HC Deb 24 March 1925 vol 182 cc291-309
Mr. ARTHUR HENDERSON

Having taken part in the framing of the Protocol, and therefore being one of its authors, I willingly accept the responsibility of saying something in its defence in this Debate. The House is aware that the Protocol owes its origin to the action taken by the French and British delegations, headed by their respective Prime Minister, at the fifth Assembly of the League of Nations. For me to pretend that I am not seriously disappointed and perturbed at the course which events have taken with regard to the Protocol would be sheer affectation. Those of us who took part in the work at Geneva, work that was done in the interests of world peace, were entitled to expect that that work would have been considered of sufficient importance to receive the impartial and dispassionate consideration of Parliament in an untroubled and unprejudiced atmosphere. But what is the position at the moment? Is it not true to say that a situation has been created which renders discussion of the Protocol as a question of high politics—and not only of high politics, but also as a question affecting the destinies of generations yet unborn—practically impossible? Has not the Protocol been seriously damaged, if not destroyed? Take the pronouncement against the Protocol by the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, whom we are all pleased to see back in his place, in the name of the Government at the Council of the League. Before Parliament was given the opportunity of considering the matter, the blow which aimed at killing the Protocol was delivered at Geneva.

The Government, in my opinion, have taken a very serious step indeed in declaring against the policy embodied in the Protocol and by encouraging a return to the discredited and dangerous policy of separate and limited alliances and undertakings. That is what the proposal which has emanated from the Government in favour of special arrangements in order to meet special needs really amounts to. No other construction can be placed upon the speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman at the Council of the League, coupled with the latest proposal of the five-power pact made by the German Government. The situation, as it seems to me, has been rendered much more difficult and confused by the uninformed criticism, and even the misrepresentation, so freely indulged in against the Protocol during the past few months.

Having said this, I feel hound to confess that the actual position of the Protocol at this moment is very difficult to visualise. Has the cremation taken place? Are the ashes awaiting burial, have the last rites been performed, and are the speeches to be delivered in this Debate anything more than funeral orations? I confess that I do not know. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will be good enough to inform the House exactly where the Protocol stands. I notice that the Press, in the interview with the right hon. Gentleman on his return from Geneva, have attributed to him, in his interview with the French Prime Minister, the statement that they: shod a few tears over the tomb of the Protocol. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman has been misreported. If he has been correctly reported, then I must say that I refuse to subscribe to the view that the principles set out in the twenty-one Articles of the Protocol are dead and done with. I do not make this statement because I am interested in the authorship of the Protocol. I make the statement because I remember with great satisfaction that the representatives of no fewer than 47 nations decided, with striking unanimity, to recommend the Protocol to their respective Governments and peoples. They did so because they realised that experience had revealed gaps and limitations in the Covenant which, in the opinion of the authors of the Protocol, could very well be dispensed with. They did so, also, because they felt that if war was to be averted, sanity and reason must be substituted for brute force by the more general applica- tion of the principles of arbitration, security, and disarmament.

What, may I ask, is the purpose of the Protocol? The purpose is defined in the closing words of the Resolution proposed by the then British Prime Minister, and seconded by the French Prime Minister. The words are: It is to settle by pacific means all disputes which may arise between States. The Protocol, therefore, embodies a system of arbitration which no international dispute, whether juridical or political, can escape. It lays down as a foundation condition of international intercourse that all disputes shall be settled by pacific methods. It defines and prescribes the sanctions which may be applied against any State which fails to observe its obligations. It cites the criteria for deciding which is a covenant-breaking State. The Protocol recognises the fact that as there can be no disarmament without security and arbitration, so there can be no security or arbitration without disarmament. History demonstrates that armaments of themselves do not prevent war; on the contrary, they enormously increase the danger of war. When the mad race and competition in armaments creates an atmosphere of suspicion, jealousy and antagonism, war at last becomes inevitable.

Whatever may be the faults or deficiencies of the Protocol, and however much Members of this House may consider that the Protocol requires revision, its authors can claim that it does recognise, however much may be said to the contrary, that the first essential is to get rid of war as an instrument of policy. When we took the course we did we realised that militarist mentality has dominated the minds of the people of the respective nations so long that it would not be an easy task to transfer the spirit that has operated in the minds of the nations, nor would it be easy to unbuild the powerful military machines of the world. To do that successfully, we must, at least, provide satisfactory means whereby international disputes of every kind and description can be peaceably dealt with and, if possible, settled.

