MIDDLE EASTERN SERVICES.

HC Deb 11 July 1922 vol 156 cc1085-137

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £4,363,100, be granted to His Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923, for sundry Middle Eastern Services under His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, including certain Grants in Aid."—[NOTE: £6,000,000 has been voted on account.]

Sir DONALD MACLEAN

I beg to move to reduce the Vote by £100.

I wish at the outset to make a protest against the way in which these Estimates are presented to us. I do not know whether hon. Members have the Votes before them, but, if they want to find out what is the cost to the country of the Middle Eastern services, they must first of all pursue a diligent search through the Colonial Office Vote. They will find in Vote 7 the Secretariat of the Middle East Department. If there be any delusion that that is the end of the cost of the Middle East Department, I would refer hon. Members to Vote 3 of Class 5 which is now before the Committee. There they will find that the amount required for the coming year for sundry Middle Eastern services comes to a total of £10,363,100. That cannot be all of it, because there must be some other charges for the transport of military forces, air personnel, material for the Air Force, armoured cars and tanks, and the new special form of Rolls-Royce car which was supposed to dominate Iraq, and which goes there at somebody's expense.

The SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Churchill)

It goes there at the expense of the Middle Eastern Vote.

Sir D. MACLEAN

It is not here at all. How is it charged? It is part of the settled policy of His Majesty's Government to have inside the Colonial Office a War Office for the Middle Eastern Department. They indent the War Office for the force that they require, and then, instead of the cost coming on the War Office Estimate, the Colonial Office pays the War Office. I remember when the War Office Estimates were before us earlier in the year and also last year, that I tried to find out the total cost of the armed forces of the Crown, and the Secretary of State for War said that I should find the cost of the forces operating in the Middle East in the Colonial Office Vote. One, therefore, had to find out by reference to the Colonial Office Vote what was the total War Office expenditure. As I understand it, this new Department was set up so that there should be collated within the Vote of the Colonial Office the total expenditure of that particular office. They were, in operating upon the Middle East, dealing with two or three different problems, and the best thing to do was to get them altogether and deal with them with a permanent Secretariat. It looks to me as if the need for a permanent Secretariat for handling this part of the Middle East is about to disappear, or, at any rate, to get very much lees. I hope, therefore that it will be regarded, not as a permanent, but merely as a temporary institution, and that we shall get back again to the much simpler form of the War Office sending troops and the War Office itself carrying the expenditure and being responsible for it. If we were going to start a new British Empire in the East and run it under the Colonial Office with all its military equipment, I suppose this would be the way to do it. But I understand that is not the intention of the Government, and I am quite certain that it is not the intention of the country. We have quite enough on our hands with our present commitments; I hope, therefore, that this is merely a temporary arrangement to deal with what I hope is a rapidly changing situation.

Let me, on that point, ask the right hon. Gentleman one or two questions. He has appeared at the Bar, as it were, on two previous occasions in connection with these Votes. He introduced a Supplementary Estimate earlier in the year and made an interesting speech, and last week, when the Colonial Office Vote was before us, we had a very interesting statement from the Under-Secretary of State, followed by a general Debate and a Debate on the question of Palestine, which occupied the attention of the Committee from 8 o'clock till 11 o'clock. Therefore, this is really the first time we have been able to really address ourselves to the question of administration in Iraq and its cost. In the first place, I noticed that in the Colonial Office Vote, where the Middle East Secretariat is dealt with, there is an additional cost of £1,000. I would like to ask why has the cost of this Secretariat gone up from £8,720 last year to £9,631 this year. There must be some reason for it. With the problem getting less and the difficulties not increasing I should have thought that the cost of officials would have decreased in proportion to the lessening of the problem.

I want to ask some questions with regard to the Middle East services. First of all, I want to deal with Sub-head A amounting to £9,096,000. It is a matter of great satisfaction that that item has been reduced this year from £24,221,000 last year to a little over £9,000,000 this year. I welcome that, and I think it is almost in identical conformity with the hope which the right hon. Gentleman expressed some months ago as to what was likely to happen. Before I deal with the question of policy, I would like the Colonial Secretary to answer one or two questions with regard to Sub-head C.1 and C.2, and also Sub-head B. Why is it that under Sub-head C.1 (the High Commissioner, salaries and expenses) have increased by no less than £10,000? If hon. Members will look at the explanatory note they will find it states that This amount is required as a contribution towards meeting part of the salaries and incidental expenses of the High Commissioner and his personal and political staff. What is the total cost to both India and ourselves? It must be a very considerable sum. There is an increase of £10,000, and I should like to know why that increase has happened this year. I take next Sub-head C.2 (Provision and Maintenance of Quarters for Staff). That is not a new expense, and there is no comparison with last year at all. It is a fresh expenditure as compared with last year of no less than £23,000. I look at the Sub-head and I find it says: A sum of £15,000 is required for the erection of certain outbuildings to the residency and for quartets for certain officials of the High Commissioner's staff. I notice there is also £8,000 for repairs. What does that really mean? Does that indicate new big permanent buildings for the Commissioner and hip staff? Surely that is an expenditure which might very well be avoided if the policy which has been indicated and adumbrated by the right hon. Gentleman is being carried out. What is the amount, and what is the reason for it? On this question of buildings the Committee ought to have some idea of the immense sums this country has been spending in Iraq, which amount to no less than £1,906,000, or nearly £2,000,000. This item is shown on the Appropriation Account published a few weeks ago.

Mr. CHURCHILL

Dealing with last year.

Sir D. MACLEAN

We know that the figures are for 1920–21, because the Public Accounts Committee always works a year after the event. I am dealing with the latest public work of the Public Accounts Committee, and that shows that £2,000,000 has been spent on these buildings. On this item I do not find anything like the reduction one would expect when you drop your defence expenses from £25,000,000 down to {9,000,000. Why have not the expenses on permanent buildings being reduced in the same proportion? Now I come to Sub-head D (Maintenance of Native Levies). I was only able to see this document at a very late hour last night, but it is one of some considerable interest. It accounts for the sum of £600,000 for the current year as compared with £667.000 for last year. It says: This force is under the orders of the High Commissioner and is distinct from the Iraq Army, the whole cost of which is borne on Iraq revenues. The sum provided represents the cost of maintaining the force at an estimated strength of 5,500 throughout the financial year. It has cost the country £600,000 to provide an army acting under the orders of the High Commissioner. I want the Colonial Secretary to tell the Committee how many armies there are in Iraq. Here, at any rate, is one costing £600,000 this year and £687,000 last year, or altogether about £1,250,000. Then there is the Im- perial Force as well, and also the Air Force. In addition to that there is the Iraq Army, the cost, of which is borne entirely on the local funds. Therefore you have three separate military forces in Iraq. I do not know what is going to happen if there is an intervention of the tribesmen from Southern Kurdistan. How is that army going to operate?

Mr. CHURCHILL

What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by intervention? Does he mean invasion?

Sir D. MACLEAN

That really raises a very important point. One of the most difficult problems of Iraq is the inclusion within the Mandate of Southern Kurdistan. That is a most important and difficult question which has been dealt with by one or two hon. and gallant Members opposite. They have spoken with considerable knowledge from the military point of view of the dangers which are ever lurking there. Who is going to meet those incursions? If you are going to cut down your expenditure and gradually withdraw from the country you have three armies to settle with. We should like an explanation from the right hon. Gentleman of those points which I have committed to him.

There is another point in this connection. He knows perfectly well the feeling among the Indian forces in Iraq where they do not get on well with the native levies. We have been told that there is great unrest in Southern Kurdistan, and I cannot imagine that that is a position which gives any satisfaction to the right hon. Gentleman in charge of this Vote. I pass from that to the subject of railways and the cost to this country. On the same page there is a capital expenditure on Iraq railways this year of £70,000, in addition to the £300,000 spent last year. How many millions altogether the railways there have cost this country I do not know, because it is very difficult to disentangle all these items. Such investigations as I have been able to make lead me to believe that millions of British money have been poured out upon railways in Iraq, and there was £300,000 for last year alone. On this point I would like to quote what my right hon. Friend and leader laid down on this question two years ago as to what should be the policy of the Government. He said: The Mandate ought to be confined as far as our direct administrative responsibility is concerned to those parts of Iraq which are within reach of the Persian Gulf, which includes the zone of Basra. That speech was made in 1920, and it looks as if it there were some chance of that policy forming the policy of His Majesty's Government. If that is so, why go on with this large expenditure on railways? Who is going to get the railways and have we had any offers for them? Is the President of the Board of Trade taking any part in Iraq administration, and is he likely to take over these railways? We have recently had some very interesting and amusing descriptions on Parliamentary administration in Iraq and the question was asked the other day whether the Iraq President of the Board of Trade had tendered his resignation and whether it had been withdrawn. We may have all sorts of opportunities for making further inquiry with regard to Iraq administration, but what I want to know is what is the policy of the Government with regard to the immense sums already spent on railways. How are they gripping that important financial fact? Perhaps I may get an answer to that later on.

I come next to the point which is no doubt of the greatest general interest, and that is the real policy, if there be one, of His Majesty's Government with regard to Trag. There was a question asked by the hon. and gallant Member for Stafford (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) as to whether the terms of the Treaty regulating the relations between the British and the Arab Governments had now been agreed upon. There seems quite substantial evidence that the Arabs, through their representatives and their King, are very discontented with the present condition of affairs under the mandate. I do not pretend to speak with special knowledge on the matter, but they resent the slight put upon Arab nationality by the continuance of the mandate and the British administration in its present form. They want to get back to the promises or pledges of Arab independence and sovereignty. They want to combine that complete independence with the advantage of the British people paying the expense. They cannot have it both ways. There is clearly, so far as I can observe, a situation arising, if it has not already arisen, in which, if the. Government are wisely guided and if they properly direct their policy, we may have an opportunity of cutting our losses in Iraq and bringing our hold on that country practically down to the policy which was suggested by my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley two years and some months ago. What is being done with regard to that? There are chances which arise and have arisen in the history of the administration of our Empire in various parts of the world for the reversal of a policy which has been ill-conceived grossly extravagant, and dangerous to the peace of the Commonwealth. I think such a chance is within the grasp of the Government to-day.

What an extraordinary position we are in. Not only have we these forces to which I have made allusion, but we are also carrying on a policy of subsidising a potentate whose action may be> awkward for us in the centre of Arabia. I forget his name for the moment. I think it is Ibn Saud. He and others are getting from us no less a sum than £125,700. This will be found under Sub-head H, "Arabian Subsidies." On the one hand there is the King of the Hedjaz and, on the other hand, Iraq, and whichever way this Arab throws his influence, he is in a position to ask for more. Does he get it? If so, how is the payment made? Is he paid in notes or in gold?

Mr. CHURCHILL

In gold.

Sir D. MACLEAN

What an extraordinary position? In this country no one sees gold, but, apparently, this Arab Chief, in the centre of Arabia, can get as much as he wants within the limits of £100,000. Financiers would like to see once again a gold standard in this country. Apparently, there is one in the centre of Arabia, but not in London. I do urge on the Government the necessity for a reduction of expenditure, and a very substantial reduction, too. Here is a chance, I am certain, for going back on what has been a- gross mistake, which has cost the people of this country not a penny less than £100,000,000 during the last three or four years. Yesterday this House was engaged in discussing economy. Passionate speeches were made against a reduction of expenditure which entailed keeping children under five out of the schools of the country and which, also, entailed the cutting down of secondary education, thereby reducing our production of the most valuable assets of the country. We had Minister after Minister at that Box—we had a whole range of Cabinet Ministers and I think we ought to mark the occasion down specially as a red-letter day—all saying how anxious they were to meet our criticisms but adding that we could not afford to forgo these particular economies. Yet the Government can apparently afford to pay out 125,000 gold sovereigns to chieftains in the centre of Arabia in the form of subsidies, while they cannot find the money necessary for education and other social services which are so important to our people—

The CHAIRMAN

I would remind the right hon. Gentleman we cannot have yesterday's Debate over again.

Sir D. MACLEAN

It is only in the form of an echo.

Mr. CHURCHILL

And a very irrelevant echo.

