HC Deb 21 November 1917 vol 99 cc1302-26

(1) If at an election for one Member of Parliament there are more than two candidates, the election shall be according to the principle of the alternative vote as defined by this Act.

(2) At a contested election for a university constituency, where there are two or more members to be elected, any election of the full number of members shall be according to the principle of proportional representation, each elector having one transferable vote as defined by this Act.

(3) His Majesty may by Order in Council frame Regulations prescribing the method of voting, and transferring and counting votes, at any election, according to the principle of the transferable or of the alternative vote and for adapting the provisions of the Ballot Act, 1872, and any other Act relating to Parliamentary elections thereto, and with respect to the duties of returning officers in connection therewith; and any such Regulations shall have effect as if they were enacted in this Act.

(4) Nothing contained in this Act shall, except as expressly provided herein, affect the method of conducting Parliamentary elections in force at the time of the passing of this Act.

Mr. A. WILLIAMS

I beg to move, at the beginning of the Clause, to insert, (1) In a constituency returning three or more members any election of the full number of members shall be according to the principle of proportional representation, each elector having one transferable vote, as defined by this Act. This is a proposal to restore the provision in the Bill as introduced—a provision which embodies an important part of the compromise mixed up with the whole of this Reform Bill. It was a part that was unanimously recommended by the Speaker's conference, and inserted by the Government in the Bill they introduced, but left by them to the House. I desire to emphasise the fact that it was part of the unanimous recommendation of the Speaker's Conference, because that fact has been denied—I think most improperly denied—and I cannot think how such a mistake could have been made. The proposal was that proportional representation should be the method of an election in constituencies returning three, four, or five members. The subject of this was, of course, that, as far as possible, each of the political parties in such a borough should be represented in proportion to its strength, and, moreover, that any very strong independent candidate should be given a chance of getting representation for that borough if supported by an adequate number of voters. The way in which that object was proposed to be carried out was by taking as undivided constituencies all boroughs which were large enough to have three, four, or five members, but with regard to larger boroughs they should be divided into two constituencies, each returning three, four, or five members, or, in the case of very large boroughs, into three constituencies returning each three, four, or five members. The method of voting defined by the Bill was simply the method of putting the figure 1 against the elector's first choice, the figure 2 against the candidate he would wish to vote for if he could not get No. 1, and the figure 3 against his third choice, and so on. It is exactly the same form of voting as we shall have in single-member constituencies if we adopt the alternative vote, which was also in the Bill as brought in, and which stands in the Bill now as it has passed through Committee.

Therefore, the suggestion that there is any complexity about the way the voter would have to vote under proportional representation has no more foundation than if anyone were to suggest that it was beyond the elector to put 1, 2, 3 against the names of a single-member constituency where there is the alternative vote. Those proposals were struck out of the Bill in the Committee stage, and struck out by a very small majority, the Committee declining to have any proportional representation in boroughs, while leaving it to a certain extent in the universities. I now ask the House to reinstate these provisions, and, of course, I must state very briefly upon what grounds I ask for it. I am not going over all the arguments for proportional representation itself, and not even the chief arguments. I am only going to give the arguments for my Amendment. My arguments are, in the first place, that the majority was very small; in the second place, that the idea was an unfamiliar idea, and I have very great reason to believe it has become much more familiar to hon. Members since then. Thirdly, that there is very great evidence that opinion has been growing, both in this House and in the country, in favour of proportional representation since the matter was considered in Committee. I would remind the House that when this matter came up in 1885 in the House of Commons it was practically, if not absolutely, the first time that proportional representation was ever suggested in this House. It is quite true that there had previously been proposals for minority representation as it was called, but proportional representation is essentially different from minority representation, for this reason. The first principle of proportional representation is that the majority of votes must get the majority of the seats, while with minority representation we find that in its anxiety to represent minority it sometimes forgets what is justly due to the majority.

In 1885 there were thirty-one votes given for proportional representation in a House practically the same size as this, and then the matter was forgotten for some years. In 1910 a Royal Commission was appointed to consider electoral systems, and proportional representation was before that Commission. We are told that the Royal Commission did not report in its favour. That is in a sense true, but if you look into the Report of the Royal Commission it says distinctly that they did not recommend it to be accepted here and now. They admitted it would work, and admitted almost everything in its favour, but they did not recommend it here and now. They went on to say that under certain circumstances it would be desirable to adopt it, and one of the things they mentioned was in the case of a great increase of the electorate. That is exactly the position which is in front of us now.

In 1912, 1913, and 1914 the Home Rule Act, and subsequently the Home Rule Amendment Act, were before this House, and in those Acts proportional representation in the form we are now asking for it was given a large place for the Irish Parliament, both in the election of the Irish Senate and the Irish House of Commons. Then we came to July, 1917, when proportional representation for this Imperial House was almost carried in Committee, for the majority against it was only thirty-two. Since then we have plenty of evidence that there has been a change of opinion in favour of proportional representation. Hon. Member after hon. Member have told me that the tide is turning in that direction, and quite a number of hon. Members have said that they themselves have determined to vote for it now, although they voted against it formerly. Therefore I think we are surely justified in believing that the flowing tide is with this movement in this country, and we are justified in bringing the matter forward once more for the judgment of this House.

