§ (1) A person shall not be disqualified from being registered or from voting as a Parliamentary elector by reason that he or some person for whose maintenance he is responsible has received poor relief or other alms.
§ (2) A person shall not be entitled to be registered or to vote as a Parliamentary or local government elector if he is not a British subject, and nothing contained in this Act shall, except as expressly provided therein, confer on any person who is subject to any legal incapacity to be 1210 registered or to vote, either as a Parliamentary or local government elector, any right to be so registered or to vote.
§ Adjourned Debate resumed on Amendment proposed [20th November] —at the end of Sub-section (1), insert the words " Any person who has been exempted from military service on the ground of conscientious objection or who, having joined the forces, has been sentenced by court-martial for refusal to obey orders, and who alleged conscientious objection to-military service as a reason for such refusal, shall be disqualified from being registered or voting as a Parliamentary or local government elector." —[Sir George Younger.]
§ Question again proposed, " That those words be there inserted in the Bill."
§ Mr. MORRELLI desire to obtain your ruling, Sir, on a point of Order with regard to the Amendment now before the House. What I want to submit is that this Amendment is really inconsistent with the scope of the measure and outside the scope of the Bill. This Bill is a franchise Bill. Its object is to improve and increase the representation of the people and to make it as complete and fair as possible. What I want to submit is that there is no precedent for using a franchise Bill in order to disfranchise a large section of the existing electorate.
§ Mr. MORRELLIt may, no doubt, be said that this Bill does already withdraw votes from a certain number of people —namely, the plural voters —but it does so. with the object of improving the representation. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] That is the intention, anyhow, to make this, House more representative of the people. In regard to this Amendment it is clear that the object is not to make this House more representative, to improve the representation of the people, but —as the Mover and Seconder said in their speeches yesterday and as was shown in the Debate —the object is to penalise —for good or bad reasons, I am not going into that —to inflict a penalty on a certain claps of electors. I should like to draw the attention of the House to certain phrases used by the Leader of the House which, I think, entirely bears out what I am saying. The Leader of the House, in a portion of his remarks last night, dealt again and again 1211 with the view that this was an Amendment to punish these people by taking away their vote. He said that if you found that there was a real danger to the State in the growth of this—that is, conscientious objection—you had a perfect right to put it down. Again, he said:
I think it will be a direct deterrent to the growth of this kind of thing—that is, conscientious objection. A little later he said:I do not think that it is right to make any punishment of this kind perpetual." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th November, 1917, cols. 1151 and 1152.]The right hon. Gentleman said the punishment ought not to be perpetual, but only for a certain number of years. I submit that this shows clearly enough that the intention of this Amendment is that it should be a penalising measure. It may be right or it may be wrong to penalise conscientious objectors, but what I venture to submit to you, Mr. Speaker, is that there is no precedent, and that it is not right, to use a franchise Bill for this purpose. If the House desires to deal with conscientious objectors, the House should deal with them in a Bill specially for the purpose, and ought not to put this in a franchise Bill in order, by a side-wind, to disfranchise any class of the electors.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe object of this Bill is to settle on as permanent and firm a footing as possible the general question of the representation of the people in Parliament. If it so happens that during the course of the Bill a certain number of people are disfranchised, all I can say is that that comes within the scope of the Bill. They may happen to be conscientious objectors, or 40s. freeholders. These latter class are disfranchised, or, at any rate, a very considerable number of them will lose their votes altogether. There are also freemen who are disfranchised. I dare say there are other classes. I cannot, therefore, hold that because the Bill disfranchises a certain number of persons, that, therefore, the Amendment now before the House is out of order.
§ Mr. MORRELLMight I put one point Mr. Speaker, with which you did not deal? No doubt the Bill may incidentally take away the votes of a certain number of people. In very few cases, however, will it take them entirely off the electorate. In no case will this be done as a punishment. That is what makes the case I am 1212 putting and the other cases different, and I would respectfully submit that aspect to you.
§ Mr. SHERWELLIn reference to your argument, Mr. Speaker, as to the 40s. freeholder, may I point out that there is no proposal in this Bill which disfranchises the 40s. freeholder? The only provision in this Bill to the effect suggested is that which prevents him being a plural voter.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe hon. Gentleman is mistaken. The 40s. freeholder to vote is abolished. It may, however, well be that there will be a considerable number of freeholders who will not obtain either the residential or the business vote.
§ Mr. LEIF JONESMay I submit to you another point of Order to that mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Burnley? In Clause 5 of the Bill special provisions are made for persons serving on War service. Sub-section (3) of that Clause says:
(3) This Section shall apply to any person who in connection with any war in which His Majesty is engaged is abroad and is—(a) in service of a naval or military character for which payment is made out of money provided by Parliament; or(b) serving in any work of the British Red Cross Society, or the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England, or any other body with a similar object.I submit to you that the Amendment moved by the hon. Baronet the Member for Ayr will have the effect of disfranchising a large number of people who, in Clause 5, we have specially enfranchised. The whole of the Non-Combatant Corps in France consists, as I understand, of conscientious objectors who are employed on non-combatant work. [An HON. MEMBER: "No!"] Well, a large number of them, at any rate. They have the vote given to them by Clause (5). You have the members of the Friends' Ambulance Unit, who are engaged in war service abroad, and the vote has been provided for them by Clause (5). The point I wish to submit to you is this: Is it in order for this House, on Clause (8) of the Bill, when we have settled this question in Clause (5), to go back upon its decision, and by an Amendment to Clause (8) upset our decision, as it would be upset if this Amendment were carried?
§ Mr. SPEAKERIn regard to Clause (5), the House must have had in its mind the fact that there would be certain persons who would be disqualified because Clause {8) had been in the Bill for some time. Clause (8) deals with disqualifications. If I were to accept the argument of the right hon. Gentleman it would lead to striking out Clause (8).
§ Mr. SPEAKERIt must! We must read the Clauses together. The right hon. Gentleman's submission would mean that you could not make any exception in Clause (8). It is always open for the House to add to disqualifications if it so chooses.
§ Mr. JONESI gather I have not made myself quite clear. There is no contradiction at present between Clauses (5) and (8).
§ Mr. JONESI am not aware of it. But I suggest that we may disqualify in Clause (8) those whom we have disfranchised in Clause (5). If the Amendment of the hon. Baronet be carried you will have set up a contradiction which, I submit, does not at present exist between the two Clauses. I suggest, on a point of Order, that it is not for this House to carry an Amendment to Clause (8) which upsets Clause (5) of the Bill?
§ Sir G. YOUNGERMay I say that I put this Clause down originally as a new Clause, intending to move it at the beginning of these proceedings, and before any of these Clauses were reconsidered? In these circumstances you will remember, Mr. Speaker, that you told me it must come in the disqualifications Clause. It would, therefore, be surely very hard to disqualify me from dealing with this matter now.
§ Mr. R. McNEILLMay I point out that there is already a contradiction such as the right hon. Gentleman suggests, between Clauses (5) and (8)? In the Subsection of Clause (5), which he has read, qualifying those serving in any work of the British Red Cross Society or the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England, the right hon. Gentleman and the House are entirely unable to say whether all those who are employed in these orgamosations are British subjects. As a matter of fact, I happen myself to know 1214 at least one person who is not a British subject who is so employed. Consequently the argument of the right hon. Gentleman applies just as much to the Bill as it stands as in the case of the Amendment.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThat was my point. There are certain disqualifications laid down, and they must be taken to be the exceptions to what is provided for in previous Clauses. It is open, however, to the House to add disqualifications.
§ 4.0 P.M.
§ Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEOn a point of Order. I want to take your ruling, Mr. Speaker, upon this question. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Morrell) has said that with regard to the speeches of the Proposer and Seconder of this Amendment, they said they desired to penalise the conscientious objector. Their speeches last night were directed entirely in the opposite direction.
§ Mr. SPEAKERThat is not a point of Order.
§ Lord HUGH CECILJust before the House adjourned last night my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House addressed to the House a very remarkable speech. As I listened, that speech excited in my mind both surprise and indignation. My right hon. Friend, in a quite momentary irritation with me—and none of my right hon. Friend's irritation goes beyond the moment—seemed to think that I was criticising his speech because I thought it was a foolish speech. Certainly I thought nothing of the kind. I never think my right hon. Friend's speeches are anything except exceedingly able, but 1 did think—and I am afraid I still think—it was a very dangerous speech, that it laid down propositions which I can hardly think my right hon. Friend sufficiently considered—propositions which go a great deal further than anything relating to this Amendment. I will return to what my right hon. Friend said in a moment, but let me, at the very outset, make a preliminary objection to the Amendment which is before us. The preliminary objection that I make to the Amendment—and it applies to all the objectors within its compass—is that it is a retrospective enactment, inflicting disability of which they had no notice when they incurred it. It is a very well-known maxim of legislation that the Legislature should in no circumstances inflict punishments or disabilities upon persons retrospectively 1215 without giving them notice before they commit the offence for which they are to be punished or disabled, so that they may, if they please, avoid the punishment or disability. I submit that this Amendment transgresses that. Had it been the intention of Parliament, at the time the Military Service Act was passed, to disable any person who desired to avail himself of the Conscientious Objector Clause, Parliament should, in all honest and straightforward dealing, have said so then. They should have said that if a man availed himself of this objection he was subject to a certain disability, and then those who took it would have Known where they were. But solemnly to offer by legislation a certain exemption, and then, after a small number of people have availed themselves of the exemption—have taken advantage of the position allowed them by the law—suddenly to turn round and say. "You did not know we regard with profound disapproval the very exemption we offered you. You did not know we intend to punish you for availing yourselves of the exemption we extended to you. You have done what we invited you to do." [HON. MEMBERS: " No!"] Yes, in the case contemplated by Parliament, when a person felt a conscientious objection he was to be exempted—" For availing yourselves of the machinery we set up, we take away from you the vote without warning—and, as I say, without justice—because now public opinion is in a state of irritation, and it would be unwise to resist that public opinion any longer." Let me ask, Who are the objectors? That preliminary criticism applies to all of them, but the mass of my arguments, which I design to submit to the House, applies mainly to some.
I had not the good fortune to hear the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr Burghs (Sir G. Younger), but I read it in the Report, and, among other interesting features, it contained a very interesting analysis of conscientious objectors, describing the various groups into which they fell. That must convince the House, as everyone who has looked into this knows, that there are very different people classed together as conscientious objectors. The distinction I should perhaps make of them—of course, it is a rough distinction—is that in the case of certain conscientious objectors—I do not know whether they are the majority or 1216 not, but that does not matter—there is a seditious element woven in with their conscientious objection, and, as the tribunals have found, it is not that they are not sincere, but it is that there is another element besides conscientious objection, namely, a seditious objection, with which I have not the very smallest sympathy: and if in any way it were possible to say in respect to those who offered to military service, not a conscientious objection, but a seditious resistance, I should be the last to deny that the State had a perfect right to punish them for that sedition. But there is confessedly another category of persons who have a moral or religious objection to military service, and who confine themselves essentially to saying, "I am bound to respect, in regard to my own life, my own conscience. My own conscience tells me that to do as you would have me do would be wrong. Therefore, without any desire of sedition or rebellion, but merely because of the inherent right of every man to obey his own conscience and the higher moral law, which, according to Christianity, we are told comes before the law of the State, I must disobey, not seditiously but because I am answerable here and hereafter for how far I obey my own conscience."
Those are two very different cases, and let me say—because my right hon. Friend referred to sincere rebels with some sympathy—the case of the true conscientious objector is quite different from even the best rebel. At any rate, there are two great distinctions. A rebel is not satisfied with managing his own action; he wishes to control directly or indirectly the Government of the State. The Irish rebellion sought to overthrow the British Government in Ireland. Some rebellions we think right, and some we think wrong. The rebellion of 1688 we think right; the rebellions of 1715 and 1745 we think wrong. In my view, and in my right hon. Friend's view, the rebellion that was menaced in Ulster would have been righteous, but we are all of opinion that the Sinn Fein rebellion was wrong. [Laughter.] My hon. Friends think I am speaking facetiously, but they are profoundly mistaken. I am speaking what I believe to be the platitudes of the subject, because I am anxious to clear part of the ground. In all these cases the rebels, whether they were right, or whether they were wrong, were seeking to influence a great many people besides themselves. They were seeking to control 1217 in one way or another the government of the country. I do not think anyone who does that can complain of other people, differently minded, who oppose them, or punish them for their action. Both are acting conscientiously; both pursue the object which they believe is in the interest of the country, and if, in the extreme case, they avail themselves of force they have no right to complain of force being used against them. But that is wholly different from the conscientious objector, who claims to do nothing except to manage his own action, which he is bound to do.
There is a second distinction. The conscientious objector does what the rebel does not. He appeals to a higher law altogether than the law of the State. The Jacobites of 1745 and the supporters of King George II. were essentially aiming at objects on the same plane, as one may say, and justified their objects by arguments of the same sort, with a different termination. Neither appealed to a different standard of morals or a different standard of expediency from the other, but it is the very essence of the conscientious objector's position that he says the State has, up to a certain point, undoubtedly authority over him, but that in this respect he is bound to obey a higher law than the law of the State—a religious law or a moral law which prohibits him from obeying the law of the State. " I only ask," he says, " leave to obey it in my own person, and because I feel the burden of it upon me. I am bound, as I conceive, to obey this higher law. I am bound therefore to disobey the lower law of the State, not because I am seditious or rebellious, or because I want to impose my opinions upon anyone else in the world, but because every individual is responsible here and hereafter for what he does by his own act and by his own will, whether the State commands him or whether it does not."
§ Mr. STANTONWhy does he not get out of the State? Let him go where he likes.
§ Lord H. CECILBut this is why I listened to my right hon. Friend with surprise, if I may say so with respect. My right hon. Friend seems to put aside the appeal to the higher law altogether. It is not that he says, as many hon. Members supporting the Amendment, perhaps, would say, "Yes, we recognise the higher law, but you misinterpret it." That is a point I am 1218 coming to in a minute. My right hon. Friend says the safety of the State is supreme; there is nothing beyond it. That is not a novel opinion. I might even say it is a notorious opinion. It is precisely the argument that the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, used in the famous speech in which he spoke of the Treaty safeguarding Belgium as a scrap of paper. My memory may be inaccurate, and I may be mistaken, but I almost, think he quoted the very same saying, that the safety of the State is the supreme law. If there be no other law, if the safety of the State is for the government of the State, and the citizens of the State, the last word of moral obligation, then how can we blame the German Government for many things for which we do blame them?
Take, for example, one crime which sank, and deservedly sank, into our hearts, and which roused us to passionate indignation—I mean the execution of Miss Cave[...]7 It is not disputed that Miss Cavell was, according to the strict law of the War, guilty of a war crime. Why did we say it was inhuman and iniquitous to put her to death? Because, according to a higher law, she had a strong claim to the respect and gratitude of the German Government and people who put her to death. Precisely because there was a higher law she ought not to have suffered as she did, and precisely because we believe in that higher law we uttered the cry of indignation at her death. Are we to be told now, in the language of her murderers, that the safety of the State is the supreme law? No, Sir. We cannot make any such answer. We are Christians first and Englishmen afterwards. Christianity can never compromise with any national claim. It must have its disciples all in all, soul and body, leaving no sphere out, and to reserve to the State any supremacy is to part company with the Christian system altogether.
§ The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER. (Mr. Bonar Law)I should like to know exactly what the right hon. Gentleman means by his argument. I confess I have rather been accused of making a foolish speech. Does he mean that because we say the German State does things that nobody else and no State ought to do on the grounds of necessity. that is the same thing as when the other States. notably France, America, and everybody else say, " We have a right to demand that every citizen shall give his life in the service of the State if we ask him?"
§ Lord H. CECILI made no such general statement. What I said was that you cannot meet the claim of the conscientious objector by simply saying that the safety of the State is the supreme law. You must accept his appeal to a higher law and argue on the basis of that higher law.
§ Mr. BONAR LAWDoes my Noble Friend's argument mean that a man who has been before a tribunal can demand that his conscience shall be above the decision of the tribunal?
§ Lord H. CECILI will come to that point in its proper place, but it does not here arise. The point I was pressing is this, and I am glad to hear that my right hon. Friend does not really hold the view which his language seemed to convey. I am only for the moment saying that you cannot set aside a conscientious objection merely by saying that the safety of the State is supreme, and that we will not listen to him, if he claims to serve and obey a higher law than the law of the State. You must say, "We agree with you that there is a higher law than the law of the State, but, judging you according to that higher law, you are in this way or that way in fault." Therefore, I think it is clear that we must follow the conscientious objector on to the ground of an appeal to conscience, that is to say, an appeal to the moral law which is admitted to be superior to the law of the State.