Sir D. MACLEAN

It has now completed its reverberation. Here is an opportunity of saving millions of money: of turning back on an unhappy past and entering on a businesslike and prosperous future.

Captain COOTE

The right hon. Gentleman, in moving this reduction, has merely given us a repetition of what, to the best of my recollection, the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) said about a year ago on a similar occasion. I confess I disagree fundamentally with what is the practical proposal of the right hon. Gentleman's policy. The right hon. Gentlemen opposite have consistently advocated a policy of scuttle from Iraq on the very grounds which they deplore when they attack the Government policy elsewhere—on the ground of convenience and economy. No other consideration is allowed to weigh with them. The right hon. Member for Paisley, in his speech last year, spent considerable time in elaborating the thesis when is a pledge not a pledge. Breaking pledges is the kind of thing of which he repeatedly accuses the Government. But what does his own policy mean? He advocates the withdrawal of our sphere of activities to what is called Basra. Basra is the port of Traq, and if we strengthen our hold on Basra, what will the Arabs of Iraq say! They will say that we are establishing ourselves there with the sole object of throttling the development of their trade. Whether the right hon. Gentleman is right or wrong in the facts he has brought forward, there can be no doubt that that is what the Arab will say if we do that.

The right hon. Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) sees in this suggestion that some alteration should take place in our relations with Iraq a chance of carrying out this policy of evacuation. I do not think in carrying out a policy of evacuation we should be acting as honourable men. It seems to be established both in fact and sentiment that we owe a duty to the Arab population in the Middle East. At any rate, the Arabs in those regions are convinced that we do. They say you have failed us in Palestine and in Syria, but in Iraq you have a chance to implement your promises. I think there is a good deal of truth in that. How are we going to implement those promises? I do not know whether hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite are arguing on the supposition that we are not wanted in Iraq. If they are, I think they are wrong. I am informed from very credible sources that although the Arabs do desire some alteration in the status of their country they are not prepared to do without European assistance for some time to come. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to read into that desire of theirs rather unworthy motives. He seemed to think that they wanted to have our assistance at our cost and not to do anything for themselves. According to my information, they require this alteration in status, not merely for sentimental reasons, but for practical reasons. It is very difficult under present arrangements in Iraq for an Arab Government to make good.

The right hon. Gentleman, for example, mentioned the district of Kurdistan. The existence of South Kurdistan within the boundaries of Iraq is causing the greatest complication in that country. That particular district of South Kurdistan has always been included in what is technically known as Iraq, and apart from that the difficulty which the Arab Government has found in dealing with this part is that they are unable, under the present arrangements, because of the evil significance that the word mandate has in Iraq as a whole to make their influence felt in that country. I believe that if the status of the Arab Government were altered they would find it far more easy to come to terms with the Kurds of South Kurdistan and to establish themselves on a sounder footing. There are some grounds for believing that if the alteration of status did take place the Kurds themselves would co-operate with the Government of Iraq whereas under present arrangements they are fair game for the intensive Turkish propaganda which is going on in their midst. There are other complications attached to this suggested alteration in the status of Iraq which will require the gravest consideration. There is first the repercussion on the position in Syria. I do not know whether we in this country are particularly concerned with that. The French, of course, will be afraid that if this alteration in status takes place they themselves may be faced with a similar demand in that part of the Arab world for which they are responsible. That is a matter for them to deal with upon what lines they think fit. The point for us to consider is whether it will be wise and whether it will be in accordance with our honourable obligations to carry out this change. I think it will.

I should like to say one word, before I leave that part of the subject, upon the grounds of economy. It will be easily seen that if this change does result in establishing the Government in Iraq upon a firmer basis, our responsibilities will be proportionately lessened in that country. It is well known that part, at any rate, of the great cost—I am not for one moment denying the great cost—of this responsibility to the British taxpayer is because the Government of Iraq cannot make its influence sufficiently felt throughout the country, and finds a great difficulty, not merely in Kurdistan, in the collection of the revenues and in the enlistment of an Arab gendarmerie in that country. I am sure that this alteration will make all these difficult tasks considerably easier; if it does, it will result in increased economy for the taxpayer of this country.

I pass from that to consider what will be the effect of this proposed alteration upon our responsibilities to the League of Nations. As I understand it, the mandate which we at present hold was given by the Supreme Council, and not by the League of Nations. Yet under that mandate there are direct responsibilities to the Council of the League. I cannot understand—the thing is said, not in this House, but outside—the attitude of those who see in this proposed alteration some infringement of some duty which we owe to the League of Nations. As the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary reminded us at Question Time, the mandate does not give the mandatory Powers advantages. It imposes upon them responsibilities. In this proposed alteration, if we conclude a Treaty, all the requisite safeguards which the League of Nations demands from us in relation to our conduct in Iraq can be, and I think will be, inserted. It will be for this House, when the time comes for the Treaty to be laid before it, if it so desires and thinks fit, to insert provisions which will make our final responsibilities in regard to the League of Nations perfectly clear.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I want to enlist my hon. and gallant Friend as an ally, but is he aware that this House has no jurisdiction at all over Treaties unless there is legislation involved?

Captain COOTE

I do not know whether my hon. and gallant Friend was in the House at Question Time, but I am now referring to an answer given by the Colonial Secretary that the Treaty would be laid before this House, and that, thereafter, it would be referred to the League of Nations. Anyhow, I believe it is so.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

Not always!

Captain COOTE

It is perfectly competent for us in this House to intimate to the Colonial Secretary what we think ought to be put into the Treaty. In regard to the League of Nations, the main points—as no doubt the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows—to consider are: firstly, an annual report, which we, as the mandatory Power, are bound to submit in regard to our administration to the League of Nations, There seems to me to be no earthly reason why the Government of Iraq in conjunction with their British advisers should not agree to submit such a report. The second main provision, so far as I remember, in the Covenant, is that equal trading facilities should be given in the country —that every mandatory State is to supply equal trade facilities to members of the League. Provision can very well be inserted in the Treaty to that effect. There are also subsidiary provisions about arms and the liquor traffic, which would be even easier to insert. Therefore, my contention is, that under this proposed alteration in the status of Iraq, and of our position there, we should be fulfilling what, I assert in defiance of what has been said from the benches opposite, is an undoubted duty towards the people of that country. We should at once be fulfilling that duty and at the same time lessening the cost of that duty to the people of this country; also we should be doing that which the people of Iraq most ardently desire. Whether we like it or not, in this country to-day and all over the world there is a disease, a poison as I think it, called nationalism which has run through the nations like fire. The problem for statesmanship, as I see it to-day, is to get to that point at which one can reconcile what that spirit of nationalism demands with what it is safe and proper should be done for the peoples among whom it is preached. Therefore I want to urge upon the Colonial Secretary the one broad fact that the suggested alteration in the status of Iraq is in full accord with the policy which he announced when he took over the responsibility of these regions some considerable time ago. The right hon. Gentleman then laid it down that we had a duty towards the people of that country, a duty which it is very difficult to disentangle from the many duties which our war pledges have imposed upon us, and which we should make a sincere and honest endeavour to fulfil. I do suggest to the House that before we listen to the somewhat traditional and somewhat stereotyped argument which came from the opposite benches, urging us to get out and secure at all events, economy, that we should, in the spirit expressed by the Colonial Secretary when he took over the responsibility for these regions, make an honest attempt to fulfil our duty in accordance with the wishes of these native Arabs whom we have encouraged to hope will be allowed to make a success of their own Government in their own way. We should take this step and this Government should give them a fair chance so to do.

Colonel WEDGWOOD

I am always interested in these differences between the two wings of the Liberal party—

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

Oh, no I Not a separate party!

Colonel WEDGWOOD

I cannot understand on this occasion why the Coalition Liberals and the Free Liberals are not agreed. They are advocating precisely the same policy. First of all the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Captain Coote) and my colleague the right hon. Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) were advocating a policy of scuttle.

Captain COOTE

Nothing of the sort!

Colonel WEDGWOOD

I think the real facts of the ease are becoming too strong for the two sections of the Liberal party.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

There are not two factions!

Colonel WEDGWOOD

But the difference is such that there seems no possibility of bridging it over, or having a common policy in Iraq, which is very regrettable. At the same time the facts of the case suggest that what some people call a policy of scuttle and other people call the far-sighted policy of Imperial expansion are at the present time one and the same thing. The Colonial Office is in the difficult position of having to adjust their minds to the new situation that has been put before the Committee. King Feisal, our very good friend, is very anxious to be able to control his country, and he can only control it if he is allowed to say that he is an independent monarch, which is more or less a matter of form and very little else. In order, however, that he may satisfactorily carry on, without enormous expense to the British taxpayer, he wants to be called an independent monarch. So far as I am concerned it seems to me that this adjustment that he should call himself an, independent monarch if he wants to, is well-advised from our point of view. In either case when difficulties arise he will be either, by virtue of his Treaty, or some more cogent reasons, depending upon the British taxpayer and the British Government just as is King Hussein, who gets the 60,000 golden sovereigns given to him yearly.

One cannot possibly discuss this question of Iraq even to-day without realising that the problem really is one not so much of England and Iraq as of England and the Turkish Power. There is the whole difficulty. The Turkish pressure upon Southern Kurdistan and Bagdad is the principal reason why King Feisal, as I believe—we have not had that officially from the Government yet—would prefer independence to the Treaty or Mandate if it gives him a stronger position to argue with Moslem propaganda. Really, we have got to understand that Iraq at the present moment is merely the scene of the struggle which is going on all over the East to-day between the Moslem Powers and ourselves. I myself think that whilst the policy of the Government is perfectly right in connection with Palestine, that it would be desirable that they should know by whom this change, apparently adopting a policy of scuttle— if you like to call it so—is made. It will enable us to stand behind King Feisal when pressure is brought to bear upon him. It will strengthen his position in relation to his own subjects, and technically strengthen the position of the British taxpayer by removing a large part of that which falls upon us at the present time. I do not want to close my speech, which I desire to be brief and is delivered in order to explain our point of view, without asking the Colonial Secretary to take the opportunity to-day, either on this or the next Vote, to reply to that long Debate we had on Colonial policy this day week. On the next Vote it will be perfectly proper to reply. I do not remember a case before where there has been a long Debate and no reply from the Department concerned in the subjects raised in the Debate. I hope, therefore, on this or the next Vote the right hon. Gentleman will deal with the problem of Kenya, Rhodesia, and the West Coast.

5.0 P.M.

Mr. MOSLEY

My hon. and gallant Friend who has just sat down appeared to take the view that, provided the British taxpayer pays, it does not so very much matter whether we are interested in keeping Iraq or whether King Feisal be recognised as an independent monarch with English support. I venture, even with this case before us, to suggest that there are advantages in favour of the mandatory system which are not to be found in the proposal which the right hon. Gentleman adumbrated at Question Time to-day. For instance, my hon. and gallant Friend, who spent some time and much labour in explaining exactly how this new proposal could be brought within the ambit of the provisions of the League of Nations' Covenant. It is a difficulty, and he discovered that difficulty for the reason that there is no stipulation within the Covenant of the League of Nations in regard to any condition of this kind.

Captain COOTE

There is no stipulation against it.

Mr. MOSLEY

Quite. But the League of Nations' Covenant does not contemplate any transitional period between a mandatory position, and a position of complete independence. Therefore, in order to bring this proposal into practice, we have either to amend the League of Nations Covenant, or to introduce a system which is not contemplated in that Covenant at all. There must be one very evident result of such departure from the strict letter of the Covenant. In the first place, it is always bad immediately to interfere with a new machine which has hardly got into running order. At once it gives all its opponents an opportunity to say, "You see, this machinery cannot function. Already it has been altered and amended." But there is a greater objection than that. Already our Mandate in Iraq has been subjected to very grave suspicion all over the world, quite wrongly, as I believe. There is a large section of American opinion, and a large section of French opinion, which believe that this country is interested in the affairs of Iraq, not so much because it is inspired by the sacred trust of civilisation, as by the desire to work some devious oil concessions. I believe that conception to be entirely unfounded. But a departure from the letter of the Covenant, a new departure such as this, must at once give a great impetus to all the suspicions and doubts which are animating these other people. At once a large section of opinion will say, "You could not get what you wanted under the mandatory system; its provisions are drawn too tightly. And so you have to constitute a new system, which is not contemplated at all under the Covenant of the League of Nations, in order to further your nefarious designs." We know such suspicions to be entirely unfounded and foolish, but what is the object of giving further ground to such suspicion as exists already, unless very substantial advantages to this country and the mandated territory are to be derived from the change?

