§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—;[Mr. F. Hall.]
§ Lieut.-Colonel Sir EDWARD GRIGGI propose to raise the question of correspondence between the Government and the Dominions in relation to the Treaty of Lausanne. I can assure the Members that I am not bringing up this question in any controversial spirit; and I know that the time available for this debate is limited. I therefore wish to take up as little as possible of the time of the House. A very important question has arisen in regard to the negotiation and signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, and attention should be called to the importance of the precedent set up. I think if possible, this House should determine that that precedent should not be followed in future, but that we should return to the practice laid down in regard to the Treaty of Versailles and all the Peace Treaties that followed the Treaty of Versailles. When the Treaty of Lausanne was introduced into this Parliament we were assured that it had universal approval; that it had been accepted and welcomed by the whole Empire. The facts have come out by degrees. They have been hard to elicit. It turns out that they are very different.
The essential fact, which was not revealed at the outset, is that the Dominions were not invited to send plenipotentiaries to the Treaty negotiations at Lausanne. From the very outset Canada called attention to the importance of this change in procedure, and at the end of the year 1922, she had said quite definitely, in view of the great change of procedure, that she could not be hound by any negotiations carried on at Lausanne and could riot be expected to accept them unless they were submitted first to her own Parliament. When the Treaty was finally made public, Canada refused to nominate a plenipotentiary to sign the Treaty, and the other Dominions took the same course. The result is that we have in the Treaty 1618 of Lausanne the only Treaty of Peace that is not signed by the Empire as a whole. It is signed only by an English diplomat, Sir Horace Rurnbold. I make no reflection whatever on Sir Horace Rumbold. He did his work with all the skill and training for which he is well-known. But the difference between the weight of an instrument signed only by an English diplomat, and the weight of an instrument signed by the Dominions as a whole, must be very obvious to the House.
The question must be asked: how has this occured? Both the British and the Dominion Governments are obviously concerned in the whole course of procedure since the Conference of Lausanne, but I imagine that everyone will agree with me that comment upon the procedure adopted by the Dominion Governments is not proper in this House. I propose to make no reference whatever to the course taken by the Dominion Governments, although it is obvious the responsibility for what took place is not entirely with the British Government, but it is shared by the Dominion Governments. What is clear, however, is that the main responsibility for what has occurred rests upon British Government, because it all arises from the fatal initial error that the Dominions were not asked to send plenipotentiaries to the negotiations at Lausanne.
The despatch which, has been issued shows that the Dominions were informed that an agreement had been come to with France and Italy that each Power should be represented by only two plenipotentiaries, and they were asked whether they would agree to allow Lord Curzon and Sir Horace Rumbold to represent the British Empire. They were given no option in the matter, and they accepted that procedure, but they were given no alternative. The immediate result was that Canada telegraphed to say that she could not associate herself with the results of the negotiations, and on 31st December she made it quite clear that she would not nominate a plenipotentiary to sign the Peace Treaty at Lausanne nor would she regard herself as being bound by that Treaty unless it were first submitted to the Canadian Parliament.
Compare this history with that of the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles was negotiated by a complete British Empire Delegation, and every 1619 important feature of that Treaty was adopted by that Delegation before it was accepted. The British Empire Delegation sat at Paris throughout the negotiations and participated in every important decision, and at the end the signatories of the whole of the Empire Delegation were appended to the Treaty of Versailles. What happened in the case of the other Treaties which followed? It is true that the British Empire Delegation broke up before these other Treaties were, completed, but the whole principle on which they were based was laid down in the Versailles Treaty and the other Treaties simply followed the principles adopted in the case of the Treaty of Versailles. I am perfectly certain that there is no Dominion statesman who will not say he did not play the fullest part which he desired in the negotiation of those other Treaties.
The proof of the matter is, that there was no question whatever about the Dominions appointing their plenipotentiaries and signing those other Treaties just as they had signed the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Sèvres was negotiated later. The British Empire Delegation was not sitting during the negotiation of that Treaty, but the Dominions were given every opportunity of appointing plenipotentaries, and Sir Robert Borden took a. prominent part in some of the preliminary settlements of principles on which that Treaty was framed. There is no doubt the Dominions were completely satisfied with the procedure then followed, because, once again, they appointed their plenipotentiaries, and they signed the Treaty of Sevres. Their names are in the preamble, representing all the Dominions and India, and they signed as plenipotentiaries on behalf of each Dominion.
So far the precedent was unbroken. It was followed once again when the Empire was confronted with the delicate negotiations undertaken by the Washington Disarmament Conference. It is no secret that there we were then confronted with a very great division of opinion within the British Empire itself, but the British Empire Delegation, under the chairman ship of Lord Balfour went to Washington. and the result of sitting as one family under Lord Balfour's most distinguished chairmanship was that all disagreements were resolved and there was unanimous 1620 approval of the Treaties ultimately negotiated. I think that proves conclusively that up to the Treaty of Lausanne the precedent that Treaties of this importance, Treaties of Peace involving the obligation, in certain contingencies, of going to war have been negotiated by the British Empire as a whole, and the signatures of the whole Empire have always been secured before ratification.
I have only two more observations to make on the history of the Treaty of Lausanne. In the first place, since it departs entirely from the procedure of the other Treaties, and that fact was known when the Imperial Conference met last year, why was the subject not raised there? Here was an Imperial question of the deepest gravity. There was real disagreement as to the manner in which the Treaty was negotiated, and an absolute certainty that the eldest of the Dominions would not sign that Treaty, and yet the question was not raised at the Imperial Conference. If important questions like this are to be burked at Imperial Conferences in that manner, what is the use of Imperial Conferences?
In the second place, I think it is important to call attention to statements widely made in Canada that the reason why our Government agreed that only two plenipotentiaries should be appointed to represent the British Empire at Lausanne was due to the fact that the French Government stated that if the British Empire went there as a British Empire Delegation, France would have to bring a delegation of her own, including the Sultan of Morocco. That statement has been widely made in Canada, and it is really believed that that objection was made by France. What would it mean if the British Government really paid deference to this objection on the part of France? It means that they set aside all the precedents established by previous Treaties of Peace. Not only that, but they surrendered the status definitely given to the British Empire in the Covenant of the League of Nations. If you look at the list of Original Members of the League of Nations, you will find France named, but it does not mention Morocco and other potentates. Compare that with the names representing the British Empire. The British Empire is 1621 the first heading, then Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and India. Why was that position given away at Lausanne? It was given away from the moment we accepted any reason for not taking the whole British Empire Delegation to Lausanne on the ground that another Power would bring a subordinate potentate.
I do not wish to trespass too long on the time of the House—[HON, MEMBERS: "Go. on"]—but why is this status secured by us in the Covenant of the League of Nations of so much importance to the British. Empire? Just consider what the British Empire ie at the present time. I am thinking now, not of the Asiatic Empire or the dependent Empire, but of that part which consists of Great Britain itself and the self-governing Dominions. Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions at this moment constitute an actual league of nations acting together on the very principles to which the wider League of Nations aspires. It is a family of free nations, and there is no question of competition in armaments between them. Indeed, our very co-operation means that our individual need for armaments is reduced. We are seeking the utmost co-operation in trade and business. We have the same institutions, we have the same Sovereign, and we desire to act together to protect our civilisation and to provide for all its moral and material needs, and, in particular, for raising the standard of life throughout our communities. We desire to defend our legitimate interests, and we desire, above all, to act together to maintain the peace of the world. The British Empire, then, is an actual league of nations; it is a practical experiment in international cooperation, and it is an example of what the great League of Nations itself aspires to become. This may be said with confidence—that if the league of nations represented in the British family of nations cannot act together in the conditions in which they are trying to act together now, then there is no hope indeed for the wider League.