With regard to the flowing tide I will not weary the House with the experience of foreign countries or our own Dominions over the seas, but if I did I could show you that the tide is flowing as strongly in those countries in favour of proportional representation as it is in this country. Those of us who follow the movement all over the world closely know that there is never a month without some evidence that the principle of proportional representation is making headway it every great civilised country, and particularly in one of the Dominions of our own Empire. Therefore I say again we are well justified in asking the House to reconsider this matter, all the more so because it seems to me that the House fails to realise in June or July the effect of striking out proportional representation, and the effect it would have on the rest of the Bill. We discussed that last night, but the fact that the Bill with proportional representation introduces plural voting into certain boroughs, namely, into fifteen borough divisions, and without proportional representation the Bill would introduce plural voting in 213 borough divisions, the law hitherto having been that there should be no plural voting in boroughs. That is a tremendous change.

I suppose you may put it roughly that plural voting within the boroughs will be multiplied tenfold by striking out the proportional representation provisions. I do not believe that that was in the mind of the House when the Committee gave that vote. I am certain it was not intended by Liberal, Labour, or the Irish parties, and I ask myself whether it was really intended by the Conservative party. Of course, personally, I have no right to speak for them, but this I will say, that every public speaker of experience in the last few years knows how hateful plural voting is to the majority of the great mass of our people, and how damaging it has long been to the Conservative party. The Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University last night urged upon those of his own party how much more to the interests of true Conservatism it would be to rely upon proportional representation giving them the just representation to which they are undoubtedly entitled, rather than to rely upon an artificial proportion, such as plural voting would be. I am completely convinced that he was right. I believe that the majority of our people of all classes want steady progress, and neither reaction nor violent, rash innovations. Since proportional representation gives the majority of seats to the majority of votes, it should give to that steady progressive majority the power which rightly belongs to it, and if that is not the true interests of Conservatism in the truest and best sense of the word, then I am afraid I do not understand it.

It is said, however, that the alternative vote would do what proportional representation claims to do, and would do it very much simpler. The alternative vote would give representation to only one party in each constituency. We should have a series all over the country of three, four or five-cornered fights, and one of the parties at or near the top of the poll would get the seat in each case, while the other parties at the bottom of the poll would not be represented, but in exchange they will have the right of saying which of the candidates they had opposed should get the seat and which of their opponents should be represented and which of their opponents should go unrepresented. The consequence would be that we should have scores of members returned to this House by the votes of their political opponents. When we met here we should have Conservatives returned by purely Conservative votes, and we should have Conservatives who did not get in at the first choice but who were put in by Liberal votes on the second choice in order to keep the Labour men out. There would be Conservatives put in by Labour votes despite the votes of Liberals, and you would have Liberal Members dependent upon Conservative votes. That is what has happened in other Parliaments where they have the alternative vote, where one man says, " I depend on blue votes "; another says, " We will try something else "; but that will not suit somebody else because he depends on buff votes. How much better it would be under proportional representation, when you would have hon. Members coming here elected by consistent bodies of opinion behind them with whom they really did agree. I agree that the alternative vote may be better than the present system, which very often gives a seat to the representative of a mere minority. It may be the best that you can do in single-member constituencies, but I do ask the House to say that it is far inferior to that which proportional representation in larger constituencies would give us. There every party would be represented by a man who was dependent upon a consistent body of opinion, and every party in every locality would have the opportunity of being represented by its real choice and by the best man, usually the best local man who could be put forward. The realisation of these facts and arguments is, I am convinced, spreading. We have great evidence to show it, and in these circumstances we have felt justified in giving the House the opportunity of reconsidering the vote that was given in Committee.

This Amendment would reinstate exactly the words that were in the Bill when it was introduced. Its acceptance would bind no one to any details, because it contains practically no details. It asks the House to affirm the principle of proportional representation by applying it to those town constituencies which are large enough to admit of sharing the representation among two or three parties; that is to say, for practical purposes any constituency returning three or four or five members. It does not lay down which boroughs are to be constituted as constituencies returning three, four, or five members. That will be for decision on Schedule IV. It is true that we have down Amendments which reconvert into undivided constituencies those boroughs which are just large enough, being neither too small nor too big, for three, four, or five members. As the Bill stands, they were arbitrarily divided into single-member areas. It was necessary for us in putting down the Amendment to provide some constituencies to which it would apply, because as the Bill stands there are no constituencies to which the Amendment could apply. It was therefore necessary for us to put down Amendments to the Schedule saying that there should be such and such boroughs to which it should apply. It does not mean by putting down a limited number of Amendments as we have done that we ask the House to confine proportional representation to the twenty-two boroughs against which we have put down Amendments. In addition to those twenty-two boroughs, which are exactly the right size for proportional representation, the Speaker's Conference recommended, first, the linking up of small adjacent boroughs and, secondly, the sub-division of every large boroughs, such as Glasgow or Liverpool, into two or three divisions. We, as private Members, could not put down Amendments covering those points, because they involve the linking up of areas or the sub-dividing of areas. Only the Boundary Commissioners can do that, and as we were not Boundary Commissioners it was impossible for us to do it. We have put down those Amendments that were within our power, not intending to limit the House to those boroughs or to ask the House to say precisely the boroughs to which it should apply, but leaving it absolutely open for the House on the Schedule to decide whether it should be applied to the whole extent to which the Speaker's Conference recommended it.