I submit that there are certain disadvantages likely to accrue from this new constitution which should, at any rate, be counterbalanced by some very substantial improvement in the prospects of administering that territory, and also in alleviating the burden of the English taxpayer. But what advantages do we get out of it? The only way in which this alteration affects us is that we surrender a large measure of our authority. Apparently, we are to transfer the entire functions of government to the Arab administration, and, at the same time, we retain all those responsibilities with which we were originally shackled. We retain, in fact, every disadvantage of the mandatory system, and we have none of its advantages. The right hon. Gentleman so far has not defined the exact relationship which is to exist between the English Officer Commanding in Iraq and the Arab administration. That, surely, must be a very delicate definition. He has not in any way foreshadowed the delicate position of our advisers. But it certainly appears from the Press accounts which have emanated, presumably, from official circles, that we are, in fact contemplating the constitution in Iraq of a form of government largely analogous to that which has prevailed so long in Egypt—a not altogether very desirable form of government— constituting another Egyptian problem in a part of the world where there are no essential interests of England concerned. The hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Captain Coote) spoke once again of the great obligations under which we labour to the Arabian population. We have heard much of those obligations, but I have listened to every Debate of the last three years on this subject in the House, and I have never yet heard those obligations defined, and I have yet to learn why we are under any obligation to remain for an indefinite period in Iraq, beyond our promise to constitute an independent Arab State. Surely we are not expected, having constituted that State, to bolster it up for ever with English arms and money if it be incompetent to function? Surely, having constituted that State, we are then at liberty to withdraw, and to allow it to proceed in its independence?

Be that as it may, it is old history and an old controversy. An entirely new situation has now arisen. The Arabs now come forward and say, "We do not like your Government." They have given us evidences of that before in the rebellion which they instigated and raised against our rule. But their duly accredited leaders now come forward and say that they do not like the English mandate, and they object to the form of rule which we have constituted under the League of Nations. Whatever obligations ever existed in that country surely have been entirely dissipated by this new demand for independence and freedom from the English yoke. If ever there were an obligation, it surely has been destroyed by this new demand. It is quite true that King Feisal admits that this new independence, this Arab State which is to be free from the shackles of any outside interference, is to be bolstered up, maintained and assured by English arms, men and money. How long are we really going to undertake this duty all over the world in regions where there are no material English interests concerned, of preserving independence and the internal order of other people, by the money of the English taxpayer and the men who have to be dispatched to these far-off lands? The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the catastrophe which would result from a very probable outbreak of disorder in Iraq, in the event of our evacuation, and I am quite sure the right hon. Gentleman spoke with his accustomed accuracy from official information. But even if there were to be a grave outbreak of disorder in Iraq from our withdrawal from that country, is it not better that there should be disorder among the nomadic tribes of that country than the possibility of disorder in the streets of the cities of this country? After all, this great taxation, which is weighing down industry and oppressing the industrial situation in this country, which has resulted in nearly two million unemployed men walking the streets of this country, surely there is a graver fear of disorder in the very heart of our Empire, and a graver danger to the whole structure and fabric of that Empire, from the burden of taxation than through the possibility of disorder in a remote country?

Hon. Gentlemen who seek to commit this country to the maintenance of these remote Imperial responsibilities—for that is what it amounts to—are violating not only in its entirety the new conceptions, of world affairs which have emanated from the War, but they are also violating every tradition of sound Imperial strategy, which has devolved upon us even from the days of the Roman Caesars. In successful Imperial government, in times of strain and stress, when a great and virile people are emaciated as the result of prolonged war, it has always been the policy of wise rulers to retire from outlying places and consolidate their forces, and thus to build up their strength, and, if the occasion arises, in accordance with the spirit of those days, once again to fling their forces over the wider area. We have passed very far from those times, but, even from the point of view of hon. Gentlemen who see these great obligations of preserving order all over the world, surely it is wise at such a time not to endanger and jeopardise the whole fabric and structure of Empire by piling these great burdens upon that structure? Surely it is better to consolidate our remaining forces and resources, and so to recover our strength. Under existing circumstances, when these people repudiate our rule and want to be rid of us, seriously to ask the people of this country to go on supplying men and money for the maintenance of order amongst people who do not want it, is something which approaches very nearly to an outrage upon the feelings of the taxpayers of this country, who too long have been struggling to meet the burdens of your commitments.

Captain ELLIOT

It is difficult to follow the tortuous workings of the mind of the hon. Member opposite, but, so far as I understand, he was of opinion that anything that we were asked to do as the mandatory of the League of Nations it was incumbent upon this country to do, but that if the unfortunate Arabs asked to be allowed to deal directly with the people, to whom their destinies have been entrusted, rather than through the medium of the secretariat of the bureaux on the shores of Lake Constance, no punishment could be too great for them, and nothing his eloquence could urge would be too serious for him to demand that we should inflict as a punishment upon those audacious Allies of ours. It is a little disproportionate that these measures of denunciation should be hurled at the head of a gallant ally of ours in the War, simply because he has suggested, as I understand, that the obligation of this country under the mandate has been terminated, and that he is anxious—for this is the essence of his position—to continue the co-operation of this country which has been, in his opinion, of great benefit to him in the past.

If he considers, as he does consider, that the maintenance of the word "mandate" will involve him in difficulties with his own people, surely that is a matter rather for the Iraqians to arrange with their ruler than for us to interfere in. If King Feisal finds, as he claims to have found, that his whole problem of Government would be gravely prejudiced by the suspicion amongst his people that he is merely the puppet of some Western gang, some group of Allies such as the victors in the late War—{HON. MEM- BEES: "Gang!"] well, I have no objection to the word "gang" at all. The idea of a gang of robbers is certainly a nobler and better idea than the idea of a gang of conspirators, to which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) would commit this House, seconded by the eloquent efforts of the hon. Member for Harrow. That we should retain the country as a mandatory under the League of Nations, or that we should scuttle from it, is surely better than the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley, which, as far as I could understand it, was that we should partition up this unhappy country of Iraq, proceed to tear up all our pledges, and seize the only valuable part of the country, namely, the port of Basra. Then, by a masterpiece of cynicism, the hon. Member for Harrow suggested that, having consolidated our position there, we should at some future time, when our strength had grown again, when we had once more refilled our magazines with ammunition and our battalions with fresh soldiers, sally out from this fortress and proceed to reconquer the unhappy country from its unfortunate inhabitants. If I have misrepresented the hon. Member I shall be glad to be corrected, but that is the logical consequence of what he said.

Mr. MOSLEY

That is not my policy. I was merely suggesting it as a wise policy for any crank Imperialist who happened to listen to it.

Captain ELLIOT

No doubt the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley would be delighted to hear himself described as a "crank Imperialist" by his latest recruit, the hon. Member for Harrow. These recriminations between Members of the same party, sitting, not on different sides of the House, but on the same side, are very painful to those of us who belong to the great and united party which has so long and honourably been entrusted with the destinies of this country. I suggest that they maintain their domestic differences for their own consumption in the recesses of Abingdon Street, or some other place from which the rumours of their quarrels will emerge— The old, unhappy far-off things and battles long ago. I must apologise for having been diverted from the line of my argument, which was simply to the effect that the Arabs are asking for an alteration in their present status, and that there is nothing in international law, or in the interests of this country, in any way to be injuriously affected by the alteration for which they ask. To say that we cannot touch the Mandate because the alteration was not contemplated when the Covenant of the League of Nations was drawn up, is to run a grave risk of concluding that men were made for Mandate? and not Mandates for men. The original conception of a Mandate was a means by which the civilised West could help the undeveloped East, and if the undeveloped East says to us that the form in which we propose to help it is not acceptable to it, but that it still desires our help, then it seems to me that it is for this country to examine the problem honourably and sincerely, not merely with its eye on the next pocketful of sovereigns that it may desire to spend in unemployment donations here, but to look far afield to the greater interests of this country in its whole relationship with the world of Islam. It is essentially necessary that this country should consider the matter with an open mind, and should say, "We believe that the Mandate was in the best interests of Iraq. We entered upon it to fetter ourselves, and not to fetter you. But if you think you would prefer some other status, then we desire honourably and faithfully to co-operate with you, and not to subjugate you. We honestly desire the interests of your country more than the oppression of your country, and we are willing to go before the League of Nations and work out side by side, England and Iraq, a status which shall be of use to both countries and injurious to neither."

There is no more deadly danger before us just now than that of refusing to enter upon new departures because, as the hon. Member for Harrow said, the mandatory machinery is new, and it would be a pity to tamper with it at the moment. But Iraq has this fear as to the mandatory system, and it may go further to wreck the belief of this country in the mandatory system than any minor alterations in paper and ink that we may make at Geneva. I beg the Colonial Secretary to consider favourably, as I understand from his reply to-day that he is doing, the request of the Arabs for an alteration in status, believing, as I do, that we stand at a fork in the roads as regards the relations between this country and Islam. We have a chance of proving our bona fides, and of doing something which though it may be distasteful to us, is acceptable to the great Moslem world. We have seen it on several occasions in the past. Perhaps the most recent instance is the little Moslem State of Albania, which the Peace settlement suggested should be given as a mandated State to Italy. We have seen that little State reject, in arms, the tutelage which it was then proposed to impose upon it. It has established itself as an independent State, and has turned its face definitely from Turkey and towards the West. It has definitely begun to co-operate with the West. No field for Turkish propaganda is open there, as is the case in Southern Kurdistan, because the people of the country have realised that their own affairs are in their own hands.

It is not merely, as the hon. Member who voiced the views of the Labour party said, a matter of words whether a State is called independent or not. It is not true, as he says, and as his party so constantly reiterate, that the command of money and the command of the sea are so important that the spirits of men are entirely dominated by them, and it does not matter whether they are called independent or not. That is a familiar fallacy upon which his party has been wrecked time and again, and upon which it will be wrecked now. As a recent recruit to it, he is, of course, not acquainted with the way in which that economic fallacy has been repeatedly refuted throughout history, but he will learn. When I was a member of that party I learned those things, and consequently left it. No doubt the hon. Member will learn in time, even as I have done, and will come to anchor somewhere in the soft recesses of the Coalition. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the command of the sea which Italy held, and the economic resources which Italy held, were not sufficient completely to dominate the Albanians. They desired their independence and seized it. The command of the sea, even if the policy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley, of the addition of the port of Basra to the great dominions of this country, were adopted, would not be sufficient completely to dominate the Arab world even of Iraq, and still less the world of Islam as a whole.

I do beg the Colonial Secretary to see whether it is not possible now, or within the next week, for us to enter upon a new stage of co-operation with Islam, to give them by a great gesture the belief that we in this country, when we have our hands free, as we have not now, in Palestine or in Syria, desire the success and not the ruin of that great system at once of politics and of theology. We have this chance now, and I think that even now, if the right hon. Gentleman could make some declaration of sympathy, he would do more good to the Empire as a whole, and to the Middle Eastern Empire in particular, than by any declaration that even he has been able to make, with all the great facilities and advantages he has possessed during his enormously useful tenure of office as Colonial Secretary.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

The nautical simile of the hon. and gallant Member for Lanark (Captain Elliot) reminded me of the young naval chaplain who said, "Do not let us anchor in the shifting sands; let us anchor on the hard and unyielding rock." The hon. and gallant Member has anchored in the soft havens of the Coalition, but he will find that his anchor will drag very rapidly, or that, when he comes to weigh anchor, he will not be able to lift it. The hon. and gallant Member is a fellow Fabian of mine, and I am surprised to hear that he has also been a Liberal.

Captain ELLIOT

The hon. and gallant Member is a Socialist.