Arbitration, obligatory and universal, in our judgment was the only alternative method to the appeal to force. True, that represents a departure from the old atmosphere of hatred and suspicion. The right hon. Gentleman said at Geneva: Brute force is what the nations fear, and only brute force can give security. To deliver the nations from that false, dangerous and discredited doctrine is the aim of the Protocol. May I remind the House that the application of the principle of obligatory arbitration is no strange and novel idea. It is already embodied in the Covenant of the League, to be applied in certain international disputes. Under the Covenant, members of the League of Nations are already pledged to submit every dispute not settled by negotiation, either to the Permanent Court of International Justice for arbitration, or to be mediated upon by the Council of the League. Under the Protocol, if there is failure to make a friendly arrangement in any dispute, provision is made for arriving at a final solution in the form of a decree of the Permanent Court of International Justice, an arbitral award, or a unanimous decision of the Council of the League. To one or other of these solutions the parties, under the terms of the Protocol, are pledged to submit.

The great object of the Protocol is the prohibition of aggressive war, which it seeks to achieve in this way, regarding aggressive war as an international crime. The Protocol provides the means whereby the risk of international conflict may be greatly diminished as a result of the settlement of international disputes by legal, peaceable and constitutional means. Surely, it follows that if more comprehensive and, as I think, more effective machinery for dealing with disputes is provided, so, naturally, we expect the disputes to be less dangerous and not more dangerous. Yet in spite of this provision for the fuller application of the principle of arbitration, it has been objected to the Protocol that it actually increases the danger of war. That I cannot admit for I want to make it absolutely clear that the Protocol creates no new obligation in this respect. What the Protocol does, is to provide the nations with the very means which we hoped all peace-loving nations would naturally use to the full in order to avoid war. It was not a theoretical admiration for the principle of arbitration which animated the framers of the Protocol, but the practical and urgent need of seeking to organise the world for peace.

It may be objected, and with a measure of truth, that in seeking to make the application of the principle of arbitration universal, the Fifth Assembly travelled much beyond the point to which many of the nations are prepared to go at the present moment. It may also be urged that the application of the principle should be more gradual. This course has been suggested if only that the nations may be educated and taught to think and move in that direction. Whatever may be said for adopting the method of a more gradual approach to universal arbitration, I cannot agree with the words used at Geneva by the Foreign Secretary that the objections to universal and compulsory arbitration might easily outweigh what he described as its theoretical advantages. I am certainly not convinced that any policy embodied in the proposed special arrangement in order to meet special needs, which he has suggested, or the five-Power Pact, is one that will accustom the nations to think and move more speedily in the direction of universal arbitration, or so effectively, as the Protocol would assist the nations to do.

It seems to me that the utility of the methods laid down in the Protocol are entirely disregarded in the statement made in the name of the Government at the Council at Geneva. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Protocol fosters the idea that the main business of the League is with war rather than with peace.

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Austen Chamberlain)

Hear, hear!

Mr. HENDERSON

The right hon. Gentleman acknowledges that. Of course, if you omit the provisions for arbitration and emphasise those defining the sanctions, you may justify that charge, but you are misrepresenting the purpose of the Protocol. We hoped that if the nations used arbitration there would be no need for sanctions, and we believe that most nations would use arbitration if they accepted the Protocol, just as they have accepted the Covenant. In view of the criticism to which the Protocol has been subjected on this point, I cannot emphasise too strongly the fact that the Protocol is only supplementary to the Covenant. It is not a new and independent instrument. The British Delegation made this position clear at Geneva, especially in their responsibility for accepting the sanctions. May I quote some words which I ventured to use at Geneva? We are remaining within the terms of the Covenant. We are undertaking no new obligation. We do not see how any power which has signed the Covenant, and which intends to carry out honourably the pledges it has given, can hesitate to subscribe to Article 11 of the Protocol. Surely loyal and effective co-operation in support of the Covenant is what may confidently be expected from every member of the League of Nations. And I also said: What we wish to proclaim to the world is that we are determined to join hands and assist each other loyally and effectively in punishing the aggressor. This, we considered, would be pooled security, whereby the might of nations would become the servant of international justice. Further, apart from arbitration—which is, I admit, the foundation of the Protocol—we make provision for the reduction of armaments. In this connection the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary used words at Geneva which it is difficult for me to understand. He said: Nor is anything of importance accomplished in the cause of peace and disarmament.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

indicated assent.