As advocates of proportional representation we, of course, accepted the Bill as it was originally introduced, and we accept it still and stand by it. At the same time, no individual Member who votes for this Amendment to-night will commit himself to demanding the whole of that which the Speaker's Conference represented or that which the Bill as introduced gave us. We are not asking the House to commit itself to the policy of all or nothing. If this Amendment should be carried to-night, as I hope it will, it will be for the Government at once to set their Boundary Commissioners to work and to decide what they will do. The work that the Boundary Commissioners will have to do will be of the simplest character, and will only take them a very few hours. The work will not be heavy. With regard to those constituencies—and they are the great majority—which are already of the exact size entitling them to three or four or five Members there will be nothing for the Boundary Commissioners to do except simply to wipe out the lines of divisions which they have already made. In the case of linking up of small boroughs, of course it will be for them to consider which boroughs shall be linked up, and in the case of dividing Glasgow, Liverpool and so on—they have already divided those boroughs into single-member divisions, Glasgow to take an example into fifteen—it will be for the Boundary Commissioners to show how those divisions are to be grouped together into three or four groups or whatever they may decide. There will really be very little to do, and very little of the work which they have already done will be thrown away. Of course, they will have nothing at all to do with county divisions.

I wish to touch upon two of the main objections that have been made to this principle. One is a supposed difficulty as to by-elections, and the second is as to expenses. I do not know how far it may be in order on this Amendment to discuss those questions at length, but fortunately it is not at all necessary for me to do so. I only desire to point out that those two questions will come up separately for the decision of the House on later Amendments. That is a fortunate circumstance connected with the form in which I am able to present this matter. We are able to-night to take the broad principle. The question of by-elections, the question of the expenses, and the question of areas will come up on subsequent Amendments. If the House accepts the principle of compulsory representation, there are two ways of dealing with the by-elections. One is to poll the whole constituency, and, as the Bill is introduced and as the report of the Speaker's Conference was framed, it was implied that method was recommended. We proportionalists were perfectly willing to accept that and we are willing to accept it now. At the same time there is another system which has been proposed and which received some support in Committee, and that is dividing boroughs into wards, each big enough for one Member, and in the case of a vacancy 'only polling that one ward to which the late Member was attached. There is an Amendment down later on which will give the House a complete opportunity of dealing with the by-election question.

10.0 P.M.

The second objection which is very often made is on the ground of expense. It is clear that the expense would be heavy, but we have always argued that the expenses of elections are what Parliament likes to enact that they shall be. The limit of expense fixed by this Bill as originally introduced was, it was said, unnecessarily high for those large constituencies returning three, four, or five Members. There is down an Amendment to Clause 1 which would limit the expense falling upon a candidate, and would put him on very much the same level as a candidate in a single - member constituency. If that Amendment be accepted when we come to it, and in these large boroughs we give two free postages instead of one, the limit of expense of the candidate in the largest possible constituencies the Bill provides —of a candidate standing alone—would not be more than about £1,100, and in the smallest constituency the candidate standing with two others would only have to spend about £300. Therefore you may say that if this other Amendment is accepted the expenses of the candidate under proportional representation will be almost exactly the same as those of a candidate in an ordinary single member constituency under the Bill as it stands now. Consequently expense is not an insuperable obstacle, and I believe that the money provided would be, together with two free postages, sufficient to enable any candidate to put his views adequately before the electors. A man standing alone in a large constituency, as the Bill is at present drawn, might have to spend rather more than £1,100. The House will have every opportunity of deciding upon these points later on. I only ask it now to decide on the question of principle—to say whether or not it desires that proportional representation shall be applied, reserving all these points of detail for later Clauses and for the Schedules. I hope I have explained our proposals clearly, and I certainly have tried to do it as briefly as possible, in view of the bigness of the subject. I am only going to add a very few words. I venture to ask the House this question, What is it that gives this House its strength? It is when it is believed to reflect the true mind and will of the country. If ever this House seems to lose autnority it is when it is suspected that it does not truly represent the mind and will of the country. Under our present system one cannot say with absolute certainty that even in a newly elected House of Commons the majority of the Members do represent the majority of the people. Even on one of the greatest issues of the day it is sometimes doubtful whether that is so or not. In the 1906 Election it was extremely doubtful what the voice of the country was on some of the biggest issues. In different parts of the country elections were fought on very different issues, and when you come to the secondary issues it is practically impossible after a General Election to say what has or has not been decided. As soon as we come here we begin to dispute amongst ourselves as to what has or what has not been decided by the General Election. Under proportional representation there can be no such demoralising doubt. Electors and parties would get representation in proportion to the votes they possess. That has been proved again and again by the experience of countries which have used proportional representation. Even on secondary questions their wishes would be accurately represented by their representatives, for each elector would have a choice of candidates before him within his own party, and he would choose the one man who most nearly represented his views not on one particular question, but on all important matters, whereas now he has no choice but to vote or not to vote for the one man whom his party has nominated. There are those in this country who do not want to see Parliament strong; they are not very numerous, but they are active and dangerous men. They want to see Parliament weak in order that sectional and class organisations may be strong and may rule. To my knowledge, one of the leaders of that school of thought the other day declared himself against proportional representation at Parliamentary elections because it would strengthen Parliament—a result which he did not desire—while he was in favour of proportional representation for other organisations which he desired to see strong. We all here, I am sure, desire to see Parliament strong. There is a time coming when Parliament will need all the strength it can legitimately command. That strength cannot come to it from leaning on any undemocratic crutch. It cannot come to it from, plural votes or fancy franchises or hereditary or plutocratic privileges, but our reliance must be on the common sense and honesty of the great mass of the people. Our strength can only come from really and fully representing the people. Government for the people and by the people does not mean for a section of the people or by any section of the people, not even by the majority, and much less by the minority. It means by representatives of the whole people and by representatives of those great sections of the people returned to this House in true proportion to the relevant strength of those sections in the nation.