What is the crux of our problem at the present time?—It has been quite definitely established that co-operation inside the Commonwealth is perfectly compatible with the fullest internal self-government in this country and in every Dominion. There is no question whatever about that. 1622 But from the very outset the Dominions have always made it clear that, while they have sought complete internal autonomy, they have never regarded that as inconsistent with the most complete and thorough Imperial loyalty. There is an incident in the old history of New South Wales which illustrates the spirit of the Empire in both forms. I believe it was in the seventies, when Lord Salisbury's Government had written a despatch to the Government of New South Wales endeavouring to compel them to admit certain Chinese immigrants who were pressing to enter the Colony, and were then in ships in Sydney Harbour. The new South Wales Legislature sat all night, and during that night they passed resolutions absolutely refusing to be bound by Lord Salisbury's despatch, and declaring that the Colony had the right to choose of what component elements its population was to be made up. That was a complete declaration of local autonomy. But at the end, as the daylight came through the windows of the old Legislature, to show that there was no lack of loyalty in their decision, the whole Assembly got up and sang "God Save the Queen." That is an example of the spirit in which autonomy has been worked out in the British Empire.
There is no question that full local self-government is established everywhere. But full national self-government does not mean local autonomy only; it does not mean internal self-government only. It means also some adequate control over the relations of the nation with foreign powers. It means, in particular, absolute freedom of choice in the great issues of peace and war. When the Great War broke out the Dominions had, as a matter of fact, no choice. They made no complaint of that. Our Treaty with Belgium, which brought us directly into the War, was negotiated a, whole generation before Canada became a dominion, and two generations before any other Colony became a dominion. There could have been no question about consulting them when that obligation was incurred. As a matter of fact, the crisis of the Great War came so suddenly that war was declared in this country before the Dominions clearly understood what it was all about. Nevertheless they sprang instinctively to our side. I am reminded by my right hon. Friend that Canada actually 1623 came to our side before war was declared. But in every Dominion it is widely held, and the democratic spirit requires, that such a thing shall never happen again. If Canadian lives, Australian lives and the blood and treasure of all the other Dominions are to be sacrificed, that can be done only by the decision of their own elected representatives sitting in their own parliaments, and not by the representatives of the British Isles in this Parliament.
If this country is to incur obligations to go to war and those obligations are not endorsed by the Dominions, what is the result? When we ourselves find that we have to go to war as a result of obligations we incur, whether they like it or not, the Dominions are then in a state of war. They may or may not participate, but they are in a state of war. It does not need any exposition now, after the experience of the Great War, to show how greatly even countries not actively participating are affected by hostilities once they break out. But not only that. Take the obligations in the Treaty of Lausanne. Who can say that if the casus foederis contained in Article 18 of the Straits Convention arose, and we were compelled by our own decision, or by the decision of the League, to defend Constantinople and the demilitarised zones—who can say where the hostilities thus started would stop? No man can say where they would stop. These things grow like a prairie fire. Although the Dominions might not participate at the outset they might find that participation was inevitable at a later stage. The only alternative which they would have to being involved in a state of war and probably ultimately in active participation, entailing maybe the sacrifice of many millions, and, what is of more importance, their sons—the only alternative would be to declare their neutrality and to secede from the Empire.
I am sure that every member of this House will agree that it should be the first principle of British statesmanship to avoid putting the Dominions in a dilemma, in which they would either have to enter war by our decision, not by their own, or else to declare their neutrality and secede from the Empire. There is, I believe, only one way of avoiding that, and it is the way laid down by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon 1624 Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) in the negotiations at Paris and afterwards at Washington. It is by making sure, when Treaties of this importance are being negotiated, that the whole British Empire is represented in a British Empire Delegation, and that the responsibility is not laid on purely English representatives speaking for the Empire as a whole. The democratic movement in this country is requiring more and more that obligations of this kind shall be submitted to this Parliament. If we require that in our own case, we must admit it to be equally just in the case of the Dominions. They must have a voice just as we claim a voice; their Parliaments must be able to decide just as this Parliament decides. I hope, therefore that the result of the publication of this correspondence on the Lausanne Treaty will be to lay down that in future we will not adopt that evil precedent, but will adhere to the sound precedent laid down at Paris and at Washington by my right hon. Friend.
§ Mr. RONALD McNEILLI hope that the House will not consider that it is improper for me to intervene at this moment, although I think it is really more an opportunity for the Government to reply to the speech which has just been made. As far as I am concerned, I can be perfectly content to rest upon the reply that was given on this particular question by the Prime Minister when the House was called upon to ratify the Treaty of Lausanne. I understand that the Prime Minister will speak later, and unless his reply be very different from the speech which he made on the occasion to which I have alluded, I certainly would have very little to say in addition to that. But as the hon. and gallant Member who has just spoken said in the course of his speech the main responsibility for what we regard as a very important departure from precedent rests upon the British Government, and as a member of the British Government at the moment when the Treaty of Lausanne was negotiated, I should like at the present moment to say something on the subject. I do not intend to follow in any way the interesting exposition of the hon. and gallant Member in the greater part of his speech as to the general constitutional position of the different parts of the Empire. I do not think I heard anything with which I disagree, and I imagine that 1625 the general principles which he laid down are probably accepted by every Member of this House, at all events in general terms. I do not quite understand, apart from the opportunity of laying down these general principles, what the purpose of the hon. and gallant Member was in bringing this matter up on this occasion. Supposing—I do not admit it—but supposing for the sake of argument that there had been in the course of the negotiations a misunderstanding between the Imperial Government and one of the great Dominions, I should have thought that the more patriotic course was not to have dug it up some time afterwards with a view of emphasising any differences that may have existed between the views of the two Governments.