Colonel WEDGWOOD

I do not mind these accusations.

Mr. CHURCHILL

I thought you gloried in them.

Colonel WEDGWOOD

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will explain what is the definition of a Socialist. We know already that it includes a Bolshevist.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

Both the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. and gallant Friend are former Members of the same party, and both have been accused of being Socialists, so they need not worry. I should like to raise a question that has not yet been touched upon in this Debate, although in every previous Debate to which, like the hon. Member for Harrow, I have listened, and in which, I believe, I have taken part, it has come up. On this occasion, so far, there has been a restrained silence in regard to it. May I inquire of the right hon. Gentleman what is the position with regard to oil exploitation in Iraq? I make no excuse for raising this topic, because one of the reasons that were given to the House by the Prime Minister when he was defending the enormous expenditure in previous years on Iraq was that there were very productive oilfields in that country which would immensely enrich the British Empire. If we can develop oilfields by legitimate means through private enterprise abroad no one will be more pleased than myself, but I gather that we should have had a much better chance of getting what oil there was in Iraq if there had not been a British soldier in the whole country. I have that from people who have been extremely successful in developing oil in other parts of the world. I asked a question earlier this Session of the Colonial Secretary as to the results of the explorations for oil in Iraq and they were given to me as precisely nothing at all. Although we have been in that country now, including our occupation during, the War, for something like four or five years, no oil has yet been discovered. I am one of those who, with regard to Iraq, quite plainly advocate the so-called policy of scuttle. I want to clear out of that country, and as long as we are spending £100,000 on the country, and as long as I am a Member of this House, or outside if I am not a Member, I intend to protest against the expenditure of any money at all in maintaining ourselves or in maintaining our dupes in that country.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE

Who are the dupes?

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

The people whom we prop up in that country —the rulers whom we put up by arranging the elections. If they are at all able to stand by themselves, we have no business there at all. I do not, however, want to go into that at the moment. I am inquiring about the oil prospects, which are very interesting, and I also want to know whether we have finally come to an arrangement and a sympathetic understanding with the Government of the Republic of the United States about this question. It was one of the questions which was agitating that country, and the most important thing in the world to-day that lies before anyone in office in this country is to work for better relations with the United States. This was one of the causes of friction. I understand there was also some difficulty about the rights of the Standard Oil Company in Palestine, and I hope that has been settled satisfactorily as well. If we attempt, because of our position in Iraq, to give exceptional facilities and to favour the British or any allied country as against the interests of other countries we are going right against the spirit of the mandate. On the other hand, if we clear out of that country, as the present or the succeeding Government will be forced to do by public pressure, I am assured on good authority that satisfactory arrangements could be made with the local inhabitants to develop the oil fields of that country, as we are doing in South Persia with most satisfactory results, for which I admit that we have very largely to thank the right hon. Gentleman in charge of this Vote when he was a Liberal Minister. The answer to that will be that if we clear out, the Turks will come in within a week. I do not believe that is so. I believe it will be perfectly feasible to make a treaty with Turkey, which the Turks would keep, by which they would permit the Arabs to work out their own form of government.

I have discussed this matter with very high Turkish officials and members of the present Government when they were over here, and with other very important Turks, and I believe they were expressing the fixed resolve of the new Turkey which has risen on the ashes of the old, and which I believe will become a rejuvenated, healthy and progressive nation, that they do not wish longer to interfere with their Arab neighbours. The most far-seeing Turks to-day—and those are the men in power—realise that they have dissipated their strength in the past in the Yemen, Mesopotamia and the Hedjaz, and they are only willing to remain within their ethnographical limits and develop their own country. If we show ourselves prepared to work on friendly terms with Turkey I believe they will meet us with regard to Iraq and that bogey can be disposed of.

There is another matter I should like to ask information about. The question of the subsidies to Ibn Saud and other Arab potentates has been fully dealt with by my right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean). I only want to second what he has said. The thing is perfectly absurd. The policy of shovelling golden sovereigns into the itching palms of these gentry is the maddest policy I ever heard of. Is it true that these golden sovereigns are being used for importing arms, and is the very old established gun running trade, which was put down at great cost and with the very arduous service of our Navy in the years before the War, in full swing again, and are certain Continental gentlemen who served in the Latin countries-—-I will not put it any nearer—reaping a very rich harvest by selling arms to these people? Is there any truth in the reports in the Continental Press and in this country that a secret treaty has been signed between the Quai d'Orsai and Ibn Saud for support in case of trouble with the French in Syria, or even trouble with other countries? Is there any truth in the report of French political agents being at the Court of Ibn Saud, and, if so, did they go there with our knowledge, and what exactly is the position? These statements have appeared in the papers here, but is there any foundation at all for this intriguing with Ibn Saud. In other words, can we rely on this gentle- man's integrity. Ibn Saud seems to distrust the right hon. Gentleman and the right hon. Gentleman appears to distrust Ibn Saud, They may both be justified. I do not know. But what is the report of the political officers? The hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Captain Coote) referred to broken pledges. It is the height of impertinence for Coalition Liberals, or any Coalition supporters, to take about pledges. What ridiculous nonsense. If ever we gave solemn pledges to any country, it was to a country not far from Mesopotamia, namely, the Armenians. Have any of them ever protested against the breaking of our pledges there? We gave the most solemn pledges to Turkey pledges. These are countries which impinge on the territory over which the right hon. Gentleman holds uneasy sway. But what about pledges nearer home? The last thing any supporter of the Government-should speak about is broken pledges. The only sensible policy is to carry out the real pledge that we made, that we had only gone to their country to free them from the rule of Turkey. Having done that, we should clear out of the country and allow them to work out their own salvation.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE

That is not the Paisley policy.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

If the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) says we must stay at Basra, I am sure he has very good reasons. He has much more experience and knowledge than I have. At any rate, I should like to discuss the matter with him, which I have not yet had an opportunity of doing. The extraordinary thing is that it was the settled policy of this country, and I think a very clever policy, before the War—I wish it had been more successful—to encourage Germany to become involved in this waste of Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office deliberately encouraged the Germans to push on their railway to the Persian Gulf, and gave them every facility to get into Mesopotamia, which would keep them so busy that they would have no money and no force to spare for troubles in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN

Unless the hon. and gallant Gentleman suggests that that policy should now be repeated, he is not in order in referring to it.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I was saying it wag a policy which I think was a wise one, to involve the Germans in Mesopotamia so that they would not be able to do mischief elsewhere. We are also involving ourselves in Iraq, and although I do not believe this country deliberately makes mischief, at any rate in Europe, we shall so involve ourselves and spend so much money that we shall have to cut down our social services at home and starve other legitimate possessions, such as the rich and fertile territories of Africa, which are crying out for development. We have a Bill just now for stimulating cotton growing. For heaven's sake, let us find money for something productive like that if you must spend money outside these islands.

Mr. SUGDEN

We do not want your money for that.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

The Colonists do at ay rate. They are asking for money for transport, for har-hours, for Imperial development, which will probably repay itself many times over.

The CHAIRMAN

The hon. and gallant Gentleman cannot suggest any other alternative way in which this £9,000,000 can be spent.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I have one last comment to make on the question of Preference. After the speech of the right hon. Gentleman on Tuesday, which I was not here to support—I should have voted with the Government with the greatest pleasure if I had been—I should like to ask him whether Preference is going to be extended again next year to these mandated territories, such as Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN

The hon. and gallant Gentleman is anticipating the financial statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer somewhere about May next.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I shall have to keep my remarks until then. I am sorry, because I should like to have heard the right hon. Gentleman's reply. Here we are asking for this enormous sum of money. It is nearly £11,000,000, taking into account parallel expenditure by other Departments. We cannot afford it. We must protest against it. We must go on protesting, both in the House and outside. It is absolutely wrong; it is only doing us harm; it is not popular in India. The Age Khan, whose patriotism and devotion cannot be challenged, has told us very plainly how unpopular is the use of Indian troops in territories outside India. It is certainly most unpopular in the country. I am certain it is unpopular amongst the merchants of Dundee. I have challenged the right hon. Gentleman to stand an election at Dundee on the question. Perhaps the opportunity will come soon. The whole Iraq venture is extremely unpopular among all classes of the country. Lastly, it appears to be very unpopular amongst the great mass of the Mesopotamians themselves. A few Sheri-fians who have been brought in to fill a few posts want us to stay, and there may be a few Bagdadibureaucrats who want us to stay. But all the evidence I can get from Sir William Wilcox and people of that sort is that the average up-country Arab will not tolerate any rule but their own and wish to see our backs. That being the case, the last people to uphold this adventure are the right hon. Gentleman and a few henchmen he has gathered round him. Thank goodness, we turned from the Mecca adventure, the most ridiculous adventure ever suggested, in time. We have done enough harm in the world of Islam already. The idea that British trade will be fostered by a garrison there is absurd. We do our finest trade to-day in countries where there is not a single British soldier, like Mexico. We can develop the oilfields, to which we have some right by pre-War concessions and so on, without any military assistance, and the only reason I can see for maintaining this enormous expenditure in Iraq is to satisfy the amour propre of the Government and to satisfy these few pan-Arab enthusiasts. The idea of breaking pledges is absolutely wrong. Our only pledge was to allow the Arabs to govern themselves, and the sooner we clear out and let them get to work on that great experiment the better.

Mr. CHURCHILL

The hon. and gallant Gentleman who so often addresses us has on this occasion treated us to a considerable exhibition of his curious internal state of mind. At first sight it seemed to be a very simplex point of view. He summed it up in a single word, "scuttle." That was the policy which the hon. and gallant Gentleman recommended, which he had always recommended, which he would always recommend, for the British Empire to pursue in its affairs all over the world, in peace or in war. A very simple policy! Probably it would save a lot of trouble. Once you get your faith firmly founded on some broad all-embracing, comprehensive principle of that kind, you are not easily exposed to the need of making any great tax upon your mental powers.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

Or upon the Exchequer.

Mr. CHURCHILL

The hon. and gallant Gentleman made a very peculiar exception to this universal policy. "Scuttle" was the word for all parts of the world, but not in regard to Basra. There, there was to be a halt. This universal self-effacement which the British Empire is to pursue on all occasions encountered an absolute exception at Basra. What was the reason which he gave for excepting Basra from this general policy of scuttle? It was a most remarkable reason. He said that his leader, the right hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) was in favour of remaining at Basra, although his leader had not condescended to explain to him any reason why we should stay at Basra, when all the rest had been given up. Nevertheless, in spite of this lack of consideration, in spite of this lack of ordinary courtesy which one would expect to be shown to a follower of such distinction, by a leader in the circumstances in which that leader is placed, such is the submissive faith of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, usually so truculent, that, without either word or question, without even caring to know what are the reasons, he immediately accepts the policy of holding on to Basra, at all costs, whilst advocating in all other matters the policy of scuttle.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY rose—

Mr. CHURCHILL

The hon. Member must sometimes listen as well as speak.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

I do not want to be misrepresented.

Mr. CHURCHILL

I can only hope that when the political transformation to which the hon. and gallant Member and his Friends are looking forward with so much hope and eagerness takes place, this signal act of submission and abasement which he has performed publicly this afternoon will not be forgotten by my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

All I said was that I had heard the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman with respect to our staying at Basra, but that he had not discussed the matter with me; that he had not heard my reasons, and until that time occurred I was prepared to follow him in that policy.

Mr. CHURCHILL

Then I can only hope that any outstanding differences may be speedily cleared up, and that a full understanding may be established between a leader and a follower who shows such admirable fidelity, and makes such public protestations of it.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

I wish you the same.

