§ Mr. DENMANI think it would be a. misfortune if we left the Debate on foreign affairs, which we began this morning without drawing from it the conclusions that will arise in many minds as regards its practical value for the present and the future. There are two considerations I should like to put before His Majesty's Government, and if the Noble Lord is able to give us any assurance on them I am sure it will give widespread public satisfaction. The two considerations that clearly arise from the events of last year are these. First, there are-obvious uses of the diplomatic offensive From that it is natural that we should ask: Are we using the weapon of the 595 diplomatic offensive with its full effect? The second question that arises even more insurgently is: Have we attained the utmost unity of diplomatic machinery of which the Alliance is capable, or can we advance along lines of greater unity, and so very really increase our diplomatic forces? The Noble Lord quite recently in an interview referred to the dangers of what was described as a peace offensive. I regret the phrase, because it contains some indication that peace is a disease and something to be avoided at all costs, though I know it is quite unintentional. The phrase I shall myself use is diplomatic offensive, which means the same thing and does not give rise to any misconception. The one thing clear in the interview was the importance the Noble Lord attached to the diplomatic offensive. What was his argument? That by the skilful use of neutral agents, by specious offers spread abroad among the people, you can do something to weaken the popular will to victory. The pacifist is visualised as a person fed on a meagre ration of home-grown food who, on receiving a substantial dump of foreign supplies, waxes fat with offensive zeal. I agree there is a great deal of truth in that. The question arises, Are we endeavouring to perform the same operation amongst the Central Powers and their allies? Of course, in the nature of things it is not a subject on which the Noble Lord can give us intimate details, and I do not complain that he has to answer in very general terms. But there is this difference between the diplomatic offensive conducted by the Central Powers and the one conducted by ourselves, that we are not in the least ashamed. As I understand it, we are all united in the prosecution of the peace aims declared by our Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America, and we are not ashamed to spread them abroad in any quarter of the world. We have no need to adopt that secrecy and those tortuous methods which are necessary to statesmen who are following devious paths.
I am bound to say the one public fact we have learned as to the Government's activity in this direction is not wholly reassuring. I refer to the appointment of Lord Northcliffe as Director of Propaganda in enemy countries. I hate introducing personalities, because there are far too many of them nowadays, and it poisons a great deal the atmosphere 596 which we would like to keep free from such matters. I am the last person to desire to depreciate the valuable work Lord Northcliffe has done in many directions throughout this War. What I want to argue is that just in so far as his work has been valuable in other directions, it makes him an unsuitable instrument for this particular form of activity. Lord Northcliffe stands in the public mind as the leader of the "bitter end," extreme militant point of view, and that is surely the very type of person whom you should not select for conducting propaganda in enemy countries. Lord Northcliffe is to the German what Count Reventlow is to us, and if we were told that Reventlow was undertaking the task of German propaganda in this country obviously the work of German propaganda would be at once absolutely stultified. It would give rise to an atmosphere of extreme hostility in all quarters in this House. The type of mind you want to conduct propaganda in enemy countries is surely the President Wilson type of mind, the man who is prepared to say he has no quarrel with the German people as such, but will wage unending war with the Junker, Prussian, element. A man who can appeal to the democratic spirit in enemy countries and strengthen the democratic influence, rather than turn them into a line of immediate and emphatic hostility When you see the Government employing Lord Northcliffe as an instrument of the diplomatic offensive, it obviously gives room for doubt whether they are making the best use of that weapon and whether they themselves really recognise the powers that can be wielded by means of it, though they are free to recognise the dangers of it when it is used within this country. So I ask the Noble Lord if he will set at rest the widespread doubts and say that, as far as they can, they are doing their utmost towards a peace offensive in enemy lands, and that they are making diplomacy bear its fair share in furthering our aims and not neglecting the full use of one political weapon and thereby throwing undue burdens on the other political weapon, namely, the armed forces of the Crown.
My doubts are in some measures confirmed by the Government's failure to unify the Allies' diplomatic forces as they have unified so many of our other forces. It is surely remarkable that while they have brought to a very high pitch of unification the military and economic 597 3.0 P.M.
powers of the Allies, they appear to have done exceedingly little to unify the diplomatic forces. I need not enlarge on the increase of diplomatic power which the Allies would derive from possessing a single diplomatic power or a united diplomatic machine. No expression of opinion on this point could have been stronger than that of the Foreign Secretary in the early part of this Debate. But is it not possible that some such machine could be set up; and now surely, if ever, is the time for it! There is of necessity, while the events on the Western Front are still hanging in the balance, a slackening of diplomatic effort. That must be so, and that is the time when you can set up fresh machinery. The Noble Lord knows well enough that if and when we have succeeded in beating back the German offensive there will come a time of diplomatic strain when it will be impossible to start new machinery, and we shall feel the evil effects of five different Foreign Offices and five different Cabinets working without any sufficient co-ordination. The secret treaties have revealed, even more than the affairs we have discussed earlier in the Debate to-day, the confusion caused by the incompatible aim sand ambitions that have surged up from time to time in the councils of the Allies. How great is the weakness of that effect it is most difficult to estimate. The Central Powers have clearly had great encouragement in assuring their people that in 1917 they were fighting in self-defence for the preservation of their country. The Central Powers have been encouraged by the absence of any kind of Allied diplomacy to spread peace offers, which is always a danger to Alliances, more particularly in time of victory. While the American conditions were at least a basis for probably successful negotiations, the attitude of the Allies was a barrier. For this confusion and consequent danger I ask the Government to substitute a central diplomatic council at Versailles, a council speaking with a single voice and examining, with the necessary materials, if any, put before it, every proposal or hint which emanates from the Central Powers, and conducting a vigorous and unceasing diplomatic offensive. Only so can the full united forces of the Allies attain their greatest strength. There are subsidiary, although important, advantages which would arise out of such a council. It would be a body that might 598 well form the foundation upon which an institution might be developed appropriate to a League of Nations, and, perhaps of even more importance, would be the knowledge and intimate understanding of foreign affairs which would be gained by the younger generation of statesmen of all Allied countries, including the States. This is a subtle and indirect advantage it is difficult to exaggerate. The rubbing together of different points of view, personal friendships, the daily study of foreign problems, would provide an education in international problems such as has rarely been available to any State, and of the permanent value of which in its influence on peace it is difficult to speak too highly. Those are the two points I wish to bring to the attention of the Government. I regard myself as one of its humblest supporters, and I am sure the Noble Lord will realise that these suggestions are made in no spirit of criticism. I believe the Government to be the best exponent of a policy which seems somehow rare in this House, though common enough outside. I represent those who look for a Government that shall be Prussian in its vigour in the conduct of the War, and American in its single-mindedness in the pursuit of peace; and it is because I should like assurance that it is showing in the latter part of the policy the vigour and energy I recognise it puts into the first part that I have made these suggestions to the Noble Lord to-day.