Let me say, in passing, how very surprising the Amendment seems to me, even on what I consider to be the very unsound basis of the supremacy of the State. Let me point out that if we take the supremacy of the State as the supreme rule, and if we take military service as being such a special obligation that it ought to be made in quite a distinct way a qualification for a vote, we are at once in a perfect wood of trouble, out of which I think my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr Burghs (Sir G. Younger) will hardly be able to guide us. There is the difficulty of Ireland. The Military Service Acts have not been extended to Ireland, and yet we are to give votes to all the young men of military age in Ireland. although they have not got this qualification of military service. If the need of the State be so supreme, if the law of its safety be so cogent, will not some people at any rate ask " How comes it then that you are exempting twenty or thirty times as many people in Ireland, 1220 because they are Irishmen, while you are not exempting merely a few in England because they are religious"?
§ Mr. KEATINGThe argument is false.
§ Sir G. YOUNGERVery few are religious.
§ Lord H. CECILEven those few my hon. Friend does not propose to exempt. There are other persons who escape not because you have not imposed the Military Service Acts, but they are persons who are highly disobedient to the State and quite as disobedient as the conscientious objector There is the whole body of Sinn Feiners. There are the more amiable Sinn Feiners, animated by a great desire to establish Irish nationality, and tile less amiable ones who are perhaps moved by German money, but they are all to have votes. There are also the persons who have been actually convicted in the course of the rebellion; those too, I apprehend, are to have votes. There are a great many other persons. I find it difficult to read without a cynical smile my hon. Friend's Amendment, because there is such an air of absurdity in the language of it. The second part of the Amendment reads:
Or, who having joined the Forces, has been sentenced by court-martial for refusal to obey orders, and who alleged conscientious objection to military service as a reason for such refusal.That reminds me at once that there are a great many other people who have been court-martialled besides conscientious objectors. The disqualification is there carefully limited, and it must only be for refusal to obey orders, and only if that refusal has assigned to it a conscientious cause. There are also those who have been insubordinate, and deserters, and all those who have been sentenced for various military crimes and for crimes not merely military but civil, those guilty of criminal vice of the worst and most atrocious kind—all those may have votes. All those who have been sentenced by civil tribunals, such as pickpockets, robbers, all those concerned in fraud, acts of violence, and those animated by the most odious lusts, the names of whose offences must not pass honest lips—all those may have votes. And why not? There is, at any rate, nothing conscientious about them. They are free from the damning taint of a strong but unenlightened conscience. Even if I accepted the basis of my right hon. Friend's argument, I should still feel this Amendment was a scandalous absurdity. If you are really going to disfranchise 1221 persons who, because they are disobedient to the State, are to incur this penalty, you must certainly disfranchise all those who have been disobedient by way of crime as well as those who have been disobedient by way of a conscientious objection. To draw a distinction by which you admit all the worst people in the world, the thieves, the miscreants, and only exclude the conscientious objectors, will not commend itself to the religious bodies of this country.I think my right hon. Friend and hon. Friends profoundly misjudge public opinion. They listen to a vocal, excitable, almost hysterical outburst, but they do not hear the much deeper sentiment of the great body of the moral and religious people of this country, who, whether they worship in church or chapel, will hear with indignation that conscientious objectors are to be disfranchised, while every criminal is to have a vote. Even if you accept my right hon. Friend's basis of argument I Should argue thus, but I do not accept it. I say that we must proceed to ask what the higher law to which the conscientious objector appeals does require. Let me remind the House of some of the cases which will be included in this disfranchisement. They will include the Quakers who are working with the ambulance units abroad. How is it possible to justify setting them below all those bad people of whom I have been speaking. They have gone out and they are serving. They are even running great risks. I do not agree with the scruple which has led them to refuse military service, but who can say that they are not well and honourably employed? I want the House to fix its mind on those and other objectors of the Quaker sort. I do not mean only those who belong to the Society of Friends, but those who belong to other religious bodies, simple-minded people, perhaps, under the influence of a mistaken scruple who say, " We are sorry that we cannot fight in the War, because the guilt of shedding blood will lie at our door." The first observation I will make about that is, that according to the common religion we believe, holding the view that they do, they are bound to act as they do. To those who in all sincerity think it is wicked to fight in war—for them it is wicked to fight in war—it ceases to be a mere delusion, and it becomes truly operative upon the conscience. As I pointed out during the Committee stage, this is a prin- 1222 ciple which we are bound to recognise, and we do recognise it in our government of other races. We do not impose on them what they foolishly and superstitiously believe to be wrong. We never require Mahomedans, or Hindus, or any other race which has a different moral standard to our own, to violate their own conscience. We do this not only on the ground of policy, but because we think it right to do it. Although some particular scruple may be superstitious, we think that to violate it is in truth wrong. On the first point, then, of going before a higher tribunal, we find that objectors are right, and that they are bound to obey their conscience. What, then, can we say in this case? We can only say their conscience is mistaken. I say it, and I can assure my right hon. Friend not at all less vehemently than he—and I have written it to a great number—I am sure they are thoroughly and utterly mistaken, but are you going to disqualify people and punish them for being mistaken in their opinions? If you do you are surely back again to the old familiar ground of religious persecution. Certainly if I held that view, that you might disqualify for opinion, I should not begin with the conscientious objector. I should begin myself with Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Methodists, and many other classes, and I am not sure that my right hon. Friend himself would escape before my disfranchisement was complete. It is to me quite as clear that the Presbyterians are mistaken on the points in which they differ with the Episcopalians as that conscientious objectors are wrong about military service. Both propositions seem to me to be perfectly plain.
That is always so in these matters. Very good people have over and over again felt bound to impose their views because they were so certain that they were right—and I do not think that they were always wrong—but the point is that we have come surely to the conclusion that it is both impolitic from the point of view of the State and also inconsistent with the best interests of religious truth to punish people for erroneous opinions.
§ Lord H. CECILPerhaps if my hon. Friend will make an effort he will be able to follow a consecutive argument. I say, therefore, when we come to argue it on that ground, that we must either 1223 adopt the position of religious persecution or we must say, as I say, " Yes, you are mistaken, but I am not justified in forcing your conscience, because it is against my own conscience to do so, and therefore I give you exemption." I thought that was the position that Parliament took up, and I am persuaded that it is the right position for Parliament to take up. We must not refuse the vote to people who are doing what they sincerely believe to be right upon moral or religious grounds merely because we think that these moral or religious grounds are mistaken. If you do not adopt that position you must disfranchise a great many people besides conscientious objectors. But, above all, I feel most strongly—and this, I confess, is why I care about the controversy apart from the strength, as it seems to me, of the case—the danger of the particular error into which my right hon. Friend for a moment slipped last night. I am most anxious that this country should maintain the proposition that there is a higher law, that we view with admiration any appeal to that higher law, and that we will not listen to the doctrine that the State's interest is to be supreme, but on the contrary that we will make our authority conform to the higher standard and keep the State within its proper function, and within its proper scope.
Belief in the State cannot help us to bear the sufferings or control the passions of the War. It is a barren faith, as well as a degrading faith. It does but encumber us and shut out from us that higher world in which we ought to live. It is like a mist that hangs round the surface of the earth, and beyond which the sunlight and sky of the higher life shine serene. I was taken up in an aeroplane on a misty day, and all was hazy and dark below. We passed through, and there was the sun shining in strength and the sky radiant and brilliant; the mists were no more than a white carpet beneath our feet. So we ought to rise, if we are to face the dangers and difficulties of this War, above the belief in the doctrine of the State. We ought, on the contrary, to maintain that the State must conform to this higher law, and so we say as against the Germans. But shall we even retain to ourselves that self-respect which is essential in maintaining a great moral cause if we do not act up 1224 to our own principles for which we are fighting in the face of Europe if we do not say to ourselves and in our own country when people are acting conscientiously that their conscience must not be forced, and when they obey their conscience that they must not be punished and disabled for so obeying, because that is the allegiance we owe to the higher law we obey, and because so we must act as citizens of the true city, of the new Jerusalem, above which is the mother of us all?
It is in the belief in that higher region of allegiance, which imposes upon us something more than the State can ask from us, and which gives us something that the State can never give, that we should vindicate the great cause that we have in hand. We are fighting, we sometimes say, for civilisation. I would rather say that we are fighting that civilisation may remain a Christian civilisation, and certainly, according to a Christian civilisation, it is wrong to force the conscience of the sincere. It is wrong to impose upon them a duty which they believe to be contaminating and corrupting. I hope, therefore, that this Amendment will be rejected. I hope it, first of all, because it is a retrospective law, and so contrary to all sound principles of legislation. I hope it still more because it appears to enforce the law of the State as superior to the moral law, and I am certain that if we give countenance to that way of thinking, we run the danger of becoming, as I fear that the Germans have some of them become, idolators of the State, so that it is, indeed, the abomination that maketh desolate, a blood-stained idol, the Moloch of our time.
§ Mr. R. McNEILLI should like to pay my humble tribute to my Noble Friend, but I think I am right in saying that probably there is no other man in the House who either would or could have made the speech to which we have just listened. If such a speech had been made by anyone else, I doubt whether it would have had the same profound effect upon the House. Beautiful as was the language, and elevating as was the thought which inspired the speech, I do not think the argument which he addressed to us, although profoundly true as a matter of philosophic exposition, had any real, practical bearing upon the humdrum, commonplace proposal which is embodied in this Amendment. When the Bill was in Committee it fell to my lot to propose 1225 an Amendment pratically identical with that now under discussion. On that occasion I endeavoured to explain to the Committee the grounds upon which, in my judgment, consistently with the highest ethical position, the Amendment was to be justified. I have no intention to-day of renewing the argument which I then addressed to the House, but I should like to repeat with emphasis that I did not then and I do not now base the case of this Amendment upon any insinuation whatever against either the courage or the sincerity of the conscientious objector. On that occasion my Noble Friend made a speech in reply to my own on the same high level of thought and feeling, a speech which very highly impressed the House.
Even if I had the smallest ability to meet my Noble Friend on that sort of ground, I should be very sorry to attempt it. I do not think the level to which he raised the discussion is one on which any of us would like to follow him. But when my Noble Friend said on the last occasion, and repeated by implication though not in the same terms to-day, that the law of the State must give way to what he then described as the higher and Divine law, I do not think any part of the House would like to accept the antithesis implied in his language, and if we are not prepared to argue the point in that way, it is only because we all feel that really in the last resort the supreme benefit of the State cannot be separated from a due regard for the Divine law. The difficulty, just as much from my Noble Friend's point as from ours, is that the ascertainment of the Divine law is as difficult as to ascertain the supreme benefit of the State. I confess that on that part of the subject my Noble Friend adopts an extreme Protestantism in which I cannot follow him. He elevates the right of private judgment in the decision as to what is or is not the Divine law in a way which surprises me as coming particularly from him.
The position that we ought all to assume is that there is no such antithesis at all. When we speak of the supreme interest of the State it ought to be implied, and of course it always is implied—I am certain it was implied by my right hon. Friend who spoke last night—that in obeying and following and seeking to promote the best interests of the State you are not thereby departing from the Divine law so far as it is known to the humble seekers of it in this wicked world. That is the 1226 position which we ought all to assume, and it is because my Noble Friend raises the antithesis in a way which is unique to himself that I say his arguments are really not germane to the Amendment which we are discussing. There is really no question here of religious persecution. My Noble Friend on the last occasion said that the argument which I had addressed to the House had been used by those who persecuted the followers of Wyclif, and he gave other examples. He implied that we were discussing some penal action against these particular people. We are not doing anything of the sort. There is no question of persecution or punishment. We are not talking about a penal Statute; we are considering whether men are or not qualified under the Statute which we contemplate passing of exercising the franchise.
There have been numbers of Amendments proposing disqualifications on the Paper, and I dare say when the Bill becomes law it will include numbers of disqualifications. Only now, for the first time, we are sweeping away the disqualification of women. A great many of us, too, think that naturalised persons ought to be disqualified. Will my Noble Friend get up and say that if we were proposing to disqualify a man who had been naturalised for a number of years we would be pursuing the same course as the persecutors of the early Christians? When you reduce the thing from the high level on which it was placed by my Noble Friend, when you bring it down to the realm of actual fact—and that, after all, is what we have to face—the atmosphere into which the Noble Lord attempted to lead the House disappears amongst the clouds to which he so eloquently referred.
Let us approach this question from a practical standpoint and get rid of anything in the nature of such questions as that of religious persecution. There were two arguments put forward by the Noble Lord which I think require some answer. He objected to this Amendment because it was imposing a retrospective disability. My Noble Friend said that if, rightly or wrongly, the disability was to be imposed on conscientious objectors they ought to have received notice of it at the time their exemption from military service was secured. My Noble Friend is a very experienced Parliamentarian. Can he tell us how possibly that notice could have been given? Does he imagine that if anyone had attempted to put a proviso of 1227 that nature into the Military Service Act, a proviso that if men were exempted they would be in danger of being disqualified from the franchise in any future Franchise Bill that might be brought in—does the Noble Lord suggest that any such proviso would have been in order? How could notice have been given? Who was to give the notice?
§ Mr. T. E. HARVEYThe Government might have announced their intention in the matter.
§ Mr. McNEILLWho was in the position to give a notice of that kind?
§ Lord H. CECILThe Government.
§ Mr. McNEILLHow could the Government possibly have done it? This Bill now before us was not contemplated at the time the Military Service Act was passed. No one knew that it was to be brought in. Was the Government to pledge their successors for all time that whenever and if ever a new Franchise Bill was introduced, whatever its terms might be, the Government of the day was to take steps to disfranchise these people?
§ Lord H. CECILThe Government prepared the Bill, and of course they could have put in a proviso to the effect that any persons claiming exemption under the provisions of the Bill should be disqualified from the Parliamentary franchise. That would, of course, have applied to those already enfranchised, as well as to new voters.
§ Mr. McNEILLAnd if the Government had done that, what would have been the result? I should have thought that any provision of that nature would have been ruled out of order. But I do not ground my case on that point. I entirely disagree that there was any obligation to give notice. It would mean that if there were such an obligation, at no time in any Franchise Bill would it be possible to introduce disqualifications of any class or any individuals unless that class and those individuals had at some previous stage received notice of the intention to introduce the disqualification. The very proposition seems to be an absurdity, and I cannot imagine therefore how there could possibly be any obligation to give notice beforehand of what might happen in the future—an event which no one at the time contemplated. Another proposition put forward by my Noble Friend 1228 was that in which he asked: What are you going to do about the people in Ireland? You are not proposing to disfranchise all the men of military age in Ireland, neither are you proposing, he said, to deprive of their vote a number of other classes which he described in a forcible and entertaining way. He suggested that all these men would get votes, because, although they were tainted, they had not the damning taint of having a conscience. That was a very interesting argument, but has it any force? Of course it is quite true, and unfortunately it must be true that among the many millions of people who have been enfranchised by this Act, there are a great number not of the highest moral worth and a great many who may have been guilty of all sorts of affences against the law. But does the Noble Lord mean to say that the disqualification should include everybody unworthy of having a vote? Does he suggest that when you have a clear-cut class of men with whom you can deal you are not to disqualify them because you cannot carry your disqualification further so as to cover every individual who, for one reason or another, may be unworthy of the full rights of citizenship? My Noble Friend used one expression in the course of his speech, which did not surprise me, coming as it did from him, although it did surprise me when it was used last night by the hon. Member for Perth (Mr. Whyte). The hon. Member, when describing the language which he suggested would be used by the Leader of the House, and also by supporters of this Amendment, said that our attitude was that we thought it unwise to resist popular opinion. I should like to ask the opponents of this Amendment whether they agree with my Noble Friend that resistance to popular opinion should be one of the functions of the Government and of this House? I was always unenlightened enough to think that we were here not to resist popular opinion but to represent it. My hon. Friend the Member for Perth last night was very angry with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House for promising to take off the Government Whips. He said " You are giving way to clamour," and that sentiment was very loudly cheered by hon. Members on the benches below the Gangway opposite. What is so strange is that many Members in this House, to judge from their speeches, imagine that we should model ourselves on the experi- 1229 ence of the Soviets, and that the Government should show a strong, persistent and haughty disregard of public opinion outside. Surely our duty in this House is to represent public opinion outside, yet both the hon. Member for Perth and the Noble Lord the Member for the Oxford University, strong opponents as they are of this Amendment, seemed to be agreed in this, that, at all events, whatever the merits of the Amendment may be, public opinion out of doors strongly supports it.