Mr. CHURCHILL

After this, I hope the Committee will permit me to leave the hon. and gallant Gentleman, and turn to some matters of substance. I am afraid it is impossible for the Committee to ask me this afternoon to re-open and resume the main question, whether we ought or ought not immediately to give orders for the complete evacuation of Iraq. We discussed this matter for a full afternoon earlier in the Session. I made a full statement of our position, which took an unconscionable time, and the House accepted it by an overwhelming majority, and, really, without any serious challenge of the policy which I then outlined. It was certainly not a very ambitious or alarming policy. I pointed out how much we had spent in the past upon Iraq and Kurdistan. I pointed out how very great were the sacrifices we had made, and the losses we had sustained in this part of the world. I pointed out how rapid was the diminution in the cost, and that on the whole the tranquilisation was proceeding effectively. I then showed that the forecast for the future was likely to be increasingly favourable. While I could give no guarantees, I said that I thought it was possible that the expense for next year will be less than this year. I submitted to the House the view that it might well be that, when we had spent over £100,000,000, and when perhaps the expenditure of a tenth of that amount, spread over a few years, might bring our policy to success, it was worth while persevering over such part of the road as yet remains to be trod, rather than to cast away whatever sacrifice we have made in the past, and doing that fruitlessly, to exhibit ourselves before the nations of the world as a nation which has undertaken a Mandate which we are unable to fulfil, and to create in a country for which we have undertaken responsibility, conditions which would be little short of actual anarchy. When we compare these two situations, the past and the future, the past with its great losses, the future with its, I think I may say, increasing hopes, it would be an act of enormous self-stultification if the Committee were now to decide, incontinently, without regard to circumstances, without regard to commitments, pledges, or undertakings of any kind, to order the immediate evacuation of Iraq.

That being the view which Parliament took only two-and-a-half months ago, I cannot undertake to re-state and reargue in detail the whole case for the immediate and total evacuation of Iraq. Nor was that the question which was raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) in his speech to-day. First of all, he dealt with various financial questions, and he applied his scrutiny to the Estimates now before the Committee. In the first place, he complained of the form in which the Estimates are presented. I think that is an unmerited complaint. Let us look into the past history of this subject. No individual Minister was responsible for the expenditure in Mesopotamia up to the year 1921. Palestine and Mesopotamia were then administered by the Foreign Office and India Office respectively, and were kept in order by the War Office. No individual Minister could be made accountable for the cost of those countries, which, at that time, was gigantic, terrible and crushing, and which was spread over two or three different Departments, the bulk of it falling upon the War Office. The War Office, which spent the greatest part of the money, had absolutely no control of any sort over the policy which led to that expenditure.

I am responsible for having urged most strongly the concentration of the whole expense of the Middle East under one head, and placing that burden upon the back of one unfortunate Minister. I did not know at the time that I advocated it that I should be that Minister. To say that this is not in accordance with what Parliament should require that it does not minister to the effective control of the House of Commons over expenditure, and that it does not subject the expense of these territories to the full glare of public criticism and scrutiny is absolutely absurd. I have always predicted that you would never get reduction in expense on these matters until one Minister had to stand up here and face the whole unpopularity that there was in the country, and the prejudice against it. That is the greatest incentive you can have to reduction of the expenditure, and my words have been borne out by what has occurred. It is because of that incentive that we have succeeded in effecting gigantic economies. Search the whole range of British expenditure at the present time, the thousand millions of expenditure, and you will not find anything comparable in degree with the reduction that has been achieved in this field.

6.0 P.M.

The right hon. Member for Peebles turned a searchlight of his gaze upon the tables of the Estimates, and on page 56 he detected an item of £900 increase in the expenditure upon the staff of the Middle Eastern Department at the Colonial Office. He spoke for five minutes on the subject. He referred to the ever growing bureaucracy, and to mushroom departments growing up. When you consider the enormous mass of expenditure which was flowing out for Iraq and Palestine at the time that they were handed over to the Colonial Office—at that time the expenditure amounted to £35,000,000 a year—it seems to me that a sum of £8,000 a year was a very small charge to make for the additional secretariat necessary to enable the Colonial Office to undertake the super-control of the whole of that vast district. To grudge a sum of that kind for the management of a business of that size would pass the limit of frugality, would pass the furthest bounds of parsimony, and would become sheer niggardliness. I question whether there is any Department that has been administered with a smaller expenditure on headquarters staff than has been the case here. This matter is so much in the mind of my right hon. Friend, and is causing him so much anxiety, that I am going to draw the attention of the Committee to his curious sense of proportion. We have increased the expenditure in this case by £900. We have increased it by £900 this year because it was desired to have a rather stricter financial control, and two subordinates have been added to assist the Finance Officer who deals with the matter. The right hon. Gentleman seems to grudge an increase of £900 to the finance staff of the Department when in the same year in which this increase is made there is a reduction of £18,500,000. That is the sense of proportion of my right hon. Friend. £900 is added, but he might have looked through the Estimates for a week and never noticed the decrease of £18,500,000. I am bound to say that I think it is very much to be regretted that in giving a general review of the finances of the country my right hon. Friend could not set these two amounts in their proper relation, but just mentioned casually in passing the reduction of £18,500,000 which, after all, is the central figure of these Estimates.

Sir D. MACLEAN

I mentioned it at least twice.

Mr. CHURCHILL

It is perfectly true that my right hon. Friend, who is an old Parliamentarian, made one or two guarded observations without attracting attention inside the House, and which certainly are not likely to attract the slightest attention outside, but which enable him to say what he said just now, when he is reproached for ignoring, suppressing, avoiding, smothering and endeavouring to conceal the main feature of these Estimates. However, let me relieve him on the subject of this £900. I do not wish to rub in the £18,000,000 too much. I hope that the £900 will be reduced very largely in the present year, and will disappear completely next year, because, I am sorry to say, that I have not been able to persuade Colonel Lawrence to accept any longer the salary of £l,000 a year, which hitherto he has been drawing. He has written that he considers the state of affairs in Palestine and Iraq to be now so prosperous and in the future likely to be so calm, that he would not feel justified in drawing any salary, but that he will still give me his services in an honorary capacity whenever they are required. Therefore, if next year we are discussing the same question, and if my right hon. Friend is sitting up half the night studying these Estimates, his mind will be able to fix itself clearly and uninterruptedly upon the larger figure of reductions which has been achieved, without being diverted and distracted from it by this increase of £900.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the armies that were being employed in Iraq, and, of course, I have never concealed from the House that there are some elements in this Iraq situation which lend themselves, if approached in a spirit of levity, to humorous treatment, and no doubt the idea of an Arab Army, an Imperial Army and an army of levies, all co-existing together in the service of one State, differently paid, and variously controlled and commanded, does lend itself to humour and even to ridicule, but the only defence which I can plead is, that I think that on the whole we are getting on very well. I have never given any guarantee that we shall be able to succeed. On the contrary, I have repeatedly warned the House that the means at my disposal were so small, and the dangers and difficulties were so enormous, that we might well fail, but, as a fact, we have not failed up to the present. We have succeeded beyond all hope. These three armies, with the Air Force, do, I believe, constitute as good an arrangement for the purpose of preserving internal peace and defending the frontier as it is within our power to make at the present time.

It is very remarkable that, during the last year or year and a half, not a single Imperial soldier has been killed in Palestine or Iraq proper. I exclude three or four who have been killed in Kurdistan, but, so far as Iraq proper and Palestine are concerned, not only have we this colossal reduction of the expenditure from £35,000,000 to £27,000,000 and from £27,000,000 to £10,000,000, but the great reduction which, of course, has been secured by the vast expulsion of troops, the sending home and the disbandment of troops of all kinds, has been attained in a period in which no one representative of Imperial authority has lost his life. I cannot guarantee what may take place in all circumstances, but if we continue to prosper as we have hitherto done the expense in these countries instead of being £10,000,000, as it is this year, next year will be something like £5,000,000, and there will be a further reduction the year after that. Of course, if it is the wish of the House that we should evacuate these territories that is another matter, but to those who have committed themselves to an effort being made by us to fulfil our obligations, I do think that a reduction of expenditure on that scale should make an appeal.

Of course, there is a certain amount of expenditure proceeding in regard to the accommodation which must be provided for the other forces which we are employing to assist the native Government of Iraq. As I have explained, the work is mainly done by the Air Force, and the Air Force required some shelter from the tropical heat of the sun, and some reasonably permanent quarters. Every economy has been practised in building these places, and towards the end of the present year they will be complete.

Sir D. MACLEAN

What about the quarters of the High Commissioner's staff?

Mr. CHURCHILL

The principal expense this year is the completion of the quarters of the Air Force at a loop of the river Tigris where they will be perfectly safe, and from whence their control can be exercised over the whole country. If the right hon. Gentleman deplores that item of expenditure, as no doubt he may, he must remember that it is an integral part of the policy by which all these enormous savings have been achieved, and that without it it would not have been possible for us to have held and remained in control of the country, at any rate without gigantic military expenditure. So far as the expenditure on the house of the High Commissioner is concerned, if you ask a distinguished man, like Sir Percy Cox, of very great gifts for this particular kind of work, at his age, to use the whole of his unique influence and experience in guiding this policy, which so far has been very successful, the least you can do is to provide a reasonable habitation in. which he can dwell. May I point out that however large may be the diminution in your expenditure and responsibility in future in Iraq, however few may be the troops or officials you may need there, you will certainly need to have at the head of your administration an ambassador or plenipotentiary or High Commissioner, and the more you withdraw your military forces the more you will need to have a person of great influence in a position befitting the dignity of a Mandatory Power and able to give advice and counsel to the native ruler and the native Government, and in any event this item has to be considered in connection with the vast diminution of expenditure which is the feature of all these Estimates.

My right hon. Friend spoke about the subsidy to Ibn Saud, and I sympathised with the right hon. Gentleman in his difficulty in pronouncing this name. I made a mistake in saying the British subsidy was paid in gold. It is not paid in gold. It is paid in Indian silver rupees, but I think that the passage in his peroration, in which my right hon. Friend spoke about-golden sovereigns pouring into the golden sands of Arabia, might, with very little alteration, be made to fit equally well the case of the silver rupee. But the alteration, no doubt, does not affect his flight. I would like to say a word or two about the new Treaty which we are on the point of making with King Feisal. An extraordinary prejudice has grown up throughout the East against the word "mandate," as if it implied some kind of servitude or abrogation of their State, into which they are thrust and in which they are to be held through the agency of some baleful body called the League of Nations. They have got it all wrong.

I am always endeavouring, with a fervour which would do justice to my Noble Friend the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil), to explain to them the virtues of the League of Nations and the innocency of the term "mandate." But with less success than my exertions deserve. If you were to ask the King and the Government and the Assembly of Iraq what they would really like, they would say," We should like to deal with England directly without any worry about the mandate or the League of Nations. We will make you a Treaty which will give you an admirable and privileged position in our country, in return for your giving us the aid which we require from you in making it a civilised and prosperous State. We would gladly do that." That has been the argument they have used. "Everything we owe to Britain" is the language they use, and, "We would like to deal directly with you and only with you, and to make a thoroughly good arrangement between the two parties." I have to say to them, "That is all very well, but the League of Nations would never consent to it. "The other Powers would never consent, and rightly so. They would say," What? Is England, having got this territory under a mandate, going to frame a Treaty with special advantages in her favour, and then free herself altogether from the restrictions which the mandate imposed and the obligations which the mandate required?" You can see in a moment what the attitude of the other Allied and Associated Powers would be, without my mentioning the name of any one of them, and how violent and well-founded would be their objection.

Therefore, I have said quite frankly to King Feisal that, whatever our wishes might be, and however reasonable and complimentary to us his view might be, we have no chance whatever of securing freedom from the Mandate, and we are bound in all our dealings with him to take our stand upon that international foundation. I have also said, of course, that we did reserve for ourselves the right, if we really thought it necessary, to jay the Mandate at the feet of the League of Nations and to wash our hands of the whole business. Rather than that we should leave the country and withdraw the aid that is absolutely indispensable to this new State, and bring it to chaos and ruin and bloodshed, those Iraqians who have been pressing most of all for the abrogation of the Mandate will, I am sure, be the first to come forward and to say, "Rather than that England shall withdraw her aid from us, we will endeavour to reconcile our people to the Mandate and to disarm their prejudices on the subject." On that basis I hope we may very shortly reach a satisfactory Treaty, which Treaty has to be submitted to the League of Nations, together with the Mandate, and either this year or next year, or the year after next, or some time when that body is able to arrive at a united and agreed decision on the subject, we shall get it ratified in due form.