§ Mr. McCURDYI should like to take the opportunity of the presence of the Noble Lord the Minister of Blockade to say a few further words upon the subject which has been touched upon by the last speaker, and that is the question of what he styled the diplomatic offensive. I want very seriously to suggest to the Minister of Blockade that there is real need of the adoption of new methods on the part of the diplomatists among the Allied countries. It is not fair that our soldiers should be making the enormous sacrifices which they are making without at the same time receiving every kind of support on the part of the diplomatic forces of the Allied Powers, and I cannot help feeling, for reasons which I will briefly explain, that our soldiers are not at present receiving the full support to which they are entitled. We talk a. good deal about bombing German towns, and bombing German trades, but I should like to see a real diplomatic offensive started for the purpose of bombing the con- 599 sciences of the German people. The way not to do it is, of course, illustrated by the facts which have been brought out in the Debate this afternoon, and that is by our diplomatists in public continually making statements on war aims of proposals or counter proposals which are based upon questions of territory. It is an entire mistake, I venture to submit, for the Allied Governments ever to state their war aims in terms of territory, because, after all, questions of territory are merely incidental questions, and they are questions a true and fair solution of which can never be determined until we have first settled the main substantial issue, and that is by what reorganisation of the constitution of international relations, or in what other way are we going to give the countries now unhappily at war security for the future.
I take as an example the question which has been raised this afternoon about what is called the 1814 boundary of Alsace-Lorraine. It is suggested that it would be a very improper thing indeed for France to be making even a suggestion that under any circumstances those ancient frontiers of France might be restored. I noticed the other day the most distinguished Belgian, M. Maeterlinck, was saying that, so far as Belgium is concerned, the Belgians regard the creation of a buffer state from the Saar Valley up to the left bank of the Rhine as essential to the future security of Belgium; and if the Allied Statesmen cannot give Belgium any better security for her future than she possessed at the outbreak of this War, who is there in this House would dare to say that it was an improper or a shameful thing that somebody should propose, as a matter of discussion and negotiation, that, for the protection of Belgium, a buffer State should be created between the frontier of Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine against future German aggression? Therefore, when you come on to these questions of territory, you must first know whether the nations are going to have any security, other than military and naval preparations, in the future, or whether they are not. If in the future, as in the past, the security of a nation is to depend entirely upon its power to defend itself, in case of need, against a wanton violation of public right by force of arms, then it has every right to demand the rectification of frontiers, if necessary,
600 or to demand the creation of buffer States, and it is only upon the assumption which we hope will happily prove to be true, that by the formation of that League of Nations, of which President Wilson has spoken, or in some other way, there is to be a real security given to small countries like Belgium for their future, when this War is over—that one can then say, under those circumstances, that any questions of altering frontiers are unnecessary and provocative, and are matters which ought not to be brought up.
There is another reason why our war aims should not be placed upon a territorial basis. Let us sum up in a sentence or two the letter of the Emperor Karl. What happened I There were, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dewsbury said, certain circumstances which pointed strongly to a certain amount of collusion between the two Emperors of the Central Powers as to their movements in March or April of last year, and we find the Emperor Karl, as representing Austria, saying to France in effect, "It is not necessary for the French to continue the War,, because we will give you Alsace-Lorraine. The War is only being continued because those unreasonable Italians want to takeaway territory belonging to Austria. You make a separate peace, and you will have all you want. Never mind about Italy; what is Italy to you? "Then, on the other hand, Germany goes to Italy and says," What are you fighting for? We can get you Trieste and the Trentino from Austria; you need not go on fighting—why-should you?—in order that France may have Alsace-Lorraine! "So they play off one against the other, and with that diabolical cunning which marks the diplomacy of the Central Powers from start to finish, you will observe each Power promises that which it is not in its power to perform. So that once the dupe is brought into the trap, the partner and the Ally can say," Oh, Austria promised you. Alsace-Lorraine, did she? It was very kind of her, but she had no power to give it "Austria can say," Oh, Germany has-been offering the Trentino and Trieste, has she? Well, she did not consult us about it beforehand. Now, like the Bolshevik armies, having laid down your arms and gone home—having got peace negotiations on the brain—we shall reconsider the terms of the Emperor Karl's letter, or any other proposal of that 601 description. Now we will let you know what a German peace means" They need not tell us; we know already !
We do not want to discuss our aims in terms of territory. It is unscientific; it is un statesman like to attempt to do so. You cannot reasonably state what should be the frontiers of Europe until you have first settled the question of whether it is to be a Europe, in the centre of which is to be a militant autocracy, caring for nothing but its own selfish interests, prepared at any moment to resume its business of carrying on its own aggrandisement by war of conquest, or whether, on the other hand, it is a Europe which will come under the rule of law and order. It is quite idle to talk about the rectification of frontiers, just as it is quite idle to talk about the question of the return of the German colonies in Africa, until we know whether the natives are to be handed over to the same people who have butchered, outraged, and massacred them in the past, or whether they are to be handed back to a democratised, reformed, repentant Germany!
No, that is not the way in which the war aims of the Allies should be stated, if we are to assist our soldiers in the field. Let us not reiterate a multiplicity of territorial issues, which inevitably divide. Why cannot our Government for once state in a plain and unmistakable way to the world at large the simple and essential issue which is not only so much greater and more important than these minor issues, but is different in kind as well as importance? What is the great issue? We are fighting for security. We are fighting to make it impossible for this War to recur. The difference, I say, is in kind as well as in magnitude, because, while other issues arc issues which inevitably divide the combatants, this is an issue which unites, and which unites not merely the Allied Powers, but unites our enemies as well. If we are now fighting, as we are, to make a recurrence of this War impossible, we are fighting for something which is just as dear to the hearts of the German people as it is to our own. If we are fighting to save our children from the horrors of another war we are indeed fighting, too, to save the children of the German people from the horrors of another war—and it is just as well that the German people should be occasionally reminded of that fact. That is why I do press this matter. It is not the first time I have raised this question, and, if the opportunity be given 602 me, it will not be the last. I do press upon the Government the necessity of reconsidering their whole method of presenting the war aims of this country to our Allies and to the world at large.
Reference has been made to Lord Northcliffe as a propagandist. I should like to say this: One of the first acts of Lord Northcliffe, on his appointment as a propagandist, was to devote more than a whole page of the "Times" to a verbatim reprint of the memorandum of war aims drawn up by the Inter-Allied Conference in London representing the Socialism and Labour of all the Allied countries. This was a document of the utmost possible importance. The printing of it in such a verbatim form in the "Times" was obviously not calculated to increase the sale or the circulation of the "Times" in this country. It was, however, an act of very great propagandist value, as ensuring that a verbatim report of an important document would go wherever the "Times" would carry it over the continent of Europe. That was a step in the right direction. It is open to this criticism, the document was one of 3,000 words. It is not a document; it is an encyclopædia, and an encyclopædia which ought to be read and digested on the instalment plan. Volumes could be written on war aims and diplomacy upon all the paragraphs of that voluminous and statesmanlike document. It was followed by a speech from the Prime Minister when he addressed a meeting of the Congress of Trade Unions. That speech was one of 3,000 words. In it the right hon. Gentleman covered the same ground as did the document. It was a most able speech. It was a speech in entire harmony with the views of Labour and Socialism, as expressed in. the document, and of President Wilson; but it was much too long. It went far too much into these territorial questions, which do not carry conviction in the minds of simple-minded men on either side of the North Sea. Therefore I do venture to press upon the Government sometimes to drop this discussion of territorial questions, to leave such discussion over till a more convenient season, and say a few plain, homely words about what we mean when we say that we are fighting for security.
