FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (Hansard, 5 March 1925)

§ Mr. HERBERT FISHER

I beg to move, That Item Class II, Vote 5 (Foreign Office) be reduced by £100. I greatly regret that my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) is precluded by indisposition from taking part in this Debate. We shall all be sensible of the loss of his eloquent voice and his vast experience, and I regret it the more because this is the first occasion since last September on which the House has had an opportunity of discussing foreign affairs. Since last September many important events have occurred, and many important events are occurring. It seems to me, and to those with whom I am associated, entirely right and fitting that the Foreign Secretary should be given this opportunity to lift the veil, which he has hitherto so successfully interposed, between the Eleusinian mysteries of foreign policy and the curiosity of my hon. Friends. The right hon. Gentleman is. proceeding next week to a very important Council meeting of the League of Nations, and although he has given us to understand that he does not desire to be pledged in respect of the business that may there arise, we feel that it is important that British delegates proceeding to an important international gathering should, at least, be apprised of the tenour and flow of the sentiment, and opinion which prevail in this House. I am, of course, not desirous, nor are my hon. Friends, of pressing the right hon. Gentleman for any premature disclosure of policy. I need hardly say we do not wish in any way to embarrass him, but we are impressed by the fact that a discussion has already been inaugurated on foreign affairs in another place, and that Lord Curzon has thought it opportune to make an important declaration of policy to their Lordships; we feel that the privilege which has been accorded to members in another place should be accorded in an even more liberal manner to us.

Before I proceed to touch upon the topics which are likely to be discussed at Geneva I wish to say a few words upon the subject of the evacuation of Cologne. As we are all aware, Cologne was due to be evacuated by the Allies—in this case the British troops—on 10th January last 691 in accordance with the time-table which was laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. We, all know that Cologne has not been evacuated, the reason given being that the Germans have failed to fulfil their obligations in respect of disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles. As I think everybody in this House admits, the postponement of the evacuation of Cologne is a. very grave step for the Government to take. We are solemnly pledged to evacuate Cologne and its area at the end of the period of five years, assuming that Germany has fulfilled her obligations under the Treaty, and although an interim or provisional document has been cited enumerating the main grounds for the dissatisfaction of the Allies, we have still to wait for the full publication of the case against the German Government. All this time has passed, and the British public are still unaware of the specific grounds on which we have decided to postpone the evacuation of Cologne. Indeed, the full document of 162 pages—I am informed—was only presented to the Commission of Ambassadors on 3rd March, and that Commission are still sitting upon it.

We on these benches press the Government for the publication of that document. We feel that it is not enough simply to give to the world the main grounds upon which the Allied Governments have decided to take the action which has been set forth. It is urged that a document of 162 pages, full of military and technical details, would not be fully understood, and that it would create in the minds of many an impression that the default of Germany had been greater than actually is the case—that the publication of such a document would retard the work of appeasement rather than promote it I confess that if I thought the publication of this document would in any way retard the task of appeasement I would conceive that to be a justification for withholding it. But the German Government will receive this document. The Germans will be informed, not only of the general grounds for the displeasure of the Allies, but they will be informed of the particular defaults with which they are charged. If the German Government is to have this document, why should not the House of Commons have it and the British public? I believe far the wiser 692 course is to publish all the facts. We have in this House a number of hon. and gallant Gentlemen who are qualified by their military experience to sift the irrelevant from the relevant points of detail, and to appreciate the points of importance. I, therefore, earnestly press the Government to reconsider their decision on this point, and to represent to their Allies that we think it desirable that the Report should be published in full.

Secondly, we on these benches are of opinion that it is desirable that Germany should be invited to offer her observations on the Report. I am' very glad to see that that contention is shared by Lord Curzon in another place. After all, we have always got to bear in mind the fact that the German Government has its public opinion to consider. From the very nature of things it is liable every week, every month, every year to carry out unpopular policies: and it is to OUB advantage, to the advantage of France, and to the advantage of Europe that the Republican Government should be stable in Germany, and that the Weimar Constitution should not be overthrown by Nationalist or Royalist influences. For that reason, for the furtherance of disarmament as and in the interest of our Allies, it is desirable so far as we can, to associate Germany with this very difficult and invidious task. There is a third point in respect of which my friends and I feel a considerable measure of anxiety. Some language has been used by the French Prime Minister and more extensively by the French Press which gives colour to the supposi- 4.0 P.M. tion that in the mind of France the question of the evacuation of Cologne is bound up with the general question of French security. We hold that those two questions are entirely separate. The British occupation of Cologne is regulated by Clauses 428 and 429 of the Treaty of Versailles, and, if we are satisfied that the German Government has fulfilled its obligations, broadly speaking, with respect to disarmament, we ought to evacuate Cologne and its area. It ought to be made clear—and I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend will make it clear—whether, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the evacuation of Cologne will be carried out by 693 the British Government independently of French concurrence if and when the British Government is thoroughly satisfied that the Germans are substantially fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty. Is it the case that before Cologne can be evacuated the Allies must be agreed that the Treaty has been observed, or do we make it plain that we reserve to ourselves the right of independent judgment, assuming that, unfortunately, we are unable to agree, as I hope we may be able to agree, with our French Allies, with respect to the German fulfilment of the Treaty.