An hon. Member asked about oil. There again, of course, we are not completely masters of the position. We have recognised the rights of the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which we have a great interest, but those rights have not been recognised by the United States, and we have not been proceeding in a brusque or inconsiderate and domineering way in dealing with the matter. On the contrary, we are making every effort to arrive at an amicable agreement with the United States upon the interpretation which is to be placed on the pre-War concessions given in Iraq and in Palestine, In the meantime we are not proceeding with the development of these oil-fields. That is regrettable. It has not been due to idleness on our part, but to our desire not to take steps which would appear to amount to a greedy exploitation by us of properties about which other great and friendly Powers manifest a lively concern. I do not think the Committee has any reason whatever to bear the Colonial Office a grudge for their contribution to the course of events in the Middle East, and in Iraq in particular.

I do not conceal from the Committee that all these last 18 months I have been very anxious lest our internal arrangements in Iraq, which were being proceeded with quite satisfactorily, should be interrupted by an incursion from the Turks in the Mosul district, or by increasing disorder in Kurdistan.

I pointed out a year and a half ago that if our policy was to be successful a satisfactory peace with Turkey was indispensable. We have not got it. We do not seem to be very near to getting it. So we have had to dispense with the indispensable. But we have managed to carry on without that great advantage. Still I do not conceal at all from the Committee that it imposes anxiety upon me. As far as Southern Kurdistan is concerned, we have not the slightest intention of getting ourselves involved or entangled there. We are doing the best we can for Southern Kurdistan, but we are not committing ourselves in any serious way. I have given explicit directions which will prevent anything of that kind arising. We do not wish to force the people of Southern Kurdistan under the Government of King Feisal. They are free to take part or not in the elections which are about to take place, as they choose. We are most anxious to study their wishes and to develop any local variant of the self-government which has been given to Iraq that may commend itself to them.

We believe firmly that the interests of Southern Kurdistan are so closely involved in Iraq that, without any compulsion from us, these two territories will ultimately come into harmonious accord. The situation is not entirely without resemblances to other situations with which the Colonial Office has had recently to deal in other parts of the British Dominions. I do not think we have had a bed of roses to lie upon, but I claim that we have been steadily making good the undertakings given to Parliament, and I hope that next year the burdens which still lie upon us will be still more markedly reduced. If that should be so, and if we should not be interrupted by outside incursions, I think that on the next occasion when I have the pleasure of discussing these matters with the Committee I shall be entitled to extort from them the admission that on the whole this difficult and hazardous experiment is being attended with a certain measure of modified success.

Lord ROBERT CECIL

I am sure the whole Committee will express congratulations to the right hon. Gentleman for the very considerable amount of success which he has achieved during the last 18 months. I was very glad to hear what he said about South Kurdistan. I am extremely anxious that we should not get into any entanglement, which would be of a very serious and costly character. I wish the right hon. Gentleman had said a little more about the subsidies to the chiefs in Arabia. The situation there is unsatisfactory. We have given these subsidies for years. I am not suggesting that the right hon. Gentleman is responsible for the policy. But it is a policy which ought to be reconsidered. Do we get any adequate return for the £150,000 which we are spending in Arabia? I think the policy is certainly improving. There was a time when two Departments of the Government were subsidising rival chiefs and enabling them to fight each other with greater ease than would otherwise have been possible. But probably we still waste a considerable amount of money in Arabia. The Colonial Secretary made considerable objection to the criticism of the right hon. Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) on the subject of economy. I do not think those objec- tions were well founded. It was said with truth and candour that the economy which the Government had achieved in this matter was due to the pressure of public opinion. The price of economy, like the price of liberty, is eternal vigilance, and the only way in which economy can be enforced under our present system in this House is by people of the position of my right hon. Friend examining with scrupulous care the Estimates, and pointing out even relatively small items on which economies can be made. It is quite true that £900 is a comparatively small sum. If it is not justified, it ought not to be spent. My right hon. Friend was more than entitled to draw attention to a fact which at first sight seemed difficult to explain, namely, that whereas our responsibilities were decreasing in one respect, the expenses of headquarters administration were increasing.

The Colonial Secretary complained very much that sufficient recognition had not been given to him for the fact that he was saving £18,000.000. I agree that the saving of £18,000,000 is an immensely satisfactory circumstance. What moves a great many people is that this £18,000,000. like the other millions that we saved last year, would never have been saved unless the Government had been induced entirely to reverse their original policy. While we are ready to thank the right hon. Gentleman for this saving of money, we are forced to add that if the criticisms of their Iraq policy had been attended to sooner by the Government, this, and much more, would have been saved by an earlier change of policy. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues show a public appreciation of the fact—although they must realise it in their own minds—that they have been forced completely to abandon their original policy in Iraq. The House will recollect that for months, if not years, in the past an entirely different policy was pursued. The object, apparently, was to convert Iran into an Indian province with an Indian administration, a policy that was costly and unpopular, and very nearly led us into very serious military difficulties. That policy has now been completely abandoned. It was wrong from the outset, and was pursued in defiance of criticism and the objections raised against it from outside. Though we are glad it has been abandoned, we cannot say the Government are entitled to the congratulations of this House or the country because, at long last, they have adopted a policy which, if adopted earlier, would have saved us even more money than they claim to have saved now. That is the essential part of the criticism which may now be directed against the Government.

I do not understand, however, what the new policy is. I listened very carefully to that part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. He explained the objection in Iraq to the policy of mandates, and declared a warm and, indeed, a passionate adherence to the principle of the League of Nations, which he has managed, on occasion, to conceal with great success. When he went on to explain what it was he proposed to put in place of the mandate system, I confess I was puzzled, and I am not sure yet, whether I understand what it is he proposes to substitute. I understand the position in Iraq at the present moment is this, that technically we are there because we conquered the country. We are there by right of conquest, and that is our only right. We have no Treaty rights at all. Technically, at this moment it is occupied enemy territory, and we are free from all Treaty obligations. We can administer the country as we like. I understand an agreement was made as between the principal Allied and Associated Powers that, if and when a Treaty was made, regularising the position, a mandate for this district would be allotted to this country as one among those Powers. When the right hon. Gentleman sneers at the delays which he thinks have taken place or may take place in consequence of the proceedings of the organs of the League, I venture to remind him that, so far, the matter has not come before the League at all. It is still entirely in the hands of the Supreme Council, and if any delays have taken place—and very grave and serious and disastrous delays have taken place in dealing with the whole of the subject—the blame is entirely to be laid on the principal Allied Powers. I think I hear the right hon. Gentleman make a reference to the Associated Powers. He must remember that the Associated Powers had no concern in making this arrangement. The people who had to make peace were the Allied Powers, not the Associated Powers. I know it has been said that the difficulty in obtaining the views of the United States as to the mandate on Armenia held up the whole negotiations with Turkey, but I have never been able to accept that as anything but a mere excuse for what was, in fact, a very serious failure in the policy of the Allied Powers. The delay has been caused by their delay, and that is a thing which should be thoroughly understood. The League, so far, has had nothing to do with the matter. It has never been broght before the League at all. I read that there is to be a discussion on the terms of the mandate for Palestine before the Council which is due to meet, I understand, in London next week, but I imagine all that can be discussed will be a kind of provisional agreement. If and when a mandate is regularly allotted it will be administered under particular terms which will be there agreed upon.

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that if the policy of the Government were to be one of proposing to deprive their associates in the late War of the advantages, on the faith of which the San Remo Agreement was concluded— that is to say, if they were going to take away from them the open door and advantages of that kind in Iraq, that would cause very grave annoyance and very justifiable annoyance. I agree, also, that if any attempt were made behind the backs of other people, as was unfortunately made in the case of Persia, to set up a Protectorate or something of that nature, then we would incur, as we did there, grave unpopularity and grave objection on the part of the great Powers without achieving any result. To that extent, I am entirely with the right hon. Gentleman, but I do not quite know what he really proposes. I can understand that the objection which is felt against the policy of mandates in Iraq is founded on a misapprehension, namely, that a mandate in some way—the word"mandate"— implies some kind of derogation from their national dignity, and they would prefer independence, even if it were accompanied by such Treaty limitations as would, in fact, give them no greater rights than they would have under a mandate. Are the Government going to insist on a mandate or not? Are they going to grant the request of the Arabs to have a qualified independence, rather than a mandated posi- tion, or are they going to say to the Arabs: You must have the mandate, but we assure you that it does not involve any derogation of your dignity?

Mr. CHURCHILL

It is not in our power to depart from the mandate unless we throw up the whole position. We are making a Treaty with King Feisal which is designed in every possible way, short of our breaking our honour with the League of Nations, to meet his feelings and the local national feelings.

Lord R. CECIL

I dare say that may be the best policy. It is difficult for anybody outside negotiations to criticise those negotiations while they are in progress. I would draw attention to the terms of a Clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations, to which I feel at liberty to refer, because it was drafted at the direct personal instigation of the Prime Minister, and I was not concerned in it: Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. That is a Clause referring to the Asiatic territories, including Iraq, and I should have thought that on that Clause it was possible to recognise the independence of Iraq, subject to a Treaty securing to the other members of the League and the principal Allied and Associated Powers whatever rights they would have been entitled to under a mandate strictly so-called. In other words, I should have thought there was nothing in that Clause against getting rid of the for m "mandate" if that were really a serious matter for Arab sentiment, and yet preserving to all nations who were parties to this Treaty the rights which they would have had under the Treaty.

Mr. CHURCHILL

That is very much what we are doing. We are not entitled to disclaim the mandate, but we are acknowledging an Arab State—we are creating an independent Arab State and making a Treaty with that State.

Lord R. CECIL

I do not think there is anything more than words, if there is even that, in difference between us. The only thing I would recommend—and I am sure it has been considered—is that on the question of words some satisfaction might be given. I should like to describe as I see them the essential factors of the situation. There seems to be three of those factors. There are our interests, there are our duties to our fellow signatories, and there are the duties which we owe to the Arabs, included in them being a proper regard for the sensitiveness of the Islamic peoples, which perhaps in some sense may be regarded as an outside consideration. I have always had the greatest doubts whether we have any considerable direct interests in Iraq. I do not much care for what is called the oil policy, but I have very serious doubts whether there is any considerable amount of oil to be obtained, and I do not know what other interests we have got in the country. Our duties to our associate nations are defined by Treaty and have already been described. When we come to our duty to the Arabs, I conceive that since we went into this country and undertook this mission, on the traditional principles of English law and justice, we are not entitled to leave the thing half-done, if by doing so we inflict injury on those into whose country we have entered. But I do think—and in this I entirely agree with the hon. Member for Harrow (Mr. Mosley) that the fact that the Arabs are pressing for independence greatly relieves the original obligation we were under to them. We cannot leave the country against the will of the inhabitants and expose those who are friendly to us to slaughter and ruin. I do not want to plunge the country back into chaos, but, at the same time, if the people of the country are pressing for their independence, then it is our business to give as great a measure of independence as it is possible for us to do, and the more we reduce our liabilities in Iraq the better I shall be pleased.

I do not believe who have any interests there. I think our only reason for remaining there is the duty under which we have come to the inhabitants. I do not put it exactly as a pledge; it is more than a pledge. You choose to go into the country, you occupy it, you create an entirely new state of things, and you cannot then suddenly say, "I am going to disregard everything I have done, and expose the whole country to disorder and the people to slaughter." That is im- possible, but that we ought to do everything we can to reduce our responsibilities I profoundly believe. An hon. Member opposite asked us to do all we could to show the Mahommedans throughout the world that we desire nothing but the welfare of their faith and their system of politics. That may be perhaps true, but in this matter I think we should be acting mistakenly if we thought that that was the main consideration. I believe that the greatness of the British Empire depends on the fact that British administrators have habitually regarded the interests of the actual populations under their control as their first interest and their first duty. I believe that great principle has been the foundation on which the whole of the greatness of the Empire has been built. Therefore, I would not bother too much about the effect our policy was going to have on Mahommedan feeling generally. I doubt very much whether anyone, even the most skilled, can prophesy exactly what effect any particular act will have on that feeling. I am not at all sure that concession to it is the way to conciliate it, but I do think that, having placed ourselves in the position in which we have placed ourselves, we are under a duty to the inhabitants of Iraq, and that we must fulfil it.

