§ It is very easy to say about Russia, "Why do you not do something?" I 2940 would like to ask each man consecutively what would he have done. To begin with, let me say at once, there is no question of recognition. It has never been discussed.—it was never put forward, and never discussed for the reasons I have given. I can give two or three more. There is no Government representing the whole of Russia. The Bolshevik Government has committed against Allied subjects great crimes which have made it impossible to recognise it, even if it were a civilised Government, and the third reason is that at this very moment they are attacking our friends in Russia. What is the alternative? Does anyone propose military intervention? I want to examine that carefully and candidly. I will not say before the House, but before any individual commits his conscience to such an enterprise, I want him to realise what it means. First of all there is the fundamental principle of all foreign policy in this country—a very sound principle—that you should never interfere in the internal affairs of another country, however badly governed; and whether Russia is Menshevik or Bolshevik, whether it is reactionary or revolutionary, whether it follows one set of men or another, that is a matter for the Russian people themselves. We cannot interfere, according to any canon of good government, to impose any form of government on another people, however bad we may consider their present form of government to be. The people of this country thoroughly disapprove of Tzarism—its principles, its corruption, and its oppression—but it was not our business to put it down. This is a question for Russia itself. We certainly disagree—I believe I may say every man in this House wholly disagrees fundamentally—with all the principles upon which the present Russian experiment is based. We deplore its horrible consequences—starvation, bloodshed, confusion, ruin, and horror. But that does not justify us in committing this country to a gigantic military enterprise in order to improve the conditions in Russia.
§ Let me speak in all solemnity, and with a great sense of responsibility. Russia is a country which it is very easy to invade, but very difficult to conquer. It has never been conquered by a foreign foe, although it has been successfully invaded many times. It is a country which it is easy to get into, but very difficult to get out of. You have only to look at what has happened in the last few years to the Germans. 2941 They rolled up the Russian armies, they captured millions of Russian prisoners, they took Russian guns. The Russians had no ammunition, there was barely anyone to resist them, and at last the Russian Army fled, leaving their guns on the field. There was no Russian Army. Neither M. Kerensky nor any of his successors could get together 10,000 disciplined men, and yet the Germans, to the last moment, whilst their front was broken in France, while their country was menaced with invasion, while they themselves were being overwhelmed with disaster, had to keep a million of men in Russia; and why? Because they had entangled themselves in the morass, and could not get out of it. Let that be a warning. At that time the Bolshevik Army was comparatively feeble. May I put it in another way?