I make this practical suggestion, that if you really want to explain your war aims to the people of this country, or to the Allies and to the world at large, the simplest explanation would be to do some- 603 thing—something concrete and tangible which they could see. You say you want to abolish war: why not start by agreeing not to make war on one another? You say, "We are trying to make it impossible for any war to recur" Why not, at any rate, start by agreeing never to make war on the United States of America? They would be quite willing.
§ Mr. McCURDYI beg your pardon: that is an example of the imperfect information that one finds in the most unexpected quarters. I should have thought that my hon. Friend would have known the Bryan Treaties from A to Z. They are not treaties abolishing war, but legitimising it, recognising its propriety by defining conditions precedent upon which you can go into a war of aggression with a clean heart and a good conscience. All you have to do is to agree to arbitrate first and then to wait twelve months. That arrangement is only binding between ourselves and America for five years.
§ Mr. KINGYou would never have war under those conditions—that is, if you have to wait a year—never!
§ Mr. McCURDYA treaty of that kind may satisfy, and rightly satisfy, my hon. Friend, because of his great diplomatic experience and his statesmanlike and constructive mind. He is able to read out of that somewhat jejune document the beneficial results which no doubt may flow from it. Let me say that it is no good for propaganda purposes. We want an agreement much more simple than that and much more comprehensive, and there is no reason why this country and the United States of America and the great Republic of France should not commence tomorrow by saying in the face of the world that we are fighting to make war impossible again, and that, so far as we are concerned, we are never going to make war again, and we put our hands to a solemn Treaty to that effect. That would do more to make clear our essential war aims than many speeches. I support the suggestion put forward by the hon. Member for Carlisle, (Mr. Denman), that the first real constructive need of war aim propaganda is to start and build, in the eyes of all mankind, at least the foundation of that League of Nations, and of that recon- 604 struction of the international machine which President Wilson, and all Allied Statesmen, say is the means on which they will rely to make war impossible in the future, but which is very difficult for the uninstructed man in this country, or Allied countries, to fully understand until he can see in plain form the structure being built, and in that way realise our sincerity of purpose. If that were done, it would be a diplomatic offensive in the right direction, calculated to do-no possible harm to the cause of the Allies, but would, as a matter of fact, weaken and divide the enemy, and strengthen the resolution of our own people and of our own soldiers who are fighting at the front.
§ Mr. WHYTEThe speakers on this subject this afternoon have, I think, accepted the hint thrown out by the Foreign Secretary that it is impossible to conduct a discussion on this subject on the same lines as obtain in our discussions on domestic politics. Every Debate on foreign politics during the last three or four years has been conducted, in the main, in that spirit, and, therefore, the Foreign Secretary ought to be well satisfied with the form of this Debate, and the spirit which has animated every speaker. I hope the right hon. Gentleman's mind is receptive enough to take stock of the very useful hint which has just been made in the characteristic and interesting speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. McCurdy). In that speech, as well as in the speech made by the hon. Member for Carlisle, there found expression a feeling which is widespread throughout the country, and in quarters in which pacifist doctrines have never found a place that, along with the portentous and gigantic reorganisation of this country for military purposes of this War, there never has been a sufficient orientation of the mind of the Government towards the political issue. The Foreign Secretary told us, when we are discussing the political issues of the War, we must remember that they are not as domestic issues are, and that in them not only the British Government is concerned, but other Governments, over whom the British Government has no more than the influence of a friend, and sometimes not that, and that therefore anything said in relation to the political attitude of His Majesty's Government 605 towards the diplomatic side of the War should always take into account the difficulty of conducting war in an Alliance.
That is perfectly true. Take, for instance, the specific issue out of which this Debate arose to-day. I do not believe that there would have been a Debate to-day on this subject if it had not been that practically every report which came to us from France offered different accounts of the negotiations launched by the Emperor Charles' letter to Prince Sixte, of Bourbon-Parma. But, though these accounts differ in many important respects, they all coincide in attributing to the British Prime Minister a special and peculiar part in those negotiations, and they all insist that the Prime Minister used his influence with the Prime Ministers of the Republic of France and. the Kingdom of Italy, to show that if a proposal of this sort was made it ought to be probed to the bottom, even though it turned out not to be based on good faith. That is very sound doctrine provided you know who you are dealing with, and the Government and the country knows quite well how to distinguish a purely diplomatic offensive of the kind described by the Foreign Secretary as a peace offensive from a bonâ fide offer of peace terms.
I do not think the Foreign Secretary can complain that this Debate has been raised to-day because it has given him the opportunity of making several very important announcements. First, that the British Government has never been responsible for the initiation of any of these secret negotiations; secondly, that the Government has always insisted that, whenever proposals were made, and from whatever quarter they came, they should be treated on their merits, although the latest speech of the Minister of Blockade did not seem to indicate that that treatment had been meted out to every proposal that was made; and, thirdly, that whatever wild aims may have been attributed to other members of the Alliance the British Government has never countenanced them. I will never believe that the Alliance as a whole would countenance any extravagant aim. I have always understood that in relation to one or two agreements which were certainly open to criticism, there were at the time the agreements were made cogent reasons why they should be made, although sometimes the makers of them were unable to see their most distant and 606 perhaps more disastrous results. Therefore, I do not wish for a moment to cavil at the Government for the course they took, and I think the House will agree with the decision arrived at by a small majority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the French Chamber, that the offer conveyed through the Emperor Charles' letter to Prince Sixte was not one upon which a bonâ fide peace could have been founded. I think my hon. Friends were justified in concluding that there is not a sufficiently cohesive arid coherent method of dealing with these things when they arise.
I have never been an advocate of open diplomacy in its cruder form, and, I believe, all negotiations must be initiated by private conversations, and there will be little suspicion of those private conversations if the public were assured that the main principles upon which the Government were operating had their full consent, and they would be still more confident of the final result if the diplomatic intentions and movements of the whole Alliance were guided by something like the same unity of control as exists in regard to the military. We have had declarations of the political side of the War from bodies which were really set up to deal with military affairs. I think that we are entitled to ask for something in the nature of a political council at Versailles. There is one substantial difficulty in the way, and it is germane to one of the questions which was asked by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Runciman). What position would the United States occupy in that respect? The United States is in the position of an Ally which has not yet signed the compact of London. It is, therefore, in a position in some way the most powerful of the belligerents, and is not bound exactly by the same compacts which govern the others. Until the United States comes into that compact it might be difficult to form a political council at Versailles, but I am quite sure, if a council of that sort could be formed, and if the Government were assured that its deliberations were governed by those principles which have been laid down over and over again by the principal leaders of the Alliance, both here and abroad, public opinion, as a whole, would be a great deal steadier than it sometimes shows signs of being, and would be able to support the Allied Governments in resisting every diplomatic offensive 607 which was not based upon an honest purpose. I should like to say one word, not about the latest diplomatic offensive, but about the diplomatic offensive which has been conducted in one form or another ever since the Sixte letter was handed to M. Ribot. That letter has been discussed this afternoon, mainly as a means of dividing the Allies, and the offer made to M. Briand in Switzerland some months later was also discussed in that sense. I agree, but behind that motive there was surely a much greater one, and that was not to divide one Ally from the other, but to separate the problems of Eastern Europe from those of the West, and to try and persuade the democracies of the West that the result of the War will be that those ideals of public right and justice and freedom for nationalities, and so on, which have figured so often and so eloquently in the proclamations of our war aims, can obtain, if we will, west of the Rhine, but that east of the Rhine to Mesopotamia there shall obtain not the rule of right, but the rule of force as interpreted by German power.
