§ Question again proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."
§ Mr. MOSLEYI was trying to emphasise, as has already been emphasised, the urgency of the factor of time in this consideration. As I endeavoured to point out, prior to the reassembly of Parliament, the very gravest situation, an irreparable situation, may have arisen upon the Continent of Europe, and I was therefore trying to urge upon His Majesty's Government that whatever measures they may see fit to adopt should be adopted at the very earliest possible moment. So far, there is a grave suspicion that the Government of France have been playing for time, and that our Government have been 1824 playing into their hands in that endeavour. We find M. Poincaré engaged with one hand in smashing to pieces the last vestiges of our great European markets, while with the other hand he is throwing diplomatic bouquets to this country, and something more is required of our statesmanship than to catch those bouquets and to throw them back. That is the pastime which in the past has been called preserving the Entente, and it is a game the expenses of which are paid by the people who walk our streets in starvation.
The French view is, that even if Germany collapses, if chaos supervenes in Europe, that is all for the benefit of France. Her problems, of security, will then be solved. There will be no more danger of a German menace. There is also the view that in this way, by a system of organised loot operating in chaos, she stands as much chance of getting reparation as in any case, and so the view is held that, whatever happens, France scores and England loses. She gets security, and as much reparation as she will ever get, and we lose our markets and our last chance of obtaining reparation from a coherent and ordered Government in Germany. Therefore, we cannot afford, as the French Government believe they can afford, to let the situation drift on until chaos and anarchy supervene on the Continent of Europe. What are the Government going to do in this situation? They have tried the method of persuading France to take a reasonable point of view, a method which, from the outset, was doomed to failure by one very simple consideration. It stood to reason that if there was to be any solution of reparations on the lines we desire, that is, a cessation of economic vandalism in Europe, someone had got to tell the French people that, as a result of their Ruhr intervention, they would obtain not more, but less, by way of reparation, and you always get back to that fundamental factor. To talk of all these formulae of a cessation of passive resistance, of invisible occupation, and all the rest of it—these are the formulae in which statesmen in difficulties wrap themselves like silkworms in their cocoons. They mean nothing. You always get back to the fundamental fact that, as a result of the Ruhr occupation, France will not get more, but less, and there is no French statesman who can go 1825 to his countrymen and enlighten them upon that point without being overthrown the next day.
Therefore, a mere policy of trying to persuade France must always be doomed to failure, because no French statesman can afford to be reasonable. You have got to devise some policy which, in some way, saves the face of French statesmanship, or induces or compels the French nation to reason. As I conceive, there are two possible methods by which that might be done. The first is release France from inter-Allied debts, surrender your share of reparation, in fact do everything which the Government are refusing to do. That would mean that the occupation of the Ruhr had not broken the passive resistance of the German Government, but had broken the passive resistance of the British Government. We may well come to that. It may be a feasible policy. It may be possible to bribe the French out of the Ruhr. There is another policy, which has been urged time after time from these benches, and which the Government have always rejected, and that is the policy of mobilising world opinion, morally and economically, through the League of Nations, employing Article 11 of the League, and organising such an array of righteous force throughout the world that no one Power, however powerful, could afford to stand up against it. I believe those practical policies might be used in conjunction one with another with success—a measure of generous financial provision in conjunction with economic and moral pressure through the League of Nations. I very much doubt if this Government can use either method. They cannot be generous with their debts, or surrender their debts; their supporters will not allow it. The right hon. Member for the Hillhead Division of Glasgow (Sir R. Home) came down yesterday and conjured up a terrible picture of releasing Germany from its obligations, and said that Germany, by the policy of inflation, had put itself in such a position that it could challenge the industrial supremacy of Europe. As I listened to him, and heard the magnificent result of a policy of inflation, I was tempted to inquire why, during his tenure of office, he had pursued a policy of acute deflation. On 1826 some occasion I should very much like the right hon. Gentleman to enlighten us upon the point. With the views prevailing on those benches, we are unlikely to give any generous settlement on the lines of surrendering some of our claims to debt and reparation. There is also not much chance of the alternative policy being pursued. Many Members opposite do not believe in the League of Nations and certainly not in its being called into this dispute, and, in fact, in the statements made by the Prime Minister a few weeks ago and today there has not been one reference to the League of Nations, or any probability that the problem is likely to be handed over to its jurisdiction.