I must, first of all, entirely traverse the contention of the hon. and gallant Member that in this particular case there was a departure from universal precedent Let the House remember that the negotiations for signing the Treaty of Lausanne really were a continuation of the negotiations for the Treaty of Sevres. The latter Treaty was duly signed by all parties concerned and it was only because owing to the lapse of time it was found impossible to put it into execution, and it therefore required to be modified, that it was necessary to negotiate a fresh Treaty at Lausanne. I am not going into the reasons why the Treaty of Sevres was not carried out. I should have thought that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leith (Captain W. Benn) who I see is amused, and those sitting beside him, would have been the first to desire that the waters of Lethe should pass over that transaction. However that may be, let me remind the House of what actually took place. It was not possible to carry out the Treaty of Sevres before some modification had taken place. How was the Treaty of Sevres negotiated? In the former Debate in the House it was contended by the right hon. Gentleman below the Gangway, and especially by the right hon. Member for the English Universities (Mr. Fisher), that the representatives of the Dominions had taken part in the negotiations for that Treaty. Since that I have gone carefully into what happened. The negotiations for the Treaty of Sevres may be divided into several phases. They begun by two sets of conversations which had taken place in London at the end of 1919. The first of these conversations was 1626 presided over by the right hon. Gentleman who was then Prime Minister at Downing Street, and M. Clemenceau came over from Paris to take part in discussing the preliminary principles. It was a purely Allied conversation at Downing Street. Subsequently, I suppose because it was found that greater detail was required, there was a second set of conversations which took place at the Foreign Office and was presided over by Lord Curzon. That was a meeting of the Ambassadors of the Allies. Up to that point there never had been any suggestion that the Dominions should send representatives. They had in fact not sent representatives and they had never suggested themselves that they ought to be invited to do so. These conversations produced the first draft of what afterwards became the Treaty of Sevres. The venue was then changed to San Remo, where conversations took place and the draft made in London was gone through Clause by Clause and line by line, and it reached its final stage in that Conference. At San Remo again there was no representative of the Dominions present; we never invited any, and it was never suggested that there was any reason why they should be present. The next stage was that the Turks were then invited to send their representatives to Sevres not for discussion, but to sign the Treaty, and it was at this stage for the first time that there was any question of the Dominions participating. The hon. and gallant Member laid great stress on the difference between being asked to sign and being asked to participate. He laid great stress on the importance of the Dominions being asked in all these Treaties both to negotiate and to sign. But even as regards the signature of the Treaty of Sevres so little importance apparently, from the great constitutional standpoint brought forward by the hon. and gallant Member did the Dominions attach to it, so much did they accept it more or less as a matter of formality, that their representatives who came to sign at Sevres were not independent statesmen sent from the Dominions to represent their Governments, but their High Commissioners in London, who went over from here to sign on behalf of the Dominions who had taken no part in the previous negotiations. One Dominion, indeed, was content to be represented by the Counsellor in the British Embassy at Paris. He signed on behalf of New Zea- 1627 land, and it was Only in that way that the signatures of the Dominions were attached to the Treaty.
§ Sir E. GRIGGI am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but will he explain, then, how it comes about that the Dominions quite willingly signed the Treaty of Sèvres, and refused to sign the Treaty of Lausanne?
§ Mr. McNEILLI do not think it is correct to say that they have refused to sign the Treaty of Lausanne, but I am corning to that.
§ Sir E. GRIGGI should have said Canada.
§ Mr. McNEILLThe hon. and gallant Gentleman has made a great deal too much out of the position brought about—I think it hardly amounts to a misunderstanding—on the part of Canada, and Canada alone. The hon. and gallant Gentleman referred to the Imperial Conference, and asked how it had come about that the matter was never mentioned at the Imperial Conference. I was amazed to hear the hon. and gallant Gentleman say that. Has he never looked at the Report of the Conference?—Not only was it mentioned, but it was most seriously discussed, and it takes a very prominent place in the Report. The whole principle upon which different grades of Treaties are to be negotiated, signed and ratified, is gone fully into. May I call the attention of the House to one particular paragraph under the head of "Negotiations" It is at the bottom of page 13, and it says:
Before negotiations are opened with the intention of concluding a treaty, steps should be taken to ensure that any of the other Governments of the Empire likely to be interested are informed, so that if any such Government considers that its interests would be affected, it may have an opportunity of expressing its views, or, when its interests are intimately involved of participating in the negotiations.
§ Sir E. GRIGGI am not quite sure that I understand the right hon. Gentleman. It has been stated frequently that Canada raised no objection whatever at the Imperial Conference to the way in which the Treaty of Lausanne was negotiated and signed. Are we to understand now, as a new fact, that the discussions about the way in which Treaties were to 1628 be negotiated and signed in future arose out of objections taken by Canada? If so, it seems to show that Canada did state objections to the method of negotiation and signature of the Treaty of Lausanne at the Imperial Conference.
§ Mr. McNEILLI am quite willing to give way, but I do not quite see why the hon. and gallant Gentleman should interrupt me at every sentence in my speech, as I understand that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) intends to take part in the Debate.
§ Sir E. GRIGGI am only asking for information.
§ Mr. McNEILLI do not complain, but I think we should really get on better if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would be content with having made his speech and allow me to make mine. As a matter of fact, this question was, as I understand, put on the Agenda of the Imperial Conference, and did not arise, so far as I know, out of any special objection raised by Canada at all; but, of course, it was perfectly open to Canada or any other Dominion, having fresh in their recollection, as they must have had, the whole of the negotiations with regard to Lausanne as an up-to-date example of this particular relationship in the Empire—it was open to them then to discuss the matter and to carry, if they liked, any resolution or take any part they liked in putting on record their opinion with regard to these negotiations.
I was, when I was interrupted, quoting this paragraph in order to show that the Imperial Conference contemplated alternative courses. One was that in the case of these Treaties a Dominion might have an opportunity of expressing its views. It was evidently contemplated that there might be, and would be, cases where the Dominions would be amply satisfied with expressing their views. Then it goes on, as an alternative, that, when its interests are intimately involved, it shall have the opportunity, if it wishes to do so, of participating in the negotiations. With regard to these particular negotiations I think it is apparent, from the correspondence which has been published, that the Canadian Government never did make any categorical request that they should take part in the negotiations. They never, except possibly by 1629 implication, suggested that they would like to do so, and, on the contrary, several times in the course of the negotiations they used these categorical words. In the first telegram in the White Paper, from the Governor-General of Canada, dated 1st November, it is stated, on behalf of the Canadian Prime Minister, that
Our Government has no exception to take to the course pursued by His Majesty's Government with respect to the conclusion of a Treaty to end the War in the Near East.They have no exception to take. It is quite true that later in the telegram the Canadian Prime Minister goes on to say that, so far as regards any obligations that might arise from the Treaty, under the constitutional rule in Canada he must, of course, submit to his Parliament the obligations arising out of the Treaty, just as we here submit the Treaty and the obligations arising under it to this Parliament to express its opinion and ratify it. I understand that the Prime Minister of Canada, quite rightly I have no doubt, had always shown a very keen appreciation of the necessity for this Parliamentary control in Canada, and he had laid so much stress upon it that possibly —I do not say that it was so—his reference to that matter in this telegram may have been taken as really a reiteration of his very well-known opinion upon that subject. Again, later in the correspondence, on the 25th November, the Prime Minister of Canada says:We had no exception to take to Canada not being invited to be represented at the Conference.Surely it is idle to suggest, in the face of this frequent reiteration, that the Canadian Government either then felt themselves aggrieved, or feel themselves aggrieved now, because they were not invited to take part in the negotiations. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that if, at any sufficiently early period, at all events if, before the Conference took place, in reply to the first telegram that was sent to them, the Canadian Government had clearly taken up the attitude which the hon. and gallant Gentleman now takes up on their behalf—if they had definitely stated, "Unless we are invited to take part in the negotiations we cannot accept any responsibility for any Treaty or any obligations under it "—I have not the least doubt that, if that attitude had been taken up from the 1630 first, no misunderstanding of any sort could have arisen, and the Imperial Government would readily have fallen in with any such suggestion. But no such suggestion was made, and I do not think that any of the other Dominions have ever raised the point up to this moment. They always expressed themselves as amply satisfied to be represented at the negotiations by the Foreign Secretary and by our High Commissioner at Constantinople, and they were equally agreeable to have the signatures of those two gentlemen representing them. In these circumstances, I do not myself see that there is any possible ground for the suggestion that there is any grievance or any radical departure—or any departure—from the sound constitutional doctrine in this matter; and when the hon. Gentleman actually says that the Dominions were given no alternative—those were his words, as if a sort of ultimatum was presented at their heads, and it was said, "You have got to accept the signatures of Lord Curzon and Sir Horace Rumbold or leave them, at any rate there is no alternative open to you"—I do not think that anything could be further from the actual facts. The real facts were that they were consulted from the outset as to whether the proposed procedure would be agreeable to them, and they said that they had no exception whatever to take. I do not want to say, and I should be very sorry to say, anything that would appear to be in the smallest degree a reflection on any of the Dominion Governments, but, if there is any misunderstanding at all, it can only have arisen from the fact that the Canadian Government at the outset did not make their position quite so plain as they have made it since. But, even if there was a misunderstanding of that sort, it entirely falls short of the constitutional offence which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has alleged in his speech to the House, and, so far as I am concerned, speaking as a representative of the Government that was then concerned, I do not consider that we have anything whatever for which to apologise.
