is coming from, but we are working along on those lines. He complained that during the War a mere squadron of cavalry alloted to a division was insufficient. Our present plans, which I explained in Committee, permit of a regiment being allotted to each division instead of a squadron, and I hope that will be found to be effective.

Then my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newbury (Brigadier-General Brown) called attention to the reduction of British troops in India, but he did not get the figures quite right. They are 64,040—not so many as he mentioned. He hoped that the Indian authorities were satisfied with the reduction I had made. In that respect, the British Army is the servant of India. India is the paying authority. She pays the price and calls the tune, and the reduction of the British Army in India was not a voluntary reduction by the authorities at the War Office, but was asked for by India in order to relieve the finances of India. I would willingly have continued to have the infantry in its old establishment. I should have preferred it to the new establishment, but, of course, it was for the Indian authorities to decide.

Then he asked me what is to be the organisation of the 11th Hussars and 12th Lancers, and he complained that the fact that those two regiments had been selected was disclosed in the Press before it was announced in the House. He was probably not present when I answered a question on that subject, to which I would refer him. It was not at my wish that there was any public disclosure before I could state the facts in the House. It was unauthorised and incorrect. I cannot control the papers. They no doubt heard gossip. They were very nearly right but not quite right, and I very much regret that the 12th Lancers had only just got the official despatch, or perhaps had not received it, at the time that it was disclosed in the Press. It was not really my fault. I was trying to do the exact opposite. The two cavalry regiments which are being mounted on armoured cars are to be three squadrons of 34 armoured cars. During this year, these Estimates provide for the regiment at home having 34 armoured cars, the regiment in, Egypt—that is the 12th Lancers—having 11 armoured cars only, so that one squadron shall be mounted on armoured cars and the mounts of the other squadrons will be changed in succeeding years. I cannot do it in Egypt completely this year.

I think I have dealt with everything except the points raised by the hon. Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. Lawson). He really raised two major questions—the question of vocational training and the question of alterations in the duties of the Quartermaster-General and the Master-General of the Ordnance. Let me deal with the last one first. Fortunately, he did not re-open the whole question, but dealt with only a portion of it. He wanted to know why the buildings should now be transferred to the Quartermaster-General. There are some ragged ends, as there always are in an alteration in an organisation, and then it comes to a question of choice of what you think is best on the whole. Let me explain what the proposition was. We had internal combustion engines which were increasing and which are going to increase in number. As the old organisation was, those that were mounted on chassis which ran on wheels were under the Quartermaster-General, and those that were mounted on chassis that went on tracks were under the Master-General of the Ordnance. The tracks became semi-tracks and the wheeled vehicles became at times wheeled vehicles, and sometimes tracked vehicles as invention had made them interchangeable, and the confusion between the two classes—the one allocated to the Quartermaster-General, and the other allocated to the Master of the Ordnance—was supreme, and something had to be done. Moreover, the real reason was obviously the internal combustion engine and not the horse; that was the motive power in the field. Unless you are to have duplication in repairs, in design, in research, in the two separate departments, there had to be an amalgamation. I have amalgamated, and I have amalgamated with the Master-General of the Ordnance. But that means throwing a great deal of extra work on the Master-General of the Ordance. It means that all factories, including the clothing factory, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, come under the Quartermaster-General.

Was there some duty which the Quartermaster-General was doing which had been thrown upon him in the past which could have been transferred to the Quartermaster-General? There was. The Quartermaster-General was responsible for quartering, for finding quarters, and we have made him now responsible for building quarters. The hon. Member says, "Yes, but he is now going to build places which the Master-General of the Ordnance is going to use." Yes, because I do not want two building departments. I want one, and I put that one building department under the Quartermaster-General. If the hon. Gentleman comes to think about it, he will find that there is a real reason for the alteration which has been made, and the alteration is a permanent alteration, although I will not say that ragged ends here and there cannot be, by experience, improved upon and the organisation made a little cleaner in the future. It may be so, and I shall be the last to put any obstacle in the way of that.

