HC Deb 21 March 1918 vol 104 cc1231-57
Brigadier-General CROFT

I desire to call attention, before the house rises for the Adjournment, to the question of the blockade. I have realised that this question of the blockade of our enemies is divided into two great parts. There is, first of all, the question of financial blockade, which I do not intend to touch upon to-day, but which has been one of very vital importance since the beginning of the War. The other is the question of the economic blockade, about which I wish to offer a few remarks to-day. In referring to this question, which interests every man, woman, and child in this country, I desire to say at the outset that I fully realise there has been considerable improvement in this matter in the last two years, or year and a half, and especially since the United States of America came into the War. But the blockade, even in that period, has not been perfect. There have been various questions. I should be very glad to find that the Noble Lord had been able eventually to put his finger on the sand and gravel to Holland, and then to hold up the question of cement pending inquiry. We also know that in recent times there have been exports of our articles which have materially affected the position of industries and the conduct of the War in regard to this country, and I would particularly refer in that connection to the question of linen, which I raised not long ago in this House. We discovered that in the case of Switzerland alone the exports of linen from this country had increased by something just over 100,000 yards. The Noble Lord told us that this traffic had been stopped, but this question had assumed greater proportions than we would understand from the figures which at that time came forth. The matter is now one of supreme importance to this country, and one in which, unfortunately, the country was not taking so much interest up till quite recently.

I refer especially to the exports of linen goods to neutral countries. If we take the Norwegian imports from Britain with regard to linen, there was a very serious increase last year. There is even more to be said with regard to this question than a casual reference to these exports. When the occupation of Belgium took place a big supply of our flax was immediately cut off, and when the fall of Riga took place, I am sorry to say, practically the whole world supply of flax fell into the hands of our enemies. Even advice at that time, apparently, had little effect on the Minister of Blockade. Flax in the shape of yarn, piece goods and linen thread was allowed to leave this country, I believe, in very large consign- ments, notwithstanding that the Irish flax crop in 1917 was the worst they had for ten years. I am referring to the general position of flax up to this year, but perhaps the Noble Lord will refer even to so late a period as the beginning of January of this year. I want to ask the Noble Lord whether it is a fact that this position was at last recognised to be so important that the authorities, finding that the situation had become desperate, actually issued an Order in Council forbidding all export of flax products and linen goods at the commencement of January —I think the date was 8th January. Perhaps the Noble Lord will be able to tell me whether that is so?

Captain Viscount WOLMER

(Assistant-Director, War Trade Department): Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman say where the linen went to?

General CROFT

I was mentioning just now linen exports to Norway, but what I am going to refer to now is all linen exports. I shall be very glad to hear from the Noble Lord that this is not a fact, but the figures I got from the Board of Trade as to Switzerland show very clearly there was an increase of 100,000 yards of linen piece goods. I am going to ask if the Noble Lord can tell me whether it is a fact that in January, 1916, we exported 10.535,000 yards of linen piece goods; in January, 1917, 9,954,000; and in January,1918, 7,000,000 yards In the first eight days, to foreign countries?

On the 29th of January a meeting was held in Belfast for the purpose of encouraging the growing of flax in the British Empire, and the President, Mr. J. C. Crawford, chairman of the York Street Flax Spinning Company, Limited, said: They were so short of flax that the trade was faced with disaster, and that it would be nothing short of a calamity to the Empire if We could not maintain the supply of aeroplane cloth and other necessary supplies made of linen for Government requirements. The breakdown of Russia made us realise how dependent we were on that country for the very existence of our trade, and we were now face to face with the fact that we were threatened with an absolute shortage of raw material. Presumably, he would not have made that speech unless he was of opinion that we had carefully to economise our linen supply. I will ask the Noble Lord for information, and I hope he will tell me that my fears are not realised, and that this very large supply, in the face of this calamitous shortage, did not take place. Again, I would ask the Noble Lord if it is not a fact that even up to this year there have been jute yarn exports from this country? Is it not a fact that, up to 1917 even, vast quantities were allowed to leave this country?

The MINISTER of BLOCKADE (Lord Robert Cecil)

Jute?

General CROFT

Yes. And even as late as last January returns showed an increase. The figures, which, I submit, are substantially accurate, show that in January 1916, the export was 2,000,000 lbs. weight, and in 1917 2,314,000 lbs. weight, and 1918 2,918,000 lbs. weight. Those are the January figures. Now, such is the scarcity which exists in Dundee, that it is necessary, I believe, for a manufacturer to obtain a licence before he is permitted to put any order into work. Those are facts which we would like to be informed about, and are matters of very great importance. They show the blockade, even recently, to have been nothing like complete. They show that we have been exporting—I believe that they have been stopped since January, as far as linen is concerned—material vital for the prosecution of the. War, and which might be used in the prosecution of the War if transferred through those countries to Germany. And in this connection—and I am going to deal With the earlier period—I will only say this, that it does seem to the majority of people in this country that if there is any question whatever of any of these goods reaching the enemy, even if the Noble Lord has no direct evidence, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the interests of this country, and no export ought to take place, and it ought to be completely stopped, as was the case when the Noble Lord stopped the export of cement, after considerable agitation had taken place.

The reason I want to raise this question particularly this afternoon is owing to what I can only describe as the contradictions and almost the equivocations of Ministers with regard to the indefensible export of essential and vital foodstuffs during 1915 and the first half of 1916 to neutral countries, with the distinct probability of this food ultimately going on to Germany. I have endeavoured to find out recently who was responsible, and I maintain that it is the duty of this House to fix the responsibility for this most serious matter. The right hon. Gentleman on the Front Bench (Lord Robert Cecil)—I do not know whether it is through a mistaken idea of chivalry—refuses to point out to the country who were responsible. I will only say that if they refuse, they will be regarded as accomplices, and the result will be that they will not strengthen the position of the Government. It would be far better if they would say quite frankly who were responsible for these exports. I asked the Noble Lord on 12th March to say who were responsible, and he replied that three different Departments were responsible—the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Blockade, and the Admiralty. I think it was on 13th March that I asked the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Leverton Harris, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Blockade), who was responsible, and he gave me a very vague answer, that it was not the Minister of Blockade. I was very glad to hear that.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of BLOCKADE (Commander Leverton Harris)

Before March, 1916.