What is the policy which this Government is likely to pursue before Parliament re-assembles? We have seen that policy adumbrated to a certain extent in the inspired Press. It is, apparently, if they are going to do anything at all, a policy of proceeding single-handed and trying to impose by various means, mostly by persuasion, the will of this country upon France. If we fail in that, we are, apparently, to do some separate deal with Germany. We are to muddle along in a single-handed fashion, trying to scrape what we can for ourselves out of the European mess. I believe that to be a policy full of peril. I believe it is a policy of stroking the nettle instead of grasping it, with the result that we are likely to be very badly stung. Supposing France said, "Any separate dealings with Germany are a breach of your obligations under the Treaty of Versailles, and we regard it as a hostile act," we may, in the irresponsible position of the back benches, envisage these prospects. What will happen then? This country may be put to the most humiliating diplomatic reverse in the whole of its history. That is a very dangerous policy fraught with peril. I believe that what appears the bolder policy, which has been rejected so consistently from the Government benches, the policy of bringing this matter forward under Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, instead of trying to impose our own will in a single-handed policy, is the only feasible policy, the sanest policy, the policy which holds out by far the greatest prospect of success. France could not say it is a hostile act. We have a friendly right under the Covenant. 1827 She must automatically consent to that inquiry, which, by the method of the old diplomacy, she is now frustrating. Directly the matter comes under the Council, it is in the light of day, and the country must defend its position, in front of the full glare of world opinion, to the nations of the world. You may say France may break her obligation under the Covenant, and, incidentally, the Treaty of Versailles, because the Covenant was part of that Treaty.
But does anyone seriously suggest that the French nation is going to break with the world, to put themselves in an unreasonable and a hopeless position in an issue of this sort? She shows a particular anxiety at the moment not to do anything of the sort, an anxiety not to have a break, to play for time; above all, not to be isolated from that little country Belgium. When we observe her frantic efforts to keep Belgium on her side, can anyone say she would be prepared to break with every great country in the world. I do not believe France would pursue any such policy. I believe that, whatever be the motives of France, this represents the safest and most feasible policy of this country. She may accede to a League policy. She cannot accede to an English policy, and justify herself to her own people. No French statesman could possibly do that. The League policy no doubt holds out the best hopes of success whatever view we may take of the motion of M. Poincare. If he is a man who has been driven too far, and in reality knows in his innermost soul of the failure of his own plan, this gives him the chance to save his face with his own people. By the intervention of the machinery of the League of Nations he may be enabled to say to his people that his policy had succeeded, but that this intervention had robbed them of the fruits of victory—it would save his face. He might abuse us in public, but thank us in private. This would be a diversion and a distraction of which he may stand in need. Supposing on the other hand his designs are more sinister and he is aiming at the break-up of Germany—at smashing the economic position of Europe, well, then, in the face of such a criminal and outrageous design you would mobilise whatever police force there is in the world. There are other advantages. 1828 You are breaking away from all those ghastly traditions of Secret Diplomacy which over and over again have inundated the world with blood, by bringing the whole thing out into the plain light you are exposing it so that it may be publicly discussed. You are putting those who object into the position of defending their position. You are organising all the great and peaceful opinion of the nations which exists throughout the world, in every people, amongst the simple and ordinary people.
I hope the Government will cease playing this sinister game of chess with France in which the destinies of millions of people are involved, and instead take their case into the high court of the world, and have it decided in what should be the great tribunal of the nations. There are two distinct and absolutely different methods of doing these things. There is the new method, the League method, and there is the old method by which diplomatists creep from Foreign Offices to Foreign Offices in the dark, and we find a handful of men taking great decisions which might affect millions of the people in privacy and secrecy. So we will in this way drift back to a system which may mean that the whole world may be ultimately aflame with war. I would beg the Government to break with these old vicious methods, and to try the new method which, at least, has never been tried, in the place of the old method which has been tried and found wanting; to come forward in the full light of day and to trust the will of the ordinary people of the world to fight their battle on the side and in the cause of peace. If they do that, they may yet emblazon the pages of history with the glory of their achievement.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI am very reluctant to intervene in this Debate. I realise what are the difficulties of any Government dealing with this problem. It is assumed, perhaps too readily, that the British Goernment can always take a course in reference to foreign policy on the same lines as they can in regard to their domestic policy. That is not the case. Anyone who had to deal with problems which involve the interests, traditions, and prejudices of four or five other countries knows how exceedingly difficult it is to pursue the policy 1829 which he conceives to be the best. In this particular problem you have got to carry along with you France, Belgium, and Italy; occasionally you have got to consider the United States of America, although they are not there to present their views. Each of these countries has got a different point of view. It has got a different interest in the problem of reparation. It has got a different fundamental view in regard to its attitude towards Germany, and having had several years' experience of trying to work well with these various countries, I am not disposed to go out of my way to blame any Government that fails to secure complete unanimity. I am not getting up for the purpose of doing so. What I am disappointed at is, that the Government have not taken the House of Commons and the country more into their confidence as to what they are going to do. I believe that to be the right course. When I listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. J. R. MacDonald) I thought that he knew a good deal more than anybody else in the House of Commons. I assumed he did because there was nothing in the statement of the Prime Minister that justified in the least the assumpion which he drew in regard to the policy of the Government.