Mr. HENDERSON

The right hon. Gentleman accepts that statement. When he used those words, he must have known that the date of the Disarmament Conference had been definitely fixed. He must have known that disarmament was an integral part of the Protocol scheme. He must have known that, although the Protocol might be signed and even ratified the operation of the Protocol was deliberately and of set purpose suspended until the Disarmament Conference had completed its work and adopted a scheme of disarmament. Thus in the Protocol we linked together machinery for peaceful settlement, pooled security and reduction of armaments. On this point I may observe that the Government in the references which have been made at Geneva to their limited plan are abso- lutely silent. Will the right hon. Gentleman, when he speaks, inform the House how his alternative policy will help forward the idea of disarmament? Do the Government believe in and desire disarmament? The Protocol was an attempt to fulfil our obligations under the Covenant and under Article 5 of the Treaty of Versailles, which places upon us this responsibility of taking measure for the progressive reduction of armaments. Was this "to be obsessed with the idea of war"? Was not this, I would ask, an essential step in organising the world for peace?

But I go further. It should be noted that the Protocol forbade private war. It is one thing to say, "You must not fight for your own hand." It is quite another thing to say, "You must arbitrate," but the Foreign Secretary does not seem to have appreciated this distinction. His policy is to make special arrangements in order to meet our needs. The policy of the Protocol is to provide a workable scheme for avoiding war in all circumstances. The chief value of the Protocol would be that the nations would give up the appeal to war in their own separate interests. That they would further agree to arbitrate is, as I have shown, an immense step forward in the organising of peace, but the first step which the Protocol endeavoured to secure was the abolition of war and—I want to lay emphasis on this point—the abolition of war as an instrument of jealousy or ambition. This surely was building upon the true foundations of peace.

I now desire to notice one or two of the criticisms against the Protocol, about which too much has been made during recent weeks. Some critics appear to think that the Fifth Assembly, when they framed the Protocol, had entered upon an entirely new and untrod path. Such, however, is not the case. The Fifth Assembly simply carried to their logical conclusion the aims of the authors of the Covenant. We had for our guidance the years of experience since the establishment of the League of Nations in January, 1920. We used the evidence accumulated by Committees of the League which had discussed the same problem of disarmament and security (luring the preceding years. Practical men well-acquainted with military difficulties had reviewed the problems and we had access to all the evidence available to them. The British Delegation was able also to use the practical experience of the statesmen of other countries. All this, and not merely some theory, led to the framing of the Protocol.

We were driven to adopt the Protocol because experience during the past four years had demonstrated the limitations and defects of some of the articles of the Covenant. Moreover—and this is very important—a measure of insecurity, real or imagined, had been revealed, causing grave discontent and unrest in several countries, and had threatened Europe—this is important to all of us—with a new competition in armaments. It should also be kept in mind that the League, which was an experiment in 1919, is now securely established, and it is only right that it should be prepared to extend its useful work. The League of Nations, through its Assembly and its Council, be it said to their credit, have with deliberation and determination, endeavoured to secure a stronger guarantee for world peace. Nor is it correct to say, as has been said, that the Protocol was ill-considered, ill-conceived, and hastily constructed. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was elaborated on the initiative of France and Great Britain. This work was undertaken as the result of inquiries and investigation which continued for years. The Draft Treaty was accepted by France and several other countries, probably because they had realised that no disarmament was possible without a corresponding increase in the sense of security. For various reasons the Draft Treaty was unacceptable to a large number of States, members of the League, including our own country. The main objection was that it placed an emphasis on military assistance according to pre-arranged plan, and fixed the automatic application of partial alliances which were thought by many to be inconsistent with the ideal and the spirit of the League of Nations.