General CROFT

Before March, 1916, and I then pressed him further and the hon. Gentleman was retained in his seat by the Noble Lord, and, like the Tar Baby, said nothing. I then asked: Whether the Prime Minister would state what Minister was responsible in 1915, and the first eight months of 1916, for the very large and increased exports of essential foodstuffs to Scandinavia, Denmark, and Holland? The Leader of the House replied as follows: At the time referred to the control of exports from this country had not been fully organised, but it would be impossible to say that any one Minister was responsible. It is a curious fact that the Noble Lord (Lord R. Cecil) is rather under the impression that three Ministers are responsible, then the Member for East Worcestershire eliminated one, which left two, and the Leader of the House states that no Minister was responsible. At the time referred to, in the year 1915 and in the first eight months of 1916, exports were not organised and no one Minister was responsible? We fed the Germans because no Minister was responsible. I asked him whether he would give a day to discuss this question, and he replied: I have no doubt, if the House thought it desirable to attach responsibility for what happened three years ago, it would do so. These facts have only been realised lately. The enormity of feeding the Germans has only recently come to light, and. the country has only recently realised that while we were going short of those very commodities we sent this enormous volume of food to neutral countries, and I am going to prove to the House that they very largely went on to Germany. The Leader of the House seemed to consider it a waste of time to discuss what happened in 1915 and 1916, and quite properly wanted to get on with the War. But the world knew at that time and realised the dangers of the submarine, and our enemies knew it and our Allies. Only the Government in 1915 and 1916 did not grasp the vital necessity of preserving every pound of food we had in this country. No Minister was responsible during this time, and yet we find that millions of tons of produce and rawmaterial left this country—ore for shells to blow our men to bits with in the trenches, cotton to provide explosives for those shells, and food to feed the Germans who fired those shells—and when we remember the way that not only the fighting men, the soldiers and sailors, have borne the burden of this War and of these continual perils, but the way in which the civil population of this country has gone through the discomforts of this War—when we remember all that, I say it is very difficult for us to remain silent while the poor of this country go short of tea and other commodities at the present time, and when we remember the vast exports that went on by the deliberate policy of Ministers in the years 1915 and 1916. Therefore I submit that I have the right to ask, and the country has the right to know, who was the man, or men, who betrayed their country by feeding the Germans in this manner. Figures in these days are very difficult to get at. The returns are not issued in the same way as they used to be, but, at any rate, we have some figures from the Noble Lord himself which he very courteously and kindly gave us recently.

I am going to take the case of Sweden alone as an instance. In 1913, the last completed year before the War, our exports to Sweden were 245,000 lbs. weight of tea. For the nineteen months commencing 1915 up to 31st July, 1916, our exports were 7,709,000 lbs. weight of tea. Our exports for this period of one and a half years were thirty times as great as those of 1913. If we take cocoa in 1913, 149,000 lbs. weight were sent and then for the nineteen months of 1915–16 not 149,000 lbs., but 13,788,000 lbs. weight went to Sweden. That is an increase over the 1913 period for this nineteen months of no less than 90 per cent. This may have been very good for the cocoa manufacturers in this country, but I venture to think, in the light of all that has happened, it was a crime against the people of our land.

Sir E. CARSON

May I ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman whether it is not 900 and not 90 per cent?

General CROFT

That may be; in any case the increase was a very large one—yes; the right hon. Gentleman is right. May I give the total exports of tea to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland in 1915–16? It amounts to 127,000,000 lbs. weight. I bring the deliberate charge against the Government of that day that they were, by allowing these vast exports to go, and knowing that our ships were being sunk right and left, they were actually feeding the Germans, and helping them to sustain the War at that time. May I give the proofs which I said I would give in justification that these things were not meant entirely for the local consumption of the countries to which we sent them? I remember the other day that we found the export of pepper had gone up to Sweden, I think, by 1,000 per cent. Why should Sweden have this sudden taste for pepper? That was in 1916. Here we have the actual facts which, I think, conclusively prove what has been happening. The imports to Germany of foodstuffs from Holland and Scandinavia during 1916, so far as I can make out, were 1,406,000 tons, and if I take the Dutch figures alone, those from Holland, for the first six months of 1914 and 1916, these comparisons are very remarkable. Of butter, in 1914, Holland sent to Germany 8,000 tons; in 1916 she sent 19,000 tons. Cheese, in 1914, 6,000 tons; in 1916, 46,000 tons. Eggs, in 1914, 8,000 tons; in 1916, 20,000 tons. Meat, in 1914, 8,000 tons; in 1916, 40,000 tons. Flour, in 1914, 21,000 tons; in 1916, 52,000 tons. The total increase in these commodities alone of Dutch exports into Germany were of no less than 128,000 tons in 1916 over 1914—a very remarkable fact. Yet, while Holland went on sustaining Germany, we went on sustaining Holland, and that is a fact which the people of this country at the time were not aware of, or I venture to think they would have very soon seen that a Minister was appointed who was responsible for our exports; during those years. What is the other side of the picture? How did Holland treat us in that time? In 1914 Holland sent us 3,652 tons of butter; in 1916 it dropped to 97 tons. Of cheese, in the first year, Holland sent us 9,702 tons; in 1916, 668 tons. Eggs, in 1914, 4,595 tons; and in 1916 it dropped to 591 tons. Of meat, in 1914, Holland sent 34,000 tons—I am giving rough figures without the hundreds —and in 1916 this dropped to 1,630 tons. Potato flour, in 1914, Holland sent us 15,50c tons, and in 1916 this dropped to 6,932 tons. Holland, a country which fed us in peace-time, deserted us in war. Whilst Holland's supply of food to Germany of these essentials increased by 128,000 tons, her supplies to the United Kingdom decreased by 57,000 tons. The whole of this agricultural export business to Holland is controlled by a certain Mr. Kroeller, who is, I believe, the expert who does all the business for the Netherlands Overseas Trust. I gather from the answer I was given that Mr. Kroeller was the adviser and decided what agricultural produce was to go into Germany, but, if the right hon. Gentleman says that is not so, then I am mistaken. May I put it that Mr. Kroeller is a member of the Netherlands Overseas Trust, probably one of the most influential members, and that he is a gentleman who has made a great amount of money out of the War? I believe that at one time he was in this country a great deal, and was received in one or two Government Departments, where he was welcomed as the ambassador of Holland.