When I speak of the fulfilment of the Treaty, I mean substantial fulfilment of the Treaty I do not think that we ought to remain in possession of Cologne and its area if we are satisfied that the Germans are not infringing the Treaty in a substantial way and with premeditation. We ought not to make minor, casual, unpremeditated defaults which may be discovered in this region or in another region by the microscope of the Military Commission an excuse for failing to fulfil our part of the Treaty of Versailles. It may perhaps be worth recalling that in September, 1920, M. Poincare" himself engaged in a very interesting controversy with M. Tardieu in the "Temps" newspaper, in the course of which M. Poincar´ explicity and cogently argued that the lapse of the Anglo-American guarantees had nothing to do with the fulfilment of Articles 428 and 429 of the Treaty of Versailles. Of course, we all realise that the lapse of those Treaties, not due to any fault of our own, not due to any fault on the part of France, has been a very serious thing for France, but it cannot be made good by a refusal to evacuate the Cologne area, and this is the more obvious since Germany was no part to the Treaty in question. This brings me to the connected question of security. The French are always complaining that they were induced to abandon their claim to a permanent hold of the Rhine frontier by the offer—

§ Mr. FISHER

I apologise. The French claim was for an international control of the bridgeheads of the Rhine and for the detachment of the German territory west of the Rhine and its formation into a buffer state. They have always complained that they were induced to forego that claim by the promise of an Anglo-American guarantee which has failed to materialise, and I agree that the French have a case which deserves our most earnest and serious consideration. We all know what view the illustrious Marshal Foch took of the problem of French security at the time of the peace negotiations in Paris. It was his view that no pact, no British pact, no American pact, no Anglo-American pact could give to France the measure of security which would belong to her if the bridgeheads of the Rhine were placed under an international control. Such pacts might effectually shelter France from defeat; they would not, in his view, shelter her effectively from invasion. We can well understand what great weight an opinion coming from so illustrious a soldier after so great and hard-fought a War must exercise upon the French mind. But from the first British statesmen took a different view. We took the view that the detachment of 7,500,000 Germans from the body of the Reich would create a new Alsace-Lorraine and would inevitably lead to a new war, and that, so far from assisting to consolidate the security of France, it would have the very opposite effect.

Now what are we to do? Have we any responsibility in regard to the question of the security of France? We read of many proposals and suggestions in the newspapers. One suggestion is that Great Britain should form a triple alliance with Belgium and with France to guarantee the Eastern frontiers of those two countries. To that proposal, I and my friends on these benches are unalterably opposed. We are opposed for two very good reasons. In the first place, in the early part of 1922, a defensive pact was offered by the Government of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs to Belgium and France as part of a general arrangement in which Russia was to be included "for the appeasement" of Europe, but that offer was summarily and briefly rejected by the French Government. It was regarded as 695 humiliating in form and inadequate in substance, and it was clear from the first that the offer of a pact which did not include some arrangement for the guarantee of the frontiers of France's Eastern Allies would be unacceptable to France. The fact that that British offer was there and then summarily rejected in itself is a sufficient argument why such an offer should not be renewed, but there is a far graver argument against such a proposed triple alliance than that. It is that if England were to enter into an exclusive pact with France and Belgium we should, in effect, be initiating a process which would ultimately and inevitably lead to the division of Europe into two groups of Powers arrayed one against the other, plotting against one another, and arming against one another—a situation which would lead in the end to a repetition of the catastrophe of which we have so clear and fearful a recollection. We all know that one of the first answers which would be made to such a triple alliance of the Western Powers would be a combination between Russia and Germany, and, although it is true that a temporary measure of security might be afforded by such an arrangement to the populations of Belgium and France, it would, I submit most seriously to the Committee, be a very injurious policy on any long-sighted view of human affairs.