I am, however, also convinced that we must reduce our obligations as quickly as we can consistently with the great principle of not deserting our friends. A good many hard things have been said about the policy of scuttle. If scuttle means deserting your responsibilities and exposing your friends to slaughter and ruin, I agree that it is a policy to be condemned, but if it means reducing, by

every means in your power, the responsibilities of our Empire consistently with fairness and justice, then I believe it is the right policy for us to pursue. I do not believe you will find a single statesman of any responsibility for the last half century, whether he called himself Radical or Conservative or Labour, who did not realise that the British Empire does not gain by extending its responsibilities. It is already quite as big as it ought to be in its own interests, and, for my part, I am only too anxious to see our responsibilities in Iraq reduced as quickly and as completely as possible. I should welcome an announcement by the Government that they were satisfied that they could, without injustice to anyone and with the full assent of the inhabitants of Iraq, withdraw from the country altogether, but as long as we cannot get that assent, as long as we are under an obligation to protect our friends in that country, as long as it is part of our duty to see the undertaking through which we entered upon during the War, as long as that policy is imposed upon us by feelings of honour and justice, then I only ask that it should be pursued with as great a regard to the necessities of the time and the urgency of economy as possible, and I welcome any step which will diminish our responsibilities on the lines which I understand the Government are pursuing. I can only express my deep regret that the policy which is now being carried out was not carried out much earlier.

Question put, "That a sum, not exceeding £4,363,000, be granted for the said Service."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 79;Noes, 210.

Division No. 213.]	AYES	[6.53 p.m.
Acland, Rt. Hon. Francis D.	Entwistle, Major C. F.	Kennedy, Thomas
Adamson, Rt. Hon. William	Erskine, James Malcolm Monteith	Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M.
Banbury, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick G.	Foot, Isaac	Lambert, Rt. Hon. George
Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery)	Galbraith, Samuel	Lawson, John James
Barnes, Major H. (Newcastle, E.)	Gi[...]s, William	Lunn, William
Barton, Sir William (Oldham)	Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton)	Maclean, Rt. Hn. Sir D. (Midlothian)
Bell, James (Lancaster, Ormskirk)	Grundy, T. W.	Macveagh, Jeremiah
Benn, Captain Wedgwood (Leith)	Guest, J. (York, W. R., Hemsworth)	Maitland, Sir Arthur D. Steel-
Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W.	Hall, F. (York, W.R., Normanton)	Malone, C. L. (Leyton, E.)
Bramsdon, Sir Thomas	Hallas, Eldred	Mills, John Edmund
Briant, Frank	Halls. Walter	Morrison, Hugh
Brown, James (Ayr and Bute)	Hartshorn, Vernon	Mosley, Oswald
Cairns, John	Hayday, Arthur	Murray, Dr. D, (Inverness & Rose)
Cape, Thomas	Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Widnes)	Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan)
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord R. (Hitchin)	Hirst, G. H.	Poison, Sir Thomas A.
Clynes, Rt. Hon. John R.	Hodge, Rt. Hon. John	Rattan, Peter Wilson
Davies, A. (Lancaster, Clitheroe)	Irving, Dan	Rendall, Athelstan
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)	Jones, G. W. H. (Stoke Newington)	Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)
Davison, J. E. (Smethwick)	Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown)	Robertson, John
Edwards, G. (Norfolk, South)	Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)	Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor)
Royce, William Stapleton	Thomson, T. (Middlesbrough, West)	Williams, Penry (Middlesbrough, E.)
Sexton, James	Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plaistow)	Wilson, James (Dudley)
Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough)	Tillett, Benjamin	Wintringham, Margaret
Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser	Watts-Morgan, Lieut.-Col. D.	Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C.)
Sutton, John Edward	Wedgwood, Colonel Josiah C.	Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton)
Swan, J. E.	Wignall, James
Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby)	Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consett)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
		Mr. Hogge and Mr. T. Griffiths.
NOES.
Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte	Gritten, W. G. Howard	Peel, Col. Hn. S. (Uxbridge, Mddx.)
Ainsworth, Captain Charles	Guthrie, Thomas Maule	Perkins, Walter Frank
Armstrong, Henry Bruce	Hacking, Captain Douglas H.	Perring, William George
Ashley, Colonel Wilfrid W.	Hallwood, Augustine	Pollock, Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Murray
Atkey, A. R.	Hamilton, Sir George C.	Pratt, John William
Baird, Sir John Lawrence	Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry	Purchase, H. G.
Baldwin, Rt, Hon. Stanley	Harmsworth, C. B. (Bedford, Luton)	Randies, Sir John Scurrah
Balfour, George (Hampstead)	Haslam, Lewis	Ratcliffe, Henry Butler
Balfour, Sir R. (Glasgow, Partick)	Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford)	Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. N.
Banner, Sir John S. Harmood-	Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank	Richardson, Sir Alex. (Gravesend)
Barnston, Major Harry	Hills, Major John Waller	Richardson, Lt.-Col. Sir P. (Chertsey)
Barrand, A. R.	Hinds, John	Roberts, Rt. Hon. G. H. (Norwich)
Barrie, Sir Charles Coupar (Banff)	Hoare, Lieut.-Colonel Sir S. J. G.	Roberts, Sir S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall)
Bartley-Denniss, Sir Edmund Robert	Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy	Robinson, Sir T. (Lancs., Stretford)
Beauchamp, Sir Edward	Hope, Sir H. (Stirling & Cl'ckm'nn, W.)	Rodger, A. K.
Beckett, Hon. Sir Gervase	Hope, Lt.-Col. Sir J. A. (Midlothian)	Rutherford, Sir W. W. (Edge Hill)
Bellairs, Commander Cariyon W.	Hope, J. D. (Berwick & Haddington)	Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)
Benn, Capt. Sir I. H., Part. (Gr'nw'h)	Hopkins, John W. W.	Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D.
Bennett, Sir Thomas Jewell	Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley)	Scott, A. M. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Betterton, Henry B.	Horne, Sir R. S. (Glasgow, Hillhead)	Scott, Sir Leslie (Liverp'l, Exchange)
Blair, Sir Reginald	Houfton, John Plowright	Seager, Sir William
Boscawen, Rt. Hon, Sir A. Griffith-	Howard, Major S. G.	Seely, Major-General Rt. Hon. John
Bowles, Colonel H. F.	Hunter, General Sir A. (Lancaster)	Shaw, William T. (Forfar)
Bowyer, Captain G. W. E.	Hurd, Percy A.	Simm, M. T.
Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive	Hurst, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald B.	Smith, Sir Harold (Warrington)
Briggs, Harold	Jephcott, A. R.	Smith, Sir Malcolm (Orkney)
Broad, Thomas Tucker	Jesson, C.	Sprot, Colonel Sir Alexander
Brown, Major D. C.	Jodrell, Neville Paul	Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston)
Bruton, Sir James	Jones, Sir Evan (Pembroke)	Stanton, Charles Butt
Buckley, Lieut. Colonel A.	Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)	Steel, Major S. Strang
Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James	Kellaway, Rt. Hon. Fredk. George	Stephenson, Lieut.-Colonel H. K.
Burdon, Colonel Rowland	Kidd, James	Stewart, Gershom
Burn, Col. C. R. (Devon, Torquay)	King, Captain Henry Douglas	Sturrock, J. Leng
Casey, T. W.	Larmor, Sir Joseph	Sugden, W. H.
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Sir Evelyn (Aston)	Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale)	Sutherland, Sir William
Chamberlain, N. (Birm., Ladywood)	Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales]	Taylor, J.
Child, Brigadier-General Sir Hill	Lindsay, William Arthur	Terrell, George (Wilts, Chippenham)
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.	Lister, Sir R. Ashton	Terrell, Captain R. (Oxford, Henley)
Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spender	Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green)	Thomas, Sir Robert J. (Wrexham)
Coats, Sir Stuart	Locker-Lampson, Com. O. (H'tingd'n)	Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South)
Cohen, Major J. Brunei	Lorden, John William	Thomson, Sir W Mitchell- (Maryhill)
Colfox, Major Wm. Phillips	Lort-Williams, J.	Tickler, Thomas George
Conway, Sir W. Martin	Lowther, Ma).-Gen. Sir C. (Penrith)	Townley. Maximilian G
Coote, Colin Reith (Isle of Ely)	Loyd, Arthur Thomas (Abingdon)	Tryon, Major George Clement
Cory, Sir J. H. (Cardiff, South)	Macdonald, Rt. Hon. John Murray	Turton, Edmund Russborough
Cowan, Sir H. (Aberdeen and Kinc.)	Mackinder, Sir H. J. (Camlachie)	Waddington, R.
Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry	M'Lean, Lieut.-Col. Charles W. W.	Wallace, J.
Curzon, Captain Viscount	McMicking, Major Gilbert	Walters, Rt. Hon. Sir John Tudor
Davidson, Major-General Sir J. H.	Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J.	Walton, J.(York. W. R., Don Valley)
Davies, Alfred Thomas (Lincoln)	Macpherson, Rt. Hon. James I.	Ward, Col. L. (Kingston-upon-Hull)
Davies, Thomas (Cirencester)	Marks, Sir George Croydon	Ward, William Dudley (Southampton)
Dawson, Sir Philip	Marriott, John Arthur Ransome	Watson, Captain John Bertrand
Du Pre, Colonel William Baring	Martin, A. E.	Weston, Colonel John Wakefield
Edwards, Major J. (Aberavon)	Middlebrook, Sir William	White, Col. G. D. (Southport)
Edwards, Hugh (Glam., Neath)	Mitchell, Sir William Lane	Williams. C. (Tavistock)
Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark)	Molson, Major John Eisdale	Wilson, Col. M. J. (Richmond)
Evans, Ernest	Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Morltz	Windsor, Viscount
Falcon, Captain Michael	Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C.	Winterton, Earl
Falle, Major Sir Bertram Godfrey	Moreing, Captain Algernon H.	Wise, Frederick
Farquharson, Major A. C.	Morrison-Bell, Major A. C.	Wolmer, Viscount
Fell, Sir Arthur	Munro, Rt. Hon. Robert	Wood, Hon. Edward F. L. (Ripon)
Flannery, Sir James Fortescue	Murray, Hon. Gideon (St. Rollox)	Wood, Sir H. K. (Woolwich, West)
Foreman, Sir Henry	Murray, John (Leeds, West)	Wood, Sir J, (Stalybridge & Hyde)
Forrest, Walter	Neal, Arthur	Woolcock. William James U.
Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.	Newman, Colonel J. R. P. (Finchley)	Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L.
Gardiner, James	Newson, Sir Percy Wilson	Yeo, Sir Alfred William
Gee, Captain Robert	Nicholson, Brig.-Gen. J. (Westminster)	Young, Sir Frederick W. (Swindon)
Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham	Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)
Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John	Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Gould, James C.	Palmer, Brigadier-General G. L.	Colonel Leslie Wilson and Mr. McCurdy.
Green, Joseph F, (Leicester, W.)	Parker, James
Grenfell, Edward Charles

Original Question again proposed.

7.0 P.M.

Mr. L. MALONE

I do not think the Secretary for the Colonies enlightened us in regard to oil in Iraq. I am informed on very reliable authority that since the War not a single gallon of oil has been exported from that country. What is the result of the difficulties which have arisen in Iraq with regard to oil They are impairing the relations between this country and the United States of America. So long as the oil business in Iraq remains unsettled, so long will there be a danger of the relations between this country and America being impaired. Last week I happened to read the Report of the Annual Meeting of the Shell Trading and Transport Company. I saw, in the Chairman's speech, that restricted regulations had been imposed in the United States of America against British ships operating in the ports and harbours of the United States. That is one result of our undecided and unsettled policy in the oil world in general, and in Iraq in particular. I should like the Secretary of State for the Colonies to tell us something about that: matter.