That seems to me to be the great lesson to be learned from all these offensives. I do not believe in the long run, things being as they are, that it will be possible for any diplomatic design of the Central Powers to separate one of our Allies from the rest, but I do believe, unless the Government take care to keep before the country the even greater issues which I have just mentioned, that when we do come to make peace, serious temptations will be offered to us to make peace on a basis upon which it will be absolutely impossible to establish the rule of right or law throughout Europe. You cannot hope for anything in the nature of that new international order which has just been so eloquently described, or even to lay the first stones of the foundation of that order, unless the peace which emerges from this War is a peace which establishes public law not only in Western Europe but also, and still more firmly, in Eastern Europe. The principles which we proclaimed at the beginning of the War of re-establishing the idea of public right are just as cogent, and infinitely more needed, in Eastern Europe than they are in Western Europe. I believe it is long since any man who has really studied the question closely doubted whether we should be able to release Belgium and restore her complete independence, both politically 608 and economically, but it has taken all the four years' education of the War—and the education is not yet complete—to explain to people in this country that exactly the same issue for which we went to war in the Belgian case is at stake in every other crucial case in Eastern Europe. That argument can be addressed with the same success and the same confidence to practically every school of political thought in this country. I do not care whether you are a pure Imperialist, of, say, the "Morning Post" school, or whether you are a pure pacifist of the school of the Union of Democratic Control. A peace founded upon Macht Politik in Eastern Europe is equally disastrous to both. I should have thought by this time that we should be able to see in every diplomatic design of the Central Powers that master thread running through them all—namely, of establishing and garnering the fruits of all their victories in Eastern Europe at the comparatively small expense of yielding territory to which they have no right in Western Europe; and I express the hope with all the cogency at my command to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Blockade that the Government will take care whenever they discuss the diplomatic and political side of the War to accept the hints which have been offered by my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. McCurdy), and in particular to point out to the British people and all the democratic peoples of Western Europe, especially after the peace of Brest-Litovsk and the disastrous peace that the. Central Powers have imposed upon Roumania, that their outlook towards peace in the future is just as much at stake in Eastern Europe as in their own more comfortable and peaceful part in the West.
§ Commander WEDGWOODIt was with great pleasure that I listened to the speech of my hon. Friend, and I want to use additional arguments to force home his point. I have had no consultation with him whatever. I came here to-day convinced that a new point of view should be stated in this House. I was discussing the other day with an important diplomat the vitally important "question of what the war aims were to be, and I said to him" This War is becoming a struggle between President Wilson and the Round Table, "and he said" Yes; and it is the Round Table that will win" I want to put this to my hon. Friends of pacifist persuasion, because they without knowing it 609 are so far as I can see in league with the Round Table scheme. Lord Milner and the others of that group, are, I think, anxious to secure a peace of adjustment, a peace which shall attain our aims in the West and leave the East out of account, which shall slice up tropical Africa and the German colonies without any regard to the native rights and any regard to anything but real politik, a peace which will preserve the dynasties, but deny the rights of democracies throughout the world. That peace will not be a real one. It will involve the burden of militarism upon all the peoples of the world till the next war comes. It is a negation of the idea of a League of Nations, because no League of Nations can be based upon an unjust peace which denies the rights of nationalities. You cannot have a League of Nations with an international police to prevent intervention and the altering of existing boundaries, if those boundaries are fundamentally and notoriously unjust. Therefore, this peace which may be offered to us any day now, a peace whereby the Western Powers will attain their aims, and a peace which will absolutely disregard any reopening of the Eastern question would be a disaster to the whole civilised world. It would be a peace which will not obtain the sanction and the guarantee of the American Republic.
The important thing—indeed, the vital thing—for us as Englishmen is to remember that any peace which is obtained must be a peace guaranteed by America. One thing that this War has done has been to unite the Anglo-Saxon race throughout the world. There is one way in which we can split that unity and revert to the prewar preparation, jealousy and rivalry between ourselves and America—that is, by accepting a peace which denies all that President Wilson has proposed or that he has advocated throughout these years of war; indeed, not merely since the outbreak of war, but before. If we are going to make the world safe for democracy, we have to back up President Wilson and his war aims rather than an adjusted peace, which will be a militaristic peace and which will saddle upon us Conscription, armaments, secret diplomacy, and all the curses of the Old World of which we are striving to get rid. The unfortunate thing is that in this country we speak with a divided voice. One knows that the bulk of the people of this country are in favour of President Wilson's terms. The Labour party have backed it up. I believe the 610 Liberal party backs it right through, not only Liberal militarists like myself, but even pacifists like the hon. Member for Hanley (Mr. Outhwaite). The people of this country would sooner have President Wilson's war aims than the policy stated by either Front Bench in this House. The bulk of the population of this country, and, so far as I can see, the bulk of the population in France also, support President Wilson's war aims.
We are in serious danger of being rushed by a secret diplomacy—not merely the diplomacy of our Foreign Office, but the diplomacy run in the "Garden" in Downing Street—into a peace which will perpetuate war, which will perpetuate kings, kingdoms, and aristocracies, and deny rights through all time to democracy throughout the world. We are up against that sort of diplomacy, with the weird combination of Lord Lansdowne, Mr. E. D. Morel, and Lord Milner. No one has a keener admiration for Lord Milner than I have, but I dislike his policy. If that weird combination were to settle a premature peace in this War, it would be a disaster to the whole of the forces of democracy in the world. We do not want to have an unsatisfactory peace. We have made sacrifices, we are prepared to make even more sacrifices if the peace is worth fighting for, but we are not going to be forced by the fear of revolution or by the fear of an Income Tax of 10s. in the £ to compound with our consciences and accept that which sells the rest of the democracy of Europe. I know that strong pressure will be brought when Germany enters the lists for peace to accept the status quo in the East, to accept the subjugation of the subject races in Austria, the subjection of Courland, Lithuania, Livonia, and of Poland, in order that we may get slices of territory in Africa. We do not want slices of territory in Africa. We want justice. Our men are lighting for that and not for militaristic aims. It is not the British Empire, but democracy which is the backbone of this War.
