§ Let me say this. They raised armies at our instigation and largely, no doubt, at our expense. That was an absolutely sound military policy. For what happened? Had it not been for those organisations that we improvised, the Germans would have secured all the resources which would have enabled them to break the blockade. They would have got through to the grain of the Don, to the minerals of the Urals, and to the oils of the Caucasus. They could have supplied themselves with almost every commodity of which four or five years of rigid blockade had deprived them, and which was essential to their conducting the War. In fact, the Eastern Front was reconstructed—not on the Vistula. It was reconstructed at a point that hurled the German Armies to their own destruction, and, when they got there, deprived them of all the things they had set out to seek. What happened? Bolshevism threatened to impose, by force of arms, its domination on those populations that had revolted against it, and that were organised at our request. If we, as soon as they had served our purpose, and as soon as they had taken all the risks, had said, "Thank you; we are exceedingly obliged to you. You have served our purpose. We need you no longer. Now let the Bolshevists cut your throats," we should have been mean—we should have been thoroughly unworthy indeed of any great land. As long as they 2943 stand there, with the evident support of the populations—because wherever the populations are not behind them every organised effort to resist Bolshevism has failed—in the Ukraine, where the population is either indifferent or, perhaps, friendly, we have there populations like those in Siberia, the Don, and elsewhere, who are opposed to Bolshevism—they are offering a real resistance. It is our business, since we asked them to take this step, since we promised support to them if they took this step, and since by taking this stand they contributed largely to the triumph of the Allies, it is our business to stand by our friends. Therefore, we are not sending troops, but we are supplying goods. Everyone who knows Russia knows that, if she is to be redeemed, she must be redeemed by her own sons. All that they ask is—seeing that the Bolsheviks secured the arsenals of Russia—that they should be supplied with the necessary arms to enable them to fight for their own protection and freedom in the land where the Bolshevists are anti-pathetic to the feeling of the population. Therefore I do not in the least regard it as a departure from the fundamental policy of Great Britain not to interfere in the internal affairs of any land that we should support General Denikin, Admiral Koltchak, and General Kharkoff.
§ Mr. CLEMENT EDWARDSAre you supplying them with food?
§ The PRIME MINISTERI do not think so. They are not asking for it; they are asking for equipment, and we are supplying them. As far as food is concerned, they are very well off. The Don is a very rich country, and we have not heard that there is any suffering in those parts. What more are we doing? This is so important a part of the policy of the Allies that I am bound to take up some time in order to explain it. The next item in our policy is what I call to arrest the flow of the lava—that is, to prevent the forcible eruption of Bolshevism into Allied lands. For that reason, we are organising all the forces of the Allied countries bordering on Bolshevist territory from the Baltic to the Black Sea—Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Roumania. There is no doubt that the populations are anti-Bolshevist. I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Paderewski the other day. He had just come from Poland, and he told me that the Polish population were bitterly anti-Bolshevist. 2944 The Czecho-Slovakian statesmen—a very able body of men—told me exactly the same thing about Bohemia, and the same observation applies to Roumania. If Bolshevism attacks any of our Allies, it is our business to defend them.