HC Deb 03 August 1926 vol 198 cc2953-4

Lords Amendment:

In page 2, leave out lines 4 to 8, and insert Provided that where the applicant and the infant are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, it shall be lawful for the Court, if it thinks fit, to make the Order notwithstanding that the applicant is less than twenty-one years older than the infant.

Captain HACKING

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment. This is a purely drafting Amendment. There is no change made in the effect of the Clause.

Lords Amendment:

In page 2, line 26, after " infant " insert "either."

Captain HACKING

I beg to move, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

It was argued in the House of Commons by the hon. Member for Exeter (Sir Robert Newman) on the Report stage, that the Court ought to have somewhat wider power than the existing Clause gives to dispense with the consent of a putative father. It was suggested that the putative father (quite likely to be an undesirable person) would be in a position to refuse consent to the adoption on grounds, perhaps, merely of spite against the mother; or even to attempt to level blackmail by refusing his consent except for a consideration; and that provided he had been contributing regularly, however small an amount, the Court would be unable to overrule his refusal. The point was accepted, in substance, by the Government, and the Amendment now inserted (which has the concurrence of Mr. Justice Tomlin) gives the Court a wider discretion to dispense with the consent of a "person liable to contribute."

Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

Lords Amendment.:

In page 2, line 34, after "consent," insert or that the spouses have separated and are living apart, and that the separation is likely to be permanent.

Captain HACKING

I beg to move, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

Efforts were made in the House of Commons to secure an Amendment so as to allow a married person, definitely separated from his or her partner, to be able to adopt a child without an absolute necessity of obtaining the consent of the partner. Against this, it might be argued that separations are not always so permanent as they seem, and that if the Court were to overrule the wishes of the separated partner the effect might be either to put a final obstacle in the way of an otherwise possible reunion or to leave open a possibility that in the event of a re-union the welfare of the child might be prejudiced. The Government undertook, however, to consider the point; and the Amendment now inserted would give the Court discretion to dispense with the consent of the separated spouse if satisfied as to the probable permanence of the separation.