The other question to which I wish to refer is one that I raised at Question Time to-day, as to the publication of the letters which are being quoted in the Press, and which wore written by Sir Henry McMahon to the Sheriff of Mecca. On the 24th October, 1915, Sir Henry McMahon, who was then High Commissioner in Egypt—I am glad to see the Under-Secretary has come in; I hope he will be able to answer this point—wrote certain letters to the Sheriff of Mecca, as he then was. Those letters are being quoted, or rather misquoted, all over this country to show that we have broken our pledges to the Arabs. I am wholeheartedly in favour of our policy towards Palestine, and should have spoken in favour of it had I caught the Speaker's eye, which unfortunately I did not, in the Debate last week on the Rutenberg scheme. The Arabs have associated themselves with all the most reactionary and anti-Semitic bodies in this country. That is one of the reasons why they fail in this country. If they had not associated themselves with these reactionary and anti-Semitic bodies, their cause would have stood a far greater chance of success. These bodies are misquoting this correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sheriff of Mecca.

I suggested, in my question, and I was supported by other hon. Members, that this correspondence should be published in full. It might be given to the Press, and we should then know once and for all what pledges were given and what were not given. If there be any parts in that correspondence which it would not be in the public interest to publish they could be left out. I want to know, before we pass this Vote, what are the reasons for not publishing this correspondence and what it contains that is inadvisable to publish. I also ask if the Government really realise the importance, of coming to an early decision on the oil question. I hope the Under-Secretary will sec his way to give me a reply to these two questions now.

Mr. MILLS

I should like to supplement the remarks made by the hon. Member for East Leyton (Mr. Malone), because I feel these are matters on which we should get a little satisfaction. I think his request is not unreasonable, in view of the fact that in the Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, there is a reference, on page 3, to the safeguarding of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It is there stated that Abadan, the refinery of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, was henceforth safe, and from being an object the protection of which was one of the primary duties of the force, it assumed for the rest of the War the role of purveyor of crude oil, kerosine and petrol, to every branch of His Majesty's Services. If that were good enough for the purposes of the War, it is good enough for us to know exactly what is the present state of affairs in time of peace. As so many things have been said with regard to the combatent nature of the relationship between Shell oil and Standard oil, and as allegations have been made that practically thousands of lives have been used up in the struggle to get what is regarded as potentially the best oil market in the world, it is very essential that we should have some little enlightenment on this phase of the Government's activities in Iraq.

There is another aspect of the case to which I wish to refer. I do not know whether or not. I shall be in order, but no doubt the Deputy-Chairman will pull me up immediately I transgress the rules. This afternoon I dared to assert the right of a private Member and to ask for information in regard to a gentleman who served under Lord Cromer as Minister of Education and Justice, and who was referred to by Lord Kitchener as one of the coming men in Egypt. This particular gentleman is at present confined in the Seychelles Islands. I want to know if this Vote carries with it any ability on our part to deal with the question of the Seychelles? An ordinance was conveniently passed within 24 hours of this man's deportation, and in view of the way in which some of these decisions, providing for the detention of people unsuitable to the Government in their own country, were issued, it is incumbent that we should have some exact information as to the conditions in the Seychelles.

The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN (Sir E. Cornwall)

I have allowed the hon. Member to make his point. He said he did not know whether he would be in order, and I must tell him that he is out of order.

Mr. MILLS

I defer to your ruling, Sir, and hope that at some future time it will be in order to raise this matter.

Mr. MALONE

I hope there is going to be a reply to the very important questions I put with regard to oil and to the publication of the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sheriff of Mecca. I want to know why it is not desirable to publish the correspondence. As there is no reply, I beg to move that the Vote be reduced by £100.

The DEPUTY - CHAIRMAN

That Amendment would not be in order.

Original Question put.

The Committee divided: Ayes, 184; Noes, 70.

Division No. 214]	AYES.	[7.10 p.m.
Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte	Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark)	Kidd, James
Ashley, Colonel Wilfrid W.	Evans, Ernest	King, Captain Henry Douglas
Atkey, A. R.	Eyres-Monsell, Com. Bolton M.	Larmor, Sir Joseph
Baird, Sir John Lawrence	Falcon, Captain Michael	Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale)
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley	Falle, Major Sir Bertram Godfray	Lewis, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Univ., Wales)
Balfour, George (Hampstead)	Farquharson, Major A. C.	Lister, Sir R. Ashton
Balfour, Sir R. (Glasgow, Partick)	Fell, Sir Arthur	Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green)
Barnston, Major Harry	Foreman, Sir Henry	Lorden, John William
Barrand, A. R.	Forrest, Walter	Lowther, Col. Claude (Lancaster)
Barrie, Sir Charles Coupar (Banff)	Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E.	Loyd, Arthur Thomas (Abingdon)
Bartley-Denniss. Sir Edmund Robert	Gardiner, James	Maekinder, Sir H. J. (Camlachie)
Bonn, Capt. Sir I. H., Bart. (Gr'nw'h)	Gee, Captain Robert	Macpherson, Rt. Hon. James I.
Bennett, Sir Thomas Jewell	Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham	Marks, Sir George Croydon
Betterton, Henry B.	Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John	Martin, A. E.
Blair, Sir Reginald	Green, Joseph F. (Leicester, W.)	Middlebrook. Sir William
Borwick, Major G. O.	Grenfell, Edward Charles	Mitchell. Sir William Lane
Boscawen, Rt. Hon. Sir A. Griffith-	Gritten, W. G. Howard	Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Moritz
Bowles, Colonel H. F.	Guinness, Lieut.-Col. Hon. W. E.	Morden, Col. W. Grant
Bowyer, Captain G. W. E.	Guthrie, Thomas Maule	Moreing, Captain Algernon H.
Bridgeman, Rt. Hon. William Clive	Hacking, Captain Douglas H.	Morrison, Hugh
Briggs, Harold	Hallwood, Augustine	Neal, Arthur
Broad, Thomas Tucker	Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry	Newman, Colonel J. R. P. (Finchley)
Brown, Major D. C.	Haslam, Lewis	Newson, Sir Percy Wilson
Bruton, Sir James	Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford)	Newton, Sir D. G. C. (Cambridge)
Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James	Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank	Nicholson, Brig.-Gen. J. (Westminster)
Burn, Col. C. R. (Devon, Torquay)	Hills, Major John Waller	Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield)
Casey, T. W.	Hinds, John	Nield, Sir Herbert
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Sir Evelyn (Aston)	Hoare, Lieut.-Colonel Sir S. J. G.	Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William
Chamberlain, N. (Birm., Ladywood)	Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy	Palmer, Brigadier-General G. L.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.	Holmes, J. Stanley	Parker, James
Clay, Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Spenoer	Hope, sir M. (Stirling & Cr' ckm'nn,w.)	Peel, Col. Hon. S. (Uxbridge, Mddx.)
cohen, Major J. Brunei	Hope, Lt.-Col. Sir J. A. (Midlothian)	Perring, William George
Colfox, Major Wm. Phillips	Hope, J. D. (Berwick & Haddington)	Pollock, Rt Hon. Sir Ernest Murray
Conway, Sir W. Martin	Hopkins, John W. W.	Pratt, John William
Coote, Colin Reith (Isle of Ely)	Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley)	Purchase, H. G.
Cory, Sir J. H. (Cardiff, South)	Houlton, John Plowright	Randies, Sir John Scurrah
Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities)	Howard, Major S. G.	Ratcliffe, Henry Butler
Cowan, Sir H. (Aberdeen and Kinc.)	Hurd, Percy A.	Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. N.
Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry	Hurst, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald B.	Richardson. Sir Alex. (Gravesend)
Curzon, Captain Viscount	Jephcott, A. R.	Richardson. Lt.-Col. Sir P. (Chertsey)
Davidson Major-General Sir J. H.	Jesson, C.	Roberts, Rt. Hon. G. H. (Norwich)
Davies, Alfred Thomas (Lincoln)	Jodrell, Neville Paul	Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor)
Davies, Thomas (Cirencester)	Johnson, Sir Stanley	Robinson, Sir T. (Lancs., Stretford)
Dawson, Sir Philip	Jones, Sir Evan (Pembroke)	Rodger, A. K.
Edwards, Major J. (Aberavon)	Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth)	Royds, Lieut.-Colonel Edmund
Edwards, Hugh (Glam., Neath)	Kellaway, Rt. Hon. Fredk. George	Rutherford. Sir W. W. (Edge Hill)
Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham)	Taylor, J.	Weston, Colonel John Wakefield
Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert Arthur	Terrell, George (Wilts, Chippenham)	White, Col. G. D. (Southport)
Sassoon, Sir Philip Albert Gustave D	Terrell, Captain R. (Oxford, Henley)	Williams, C. (Tavistock)
Scott, A, M. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)	Thomas, Sir Robert J. (Wrexham)	Wilson, Col. M. J. (Richmond)
Scott. Sir Leslie (Liverp'l, Exchange)	Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South)	Windsor, Viscount
Seager, Sir William	Thomson, Sir W. Mitchell- (Maryhill)	Winterton, Earl
Seely, Major-General Rt. Hon. John	Tickler, Thomas George	Wise, Frederick
Simm, M. T.	Townley, Maximilian G.	Wood, Hon. Edward F. L. (Ripon)
Smith, Sir Harold (Warrington)	Tryon, Major George Clement	Wood, Sir H. K. (Woolwich, West)
Smith, Sir Malcolm (Orkney)	Turton, Edmund Russborough	Woolcock, William James U.
Stanley, Major Hon. G. (F'reston)	Waddington, R.	Yeo, Sir Alfred William
Stanton, Charles Butt	Wallace, J.	Young, Sir Frederick W. (Swindon)
Steel, Major S. Strang	Walters, Rt. Hon. Sir John Tudor
Stephenson, Lieut. Colonel H. K.	Walton, J. (York, W. R., Don Valley)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—
Sturrock, J. Leng	Ward, Col. L. (Kingston-upon-Hull)	Colonel Leslie Wilson and Mr. McCurdy.
Sugden, W. H.	Ward, William Dudley (Southampton)
Sutherland, Sir William	Watson, Captain John Bertrand
NOES.
Acland, Rt. Hon. Francis D,	Grundy, T, W.	Robertson, John
Adamson, Rt. Hon. William	Guest, J. (York, W.R., Hemsworth)	Royce, William Stapleton
Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery)	Hall, F. (York, W. R., Normanton)	sitch, Charles H.
Barnes, Major H. (Newcastle, E.)	Hallas, Eldred	Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough)
Barton, Sir William (Oldham)	Halls, Walter	Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser
Bell, James (Lancaster, Ormskirk)	Hartshorn. Vernon	Sutton, John Edward
Bonn, Captain Wedgwood (Leith)	Hayday, Arthur	Swan, J. E.
Bowerman, Rt, Hon. Charles W,	Hirst, G. H.	Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby)
Bramsdon, Sir Thomas	Hodge, Rt. Hon. John	Thomson, T. (Middlesbrough, West)
Bromfield, William	Hogge, James Myles	Thome, W. (West Ham, Plaistow)
Brown, James (Ayr and Bute)	Irving, Dan	Tillett, Benjamin
Cairns, John	Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)	Watts-Morgan, Lieut.-Col. D.
Cape, Thomas	Kennedy, Thomas	Wedgwood, Colonel Josiah C,
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord R. (Hitchin)	Kenworthy, Lieut.-Commander J. M.	White, Charles F. (Derby, Western)
Clynes, Rt. Hon. John R.	Lambert, Rt. Hon. George	Wignall, James
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)	Lawson, John James	Williams, Aneurin (Durham, Consort)
Davison, J. E. (Smethwick)	Lunn, William	Williams, Penry (Middlesbrough, E.)
Edwards, G. (Norfolk, South)	Maclean, Rt. Hn. Sir D. (Midlothian)	Wintringham, Margaret
Entwistle, Major C- F.	Mosley, Oswald	Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C.)
Foot, Isaac	Murray, Dr. D. (Inverness & Ross)	Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton)
Galbraith, Samuel	Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan)
Gillis. William	Poison, Sir Thomas A.	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—
Graham, D. M. (Lanark, Hamilton)	Raffan, Peter Wilson	Mr. L'Estrange Malone and Mr. Mills.
Gretton, Colonel John	Rendall, Atheistan
Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)	Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring)