§ Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 22nd February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."
§ Mr. ELLIS GRIFFITHMy hon. Friend the Member for West Clare (Mr. Lynch) gave notice that he would call attention, upon the Adjournment to-night, to a matter of very grave public importance. I saw the Noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a few minutes ago, and I have no doubt he will be in his place shortly. The hon. Member for West Clare on Tuesday last, 21st November, called attention to the Greek situation, and I am bound to say I think it is a very extraordinary thing that a count was moved and carried in the middle of his speech. If I may say so, with great respect, I do not think it reflects great credit on the British House of Commons when there is a count in so important a matter as that. It is quite true that the Noble Lord some time ago said that foreign policy was a matter that was not to be discussed by the House of Commons. From that view I profoundly dissent. It is the House of Commons that has got to pay for the successes and the blunders of foreign policy, and it is the House of Commons, too, that ought to have a voice in the discussion of them. Therefore, I think I need not apologise to the House for saying a word or two upon this question. Of course, we all understand that there are certain aspects of foreign policy that cannot be discussed publicly in this House. I fully understand that. When we move for a Secret Session we are told there is no occasion for it; but at the same time, if there is any discussion of foreign policy in certain of its aspects, a Secret Session is the only method of discussing it, and when we are denied it I do not think I, or any of my hon. Friends ought to be blamed if we, at any rate, raise this matter in its general aspects.
I am not going into a long discussion on the Balkan question, but I think I may say the whole situation, speaking generally, is not very satisfactory at the present moment. Really, discussion would serve the Government's purpose, because the Government's object, no doubt, is to get the confidence of the country in its foreign policy, and if it wants the confidence of the country it had far better have a frank 104 and a free discussion in the House of Commons, because, in the absence of that discussion, there are certain rumours which get spread, and certain information gets published, which are far more likely to do harm to the Government, and much more likely to disturb their stability—not in office, because they care nothing for that—as supreme guardians of the Empire, than free discussion in the House of Commons. Is it true that the Government during the last two years have been pressing upon Greece and upon Roumania the duty of neutrality? That is a very important aspect of the question. In the second place, since M. Venizelos has formed a Provisional Government, and since he has declared war in the name of that Provisional Government upon Germany, what is the position of our Government? I ventured some time ago, when the Noble Lord was present in a Debate on the Adjournment of the House, to suggest to him that the British Government ought to make up their mind once for all between the King of Greece and the State of Greece—make up. their mind who is their friend, and to act accordingly. They have not too many friends, and when they find a friend they ought to try to make the most of him. Venizelos is their friend,, and has been their friend, and not only their friend in profession, but in practice and sacrifice, and I think the least the British Government can do is to stand by him.
The Noble Lord has. no doubt, seen a letter in the "Times," dated 23rd November, professing to speak in the name of Venizelos, in which that statesman in Greece, and the friend of the Allies, makes very definite statements. The complaint that he puts forward there is that a neutral zone has been declared by the Allies in Greece. It is a remarkable position that the Allies in Greece, in a neutral country, should declare that a certain territory is neutral territory—that is to say, not neutral as between belligerents, but neutral as between the King of Greece and the Venizelos party. That is a very remarkable proceeding, and yet we profess not to take an attitude hostile to the King of Greece. The Noble Lord said they recognise the King of Greece as king de jure and Venizelos as ruler de facto. I confess I am not subtle enough to understand that because, in so far as Venizelos is recognised as ruler de facto, it must be we are-repudiating the King as king de facto in 105 that country when we recognise the Leader of the Constitutional party as ruler de facto. We have declared a neutral zone, and what our friends in Greece say is that in that very neutral zone there is no passage for Greeks to join the Venizelist party. I should like to know whether that is true or not, because if it is true I think the sooner we relax this restriction the better. In the second place, it is alleged—and I should like to know whether this is true or not, that in Greece those who have joined the Venizelist party are prosecuted for high treason and condemned for high treason. Do we really allow in Greece that those who have joined us, those whom we have recognised de facto, those to whom we have given hundreds of thousands of pounds to join us, those we have protected in many ways—do we really allow that those shall be prosecuted for high treason? Let me tell the Noble Lord this: There is a vast amount of alarm and disquietude in this country about our attitude towards Greece. Although the essence of diplomacy may be secrecy, the only justification for secrecy is success, and I do not think there is enough success in our diplomacy to justify the secrecy that has prevailed for so long, and I ask the Noble Lord to take this opportunity to give some reassuring words to this country because I am certain—apart altogether from the conditions of the War in the Balkans, about which I say nothing—there is considerable disquietude, as I have already said, about the attitude of this country towards Greece, and towards the only statesman in Greece who has sacrificed all on our behalf. I ask him to allay that disquiet and alarm and give us an assurance that everything will be done to recognise M. Venizelos, not only de. facto, but in every possible way as an Ally and friend, and a man we are prepared to back up with all the power of our Empire.
§ 7.0 P.M.
§ Mr. DILLONI think the right hon. Gentleman has done a great public service by raising this Question to-night. I confess I share entirely the feeling he gave expression to at the opening of his observations that it was a discredit to this House that when this matter in which the country undoubtedly takes a burning and a daily increasing interest was raised the other night in the House, an organised count-out took place. The Noble Lord laid down the other day one of the most astounding principles that has ever been 106 addressed to the House of Commons, and it seems to me a marvellous sign of the condition to which this House has been brought under the Coalition Government. Nobody who remembers the proud history of this House as long as I do can be blind to the fact that there is rising up outside this House an increasing contempt for its deliberations. An increasing idea is spreading through the people which is most dangerous, that this House has been obliterated, muzzled, and reduced to absolute helplessness by the operation which gave birth to the Coalition Government. The right hon. Gentleman indicted the action of the Government with regard to M. Venizelos. In my opinion, this House has been far too long silent in regard to that action. The idea has spread abroad —fatal idea for this country—that, whatever nation, or whatever body of men on the Continent declared themselves friends of this country and the Allies, that nation is sure to suffer. I am not going any more than the right hon. Gentleman to enter. into the Question of the Balkans, but I do hope this House before long will claim the right to debate that Question and get some information as to the causes which have brought about the disasters which have now taken place. It may be plausibly argued, though I do not quite admit successfully argued, that in the case of Serbia and Roumania we were unable to aid them. I do not agree with that, but I think it is a question which ought to be debated, and sooner or later it must be debated. Who can say that in the case of Greece those who speak for the majority of the population—[An How. MEMBER: "No."]—
§ Mr. J. HENDERSONUnfortunately, they do not.
§ Mr. DILLONBut I say they do. What test does the hon. Member apply? I look on M. Venizelos as a man who has had for years the confidence of the liberty-loving Greeks, and who on a recent occasion, in spite of Royal intimidation, appealed to the people of Greece and carried by a free vote, by an immense majority, the verdict of Greece. What has been the consequence since that? We were then omnipotent, and we have seen that man obliged to fly from Athens and take refuge in Crete. He then went to Salonika to aid us in the advance that ought to have taken place months ago, and when he proceeded to organise an army in support of the Allies what was 107 the conduct of the Government? First of all, they allowed these men to be attacked, insulted, and imprisoned, and the lives were threatened of those Greeks who had the courage to join M. Venizelos. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the letter which was sent, I think, by Mr. Arthur Evans and Mr. Burroughs, speaking in direct communication with M. Venizelos, in which he pointed out the neutral zone. I recollect reading that letter, and these two gentlemen who were in direct communication with M. Venizelos complained that the neutral zone was drawn up in such a way as to include under the de jure domination of the King large tracts of Thessaly and Pirius which are loyal to M. Venizelos, and which are placed on the wrong side of the neutral zone, where the population are anxious to join our Army, and where they dare not join except at the risk of their lives. The moral effect of such conduct as this is fatal to the prestige of the Allies in Europe, and already there is spreading an impression that those who take sides with the Allies are sure to suffer and go to the wall. Surely we have not so many friends that we can turn our backs on M. Venizelos, who is admitted to be one of the greatest statesmen in Europe! I think that the hour has come when this House ought to insist upon its ancient right. For two years we have remained practically silent. Since May, 1915, we have remained absolutely silent as regards any effective criticisms of the War. The War Office—not the Government; make no mistake about it—and certain organs of the Press are perpetually talking about politicians having messed this War. The politicians have messed the War because they have not controlled the soldiers, and the hour has come, if this War is not to be lost by the General Staff of the War Office, when this House and the politicians should reassert their right, and call these men to question and to explain this policy which appears to us to be absolutely fatuous.