Mr. MARRIOTT

I rise to second the Amendment which has been moved in so closely reasoned a speech by my hon. Friend. The question before the House to-night has been twice debated during the present Session, and there is no reason, therefore, why I should take up the time of the House at any great length on this occasion. On both of the occasions to which I have referred the principle which is affirmed in this Amendment was rejected, and on each occasion by a very small majority. I should like, therefore, to submit to the House to-night one or two points which may, I hope, have the effect of inducing the small majority by which the issue was previously decided to reconsider the judgment at which they then arrived. I would ask the House, in the first place, to consider very briefly one or two of the objections which have in the course of the last few months most prominently emerged against this proposal. The first, which I have no doubt we shall hear to-night from the hon. Member for Westminster (Mr. Burdett-Coutts), is that the advocates of this electoral method have not the courage of their opinions, and that they propose a very partial application of the principle to which they adhere. May I venture to point out that this objection has no validity whatever as regards the particular Amendment which we are moving to-night? This Amendment merely affirms a principle. The extent of the application of that principle depends entirely on the acceptance or rejection of subsequent Amendments. I lay no particular stress upon this point. I am perfectly free to admit that if we were logical, perhaps if we were courageous, we should press for the universal application of this principle. But we are not logical. No one except fools or doctrinaires arcs logical in politics; but of this I am quite certain, that if we were logical the very first people to reproach us with pedantic adherence to logical consistency would be the opponents of this Amendment to-night. The blunt fact is that we who believe in the principle of proportional representation are prepared to take as much as we can get, and we will not refuse the least that is offered us. The more we can get the better we shall be pleased; and for this reason. The larger the scale on which the experiment is tried the more triumphant I am certain will be the vindication of the principle it contains, although I believe that the principle will vindicate itself however small the scale. For my own part, therefore, I shall take what I can get. So much for the arguments directed against our courage and our logic.

There is a second objection, which I am not very seriously concerned to rebut. It is that we are asking the House to impose an intellectual test; that we are asking the House to put a premium on the intelligence of the elector. What is the degree of the intelligence which is demanded by this proposal? It is that the elector should be able to count the fingers on his two hands; that he should be able to, count up to ten, perhaps to twelve, and possiby to twenty; but the degree of intelligence which we ask of the elector is no more than is involved in picking up sides for a cricket match. I know I shall be pointed—I am sure the hon. Member for Westminster will point me—to the White Paper which has been circulated. [HON. MEMBERS " Rear, hear! " I knew that point would emerge, and I will deal with it for a moment. I know that Paper has created a very strong prejudice against the Amendment we are moving to-night; but I hope the House will allow me very respectfully to say that that prejudice is wholly irrelevant to the particular proposal we are making to-night. I admit that, on paper—especially on that particular Paper—it looks hideously complicated; but as regards the voter the argument is irrelevant. The voter has nothing whatever to do with the counting of his own votes. That is a matter for the expert clerk, who will, no doubt, be trained to the business he has to do. A paper has been circulated—it reached me a day or two ago, and I have no doubt it has reached other hon. Members—on the authority of the hon. Member for Westminster, and it contains this sentence: If only this paper of rules could be distributed broadcast among the electors of England proportional representation would never have a nuance till Doomsday. [HON. MEMBERS: " Hear, hear! "] Exactly. Let me put this question to the hon. Members who cheer that sentiment. What earthly reason is there why the paper of which they have made so much account should ever be circulated among the voters at all. Why should they ever see it? It is nothing to do with the voters The suggestion which is made by hon. Members is not an appeal to reason or to serious argument. It is an appeal to prejudice, and to irrelevant prejudice at that.