But the alternative to the Draft Treaty, the Protocol, was consonant with the experience on which this former document was based. For instance, the Draft Treaty combined only two principles, security and disarmament. It omitted to notice the fact that nations complained of injustice, and were without adequate and recognised means for expressing their claims. Thus the Protocol sought to carry matters a step forward by combining the three great principles of arbitration, security, and disarmament. Therefore, arbitration is the new principle, and may be regarded as the very foundation of the structure. This, I may say, has actually been used as an abjection to the entire scheme. It is said, we should not be under the obligation to submit disputes to arbitration. But the Government's own statement at Geneva admits that the British Empire has not only favoured arbitration in theory, but has largely availed itself of arbitration in practice. If this be correct, if this country has found it such a useful instrument, should it not encourage its general application?

We say to the Government: "Take the next step. Make the promise to accept the principal of universally compulsory arbitration. Surely we have nothing to lose by the submission of our case in any dispute in which we may be involved." The obligations we have already undertaken in the Covenant of the League are fairly definite on this point. But in the opinion of the League itself—this is very important—those obligations require to be strengthened. If the Government will examine the Covenant in the light of experience, they will find the reasons for the proposals made in all the articles of the Protocol. It may be said that nations are not prepared to go so far or so fast, and that the obligations under the Covenant are sufficient for the time being. At any rate, so far as this country is concerned, our reply to such objections is this: that no fewer than 17 nations have already signed this very promise in accepting the Protocol, and the representatives of 47 nations at the Assembly of the League recommended the Protocol to their Governments. As I have said at the beginning, we recommend this scheme to the Government and to the people. Indeed we are prepared to assert that the great majority of the people of Great Britain are willing to support arbitration for the settlement of international disputes, whether that arbitration be in the Protocol or out of it.

It is difficult for us to understand the view point that the Covenant is sufficient and that we should not seek to improve upon it. Much water has passed under the Bridge since the right hon. Gentle- man the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) accepted the Covenant in 1919. The world has not been standing still since those clays. Many nations desire to develop the potentialities of the Covenant in order that it may be used so as to provide security, and a more equal sense of security to all the nations, large or small, especially those nations which join the League of Nations. But it is actually claimed that the gaps in the Covenant were purposely left open, and its authors may be ready to say that it is still the last word in constructive statesmanship_ But it is right for me to remind them that it is the League of Nations itself which is the best judge of either the success or the limitations of the Covenant they are called upon to work, and, after five years' experience and discussion, the League of Nations Assembly reached the conclusion that the Covenant needs to be supplemented, on the lines of the Protocol, if the purposes of the Covenant itself are to be effectively fulfilled.

Another objection, and a very important objection, one that has been very much canvassed against the Protocol, is that it would make the British Navy the tool of a non-British body. I believe somebody said it was going to be committed to a non-British body to hawk it round the world. This objection was fully considered during the framing of the Protocol last September. At that time I was able to show that such objections could be met by reservations. I stated that in accepting the obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court, the British Delegation proposed to make a reservation to the effect that disputes arising out of warlike operations undertaken by the British Empire in support of the League shall not be referred to the Permanent Court for settlement. Our aim was to make it clear that we did not desire that the Permanent Court should become a body for controlling military or naval operations. This, as I have already said, was made absolutely plain at Geneva, and I venture to ask the House to bear with me for a moment while I quote a few of the things I ventured on that occasion to say. This is on the question of the right of other people to move our Navy into the different seas of the world: I come now to the questions of the reservations which the British Government will feel themselves obliged to make in accepting the obligatory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court and this new procedure of compulsory arbitration. These observations relate to disputes arising out of warlike operations in which the British Empire may in the future be involved. Let there be no misunderstanding. In the view of the British Government, it is not conceivable that the British Empire should be at war against the Covenant or against the stipulations of this new Protocol. We, therefore, only envisage the case in which we are engaged in warlike operations on behalf of the Covenant, and with the approval of the Council or the Assembly of the League. We are sure that in such a case as this, it would be necessary and desirable in the general interest, as well as in the particular interest, of Great Britain, that the British Fleet should be able to operate with the freedom that may be required to secure the rapid success and termination of the sanctions. We propose, therefore, when we accept the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court to make a reservation to the effect that disputes arising out of warlike operations undertaken by the British Empire in support of the League shall not be referred to the Permanent Court for settlement. It will be observed that a similar reservation appears in Article 4 of the project which is laid before the Committee. These reservations do not appear to us in any way to limit the value of what we are doing to-day. No one desires"— and this is the important point— that the Permanent Court should become a body for controlling military operations. Its purpose, and the purpose of these new arbitration arrangements we hope to set up, is to prevent war altogether, by securing the peaceful settlement of disputes. We believe, therefore, that in safeguarding the liberty of action of the British Fleet—which, above all things, it is necessary for us to safeguard—we are rot acting contrary to the general interest of the nations of the world. I claim that the Protocol clarifies the obligation already existing under the Covenant, but the method and extent of the loyal and effective co-operation remains the prerogative of Parliaments and their Governments. There has been a great amount of misunderstanding on this point. I desire to make it quite clear, that when the British Navy is called into action under this project, and the extent to which the British Navy is going to be used, are both matters solely for the decision of the British Government of the day. The British delegation would not agree to any other position than that any decision regarding the use of National forces must be taken by the Governments of the States concerned. Neither the Permanent Court nor the Council of the League have any control whatsoever over the forces of any particular country.