I welcome the opportunity of stating here that the democracy of England, Liberal and Labour, is behind President Wilson and not behind the "Garden" in Downing Street. [An HON. MEMBER. "What about the Tories?"] The Tories are divided, but many of them are standing for democracy too, although many of them accept the nationalistic ideas of the Old World; they have stepped out of the reign of George III., and think that they 611 can conduct the world in the twentieth century on those lines. We know that so far as our Allies are concerned the policy of America must prevail. It is no use blinking the fact. Why, then, should we go out of our way to advocate policies which America has turned down? In the East, particularly in connection with the Russian difficulty, America has throughout taken an absolutely democratic line, which results have shown to be in the interests of the whole Allied policy in this War. Would it not have been better if our Government had taken their cue more from America and less from other of our Allies? It is a difficult subject for me to touch upon, but I will say this, that the more the President of the United States comes out into the open and advocates and forces upon the rest of the Allies this policy, the more he will be supported by the democracy of Europe and the better it will be for our Government if they find out his views beforehand and back them up rather than accept dictation from other directions. We do not want to have any sort of controversy with America. They came into this War, just as we entered it, for purely altruistic reasons. We knew when we started in this War that we were not afraid of invasion by Germany. We went in to protect France and Belgium. America came in for the same reason, not because she was the least afraid about herself. She came in because she believed she was fighting for the cause of democracy and justice. [An HON. MEMBER:" How long did it take her to find it out?"] Perhaps longer than it took us. Distance from the scene of conflict makes a great deal of difference. America has come in on exactly the same lines as ourselves. She is not in this War to get anything for herself. I hope that we in this country are out to get nothing for ourselves, but all for democracy.
§ Mr. KINGThe two last eloquent speeches have drawn the attention of the House to the position in the East of Europe. I propose, in accordance with the notice I have given, to call attention to the position in the Eastern States of Europe and to ask the Government to make a statement of their policy and aims. Those who are following anxiously but hopefully affairs in Russia and those countries which were previously part of Russia may have observed in the "Times" this morning an account of a speech 612 delivered yesterday by Sir George Buchanan, our recent Ambassador in Petrograd, which gives some ground for hope, especially as Sir George Buchanan, in the course of his remarks, stated that he brought to the meeting he was addressing a message from the Foreign Secretary. There cannot, then, be any doubt that he was speaking not merely from the position of one who had held high office in Petrograd under our Foreign Office, but that he also was in immediate touch with the Foreign Secretary on this matter. In the course of his remarks he said:
Russia had now been split up into a number of republics. He hoped that in the end she would be stronger than ever. We must not disinterest ourselves in Russia because of what had happened recently, for if we did so it would allow her to fall completely under German domination. If Germany was allowed to control Russia's enormous Empire and her vast natural resources of unexploited wealth, she would become the mistress of the East, and whatever conditions were imposed in the West, then Germany would have won the War. He was afraid this fact had not penetrated into the minds of the British public.'Sometimes I am almost afraid to think the fact has not penetrated into the minds of British Statesmen at the Foreign Office, because recently we have had no public sign—I hope something has been going on behind the scenes—that we are offering any material help, encouragement or hope to the Russian people, and it is because I want to face facts and to suggest methods by which we could do this that I am speaking to-day. First of all, are we facing the true facts, not as they are represented by the "Times" Newspaper or Reuter's correspondent, but as we may gather them from the organs of neutral opinion and from the best informed persons who have recently returned from Russia and elsewhere in the East? The-facts are, of course, first of all, that the strength of the present Bolshevik Government is greater than ever. When it was established early in November, 1917, it was the opinion of the newspapers, again and again repeated, and apparently even the opinion of official circles here, that the Bolsheviks would fall, as the five previous Governments of Russia had done, in the course of a week or two. That Government has lasted for six months, and now even the "Times" newspaper is reporting that Lenin, Trotsky, and the Bolsheviks are stronger than ever. Some of us, especially if we have Russian bonds, may not like that prospect, but let us face the facts, and if the Bolsheviks have esta- 613 blished a strength which no other Government since the Tsar had, if the prospect of being turned out is as remote as ever— more remote than it has been before—the obvious conclusion is that we must in some form or other, sooner or later, recognisen the Bolshevik Government as the de facto Government of the country.I believe we can afford to do so if we move on dignified and cautious lines, for one thing is evident. The Bolsheviks are at present modifying and moderating their policy in certain most important respects. They are so modifying their policy as almost to invite us to step in and help them. A little time ago there was nothing but the State bank and the Cooperative bank, but now actually private banks are being enabled to open their doors. That is a great advance, and though no doubt it is under great restrictions it suggests the possibility of the opening of foreign trade and the use of capital apart from strict Socialist control, which we have not had before. That is a remarkable sign. Another is the development of a regular army. The Bolshevik Force, the Red Guards, let us suppose, have been a tatterdemalion crew. Let us suppose they have been lacking in the usual order and discipline of an army. But now there is growing up a definitely organised, better equipped, better officered army than there has been certainly since the early days of the Revolution. Probably the Russian armies which are being formed, and are growing up now, will have the prospect of being stronger in another few weeks for even offensive operations against the Germans than before. That is a matter which is difficult to decide on the evidence that we have, but we still retain our military mission in Russia. I suggest to our authorities that close inquiries as to the progressing organisation of the Russian Army at present might be made by our military authorities. Another point which is very remarkable in connection with recent Bolshevik policy is that the Bolsheviks are now taking into their Soviets others than men who have been manual labourers. At first there was almost a tendency to reject anyone who was not engaged in actual labour. Now intellectuals are coming in in much greater numbers, especially teachers and professors, and the result is that the Bolshevik Government is getting an intellectual force of men of university training 614 in a measure which it never had before, and its prospect of organising the country and developing its resources, and getting a real moral and intellectual force behind the Government, is much greater at present than it was.
That being so, can we not make some approach to the Bolshevik Government? I believe if our Foreign Office had ever really thought the Bolsheviks would have been in their present position six months ago they would not have cut themselves off from relations with them so hopelessly as they did. They did not expect their life to be so prolonged. They did not expect that the Germans, brutal as that military power is, would behave with such callous disregard of their own word and with such public brutality as that with which they treated the Russians. We have all been deceived in these respects, but are there not grounds now why we should come very near to having good relations with the Bolshevik Government? It will mean some amount of restraint and possibly some amount of humiliation for us who have imprisoned Chicherin, the present Foreign Minister, and other great and eminent Bolsheviks within the last few months. It is very difficult, but let us accept our humiliation and do it manfully. After all, if we have committed a fault, do not let us tell lies to make people believe we have never done so. Let us face the fact that we must admit our errors.