§ Mr. SPEAKERI think it will be for the convenience of hon. Members if I indicate, as far as possible, how the time available to-day may be distributed among the various subjects. We cannot have an actual hard and fast time table, hut, in view of the subjects which have 1631 been notified to me, I propose to allocate about two hours to the Foreign Office question, then I understood one hour is desired for Indian questions, and after that, about 2 o'clock, Members desiring to raise questions about the present industrial troubles can address themselves to the Ministry of Labour.
§ Captain WEDGWOOD BENNMay I submit to you, Sir, that the rights of private Members on this Adjournment Motion are being steadily curtailed from year to year? There was a time when the Motion was "That this House do now adjourn," and the Government were required to carry that Motion before we did adjourn. Now a new procedure has been introduced, by means of which we have to adjourn at four o'clock in any case, and in a matter of vital Imperial concern—this is a very good case in point—the opportunity of debate is being very much curtailed. I would submit to you that it is a matter for consideration whether, in the future, you should accept such Motions for Adjournment in the form in which they are now made, as they have a prejudicial effect upon the rights of private Members to have an opportunity of intervening in the Debate.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe House has made its decision on that point, and I have nothing to say. All I desired to do was to give the House such information as was in my possession, and to do equal justice to Members in all parts of the House.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI will do my best not to interfere with any arrangements which you. Sir, may think desirable for the convenience of the whole House, but I should like to say this. I cannot conceive a more important subject for discussion by the Imperial Parliament than that which has been raised to-day. It obviously affects the whole constitution of the Empire, and the relations of the Dominions to ourselves and of ourselves to the Dominions. And a time may come when this debate and the effect it will have may exercise an influence beyond calculation upon events in the Empire and in the world. If anything would add to the gravity of the action which was taken by the late Government, it is the defence which has been put forward by the right 1632 hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. He did not apologise He defended it, which means that he thinks it was the right course to pursue; and if another Die-Hard Conservative Government come into power they will do exactly the same thing again. That was a most serious declaration. If he had said, At the time there was a good deal of hurry and the thing had to be done straight away, that would be a different thing, but he defends it as a precedent. He said "It is the right thing to do." I should like to, know whether that is the t view of colleagues of his sitting on that side of the House. Does his Party, which I thought always placed the, unity of the Empire and its strength and integrity high on its banner, really take that view? It Is a very serious action to take. His defence was one which I think has aggravated the whole position. He said "It is the business of the Prime Minister of the day to defend that action." Surely not. He was quite willing to leave it on the defence which he had made. I never heard the Prime Minister defend that action. Does he mean to suggest that the Prime Minister in anything he said in this House defended the action of Lord Curzon in intimating to the Dominions that an agreement had been arrived at with the Allies without consultation with them that they should be excluded from the Conference?
§ Mr. McNEiLLNo.
§ 12 N.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. That shows he has not even read the document. I am not surprised that he knows nothing about it. Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs are not supposed to know what is going on. In fact, they are deliberately kept ignorant lest they should embarrass the Government. They might give information to the House of Commons—a very dangerous thing to do—and therefore, as a rule, men are chosen for that purpose who have considerable glibness without any knowledge. I understand the right hon. Gentleman gave complete satisfaction. But he has had an opportunity of looking into the matter since. Would he mind looking at the first page of this White Paper. What will he see there? Here is a telegram sent by the Prime Minister to his opposite number in the Dominion. It was drafted 1633 in the Foreign Office. I know these things by experience:
According to arrangements agreed upon with French and Italian Governments, each Government will be represented at Lausanne by two plenipotentiaries.That is a telegram sent to Canada intimating that an arrangement had already been arrived at with France and with Italy that Britain should be represented by only two plenipotentiaries. That is not asking their opinion. It is not asking them "Do you want to be represented?" It is stating that an agreement has been arrived at that they should not be there. What else does it mean? Does the right hon. Gentleman really suggest that in the speech of the Prime Minister on the Lausanne Treaty he defended it? If that be the case, it is doubly grave. But I do not understand that it is. I never heard him defend it.
§ Mr. McNEILLThat is really not the point I took up at all. 'The agreement referred to in that telegram, if my information be correct, was arrived at while t he right hon. Gentleman himself was Prime Minister. He knows far more than I do about these matters. Does he really suggest that intimating to the Dominions that an agreement had been come to between the Allies themselves as to the mode of representation, and then asking for their opinion, is an announcement to them of a fait accompli? I absolutely deny it.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEHere again the right hon. Gentleman has not read the document. He says an intimation was given to the Dominions that two representatives were chosen. First he said it was arrived at when I was Prime Minister. That is not correct.
§ Mr. McNEILLI think it was.
§ Mr. McNEILLI certainly do not intend to withdraw, because I believe it is accurate.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEMy recollection is that I certainly was never informed that this was the intention of the Foreign Office, because. I always proceeded upon the opposite assumption, and I do not see why it should have been departed from here. He says in this telegram the Dominions were asked their opinion 1634 whether two representatives would do. There is not. a word to ask them whether that is the case. They are not invited. It is simply an intimation that the Government had decided to do. so. That is a. reversal of the whole process by which the unity of the Empire has been advanced during and since the War, and a serious one, and I should like to know whether hon. and right hon. Gentlemen sitting on those benches, who, I know, have a sincere belief and conviction in the unity of the Empire, approve of conduct of that kind. I do not believe it. They will repudiate that defence, and it is the only possible chance, I think, of this mischief not proceeding as I think it has started.
Then the right hon. Gentleman said, "I will give you an account of how the Turkish Treaty was negotiated. "Where did you get that account Why did not he start a little earlier The main principles of that Treaty were discussed in Paris by the British Empire Delegation. I am not now drawing upon my memory, although I might have done so. I have looked up the whole of the Minutes within the last two or three days, and I say that the main principles were discussed during that British Empire Delegation, where the Prime Ministers of the Dominions were present. We delegated can, of them, Sir Robert Borden, to be our representative on the Commission that settled the question of South-Eastern Anatolia, and the whole of the Turkish possessions in Europe. Mesopotamia Was discussed, Palestine was discussed, Armenia was discussed, Cilicia was discussed, Smyrna was discussed, and Thrace was discussed. The Dardanelles were also discussed. All these vital questions were discussed at Paris, at the meetings of the British Empire Delegation. Not only that, but the British Empire Delegation heard the evidence of the Mohammedans on the decisions that were then being taken. What is the good of saying that the Dominions were not consulted?