Another suggestion, far more promising, has recently been ventilated in the newspapers. We hear—whether our authority is good or not the right hon. Gentleman no doubt will tell us in the course of the Debate—that the German Government has come forward with an interesting proposal. We are informed that the German Government has come forward with the proposal to join in a pact guaranteeing the Eastern frontier of France, but we understand that the Government of Berlin desires to leave itself free to defer to the League of Nations, or to arbitration, questions relating to the German frontier on the East. We should be obliged if the right hon. Gentleman, when he comes to reply, would tell the Committee whether there is any substance in this newspaper report, whether the German Government has made any practical proposal, and, if so, at what time, and what attitude His Majesty's Govern- 696 ment propose to take in respect of it? For myself, I may say at once that I should very much welcome such a proposal as this. I think it would be all to the good if Germany could be brought to give a free and spontaneous assent to the Eastern frontier which was imposed upon her, as a result of the War, in the Treaty of Versailles. I earnestly hope, if such an offer has in fact been made, that His Majesty's Government will do their best to support and commend that offer to our French and our Belgian Allies. I anticipate, as no doubt every other Member of this House does, that objections may be raised on the French side. I anticipate that it will be said in Paris that France cannot accept any form of guarantee which leaves out of consideration Poland and Czechslovakia. Only last week, in fact, a speech was made by the Polish Prime Minister in the Polish Parliament to the effect that it would be a dereliction of France's duty to accept any such proposal. I realise the difficulties under which France may labour, but at the same time I should like to recall to the memory of the Committee the terms of the covering letter which M. Clemenceau, acting on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, addressed to Germany when he sent to Germany the revised copy of the Treaty. These were M. Clemenceau's words: The Allied and Associated Powers believe that the Treaty is not only a just settlement of the great War, but that it provides the basis upon which the peoples of Europe can live together in friendship and equality. At the same time it creates machinery for the peaceful adjustment of all international problems by discussion and consent, whereby the settlement of 1919 itself can be modified from time to time to suit new facts and new conditions as they arise. M. Clemenceau is expressly informing the Germans that it is free to them, under Clause 19 of the Covenant, to open up with the League of Nations the questions respecting their frontiers and other matters which had been provisionally settled in the Treaty of Versailles. I venture to hope that on some such lines as those which appear to be indicated in the German proposal—if proposal there be—my right hon. Friend may find a solution for some of the most urgent of his difficulties.

There is, of course, another line of progress to which public attention has in 697 recent times been most powerfully directed. I allude to the Geneva Protocol. I understand that His Majesty's Government are about to produce a considered document giving their view on the Geneva Protocol, and as I assume the House will have an opportunity of fully debating that Paper when it comes to hand, I do not propose now to occupy much of the time of the Committee with a. discussion of the Protocol. I am inclined to think that on the present occasion such a discussion would be premature. I will only make one or two very general observations about that most important, most far-reaching, and, if I may say so, most complicated document. The first is that even if His Majesty's Government feel themselves unable to accept fully or without reservation, or to come to any decided conclusion with regard to the Protocol at the present moment, they will not meet Geneva with ii blank and sterile negative. The Protocol, after all, is founded upon great principles; the principle of arbitration, the principle of disarmament, the principle of security, principles to which all right-thinking citizens owe allegiance In my submission nothing would be more injurious to our reputation in the world, or to the progress and welfare of the League of Nations, than that for the second time running the British Government should reject a document which has for its object the general disarmament of the world. That is my first point.

My second observation is that many of the arguments which are commonly addressed against the Protocol obviously imply an imperfect acquaintance with its terms and implications, and that we ought not to be too hasty in condemning so difficult a document. On the other hand, I feel that the proposal in its present form does raise very great difficulties, more particularly in connection with possible commitments in the Eastern part of Europe, difficulties which are certainly grave so long as Russia remains outside the orbit of the League of Nations, but might hereafter be sensibly diminished if that powerful State were brought within the comity of nations.

I have said what I intend to say on the subject of security, but there are one or two questions of considerable, though not perhaps of the greatest, importance, which will come before my right hon.