I pass to a third objection, which we hear on every side—that this proposal is going to open the doors of this House to faddists and cranks. With all respect, I would venture to ask whether the present system is entirely successful in excluding them? I do not think that anyone who is even slightly acquainted with the proceedings of this House will answer that question with an unhesitating affirmative; but if there are cranks at large in the country —and I am sure it is Utopian to hope to eliminate them—I would venture to ask if this House is not the safest place in which to intern them? I think it is for two reasons. In the first place, if they are mere cranks and bores, if they represent length without breadth, as a great many do, there is no place whatever in the world where their emptiness will be so quickly or so effectively exposed as in this House itself. If they are not mere cranks, then I submit that it is desirable that such substance as their views possess should be examined in this House; for it not very seldom happens that the crank of to-day is the statesman of to-morrow. Then we are told, in the same paper to which I has e been referring, that proportional representation is a demonstrated failure in this country. I venture to say that it has never been tried in this country. We have been pointed to the experiment of 1867 of the minority seat in the three-cornered constituency, but I venture to suggest that that was not really an experiment in proportional representation at all, and it is precisely because that experiment failed to secure the object which it, in common with ourselves, had in view, namely, a due, ,fair, and reasonable representation of minorities, that we now present and ask the House of Commons to adopt a totally different proposal, the proposal which is embodied in this Amendment. In the year 1885 these single-member constituencies were definitely recommended and adopted. I am sure I shall be within the recollection of the House in saying that in 1885 the present system of single-member constituencies was itself adopted as an experiment in minority representation as an alternative to the three-cornered constituencies. Is there a single Member in this House to-night, or is there anyone outside it, who will contend that from that point of view the experiment initiated in 1885 has been successful? Allow me to recall the facts to the remembrance of the House.

Since 1885 there have taken place seven General Elections. At the first, in 1886, the Unionist party was returned with a majority of 183. On the principles we are recommending to the House that majority ought to have been eighty-seven. I am now speaking not of the United Kingdom, but of England, Scotland, and Wales, excluding Ireland from the computation. As regards those three countries, in 1892 the Unionists ought to have been in a majority of seventeen, and they were in a majority of seventeen, the only occasion on which the result has really tallied with the principle. In 1895 the Unionists were again returned, with a majority of 213. Their majority in that year should have been 111. In the kharki election of 1900 they were returned again, with a majority of 195, which was seventy in excess of their due proportion. In the great " landslide" of 1906, when it was not the Unionist party which was returned, their opponents were returned with a majority of 289. That majority should have been 89; it was 200 in excess. In January, 1910, the majority was 63, when it ought to have been 17, and in December of the same year it was 61 when it ought to have been 5. These are the results so far as England, Scotland and Wales are concerned of the General Elections which have been held under the present system. I turn from these general results to the results in particular localities which have a claim to be regarded as political entities. I take Scotland. In the election of January, 1910, the Home Rule party obtained 394,103 votes and with those votes they obtained 61 seats in Scotland. The Unionist party polled 265,770 votes and they obtained eleven seats, that is to say, one Home Ruler was returned roughly for every 6,500 votes and one Unionist for every 24,000 votes; in other words, the vote of the Home Ruler was worth four times as much as that of the Unionist. [An HON. MEMBER: " They are worth it!"] It might be worth twice as much, but I do not think any hon. Member would contend that it would be worth four times as much. I need not develop the point upon which I am insisting, but there is an even more curious case than that of Scotland Look at the case of Wales. In 1906, out of thirty-four seats in Wales, the Unionist party obtained not one, although they polled 100,547 votes.

Sir FRANCIS LOWE

You do not bring Wales in.

Mr. MARRIOTT

I would gladly have put it in. I have said that we have put in as much as we think we can get. If we can get Wales, we will take it. We will not exclude anything we can get. I turn from that point to the theory that is very often urged, namely, virtual representation. We are told that although it is perfectly true that the Unionists cannot get a seat in Wales and that they get miserable under-representation in Scotland, yet as they have over-representation in the home counties —Kent, Surrey and Sussex —that the Unionists of Scotland are virtually represented by the Unionists of South —Eastern England. Is it any consolation to the Unionists of Scotland or Wales to be told that though they are under-represented their fellow Unionists in South-Eastern England have more than their deserts? Besides, does this theory of virtual representation work, even on the hypothesis which is put forward by those who maintain the principle? Take, for example, the election of 1895. There were 484 seats contested in the United Kingdom. The Unionist Party in that year received 1,785,372 votes, with which they got 282 seats. Their opponents received 1,823,809 votes, for which they got 202 seats. That is your theory of virtual representation. It is a mockery of representative Government a mere caricature of democracy.

