§ Sir W. BULLCan the Prime Minister now give us the decision of the Government with regard to the Channel Tunnel?
§ The PRIME MINISTERThe Government have had under consideration the question of the Channel Tunnel, which was brought to their notice by the Members of the House of Commons Channel Tunnel Committee. In a Memorandum with which the Committee were good enough to furnish me, it is stated that virtually 400 Members of this House have now declared their intention to support the scheme. Some Members attached the condition, to which the House of Commons Channel Tunnel Committee assented, that the approval of the naval and military authorities and of the 1783 Committee of Imperial Defence should first be given, and the Committee gave me to understand that the promoters would, in the absence of such approval, be unwilling to launch the project.
I accordingly decided to refer the matter to the Committee of Imperial Defence; and, partly in order to reinforce the Government by the opinion of those who had had the responsibility of deciding this question in the past, and, partly with a view to removing it altogether from the sphere of party politics, I invited the four former Prime Ministers, who had been chairmen of the Committee of Imperial Defence [Lord Balfour, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Baldwin], to attend a meeting on the subject.
The members of the Committee of Imperial Defence, including the former Prime Ministers, were given all possible information bearing on the subject. Apart from several communications from the House of Commons Channel Tunnel Committee, including some notes on French official opinion, and the verbatim notes of their deputation to myself, the Committee of Imperial Defence were furnished with an exhaustive summary of the earlier History of the question. In addition, they had before them a series of Papers on the subject, prepared in several of the Government Departments in the year 1920. These included Memoranda by the General Staffs of the three Services, as well as a very complete Report prepared in 1920 by the Home Ports Defence Committee on the safeguards to be imposed from a defensive point of view, if the tunnel should be built, and the considered opinions of a number of Ministers. Memoranda on the commercial and transport aspects of the scheme were furnished on the present occasion by the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Transport respectively. Finally, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff met a few days before the main Committee, and furnished a Joint Report on the military aspects of the problem. They supplemented this Report by verbal statements at the meeting.
Thus the Committee had before them, not only the views of their predecessors, but a series of Memoranda on the latest aspects of the project, prepared in the light of war experience and post-war con- 1784 ditions. There was, therefore, no side of the question on which the fullest possible information was not available.
I think that most of those present, like myself, had approached the subject with a certain pre-disposition in favour of the Channel Tunnel. When the evidence came to be discussed, however, it was found that everyone had been forced to an opposite conclusion. The advice of the staffs of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry was against the project. While the scheme offered very slight attractions from a military point of view, it was found to involve considerable military disadvantages.
From the point of view of security, the Committee of Imperial Defence do not wish to overstate the risk. But they are advised, as their predecessors were advised, that there is unquestionably an element of danger involved. While naval and military opinion in the past has differed considerably as to the extent of this danger, there appears no room for doubt that the existence of a tunnel would be bound to add something to the anxieties of those responsible for national defence, to our commitments, and to our expenditure.
And, as pointed out by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in a statement on the subject in this House in 1907,
Even supposing the military dangers involved were to be amply guarded against, there would exist throughout the country a feeling of insecurity which might lead to a constant demand for increased expenditure, naval and military, and a continued risk of unrest and possibly alarm, which, however unfounded, would be most injurious in its effect, whether political or commercial.The Committee were also advised that, if ever the tunnel was built, Government ownership would tend to facilitate the taking of measures whether for its security or destruction.Having examined the defence aspects of the question, the Committee turned to its civil aspects, in order to ascertain whether there were overriding advantages which would justify them in advising that the military risks involved should be run.
The Committee were informed that the construction of the Channel tunnel would have but little effect on the foreign trade, of this country. The question of passenger traffic is alone important, and by it the Channel tunnel scheme as a com- 1785 mercial enterprise must stand or fall. If, however, the tunnel, when completed, succeeded in attracting passenger traffic to the extent which its promoters hope for, one result would be the gradual disappearance of the cross-Channel steamship services.
As regards relief to unemployment, the Parliamentary Committee estimate that on the tunnel itself about 2, 500 men would find employment on the English side, and an equal number on the French side of the Channel. There would, in addition, be consequential employment elsewhere, and one of the estimates in the memorandum of the Channel Tunnel Committee was for an over-all figure of 12, 000 workers in Great Britain and 12,000 in France.
The Committee of Imperial Defence were unanimous that the advantages of the Channel Tunnel were not commensurate with the disadvantages from a defence point of view. Further, they took the view that all that has happened in the last five years in the way of naval, military and air development has tended, without exception, to render the Channel Tunnel a more dangerous experiment.
That was the unanimous opinion of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who accordingly recommended that, at the present time, the Channel Tunnel ought not to be proceeded with.
In view of this, the Government had no alternative but to accept the advice of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
§ Sir W. BULLWill the right hon. Gentleman, at the earliest convenient opportunity, take the necessary steps to secure the appointment of a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, with a view to examining afresh in public this very important Imperial question, especially with regard to the entirely new conditions which have arisen since the inquiry held by the Joint Committee, over which Lord Lansdowne presided, in 1833?
§ The PRIME MINISTERI think I had better have notice of that question. I am only too glad to secure that this project should receive the most complete examination, but I think it would be necessary before an answer could be given that soundings should be taken as to the opinion of the House through the usual channels, and after that has been done if a question is addressed to me I 1786 shall be very glad to give a decision upon it.
§ Mr. R. McNEILLDoes the right hon. Gentleman imagine that a decision by a Select Committee of the two Houses could possibly carry the same weight as the opinion of the Imperial Defence Committee?
§ The PRIME MINISTERI do not think so.