There is another objection, about which we have heard a great deal since last September. I refer to what is known as the status quo objection. Here I am prepared to admit there may be a more substantial reason for hesitation. Criticism on this point usually refers to frontiers as defined by treaties, especially the Treaty of Versailles. What is our reply to this very formidable objection? Our reply is—and I want to quote the words of the Covenant, not from the Protocol, but from the Covenant itself: The Covenant expressly recognises, in Article 19, the right of the Assembly of the League of Nations to bring organised public opinion to bear on treaties which have become inapplicable, and international conditions which militate against the peace of the world. On this provision of the Covenant, the Fifth Assembly did not go back It, is quite true, it did not go forward, though I admit, personally, I should have liked to have seen it go forward. I reminded the Assembly that Lord Bryce, in his great work on international relations, says: Any guarantee of a strays quo ought to be accompanied by ample provisions for an examination of the existing causes of discontent and their removal. If Article 19 of the Covenant is not sufficient, that, surely, must be an argument for the revision of the Protocol and the amendment of the Protocol, which, unfortunately, so far as we know, is not the policy of His Majesty's Government. But, as I have already said, the Protocol creates no new obligation to the use of armed force to maintain the status quo established by the Treaties, And let it not be supposed that this objection, which is held to be fatal as against the Protocol, is not equally valid as against the proposed Five-Power Pact, and, so far as we know, against the policy of special arrangements in order to meet a special need. A permanent arrangement of the kind contemplated in the Pact is not, in our view, a guarantee of European peace. I agree that it would be disastrous for the League of Nations to become committed to the doctrine that the determinations of the Peace Treaties are fixed and final. I said so to the League at Geneva in these words: The League cannot afford to give the impression that it is content to permit the permanent stereotyping of the wrongs of the past. If it be true to say, as some critics say of the Protocol, that it involves us in the possibility of war to maintain the territorial arrangements imposed by the Treaties, is it not equally true to say that this danger will continue to be with us eve: if the Protocol be destroyed? The right way to meet this danger is to provide for a change in the status quo by peaceable methods, and the only change that the Protocol makes in the position is that it lays it down that you will not change the status quo, you will not alter the boundaries, if you accept the Protocol, by means of force. On the contrary, the Protocol does definitely and, in our opinion, unmistakably, limit the possibilities of war arising from this cause.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

Can the right hon. Gentleman interpret the Protocol to mean that, under it, any existing boundary of Europe might be subjected, at the will of anyone concerned, to immediate compulsory arbitration?

Mr. HENDERSON

I do not say that that is the position at all. I have already told the House that, with regard to Article 19 of the Covenant, we have neither gone back nor forward. We have left it, and I do not mind saying here, that whoever goes to deal with this question, I hope will realise what a thorny subject it is if they are going to alter Article 19. But it is there, and that is as far as I am prepared to go. We did not interfere with it in any way, but it does not, in my opinion, stereotype, as has been said, the whole of the boundaries of the world. The House will remember that in his speech, delivered at the League of Nations Assembly, the present Leader of the Opposition emphasised the importance of the entry of Germany into the League. This has a great deal to do with the Protocol. It has far more to do with the Protocol than many people imagine. We strove might and main to get Germany included in the League while the sittings of the Fifth Assembly were going on. For reasons into which we need not go here, it was not possible; but we continue to assume that Germany will presently be a member of the League. In fact, we hope—and I trust we will not be disappointed this time—that Germany will be admitted a member of the League at the next Assembly. If Germany be admitted, then, in our opinion, that admission, and not a separate Pact, in which Germany is a partner, is the best basis for security in Europe. It would be a disaster if Germany were led to accept the idea of a Pact as an alternative to membership of the League, or as a substitute for membership.