I will leave these rather detailed points, though they are details of very great importance, and submit one or two rather more general considerations. The first point I will urge we have heard almost ad nauseam, but not, I think, in this connection. I suppose there is no point which has been more assiduously laboured, whether by politicians or by publicists who have commented upon the working of the British Constitution in the last ten or fifteen years than the increasing autocracy —a phrase which is becoming so familiar —of the Executive. What is the best corrective, assuming that this charge is true, assuming that we are suffering, as we are constantly told, from the increasing autocracy Of the Executive? I submit that it is to be found in the proposal embodied in this Amendment. I know I shall be asked by one of my right hon. Friends opposite whether I really desire to weaken the Executive? To that question I reply I do and I do not. I draw a distinction between the Executive in its executive functions and the Executive in its control of the Legislature, which is an entirely different point. I do not at all want to weaken the Executive in the exercise of the functions which are proper to an executive, but I do wish to limit its encroachment upon the sphere which is proper to the Legislature. That is a distinction which I am entitled to press upon the House —a distinction of some real importance in connection with the argument which I am putting forward.

When complaint is made by publicists or politicians that the power of the Cabinet has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished, it is not of the latter they are thinking. The power of the Cabinet over legislative processes ought to be curtailed and there is no more effective way of curtailing it in its relation to legislation than that which is embodied in the principle of the Amendment which I am seconding. There is one other general consideration, and it is a point which is constantly urged, is the increasing tyranny —I do not associate myself with this charge, but am merely putting it to the House —of party and of party organisation. That is a complaint which is heard on every side, the increasing pressure of the party machine. I think there is some substance in that complaint, though how much precisely I am not prepared to say. Anyway, the complaint comes —and this will not be denied —not from one political party but from all political parties, and especially from the youngest of our political parties to whom I would make a strong appeal to-night, an appeal which in strength is out of proportion to the number of that party. [An HON. MEMBER: " The National party are not here!"] I do not see the National party here. It is said that this evil of the party machine will not diminish but will be increased by proportional representation. If that is the case how is it that the party machines are notoriously against proportional representation? The men who mind those machines are pretty shrewd men. Are they on both sides against proportional representation because they are afraid proportional representation will increase their power? It is an insult to their intelligence to suggest such a thing. I hope we may have an answer to that question before the Debate concludes. At the present time the choice of the electorate is virtually confined to the party selection of nominees, The electors have to vote for a particular candidate or they waste their vote. Under proportional representation no vote can be wasted except by the deliberate action of the voter. That is surely a very great gain if there was no other gain in the proposals which we submit.

I hope it may not be deemed impertinent or presumptuous if I conclude —because on this question I feel very strongly indeed, and have not arrived at a conclusion on it in the last few months or the last few years —with a very earnest appeal to all parties in this House. As a lifelong Imperialist myself I would appeal to all those who view the political institutions of the United Kingdom in relation to the larger whole of which the United Kingdom forms a component part, to give in this matter of proportional representation a lead to the great self-governing dominions. At this moment it is a really serious matter and I hope the House will take it seriously. In two if not in three of the greatest dominions a mere majority vote is threatening to-day very grievous consequences to the stability of the Empire. The present system, it is notorious, tends to exaggerate those differences of race and creed which in the case of Canada and South Africa are already sufficiently and notoriously menacing. This is a point on which I will venture to quote words which will be listened to with respect in every quarter of the House, words which came from the death-bed of the late Lord Grey. In his last letter to the "Times" on the very subject which we are discussing now he said: In Canada the necessity of the two political parties to obtain an electoral majority in every district is a corrupting influence which poisons the life of the people from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In South Africa the failure of General Botha to win a single seat in the Orange River Province at the last General Election seriously imperilled the Union. In Australia the caucus is supreme, and it is no more possible to those who are not members of labour associations to be elected in the mining and industrial districts than it has been for Unionists for the last quarter of a century to obtain Parliamentary representation in the South and West of Ireland. Whatever the House may think of my words, they will not think lightly of the words of Lord Grey. I appeal, in the first place, to all genuine Imperialists. In the second place, I appeal to all genuine and consistent democrats, to all who pay something more than lip-homage to those principles which lie at the root of the policy which they profess to affirm. How anyone who calls himself a democrat can be satisfied with the present system I am personally at a loss to comprehend. In the third place, I make a very earnest appeal to members of the Unionist party, to those of them at any rate who have any concern at all for their fellow Unionists who are so flagrantly unrepresented in Scotland, almost wholly unrepresented in Wales, and totally unrepresented in the South and West of Ireland. Finally, I appeal, and this is the root and essence of my appeal, to the more moderate, more reasonable men, not of one party but of all parties. I do not, because I cannot, appeal to the extremists of any party. They may win in the future, as they have won in the past, their crushing, overwhelming victories. Each in turn may win them. They may win, they will win, that sort of victory under the majority system. I wish the country joy of those crushing victories on the one side and the other. My appeal is not to the extremists. But I would appeal, and with all the earnestness I can command —and I would that my powers of persuasion were equal to the strength of my convictions —to all the more moderate men, and to the more reflective members of all parties and of every party, to think very seriously indeed before they reject the Amendment which is now before the House. From the bottom of my heart I believe that, if they do reject it, there is not a moderate man of any party who will not soon repent in sackcloth and ashes of the vote which he gives for its rejection. Everybody agrees that there are grave and difficult days ahead of us. We do not know what the immediate future may bring forth. What we do know is that under the Bill, to which this is an Amendment, and under the circumstances of the hour, we are launching the ship of State upon a very dark and stormy and uncharted sea, and, in my deliberate judgment, it is the height of unwisdom to decline to take advantage of any one of the safeguards which either science or prudence may suggest.