§ Lord H. CECILI did not say that.
§ Mr. McNEILLIf the Noble Lord did not say that, then I do not know what he meant by saying that the attitude of the Government and of the proposal of the Amendment was that it was unwise to resist public opinion any longer.
§ Lord H. CECILMy hon. Friend may think that public opinion is in that direction. I do not assent to it myself.
§ Mr. McNEILLI see now the attitude of my Noble Friend, but that does not seem to be the attitude of the hon. Member for Perth. He talked about clamour bringing pressure to bear on the Government; he used that taunt regarding our attitude towards this Amendment. There is popular opinion of some sort outside.
§ Mr. HEMMERDESome sort!
§ Mr. McNEILLIs the hon. and learned Gentleman prepared to divide public opinion into two departments—worthy and unworthy?
§ Mr. HEMMERDEI say it is for the 'Government to do that, and not merely to follow the popular opinion of the moment, but to study popular opinion.
§ Mr. McNEILLThe hon. and learned Gentleman says that it is the duty of the Government not to follow the popular opinion of the moment, but to prophesy what may be popular opinion next week.
§ Mr. HEMMERDENot at all.
§ Mr. McNEILLI am much more simple-minded. I am not frightened by this taunt about clamour. I have an idea that this proposal is widely supported throughout the constituencies of the country. I know it is very largely supported and desired by my own constituents, and I think it my duty to represent my constituents in this House. Some hon. Gentlemen take a different view of 1230 their duty to their constituencies, and they may adopt a different course. I do not know if the hon. Member for Perth has received, as many of us have received, a great many letters and communications, pressing us to support this Amendment. I hope, after his speeches last night, he will send a reply to any communications from Perth to the effect that he intends to resist the clamour of his constituents, and I trust, too, at the proper time those constituents will have an opportunity of expressing their views upon his action. If it is our duty at all times to represent public opinion, I think it is a special duty to-day, because the House has long outstayed its welcome in the country. Owing to the exigencies of the War—a reason which I think quite sufficient—the House has had to renew its existence time after time, and now it is very much out of touch, not only with the constituencies, but with the ordinary channels of public opinion. We ought, therefore, to be more than ever sensible to the changes that have taken place in the country and to the attitude of our constituents with regard to the policy of this House. We are now constructing an entirely new situation by this Bill. The constituencies which are existing at the present moment are practically unrepresented. The new constituencies are still less represented. We have any amount of indication as to the trend of public opinion with regard to this Amendment. The hon. Member speaks of the public opinion at the moment. That is good enough for us. The popular opinion of the moment is largely in favour of this Amendment. I believe it to be overwhelmingly so, and I believe there will be profound dissatisfaction throughout the country if the Amendment is defeated. I hope, therefore, it will receive large and general support.
§ 5.0 P.M.
§ Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETTI wish to give the reasons which lead me to accept this Amendment. In my mind the difficulty that arises in matters of conscience is that the man who possesses a conscientious belief often belongs to some association which focusses a variety of opinions, but you do not know that he may not be deceiving himself. and that a complexity of opinion may be influencing him when he thinks that he is only driven by one clear call of conscience. In the matter of conscience, undoubtedly the 1231 State cannot judge; neither can Courts of inquiry nor tribunals; and if a man honestly says he cannot in the sight of God do a particular thing, I quite agree that he should not be compelled to do it. But we all see an inconsistency even in the best of these men. There is no doubt that in resistance to evil, or in taking the law into one's own hands, and resisting force by force, there is no limit you can put to that argument, and, as has been said again and again, the civil law and conscience are just as much at stake as the War itself. The resistance to the enforcement of law by force stands on a level with objections to fighting. You ask a man to do something on behalf of a community called the State. He says his individual conscience clashes with that demand, and you say, "Very well; but are you to take all the advantages of the State? Are you to remain a member of a society in which you have protection, which contributes very much to you, and which in ordinary times makes comparatively small demands on you in return? Are you to deny the right of that State by a majority to call upon you to defend it? The least we can say is that we will not persecute you "—and I very much object to a great deal of the persecution that has taken place—" but you can no longer belong to our society. We are very sorry to part company with you, but every society has its rules—the State above all other societies—and there is something in regard to the State that has an element of responsibility and imposes a duty different to all other forms of association." We have had quotations from the highest laws. I very much enjoyed the appeal that has been made to us, but the State has a certain claim. The evolution of society is a Divine movement of humanity, and the State itself has its rights to decide and may be more right than the individual. " Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's " is not a commission but an injunction as direct as that to " Render to God the things that are God's," and I think that although there are distinctions—and I should like distinctions to be made, if that were possible, in the case of those who are exposing themselves to the risks of war and yet are not countering blow by blow—if one looks at the matter broadly as a main question, I am strongly in favour of depriving, and I urge this House to deprive, those who are not fulfilling their duties to the State of their vote.
§ Sir EDWARD PARROTTAny Member who intervenes in this Debate must pay a tribute to the extraordinarily high character of the speech delivered by the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil). I desire to add my very feeble voice to that very powerful plea. I venture to think that when the Noble Lord comes to read that speech ten years hence he will do so with, very great satisfaction. When the passions engendered by this War have passed away, and he is able to approach it again with that calmness and clearness of outlook which we all hope to recover in time, I am perfectly certain be will be quite content with what he has said to-day, and that his speech will remain for ever a tribute to those principles which actuate his public conduct. I wonder whether the same can be said of the speech delivered by the Leader of the House (Mr. Bonar Law) last night! We all recollect that only a few months ago he was in the Lobby leading the House in opposition to an Amendment of similar intent to this which is before us to-day, and I have no doubt whatever in my own mind that those who walk by sight and not by faith will follow him into the. Lobby in quite a contrary direction. I imagine that when the right hon. Gentleman's biographer comes to collate his. speeches, many years hence I hope, the speech of last night will be omitted altogether and the incident will be passed over. I am speaking to-day on this question simply because I hate to give a silent vote. The question does not depend in the least degree upon the fluctuating circumstances of the hour, but on immutable principle. I say frankly that I dislike the conscientious objector as much as any Member in the. House. I think he suffers from apoplexy of conscience, and that he is wrong-headed in his present view, but at the same time, because I dislike him and because my emotions are aroused, I am bound to consider his case as coolly and calmly as possible. I am strongly opposed to placing a stigma upon a man at a time when I am actuated by an emotional impulse, the most fatal impulse for legislation. One has only to recall Greek history to know how perilous it was, in those times, as it has been ever since, for men to legislate under the influence of feelings such as those which are engendered by present conditions.
Surely the crux of the whole problem is that you have a Military Service Act 1233 in which there is a definite enactment that a man may obtain a certificate of exemption from combatant service on the ground of conscientious objection. There he is acting under an Act of Parliament, and you now propose to place a disability upon him because he has actually accepted that Act and acted accordingly. It is very much as if you said that any citizen may walk down Whitehall, and you then proceeded to add that if he does so the first policeman he meets will be entitled to take his watch. The subsequent provision nullifies the preceding enactment. One can easily understand the repealing of that Section and the setting up of a new condition of things, but simply to inflict punishment on a man because he takes advantage of an Act of Parliament is surely something that cannot be defended. One might almost call it the legislation of lunacy. I suppose there is no one in this House who denies that there are conscientious conscientious objectors. Reference has been made to the Friends, and to the magnificent work they have done. Yet this Amendment proposes to lump together sincere and insincere, genuine and sham, good and bad; to treat them all alike in the spirit of Donnybrook Fair—when you see a head, hit it. I wonder, as a newcomer, if this is the manner in which the Mother of Parliaments legislates. Surely we want at this time cool, and calm, and ordered reason. We know ourselves to be agitated very considerably on this question, and certainly every man ought to bring his mind to pause and consider most carefully what he proposes to do. In the First Schedule of the Military Service Act you have a series of exceptions laid down, and amongst them are those in Holy Orders and regular ministers of any denomination. The remarkable thing is that because those men are scheduled they are not to have this disability put upon them. There does seem to be a grievous anomaly there. How many men are there lurking in uniform in Government offices at the present time who have not the remotest intention of fighting at all and who are probably there for the purpose, in a large degree, of evading service? They are not to be touched by this Amendment. They are doing national service, and so are very many conscientious objectors.
You have a further and quainter anomaly, namely, that you are going to take away the vote from the conscientious 1234 objector, and at the same time are, going to leave him free to come into this House, where he would presumably be of very much more value than as a simple voter. It is not necessary to be a voter in order to come to this House. Then again, one looks back and wonders what would have happened in past times had there been Conscription, and along with it the attempt to cast this stigma on a man who had taken advantage of the benefit the Act conferred on him. Let us go back to the Boer War. If this Amendment had been carried during the Boer War the Prime Minister himself, who was then of military age, would have lost his vote altogether. Let hon. Members carry their minds back to the Crimean War. The House would have stigmatised Cobden and Bright, and many another great man whose position is now fixed in history. Every one would wish to beware of creating martyrs, but there is no doubt that these men in the future will go about in a gabardine, as it were, and will by virtue of the disability which you are imposing on them to-day be able hereafter to claim that they were martyrs for conscience sake. You have only to look at history to see what the martyrs for conscience sake have done. The very privileges of this House have been built up by men who were martyrs for conscience sake. Conscience may not appeal to you, or it may not appeal to me, but at the very same time, as has been pointed out clearly and powerfully to-day, it is the one guiding principle which everybody would wish to foster and strengthen, and not to weaken. Reference has been made to the new conditions after the War. Surely in those times you will want conscience. Surely you will wish to say to a man, "Stand up for what you believe to be right, even though you suffer for it". It seems to me by placing this disability on these men who have acted in a manner that does not please you, and does not please me, you are distinctly discouraging men for the future to act upon the highest and noblest of moral and spiritual impulses.
§ Captain BARNETTThe Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil) in one of those brilliant dissertations which always interest, and sometimes influence the House, has given us a réchanffé of the speech he made in Committee on this subject. He has to-day spared us the early Christian martyrs, the persecution of Wycliffe, and other evil 1235 deeds, but everything else we have had, including his devotion to the Divine Will as superior to the safety of the State. I wish to bring this question of the conscientious objector's vote down from the cloudy mountain tops of ethical and religious speculation to the solid tableland of dull. cold, prosaic fact.
Is it or is it not desirable in the interests of the State that these men should have votes? The Noble Lord asked that question, and also asked who were the people who were going to lose their votes if this Amendment were carried. Let me take the first class—namely, those people found to be sincere by the tribunals. Perhaps the most complete of all examples is the Society of Friends, which was exempted under the old Militia Ballot Act. The Society of Friends is an institution which has led a peaceful existence under the protection of our Army and Navy; it has acquired great wealth, and it has carried on many works of benevolence. If all the funds of the order have not been given to works of benevolence, and if, perhaps, some of them have gone to political associations, at any rate no one can deny the great benevolence shown by members of that society. What is the proper line for Parliament to take at this great juncture of our national history? Surely it is to say to these people, so far as they are of military age, "For your religious views, we respect you; for your benevolence, we thank you; but for your failure to discharge the first duty of a citizen, we disfranchise you." That is the only logical way in which this matter can be approached. We have had to-day, especially from the hon. Member for South Edinburgh (Sir E. Parrott), the doctrine of the original contract, which is supposed to have been made when we allowed these people to claim exemption on conscientious grounds. I suggest that there is no such contract. It is perfectly true that when this Bill was in Committee the Home Secretary, who was in charge of the Bill, did say something which seemed to justify the idea that there was an undertaking that the vote should be given, but it was an obiter dictum. In the Debate the hon. Member for the St. Augustine's Division (Mr. R. McNeill) raised the same point. He said:
Does my right hon. Friend seriously suggest that a Clause of that sort disfranchising the conscientious objectors could in any circumstances have been combined with the Military Service Act?1236" The reply of the right hon. Gentleman was:Indeed I do."—[OFFICIAL REPORT,26TH June,1917,col.333,Vol.XCV.]I hope that was only an obiter dictum. If it was not, I, for one, strongly and vehemently protest against it. There was no such contract. Where is the consideration for it? It is not as though the conscientious objector had been doing anything that the State wanted him to do—very far from it. The conscientious objector was doing something which he claimed the right to do. The State was good enough to let him do it, but how can it be said that there was any obligation, either expressed or implied, to give that man a vote? Never since the original contract of Jean Jacques Rousseau has there been such a travesty of a contract. We have been told that we are exploiting opinion outside, and that we are yielding to popular clamour, when we vote for this Amendment. That has been very well answered by the hon. Member for St. Augustine's Division, who has told the House, and every Member knows it, that in his own Constituency there is overwhelming public opinion behind this Amendment. [Hox. MEMBERS: "No!"]
§ Commander WEDGWOODI have not had any communications.
§ Captain BARNETTI have been inundated with letters and telegrams from people asking me to vote against the enfranchisement of conscientious objectors. If my hon. Friend has not had similar letters or telegrams, he is unfortunate in his constituency.
§ Mr. OUTHWAITEThey do not read the "Daily Mail."
§ Captain BARNETTThe instinct of the people here is a perfectly right one. We in this House are, perhaps, inclined to think that we can judge better than the people outside in a matter of this kind. In taking off the Government Whips and allowing us to have a straight vote on this question, which we did not have last time, and in throwing open the doors of the Lobbies so that the vivifying and bracing breeze of public opinion can come through them, the Government is taking the right course. I believe that this Amendment will be carried by a substantial majority. Last night the Leader of the House said there was only one point he desired to criticise, that was the question of a time limit. I have on the Order Paper an Amendment 1237 suggesting that twenty years should be the period of disfranchisement. I have put another Amendment on the Paper which I propose, with the approval of the House, to move now as an Amendment to the proposed Amendment, namely, after the word "disqualified" to insert the words "for a period of twenty years."
§ Mr. DENMANOn a point of Order. I have a prior Amendment to that. I understood that the hon. and gallant Member (Captain Barnett) was speaking on the general question, and if I had known that he was going to move his Amendment I should have moved mine first.
§ Mr. SHERWELLOn the point of Order. In view of the large number of Members who desire to take part in the Debate on the general Question, would it not be more in conformity with the sense of the House that we should continue the general Debate now and take the Amendments afterwards?
§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Whitley)I did not appreciate that. the hon. and gallant Member was rising to move his Amendment. I think it will suit the convenience of the House if he did not move it now and would get some other hon. Member to move it for him formally later on.
§ Captain BARNETTI will bow to your ruling, Sir. My only desire was to save the time of the House. Through my ignorance of the Rules I thought that in supporting the Amendment of the hon. Member for Ayr Burghs I should be able to move my own Amendment. We have had all example quoted to us of the disfranchisement of the conscientious objector. Canada, a great, free nation, of her own accord has disfranchised conscientious objectors, and I do not think that this House, the Mother of Parliaments, ought to be afraid to follow the example of one of the daughter Parliaments. It is perfectly clear that it is the impression of all sane and healthy minds that a man who is not prepared, from whatever cause, to do his duty in time of stress and danger like the present, should not be allowed to vote. If there is apostolic authority for the view that if a man will not work neither shall he eat, in times like the present we may fairly enact that if a man will not fight neither shall he vote.
§ Mr. OUTHWAITEWhat about you?
§ Captain BARNETTI am quite prepared to meet that question. I have done 1238 two years' service in the British Army on the General Staff. I have trained 45,000 men in musketry in this country, and I am prepared to fight if my age would allow it, so that the gibe of the hon. Member leaves my withers unwrung. It is irrelevant, and a personal digression. The Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University, in his appeal to the higher law, referred to the case of Nurse Cavell, and seemed to think there was some lower law which would have allowed the Germans to execute her and that it was only the higher law that made it a crime. That is an extraordinary proposition. I know of nothing of which Nurse Cavell was accused which, by the law of any civilised country, would have allowed her to be put to death. I desire to make a protest against the suggestion that it was only under the higher law known to the Noble Lord that her execution was murder. I hope that when we go into the Division Lobby unhampered by any direction from the Whips we shall show by an overwhelming vote the determination of the Parliament of Great Britain to follow the good example set by Canada and disfranchise the conscientious objector, at any rate, for a term of years.
§ Mr. ROWNTREEIt will be evident to hon. Members that the proposal contained in this Amendment raises very deep issues, and that whatever be the result of the vote to-night the suggestions that have been made here to-day will have their influence afterwards. If this Amendment is carried in the form in which it is placed before us. I want the House to realise that it will enact one law for those below forty-one and another for those who are above forty-one. I want the House to realise that the conscientious objector who has been exempted because he is in a certified trade will get his vote, while a man who has pleaded his cause before a tribunal is refused. It is exactly the same with regard to business exemptions and just the same with regard to the man who is in the regular ministry. Those are all exempted. The conscientious objector in the ranks of the regular ministry will have his vote. Lastly, the man who has been medically rejected and who is a conscientious objector will receive his vote, while a man who has gone before a tribunal will not. It has been pointed out that those men who have been exempted have broken no law, but have merely accepted what Parliament gave them the right to accept. In this connection I 1239 would ask the House to consider the men to whom they are going to refuse to give a vote. Reference was made again and again during the passage of the Military Service Act to the work of the Friends Ambulance unit There are at the present time in France 600 men in that unit, under the Red Cross, doing what we have been told is work of the utmost value. We have, purposely said very little about them, and I dislike mentioning this fact, but I am bound to do so after some of the things which have been said to-day. The Society of Friends has raised £250,000 and has its representatives in France, in Holland, in Russia and in Armenia. These men, many of them before the Military Service Acts were ever introduced, have now for over three years been giving their services, receiving no pay, in work which, from the testimony of the Red Cross and the English War Office and the French War Office, has been of enormous value. Every one of them you are going to disfranchise if this Amendment is carried. The French have given some of these men the Croix de Guerre.
§ Mr. STEWARTif the ambulance parties went to the Front before the Conscription Act was passed I do not think this Amendment will disfranchise them. At any rate the proposers do not wish to do so.
§ Mr. ROWNTREEI am obliged to the hon. Member, but I think it will apply to these men because after the Military Service Acts came in the men who were out in these different countries had to receive exemption at the hands of the tribunals. It is quite true that in the case of most it was done by correspondence and was freely granted by the tribunals concerned. I frankly admit that a large number of Members have told me they have no intention of disfranchising these men, but if the Amendment is carried they are disfranchised and I think that would be an act unworthy of this House. Some men of the same opinion have been operating in the Italian theatre, those who were the first in Gorizia and were the last to leave it, who were in that disastrous retreat and did what they could to steady the retreating army—under the terms of this Amendment you are going to take away the vote from these men, who have given all the service which was possible and which they felt they could render in conformity with their conscientious belief. 1240 But there are other types of men that you are going to disfranchise, and I doubt whether the House really wants to. Are you going to disfranchise, do you wish to disfranchise men who have left prosperous businesses and accepted practically the pay of the soldier and a mere maintenance allowance for work of national importance in regard to agriculture? I know scores of them. Many of them have sacrificed large pecuniary gains in order to do what they felt was valuable service to the State. Just the same with the men who have come up before the Pelham Committee. Those men have asked to do service. They have been told to leave their business, to get on to the land or to get into some flour mill. They have done it. They have received a maintenance allowance, and if they were able to earn a higher sum than that they have again and again given the balance to some Red Cross Society or charitable society of that kind. Do you want to disfranchise those men? Do you want to treat them worse than you treat the criminal? The man who has been fined or sent to prison for profiteering you let out and allow to have the vote at the end of the War.
§ Mr. HEMMERDETwo votes.
§ Mr. ROWNTREEAnd often two votes. And these men who have sacrificed their pecuniary positions and opportunities and have done the national service that you ask them to do by the administration of the Military Service Act are going to be disfranchised. I do not believe it. I believe the sense of justice and of honour is too high in this House to allow of that being done. If it is done, I believe it will be altered very quickly by the balanced judgment of the people. An hon. and gallant Gentleman representing a division of London said he thought the right thing was to disfranchise all Quakers. It may be so. That may be the right thing. Those of us who belong to that body are very conscious indeed of the failures of that society. And yet, I think that body has added something that is substantial and real to the national life in this country. I am afraid there have been large differences of views amongst members of the society. There have been statesmen, and there have been idealists. If this country had accepted in 1693 the advice of William Penn, who was, I think it is admitted, practically the originator of the league of nations, you would have been saved many 1241 wars, and I think you would have been saved this War. It may be the right thing to disfranchise all members of the Society of Friends under forty-one. That is really what you are doing. [Interruption.] The right hon. Gentleman says many members of the Society of Friends are fighting, and I entirely accept that. Why are they fighting? Because they believe that this is a War for freedom, because it is a War for small nations, because it is a War for personality and individuality, and there is not one member amongst those who are fighting to-day who would not deplore the fact of the House passing this Amendment, and would not feel that it was not going against the very thing that they are fighting for at present. For these men that I have spoken about there is an unanswerable claim that they should be allowed still to have their vote.
I pass to the class that most Members of the House feel far more strongly about in some ways. I find it easier to speak about these men, because I disagree with the attitude that they have taken, and I have done my best to argue with them and to suggest another course. I know perfectly well that it is the absolutist that so many Members of this House really feel should be dealt with in this way. It is a profound mistake to think that many of these men have not in the past rendered ungrudging service to the State. I believe the real test of a good citizen is the voluntary service he renders to the community. The Leader of the House last night mentioned the case of Stephen Hob-house. Anyone who knows Stephen Hob-house knows that he holds this view profoundly, that he holds it so strongly that he has discarded the opportunities of wealth and asked his people not to encumber him with any property, and, after serving as a civil administrator, he went down and lived in voluntary poverty in the East End of London. He has done invaluable service in the past. You do not allow that man the absolute exemption that is provided. You put him in prison; you keep him, I regret to say, as a third-class prisoner. You do not allow him to have pen and ink. You do not give him the chance that John Milton. or John Bunyan had of writing while they were in prison. You keep him in for three years, and at the end of that time you say, "You are not going to have the vote." My right hon. Friend says to the House that Nonconformity approves that kind of thing.
1242 Let me take another case—Malcohn Sparkes. He left his business, gave himself to the important work of reconstruction, and worked out for the building trade a scheme practically on the lines of the one which is so honourably associated with your name, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Thu building trade asked, " May we keep this man to work for us, because we want him to carry this scheme further?" You did not allow him to go on doing valuable service of that kind. You thrust him into gaol as a third-class prisoner, and you kept him there doing hard labour. You have not allowed him pen or paper to write with. He cannot go on with the work which he was doing and which was of such value to the nation, and now you say, in addition to that, " No vote for you." I believe these things go on because they are not known. When they are known people are astonished and unhappy. Few men have done more to bring the United States of America into association with us at this time than Gilbert Murray. What is his view, after going through the cases of a number of these men He says:
However wrong-headed, conceited, and unpatriotic. and the rest of it, the objectors may originally have seemed to us, the long and fruitless and illegal persecution of these men leaves on the mind of the coldest observer an impression of some moral heroism on the side of the culprits and some moral and intellectual vileness on the side of their oppressor.No one has spoken more strongly in favour of this War or worked more arduously for it than Gilbert Murray, and that is, his verdict as he surveys what has been done in regard to these men. On the top of all that, the proposal is that you should take away their vote. As I understand it, their real testimony is that they have nothing to do with Conscription. Take the case of Clifford Allen, who says:I have chosen to suffer sentence after sentence of hard labour rather than secure my discharge from prison by effecting a bargain with Conscription.As the Noble Lord (Lord H. Cecil). says, that may be an absolutely wrong view, but it is a sincere view, and I am not sure whether in after days, when the history of this War comes to be written, you will not find that some of these men who refused to bow to Conscription are not some of the pioneers in trying to rid Europe of this awful system of Conscription. You may not believe it. At any rate, that is what these men think. This question raises the deepest principle of all. These men, mistaken though you feel they are, would have been wrong if they had taken any other action. We have tried to convince them and to get them to take some 1243 other action, but they would have been wrong according to the principles laid down by the Noble Lord if they had taken any other action. A well-known Member of this House said:It seems to be the Divine will 'that light upon great subjects' should first arise and be gradually spread through the faithfulness of individuals in acting up to their own convictions.Will this policy help in the prosecution of the War? Will it help in rebuilding after the War? Will it diminish the influence of these men? I believe that it will enormously enhance their influence. Some of you have said that they can hardly get a hearing now, but after this one-third of the people, if not more, will feel at once that an injustice has been done to them. You will have made martyrs of them, and you will have made it extremely difficult for some of the truest servants in the State. Look at the question of the Society of Friends. If there is one principle which is taught in our schools, if there is one thing which is said to the young in that body, it is this, "You have a duty and a responsibility to the State. You are to serve the State to the best of your ability, and just because you cannot take arms it is all the more incumbent upon you to serve fully and completely in other ways." What are we to say now to every one under the age of forty-one? What are we to say to the young boys in our schools? The same advice, the some counsel, the same injunction will be given, but we shall have to add, "Unfortunately, though all these things you do, the State is not prepared to give you a vote." I do not believe that the House desires that; I believe the House would be profundly uncomfortable if that came about. I do ask hon. Members, before they vote on this Amendment, to ponder most carefully as to whether that is really the result that they desire.One of the great difficulties we feel at the present time in debating this question is that we are so sensible of the awful losses that all of us have had in this War. It is an extraordinarily difficult thing to keep one's balance and one's judgment in such circumstances, but there is growing up in this House and in this country and amongst all the civilised countries of the world a profound desire that some way should be found of getting rid of war. Our leading statesmen have said during the last few days that this is a War to end war. My belief is that every one of us 1244 in this House desires that, but the very men whose fathers have for generations tried to suggest ways in which that can be brought about are by this Amendment told, "We have no further use for you in the service of the State" I do not believe that such action will weaken the influence of these men; I believe it will enormously strengthen their influence. I do not want the State to make a mistake. Their advocacy in future is going to be supplemented by the advocacy of some of those who have seen most of the horrors of this great War. One of the most noted correspondents in this War has been Philip Gibbs. Have you read how he closes his book on "The Soul of the War"? He says:
There will be no hope of final peace until the peoples. of the world recognise their brotherhood and refuse to be led to the shambles for mutual massacre. If there is no hope of that— if, as some students of life hold, war will always happen, because life itself is a continual warfare and one man lives only at the expense of another, then there is no hope, and all the ideals of men striving for the progress of mankind, all the dreams of the poets and the sacrifices of the scientists are utterly vain and foolish. and pious men should pray God to touch this planet with a star and end the folly of it all.If Christianity does not destroy war, war will destroy Christianity.
§ 6.0 P.M.
§ Mr. CHAMBERLAINI hope I shall not make a long demand on the patience of the House; but I am unwilling to give a silent vote upon this question. I find my position equally far removed from those. of the two hon. Gentlemen who have last spoken, who represented rather the extremes on either side. I hope the hon. Member for York will not think that any of us in this House will be insensible to the appeal made by a member of his society for consideration for the large measure of public service which the Society of Friends renders in this country. I am not a member of that society; but I belong to another, I think a smaller religious community, the members of which have often been linked with the members of the Society of Friends in public work, without distinction of creed, and I feel the difficulty which necessarily arises when a man who has given real public service to the State or the community in which he lives is confronted by a demand for a kind of service which he is unwilling to give when we are asked to decide how we shall treat such a man My hon. Friend has taken us rather far from the question which is before us, in the account which he gave of individual cases. The prison treatment of these men 1245 is a thing quite apart from that which we are now discussing. It may be quite wrong. At any rate, it raises, as we all admit, one of the most difficult questions of political sagacity with which a community can well be confronted. Here are people—I hope I may say this without offence—afflicted with a certain blindness, a certain incapacity as it seems to us to see what their duties and obligations are. How are we to treat them? Are we to punish them? Are we in some other way to try to convert them? I am not here to advocate the prison treatment. That is a distinct thing. I am not saying that there may not be very good grounds for the suggestion which my hon. Friend threw out that a man who has proved himself a bad citizen by having been convicted of a criminal offence should himself be disfranchised for a period. I think that there is a great deal to be said for it.
§ Mr. ROWNTREEI did not make the suggestion.
§ Mr. CHAMBERLAINMy hon. Friend would not like to see that suggestion adopted, but if so it is not quite fair to taunt us with inconsistency because we have not done it. I am quite willing to consider an Amendment of the kind if my hon. Friend will put it down; but those are not the questions which we are discussing now. We are discussing now whether a man who cannot render to the State the service which in this emergency the State is forced to call forth from him should have a vote, and I do not think it a reasonable suggestion that, if we decide that, as he is unable to fulfil the obligations which the State would desire him to fulfil, he cannot therefore enjoy all the rights which other citizens possess, therefore we are making a martyr of him. We may be making a martyr of him by the prison treatment, and that may be a reason for changing it, but you really will not make a martyr of him by telling him that for a period of years or for life he will not have a vote. If everybody who has not got a vote was a martyr what a nation of martyrs there would be even at the present time! I do not approach this question from quite the same point of view as the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford, I approach it from the point of view of what the vote is. I do not regard the vote as a birthright. I regard it as a privilege, a trust, and I say that we have a right to attach conditions to it. It is not sufficient to say, in answer 1246 to that, that some of those conditions are such as certain conscientious people cannot accept. There are people of eccentric or unbalanced minds who find objections to many laws which in the interests of the community as a whole we are obliged to enforce. We are obliged to restrain those eccentric individuals. In some instances we are obliged to compel them, but we do not make martyrs of them. We have the right to say, in conferring this privilege, in giving this trust, that we will attach to it certain conditions. A condition which is suggested is that if a man has been called upon in a great emergency for a certain kind of service and pleads conscientious objection, and: on that ground secures exemption, then we have the right to say that as that was the service which was required by the State above all things, as this is the time, in the whole of our long history, when the State has the greatest need of what its citizens can give, he who has been: unable to give what is asked and what the State requires has no inherent right to claim a vote which we think proper to withhold. My hon. Friend said, in the opening passages of his speech, that in the result you will have one law for men over forty-one and another law for men under forty-one. Yes, you will. You will have one law for the man who, being a conscientious objector, is exempted by reason of his occupation, and another for the man who, being a conscientious objector, on that ground and that ground only is granted exemption. Further, you have one law for men over forty-one and another law for men under forty-one now. You require men under forty-one to go and fight, and you do not require men over forty-one. The State in that matter has adjusted the law to what it believes to be the exigencies of the conditions, and the circumstances of the help which the individual citizen can best render. We come back always to the same point. In a great crisis, in the greatest we have ever known, you have asked men to serve. They have refused. You have a right to limit the extent to which they share in privileges of citizenship. The emergency in which we have asked them is one in which our whole existence as a nation is at stake. We are waging the greatest War we have ever known. It is at that moment that they find themselves unable to give the assistance which the State requires. If they are unable to give that assistance, by what right can they claim to decide the 1247 future of the country. I will not pursue the matter any further. I have said enough to make my position quite clear. I am going to vote for this Amendment, or at least I am going to vote for the principle. As far as I understand the position, the first question which you will put: from the Chair will enable us to vote upon the principle in some form or another. At any rate, whenever the principle is raised I am going to vote for it.
But now I want to make an earnest appeal to my hon. Friend who moved this Amendment, to those who support it in its present form, and to the Government themselves. My hon. Friend (Sir G. Younger) says that the movers are prepared to accept a time limit. I supposed that they would, but I want to do something more. The real deficiency of these men, in the conditions for citizenship, is that they have refused essential service that was asked for. I am going to vote for the principle, but I do want some form of words found which will save, at any rate, the most striking cases which may be brought forward of men who, although not fighting, are taking all risks, are not shirking, and are not sheltering behind their conscientious objections, but are giving real service. Many members of the `Society of Friends would not be disfranchised even under the Amendment as it stands, as they are rendering service, just as years ago, in the war of American independence, many members of the community felt that their general abhorrence of war must give way to the holiness of the cause for which the war was waged. Many members of the Society of Friends would, therefore, be found among the combatants. But take another case, that of a gentleman not personally known to me—I am not pleading for a friend—a member of the Society of Friends, who at the outbreak of the war said, "Owing to my convictions I cannot fight for you," but who, there and then, went for service on a mine-sweeper in the North Sea. That is not shirking. That is not choosing a soft job. That is not looking about to see where something easy and safe can be found. You may think that that is a narrow point of conscience. Some of us may not be able to see it. What they would not do was to take life, but they would take all the hard work, and they would take all the risk, and, therefore, if we are to assert the principle against 1248 others who will not do the work that they might do, against men who are not like those for whom my hon. Friend has been pleading, but are, as we all know shirkers, who have refused to serve the State in this crisis—if we are to do that, we must find some words which will save the case of such a man as I have mentioned, or the case of the ambulance men of the Society of Friends, men who are doing really good work, who are risking their lives as freely as any of their compatriots and against whom I think no one desires to leave, as it were, any bad mark on their record during the War. The House will see that I take up a position between the two speakers who have last addressed it, who put very strongly and forcibly the more extreme views. I shall vote for the assertion of the principle. But I will then support and I hope the Government will show themselves willing, if the principle is adopted, to introduce some words to protect these cases to which I have referred.