698 Friend when he goes to Geneva next week on which I should like to offer a few observations. First o! all, there is the problem of the government of the Saar. I submit that the government of the Saar is one of the danger spots of Europe. If we are to have serious trouble in Europe hereafter, I believe it is more likely to arise out of difficulties in the Saar than from any other quarter. Nothing would conduce more effectually to the appeasement of the general situation in Europe than the introduction of more satisfactory conditions in the Saar. Many hon. Members will recall the fact that the Saar was the subject of n very important Debate in this House in the course of the year 1923, when the misgovernment of the Saar was brought before the notice of the House by my right hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Sir John Simon). When the Foreign Secretary goes to Geneva, one of the first questions with which he will be confronted will be the reappointment of certain members of the. governing Commission of the Saar, including its President, M. Rault, who are due to retire. I ventured to say in the Debate in 1923 that when the time came for considering the reappointment of the President I hoped a change would be made. I do not cast any slur upon the ability of the French official who. for the last five years, has presided over the government of the Saar. He is an' experienced man, he is an industrious man, and he has a special acquaintance with industrial questions, for he has been Prefect of Lyons, but, in the first place, he is a Frenchman, and. in the second place, he is ignorant of the German language, being able neither to speak it nor read it, and, consequently, he is surrounded by French-speaking officials in a German area. The mere fact that he is a Frenchman necessarily involves him in unpopularity. He has never enjoyed the full confidence of his associates on the Governing Commission; he has never enjoyed the full confidence of the members of the League of Nations: his policy has been severely criticised in this House; he has been the object of denunciation all over the world; and, I submit, that now that we have a chance of making a change we ought to make it. After all, we have to remember that the life of this international Government in 699 the Saar is only to extend 15 years, and it seems reasonable that, if the governing Commission is controlled during the first five years of its life by a Frenchman, some representative of a neutral country-should have the next turn.

Then there is the question of Danzig. In my experience of the League of Nations there were few more thorny questions than the relations between the Republic of Poland and the free city of Danzig under the Treaty of Versailles. Of course in this country we have every sympathy for the Republic of Poland, and we wish it all success. We desire to see this brilliant and gifted nation, whose sorrows have attracted the sympathy of liberal-minded men in this country for generations, enjoy a brilliant and a stable future. At the same time nobody can watch the course of events in Danzig and its neighbourhood without a most profound feeling of anxiety. Here is Danzig, a great German city with splendid historic traditions, one of the leading Hanseatic towns, a proud and prosperous commercial city, and one laying great stress upon its historic traditions, and close to it is a Republic constantly endeavouring to sap and undermine its independence. Fortunately, the League of Nations has in the past and is in the present, represented in Danzig by a High Commissioner who is a member of our race, a British subject, but a most loyal servant of the League of Nations, taking his orders from the League only, and through tact and good management these difficulties have been smoothed over. I hope very much that the High Commissioner will receive from this country all the diplomatic support to which he is entitled, because in the interests of Poland itself it is desirable that she should have on her western border not a bitter, angry and watchful enemy but a good neighbour and a friend.

There is one further question with respect to which I do not wish in any way to press the Foreign Secretary, but which I think is a matter of very grave importance. It is contemplated under the Treaty that the inspection of armaments in Germany and the Rhine-land should, in the near future, be transferred from the Allied Commission to the League of Nations. I understand that in September last the Council of the League of Nations 700 passed a plan for the organisation of the military inspection and control of Germany. I confess I have been somewhat doubtful as to whether it was in the interests of the League itself to take over this very penal and invidious function. However that may be, we are faced with the fact that a commission has been appointed, and the chairman of that commission is a Frenchman. That is a proposal to which exception might be taken, but I am not proposing to press that provided the Council of the League of Nations does not recede from the principle of unanimity when it has to decide whether or not a default has been committed in respect of disarmament on the report of the Commission of the League. I feel that Great Britain ought to retain its independent voice, and we ought to be able to say to the Council of the League of Nations whether we feel that a default has or has not been committed, and if we are clear that a default has not been committed, that we should be able to prevent penal sanctions being taken.

I think I have detained the Committee far too long. I am very grateful to hon. Members for the patience with which they have listened to my observations. I do not make them in any spirit of criticism of the Government, because to be quite frank my right hon. Friend the Foreign Minister has been so successful in concealing the intentions of the Government that we have very little substance upon which to attach any criticism. I do feel, however, that the time has come when the hierophant should consent to reveal somewhat of his secret, when the dark landscape of European politics should be illumined by some slight ray of information, and when in fact the British nation should be told in what direction it is going, whether away from war or towards it.