Mr. BURDETT-COUTTS

I agree with the concluding words of my hon. Friend. that by this Bill we are launching this country on an uncharted sea. We are enormously adding to the electorate, and. we are including in that electorate a very large element of those who have never exercised the vote, and that Parliament will be elected by an electorate, vast, uncertain, and of new character. Does my hon. Friend believe that in that great unknown, so to speak, before us, we are justified in adopting a new, untried, and theoretic machinery whereby all this new electorate shall choose their representatives in this House, something that is unknown to them, something which those whom they consult and who have hitherto exercised the vote, will not be able to explain to them, and something which —although I think it was my hon. Friend who derided the comparison and complexity which I attributed to that White Paper —will tell the previous electors and enable them to tell the new electors, that there is some mysterious manipulation, some calculation they do not understand, going on behind what has always been simple and straightforward to them —the vote? I think myself that this is, of all other times, the time when we ought not to commit this country to a new and untried experiment of this sort. I confess that in the earlier part of his speech I felt greatly flattered by the attention which my hon. Friend has evidently paid to a little brochure which I ventured to issue, and I certainly was not aware myself of the strength of the arguments in that production until I heard it attacked by my hon. Friend. But I admit that there was a fly in the amber of my content, owing to the opening remark of my hon. Friend, who moved this Amendment, when he called attention to an error, for which I readily apologise, in saying that proportional representation was not the unanimous recommondation of the Speaker's Conference. That was a verbal error. I was rather misled at the moment by the fact that the Government in charge of the Bill bad always declared that they would leave this question open to the House, as they did the question of women suffrage. I apologise for the error. But when my critics go on to say that proportional representation was an essential part of the compromise effected by the Speaker's Conference, and that the virtue of compromise, so to speak, covers that decision of the Speaker's Conference, and therefore covers this Amendment, I venture respectfully to altogether contest that assumption. The recommendation on proportional representation by the Speaker's Conference may have been unanimous, but it is a solecism in the Bill, and has nothing to do with any other part of the Bill. There are, and always have been, two sides to this question of proportional representation, and two opinions on the principle, diametrically opposed to each other. When you say to one side: "You are to have what you want," and when you say to the other side: "You are to have what you do not want, to put up with what you do not want and greatly object to," surely that cannot be called a compromise? It is exactly the reverse. So much was this the case that the members of the Government in charge of the Bill, who certainly were not backward in supporting the Bill throughout on the theory of compromise, abandoned that theory in the case of proportional representation and in fact —a fact to which my critics do not allude —twenty-five members of the Government responsible for this Bill have already voted against proportional representation in the previous Divisions.

The object of this Amendment is, as the House knows, to replace in the Bill the same principle, in exactly the same words, which the House, after full deliberation and debate, has twice rejected when it was brought forward at the proper time and at the proper stage in the progress of the Bill. It is now attempted to reverse these two deliberate decisions of the House at an improper time and an improper stage, with results to the Bill, and to the laborious work that has been done by the Boundary Commissioners, and to a portion —an arbitrarily chosen portion —of the electorate of the country which, I submit, are wholly unjustifiable, and which I propose to deal with specifically. Before doing so, as I have never had an opportunity in this House of speaking on the general question of proportional representation, I should like to address myself to a single point that comes under that description. I know the House is weary of debating the general question of the merits and demerits of proportional representa- tion, and I ask permission to deal with the only one point —that is my cardinal objection to the whole of these proposals of the artificial representation of minorities, or what is now called proportional representation. If I confine myself to this one, I would beg the House to bear in mind that there is a very long list of other, and most insistent, objections which present themselves to me whenever I examine the subject, and which I do not Propose to mention.

What is proportional representation? The essence of proportional representation is to give a better —and driven to its logical conclusion —I do not accept my hon. Friend's disclaimer of leaving out logic, for I feel quite sure that he evidently tries to be logical —to give a full and adequate representation in this House to minorities. I do not think I have made any mistake.

An HON. MEMBER

Representation of all sections.