4.0. P.M.
I will now make some practical suggestions. Having discussed these matters with persons of much greater experience and weight than myself, I make them personally. Act in the closest accord with President Wilson. His remarkable message to the Russians at the time the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had to be accepted and their conclusions faced did an immense amount of good in giving hope to the Russians from America. Let us act in that same spirit here and as closely as possible in the same accord. The second thing I want to suggest is that whether we recognise the Bolshevik Government or not, we should immediately send some sympathtic person to represent us in. Russia. The French have a Minister there who is not very sympathetic. The Americans have a Minister, but he is not fully accredited—Mr. Francis. We might send someone with higher authority and position than Mr. Lockhart. We have a representative in Petrograd now, 615 Mr. Lockhart, who is simply entrusted with the care of the interests of British subjects, but he has no diplomatic position. The personal qualifications of Mr. Lockhart are very high, but I would like to suggest that we sent someone who has a. very close sympathy with Labour and internationalism. It was a good move months ago to send the right hon. Member for Barnard Castle to Russia, but the treatment that his suggestions and policy received when he came back almost did away, and probably more than did away, with the wisdom in sending him. Whoever we send, let us send someone who will be personally sympathetic towards the Russian people. If possible, I would suggest, without any disrespect, that we should not send one of the old diplomatic servants. Discourage, as far as possible, offences against the Russians here. Let us recognise that the Russians have different ideals, different mentalities, and a different angle, as the Foreign Secretary himself has said, from ourselves. Do discourage attacks—wild, wicked, and malicious attacks—on Russians here. The way in which the Russians have been spoken of in some of the great organs of the Press as if they were all traitors to the Allied cause, and as if they were all ready to accept so much money from the Germans or anybody else for any purpose, is offensive and does absolutely no good. One or two expressions have been used by Ministers—I will not recall them, but I have them most distinctly in mind—which can be nothing but most offensive to the Russian people as a whole. A very well-known Oxford professor (M. Paul Vino-gradoff) only a few weeks ago expressed in quite strong language the shame he felt that Russia was being, as he said, blackguarded by large sections of the English people.
I have made practical suggestions, and I hope I have made nothing but what can be called a hopeful speech. I recognise that we have all made mistakes in this War, and all of our Governments, if they could only go back, how differently they would have managed affairs! Of all the mistakes that are obvious, there is none so great as our mistaken policy in the last few months towards Russia; but there is no mistake that we have made which I believe at the present moment we can so easily and honourably go back upon and, if not retrace our steps, at any rate 616 strike out on a new line. I do urge upon the Government that every means should be taken, if not by an immediate recognition of the Soviet Government, yet by stages in close accord with our Allies, and especially with President Wilson, to gain that end which we all have constantly in view.
§ Mr. SNOWDENI do not rise for the purpose of dealing with the point which has been so well put by my hon. friend, but I do express the very earnest hope that when the Under-Secretary replies he will be able to give a favourable response to the appeal made by my hon. Friend. I think it is to be regretted that no opportunity was given to any Member sitting on these benches, who were described more than once by the Foreign Secretary as the pacifist group, to reply on the question which was introduced by the right hon. Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Runciman). I think the results of that part of our Debate are likely to be very good. We had a number of admissions from the Foreign Secretary which even those who sit on these benches must regard as satisfactory, and I hope the policy of the Government in future will be in harmony with the declarations and promises that the Foreign Secretary made. The right hon. Gentleman stated that it was most important that there should be complete confidence between the whole of the members of the alliance. On the Foreign Secretary's own admissions this afternoon in regard to the Emperor of Austria's letter, that policy was not carried out It is perfectly clear from the admissions of the right hon. Gentleman that there was a want of confidence on the part of certain of the Allies towards other members of the Alliance. It was admitted by the right hon. Gentleman that one of the most imporant members of the Alliance was not informed of these negotiations. There was one very remarkable omission from the statement made by the Foreign Secretary about these Austrian negotiations. The right hon. Member for Dewsbury put a number of questions, and most of these were answered categorically by the Foreign Secretary, but one, perhaps the most important of all. was either accidentally or wilfully ignored by the Foreign Secretary. The right hon. Member for Dewsbury asked why these negotiations broke down, and whether it was because it was impossible to satisfy the territorial demands of certain of the Allies. In the Foreign Secretary's speech the name of Baron 617 Sonnino was not once introduced. If any reliance is to be placed upon statements which have appeared in the British newspapers it was because of the dissatisfaction of Italy as well as the extreme demands of France that these at one time very promising negotiations broke down.
I want to put this further question. The late Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) concluded his speech by saying that he hoped there would be no expansion of the original war aims of this country. What were the original war aims of this country? They were stated very often by the right hon. Gentleman himself in the early days of the War. The original war aims of this country were the restitution and the independence of Belgium and the restitution not only of Belgium politically but economically and also the restitution of Serbia and Montenegro. I do not think there is even amongst those who are called pacifists anyone who would not regard these aims as being aims which this country must have in view in a peace settlement. The late Prime Minister was of opinion that these original war aims should still remain the only aims for which this country continued in the Alliance and in the War. Therefore, I put this question. Are these the only war aims to which this country is committed at the present time? I think it is perfectly clear from what we do know, and from what we have reason to believe, that those negotiations which were initiated by the Emperor Karl a little more than twelve months ago broke down because demands were made by certain of our Allies which went far beyond the original war aims of this country. We were specially glad to hear the Foreign Secretary this afternoon disassociate himself from the demand which it is said has been made by the French President for what it is called the old 1814 or 1790 boundary between France and Germany. I do not know how the disclaimer of the Foreign Secretary will be received by Monsieur Clemenceau, but the declarations which have been made by the French Premier and by his predecessor in regard to the Allies' aims are much more extensive than those which have received the authority of any member of the British Government, not excluding even, I believe, the Prime Minister himself.
So far as our information goes the grounds on which these negotiations broke down were, first, the demand of France that the old boundaries of more than a century ago should be restored, and, 618 second, the demands of Italy. If our information is correct the larger measure of blame, notwithstanding the unreasonable and impossible demands put forward by the French President, appears to attach to Italy. The Foreign Secretary deprecated the discussion of matters in this House in which our Allies were equally interested. But we are equally interested in these matters, and perhaps we are more interested than any one of our Allies, because we have a heavier financial responsibility for this War, and we are paying just as great a toll, if not a greater toll, of human life, than any one of our Allies is paying at the present time. Therefore, we have a. right to discuss this question, and the people of this country who are finding this treasure and making these appalling sacrifices of human life—according to the War Office returns yesterday we had 7,500 casualties—have a right to be informed on these questions and to know for what purpose these lives are being sacrificed, and to know—to use the expression of the late Prime Minister—whether they are fighting for the original war aims of this country or for war aims which have been considerably and unreasonably expanded. It is stated that the Prime Minister was at one time quite favourable to the, perhaps I ought not to say acceptance, but, at any rate, the full consideration of the Austrian proposals. Why did he afterwards change his mind? It said that Prince Sixte came to this country and saw the Prime Minister, and the Prime-Minister appears to have been favourably impressed by his statement. Then he went to France and changed his views.
Now I protest altogether against the influence that Italy appears to be exercising on the counsels of the Allies. Italy came into this War for no high moral purpose. Italy was bribed to come into this War. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense!"] We have it in black and white. The terms that were offered to Italy to join the Allies were most unreasonable and most outrageous. It appears that this War is to continue and that lives are to be sacrificed in order that Italy may obtain these unreasonable demands. I want to know if, when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife said he hoped there would be no expansion of the original war aims of this country, he meant that the secret treaties ought to be repudiated, because the promises made in these secret treaties far transcend the original war aims of this 619 country, and go far beyond anything which the people of this country were led to believe was the object for which they were called upon to give their treasure and sacrifice their lives. This War should not be continued for a single day to satisfy the selfish Imperialistic ambitions of Italy. I was glad to hear the Foreign Secretary's repudiation of the extreme and unreasonable demands of France. I hope that we may have, if not this afternoon, at any rate before long, an equally emphatic repudiation of the Imperialistic war aims of Italy.