5. 0 P.M.

With the entry of Germany into the League, it will become all the more obvious that the principles of the Protocol must become the common law of the world. I am not at all disposed to think that the right hon. Gentleman has succeeded in actually killing the Protocol. The Council of the League, at its meeting on 13th March, after the right hon. Gentleman's speech had been made, decided that the Protocol should be the chief item on the Agenda of the Sixth Assembly. When the British delegation next September have to meet the representatives of possibly over 50 other States, Members of the League, they will find, in my judgment, that the Protocol is not dead. The fuller reports which have come to hand since the close of the last Council meeting go to support the idea, that this instrument has not yet been finally disposed of. The British Government at the next Assembly will have to present some definite proposal; they will have to provide an alternative, and their alternative will have to go very much beyond the declarations which the right hon. Gentleman made at the Council of the League. I think that the House is entitled to know what the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman are likely to be As I understand from reading his speech—I have read it more than once—his policy is, first, the abandonment of the Protocol, and, secondly, to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs.

For the reasons already given, I consider the Government policy profoundly mistaken, and one that is much to be regretted, especially that part of it which involves the rejection of the Protocol. Valid arguments for re-examination and amendment of some of the provisions of the Protocol there may be, but I fail to find any justification whatever in anything the right hon. Gentleman has said for the drastic and dangerous course he has adopted of rejecting outright the policy contained in the Protocol. The criticisms made against the Protocol in the Government statement at Geneva can all be met, if it is proved to be necessary, by an amendment of some of its provisions. Some are really repetitions of criticisms which have many times been refuted already, and they certainly do not constitute grounds for rejecting the principles upon which the Fifth Assembly was not only agreed, but unanimously agreed.

What. is the real policy put forward by the Government as an alternative to the Protocol? It is difficult to understand all the implications and the real inwardness of the phrase that I have just quoted, Special arrangements in order to meet special needs. I desire to make it unmistakably clear, on behalf of the Labour party, that we at any rate are resolutely opposed to any separate pact of a militarist and permanent character which would help to divide the world into armed camps. But if it is said that, in view of the delay which must now inevitably arise before the Protocol can be carried out and disarmament can begin: if, as an immediate and transitional step towards a more general agreement on the lines of the Protocol, some special arrangement is necessary, that suggestion would be worthy of examination. But let me point out that an essential condition of any such special arrangement of a temporary and transitional character must be that it is made within the Covenant. I fail to see how any such plan could be acceptable to the members of the League unless it is also based upon the principles set out in the Protocol. Such a plan must carry forward the idea of arbitration, of security, and of disarmament. No partial and limited arrangement to meet special circumstances and special needs would be acceptable on any other grounds. If agreement on these three ideas of arbitration, security, and disarmament is the object of the Government's policy, with Germany in the League, it appears to me that there is no need for a partial pact, for they would all be secured inside the Protocol.

May I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman to take the House into his confidence? Will he tell the House what is in his mind, especially with regard to this suggested Five-Power Pact? Does it include the idea of obligatory arbitration? Are all the States to be included in this special arrangement going to agree to accept obligatory arbitration for all disputes with their neighbours, taking the Permanent Court of International Jurisdiction as a suitable basis? Does his plan include sanctions? Will he say what measures of a military or naval character are to be applied in case of conflict, and when and by whose authority they are to operate? Will his plan include tests to decide what constitutes aggression? What are the provisions or tests which are to be applied for the purpose of deciding against whom the sanctions are to be applied? What is to be the connection between the Government's policy of special arrangements in order to meet special needs, and the great problem of disarmament, which was so integral a part of the Geneva scheme?