Lord R. CECIL

I never received him.

General CROFT

Mr. Kroeller is the head of a German firm; he is an avowed enemy of this country, and the head of this great trust. I want to deal now with the total weight of extra food exported by Holland to Germany in the nine months from January to September in 1914 and 1916. The increase in 1916 over 1914 was: Butter, 15,500 tons; cheese, 59,600; eggs, 16,000 tons; fish, 67,400 tons; meat, 34,800 tons; potatoes, 121,900 tons; potato flour, 31,000 tons; making in all a total increase of 346,000 tons. During the same time the decrease in the Dutch exports to this country of those commodities came to 75,000 tons. When we come to look into these figures, and when we see the enormous increases that have taken place, then I say we have to consider how it was that even a disorganised Government, which had no one to look after this matter after two years of war, allowed this extraordinary change to come about in the complexion of the trade which allowed Holland to increase so enormously her exports to Germany, while at the same time a decrease was going on to this country.

My next figures are a comparison of 1913, before the War, with 1916. The exports from Holland to Germany in 1913 were: Butter, 19,000 tons, and in 1916, when you would naturally assume no more would go in to Holland, it was 31,000 tons, or an increase of 12,000 tons; cheese, in 1913 16,000 tons, and in 1916 76.000 tons, or an increase of 60,000 tons; eggs, in 1913 15,000 tons, and in 1916 30,000 tons, or an increase of 15,000 tons; fish, in 1913 90,000 tons, and in 1916 155,000 tons, or an increase of 65,000 tons; meat, in 1913 22,000 tons, and in 1916 49,000 tons, or an increase of 27,000 tons. The only de-creases were in potatoes, which decreased from 154,000 tons to 122,000 tons; and margarine, which decreased from 22,000 tons to 3,000 tons. From these figures it will be seen that there was an increase, if you deduct margarine and potatoes, in the supply from Holland to Germany in 1916 as against 1913 of 152,000 tons of foodstuffs, as against a decrease of 51,000 tons of potatoes and margarine, or a total increase to Germany of 101,000 tons. At the same time the decrease to the United Kingdom was 100,000 tons in this connection. In the case of margarine the increase was 59,000 tons to this country, while there was a decrease to Germany of 13,000 tons. I desire to say that because I am very glad to see that there was some slight rectification in the other direction, although it was a very small one.

This is the policy which the Noble Lord opposite says that he was "proud to inherit from Lord Grey." I hope the right hon. Gentleman will realise that I appreciate how difficult it must have been for him to take up such an office when no Minister was responsible for this vast matter, and. I can fully realise how long it took him to disentangle this trouble. His business may account for some of the small lapses which have taken place since the Noble Lord took over this Department. Lord Grey told us, if in this matter the right rule had been enforced, that almost every neutral would have declared war upon England. How many neutrals have declared war on the United States? I do not believe, with a case as strong as ours, that when these neutral countries could be proved to be feeding our enemies, if you had insisted that they should not export more than in pre-war time there could possibly have been a casus belli. But even if there had been these difficulties, who is the dictating Power, if not the Power which held command of the seas at that time? Who was responsible? Were any licences granted for this export of commodities in 1915 and 1916, and, if so, who were they granted by; and, if no licences were granted, what explanation is there for the conduct of the Government of that time for allowing these goods to go out without licences. It is very difficult to find out who was actually responsible. Was Lord Grey responsible? Was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Runciman) responsible or was neither of them responsible? Was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith) responsible? If they were, I ask the House, in view of the facts I have put forward, is impeachment too mild for these right hon. Gentlemen? I ask is impeachment too mild to be adopted towards those right hon. Gentlemen, if they can be proved to be guilty?

Germany was in great straits in 1916, and up to the harvest of 1917. At that time we were informed that it was touch and go as to whether Germany could maintain her position, and prevent her people from starving and maintaining the morale of the German people. Is it not a fact that the figures which I have given might have made all the difference as to whether Germany would have had to come out of the War or whether she would be able to prolong the agony of this conflict? I maintain that our blockade was one of the main factors in enabling Germany to continue this struggle. The people in this country do not understand why the House of Commons allows these things to go by unnoticed. When we realise that all this traffic was going on by which it was possible for Germany to be helped and assisted in order to kill our men, when I am asked why we want to refer to questions which happened two or three years ago, I reply that soldiers and sailors who have failed in time of war are called upon to suffer for even a momentary failure of duty the death penalty, whilst Ministers who pursue a deliberate policy of this kind for two years, with frightful consequences to the community and the whole of civilisation, go scot-free.