I will now deal with the question of vocational training centres, because I think all sides of the House realise that it is the duty of whatever Government are in power to do their best to bring back to civil life the men they employ while they are young and in the Army. It is quite true we take young men at a time when they might otherwise be learning a trade, and we return them to civil life at a time, possibly, when it is too late to learn a trade, and it is up to the State to see that those men do not suffer more than is inevitable. All the time I have been Secretary of State for War, I have been increasing and not decreasing the amount of vocational training which has been given. The hon. Member seemed to think that it had been decreased this year. He is quite wrong. Actually last year the numbers in training went up from 1,050 to 1,440. The alteration from Catterick to Chisledon has meant that at Chisledon there can be trained 1,200 people, and it is a very large increase—not all in agriculture, but in other trades as well.

Mr. LAWSON

I realise that the right hon. Gentleman did a real service when he transferred the Catterick training centre to Chisledon, and I also appreciate what he did in that respect. But the point I made was that the preparation of the rankers and non-commissioned officers at Chisledon as against Catterick has actually decreased.

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

I do not quite understand what the hon. Gentleman's fear is. I said the places for non-commissioned officers and men at Chisledon are now 1,200, which is a great increase upon anything we have had before.

Mr. LAWSON

There are not 1,200 men there. There are only about 290 at the outside.

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

No, that is on agriculture. The hon. Gentleman is now thinking of the agricultural figures. I have the agricultural figures. They have also gone up. I am not quite sure what the exact figure is; it is on page 108 of the Army Estimates, and the numbers that can be trained in agriculture are certainly more. On page 108 it says: The full scheme provides for the following numbers to be trained annually; Chisledon, 1,200; Hounslow, 750; Aldershot, 440. Those are the total numbers, and the change from Catterick to Chisledon has enabled us to increase those numbers. Last year showed an increase on the previous year, and this year, I hope, will show an increase on last year. Of course, I would wish that we could train or give training or offer training to a great many more. But there, again, it is a question of money. When the hon. Gentleman calls attention to the fact that the fee is now 7s. 6d., I would remind him that that 7s. 6d. comes into the Estimates as an Appropriation-in-Aid, and it enables us to have more men under training without a greater expense to the State, because they are paying a large proportion of their own training fees. I believe that they appreciate it. I believe that what is being done is as much as can be done at present. I would like to increase it, and whenever I get the chance, especially if I get the money, I will increase it. He may be quite sure of this, that there is no one in the War Office who is not sympathetic towards this movement, and there is no one who will not do everything he can to spread it.

Mr. LAWSON

I am afraid that a wrong impression may be given by the right hon. Gentleman. I asked a question quite recently about the numbers being trained, and I think it will be found that the actual number being trained is round about 290. It is true that the Note says that the full scheme provides for 1,200 being trained annually at Chisledon, but I think it will be creating a wrong impression altogether —I am sure the right hon. Gentleman is not doing that consciously—if he leads the House to believe that 1,200 men are being trained, when actually only 290 are being trained.

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

I really want to clear up this matter. There were 1,440 last year, and it was an increase from 1,050 the year before. That is my first statement. Last year was greater than the year before. My second statement is, that the scheme will be in full operation this year, and when it is in full operation there will be room for 1,200 at Chisledon, 750 I think it was at Hounslow, and so on—the figures I gave just now. Last year—if he will look at the Estimates—I called attention to the fact that we were changing from Catterick to Chisledon, and I told the House then, that I only took money for the Chisledon scheme for six months, because

it was only then getting into operation. it is extending now, and when it is full it has 1,200 men.

Mr. HARDIE

May I ask if there is to be any reply to the question I put with regard to the safety of human life? I am not asking the question for myself. I am simply asking for information in order to try to save the lives of some people. It does not matter whether the right hon. Gentleman replies or not, but if I cannot get an answer now, I shall endeavour later on.

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

I did not intentionally refuse to answer the hon. Gentleman. I will answer him. We do not use "Ethyl" at all.