I believe it is a complete reversal of the decisions taken at Paris. What were the decisions taken at Lausanne? Before the right hon. Gentleman gets up, he ought to know something about his subject. He does not even know the Treaty of Lausanne. Does he realise that in three important parts it is a complete departure from the decisions taken in Paris? What were they? First of all, with regard to Smyrna and South Eastern 1635 Anatolia, that was a reversal. The Straits is another. You had a decision there, and you had a demilitarised zone, to be occupied and garrisoned by the Allies. Now, you have a demilitarised zone depending entirely upon Turkish Declarations. What were their declarations worth in the late war? Then there is a guarantee of Turkish neutrality by the British Empire. Surely that is a vital distinction. If there is any attack upon their zone, upon Constantinople, upon the Straits, the British Empire by this Treaty is bound to come in—horse, foot and artillery, with all its resources —to defend them from whatever quarter the attack comes. Is not that a vital difference?
What is the third departure? The surrender of the capitulations. You surrendered there, British rights which had been enjoyed by the traders of this country for centuries. That was not in the Paris arrangement. That was not in the Treaty of Sevres. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman has pursued his investigations so far as to inquire how that matter is working. It is a, perfect farce. A case was given to me the other day of a Turkish merchant who insured his ship, I think with a British company. The ship came back without any mishap, and he said "I must get my premium back. Nothing has happened." "Certainly not. That is what you paid on the risk," was the reply. He sued the company in the Turkish Courts, and the Turkish Courts decided that the premium must he returned.
That is the diplomacy that the right hon. Gentleman defended in this House. Those are the three things he defends. Perhaps his right hon. Friend sitting next to him the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Mr. A. Chamberlain) will get up to defend him. I should like to hear anybody defending him, except the honourable member behind him, the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Ormsby-Gore), for reasons that I dare not inquire into. These are the three serious departures. Then the Dominions are told, "We are going to send two men to represent us." No wonder that they protested. The right hon. Gentleman quoted something from the decisions of the late 1636 Imperial Conference. They were a condemnation of the action of the Government. If he had only read this little document from which I am about to quote—it would not have taken him very long; it would have embarrassed him a little bit—he would have known something about the subject. The very last paragraph here, repudiates the quotation which the right hon. Gentleman gave to the House of Commons; the very last three lines. 'He read paragraph (b). This is what the Prime Minister of Canada said:
The provisions thereof with reference to signature 2 (a) on page 14 and ratification (a) on page 15 appear to cover this case which is not within the provisions of signature 2 (b) on page 14 and ratification (b) on page 15.If he had read that, it would have saved my making this point.
§ Mr. McNEILLI am enjoying the comic turn which the right hon. Gentleman is giving, but he cannot go on misrepresenting me, or we shall get into a more serious turn. I never suggested that there was any identity of terms between the Treaty of Lausanne and the Treaty of Sèvres. In connection with the quotation that I made from the Imperial Conference, I am perfectly aware that the Prime Minister of Canada does not think that this particular case comes under that paragraph. I never alleged that it did. What I said was that the whole subject was discussed at the Imperial Conference, and that the Imperial Conference provided for two alternative forms, one that the Dominions should demand to take part in the negotiations, and the other that they should clearly make their views known.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEHere is an action by the late Government which has called forth a protest from our leading Dominion, and which may have a very serious effect upon the unity of the Empire, and the right hon. Gentleman seems to think it is a comedy, and a comic turn.
§ Mr. McNEILLI meant you.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEThat is his view of it. I take a very serious view of 1637 the action of the late Government, and I think we are entitled to ask, and I am sure we shall get an answer from the Prime Minister, whether that is really his view of the extent to which the Dominions ought to be consulted. Apart altogether from what happened in Paris, the right hon. Gentleman has—I do not say deliberately, because he did not know—omitted another most important item in the communications before the Treaty of Sèvres was concluded. What happened in London and what happened in San Remo was communicated, every word of it, to the Cabinets of the Dominions. The same information was given to them before they were asked to sign the Treaty, as was given to the British Cabinet.
§ Mr. McNEILLSo it was in regard to Lausanne.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEIt was not. The Treaty of Sevres was drafted and submitted in draft to the Dominion Cabinets. Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that the Draft Treaty of Lausanne was submitted to the Dominions, and that they were asked to sign it? If not, why does he say that the same course was pursued? If, after discussion with the Turks, there had been an agreement as there was in the other case and a. full copy of the Treaty had been submitted to the Dominions and they had been asked, "Do you approve and will you sign?" at any rate there would have been some consultation. That is what happened in the other case.
§ Brigadier-General Sir HENRY CROFTDid you consult them?
Mr. LLOYD GEORGECertainly, and (01e of the complaints against us was that we had sent a telegram. That is the Diehard intellect. I do not want to be taken away from my argument. Is that really the view that is taken by the present Government of the extent to which we ought to consult the Dominions when there is either a new policy or a departure from an old policy or there are new principles to be applied? If so, the progress made with knitting the Empire together during and after the war is completely arrested. It is unknit. I put this question to the Prime Minister. We are now about to make another attempt to settle the question of reparation upon the basis of a recommendation by an Inter? 1638 allied Commission of experts. Before the Prime Minister proceeds to a conference —because a conference is inevitable—will he consult the Dominions? Will he invite them to be present What steps is be taking to ascertain their views with regard to that settlement?
They have a direct interest in that, settlement. They were very jealous of anything which we did about reparations that in the least prejudiced their quota, however small, of the claim. In some cases it was fairly substantial and in some it was not, but they always insisted, and rightly so, upon being consulted. I would ask the Prime Minister whether he takes the view of the late Government that all he has got to do is to send a telegram, just as he has started to wherever he goes, to say that he and somebody else will represent the British Empire at the Conference, and that he will notify them from time to time of what is happening. I do hope that that is not the case. I have no reason to think that it is, but I should like that doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman opposite repudiated. It is the first opportunity which we have had of raising it. It is not our fault that the matter has not been raised before. These papers have only just been published, and at the first opportunity after the publication of the document we have brought the matter to the notice of the House of Commons. What will be the position now if there is trouble in the East—and it is full of possibilities of trouble? The right hon. Gentleman is wrong if he thinks that this is going to be the last word in the settlement of the Turkish question. There are elements of disintegration in it. I do not believe that the West will stand the surrender of capitulations. It has made business, trade and commerce almost impossible there. There was a very din gerous speech delivered by M. Trotsky the other day.
§ Mr. HAYCOCKIt is repudiated.
§ Mr. HAYCOCKIt is about time you did get a little reliable information.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI know now where to go for it whenever I have to deal with Bolshevism. At any rate that is an indication of the possibilities. M. Trotsky 1639 may not have made that speech, but it is one of the possibilities of the future. Nations do not give up these aspirations merely because there is an interlude of a revolutionary government. France never gave up her aspirations with regard to the Rhine, though she had several revolutions. Russia will not give up her aspirations for Constantinople, for the Dardanelles, for locking up the Black Sea, and her aspirations in the East. She will not give up her aspirations for Armenia merely because she has got an interlude of passivism. All that will come back. And there is Italy. Does anyone imagine that Italy with its swarming populations now living under a foreign flag. {HON. MEMBERS: "Black flag!"] No, no, the flag of America; that is not a black flag, the flag of the Argentine, the flag of France. They live under foreign flags. Does anyone imagine that Italy is going to be satisfied to see these great derelict lands, which were once prosperous under her flag, and which languish under the Turkish, without making some effort?