This kind of thing cannot go unnoticed. Our political life has already become suspect in the eyes of our countrymen because we allow these mistakes to go unpunished. Every one of us here is responsible, and unless we demand action and information which will fix the true blame, then our countrymen will think we are accessories to this crime of feeding the Germans in time of war. I believe the country demands that it shall be told who it was who betrayed them in this respect, who was responsible for sending all these vast supplies out of the country, leaving us short. I hope that the Noble Lord will not adopt the policy which he has adopted at Question Time when this matter has been raised, and I hope he will not endeavour to camouflage the House, and even though he has to let the cat out of the bag, I hope he will tell us who were the Ministers responsible for this policy at the beginning of the War. I hope he will not have any foolish mistaken idea on this question, for the simple reason that the country wants to know who is responsible, and the people are determined to have the truth.

Mr. PENNEFATHER

While I find myself very much in agreement with what has been said by the hon. and gallant Member, there are certain points on which I find myself opposed to him. As regards the export of food from this country to Holland during recent periods, I agree that the matter requires some explanation as to how it came about that with an impending shortage of food here we continued to send large quantities of food to Holland in face of the known fact that Holland was increasing her exports of food to Germany and that Holland was decreasing her exports of food to this country. I am not in possession of any official secret, but I have endeavoured in my own mind to try and find a possible explanation of this apparently inexplicable thing, and the suspicion which has formed itself in my mind is that we were bound by some agreement, possibly what is called a rationing agreement—an agreement entered into with Holland, perhaps, before my Noble Friend came upon this sphere of activities—the Noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong—but we were bound by a rationing agreement entered into at one period between the then Government of this country and neutral countries. If my memory serves me rightly—I have no special knowledge, I only know what has transpired in this House; and what has been stated elsewhere—the basis of the rationing agreement was that the neutral countries were to receive their pre-war rations of certain commodities. If such an agreement were made there must have been an oversight, because, apparently, no provision was inserted to the effect that the pre-war, ration was to be based on the assumption that the rationed country should continue to export to this country our pre-war ration. I do not know if I have made that quite clear, but I think it is evident that any rationing agreement of this nature ought to have contained a clause which said, "We will agree to your obtaining certain rations of certain commodities on a pre war basis, on the assumption that your exports of commodities to this country are maintained on a pre-war basis also, and that your exports of commodities to enemy countries shall not exceed the pre-war basis." Apparently no such provision was inserted, with the result, as far as I can see, that although a country like Holland was increasing her exports to our enemies, and was decreasing her exports to us, we still continued to say, "You are entitled to your pre-war: ration, even although you have made this fundamental change in the basis of the agreement."

Having said that, I would like to deal with the broader question of the statistics in connection with the export to neutral countries, or perhaps I should say in connection with the imports of neutral countries of various commodities which have been much commented upon. Personally, I have always held the view that nearly all these statistics are misleading. I do not think I have even seen a single set of statistics published or quoted which is what might be termed a scientific set of statistics, because one set of statistics for example gives, say, the exports from the United States of America to certain countries, ignoring all the exports from other countries, while another set of figures give the exports from the United Kingdom to Sweden, ignoring all other considerations. Statistics of that kind really are laughable and ludicrous, or they would be so were there not a tragic side of the case. They mislead people of small statistical education. It is quite possible for a person to be highly educated in every other respect and yet to be statistically ignorant, and statisticians admit the fact that it is only men in the habit of dealing with statistics who really appreciate how misleading they can be.

Take, for example, the question that we have sent within a certain period from this country huge quantities of goods to Sweden—a volume so great that it exceeded by 90 or 900" per cent., I do not café which, the quantities which we sent from the country to Sweden in pre-war years. It is important to ask what was the destination of these goods. Were not probably large quantities going through Sweden to Russia? In some cases it may be not. In other cases it was undoubtedly so, and if you take any particular item by itself you are sure to arrive at a misleading conclusion. There is, I believe, only one safe way of dealing with the matter, and that is to take Germany and the adjacent neutral countries as one great area, to ascertain what were the imports of the various commodities into that area during a certain period, arid then to compare that period with a later period. If you do that it will very often show that the apparently extraordinary increase in the imports of neutral countries from outside is due to the fact that those goods are being imported not in order to be sent into Germany, but that they are being imported to supply the deficiency caused by the failure of Germany to supply that country with goods in the manner in which she had done before the War.

I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend that the Noble Lord and his colleagues at a certain point stepped into a very delicate position—an inherited legacy—which I think we must admit was a very unenviable legacy, because it was a policy which was so obviously inadequate that it had to be changed. It is, of course, extremely difficult for any Minister or set of Ministers or any Department to turn right round and change a policy at once. Some time must always be allowed for a horseman to get into the saddle, to take the reins into his hands, and to turn his horse's head in an opposite direction to that in which it was proceeding before. The difficulties in regard to the neutrals were immense. I was often struck by the fact that the man in the street or the writer in the newspaper spoke or wrote about "the problem of the neutral." There was no such thing as a problem of the neutral. It was the problems of the neutrals because there was a separate problem in connection with each neutral country. Every country, and particularly Sweden, had to be handled differently from other centres; Sweden, because we had to use her in order to send munitions of war to Russia. America had to be handled differently from other neutrals, because upon the handling of America—her proper handling—depended whether there might not be arrayed in hostility to us a great league of neutrals with America at its head. People who criticise past errors are, I think, sometimes inclined to minimise the immense difficulties which existed at that time and which were familiar to those of us who, like myself, during that period of three years from an obscure background watched closely and attentively the development of our policy.

General CROFT

Why was not a responsible Minister appointed to do it?