So I thought the Leader of the Opposition might have been taker into the confidence of the Prime Minister, and be informed of what their policy really was His eagle eye seems to have discovered a definite policy. My perception is much too dim to discover anything approaching a definite policy. I am really at a loss to know, after listening twice to the Prime Minister, and with some inside knowledge of what the problem means, I am utterly at a loss to know what is the policy of the Government. So far as I can see, there is only one announcement which the Prime Minister made, and that was that he proposed to publish the whole of the correspondence if he had the assent of the Allies to that course. But what is the next step? That question was put by the Leader of the Opposition and by several other hon. Members. It has been put in the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Harrow (Mr. Mosley). The Prime Minister in his reply has not given—if he will forgive me for saying so—the slightest indication to the country what the Government means to do.
§ Major Sir KEITH FRASERWait and see!
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI should have thought the present Government would never have championed a policy of that kind, but, at any rate, what does it mean? In so far as the Prime Minister in his reply gave any indication at all as to his course of action, it was that he will continue his negotiations with a view to secure unity. Is it not really better that he should recognise the facts? [An HON. MEMBER: "Very much better!"] The French Government have definitely declared what is their policy. There has been no concealment. There is no secret diplomacy. The French Prime Minister has been very emphatic and has spoken with his usual lucidity and force upon the subject, and every time he has spoken he has made it as clear as words can make it what is going to be the policy, and that he does not propose to negotiate with Germany until she capitulates.
The second point is, I think, more formidable. I never thought the first was insuperable myself; but the second point I consider to be an important one—that France will not leave the Ruhr until the last payment has been made. Monsieur Poincare has not deviated from that. Questionaires have been addressed to him. Notes have been sent. There have been conversations between the Foreign Offices, but Monsieur Poincare has never deviated from that. What more can you do? Having declared his policy in the French Parliament, and received the overwhelming support of his Parliament, and that Parliament having separated after a declaration of that kind, does the Government imagine that it is going by a process of sending some more Notes to make France deviate from a policy of that kind? She certainly could not do it. It is purely a question of the psychology of the thing. No Prime Minister who ever made a declaration of that kind to his Parliament could afterwards withdraw from it. Is it not far better that he should accept the situation, accept the declaration of France as to his intentions, and proceed upon that basis. The Government know perfecly well what the French policy is. The reply is, I understand, rather brusque, and it does not take any notice of our questionnaire or vouchsafes any answer, but it is perfectly clear that the French Government mean 1831 To adhere to their policy of occupying the Ruhr until the last farthing of reparations is paid.
In view of that, what is our policy? I am very loth to press the Government upon something which I know must be a very embarrassing situation, but it is no use pretending. There were two things done to put them in that position, and which makes it very difficult for them to get out if it. The Government are more or less in the position France was in when she resfused to go in with us into Egypt. France afterwards tried to get back upon that, but she never did, and she was finally ruled out. We are now in the same position with regard to the Ruhr. We have allowed France to go in alone. We practically said to her, "We hope you will succeed." Now we are trying to go back upon that policy, and you cannot do it. Quite frankly, it is not fair to France. That is more or less the position Italy has been in. Italy approved of France's entrance into the Ruhr, but they have since realised their mistake, but the French flag is committed. It is all very well to say, "You French have made a mistake and you must withdraw," but the French flag is there, and the honour of the country is involved, and we must not overlook those questions which, although they appear sentimental ones, are really fundamental things which very often govern nations. What is the Government going to do in the face of that situation? First of all they allow France to go into the Ruhr.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI am quite willing to enter into a discussion of that question when the proper time comes, but the position is absolutely different now. I never said that the occupation of the Ruhr was something which ought to be ruled out as a sanction. I never said it in the past, and I do not say it now. I say that there are conditions which, if Germany refused to carry out the Treaty of Versailles, and carry out the conditions fairly and favourably, the occupation of the Ruhr by all the Powers would be justifiable. But that is a different thing. Here was an occupation which was an illegal one, and which the Law Officers of the Crown would declare to be illegal, and which our representative on the Reparations Commission advised and declared to 1832 be illegal, but that is a totally different situation.