All that is full of possibilities with regard to the future, and the Turk may always be depended upon to provide the quarrel. He has never failed to do so, and the real trouble is that, owing to the Treaty of Lausanne, he is under the impression that it is a victory. He is giving himself the airs of a. victor. Half his population has gone away by massacre, by deportation and by severance, but he still gives himself the airs of a great civilised Power. Trouble is inevitable in the East, and here we sign a Treaty under conditions by which the Dominions are in a position to say: "We were never consulted. You never asked us. We cannot ratify because it is not our Treaty." Anybody who knows what it meant to have them by our side in the Great War, knows what it will mean if they are in a position to he able to say: "We are not responsible. You did not think it proper to consult us." The possibilities are infinite. They are only 16,000,000 to-day. There are men in this House who will see the Dominions with a population of 100,000,000. It is vital to this great Commonwealth, in the interests of humanity, that every step that is being taken to knit the Empire together by consultation, in common action—
§ Mr. STEPHENA Diehard is listening.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI hope that that is not a purely Diehard doctrine. It would be a sad day for the Empire if that is a doctrine which is to be confined to one party. It is essential to humanity that the whole nation should believe in it. It is essential in the interests of humanity, when a step is taken which reverses progress along the lines of unification, which endangers unification, that it should be promptly repudiated.
§ Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAINMy right hon. Friend at an earlier stage of his speech invited me to intervene in the debate. I did not intend to do so until his last sentence, and now I shall only do so for a moment to express the hope that he will record the sentiment which he has just uttered when we come to divide on Wednesday week.
§ Mr. ORMSBY-GOREI wonder what goad the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) thinks that he has done by raising this question here to-day? What good has he done either towards bringing about peace with Turkey and the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne or towards cementing the unity of the Empire? He has endeavoured to get a partisan score against his former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It is apparently the main object of his speech, but there were phrases in that speech of the most mischievous and disastrous character. I will take one loose phrase, characteristic of the loose phrases that fell from the right hon. Gentleman. He said:
Italy is looking at these great rich lands in tine Near East where formerly the Italian flag used to fly.I remember reading that language in the "Idea Nazionale." under the signature of Signor Luzzati, who said:Wherever the legions of Pompey trod that was Italian soil.That sort of phrase, coming from an ex-Prime Minister, is taken up in Italy and serves to fan the flames of a new Italia irredenta. It serves to excite Italian ambitions and to excite Turkish fears. But there was something much worse than that that fell from the right hon. Gentleman. Of course, one of the objects of this Debate is to make a further attack on the Treaty of Lausanne and a further attack, in particular, on the Straits Convention. What did the right hon. 1641 Gentleman say this afternoon He said that there are three things in the Treaty of Lausanne not in the Treaty of Sèvres, and one of those is a commitment that the British Empire—and these were his words:must go with all its forces, horse, foot, and artillery, to the defence of Turkey.That is not in the Straits Convention, and it is use of language of that kind that does infinite harm in the Dominions, in this country and in Turkey and endangers peace. What is the commitment? Not that the British Empire alone, but that the British Empire, Japan, France, and Italy shall guarantee the demilitarised zones by such means as shall be defined by the Council of the League of Nations. Is that a commitment of the British Empire as a whole and alone to go with all its forces, horse, foot- and artillery, under any circumstances? [HON. MEMBERS: "He did not say alone."] That is exactly is the impression which the right hon. Gentleman intended to convey. That is the impression which he wants telegraphed out to Canada and to Australia. That is his object—once more to fan the flames of distrust and unrest between this country and Turkey and. to make it difficult for the right hon. Gentleman, the Prime Minister, to get the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, and to make it difficult for us to get peace. Let us get hack to this much criticised telegram of 27th October. This telegram was sent by the Colonial Office and not by the Foreign Office.
§ Mr. ORMSBY-GOREThe date is very important. The Carlton Club meeting, when, thanks to the efforts of some of us, we got rid from our Party of the influence -of the right hon. Gentleman—and as far as I am concerned, if there be one thing care about in politics, it is to keep that influence out of our party for ever—took place on 22nd October, and the Government, of which the right hon. Gentleman was the head, came to an end on 23rd October. I am not aware whether the new Government was actually sworn in when this telegram was sent.
§ Captain BENNWho was the Foreign Secretary
Mr. ORSMBY-GOREThe right hon. Gentleman's own Foreign Secretary must 1642 have been engaged in negotiations, under his leadership, with the French and Italian Governments with regard to the date of the meeting at Lausanne. It is perfectly obvious from the context that we were invited to send representatives to Lausanne on the 13th November. That date was arranged before the Carlton Club meeting and not after, because it was a matter of urgency. One of the reasons why the Dominions were not actively encouraged at that moment to send delegations to Lausanne was undoubtedly the situation that had arisen as the result of the Chanak and Mudania Conferences. Who was responsible for that? I seem to remember the Garden City telegram, and I am not sure that the hon. and gallant Member who introduced the debate did not have something to do with that telegram.
§ Sir E. GRIGGI was in Geneva.
Mr. ORSMBY-GOREWell, I withdraw it. At any rate, it is common knowledge that it had little to do with the Foreign Office. That war telegram—
§ Captain BENNThat was the left wing of the Tory party.
§ Mr. ORMSBY-GOREIt is very important in this matter. It is a small point whether a particular person or a particular Secetary of State was responsible on a paticular date, but it has been made a charge against us on this side of the House that we were responsible for going back upon the method of Dominion Conference that had been adopted at Paris after the War. A sufficient answer is that at the recent Imperial Conference our Government went fully into the whole question, and so that there should he no misunderstanding defined and laid down our attitude in this matter, and here it is fully set out in paragraph 9 of the White Paper headed "Negotiation, Signature, and Ratification of Treaties." That represents the view of the Conservative party of the present day as to how this machinery ought to be worked. We set our signature to that Resolution, and that Resolution, until the present or a future Government alter it in any way, represents the view of our party and of the Government of which we were Members. Therefore, it is absurd to say that we have gone back upon a precedent created in the Paris negotiations, because this is a clear definition both in regard to 1643 negotiations and in regard to signature and in regard to ratification with the most detailed information of the exact position.
In this connection the outstanding fact is the critical situation in the Dardenelles at the time of the fall of the right hon. Gentleman's Government and the urgent necessity of getting into conference with the Turkish Government without even 24 hours' delay, if such delay could be avoided. Let us face the fact, and let the Dominions face the fact that from time to time these regrettable situations do arise. Complaints that the matter came as a surprise were made both from Australia and from Canada when they got the famous Chanak telegram that must be borne in mind. But the situation had arisen, and it goes the whole way back to Smyrna. All the tragedy of the situation goes back to that fatal backing of the Greeks and then letting them down. A situation may arise in the future and is bound to arise —and the Dominions had better face it—which may require emergency treatment. How that emergency treatment can best be reconciled with proper Dominion sentiment which we, on this side, fully recognise, is a matter to be worked out in the future. I believe that, with the possible exception of Canada, at this moment the majority of the Dominions are anxious that the Treaty of Lausanne should be ratified at the earliest possible moment. It is of enormous importance to the Empire and to the Dominions. I believe it is quite as important to Canada as to Australia and New Zealand. The Dardanelles, the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar are the three strategic points on the communications of the Navy with the Pacific Dominions and with Aden and Singapore. But it is essential that the Dominions should realise how inter-dependent the parts of the Empire are on a major question of policy such as the Dardanelles is always bound to be.