I was delighted to hear the Foreign Secretary say that it would be very unwise to reject any offer of peace negotiation without inquiring into its character and the possibility of its soundness and honesty, but it seems to me not at all consistent with an act which the Undersecretary perpetrated two or three weeks ago. It seems to be a favourite medium of the Under-Secretary, for the announcement of his views and the enunciation of his policy, to call in a newspaper reporter. The representative of Reuter's agency appears to be specially favoured as a medium for the communication of the right hon. Gentleman's views as to foreign questions and policy. He gave an interview to the representative of Reuter about a fortnight ago. That interview must have been arranged beforehand. It is quite certain that the representative of Reuter did not happen to be walking past the Foreign Office and decide that he would go in to see the Under-Secretary and ascertain if there was anything which he would like to communicate. It goes without saying that that interview was an arranged interview, and it was given with a very definite object. There had been rumours for some time of a likely peace offensive by Germany, if I may use the right hon. Gentleman's words to describe a peace offer. It had been understood that the, I will not say representative of a neutral country, but a man from a neutral country, was in this country at the time, and that there were informal negotiations, and it was in an atmosphere like that that the right hon Gentleman gave his interview. It might be very difficult to point to a line in the report of that interview on which the right hon. Gentleman said that any offer which came from Germany would be rejected because it would not be genuine, but that is the only possible interpretation of the interview as a whole.
620 I think I can point to actual words in the interview which convey the impression that if the offer came it would be a dishonest offer, not made in the interests of a genuine peace but merely a move in order to deceive the Germans themselves, and to restore the drooping spirits of the German people. There was in a Sunday newspaper the day after the report of the interview which the right hon. Gentleman gave to Reuters' representative what appeared to be an inspired article dealing with this question. It dotted the i's and crossed the t's of the interview, and it really put into plain language what I think any unprejudiced reader of the interview would have regarded as its proper construction. This article said there had been a conflict between the militarist clique and the politicians in Germany in which the militarists had come out on top, and this reported peace offer was an attempt on the part of Von Kuhlmann to pacify the other side. Surely if that were the object any offer of peace which came from Germany ought to be heartily welcome. But the effect of the interview which the right hon. Gentleman gave could only be to cement together all these different cliques in Germany and to prevent the divorcing of the civilian from the military element in that empire. That, indeed, has been the disastrous effect of the whole diplomatic policy of this country during these three and a-half years of appalling warfare. Apart from the fact that I do not think it is a proper thing for an Under-Secretary to make pronouncements of this character through newspaper interviews—the right hon. Gentleman gives newspaper interviewers information that he disdainfully refuses to the House of Commons—I say that the nature of this interview and the character of the statements of the right hon. Gentlemen were altogether deplorable in their effect in Germany, as was shown by the German reply a few days later. I regret very much that the interview was given, and I hope we may take the statement made by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon that any offers that may come will be carefully and dispassionately considered—I hope we may regard that statement as an implied censure on the right hon. Gentleman for what he said at that interview.
§ The MINISTER of BLOCKADE (Lord Robert Cecil)The hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House never speaks without sounding a certain recriminatory note, but I shall endeavour to avoid as far 621 as may be imitating his very bad example. It is a little difficult sometimes. With regard to the question of the interview which he has raised, I am glad to have an opportunity of explaining very shortly the actual facts in connection with it, as the interview has been, apparently, very much misunderstood. I have already stated in this House that I was asked to give a weekly interview to American journalists. That was begun before America came into the War, and it was represented that it would be a useful thing to enable American correspondents to put questions to me on blockade and other matters, and if I thought it possible to give information I should do so. I have persisted in that practice ever since. I quite recognise that there are certain objections possible to that course. But it was begun and has been continued with the full approval and sanction of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and of other members of the present Government who are specially concerned in such matters. For my part, I have always thought it desirable—and I understood it was the view of hon. Members who sit on that bench—that diplomacy should be carried on as far as possible in public, and that the greatest possible information should be given to the public regarding diplomatic matters as can safely be conveyed. I should have thought that this humble attempt on my part would have met with their approval, but it seems to be otherwise. Certainly the object of the interviews is not to lay down policy, but to give information.
What happened in this particular case was this. The moment it began I asked, "What subject is it you desire to discuss to-day?" Immediately one of the gentlemen present replied, "The peace offensive," and it was in consequence of that observation that I thereupon explained the view I held, rightly or wrongly, as to the situation, which seemed to render it very likely that the Germans would conduct a so-called peace offensive. What is meant by a "peace offensive"? I am amazed there should be any misapprehension on the subject. It is treated as if it were some kind of peace offer. It is entirely different. The object of a peace offensive—the nature of a peace offensive—is diplomatic or semi-diplomatic action, not with the view of producing peace, but with a view of promoting war. It is intended to be of indirect diplomatic assistance to the German army in the field. That is what I thought likely to happen. I 622 am not going to repeat the interview to the House; I merely stated what I thought was very likely to occur in that connection.
There seemed to me to be certain signs of that being likely to happen, and I explained what I thought they were and what I thought likely to happen in that connection. As to the suggestion of the hon. Member that I intended or conveyed to anybody, except the hon. Member and those who think as he does of myself and of members of the Government, that any offer from Germany would necessarily be rejected, there is not a word I uttered that could be so construed by any fair-minded man; and I do not think it was so construed. I adhere most fully to what was said by my right hon. Friend this afternoon, that if any offer is made coming from a quarter which may be regarded as reasonably trustworthy it deserves examination and consideration from the present Government, because we, at any rate, are as desirous of peace even as the hon. Member for Blackburn. There is only one other observation I desire to make on this interview, and it is this: It was said to have some relation to the presence of a neutral in this country. I want to explain quite clearly that it had no connection at all with the presence of that gentleman in this country. I did not know at the time that he was here, and I only heard of it afterwards. It had no reference at all to his presence of any sort or kind. I regret very much, because it may seem somewhat discourteous to him, that anything I said should be construed as having any reference to his presence. With the rest of the hon. Gentleman's speech I do not propose to deal. My right hon. Friend spoke on the subject of the Emperor Karl's letter, and I do not think it would be useful or desirable for me to add anything to what he has said. He was fortunate enough to secure the approval of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith), and I can face with some equanimity the fact that he did not win an equal approval from the hon. Member for Blackburn.
But the Member for Blackburn did make one observation which I must repudiate with all the strength I can muster. He chose to make a perfectly undeserved and baseless attack on one of our Allies. For what purpose he did it, except to assist and comfort the enemy, I cannot imagine. I am very reluctant to believe that was his reason, but he perpetually 623 does it. It is not an accidental lapse from the proper responsibility of a Member of Parliament. He perpetually does it when he intervenes in these Debates, and to attack one of our Allies at this period of the War in the way that attack was made is an action which does not appear to me capable of any defence whatever. For my part I desire to say, though it is scarcely necessary to say it, that we utterly repudiate and disagree with it, and believe that the aims of Italy-are as high and as pure as those of any other belligerent in the War. We value her assistance to the highest possible degree, and are as determined to maintain our alliance with her as with any other of the Allies. I pass very shortly to some other observations made in the course of the Debate. The hon. Member for Carlisle (Mr. Denman) and several other hon. Members were anxious that we should make use of what he described as a diplomatic offensive, by which I understood him to mean that we should carry on propaganda in enemy countries describing the reasonableness of our war aims, and matters of that kind. As the hon. Member said he did not expect me to deal in any detail with that question, I hope he will be satisfied with my assurance that that side of our activities is not lost sight of, and we are doing all we can in that direction.