Mr. PENNEFATHER

I am afraid I cannot answer that question. It is one which should be addressed to a Minister and not to a Back Bench Member. We have not merely to dwell upon the mistakes that have been made, but to consider also the practical successes which have been achieved in one way or another by various means which are familiar to all of us who have studied the subject, but which it would be unwise to mention more specifically. By various friendly means we have done a great deal during this year or two to stiffen the blockade, as far as that could be done by such means. But if I were asked to name one of the great successes upon which I think the Government, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Noble Lord can congratulate themselves, it is that as a result of this policy, whatever its mistakes may have been, we have the United States of America fighting on our side to-day instead of remaining possibly as a critical neutral. That is such an important factor in the waging of the War that, personally, I am inclined, while fully admitting the mistakes that have been made, fully admitting that a start was made in the wrong direction, fully admitting also there has been a certain amount of vacillation, weakness, and lack of judg-ment—in spite of all that I am inclined to condone a great deal of it in view of that, one great practical success that as a result of the policy, on the whole, we have now with us as our Ally and fighting with us in this War, the great United States of America.

Lord R. CECIL

Before I deal with the speeches which have been made this afternoon about the blockade I desire to fulfil the promise I made to the hon. Member at Question Time that I would make a statement on the subject of Dutch shipping, The House will recognise, I am sure, in the light of the Rebates which have recently taken place on the shipping position, that the warfare which has been waged by Germany on the sea has not been directed only against her enemies, but has been directed against the shipping of the world Every nation, neutrals not less than belligerents, has been closely interested. In my judgment, and indeed as the facts make perfectly evident, every nation has been profoundly interested in the result of these lawless proceedings, and it has, therefore, followed that in our View, in the view of this Government, and of the Allied Governments, it has been a matter of deep regret that any Government should have appeared to assist these operations of Germany by not making the fullest use of the shipping which belongs to her.

5.0 P. M.

That being so, it has been our endeavour together with the Allied Powers for months past, by negotiation and agreement, to induce Holland to make the. fullest possible use of its shipping, and in the fulfilment. of that policy we negotiated with Holland an agreement providing for a number of other matters—matters with which the hon. and gallant Member's speech was concerned; exports of Dutch goods and the like—but dealing particularly with the employment of Dutch shipping. On the 4th of January last, I think it was, the representatives of the Dutch Government and our negotiators— the negotiators of the whole of the Allied Governments—arrived at an agreement, the substance of which was, as far as ships were concerned, that the Dutch would permit their ships to be chartered, to be used, for Allied purposes, excepting those which were necessary for the essential requirements of Holland herself. There was a provision in that agreement that the ships in question should not be required to sail in what is called the danger zone, the zone which the German Government arrogate to themselves the right to describe as the danger zone.

There was some difficulty and considerable delay in the ratification of that agreement by the Dutch Government, and what was called modus vivendi was arrived at, by which for one voyage, with certain limitations and conditions, Dutch shipping lying in the harbours of the United States, and not being utilised, of which there was a considerable quantity, should be chartered for Allied purposes for one voyage; and it was part of that modus vivendi that tonnage up to 150,000 tons might be used, for the purpose of carrying cargoes for Belgian relief, provided that for every ship that sailed from the United States with cargo of that kind a ship should be allowed to sail from Holland. Of course the ships with the Belgian relief cargoes go to Rotterdam, and the other ships would come from Holland. That was the position arrived at. When it was attempted to put this modus vivendi into operation the Dutch Government informed the American Government that they were not permitted by the German Government to carry out that part which provided for allowing a Dutch ship to sail from Rotterdam in exchange for the ship sailing with the Belgian relief cargo. Apart from that, for more than two months after the 4th of January we received no reply from the Dutch Government as to whether they would or would not accept the general provisions of the shipping arrangement, and the House will understand that that lapse of time made a very material difference in the conditions of the agreement. Had the agreement been put into effect early in January it would have been open to the Allied Powers to make arrangements with their shipping whereby they could have used the Dutch shipping in routes outside the danger zone and put other shipping into routes which involved crossing the danger zone. But since the Dutch Government were unable to give us a reply after this length of time, it is evident we were not able to make these arrangements so as to meet the considerable claims on our shipping which at this time of the year naturally arise, and the position had become in consequence entirely different. Moreover, after our experience with the modus vivendi, the Allied Governments felt that it might well be, even if the agreement were confirmed, that the Germans might take some action which would render it impossible to be carried out. For instance, they might by extending their danger zone make the whole purpose of the agreement nugatory.

In these circumstances we felt compelled to inform the Dutch Government that as they had not agreed to the original agreement we were unable now to make any agreement which did not provide for the utilisation of the Dutch tonnage without any condition at all. But in order to make it clear that we had no wish whatever that by any such agreement any Dutch interest should suffer we, apart from all the ordinary arrangements as to hire and insurance, offered that if any Dutch shipping were sunk by enemy action in the danger zone it should be replaced at the end of the War. I venture respectfully to say that that was a pretty generous offer in the circumstances. However, the Dutch Government felt itself unable to agree except under conditions, one of which was that no Dutch ships should be asked to carry war materials. It is quite plain that in the present stage of the War a ship that is unable to carry war material is of very little value to anybody at all, because almost everything is, more or less, war material. Therefore, I think the House will agree that it was impossible to regard that as an acceptable reply from the Dutch Government. In these circumstances the Allied Governments have felt that the only course open to them is to exercise what they believe to be their undoubted and unquestionable right to requisition the services of any neutral vessel found in their ports, under what I believe is called technically the right of angary. Of course, I should explain that any belligerent Power exercising that right is bound to take care that no injury is inflicted on any private interests at all, but that on the contrary that every precaution is taken to see that private interests are not affected in any way. As far as His Majesty's Government is concerned, I can say, without any kind of qualification, or modification, or reserve, that the British Government is desirous, in the exercise of this right, to do so in a way which is the most careful and least obnoxious in which the right can be exercised. They are prepared, in fact, to make provisions which I think will carry out that desire.

They will enter into an agreement, if they can, with the owners as to the rates of payment for hire and the values for insurance. They will undertake that the ships shall be returned at the end of the War to their owners. They will further compensate those owners for any losses caused to the shipping by enemy action, and they are prepared to abide by their offer to replace after the War any ship lost by enemy action by another ship within the shortest possible period alter the conclusion of peace. They will, of course, provide for the repatriation of the crews, and will take care that they are treated with every possible courtesy and consideration. Further, they naturally must give an undertaking that any Dutch ships which after this date leave a Dutch port will not be brought into Allied service except by agreement. That is evidently right and fair, because otherwise Dutch ships that sail would be subject to requisition themselves. The Government is perfectly prepared to give an undertaking that that shall not happen. Further, they have had brought to their notice that, owing: to circumstances, there is a very, very great want of wheat in Holland, and they, with the assent of the United States Government and the other Allies, have undertaken that 50,000 tons of wheat, or an equivalent quantity of flour, shall be put at the disposal of Holland in a. North American port as soon as possible, and another 50,000 tons in a South American port, and it is hoped that the Netherlands Government will immediately send out such part of the tonnage remaining in Holland as may be necessary to convey this grain. Of course, the associated Governments guarantee, as far as it is in their power, that these ships shall enjoy immunity from delay and detention, and shall receive every facility.

I mentioned just now that this question of shipping was only part of the general agreement; and, as far as we and our Allies are concerned, we are perfectly prepared to proceed with that general agreement, which provides for necessary supplies to Holland and for the interchange of goods from Holland. Finally, we are prepared to say this, that though we believe that the Dutch shipping now in Dutch ports—that is, ports in Holland or the Dutch Colonies—is sufficient for Dutch purposes, yet if it shall be found that it is not so, we will make arrangements to provide for all Dutch need. I merely mention these things to explain to the House, to prove to the House, that when I said that the Allied Governments were anxious in this matter to meet the Netherlands Government in every way, it is not a mere way of speaking, but a real, genuine declaration of intention which the Government have every purpose to carry into effect. That is really all I have to say about this Dutch shipping.

Mr. TREVELYAN

How many Dutch ships are there in Allied ports being held up with the intention of utilising them, and also what action has the Dutch Government taken in regard to it?

Lord R. CECIL

I do not know that the Dutch Government have taken any action. They had explained their view in reference to an earlier transaction. They do not take the same view as we do about these cases. The Dutch tonnage is very considerable, but I should not like to commit myself definitely to figures. By far the largest part is in American ports. Perhaps 450,000 tons of shipping is in American ports. In other ports of the world there would be between 300,000 and 400,000 tons, but I should not like to commit myself definitely.

Mr. TREVELYAN

Seeing the importance of the question, would it be possible for the Government to lay Papers upon the Table now so far as they have gone? I presume a Note was sent by the Allied Governments. Is it not fair that this country should know exactly what are the terms of that Note?

Lord R. CECIL

I will consider that matter, but I think I have given a fairly full account of the transaction, and I do not know that there is anything further that I can lay upon the Table.

Colonel YATE

If these ships have not been taken over already, will they be taken over now without any further delay?

Lord R. CECIL

I believe that the American Government have taken steps to-day with that object, and I believe that we are doing the same. I now pass to the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend (General Croft). It was a speech full of figures, and he is probably as conscious as I have been when I have had to speak that it is an exceedingly intricate subject to deal with. It depends entirely upon details and figures, a close examination of those figures, and a proper understanding of them. There are two separate things. There is the question of the conservation of essential supplies to this country and the question of blockade, properly so-called. They are two entirely different things. It may very well be, and it is undoubtedly true at the present moment, that we have to prevent the export from this country, and that the United States Government have to prevent the export from the United States, of a number of goods which, from the purely blockade point of view, might perfectly safely go to neutral countries, but they are necessary for our own needs. Strictly speaking, that is not a matter of blockade at all, and my knowledge is not very much more than that of the hon. and gallant Gentleman. It has not been any part of my Departmental duties—of course, as a, member of the Government I am responsible more or less for what the Government have done—to look after the conservation of supplies to this country. Since the appointment of the Food Controller in food matters it is his duty. Before his appointment, I presume that it was the duty of the Board of Trade. It is rather difficult for me to be certain, but I believe that was so. I ought to make this explanation. In a number of matters, such as munition requirements of the Army and Navy, and so on, other Departments come in—the War Office, the Admiralty, or the Munitions Department, as the case may be. Therefore, as far as the conservation of supplies is concerned, it is impossible to give the hon. and gallant Member the head of any particular Minister on a charger. That cannot be done. He must define exactly the particular article of which he complains, and then, if he thinks it is desirable, we will search for the culprit.

With regard to the figures, I will not deal with them in too great detail, but if the hon. and gallant Member wants any further details, I shall be only too glad to furnish him with them. As to tea and cocoa—I am not sure that he mentioned them in his speech, but he has asked several questions about them—I think, unquestionably, if you look at the matter merely from the point of view of whether tea or cocoa ought to go into Germany, that too much was allowed to go in 1915, and perhaps even in the early months of 1916, into the neighbouring neutrals. On the other hand, in the case of tea certainly, and to some extent in the case of cocoa, dealing with it merely from the blockade point of view, it is not quite a clear case. In the first place, undoubtedly a good deal of those things went by way of Sweden to Russia and not to Germany. The whole course of trade has been upset by the War, and that has happened much more since the War began than it did before the War. There is this also to be considered, and I think it also applies to cocoa: If Germany spent her money on tea, she had less to spend on other things. You will find that very largely urged by German writers in German newspapers. I remember seeing a statement in a German newspaper which said that every mark that was spent on tobacco meant so much less butter imported from neutral countries into Germany. There is something to be said from that point of view. I do not put it higher than this. If you are to be lax in anything in a blockade it is far better to be lax in a matter like tea or tobacco than it is in essential foodstuffs or in essential materials for the manufacture of munitions of war. The hon. and gallant Member mentioned sand and gravel. That has nothing whatever to do with the blockade, nor, strictly speaking, has the cement question, though I do not wish to shirk responsibility.

As to linen, I can assure my hon. and gallant Friend that, so far as my information goes, there is no case about linen at all. He said that there have been exports of linen in January and February of this year to Scandinavia and to Holland. As far as the border neutral countries are concerned, so far as I am informed, none went there at all. Taking it rather larger and taking the general aspect of the matter since the beginning of 1916, I find these figures. Take hemp, linen yarn, and linen piece goods together. That is the only fair way of doing it. It is no use taking linen piece goods alone. You must take the raw material of those piece goods if you are really to see what is going on. If a country gets more piece goods and less raw material it is the same as if it got less piece goods. Taking them together, the pre-war quarterly average for the four countries was 1,603 tons; the quarterly average for the first half of 1916 was 940 tons, about 60 per cent.; the third quarter, 490 tons; the fourth quarter, 606 tons; the first quarter of 1917, 391 tons; the second quarter, 290 tons; the third quarter, 362 tons; the fourth quarter, 131 tons; and the quarterly average for the two months of this year was 2 tons. Therefore, I do not think that there is the slightest case as far as linen imports to Northern neutrals are concerned.

General CROFT

I am particularly anxious not to be wrong in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman will not deny that there have been imports into Norway. The Board of Trade returns disclose them. The imports of thread in October, 1917, were 1,780.000 lbs. There were also imported into Switzerland, a contiguous country 100,000 lbs. of piece goods.

Lord R. CECIL

You must not take it because there has been an increase from this country into Switzerland that there has been an increase in the total imports of linen into Switzerland. Switzerland before the War got a great many of these goods from Germany, and she is not able to get them from Germany now.

General CROFT

I agree with the Noble Lord that he is not solely involved in this question. It may be an entirely Board of Trade question, but the speech made at Belfast, to which I have referred, shows the lamentable policy of allowing it to go at all.

Lord R. CECIL

As a matter of fact, very little linen has been allowed to go since 1916. I will not say that none has gone, because occasional parcels have been allowed to go. I do not wish to go into the detailed causes of the trouble in Ireland, but they are not due to exports from this country. The exports of linen from this country have been restricted to the utmost possible extent for many months past. There are other causes. There was undoubtedly during the earlier months of this War a very great deal of doubt as to how you could carry out the blockade, to what extent it would be safe to carry it out, and by what means it was to be carried on. Undoubtedly there was no attempt at organisation. I do not know that there has even been complete organisation. There was certainly no attempt at complete organisation until the establishment of the Ministry of Blockade. Up till that time the work was distributed among a number of Committees, doing the best they could, and a number of Departments of the Government. The Admiralty did a certain amount, the Foreign Office did some, the Board of Trade did some, there was the War Trade Advisory Committee, the Rubber and Tin Exports Committee, the Cotton Committee, and so on. They were all working. A great many of them exist still—they are essential—but they were working without any single responsible head who co-ordinate their efforts. That was the difficulty which met the Government. As for the blame to be attached for it, I will say a word or two in a moment, but I am not quite clear that the case is so obvious as the hon. and gallant Member would have us believe. If there is, and so far as there is blame to be attached, it would be impossible to single out any particuar Minister. You must take the Government as a whole. Everyone of us who were members in 1914 and 1915 of the first Asquith Government, or of the second Asquith Government, have their share of responsibility to bear. The policy was the policy of the Government, and if there was a mistake, and if one particular Minister may have been more or less responsible than another, it would be very unfair and unjust for anyone of us to try to escape a certain measure of responsibility for that action.

I have a number of other details mentioned here, but I am afraid I have no time now to go into them. There is one error I want to point out to the hon. and gallant Member, because it really is of importance. He made an attack on Mr. Kroeller, a Dutch subject, whom it would be unfair for me to attack or defend, but I do wish to say a word about the Netherlands Overseas Trust. It is an error to suppose that the Netherlands Overseas Trust had anything to do with the exports from Holland. Its sole duty was, and I think it is still, to receive goods consigned to Holland and guarantee that they should be dealt with only in a manner consistent with the agreements which the Netherlands Overseas Trust entered into, and that part of its duty—though I have constantly heard the Netherlands Overseas Trust attacked—I believe that body has discharged faithfully and well. At any rate, nothing has ever been proved against it. I think it has done its duty, on the whole, with remarkable success. I can only tell the hon. and gallant Member that at a very early stage of my career I asked Lord Faringdon expressly to go to Holland to report on the whole question of the blockade there. He went in great detail into the working of the Netherlands Overseas Trust, and he reported to me that he regarded it as an extraordinarily good bit of organisation, working extremely well, and carrying out its duty with extraordinary fidelity and success. I do not know what other steps I could take. If the hon. and gallant Member can suggest any, I shall be glad to consider them. It is a great pity that perpetual attacks should be made on this organisation, which, in my judgment, has done its duty with great honesty and fidelity.

The hon. and gallant Member went on—this was really the burden of his observations—to say that we had fed the Germans because no Minister was responsible. May I point out to him, what was very properly said by the hon. Gentleman who followed him, that it is very easy to forget the extreme difficulty under which any Government must labour at the beginning of a war? In the first place, there is the financial difficulty. It is quite true that it is very important—indeed, vital—to prevent anything going to Germany. On the other hand, it is equally vital—this is a fact constantly lost sight of in this House—that we should keep up our financial strength. Until America became our Ally, it was one of the most vital matters in the conduct of the War not to interfere unnecessarily and harmfully with trade. Merely to say, because there is a suspicion that this might reach Germany, although we could not prove it, and although we had no ground for thinking it would, still it might, therefore we will cut off the whole of that trade, would be reckless and improper action, in my judgment, on the part of any Government. That was one difficulty. There was another difficulty, namely, the political difficulty. There was a difficulty inherent in trying to carry out a blockade of an entirely novel character that nobody had ever tried to carry out in the history of the world before, namely, the blockade of Germany through adjacent neutral countries. I need not dwell on that, but if my hon. and gallant Friend has, as I am sure he has, taken the trouble to read carefully the various Debates which have taken place in this House on that subject, he will know that the difficulty has been dilated on constantly, and that more than one Parliamentary Paper has been laid on the Table to explain the matter to Members of this House. Apart from that, there were special difficulties. Until May, 1915, Italy was not one of our Allies. Until Italy was an Ally, any attempt to blockade Germany through neutral countries—Italy being one of them—would be a task which, so far as I can see, having now a good deal of experience, would have been almost impossible to carry out. It is difficult enough with small countries, but when you have a large country, with a large home consumption, you have to distinguish—because that is what you always have to do—between the home consumption and imports which are not merely intended for home consumption, but are intended for ultimate transmission to the enemy country. When you try to carry that out in respect of a large, populous and flourishing country, such as Italy was, I am quite sure it was a task which would have been too difficult to be accomplished successfully. Therefore, I do not myself believe it would have been possible to carry out any really effective blockade of Germany and Austria until Italy became our Ally.

That was one great difficulty. Then another, and, of course, the greatest of all, was the position of the United States. I am not going to dwell on that. I do not even like to recollect the various discussions we had on blockade matters with that country, which, I am happy to believe now, is one of our closest friends, but it would be absurd to ignore the fact that at that time great difficulties did occur. Our friends in America, not only your official friends, but our unofficial friends, were constantly warning us against pressing the matter too far, and though the hon. Member persists in blaming Lord Grey, in my judgment Lord Grey was right in regarding that danger as the greatest danger against which he had to guard as Foreign Minister of this country. Any impairment at that time of our relations with America was by far the greatest danger which threatened us from external sources. Although it is possible that Lord Grey may have made many mistakes—I do not say he did not—I do not defend Lord Grey or anybody else—on the whole the lines on which he conducted the foreign policy of this country in that respect were right lines, and any Foreign Minister who knew his business would have done much the same thing. That is really all I have to say about the great difficulties in the way of the blockade. When the hon. and gallant Member demands the impeachment of this or that statesman or that some gentleman who did his best for his country should be immediately held up to the odium of his fellow-countrymen. I must consider very carefully whether, if he had been in their place, he would have done any better. The difficulties, believe me, were enormous; the responsibility was tremendous. I am perfectly certain that every one of these statesmen who have served this country since the War have done their best honestly and patriotically, and the suggestion that they have been moved by any unworthy motive—the hon. and gallant Member did not make that suggestion, but it has been made—is absolutely baseless and without foundation. What is true is that the difficulties were very great. That very great mistakes were made and that action ought to have been taken which very often was not taken soon enough, after all only shows that every Cabinet Minister showed that he was also a human being. For my part I suppose I shall not be free from criticism. When my conduct comes to be examined, as I daresay the conduct of all of us will be examined by history or by some more rigid tribunal on which the hon. and gallant Member may sit at the end of the War, I shall be perfectly satisfied if all that can be said against me is that I tried to do my duty and very often failed. All I can say is that criticism which merely look at one aspect of the case and forgets the enormous complexities of the problems which confront Ministers at the beginning of a war, is not really patriotic, and does not really carry out the wishes which I am sure the hon. and gallant Member has very much at heart.

Mr. TREVELYAN

I wish to say a very few words about the statement which the right hon. Gentleman made at the beginning of his speech, for I feel certain that this matter of the taking of the Dutch ships is giving great concern to large numbers of people, and that what the right hon. Gentleman has said has not thrown perhaps as much light on it as is wanted. I asked in the course of his speech if more information could be given to the House, and I will explain why. Apparently the basis of the action of the Allied Governments is what the right hon. Gentleman calls the unquestionable right to requisition any neutral vessel in our ports. That right may exist. If it is a legal right, I suppose that it was quite clearly stated in the Note or communication to the Dutch. It is only right that as this action is being taken the British people, in whose name it is taken, should be made thoroughly conversant with what that legal right is.

Lord R. CECIL

As I said just now, I think some Papers are being laid—they were laid either yesterday or to-day—dealing with the general principle. If anything further is required I shall be glad to furnish a fuller statement of the principle.

Mr. TREVELYAN

I am glad to hear that, because it was not made very clear. Even so, there are other questions which follow. Even if there is a legal right, I presume this is very much the largest exercise of it that has ever been made, so much the largest as almost to constitute a. new situation altogether, where the larger part, I take it, of the shipping of a friendly and neutral country is being taken against their will. The Noble Lord let drop a phrase which showed how serious the situation is. He said naturally the Dutch dislike it—that is to say it is, taken by itself, a rather high-handed proceeding.

Lord R. CECIL

I did not say that. I said it was very natural that they should not take quite the same view about the case that we did. I hope the hon. Member will recollect that he is speaking as an English Member of Parliament.

Mr. TREVELYAN

The reason why I speak at this moment is because there is grave concern in this country about what is happening. I am not going to say that the Government is wrong. I am going to say that it is creating a critical situation, and that before that situation gets more critical they ought to consider whether it is worth it. They ought to consider what will be said about action of this sort. No doubt it may seem essential to us. We have heard a great deal about military necessity, but military necessity does not justify everything. Beyond that we ought to consider, when we are dealing with a friendly and a neutral people, even if there is going to be some advantage to us in what is being done, what the effect is likely to be on them, and if, as appears from the information that we are getting, the Dutch people strongly disapprove of our action, whether that in itself is not a reason for our Government holding its hand.