I submit that until the Government return a clear answer to these questions the House cannot judge fairly between the Government's policy and the policy embodied within the Protocol. May I remind the House that in these matters we are dealing with principles that are not merely of national, but of international significance. Surely, then, it is necessary and wise to try to obtain the consent of all parties in the House to the policy pursued by Great Britain in relation to these momentous issues, which may involve the entire future of the League of Nations. Yet, important and far-reaching as they undoubtedly are. Parliament has not so far been informed of the Government's intention. All that the House knows is that the Foreign Secretary came back from Geneva satisfied that the Protocol had been disposed of. We have not yet been told the plan that the Government mean to pursue. Great questions involving the lives, the liberties, the destinies of whole nations, are not to be dealt with in this way. The Government must be reminded that the issue with which they are dealing is literally one of life or death to millions of plain people. In conclusion, I wish to say—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I do not understand why there should be that exclamation. There has been no Debate on this subject. I am the only Member of this House who was present at the framing of the Protocol. For months the papers have been full of criticisms, and especially criticisms levelled against some who had the responsibility placed upon them of representing this country at the Fifth Assembly, and surely they will not deny me this single opportunity of speaking and not try to be a little offensive. I want to say that in my opinion France has adopted a proper attitude towards the Protocol. M. Briand at the recent Council meeting said: My Government remains definitely attached to the Protocol, but it does not refuse to enter into any discussion for improving it. Then he continued: Convinced that only the adherence of the nations to a common Protocol can induce them to renounce the competition in armaments, and convinced that if the principles on which the Protocol rests are abandoned, the nations will gradually revert to their old habits and to solutions by force, France remains faithful to the signature which she was the first to give with the object of sparing herself and other nations the horrors of war, from which she suffered so terribly. I trust that our Government, even now, will be prepared to reconsider their decisions and to act with the French in the offer which they have made. Let them jointly, at the Sixth Assembly, do their best to improve upon the work which we endeavoured to do at Geneva last September. In my humble judgment such a course would commend itself to the majority of the British people. I apologise for having detained the House at such length. I apologise because many hon. Members may feel that already the Protocol has passed into history. I felt, therefore, that I had a moral obligation to discharge, and I thank the House for its indulgence.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

I also must ask the indulgence of the House, for I have a great deal of ground to travel and not very much voice to use in my work. I have listened with interest and with attention to the statement just made by the right hon. Gentleman. I observed that he was careful throughout, except in one or two special passages, to emphasise the fact that he spoke as one of those who had represented this country at the last Assembly of the League, and as one of the joint authors of the Protocol, not on behalf of a party which was then holding the responsibilities of power and had decided to ratify the Protocol, nor on behalf of ex-Cabinet Ministers who since they left office have come to any such conclusion. A second reflection occurred to me as he spoke. The right hon. Gentleman thinks that this Government dealt with insufficient respect with the Protocol of which he was part author. I suppose that in his eyes that which was in the mouth of a Labour representative but a choleric word will become in the mouth of a Unionist Administration rank blasphemy. But the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues had to consider an international agreement arrived at in a similar way in an earlier Assembly, supported by France and by a large number of other nations. They did not hesitate to bring a free judgment to bear upon it or to express in clear though measured language their inability to recommend it for our acceptance. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman took with him to Geneva a copy of the document which my predecessor, as Foreign Secretary, had addressed on 5th July to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in regard to the proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance. No greater calamity "— said the British Government— to the cause which they have at heart can be imagined than that any scheme adopted by the League should, when submitted to the test of reality, fail owing to defects which ought to have been foreseen in advance."… "We must ask these questions: Are the guarantees contained therein sufficient to justify a. State in reducing its armaments? Are the obligations to be undertaken towards other States of such a nature that the nations of the world can conscientiously engage to carry them out? Did the right hon. Gentleman ask himself those questions when he was a party to the framing of the Protocol? Did he apply to the Protocol those tests? I am afraid they were forgotten. I am sorry to trouble the House with one more quotation. Of this proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance my predecessor wrote on behalf of the then Government: It is the considered opinion of the British Naval Staff that a Treaty such as is proposed will, if properly carried out, necessitate an increase in the British naval forces. Did His Majesty's Government consult their naval advisers and receive an assurance from them that that objection did not apply to the Protocol?