Canada will inevitably realise that in the event of the British Empire being involved in difficulties in the Near East, she will be involved as an Empire. There is no getting away from that fact. It touches India. It touches the whole Mohammedan interests of the Empire; it touches Australia, New Zealand, all our possessions in that direction, and 1644 it is quite impossible for any foreign country to treat any part of the British Empire as being neutral or to respect a declaration of neutrality from any part of the Empire if Britain is engaged on an issue such as could conceivably arise were the Council of the League of Nations to say that it is an obligation of honour on France, Italy, Japan and Great Britain to defend the Straits against aggressive action. For the moment it is perfectly clear that Canada is feeling the tremendous influence of public opinion in the prairie provinces which is shy of Canada entering into commitments similar to those which Australia and New Zealand are willing to undertake. That is, perhaps, natural, owing to the geographical position of Canada and the economic condition of the Western Provinces. But I think a very ill-service is done by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs in attempting to raise this matter at this moment. I cannot believe it will help in the solution of the difficulty raised by Canada, and I only hope that the Prime Minister, when he speaks this afternoon, will be able to reassure the House on this point, in spite of past misunderstandings and in spite of possible difficulties that may have 'become apparent to the mind of the Prime Minister of Canada which were not apparent when this matter was discussed at the Imperial Conference. When this matter was discussed at the Imperial Conference, the Prime Ministers were unanimous in their views regarding the situation in the Near and Middle East. The Conference recorded its satisfaction at the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey, and added that:
An end had thus been brought to a period of acute political tension, military anxiety and financial strain, and more particularly, had great relief been given to the sentiment of the Moslem subjects in the British Throne in all parts of the world.That was the view taken by the Prime Minister of Canada officially, then. That I believe is still his view to-day and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to inform the House that the Prime Minister of Canada has seen his way to authorise him, as the other Prime Ministers have done, to proceed immediately with the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne. It is most important that the document should be ratified; so much depends upon it.1645 The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs spoke about Turkish justice. It is very easy to laugh at Oriental peoples in the House of Commons but it does not do any good; it does a great deal of harm. It is very easy to bring up cases of that kind but is that the right way of getting a remedy? If he objects to that so much, then the right hon. Gentleman's proper duty is to say, "Abolish this. Tear up this Treaty and go to war with Turkey." That is the alternative. If he is going to fight for capitulation he will have to send the whole British Army and the Navy to get it. The right hon. Gentleman is abusing this Government and the late Government for faults in the Treaty. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] He abuses the Treaty which the Prime Minister is recommending to the House for ratification.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI do not mind abusing any Government if I think there is any ground for doing so, but I certainly did not make any attack upon the present Government in that respect. They are not in the least responsible for any of these Conferences nor for the action taken there. On the contrary, when it was suggested that the Prime Minister had accepted responsibility, I said I never heard him do so in this House.
§ Mr. ORMSBY-GOREI withdraw that remark. But at any rate the present Government recommend this House to ratify the Treaty which the right hon. Gentleman has criticised so violently to-day. We support the Government, and I hope we shall not have any more of these interpellations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs on the subject of foreign policy. My view is that for four years most of our troubles were caused by the right hon. Gentleman's method of conducting foreign policy, particularly in the Near East, and I hope that when matters are difficult, and when such negotiations as the Mosul negotiations and all they involve in the East are taking place, we shall not have Debates which tend to show divisions in our ranks in this House and divisions in the unity of the Empire, but that we shall all co-operate to get a real peace with Turkey, and real unity of the Empire, instead of making these foreign and Dominion questions the subjects of mere partisan quarrels—which is the sole 1646 object of the Liberal Members below the Gangway.
§ The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald)I hope the House will not only excuse me, but understand me, if I do not enter into this controversy at all. I have looked at the papers, and the only contribution I can make to this historical controversy now is this. I venture to prophesy that when all these incidents, beginning with the intimation that Lord Curzon made to the Dominions that it was proposed that the Lausanne Conference should be taken part in by two representatives for the whole British Empire—when that story begins to be written, it will not be contained in the first chapter of the story, but in at any rate, the fifth, the sixth, or the eighth, and it may be the eleventh or the twelfth. In the preliminary chapters, which must be studied and understood before this is understood, I am afraid that the right hon. Member for the Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) will play a part which will be a little bit more prominent than he cares to confess this afternoon.
§ The PRIME MINISTERThat is all the contribution I am going to make to history, but I think the House will again understand that my real interest in this Debate is as to how far it is going to help me, and I am sorry to say that, instead of helping me, it looks as though it might hinder ins. I have been doing my best to get the Lausanne Treaty ratified. I have explained several times to this House why I was doing that. Until the Lausanne Treaty is ratified, until it is folded up and put away as something that is complete, we really cannot go on settling the affairs of the Near East. I cannot say that I have any grievances with Canada, because. I have none. The only thing that I think everybody will regret—and I am sure that Mr. Mackenzie King will regret this as much as I do—is that there has been a lack of clear, definite statement, that if it had been known right away from the beginning that the Dominions really objected to what was proposed, then it would have given the Government of the day an opportunity of reconsidering its decision. I think, perhaps, there was more politeness than definiteness in the opening moves of the game, and then what do we find? We find that, as stage after stage 1647 is reached, the opposition becomes more and more definite, but it reveals itself at points when it is impossible to go back, and rectify any mistake that may have been made. That is the criticism that I should make, in the most friendly' and, I hope, understanding way, of what actually produced the situation which I had to face when I came into office. I am very glad to say that, as fax as Canada is concerned, it agrees, it acquiesces now, in the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. There is still the question of the Irish Free State, and I have been engaged during the middle of this week in trying to clear away the difficulties that are in the way of that. Whether I have been successful or not, I do not care to say, but I hope that the explanations given will enable me at last to advise the ratification, and close the whole chapter. The important matter for me to-day, and for the House, is this: What is going to be our future procedure? I stand by the Resolution of "Negotiation, signature and ratification of Treaties" which is found on page 13 of the Report of the last Imperial Conference. That Resolution, as far as I am concerned, will always be put into operation.
§ Captain BENNAre they ratifying under sub-head (a) or under sub-head (b)?
§ The PRIME MINISTERThey are ratifying. That is enough for me.
§ Captain BENNBut are they undertaking the obligations of the Treaty?
§ The PRIME MINISTERThey are ratifying. The correspondence is being published. [Interruption.] If these things, discussed in this way, are to help us, I am at the service of the House, I am at the service of a party in the House of Commons, but it is enough for me that this Treaty is to be ratified. That is not perhaps quite enough for the House, but I imagine that neither my hon. and gallant Friend nor myself can now shift. The important thing is that we will see that we go right, provided another treaty of the same kind has to be negotiated. So I am making no partisan statement at all, not in the least, and I say that I take my stand upon this Resolution: "Negotiation, signature, and ratification of Treaties." I wish to say, in all justice to my predecessor, that that Resolution was 1648 not put down on the agenda of the Imperial Conference because some Dominion forced his hand. It was put down on his own initiative, and appeared on the original agenda issued for the Conference. Therefore, in saying that, I feel I have the support of all the parties in the House in making the declaration—that so long as I am responsible for the Foreign Office and the Government these will be the provisions that are carried out.