As to the other suggestion that we should have at Versailles a diplomatic council, I confess I have more doubts. The object he has in view has my entire sympathy. I quite agree that nothing is more important than the complete unity of the Allies, and I adhere most readily to what was said by several speakers that it is of the utmost possible importance that we should keep in the closest touch and agreement with President Wilson. I am not sure that the establishment of permanent representatives at some centre would really do more than we can do by our existing machinery. After all, my hon. Friend must not forget that on the diplomatic side we have elaborate machinery for being represented at the various Courts of all the Powers, and wherever the centre of interest happens to be they can put the aims of the Allies. On the whole, I believe that system will be more likely to produce unification than the attempt to set up a kind of International Foreign Office, which is, I believe, what the hon. Member has 624 in view. After all, he must not forget that when it comes to great questions of policy, the determining of what course any particular country should pursue, that country will always insist on that decision being taken at the seat of government of the country. They will never delegate to any representative, however important, in some foreign centre questions on which may hang the future prosperity, or even the future existence, of the country in question. At the same time, I can assure the hon. Member that if there is anyway in which we can promote a closer co-operation of the Allies, I shall be very glad indeed to see that proposal carried out.
I think my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Lees-Smith), my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Colonel Wedgwood), and the hon. Member for North. Somerset (Mr. King), were all very anxious that we should hold out a hand to Russia, as it were, and should recollect that we have as great an obligation to secure justice in the East of Europe as we have in the West. That was, I think, the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Perth (Mr. Whyte). I quite agree with him. We have no quarrel with Russia at all. On the contrary, with the Russian people we have always desired to be on the closest terms of friendship. We have suffered, and we cannot deny it, great disappointment and great loss from the course which Russian politics has pusued. No one can get over that fact. But we are anxious to do all we can to assist and support the Russian people in their difficulty, and to preserve Russia as a great country, not only now, but for the period after this War. I think the hon. Member opposite (Mr. King) has a kind of idea that we have, as it were, some personal or political quarrel with the Bolsheviks, arising, not,. I think, from the direction of their foreign policy, but from some disapproval we may have of their domestic policy. I assure the hon. Member he is entirely mistaken. In our view the domestic policy of Russia is a matter for Russia and Russia alone. Whatever Government the Russians desire to have, the Russians ought to have, and it is not for us to interfere in any way in that matter.
§ Mr. KINGWill the Noble Lord make it quite clear that he includes action with regard to foreign loans as part of their domestic policy or as part of their foreign policy?
§ Lord R. CECILI do not want to go into any unnecessary details.
§ Lord R. CECILWhat I desire to emphasise, with deference to the hon. Member, is that we have no quarrel with the Bolsheviks, but we wish to see Russia preserved as an Allied country, or, if that be impossible, as a non-German one. That is the great foundation stone of our policy. We have no other wish at all; we only desire to see Russia a great and powerful non-German nation. These are the observations I desire to make on that point. Many other things have been said in the course of the Debate, and I do not know that I have very much to reply to. Two of my hon. Friend's spoke with great anxiety about the League of Nations, and I can add nothing to what has been said frequently in this House as to the desirability of establishing that league. I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, that we can disregard all territorial questions. After all, territorial questions are at the base of most wars that have taken place. Though I am a convinced and passionate adherent of the idea of a League of Nations, I am also convinced that it will have no chance of success, no chance of useful work in Europe, unless it is established on the basis of justice, and not on the basis of a territorial arrangement, which is not likely to endure. Merely to establish such a league as that, with the inflammable material there is now in Europe as there has been in the past, to establish a League of Nations on existing occupations in Europe, would be to place it on a basis which I am afraid would not do anything to preserve the permanent peace of Europe, which would be the merest deception and delusion, and which would lead not to peace, but to further struggle, and probably cause an increase rather than a diminution of the danger of wars in the future.
§ Mr. HERBERT SAMUELMembers in all parts of the House will agree that we have had to-day a Debate which will serve a most useful purpose. The speeches of the Foreign Secretary and of the Noble Lord, who has just sat down, have done a great deal to clear the air. I think misapprehensions were rather more rife than the Noble Lord thinks with respect to his interview on what has been called the "peace offensive." That phrase is an unhappy phrase, and it is a good thing to- 626 day that the Noble Lord and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who preceded him, have made it abundantly clear that the mind of the British Government is always open to approaches from belligerent Powers that are likely to be of an acceptable character. Of course, we must be continuously on our guard against propositions which are calculated to divide one Ally from another. Just as Hindenburg and Ludendorff are endeavouring to thrust a military wedge between the French and British Armies, so may we expect that it will be sought to thrust a diplomatic wedge between the British and the French Councils. It is an absolute truism that the more Allies you have, the easier it is to make war, and the more difficult it is to make peace. They necessarily have to some extent divergent views, which it is a task of extreme difficulty and delicacy to reconcile. They can only be reconciled if we proceed on one-great clear principle, plainly expressed, unswervingly followed, and that can only be that we are fighting, not on mere questions of territory, but for the establishment of a new world-order.
That, I venture to say, has been the keynote, at any rate, of the speeches in the later part of the Debate. One after another Members, and chief of all the noble Lord who has just sat down, have emphasised that aspect of the present world struggle. The hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Snowden), asked whether my right hon. Friend (Mr. Asquith) was content to limit himself, in his declaration of our war aims, to a specific list of territorial changes which the hon. Member enumerated. Let me remind him that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Fife has laid down, as the chief of our war aims, the attainment of security. Security cannot be attained without the establishment of a new world-order. That world-order must be based upon justice, and how are you to define international justice? It can only be defined in this way: Wherever you have a people which possesses national characteristics, which is capable of forming and declaring its national will, that people must be conceded the right to be governed according to its own ideas, and not according to an outside authority, imposed upon it by force. That is the principle which must be adopted in regard to Eastern, as much as to Western, Europe. It must be in Poland as well as. Alsace-Lorraine and the Trentino, and, 627 if I may improve the hour, I would suggest that it must be applied in Ireland -as much as in Bohemia. This world of -order, if it is to be secure, must be guaranteed by the League of Nations of which, like the noble Lord, I declare myself to be an adherent. Our enemy must know that in no circumstances will we accept a peace based on anything else than that. Our Allies already know that neither for ourselves nor for them, are we willing to fight for any more than that. I venture to suggest to my hon. Friends below the Gangway that they are really the truest friends of peace who are determined not to lay down their arms until that object has at last been attained. Otherwise, the old conditions will continue and increase, and war following upon war, until, it may be, that the world will at last fall back into the chaos of the Dark Ages. This great struggle must be settled now, and once and for all. We have repeated these declarations again and again in order that there may be a clear and perfect understanding.