Mr. BURDETT-COUTTS

A full and adequate representation of minorities.

Mr. A WILLIAMS

Of majorities and minorities.

Mr. BURDETT-COUTTS

My hon. Friends who moved and seconded the Amendment made it perfectly clear by the instances given of General Elections that it was intended that the majorities in this House shall reflect, and be in harmony with, the aggregate majority of electors who have voted for them in the country.

Mr. WILLIAMS

Hear, heart!

Mr. BURDETT-COUTTS

I am glad to have that principle assented to. Now it only needs a glance at the statistics of aggregate voters at General Elections —go back as far as you like —to discover that in nine cases out of ten, if proportional representation is successful in its efforts, it will result in a trifling majority to every Government that takes office. No one but a visionary, I imagine, can look forward to Parliamentary government being effectively carried on except under the party system. If we live, as we must live, under a party system, it is the greatest misfortune to the country, not only with regard to its home affairs, but with regard to its status and strength in relation to other countries. that the Government of the day, whichever party it represents, should have a weak and pre- carious majority. It cannot carry out its policies; it cannot pass its measures into law; it cannot even administer existing laws on any definite lines. Progress arrested, stagnation in political life, and instability of the State, are the inevitable consequences of the carrying out of the ideals of the advocates of proportional representation. And I give every man the credit of desiring to live up to his ideals. I do not put these matters forward solely as matters of argument or as postulates. Although we have very few examples of the operation of proportional representation under the single transferable vote, we have one; and I speak of Tasmania, where it has resulted in, I think, four successive elections, in exactly the state of things I have described as attaching to proportional representation, namely, an equal number of members returned for the Government and the Opposition with a so-called Independent Member holding the balance between the two.

I observe that the advocates of proportional representation have varied their attitude several times with regard to Tasmania. It's a long, long way to Tasmania; but time was when the supporters of proportional representation used to march cheerily along 8,000 miles away, to a little colony of 200,000 inhabitants and 20,000 electors (about 15,000 of whom vote at a General Election) in order to find their Parliamentary millennium. It is a very curious thing that, very soon after, they began to drop Tasmania because they found that the experiment had turned out exactly as I have said. Now, however, when these facts have been put forward again, they have issued a somewhat discursive argument in answer, in which I really cannot see any point. It does not deal with the two salient facts in the case of Tasmania. The first is that which I have stated with regard to the Government and the Opposition being practically equal in numbers in the Assembly; and the other —an equally important one —is the fact that the Australian Commonwealth, with the results of the Tasmanian experiment before them, in framing their new Constitution, declined to have anything to do with proportional representation. Anxious as my hon. Friends may be to drop the case of Tasmania, I do not think that the House ought to drop it out of consideration, because it is the one case where a practical example has shown the results of proportional representation.

Mr. CHANCELLOR

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a Bill is to be introduced in the Commonwealth Parliament bringing forward a proposal for proportional representation?

Mr. BURDETT-COUTTS

Yes, it is always a proposal —for proportional representation. They all say it is going to happen, but they will not be influenced by actual experiments, such as those which have taken place and the results of which are known. I put the results of that experiment quite clearly in the publication to which I have referred. I put the case forward in the shape of an interesting and exhaustive article in the "Times." It is an authoritative article, written by a warm and earnest friend of proportional representation, and he described the results in Tasmania. I added another article by Mr. Gisborne, a well-known resident in Tasmania, who has watched the operations of the simple transferable vote in that country, and from these two articles you will gather what the House ought not to ignore. From these practical experiments which have been made, you will gather also the by-products of proportional representation; the field it opens up for the pernicious work of the caucus; the non-election of well-tried and experienced members; and the return, to the surprise and disappointment of the electorate, of an altogether inferior grade of members. I shall not be able to finish my argument to-night, because I have now come to the point where I wish to deal, not with any of the general principles of proportional representation, but with the difficulties and inconveniences that will arise from putting it into the Bill at this stage in its progress. The first of those difficulties is that it will upset and nullify and waste the whole of the work, or, at any rate, a great proportion of the work that has been done by the Boundary Commissioners, and which has been accepted by this House. All the inner boundaries of the divisions of Parliamentary boroughs, which have been the subject of such long inquiry, and which have been so carefully adjusted to meet the wishes of the electors, and to secure solidarity to each single-member district —all this will be swept away. London, which the promoters of proportional representation offered in the last Debate to exclude if London Members would only sacrifice their provincial colleagues —a bargain which the London Members at once rejected —is now to be included, and nine great Parliamentary boroughs of London are to have this experiment fastened upon them for no one knows how many years. You will have these boroughs chosen here and there, and between each you will have a Parliamentary borough exercising the sacred privilege of its vote upon a totally different principle from its neighbour. I wonder whether the House has really considered this aspect of the case, this partial and divided treatment of the whole electorate of this country?

It being Eleven of the clock, the Debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed to-morrow.

The remaining Orders were read and postponed.