I would like to add this, however, and this is really all the contribution I am going to make. If hon. Members, and especially right hon. Members who have been at the Foreign Office and have been responsible for its work, either directly or indirectly, will look at the wording of those Resolutions, they will see that they are by no means water-tight, they will see that they are by no means definite; they will see that they require to be supplemented and interpreted. I am going to make no pledge on this to-day, but I would like to tell the House what is in my mind. I think the time has come when we have to consider, in view of present circumstances, what machinery is required to be created for the conduct of a united Imperial policy, particularly as regards foreign affairs. We have gone through various stages. There was a time when we never considered our Dominions at all. Whoever sat over there at the Foreign Office considered the responsibilities of the Empire as though he, without consulting with anybody, except perhaps the Cabinet, of which he was a Member, could say what was right or what was wrong. Then we got to another stage, when we informed the Dominions—we gave them information—as to what we were doing. That is done now pretty fully. But very likely a self-respecting people like the people who inhabit our Dominions will not be content with that. If I send a weekly telegram, or if the Colonial Office sends a weekly telegram, to the Dominions saying that the foreign news of the week is so and so, and so and so, naturally the Ministers of Australia, Canada, South Africa and so on will begin to express opinions.
That brings us to a very undefined situation. Must I respect those opinions? Must I yield to those opinions if they come with the weight, not of one Dominion, but of three or four Dominions, even against my own? Is that enough? 1649 Opinions expressed at the end of a very, very long cable are net negotiations, are not exchanges of opinion, and the whole question opens up whether it is possible —not only possible; if that were all, I should be a little more content to let things drift—but whether it is necessary to supplement information by creating a contact which comes nearer to a sharing of obligations I, therefore, think that, without much delay, if we are going to enter into any further negotiations that will commit either the honour or the resources of the Empire, that these Resolutions should be made the subject of a very careful inquiry by constitutional representatives of the Dominions as well as ourselves—representatives of the Dominions, constitutional authorities, men who have had experience of government, and experience of constitutional working, sitting with us as a sort of specialised sub-committee, or committees of the Imperial Conference, that will explore with the authorities here—with all our experience of the difficulties of conducting foreign affairs—to see if we cannot make some of these provisions a little more definite than they are, so as to remove all misunderstandings.
There is one thing more we must ask for, and must not forget—my hon. Friend opposite mentioned it—and that is, it is essential we should have the power of rapid decision. I could give at least three important illustrations of this from my own very, very brief experience. Perhaps I had better riot, but on three important occasions it was very necessary I should take my courage in my hands, and risk the consequences, and say, "That is our decision" and on each occasion the events justified the action taken. But that must be safeguarded. The whole question is now, after the War, new conditions have come in, and there has been a tremendous change in the minds of the Dominions, made by what is known as the Chanak telegram. They will never go back on that—we have evidence of it every week. That marked a decisive change in the intellectual and sympathetic relations between the Dominions and ourselves, and it called for the creation of a machine, because, to a very large extent, confidence had been destroyed. I repeat it not only here, but I daresay this will go outside. I make no proposal. I do not commit myself to this, 1650 but, in order to satisfy the House that His Majesty's Government are not overlooking what really may very rapidly develop into a situation that is almost impossible, I wish to assure the. House, by making that statement, we are not overlooking the matter. Of course, before anything is done of a definite character, I shall communicate these ideas to the House in a snore definite form, but I am sure whoever goes to the Foreign Office, and is responsible for the foreign policy of this country, must go back to these Resolutions, and develop them as far as possible.
§ 1.0 P.M.
§ Captain BENNI think the House will agree that this Debate has been justified, if only by the statement of the Prime Minister that the procedure which was adopted in relation to the Lausanne Treaty vis-à-vis the Dominions, is not going to be adopted, at least by the Dominion; in future negotiations of this kind. It is a vital matter. It is not denied by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. R. McNeill). The hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) made a long attack on Lord Curzon. He said a great many things, but he did not deny that a mistake had been made on this occasion. The late Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs defended this procedure. The Prime Minister has repudiated the procedure.
§ Mr. R. McNEILLI never defended it. What I defended was, and contend now was done, was putting the whole position before the Dominion; and asking for their opinion. As I have been accused of not reading the Papers, may I call the hon. and gallant Gentleman's attention to this paragraph, in the very first telegram that was sent by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of Canada, after the paragraph to which exception has been taken, setting out the agreement which had been come to with the Allies—
His Majesty's Government trusts that this procedure will be in accordance with, wishes of your Government.That was definitely asking for their views upon this procedure. The hon. and gallant Member may, or may not, say that that purpose was carried out, but it is that procedure which I have defended, and nothing else.
§ Captain BENNThe right hon. Gentleman attempts to make out that an intimation to the Dominions by Lord Curzon—because he was the person responsible—that we had entered into an agreement with our Allies that two plenipotentiaries should be appointed was an invitation to them to appoint representatives to take part in the negotiations. It was nothing of the kind. The right hon. Member goes on to pretend that the procedure in the case of Lausanne was the same as the procedure in the matters of the other three Treaties, but Mr. Mackenzie King repudiates that view. After all, the important thing in this Debate is not our view of what Mr. King should think, but what Mr. King does think. That is the material point. The important thing is that the opinion of the Prime Minister of Canada is that the Resolutions of the Imperial Conference regarding the Treaties, in which all the Empire was concerned, were not observed in this case.
The hon. Member for Stafford told us perfectly truly that all parts of the Empire were inter-dependent in this matter. Is that not an argument for persuading the Dominions to come in and participate, and assume an obligation? He repudiates the procedure in this matter. I am not surprised, because his vigorous criticism of Lord Curzon has been constant and very convincing. There was one contribution to this Debate which really must not be overlooked, and that was a contribution made by the right hon Member for West Birmingham (Mr. A. Chamberlain). We are talking about the foundations of the British Commonwealth, and we allege that those foundations are these: that we spread among people of the British race in various parts of the world where they settle, the same principles of government, the same liberty and freedom that we enjoy ourselves. That is what the Debate is about to-day—whether this freedom is to take place, or whether Lord Curzon is to govern the Empire without participation by its representations. That is the point. That is the essential division between the Liberal and the Tory view of the Empire.
We believe that the basis of Empire is the spread of liberty. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham has got his basis of Empire on 33⅓ per cent.: that is his conception. His conception is by conciliating some petty 1652 material interests in the Dominions you bind together the Empire. He cannot conciliate the major material interests—not even by putting a tax upon food and materials in this country. That is their conception of the problem. Our conception is different—the spread of liberty the giving to our own race the same freedom that we ourselves enjoy. That is a conception opposed to tariffs. I can remember on two occasions that support our view. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Canterbury (Mr. R. McNeill) is one of the Empire builders. What was his view and the view of his Leaders when it was a matter of giving liberty to South Africa. His then Leader in this House, now Earl Balfour, opposed the grant of a Constitution to South Africa! What has the right hon. Gentleman himself done in the matter of Ireland? For years he kept his feet upon the neck of Ireland. He was a physical force man. He was one of those Constitutionalists who threatened to take up arms, assisted to set up a provisional Government in Ulster, and assisted other men that opposed the British Government in Ireland.
§ Lieut.-Colonel FREMANTLEAs a matter of history, does the hon. and gallant Gentleman remember the grant of the Lyttleton Constitution which was proposed by the same party for South Africa
§ Captain BENNWhat would have been the result if the Lyttleton Constitution had been left? Do hon. Gentlemen suppose that when the War broke out there would have been the demonstrations of loyalty and help that we had? My final point is that this Debate brings out two conceptions of Empire—this is not an attack upon the Government—it is too late now to destroy the Treaty of Lausanne. It is the presentation of the two conceptions of Empire. If right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite suggest that the Empire is to be founded upon tariff we reply that the true foundation of Empire is liberty.