§ Mr. J. JONESYou never protested against it.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI did protest against it from the very first moment, but you have to take the situation as it is now. [An HON. MEMBER: "Which you created."] I did not create it. During the whole time I had any responsibility France was kept out of the Ruhr.
§ Mr. MOREL indicated dissent.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEThe hon. Member was allowed to make his speech without interruption, and the reason was that no one took any interest in it. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that I shall be allowed to develop the point which I am making. My first point was that the Ruhr was entered by France with the consent of the majority of the Allies. The second mistake was that the proposal of Mr. Secretary Hughes was not adopted. It-was made a few days before the meeting in Paris, and it was obviously made with a view to influencing the policy which the Government have adopted. It has been adopted by Germany and by the Pope in that great document. It has been adopted by the Government, but it has been adopted six months too late. That is the position which has been created by these two fundamental mistakes, but here we are.
Before we meet again one of two things may have happened. The first is the collapse of Germany and the other is the capitulation of Germany. What is our policy in face of either of those alternatives? We really ought to know, because Parliament may have separated. The Prime Minister says he will summon Parliament if any great decision is to be taken. Does he mean that before he declares the policy of this country he will summon Parliament in order to ratify it? What is the meaning of that declaration? Before a definite reply is given to France is Parliament to be summoned to consider it? If not, what is the object? If Germany collapses France is in possession of the Ruhr. She is in possession of the whole of the coal, the whole of the iron, and practically the-most important coal and iron deposits in Europe.
§ Mr. J. JONESThat is what they are quarrelling about.
§ 4.0 P.M.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGETake the second alternative, that is, capitulation. What does capitulation mean? It might mean that the coal and iron interests might combine, and there would be a formidable combination of French and German magnates in the same syndicate.
§ Mr. J. JONESAnd you want to go in.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI really ought to be allowed to complete my argument without these interruptions. What is our policy in regard to that? Do we propose to take any steps to stop it or to control it—for the protection of our own industry? I really think that before Parliament separates we ought to have some declaration from the Government with regard to what they mean to do in the face of this position. The situation is one of the most serious with which we have ever been confronted. No one can doubt that. Take the speech delivered by the President of the Board of Trade the other day, in which he practically predicted that six months hence we shall be worse off than we are to-day. Take the position with regard to the prestige of this country. Here is a question in which we are financially involved.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEWhy not? We have got an interest in Reparations. I am not one of those who think that Germany ought not to pay fair reparation. I never have been. I believe she can do it. I believe the method of making her do it was indicated in the proposals we put forward in August last, and I again ask the Prime Minister a question which was put to him by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. Austen Chamberlain), whether he will not publish the report of that Conference?
§ The PRIME MINISTERI intended to answer that question. I will look into it at once. My impression is that the time has come when it can be published.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEI am very glad to hear that. This was part of the series of Conferences that ended in January. The August Conference was adjourned till November. The November Conference was adjourned till January; therefore it is part of the same transaction, and I believe the late Prime Minister did give 1834 a promise that the Report should be published. The House of Commons will see, when it is published, there was a proposal put forward which would have enabled Germany to pay, in proportion to her increasing prosperity, compensation for the damage which she inflicted wantonly upon the Allied nations, by means of proposals that there should be a levy upon her exports, that the amount should be paid into a separate account, into a clearing house in the name of the Allies, and after the amount had been collected in gold, in a very short time, if German exports increased, we should have been collecting a very large sum of money towards the payment of Reparations.
Mr. LLOYD GEORGEYes, in gold, or the equivalent of gold. If hon. Members had taken the trouble to study this question—[Interruption]. My hon. Friend, I assume, pretended to know far more than I did, as otherwise he would not have risen to instruct me. But here you are. That money could have been collected if there had been agreement upon that point, and I ask the Government to see that that document is published. I am seriously concerned about the position into which we have got. Never in my recollection has the Government of this country got into quite the same position in reference to European policy. Here is a question which intimately concerns us, our trade, our commerce, our finance, our position in Europe. We are not consulted. The French Government, when we send them a Note, take no notice of the questions we put. Therefore, having regard to the effects upon our trade and upon our commerce, which are getting worse instead of better, and having regard to the position which we hold in Europe, and to the great part that we played in the War, I ask that, before this Debate concludes, the Government should take this House, and through this House the country, into its confidence, and state definitely and clearly what its policy is.