§ Mr. LEIF JONESThe House will note that the exceptions which the right hon. Gentleman has introduced into the Amendment make so large an inroad into the principle of the Amendment that his conclusion ought to have been rather that he would vote against the Amendment and move some other Amendment to carry out his proposal rather than that he should vote for this Amendment which, as I understand it, will be put from the Chair in the form in which it has been moved by the hon. Baronet. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman has heard the whole of the Debate last night and this afternoon. If he had he would realise that the object of this Amendment, and most of those who are supporting it, is to exclude from the franchise all those who refuse military service to the State. I do not see how, in recognition of other servants of the State on a level with them, he can refuse to vote against this Amendment. I hope, however, that the Leader of the House will have come to recognise from to-day's Debate that he took somewhat false ground last night when he said that he was going to leave this question to the decision of the House because the decision of the Women's Local Government Vote Amendment had also been left to the House. The right hon. Gentleman stated that as that Amendment had been left to the House—and we are grateful to him for having left it to the House—he would, in similar circumstances, leave any 1249 other Amendment, where it might be deemed desirable, to the House. But I think the right hon. Gentleman must recognise that there is no similarity between the two Amendments. In regard to the Women's Local Government Vote Amendment, the Home Secretary will remember that speeches, for many hours, were delivered from all quarters of the House by members of every party in the House, who pleaded with the Government to take off the Whips. That was done, and the Debate concluded without any Division. How can the Leader of the House suggest that there is any resemblance between that Amendment and the one now under discussion? We are here face to face with one of the most fundamental issues that can divide us. There is deep division between those who are supporting the Amendment and those who are against it, though you are proceeding with what is supposed to be an agreed Bill, and one the Home Secretary recommended to the House as an agreed Bill.
The Home Secretary himself admits that on this question there is a deep division of opinion which might imperil the prospects of the Bill. I do not think he was putting it too high—indeed, I am not sure that those Members are not widening that division as much as they can because they do not very much love the franchise Bill which the right hon. Gentleman is piloting through the House. I am not complaining because the Leader of the House has taken off the Government Whips; I only wish they would do it always; but, as the Home Secretary is going to Whip us into the Lobby, I hope he will not lead us there, I would venture to remind him of a speech which he made to the House on the Committee stage. Members of the Government rather repudiated the doctrine put forward by earlier speakers, that it was too late to move this Amendment, and that if this penalty was to be imposed upon the conscientious objector, or the other class who are not recognised conscientious objectors, but who are within this Amendment, it ought to have been moved upon the Military Service Bill. I shall read the words used by the Home Secretary on the Committee stage of the Bill, because I think they have as much force to-day as the right hon. Gentleman considered they possessed on the Committee stage. I should be astonished if, having spoken those words on the Committee stage, the 1250 Home Secretary can bring himself to go into the Lobby in support of the hon. Baronet's principle. These are the right hon. Gentleman's words:
Let us consider the position. A very short time ago, within the last two years certainly, Parliament passed an Act which allowed a man to claim exemption from military service on the ground of conscientious objection to military service. If it had been desired to impose a penalty upon him in consequence of that claim, that was the time, that Bill was the place, when such a provision ought to have been inserted.The right hon. Gentleman was challenged by an hon. Member as to whether he would at that time have inserted such a provision in the Bill. In reply the Home Secretary expressed his opinion that it could have been done. His words were:Indeed I do. If you are going to impose this disability in consequence of that claim you should have said so, and said so in that Statute at the time.I submit that the Home Secretary in that speech, made in Committee, put the justice of that case before the House, and I think the House would be going very far astray from fairness and justice, which are always pursued in legislation, if it took retrospective action by going back two years, and imposing penalties on men to whom it was intended to grant exemption.
§ Mr. R. McNEILLDoes the right hon. Gentleman mean to imply that if notice had been given at that time the conscientious objector would not have been subject to this penalty?
§ Mr. JONESIf it had been brought forward, the House would never for a moment have considered the proposition. I am dealing with two distinct classes here. The first class are those who have claimed and received recognition from the tribunal that their objection to military service was rightly based upon conscientious objections and that they came within the provisions of the Act, and therefore were granted exemption. A good many of them are doing non-combatant service and some of them are employed in very dangerous service. Many of them are in the Friends Ambulance Unit in France, and Members know what valuable service that unit has rendered. It seems to me a monstrous proposal that people who, having taken advantage of an opening provided by Parliament itself, and then have rendered valuable service to the country during the War, should be excluded from the franchise, as they will be, if this Amendment is carried. At any rate let the hon. Baronet modify his Amendment so far that these people shall not be 1251 excluded from the franchise. There is a certain class touched by this Amendment, those who have not been exempted as conscientious objectors before a tribunal, but who, being compelled to join the Army against their will, have refused to admit that they were obliged to submit to military discipline. They have been held guilty of disobedience to military orders, and have been repeatedly and heavily punished for that offence. Hon. Members talk about the strength of public opinion against conscientious objectors and men who will not go into the Army, but it should not be forgotten that a very great amount of ill-feeling is created throughout the country by the repeated punishments inflicted upon these men for what is practically one offence. It is really contrary to the British sense of justice to punish men again and again for what is to all intents and purposes a single offence. The offence of these men is their refusal to undertake military service, and it is because of the method which this House adopted in putting the demand for military service before the citizens of the country, that those who refuse military service are subjected to these repeated punishments. I always felt that the proper course for the House to pursue was this, that it was the duty of every man to offer himself for military service, and refusal to join the Army would then have been the offence committed. The man who refused would have committed that offence once for all and should have been punished once for all, as heavily as you chose, for that offence. But now you are further going to punish him by disfranchisement, and if that was to be part of the punishment for refusal of military service I submit that then, and not now, was the moment at which it should have been done.
But some Members want to go further. Some of them said to-day that they really desired to see these people outside the law; because they are not ready to serve the country in the way desired do not let them have the benefit of the franchise and make them practically outlaws. I do not think I am putting it too strongly. I think that punishment is out of date, and I think it is a great deal too severe for the offence committed. I would ask the House to carry back their minds to the time when compulsory service was enacted in this country. A very large part of the country resorted unwillingly to compulsory service. 1252 It was a slow conversion on the part of the great majority of the people of this country, and some have never been converted. If the House will carry its mind back to the temper and atmosphere of the discussion on the Military Service Bill, I think they will realise that had this proposal for disfranchisement been put forward the House would not for a moment have agreed to it. It is a punishment which you have not inflicted on the worst criminal guilty of the most disgraceful crime. You have traitors to the country at large to-day, but you do not propose to disfranchise them. There are Members of this House who profess no allegiance to the British State. You do not propose to turn them out of the House. This is a particular punishment for a particular offence, but unfortunately proposed after punishment has been given for the offence. I want to protest as strongly as I can against the House imposing this further punishment upon these men. It is a penalising measure which is being adopted against them. If I protest against it, it is not that I share the views of the conscientious objector. I do not. I disagree with them. I think they are illogical, and have great difficulty in even understanding their point of view. I do not mean that I do not understand the point of view of the orthodox Quaker in objecting to military service. I can well understand his saying that you will never overcome evil by force, and that the only way to overcome evil is by non-resistance, or that you will never overcome evil in this world by war. But the case of the man is much harder to understand who, in the present crisis of the country's fortune, refuses all national service of any kind. That, I think is illogical and difficult to understand. After all it is an opinion held by a great many people, that the State has not the right to dictate to them the services they should render. In this connection I think in a great number of the cases where national service has been refused by men who would not give military service, the decision of the objectors has been largely due to want of management by the tribunals in dealing with the men. Those who have followed the working of the tribunals must admit that when these men were claiming an exemption which they held that Parliament had granted, there was a great deal of unwise questioning, and even I will say harsh treatment by those who should have 1253 been there to hold impartially the scales of justice and administer the Act. I do not want to attack the tribunals generally, because they were administering a most difficult Act and the almost impossible task of determining what a man conscientiously thought. In a great many of these cases you might never have reached the extreme stage had they been more wisely handled by the tribunals.
In this Amendment, I put it to the House that you are fighting opinion, and I claim, and it is a claim which Englishmen have always made for many, many years, that all opinions, however obnoxious, ought to be tolerated. I would go further and claim that they are entitled to representation among the voters of the country. There is a point I want to put to the hon. Baronet who moved the Amendment. He based his argument upon the ground that these subversive opinions were spreading widely throughout the country. Of course they are spreading, and the treatment meted out to these people is the very way in which to spread those opinions throughout the country. The country is reaping in this matter part of the fruits of its own mishandling of the question. You cannot suppress obnoxious opinions by force. The very attempt to do so spreads the opinions you wish to put down. The remedy for obnoxious opinions is to meet them with righteous opinions. Let the obnoxious opinions come into the daylight, do not force them underground, for if you do you are courting the very danger and difficulty that you wish to avoid. The Leader of the House said that these doctrines are subversive of the State. Some of these people do hold doctrines which are subversive of the State. All the persecutions of history—or nearly all the persecutions—have been directed against doctrines which the rulers of the State claimed to be subversive of the State. It was the one charge which was levelled for centuries against the Early Christians. We are taunted with raising the analogy of the Early Christians. We do so because the treatment which this country is inclined to mete out calls forth the analogy. It is true that you do not use the same persecutions that were indulged in in those days, but it is the same old remedy, and the same idea: that you can crush obnoxious opinion by putting your foot down and stamping on it. It cannot be done.
1254 The effort to suppress individual opinion by way of Government authority smacks too much of German origin. I venture to say that the spiritual home of this Amendment is Germany. The claim that the State is to dictate to the individual conscience what it should think is entirely a German doctrne. Is it not against that doctrine we are fighting in this War? The reason that the free nations of the world are united against Germany is the assertion of Germany that the State is supreme—even in the domain of conscience—whereas the belief I should have said of all Englishmen was that in the ultimate decision the individual must determine by the light of his own conscience what his conduct shall be; and when the State trenches upon the ground of conscience it is going outside its proper sphere, and the individual rightly and wisely disregards even the mandates of the State if they conflict with his own individual conscience. That, I believe, has been the historic doctrine in this country not of one party, but of all parties for hundreds of years, and one of the most regrettable results of this War is that a discussion like this can be carried on in the House of Commons to-day. I never was afraid, when this War broke out, that Germany would conquer this country; I have never feared that; but I have always been afraid that we should be infected by German doctrines here. I ask the House, before it comes to a decision on this point, to recognise that in the successive steps which the Government have been taking in various directions there is a real danger that British freedom may be sacrificed before the War is over. We see in every direction growing claims by the Government to interfere, to control, to regulate, to dictate, to individuals what their conduct should be. We have set up a governmental machine for turning out proper provender for the people in the shape of the political opinion which it is suitable for them to receive. You are setting up a new censorship over pamphlets and publications before they are issued, instead of doing what Englishmen have done practically since the days of the Revolution, namely, throwing on the authors of the pamphlets the responsibility for what they write and bringing them to book if they do wrong. In every direction the Government are trenching more and more upon the rights of the individual, and this wish to disfranchise the conscientious objectors is another step in that same 1255 downward course. I ask the House with great sincerity and speaking from the very bottom of political convictions, which have not been formed to-day, but which have been formed in what is now a long political past, and I implore the House to look beyond the passions and the controversies of the hour and to remember the great traditions of British freedom in the sphere of opinion, and to be content to fight error with truth. It may be that the House will reject my plea and disfranchise these men, and even be applauded by a Press which is no longer free to express public opinion, but which represents manufactured opinions to the country. The appetite for repression and persecution grows, and I begin to fear when peace comes we shall indeed have won the War, but have lost the cause for which we fought.
§ Mr. ADAMSONI do not desire to intervene in this Debate for more than a few minutes, but I feel, however, that unless the party with which I am associated made its position clear that we might be misunderstood regarding this matter that is under discussion. We will vote against the Amendment, and I want to say that no modification of the Amendment will modify our attitude regarding this proposal. In taking up this attitude I do not want our position to be misunderstood in any shape or form. We do not agree with the conscientious objector; we disagree with him; we think he is wrong; but at the same time, on the very highest Christian and moral grounds, we cannot refuse to the conscientious objector the same right that we claim for ourselves, namely, the right to make our own choice on this question. During the course of the Debate attempts have been made to divide the conscientious objectors into two or three different classes. Personally I cannot see any room for the divisions that have been made. Some hon. Members said that the man who is a conscientious objector on religious grounds has some claim to the sympathy of the Members of the House. I think that even the Mover of this Amendment took up that position. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) in the course of his speech said among other things that we are in the midst of a great War, and that the conscientious objectors had been asked to assist and that they had refused. I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman why did 1256 they refuse, and the answer which I will give will at the same time explain my view as to the various divisions that certain Members try to make. Take the man who objects on religious grounds. Why has he objected? It is because he feels that as a follower of the Prince of Peace he cannot have the guilt of shedding the blood of his fellow man upon his head. If we take the case of the conscientious objector who objects on political or moral grounds, why does he refuse to render assistance to his country in its day of struggle? He does so exactly on the same data. He says, as one who believes in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, that he cannot be guilty of shedding the blood of his fellow man. So that, going down to the bottom, the reason is exactly the same among all these parties who take conscientious objection to military service.
There are two considerations to which I think the Members of the House would be well advised to give serious thought before they cast their votes. The first is, do not let us forget that in all ages of the world's history the blood of the martyr has been the seed of the Church. We had better be careful as to our action to-night. At the present time we have a very small proportion of our people who are taking up the position of conscientious objectors.
§ General CROFTWhat would happen if a large section of our countrymen took up that position?
§ Mr. ADAMSONI was going to point out that a very small section of our people take up the position of the conscientious objector, but let us be very careful that we do not turn that small portion into a large portion. That is my reply to the hon. and gallant Gentleman. That is the first consideration which I want my fellow Members to weigh carefully. The second one is this: Let us be very careful that in our desire to punish the conscientious objector we do not raise serious industrial trouble in this country. I can assure those hon. Members who object to the statement that I have just made that there is a real danger of serious trouble if this Amendment is given effect to to-night. The effect of the trouble, in view of the small number of conscientious objectors in the country, would not be serious. There are, however, many other matters. There is dissatisfaction in the country, which is not only on the ground of what would be done with the conscientious objector. Mankind who have the spirit of dissatisfaction 1257 have an ugly knack of joining forces with those who, like themselves, also are dissatisfied. We ought not to give them an opportunity to develop this. Do not let us act foolishly in our desire to punish these men for taking up an attitude of which we cannot approve. I hope the Mover and the Seconder will see fit to withdraw the Amendment, so that a vote may not be taken on this question. If they refuse to do so, I hope that by an overwhelming majority this Amendment will be defeated.
Captain O'NEILLI rise for a few moments to call the attention of the Mover of this Amendment to some further defects which I propose to explain to the House, largely from the point of view of how, if carried, the Amendment will read in connection with the Army Act, and offences created by the Army Act. This Amendment proposes, first of all, that any person who has got exemption on the ground of conscientious objection shall be disqualified. It also puts in a second class, namely, those who, not having got exemption, allege conscientious objection to military service as a reason for refusal to obey orders. It seems to me that what this Amendment does is, beyond a question of doubt, to penalise a man who is exempted upon conscientious grounds, and thereby has, before the tribunal, established the fact that his conscientious objections were sound. But, as I will point out in a moment, it lets off a large number of men who have not satisfied the tribunals, and who have escaped out of the net which is sought to be spread. The only people in the second class with whom this Amendment deals are men who refuse to obey orders. "Disobey lawful commands" is the proper legal expression of the Army Act. This is not the same thing as refusing to obey orders. I have, in the capacity in which I am now working in connection with the Army, been at numbers of courts-martial. I have seen these conscientious objectors. I have read, I will not say all, the proceedings, but a very large number of them. The conscientious objectors are not only—I am talking about the second class—the class of men who cannot get the tribunal to exempt them. They are not only men convicted of disobedience to orders, but they have been convicted of numerous other military offences.
1258 Men have alleged conscientious objection as a defence, for example, in desertion. Let me explain. A man fails to answer his notice calling him up. He disappears. He may stay away for months. Then he is found. He is arrested, brought back, and tried by court-martial. What is he tried for? Desertion. That man is a conscientious objector. He points out, in defence of his desertion, the fact that he does not recognise that the Army has any rights over him because of his conscientious objection. That is the technical point. I am sure it will be appreciated by the House, so that the wording of the Amendment certainly requires amending in this respect. There is another class of men. The second part of the Amendment proposes to deal with those who have alleged, as a reason for disobeying orders, that they have a conscientious objection to military service. In those courts-martial are numerous cases of men who, when they have been tried for whatever the military offence may be, have said nothing at all. They have raised no defence of any kind. They have simply remained dumb. Yet from the knowledge of the authorities of how these men have been accustomed to go about, what they were, and the way they were brought up, the authorities know, in fact, that they are conscientious objectors, although really they do not allege it at the time of trial. Therefore, this Amendment does not catch those men. Further than that. Those men are very often treated subsequently as conscientious objectors, although, in fact, they have not alleged conscientious objection in defence to the charge for which they have been tried. These men, again, will escape under this Amendment. You have, too, got men who have been tried by court-martial and who are now employed in work of national importance under the scheme. So far as I can see, those men will not be caught by this Amendment, unless the particular charge with which they are charged is disobedience to lawful commands.
Lastly, there is one further class of men whom I do not think will be caught under the provisions of this Amendment. These are the men who have possibly gone abroad and been in France. I have seen cases. Possibly for many, many months they have been there. They have suddenly developed a desire to raise as a defence in their trial the excuse of conscientious objection. I have, I hope, said enough to 1259 draw the attention of the Government and the Movers of this Amendment to the fact that the wording of it must be materially changed if the object which the Amendment desires to bring about is to be attained. So far as I am concerned I very cordially agree with what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham. I do feel that this Amendment, as now drawn, quite apart from the defects to which I have drawn attention, carries out more than, at, any rate, I wish to see carried out; because it is going primarily to hit men such as those belonging to the Society of Friends and others, who are doing work of national importance, although it may not be work, technically of a military character; while it is not going to catch in its meshes a large number of those who have not succeeded in persuading the tribunals that their conscientious objection is a good one. As the Amendment stands now, personally, I could not vote for it. I hope before the question is put the Amendment will be altered to such words as will truly carry out the desire of those who brought it forward.
§ 7.0 P.M.
Mr. CARADOC REESThe difficulty I feel in most things of this sort is that of judging others. If I were to say anything to the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment it would be this: that the result already brought about is not the result they desired. There are a number of us in this House who have no sympathy with the conscientious objector, but this will drive us into apparent sympathy with him, because you put down this Resolution, which we cannot support, and as has been said by other speakers, the result is not what you anticipate. You are going to make it appear, or, if we come to the vote, you will make it appear, as if this House were in favour of the conscientious objector, when really what we want to say is this: We refuse to see the men of the Society of Friends deprived of their votes. The next point is this: It is so easy to misjudge people. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for St. Pancras was speaking someone interrupted about his age, and somebody on the opposite benches shouted out: "What about Rees?" In paying me a compliment he was doing me an injustice. I am in my fiftieth year, and consequently do not come under the Military Service Acts. It is, however, so easy to 1260 misjudge people, and motives, and it is so difficult to get into the skin of other people and find out really how they work and how their conscience moves. That is the difficulty. It is so easy, carelessly and heedlessly, to do harm to other people, and to hurt them, perhaps when we did not intend to do so, but rather intended to pay them a compliment. The main objection I have to this Amendment is that no distinction is drawn between conscientious objector and conscientious objector. They are all treated on the one plane. The members of the Society of Friends, to take an example, under forty-one, are to be deprived of their votes. Why not deprive their fathers who taught them to be conscientious objectors of their votes? Or the mothers—for they will be getting the vote? An Act passed in this House, provided that if a man should satisfy a tribunal that he was in. reality a conscientious objector he would be entitled to do work other than that in the actual fighting line. That is the law of this country, and the conscientious objector who has taken on non-combatant work is obeying the law of this country, and surely it is wrong to penalise a man for obedience to the law. I draw a distinction between him and the other conscientious objector who says, "I will neither go into the trenches nor will I do non-combatant service." I cannot understand his position. I do not want to judge him, but that is the only man I would disfranchise. I take it that what he is in reality saying to this House and country is, "I refuse to obey the laws of the majority of the people of the country." Now, if he refuses to obey the laws of the majority of the people of the country, then we can surely say to him, "You must not expect to make laws which you expect the majority to obey." If the Amendment were limited to depriving of the vote the conscientious objectors who refuse to do non-combatant service, one could support it, but I cannot support in this broad way depriving those who obey the law as well as those who refuse to obey the law.
There is one further point. It would be as well, I think—and I commend this to the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment—if these Amendments were not put down, because they are doing a great deal of harm to what they have in mind and what they have in heart. This discussion to-day cannot do good to the attitude they want 1261 to see forwarded, and I do hope this House will be saved any Vote upon this, and that it will be withdrawn freely and readily, because, taking myself for example, I do not want to vote for it and I do not want to vote against it, but, owing to the bigger number who will be deprived of the vote who are entitled to it, and the smaller number who, I think, ought to be deprived of it, on balance I am bound to say I shall vote against the Amendment.
§ Sir RYLAND ADKINSI should like to say one or two words upon this matter, all the more because of the very difficult position in which very many of us find ourselves owing to the form in which this is raised in the Amendment, and, if I may say so, in the policy of the Government itself. Here, very nearly at the end of the Debates on this Bill, we have an Amendment moved which raises some of the most difficult and most far-reaching problems that can possibly be raised in Parliament, and in that moment of extreme difficulty the guidance we have had from the Government up to now appears to have been uncertain, indefinite, and without that power of moulding discussions in the House which in this matter might be of great help and of great importance. It is obvious now from the Debate that has taken place that this Amendment as it stands cannot possibly do. With all that has been said by the hon. Member for Carnarvonshire I entirely agree. It is not fair to Members of this House, and it is not fair to the public outside that the issue should be so presented that every vote given for it or against it is given under a sense of confusion, with no possible way of knowing exactly what is meant by any vote on either side, because here, grouped together in one Amendment, are the most different kinds and categories of people. There are those who, as has been pointed out with much force by the hon. Member for York and the right hon. Member for West Birmingham, are doing work of the utmost danger and self-sacrifice, as much as that of any soldier or sailor, but who, under this Amendment, would be deprived of their vote, and with them are grouped persons who, rightly or wrongly, decline all duties of citizenship in connection with the War at a time when the country needs the help of every citizen in the hour of its peril and its trial. How can we be asked to vote on so confused an issue as that?
1262 The suggestion has been made that this should not apply to members of the Society of Friends and others engaged in war work on land or sea. How can you possibly draw the line there? Much of my time in the last eighteen months has been spent in sitting on tribunals. We have had conscientious objectors of every variety before us, and what do we find? You cannot draw the line between those who are serving in France in the Friends' Ambulance unit and those who are not. Men have come forward and been perfectly willing to serve in the Friends' Ambulance unit, but at the time there was no room, and they were sent to do work on the land at personal inconvenience. You cannot draw the line, except to a very limited extent, by saying that this disfranchisement shall not apply to any person who has taken the alternative service which has been allowed by the proper authority before whom he has come. If you do that you at once dispose, as we all know, of the great majority of persons who are intended to be disfranchised by the Mover of this Amendment and by the Press campaign which is being engineered on the subject outside the House. if you stop short of that line you are giving a different treatment to persons of the same opinion willing to do the same work, because it is arranged that one is to go for war work abroad and it is not possible to make such arrangements for the other man. The Amendment is absolutely full of gaps and holes; it does not hang together; it would be absolutely unworkable, and would defeat the object of those who propose it. I agree with my hon. Friend who spoke last that if you could—I think it would pass the wit of man to do it—bring in an Amendment to this Bill which carefully segregated and set apart those, and those only, who decline all duties of citizenship in connection with the War—and I wish you could include those who, without conscience, are shirkers from all duties of citizenship in the War—if you could frame some Clause which got hold of those two types, and no other, then I, for one, would agree that they should have no vote for the next ten years or so, because they have made the great refusal of citizenship in the hour when citizenship is more than ever a duty. This Amendment does nothing of the kind. I cannot see any Amendment to-day which would enable; it to do that and to do nothing more.
Therefore, I join in the appeal that has been made by many Members of this 1263 House for the withdrawal of this Amendment. None of us—at least, I hope there are none of us—wish to countenance or strengthen or do anything but reprobate the men who are unwilling to discharge any civic duties with regard to the War. But it would be a very great pity if, for that reason, we allowed ourselves to disfranchise many persons who are risking their lives day by day in the interest of the country, and many other persons who have accepted, under the faith of the Military Service Act, the decision of competent tribunals, and are carrying out those decisions at no little self-sacrifice in a large number of cases. I wish it were possible to deal with the very small and special class. I do ask the Government, after this Debate, frankly to tell the House that the differences are far too great to admit of any Amendment that really will have permanent value, that this matter, like many other matters, is beyond the scope of Amendments to this Bill, and that it therefore had better be allowed to drop.
§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSONI certainly hope most earnestly the Mover of this Amendment will not withdraw it. With a great deal of what the hon. Member who spoke last has said, I find myself in a considerable measure of agreement. I admit there are certain cases at present comprised in this Amendment for whom, I think, you can make a very good case for taking out of this Amendment. There is nobody in this House who has ever heard the real story of what happened at Gorizia who will not have the strongest feeling for the Friends' Ambulance. If ever men have served their country, it is the men who drove those ambulances. But that is no reason, because you have to draw the line, for rejecting the principle, and it is the principle of this Amendment, namely, whether a man who refuses to discharge his duties to the State is to have all the rights and privileges which the State gives to its citizens, which is at stake. It is not on the actual wording of the Amendment that I take my stand. If the hon. Member, and those who think like him, believe that the actual wording of the Amendment is wrong, they can move to amend the Amendment. The hon. Member thinks it cannot be done. I think it can be done, and I see no reason whatever, from the point of view of Parliamentary procedure, subject 1264 to Mr. Speaker's ruling, why it should not be done. So far as I am concerned, I hope it may be done, but do not make that a ground for rejecting the principle. This is the first opportunity the House has had, I understand—I have not been able to follow the procedure as closely as at one time—of arriving at a decision on this question in a free Lobby, and I confess it was with a feeling of extraordinary amazement that I listened to my right hon. Friend the Member for the Rushcliffe Division (Mr. Leif Jones) pressing the right of free private judgment up to the hilt, and complaining that the Government have decided to take off the Government Whips. That appears to me exceedingly illogical. There are really in this Debate, as everyone must recognise, fundamental differences, and there are fundamental differences between hon. Members who are opposing the Amendment. There is a fundamental difference between the two hon. Members who spoke last and some hon. Members on this side. As I understand, the two hon. Members opposite would disfranchise a conscientious objector who refused to do non-combatant work.
§ Sir R. ADKINSI should disfranchise a person who refused every kind of work of national importance put to him by an appropriate authority. In that case I say he has declined to act as a citizen during the War. If you can limit it to him, I am with you.
§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSONI do not want in the slightest to misrepresent the hon. Gentleman. That is his point of view, but there are other hon. Members in this House who regard that man as the most conscientious of all conscientious objectors. They think he is carrying the conscientious principle to the highest possible point. Therefore, there are not only these fundamental differences, but there are differences between the hon. Members themselves who are prepared to vote against this Amendment. I want to say a word about the speech made by the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil), and I also wish to mention a point made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Leif Jones). I think it is a wrong point, and one which is not worthy of them—I mean the point that you ought not to make any penalty of this description retrospective, and that you ought to have given notice of it to the 1265 conscientious objector, and put it in the Miliary Service Acts. I am only speaking from memory, but so far as the Military Service Acts are concerned, I do not think we put it in because Mr. Speaker ruled that we could not do so.
I remember an Amendment of this description or a new Clause being proposed, and I think it was ruled that it ought to come as an Amendment to a Franchise Bill and not as an Amendment to a Military Service Bill. We have been told that we ought to have given the conscientious objector notice, but would it have made any difference if we had? I have always been a great admirer of the genius of my Noble Friend the Member for Oxford University, but I was surprised to hear him make a speech of the kind he has delivered in defence of the, conscientious objector. I do not think he would have made that speech with regard to the Education Bill of 1902. He did not show the same feeling for the conscientous objector in regard to that measure, and as far as I can remember his views of that occasion, they were not those which he has enunciated to-day. The view he put forward to-day was that of an extreme individualist, and it was a philosophic justification of anarchy, and, after all, the anarchist is only the individualist in a frock coat.
I do not understand the position of the Leader of the Labour party on this point. I understand the position of the Internationalists, but the one party I should have thought who would have been strong supporters of this principle is the Socialist party, because, except for those Socialists who are Internationalists, all those who adhere to the principle of a Socialist State I should have thought would have been the strongest supporters and enunciators of the rights and duties a man owes to that State. My Noble Friend, as he proceeded, appeared to perceive his difficulty, and he began to distinguish between different kinds of rebels. He said some of them were good and some of them bad, and it all depended whether you took action against the State or refused to discharge your duty to the State from a good or a bad motive. My Noble Friend is arguing for a position in which the individual is to be a judge as to whether he has or has not the right to discharge duties to the State. If he elects to take that position he cannot in the same breath maintain that he has an 1266 inalienable right to the privileges given to those who obey the State. There are people whose religious convictions are perfectly logical, and they say "we refuse to grant this claim upon us by the State, and we refuse to discharge what the State calls our duty, and we take no concern of the State. We do not care whether they give us the vote or not, and we refuse to exercise the vote when we have got it." There are religious people who argue in that way. I remember upon one occasion spending a considerable time canvassing a gentleman who held those particular views. I was trying to secure his vote and interests, and he persistently took the point that we had no permanent habitation on this sphere, and had no concern with questions of voting either for A or B. I could not persuade him even that he had a lodger vote. That is a perfectly logical position, but the position being maintained by the opponents of this Amendment to-night that a man can in the same breath, by an appeal to the higher law, say, "I refuse to discharge what the State has decreed to be my duty, and at the same time I claim all the rights and the privileges of those men in the State who have discharged that duty and who have given their lives or their health to discharge it, some whose sons have given up their lives." I say that that is a principle which this House ought not to accept, and I earnestly hope that the House will not accept that principle.
§ The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Sir George Cave)I have listened to the greater part of the speeches made on this Amendment, and I am glad to say that throughout the Debate that there has been very little disposition to quarrel with the decision of the Government to leave this question to the free vote of the House. The House rarely complains of having too much freedom given to it. In respect of this question, whatever course we took in Committee I have long felt, and the Leader of the House takes the same view, that having regard to the intensity of feeling upon this matter both in the House and in the country it would have been wrong to attempt to put upon Members such pressure as is exercised by the use of the Government Whips. Apart from that consideration the House will remember that a few days ago I indicated the course which would be taken by the 1267 Government. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cleveland (Mr. H. Samuel) pressed us very strongly to take off the Whips upon the question of the women's municipal vote, I said then, and I made it a condition of that decision, that we should be quite free to take a similar course upon this very Amendment. Having made that promise I need not dwell upon this point, for I think the House will agree that the vote should be a free one upon the merits of the Amendment.
The vote being free, my own view on the matter is, of course, of small importance, but as my speech in Committee has been referred to I hope the House will permit me to say that I do not depart in the least from what I said on that occasion. The principles and the conduct of the conscientious objectors are to me odious. I differ very widely from my Noble Friend the Member for Oxford University, whose brilliant speech will long be quoted by anarchists in all countries as justifying disobedience to the law. I think the conscientious objector when he refuses to obey a military law is rightly punished and rightly imprisoned. I cannot, however, get rid of the opinion which I have expressed before, that when you have by Statute, whether wisely or unwisely, permitted a man to claim exemption before a tribunal from military service. you cannot a little more than a year afterwards impose upon him a legal disability, however slight, for taking advantage of his statutory rights. For that reason I cannot vote for this Amendment.
I did not rise in order to argue the merits of this Amendment but there is one other thing I would like to say. I would like to ask—how can the Government assist the House under present conditions? I think all of us would like to know the opinion of the House upon the wide question of principle involved. There is the very serious obstacle to this Amendment which many hon. Members have pointed out, that in its present form it is open to very grave objection. To begin with it does not go nearly as far as those who support it would wish it to go. My hon. and gallant Friend opposite has already pointed out that as regards the latter part of the Amendment it only applies to men who have been sentenced by a court-martial for refusal to obey orders, and 1268 that would not catch more, I suppose, than half of the conscientious objectors who claim protection on the ground that they are conscientious objectors. Some of them have been dealt with as deserters and for other military offences, and unless you amend this proposal in that respect you would fail to a great extent to carry out the purpose you have in view. But in other respects the Amendment would go much too far. It might disqualify those who have accepted non-combatant service; it would disqualify those who have been exempted on condition that they accepted work of national importance; it would disqualify the men who have been unwilling to fight, or disabled if you please, by their conscience from fighting but who have accepted medical work and acted as stretcher bearers in Flanders. Who wants to disqualify them? You would disqualify men who have acted as mine-sweepers, after being actually exempted from military service under the provisions of the Military Service Acts. Who wants to disqualify them? No one, not a single Member of the House. Therefore, it is quite plain that in that respect, and perhaps in others, the Amendment will really not do. There is also the question of the limit of time which has not been provided for.
I believe that what the supporters of the Amendment really desire is to disqualify a man who on the plea of conscience has refused not only to fight, but to do any service whatever to his country in this War. Those are the men to whom they would wish this disability to apply. What can we do in this state of things? If this Amendment is rejected, of course there is an end of the matter, but if it should be passed I think our duty would be to accept the vote as a vote upon the principle only, and to introduce in another place words so limiting the Amendment as to exclude cases of the kind I have mentioned. Some hon. Members say, "Why not do it here?" The Government are not taking charge of or supporting this Amendment, and the Government cannot do it here. Of course, if hon. Members like to remain and insert Amendments to it, they are at liberty to do so. But I am desirous, for reasons which the House will understand, of coming to a decision upon the matter now, and I would appeal to the House, if they take that view, to vote upon the main principle, in which case we should be quite willing, as indeed it would be our duty, to go carefully into the form of the Amendment and 1269 make proposals in another place. I cannot, of course, tie the House, and I only make that proposal in the interests of time and for the general convenience of the House.
Mr. H. SAMUELWe are all anxious to adopt the course that may be convenient in order to get at the real opinion of the House, but I am afraid that some of us cannot accept unreservedly the suggestion of the Home Secretary that the House should be invited either to accept or reject this Amendment as it stands now in the expectation, or it may be only the hope, that in another place the Government may succeed in introducing Amendments which will fulfil the purpose that the Home Secretary has just mentioned. The House of Lords, of course, frequently prides itself upon its independence, and, although the Government in this House at all events are able to secure acceptance of Amendments to which they attach importance, I am not sure, however sincere, and I have no doubt that they are sincere, the intentions of the Government may be, that they will have the means at their disposal in another place to introduce precisely the limiting Amendments which the Home Secretary has adumbrated. I feel sure that there is a feeling in many quarters of the House that we should rather retain control of this matter in our own hands, vote upon the Amendment in the ordinary course, and, if necessary, upon Amendments to the Amendment as they may come forward.
§ Commander WEDGWOODI have been impressed with the importance of putting two points of view that have not been dealt with during the whole of the after-noon. The hon. Member for the St. Augustine's Division (Mr. R. McNeill) and another hon. Member who spoke after him said that there has been a great deal of agitation in the country, that the constituencies are unanimously in favour of this Amendment, and that, therefore, whatever our opinions are, we ought to bow the head and accept those views. Personally, I have not received one single communication from my Constituency asking me to support this Amendment, and I can say that not only I, but the majority of the Members in this House, would not change the views we hold if we had had communications from the majority of our constituents. It is one of our privi- 1270 leges here to be Members of Parliament and not delegates for the constituencies. We are elected on a wide range of ideals, and we are sent here because our constituents trust us to vote on principle. I should think that the hon. Member for the St. Augustine's Division is about the only Member in the House who would vote not on principle, but as told by his constituents. We can wash that out.
There is another point of view that I wish to put before the House. Everybody here has been arguing the question from the point of view both of principle and of expediency Hon. Members have said that because these men are bad citizens, therefore they should have no vote. That, roughly speaking, is the expediency argument. I would ask hon. Members to consider that voting is not the only way in which citizens can affect the government of this country. Representative government itself is on trial at the present time. There surely must be numbers of Members to-day who know that the danger is not that of extreme representation in this House, but of direct action on the part of the trades unions and syndicalist unions in this country. I do not suppose, as the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Mr. Mitchell-Thomson) has said, that there is one of these men who would have altered his views on account of his vote being taken away. The vote itself is a small matter, but deprive them of the vote, and they become everyone of them a martyr who is going to be the foundation of direct action. Take away a man's citizenship and make him a pariah so far as politics are concerned, and you give him a fatal weapon to wield against those who believe in citizenship.
Let me deal also with a point raised by the Leader of the House, who said that the supreme law was the safety of the State. That is always opposed by those who believe that you should do justice, though the Heavens may fall. There is a great deal to be said for the maxim used by the Leader of the House. It is possible that the safety of the State should be the supreme law, but, believe me, the interests of the State are not in the long run served by doing that which is unjust. It may appear temporarily that such and such a measure is in the interests of the State, and therefore must be carried violently over the heads of individuals, but in the 1271 long run those States that trample upon the individual and defy justice go down and are no longer heard or.
§ Mr. BILLINGThere is hardly a Member in this House who has not stated that if this Amendment were amended in some way or other he would support it. Surely it has not passed the wit of all the members of the Government and all the members of the Opposition to so frame an Amendment as to carry out the wishes and the views of the Members of this House. Practically, every speech we have heard, with the exception of one excellent speech by an hon. Member who spoke just below the Gangway (Mr. Mitchell-Thomson), has been in favour of conscientious objectors. It is only common justice before we go into the Lobby that it should be made perfectly clear what we are voting on. Are we voting on this Amendment or on the suggestion made by the Home Secretary? So far as I am aware, the matter is still open. Having waited patiently for three hours to hear an Amendment moved which would clear the air a little, I will, with your permission, move an Amendment to this Amendment, which I trust will in some way enable Members to vote, not at the dictation of popular clamour, but on the issue as to whether a conscientious objector, whether he is of military age or not, shall exercise the vote. There is no reason why, just because a man has been called up and has refused to fight, that he should be deprived of his vote, when others who have not been called up, but who if they had been would have refused to fight, are allowed to
§ vote. I would, therefore, move to strike out all the words after the word " person " [" any person "], and to insert instead thereof the words " who refuses to sign a declaration stating that he or she will not claim exemption from national or military service on conscientious grounds shall not be able to have his or her name placed upon the register." The Amendment then would not be retrospective, and it would meet the point of the Home Secretary that it would be illegal to take a man's vote away because he had a conscientious objection in the past. We should overcome that difficulty, and we should overcome the injustice—
§ Sir G. YOUNGERrose in his place and claimed to move, " That the Question be now put."
§ Question put accordingly, " That those words be there inserted in the Bill."
§ Mr. DENMAN (seated and covered)If this Amendment is carried, will it be possible to recommit this Clause of the. Bill, so that we may discuss the details and exercise control over the Section before it passes from this House?
§ Mr. SPEAKERDoes the hon. Member mean directly after?
§ Mr. DENMANAt any time after?
§ Mr. SPEAKERIt is always open, on the Third Reading, to recommit the Bill.
§ The House divided: Ayes, 209; Noes, 171.
1275| Division No. 116.] | AYES. | [7.45 p.m. |
| Agg-Gardner. Sir James Tynte | Bull, Sir William James | Dalrymple, Hon. H. H. |
| Ashley, Wilfred W. | Burdett-Coutts, W. | Dalziel, Davison (Brixton) |
| Baird, John Lawrence | Butcher, John George | Davies, M. Vaughan- (Cardiganshire) |
| Baldwin, Stanley | Carew, C. R. S. | Denison-Pender, Capt. J. C. |
| Banbury, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick G. | Carnegie, Lieut.-Colonel D. G. | Denniss, E, R. B. |
| Banner, Sir John S. Harmood — | Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward H. | Dixon, C. H. |
| Barnett, Captain R. W. | Cautley, Henry Strother | Duke, Rt. Hon. Henry Edward |
| Barnston, Capt. Harry | Cawley, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick | Du Pre, Major W. Baring |
| Barran, Sir Row. Hurst (Leeds, North) | Cecil, Rt. Hon. Evelyn (Aston Manor) | Faber, George Denison (Clapham) |
| Bathurst, Col. Hon. A. B. (Glouc., E.) | Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J. A. | Fell, Arthur |
| Bathurst, Capt. Charles (Wilts., Wilton) | Clive, Col. Percy Archer | Field, William |
| Beckett, Hon. Gervase | Coates, Major Sir Edward Feetham | Fisher, Rt. Hon. W. Hayes (Fulham) |
| Bellairs, Commander C. W. | Coats, Sir Stuart A. (Wimbledon) | Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A. |
| Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth) | Cochrane, Cecil Algernon | Flannery, Sir J. Fortescue |
| Benn, Corn. Ian Hamilton | Colvin, Col. Richard Beale | Fletcher, John Samuel |
| Billing, Pemberton | Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J. | Forster, Rt. Hon. Henry William |
| Bird, Alfred | Cory, Sir Clifford John (St. Ives) | Ganzonl, Francis John C. |
| Blair, Reginald | Cory, James Herbert (Cardiff) | Gardner, Ernest |
| Boles, Lieut.-Colonel Dennis Fortescue | Courthope, Major George Loyd | Gastrell, Lieut.-Col. Sir W. Houghton |
| Boscawen, Sir Arthur S. T. Griffith- | Craig, Ernest (Cheshire, Crewe) | Goldsmith, Frank |
| Bowden, Major G. R. Harland | Craig, Col. James (Down, E.) | Goulding, Sir Edward Alfred |
| Boyton, James | Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet) | Gretton, Colonel John |
| Bridgeman, William Clive | Craik, Sir Henry | Griffith, Rt. Hon. Ellis Jones |
| Brookes, Warwick | Croft, Brigadier-General Henry Page | Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne) |
| Bryce, J. Annan | Currie, George W. | Haddock, George Bahr |
| Hall, Lieut. -Col. Frederick (Dulwich) | Mackinder, Halford J. | Samuel, Samuel (Wandsworth) |
| Hamilton, Rt. Hon. Lord C. J. (Ken.S.) | Macmaster, Donald | Sanders, Col. Robert Arthur |
| Hanson, Charles Augustin | Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J. | Scott, Leslie (Liverpool, Exchange) |
| Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) | Magnus, Sir Philip | Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) |
| Hardy, Rt. Hon. Laurence | Maitland, Sir A. D. Steel- | Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir F. E. (Liverpool) |
| Harmsworth. R. L. (Caithness-shire) | Malcolm, Ian | Spear, Sir John Ward |
| Harris, Henry Percy (Paddington, S.) | Marks, Sir George Croydon | Stanley, Hon. Sir Arthur (Ormskirk) |
| Haslam, Lewis | Marriott, John Arthur Ransome | Stanley, Colonel Hon. G. F. (Preston) |
| Henry, Sir Charles | Mason, James F. (Windsor) | Stanley, Capt. Lord (Abercromby) |
| Hermon-Hodge, Sir R. T. | Meux, Adml. Hon. Sir Hedworth | Stanton, Charles Butt |
| Hewins, William Albert Samuel | Middlemore, John Throgmorton | Starkey, Capt. John Ralph |
| Hibbert, Sir Henry F. | Mildmay, Lt.-Col. Rt. Hon. F. Bingham | Staveley-Hill, Lieut.-Col. Henry |
| Hickman, Brig.-Gen. Thomas E. | Mitchell-Thomson, W. | Stewart, Gershom |
| Hodge, Rt. Hon. John | Mond, Rt, Hon. Sir Alfred | Stirling, Lieut.-Col. Archibald |
| Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield) | Morison, Hector (Hackney, S.) | Strauss, Arthur (Paddington. North) |
| Hope, Lt.-Col. J. A. (Midlothian) | Mount, William Arthur | Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West) |
| Hope, John Deans (Haddington) | Neville, Reginald J. N | Swift, Rigby |
| Horne, Edgar | Newman, Major John R. P. | Sykes, Col. Sir Alan John (Knutsford) |
| Hughes, Spencer Leigh | Newton, Major Harry Kottingham | Sykes, Col. Sir Mark (Hull, Central) |
| Hume-Williams, William Ellis | Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield) | Talbot, Lord Edmund |
| Hunt, Major Rowland | Nield, Herbert | Terrell, George (Wilts., N.W.) |
| Hunter, Major Sir Charles Rodk. | Norton-Griffiths, Lieut.-Col. Sir J. | Terrell, Major Henry (Gloucester) |
| Ingleby, Holcombe | O'Malley, William | Thomas, Sir A. G. (Monmouth, S.) |
| Jackson, Lt.-Col. Hon. F. S. (York) | Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A. | Thomas-Stanford, Charles |
| Jackson, Sir John (Devonport) | Partington, Hon. Oswald | Tickler, T. G. |
| Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, East) | Pennefather, De Fonblanque | Touche, Sir George Alexander |
| Jessel, Colonel Sir H. M. | Perkins, Walter F. | Tryon, Captain George Clement |
| Jones, W. Kennedy (Hornsey) | Peto, Basil Edward | Turton, Edmund Russborough |
| Joynson-Hicks, William | Philipps, Maj.-Gen. Sir Ivor (S'ampton) | Walker, Colonel William Hall |
| Kellaway, Frederick George | Pollock, Sir Ernest Murray | Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid.) |
| Kerr-Smiley, Major Peter Kerr | Pretyman, Rt. Hon. Ernest George | Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay T. |
| Kerry, Lieut.-Col. Earl of | Pryce-Jones, Colonel E. | Westan, J. W |
| Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement | Quilter, Major Sir Cuthbert | Wheler, Major Granville C. H. |
| Lambert, Rt. Hon. G. (Devon, S. Molten) | Randles, Sir John S. | White, Col. G. D. (Lancs., Southport) |
| Lane-Fox, Major G. R. | Raphael, Major Sir Herbert H. | Whiteley, Herbert James |
| Larmor, Sir J. | Ratcliff, Lieut.-Col. R. F. | Williams, Thomas J. (Swansea) |
| Law, Rt. Hon. A. Boner (Bootle) | Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel | Williamson, Sir Archibald |
| Lee, Sir Arthur Hamilton | Rawson, Colonel R. H | Wilson, Capt. A. Stanley (Yorks, E.R.) |
| Lloyd, George Butler (Shrewsbury) | Rees, Sir J. D. (Nottingham, E.) I | Wilson, Col. Leslie C. (Reading) |
| Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury) | Remnant, Col- Sir James Farquharson | Wilson-Fox, Henry |
| Long, Rt. Hon. Walter | Roberts, Sir S. (Sheffield, Ecclesalt) | Worthington Evans, Major Sir L. |
| Lonsdale, Sir John Brownlee | Rothschild, Major Lionel de | Yate, Colonel C. E. |
| Lowe, Sir F. W. (Birm., Edgbaston) | Rutherford, Col. Sir .J. (Lancs., Darwen) | |
| Loyd, Archie Kirkman | Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby) | TELLERS FOR THE AYES —Sir G. |
| McCalmont, Brig.-Gen. Robert C. A. | Samuels, Arthur W. | Younger and Mr. R. McNeill. |
| MacCaw, William J. MacGeagh | Samuel, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry (Norwood) | |
| NOES. | ||
| Acland, Rt. Hon. Francis Dyke | Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.) | Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil) |
| Agnew, Sir George William | Denman, Hon. Richard Douglas | Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth) |
| Ainsworth, Sir John Stirling | Dickinson, Rt. Hon. Willoughby H. | Jones, J. Towyn (Carmarthen, E.) |
| Alden, Percy | Dougherty, Rt. Hon. Sir J. B. | Jones, Rt. Hon. Leif (Notts, Rushcliffe) |
| Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbartonshire) | Duncan, Sir J. Hastings (Yorks, Otley) | Jones, William S. Glyn- (Stepney) |
| Anderson, W. C. | Edge, Captain William | Jowett, Frederick William |
| Armitage, Robert | Elverston, Sir Harold | Joyce, Michael |
| Barlow, Sir John Emmott (Somerset) | Essex, Sir Richard Walter | Keating, Matthew |
| Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick Burghs) | Falconer, James | Kenyon, Barnet |
| Barton, Sir William | Ferens, Rt. Hon. Thomas Robinson | King, Joseph |
| Beauchamp, Sir Edward | Finney, Samuel | Lamb, Sir Ernest Henry |
| Beck, Arthur Cecil | Fisher, Rt. Hon. H. A. L. (Hallam) | Lambert, Richard (Wilts., Cricklade) |
| Bentinck. Lord H. Cavendish- | Fleming, Sir John (Aberdeen) | Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas |
| Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine | Galbraith, Samuel | Lundon, Thomas |
| Black, Sir Arthur W. | Gelder, Sir W. A. | Lynch, Arthur Alfred |
| Blake, Sir Francis Douglas | Glanville, Harold James | Macdonald, Rt. Hon. J. M. (Falk. B'ghs) |
| Boland, John Pius | Greig, Colonel James William | Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester) |
| Bowerman, Rt. Hon. C. W. | Guest, Capt. Hon. Fred. E. (Dorset, E.) | McKenna. Rt. Hon. Reginald |
| Brady, Patrick Joseph | Gulland, Rt. Hon. John William | Maclean, Rt. Hon. Sir Donald |
| Brunner, John F. L. | Hall, Frederick (Yorks, Normanton) | McMicking, Major Gilbert |
| Burns, Rt. Hon. John | Harris, Percy A. (Leicester, S.) | MacVeagh, Jeremiah |
| Buxton, Noel | Harvey, T. E. (Leeds West) | Maden, Sir John Henry |
| Cator, John | Hayward, Major Evan | Mallalleu, Frederick William |
| Chancellor, Henry George | Healy, Maurice (Cork) | Manfield, Harry |
| Chapple, Major William Allen | Helme, Sir Norval Watson | Mason, David M. (Coventry) |
| Clough, William | Hemmerde, Edward George | Millar, James Duncan |
| Clynes, John R. | Henderson, Rt. Hon. Arthur (Durham) | Molteno, Percy Alpert |
| Collins, Major Godfrey P. (Greenock) | Henderson, John M. (Aberdeen, W.) | Mooney, John J. |
| Collins, Sir W. (Derby) | Higham, John Sharp | Morrell, Philip |
| Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth) | Hinds, John | Morton, Alpheus Cleopnes |
| Crooks, Rt. Hon. William | Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Sir Charier E. H. | Needham, Christopher T. |
| Crumley, Patrick | Holt, Richard Durning | Nicholson, Sir Charles N. (Doncaster) |
| Davies, David (Montgomery Co.) | Howard, John Geoffrey | Norman, Sir Henry |
| Davies, Ellis William (Eiffon) | Jacobsen, Thomas Owen | Nugent, J. D. (College Green) |
| Davies, Timothy (Lincs, Louth) | John, Edward Thomas | O'Noill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.) |
| Outhwaite, R. L. | Rowntree, Arnold | Toulmin, Sir George |
| Palmer, Godfrey Mark | Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter (Dewsbury) | Trevelyan, Charles Philips |
| Parker, James (Halifax) | Runciman, Sir Walter (Hartlepool) | Walsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince) |
| Parrott, Sir Edward | Russell, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. | Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford) |
| Pearce, Sir Robert (Staffs, Leek) | Samuel, Rt. Hon H. L. (Cleveland) | Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan) |
| Peel, Major Hon. G. (Spalding) | Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton) | Watson, J. B. (Stockton) |
| Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. | Seely, Lt.-Col. Sir C. H. (Mansfield) | Watt, Henry A. |
| Pratt, J. W. | Shaw, Hon. A. | Wedgwood, Lieut.-Commander Josiah C. |
| Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central) | Shorwell, Arthur James | White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston) |
| Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.) | Smallwood, Edward | Whitehouse, John Howard |
| Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.) | Smith, Capt. Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe) | Whittaker, Rt. Hon Sir Thomas P. |
| Raffan. Peter Wilson | Smith, H. B. Lees (Northampton) | Wiles, Rt. Hon. Thomas |
| Rea, Walter Russell | Smith, Sir Swire (Keighley, Yorks) | Wilkie, Alexander |
| Reddy, Michael | Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.) | Williams, Aneurin (Durham, N.W.) |
| Rees, G. C. (Carnarvonshire, Arfon) | Snowden, Philip | Williams, Llewelyn (Carmarthen) |
| Rendall, Athelstan | Sutherland, John E. | Williams, Col. Sir Robert (Dorset, W.) |
| Richardson, Arthur (Rotherham) | Sutton, John E. | Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Worcs., N.) |
| Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven) | Taylor, John W. (Durham) | Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton) |
| Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs) | Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe) | Winfrey, Sir Richard |
| Robertson, Rt. Hon. J. M. (Tyneside) | Tennant, Rt. Hon. Harold John | Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow) |
| Robinson, Sidney | Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton) | |
| Roch, Walter F. (Pembroke) | Thorne, William (West Ham) | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Lord |
| Rowlands, James | Tillett, B. | Hugh Cecil and Mr. Adamson. |
Question put, and agreed to.
Mr. H. SAMUELMay I ask, in view of the Division which has just been taken, if the Home Secretary will consider this suggestion? The Sub-section which has been added to the Bill has been added in a form which, it is generally agreed, is not the right form, and I would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman it would best meet the convenience of the House if, when the Bill is recommitted—as it will be for the Irish Clauses and Schedule—it should also he recommitted in respect of the Sub-section just added, in order that the House may have an opportunity of putting it in the form in which it is desired it should proceed to the other House.
§ Sir G. CAVEWe will certainly consider that suggestion, and consider it sympathetically.
§ Colonel GRETTONI beg to move, at the end of Sub-section (2), to insert the words, "A person shall not be entitled to be registered or to vote as a Parliamentary or local government elector if such person has been interned under the provisions of the Defence of the Realm Act."
8.0 P.M.
The principle embodied in this proposal is very similar to that which the House has just carried. Under the law as it now stands persons who are suspected, or supposed to be unreliable and disloyal, whether they are naturalised subjects of the Crown or whether they are foreigners, are interned and kept under restraint either during the period of the War or until such time as they may be safely released. The Amendment which I now move proposes that these persons shall not have the right to exercise the franchise at either Parliamentary or local government elections. Clearly such persons 1276 are not reliable citizens of the State. Whatever may be said as to the administration of the Defence of the Realm Act, I think it will be admitted in all quarters that that Act has not been administered stringently and ruthlessly or harshly, and that the criticism as to the internment of persons in this country has always been in another direction. At any rate, the power has been very carefully exercised. I do not wish, in moving this Amendment, to enter into any long arguments regarding the naturalisation laws, but it is notorious that the naturalisation of foreigners as British subjects in this country has been done under conditions very lax and very unsatisfactory. It has not even been considered necessary to ascertain whether the person naturalised as a British subject has in fact ceased to be a subject or will cease to be a subject of a foreign country, and the result has been that many of these people hold a dual citizenship recognised by the law of this country and not repudiated by the law obtaining in certain foreign countries. It is the case that in the case of war the land of birth makes a very great call upon those in foreign countries. There are many other considerations in connection with our naturalisation laws with which it would not be right or proper for me to deal at any length, but I do wish to call attention to this matter, because many persons are naturalised under the law of this country at the present moment who are not in fact desirable British citizens. Some of these have been interned, and no doubt there have been cases of British subjects of British birth who have been interned; but it is quite clear that this Amendment will not affect any very large class 1277 in this country. It may be assumed that persons who have been interned have been interned for very good reasons, and that they are not loyal or reliable citizens of the Crown, and I think they should not exercise the franchise.
§ Colonel YATEI beg to second the Amendment.
§ Sir G. CAVEThis Amendment would really have very little effect. The greater part of the persons interned are, of course, aliens who are thereby disqualified from voting. The only persons affected would be those who have been, or may be, interned under Regulation 14 (b) and I suppose there would be not more than 100 in the whole country who would be affected in this respect. Even as regards that 100, I suggest that there is difficulty in justifying this Amendment, because those persons are not interned for any crime or offence but on suspicion, and in order that due precautions may be taken for the safety of the country. I think it is quite right to intern them on suspicion, but I do not think they should be deprived of their vote on suspicion. Most of them, I think, many of them at all events, are naturalised British subjects, and as to all those the Government intend very shortly to introduce a Bill which will enable their naturalisation to be considered and, if need be, to be cancelled. The hon. and gallant Member may be quite sure that that measure will be taken; that is that proceedings will be considered and, if need be, commenced in respect of all naturalised citizens who have been interned, because the very fact that they are interned shows that they are under suspicion, and they will probably be called upon to justify their naturalisation as British subjects. We shall deal with them in that way, and as denaturalisation disqualifies them, we should get rid Of them once for all. That would cover a great part of the very limited area that would be embraced by this Amendment, and for those reasons I hope the Amendment will not be carried.
§ Amendment negatived.
§ Sir G. YOUNGERI beg to move, at the end of the Clause, to insert the words:
A person shall not be disqualified from voting at any election as a Parliamentary or local government election by reason that he is legally employed 1278 for payment by or on behalf of the candidate at any Parliamentary or local government election.I think the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gulland) will know the purpose of this Amendment. I do not know whether he agrees with it or not, but his party is in the same position as my own with regard to this matter, and in the hope that he agrees with this alteration, I move the Amendment.
§ Colonel GRETTONI beg to second the Amendment.
The point is really not a very large one. The number of persons who may be employed at an election is limited by law. Those persons in many cases feel a distinct grievance that they may not exercise their vote. There is really no question of corruption in this matter. It happens that the very few people employed in each election are by law deprived of their votes, and they desire to vote. It is only at an election of the closest possible character that their vote will turn the result one way or the other, and therefore as there is a certain stigma, or they feel that there is a certain stigma, cast on them, I venture to suggest to the House that this Amendment might well be carried as it would give satisfaction and relief to a certain number of persons in this country without doing any harm to the general welfare of the State.
§ Mr. GULLANDI quite agree with the hon. Baronet (Sir G. Younger) that on the whole this is probably quite a fair proposition. I should think that in the future with the very much restricted expenses of elections the number of those employed will be considerably less than it has been in the past. Another point I should like to put, in view of the Amendment, is that I have seen at an election an inferior man appointed as a messenger, or even as a sub-agent, because he is not an elector, and because it is considered that if you appoint a man who is an elector you deprive him of his vote. That, I think, is quite a good argument for the Amendment, and as I do not see any very strong arguments against it I do not desire to oppose it.
§ Mr. MAURICE HEALYI confess that this Amendment seems to me a very startling proposition. As long as there have been elections it has been the law—and, I believe is part of the Statute—that nobody who is a paid servant or agent of the 1279 candidate can cast a vote; and there is a very obvious reason for it. It is quite out of the question that anybody who receives remuneration from a candidate would vote against him or can bring an unprejudiced mind to the issues which are tried at the election. He is paid to take one side, and I think, with great respect, that the existing law which says that an elector must be an independent elector is a good law. In the old times, when there were election addresses, they were addressed to the independent elector. Is the paid agent of the candidate an independent elector or not? I say he is not. He is doing nothing at all dishonourable or discreditable. He is earning his bread, and, I am sure, giving good value for the fees he receives; but he is not an independent elector when he becomes the paid servant of the candidate, and it is idle to say that that man can give an honest, or, at any rate, an independent, vote on the issues which are raised at the election.
§ Colonel GRETTONThe candidate can vote for himself.
§ Colonel GRETTONHe is biassed.
§ Mr. HEALYI did not say unbiassed. No elector is unbiassed. The fact that a man goes to the poll and takes a side shows that he is not unbiassed. He has formed a judgment on one side or the other, and to say that he is unbiassed is nonsense. The question is, Did he form his judgment on proper grounds or is he influenced by payment? It is conceded that any man who takes money for his vote is doing a disgraceful thing. There is no disgrace in taking money to assist a candidate at an election, but the notion that a man who takes money from a candidate at an election continues to be an independent elector is, with great respect, arrant nonsense. Can the House conceive a man who has taken a fee voting in any way but one; and is not that the effect of this Amendment? Could he honestly vote for any candidate other than the man who has given him this money?
§ Colonel GRETTONHe could.
§ Mr. HEALYDo you think any candidate would employ an agent who was going to vote against him? Such a thing is inconceivable. Take the election agent. He may be a very honest man, a man of the most shining virtue, but is it conceiv- 1280 able that if he takes a fee to conduct the election he will vote against his principal, or is it suggested that he will be acting honestly in doing so? The same applies to every man in the hire of the candidate, from the conducting agent down to the lowest messenger. I hope we shall not accompany this great reform and extension of the franchise by introducing into it the principle that a man who is paid to act for a candidate can come up and vote for him. The grievance involved in this matter is quite insignificant. It affects both parties equally, as the hon. Baronet said, and therefore no one suffers. Assuming that both candidates are equally equipped with agents and messengers and all the rest of it, no candidate suffers because his paid agent cannot vote, and what good purpose would be served by this Amendment? So far as it is a disqualification on one side it is a disqualification on the other. Why did previous Parliaments agree that paid agents should not be permitted to vote? Is there any reason but the one that it was a kind of corruption, and it is undoubtedly a kind of corruption. I venture to appeal to the hon. Baronet to think seriously before he asks the House to accept an Amendment of this kind. For my part, I cannot imagine anything more objectionable than that we should now, in introducing this great reform, put into this Bill the principle that a man's paid agents can come up and vote for him. Obviously, the more paid agents a man has the more votes he gets. Obviously the rich man can employ more paid agents than the poor man. It is, indeed, said that there is a restriction on election expenses which consequently limits the number of paid agents that a man has. So there is. That, however, does not alter the fact that a rich man can employ more paid agents than a poor man. No two candidates spend exactly the same on their election. The man who has a considerable sum of money to spend is always at an advantage at an election compared with the poor man. The poor man necessarily spends less money—that is to say that he will have less paid agents. Accordingly, this Amendment puts the rich candidate in a position of advantage as compared with the poor candidate. That, however, is not the most powerful argument.
§ Sir G. YOUNGERThe expenses are limited by the Act.
§ Mr. HEALYI know they are; I have just pointed out that that is so. But the hon. Baronet has assumed that every candidate spends the maximum. He does not. The poor man spends less than the rich man, and will consequently have fewer paid agents. Up till now we have assumed that the voter was a free and independent elector. That is a trite and a commonplace of every election address. Now, for the first time we will say in our elections that he is a free, independent, and paid voter. There will be those who vote from love of principle, and those who vote from hire.
§ The PRESIDENT of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. Hayes Fisher)The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, who is an expert in electioneering matters, seems to think that if we accept this Amendment we shall very largely increase the area of bribery and corruption, and that we shall do much to diminish the independence of the elector. I regard this Amendment, I am afraid, from a very different point of view. I think it is quite a small matter. The law at present makes conditions as to the number of persons, the various classes of agents, clerks, etc., who may be employed by any candidate. Rule 7 of the Schedule of the Act lays it down that those employed for payment, clerks, agents, committee-room attendants, messengers, and people of that kind cannot enjoy the privilege of voting. My hon. Friend who has moved this Amendment says that he desires that in future, although they are engaged for payment, that these people should not be prohibited from voting. No doubt the law was framed originally with a view to the prevention of bribery and corruption. I think we certainly, as regards elections, live in a very much clearer atmosphere. I want to remind my hon. and learned Friend, who thinks that if we accepted the Amendment it would be very much to the benefit of the rich candidate, that after all you can only employ now a certain number of these polling agents, clerks, messengers, and so on, and that, as we are cutting down expenses to at least half, you will have to employ many less of these paid servants of candidates.
For my own part my experience in electioneering, as that of my right hon. Friend opposite the Member for Dumfries Burghs, is that very often one has had to take most inferior persons and put them in charge of committee rooms. We 1282 have had to take them because in a tight-fought contest one did not want to deprive oneself even of a single vote. My hon. and learned Friend argues against this proposition, but no one will suffer, for both sides will have the same opportunity as now, and both sides now can employ a certain number of polling agents who are disqualified from voting. Therefore, one candidate does not get any pull over the other. I thought I should be justified in accepting this Amendment—particularly as it has been supported by my right hon. Friend opposite, who is also an expert in electioneering—on this ground: the constituencies now are going to be larger, and much more difficult to work, and we want the very best results wherever we get a contest, we want the greatest number of people at the poll, and the most efficient machinery to carry out our elections, and I believe you are not going to get that unless you allow candidates a fuller choice in this respect than is the case now. Unless, therefore, there is some more opposition to this proposal than I see at present, moved and supported as it is by electioneering experts, I am inclined to accept the Amendment.
§ Amendment agreed to.