Mr. HARDIE

That is what I asked.

Sir L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS

We do not use it, and that is my answer. We have an experimental depot at Woolwich which is constantly experimenting with a view to finding means of saving human life, and finding methods which case our own people and at the same time improve their defence.

Question put, "That '153,500' stand part of the Resolution."

The House divided: Ayes, 222; Noes, 129.

Division No. 49.] AYES. [6.29 p.m.
Acland-Troyte, Lieut.-Colonel Caine, Gordon Hall Elliot, Captain Walter E.
Agg-Gardner, Rt. Hon. Sir James T. Campbell, E. T. England, Colonel A.
Alnsworth, Major Charles Carver, Major W. H. Ersklne, Lord (Somerset, Weston-s.-M.)
Albery, Irving James Cautley, Sir Henry S. Everard, W. Lindsay
Alexander, E. E. (Leyton) Cazalet, Captain Victor A. Falle, Sir Bertram G.
Allen, J. Sandeman (L'pool, W. Derby) Cecil, Rt. Hon. Sir Evelyn (Aston) Finburgh, S.
Applin, Colonel R. V. K. Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. N. (Ladywood) Forestier-Walker, Sir L.
Apsley, Lord Chapman, Sir S. Forrest, W.
Astbury, Lieut.-Commander F. W. Charteris, Brigadler-General J. Fraser, Captain Ian
Astor, Maj. Hn. John j.(Kent,Dover) Christie, J. A. Gadle, Lieut.-Col. Anthony
Atkinson, C. Clarry, Reginald George Galbraith, J. F. W.
Balfour, George (Hampstead) Clayton, G. C. Ganzonl, Sir John
Barclay-Harvey, C. M. Cobb, Sir Cyril Gates, Percy
Beckett, Sir Gervase (Leeds, N.) Cohen, Major J. Brunel Gilmour, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir John
Bellairs, Commander Carlyon Cooper, A. Duff Goff, Sir Park
Benn, Sir A. S. (Plymouth, Drake) Cope, Major William Gower, Sir Robert
Bennett, A. J. Couper, J. B. Grace, John
Berry, Sir George Courthope, Colonel Sir G. L. Graham, Fergus (Cumberland, N.)
Bethel, A. Cowan, Sir Wm. Henry (Islington, N.) Grant, Sir J. A.
Birchall, Major J. Dearman Craig, Capt. Rt. Hon. C. C. (Antrim) Grenfell, Edward C. (City of London)
Bird, Sir R. B. (Wolverhampton, W.) Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H. Gretton, Colonel Rt. Hon. John
Blundell, F. N. Crooke, J. Smedley (Deritend) Grotrian, H. Brent
Bourne, Captain Robert Croft Crookshank, Col. C. de W. (Berwick) Guest, Capt. Rt Hon. F. E.(Bristol,N.)
Bowyer, Captain G. E. W. Crookshank, Cpt.H.(Lindsey,Galnabro) Hacking, Douglas H.
Briscoe, Richard George Curzon, Captain Viscount Hall, Capt. W. D' A. (Brecon & Rad.)
Brittain, Sir Harry Davidson, Rt. Hon. J. (Hertford) Hanbury, C.
Brocklebank, C. E. R. Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H. Harland, A.
Brooke, Brigadler-General C. R. I. Davies, Maj. Geo. F.(Somerset,Yeovll) Harrison, G. J. C.
Brown, Col. D. C. (N' th' l'd., Hexham) Davies, Sir Thomas (Cirencester) Hartington, Marquess of
Brown, Brig.-Gen.H.C.(Berks, Newb'y) Davies, Dr. Vernon Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)
Buchan, John Dawson, sir Philip Haslam, Henry C.
Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James Drewe, C. Headlam, Lieut.-Colonel C. M.
Burton, Colonel H. W. Eden, Captain Anthony Hendarson, Capt. R. R.(Oxf'd, Henley)
Butler, Sir Geoffrey Edmondson, Major A. J. Henn, Sir Sydney H.
Hennessy, Major Sir G. R. J. Mitchell, S. (Lanark, Lanark) Smith, R. W. (Aberd'n & Kinc'dine, C.)
Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford) Mitchell, W. Foot (Saffron Walden) Smithers, Waldron
Hills, Major John Waller Mitchell, Sir W. Lane (St eatham) Somerville, A. A. (Windsor)
Hilton, Cecil Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C. Spender-Clay, Colonel H.
Hoare, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. Sir S. J. G. Morrison, H. (Wilts, Salisbury) Stanley, Lieut.-Colonel Rt. Hon. G. F.
Hogg, Rt. Hon. Sir D.(St.Marylebone) Murchison, Sir Kenneth Stanley, Lord (Fylde)
Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard Nelson, Sir Frank Storry-Deans, R.
Holt, Captain H. P. Neville, Sir Reginald J. Stott, Lieut.-Colonel W. H
Hope, Capt. A. O. J. (Warw'k, Nun.) Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter) Stuart, Crichton-. Lord C.
Hope, Sir Harry (Forfar) Oakley, T. Styles, Captain H. Walter
Hopkins, J. W. W. O'Connor, T. J. (Bedford, Luton) Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser
Hopkinson, Sir A. (Eng. Universities) Oman, Sir Charles William C. Sugden, Sir Wilfrid
Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney,G.) Penny, Frederick George Thom, Lt.-Col. J. G, (Dumbarton)
Hudson, R. S. (Cumberl'nd, Whiteh'n) Percy, Lord Eustace (Hastings) Thompson, Luke (Sunderland)
Hume, Sir G. H. Perkins, Colonel E. K. Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, S.)
Hurd, Percy A. Peto, G. (Somerset, Frome) Titchfield, Major the Marquess of
Hurst, Gerald B. Pilcher, G. Tryon, Rt. Hon. George Clement
Inskip, Sir Thomas Walker H. Pilditch, Sir Philip Vaughan-Morgan, Col. K. P
King, Commodore Henry Douglas Power, Sir John Cecil Waddington, R.
Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement Pownall, Sir Assheton Wallace, Captain D. E.
Lamb, J. Q. Preston, William Ward, Lt.-Col. A. L.(Kingston-on-Hull)
Lloyd, Cyril E. (Dudley) Price, Major C. W. M. Warner Brigadier-General W. W.
Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green) Ralne, Sir Walter Waterhouse, Captain Charles
Loder, J. de V. Ramsden, E. Watson, Rt. Hon. W. (Carlisle)
Long, Major Eric Reid, D. D. (County Down) Wells, S. R.
Lougher, Lewis Remnant, Sir James White, Lieut.-Col Sir G. Dairymple
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh Vere Rentoul, G. S. Williams, A. M. (Cornwall, Northern)
Luce, Maj.-Gen. Sir Richard Harman Rhys, Hon. C. A. U. Williams, Com. C. (Devon, Torquay)
Lumley, L. R. Richardson, Sir P. W. (Sur'y, Ch'ts'y) Williams, Herbert G. (Reading)
MacAndrew Major Charles Glen Robinson, Sir T. (Lanes, Stretford) Wilson, Sir C. H. (Leeds, Central)
Macdonald, Capt. P. D. (I. of W.) Ropner, Major L. Wilson, R. R. (Stafford, Lichfield)
Macdonald, R. (Glasgow, Cathcart) Ruggles-Brise, Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Windsor-Clive, Lieut.-Colonel George
McLean, Major A. Russell, Alexander West (Tynemouth) Winterton, Rt. Hon. Earl
Macnaghten, Hon. Sir Malcolm Rye, F. G. Withers, John James
Macquisten, F. A. Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham) Wood, Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley
MacRobert, Alexander M. Samuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney) Woodcock, Colonel H. C.
Maitland, Sir Arthur D. steel Sandeman, N. Stewart Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L.
Marriott, Sir J. A. R. Sanders, Sir Robert A. Yerburgh, Major Robert D. T.
Meller, R. J. Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D.
Meyer, Sir Frank Shepperson, E. W. TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Milne, J. S. Wardlaw Skelton, A. N. Captain Margesson and Sir Victor Warrender.
NOES.
Adamson, Rt. Hon. W. (Fife, West) Greenall, T. Murnin, H.
Adamson, W. M. (Stall., Cannock) Greenwood, A. Nelson and Colne) Naylor, T. E.
Alexander, A. V. (Sheffield, Hillsbro') Griffith, F. Kingsley Oliver, George Harold
Ammon, Charles George Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool) Owen, Major G.
Baker, J. (Wolverhampton, Bilston) Groves, T. Palln, John Henry
Baker, Walter Grundy, T. W. Paling, W.
Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertiflery) Hall, F. (York, W. R., Normanton) Pethick-Lawrence, F. W.
Barnes, A. Hall, G. H. (Merthyr Tydvil) Ponsonby, Arthur
Barr, J. Hamilton, Sir R. (Orkney & Shetland) Potts, John S.
Batey, Joseph Hardie, George D. Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)
Bondfield, Margaret Hayday, Arthur Riley, Ben
Briant, Frank Hayes, John Henry Ritson, J.
Broad, F. A. Henderson, Right Hon. A. (Burnley) Rose, Frank H.
Bromfield, William Hirst, G. H. Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter
Bromley, J. Hirst, W. (Bradford, South) Salter, Dr. Alfred
Brown, Ernest (Lelth) Johnston, Thomas (Dundes) Scrymgeour, E.
Brown, James (Ayi and Bute) Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth) Scurr, John
Buxton, Rt. Hon. Noel Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly) Sexton, James
Cape. Thomas Jones, T. I. Mardy (Pontypridd) Shaw, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Preston)
Charleton, H. C. Kelly, W. T. Shiels, Dr. Drummond
Cluse, W. S. Kennedy, T. Short, Alfred (Wednesbury)
Clynes, Right Hon. John R. Kenworthy, Lt.-Com. Hon. Joseph M. Sitch, Charles H.
Compton, Joseph Kirkwood, D. Smith, Ben (Bermondsey, Rotherhithe)
Connolly, M. Lansbury, George Smith, H. B. Lees (Keighley)
Cove, W. G. Lawson, John James Smith, Rennle (Penistone)
Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities) Lee, F. Snell, Harry
Crawfurd, H. E. Lindley, F. W. Snowden, Rt. Hon. Philip
Dalton, Hugh Livingstone, A. M. Spoor, Rt. Hon. Benjamin Charles
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton) Lowth T. Stamford, T. W.
Day, Harry Lunn, William Stewart, J. (St. Rollox)
Dennison, R. MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. R. (Aberavon) Sutton, J. E.
Duncan, C. Mackinder, W. Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plaistow)
Dunnico, H. MacLaren, Andrew Tinker, John Joseph
Fenby, T. D. Malone, C. L' Estrange (N' thampton) Tomilnson, R. P.
Gardner, J. P. Maxton, James Townend, A. E.
Glbbins, Joseph Mitchell, E. Rosslyn (Paisley) Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. C. P.
Gosling, Harry Montague, Frederick Varley, Frank B.
Graham, Rt. Hon- Wm. (Edin., Cent.) Morrison, R. C. (Tottenham, N.) Viant, S. P.
Wallhead, Richard C. Welsh, J. C. Williams, T. (York, Don Valley)
Walsh, Rt. Hon. Stephen Westwood, J. Wilson,R. J. (Jarrow)
Watson, W. M. (Dunfermline) Wiggins, William Martin Wright, W.
Watts-Morgan, Lt.-Col. D. (Rhondda) Wilkinson, Ellen C.
Webb, Rt. Hon. Sidney Williams, C. P. (Denbigh, Wrexham) TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Wellock, Wilfred Williams, Dr. J. H. (Lianelly) Mr. Allen Parkinson and Mr. Whiteley.

First Resolution read a Second time.