§ Commander BELLAIRSI think the speeches we have just listened to have commanded the general assent of the House, and there is great alarm and disquiet throughout the country about the attitude of the Government. I ventured to protest against an answer which the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs gave me last Thursday about this very neutral zone. Tasked a question which was per- 108 fectly within the rights of a Member of this House, and one which I subsequently found was approved of by the friends of M. Venizelos. We have to remember that, owing to the failure of the Allies to give adequate assistance to M. Venizelos, he has no diplomatic representative in this country, and necessarily he has to have his. case represented here by unofficial people. At the time I asked my question I did not know whether it would be approved by M. Venizelos or not, but I found afterwards, that it was approved. It was a question relating to the neutral zone:
(1) Whether His Majesty's Government will take measures to see that the towns of Grervena, Servia, and Litohori, which are said to mark the southern boundary of the neutral zone, in which so many outrages have been committed and are still being committed against adherents of M. Venizelos by Royal troops, will now be included within the neutral zone, so that their inhabitants will be defended against further outrage; and (2) whether His Majesty's Government will take measures to ensure that followers of M. Venizelos who happen to inhabit towns in Old Greece, or towns to the south of the neutral zone now established, will receive every opportunity, and will be allowed by the Royal Government, to leave its jurisdiction and cross the neutral zone to the jurisdiction of M. Venizelos?Those questions were asked directly in the interests of the Allies and in the interests of those who are supporting the liberties, of Greece. Nevertheless, the right hon. Gentleman, in reply, read what was tantamount to a lecture to me for having asked that question. Of course it may be right from a Foreign Office point of view to say that a Member of this House is wrong in asking questions of that nature.
§ The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Lord R. Cecil)I did not say that, because the hon. Member has a right to ask anything which Mr. Speaker allows him to ask.
§ Commander BELLAIRSThe point the right hon. Gentleman made was that asking questions of His Majesty's Government assumed separate action on the part of our Government. I will read the answer given by the right hon. Gentleman:
I must point out to my hon. and gallant Friend that suggestions that His Majesty's Government should take measures for this or that purpose do not take account of the real situation in Greece. The decision of all such matter rests with the Allied Governments, and I cannot say more than that these matters are receiving, and will continue to receive, the attention of those Governments. To say more than this one way or the other would necessarily give the impression that we were trying to impose our will on the Allies by making a public statement designed to force their hands. I hope hon. Members will not make co-operation with the Allies difficult by ignoring their existence in questions which are put upon the Paper, and which 109 seem to expect separate action on the part of His Majesty's Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd November, 1916, col. 1551, Vol. LXXXVII.]No hon. Member of this House expects separate action, but we want the case put as strongly as we can for M. Venizelos. There is an idea current in the country that His Majesty's Government have been rather a drag on progress in regard to these matters in Greece. We want them, if possible, to lead the way and clear up a situation which ought never to have existed for more than a single week. In Greece undoubtedly the attitude of the King's Government with the control of the Army has prevented a forward movement, because they are so placed that they can threaten the communications of our Armies, and it is necessary that a situation of that character should be cleared up at once so that we can render the maximum assistance to the Roumanian people. With regard to the information, if my right hon. Friend takes up that line, he can refuse to answer any question on the ground that he must consult the Allies, but what is the position of the French Chamber in this matter? They are going to have a Secret Session at which they are going to discuss these very points. They have their Foreign Affairs Committee, and the members of that committee are told practically everything, but we are in the position of constantly being put off by answers such as my right hon. Friend has given to me. It is not Question Time now, and therefore I hope the right hon Gentleman will make a full and frank statement, showing that we intend to give M. Venizelos the maximum amount of assistance in our power.
§ Mr. HENDERSONI am quite in sympathy with M. Venizelos and with all he represents, but it is not quite the fact to represent him as representing the whole of Greece, and I am sorry that it is not so.
§ Mr. DILLONI said the majority of the Greek people.
§ Mr. HENDERSONBut why should we not have the facts? Is it not a fact that all the islands are with M. Venizelos, while the mainlanders do not want to fight at all? The King could not hold the position he does if he had not had a very large backing in the country of those who do not want to fight. I have been eleven years in this House, and I have always heard on all sides that diplomacy of a delicate nature should not be discussed in this House. Eminently this is a case in which we must work with our Allies, and in bringing a 110 charge against the Government you are actually bringing a charge against our Allies and discussing matters which ought to be discussed toy them in conclave, which ought not to toe hindered or reflected upon by any action in this House, more particularly as this House cannot possibly know the whole facts of the case. I wish we could declare M. Venizelos King of Greece. My sympathies are entirely with him, but I see the difficulties, and we must face them. The Allies have to face a very difficult position in Greece, and I wish them safely out of it. We must, however, face facts, and acknowledge them, and not hide from ourselves, as is manifest, that there is a large section of Greece who do not want to fight. That being so, we must give our sympathies to the Allies and our own Government in trying to deal with a very difficult situation.
§ Mr. R. McNEILLI do not propose to follow the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down and to apportion the various parties in Greece, but I want to say that I am entirely of the same opinion as the hon. Member for East Mayo. Although, as the hon. Member opposite has said, the King of Greece is not without support, yet the vast majority of the Greek people, as the elections and every other indication have shown, are on the side of M. Venizelos, We are all conscious of the difficulty at such a time as this of discussing any matter connected with foreign policy, but I do not think the Foreign Office have any reason to complain of the way in which this House has treated this question.
§ Lord R. CECILHear, hear!
§ Mr. McNEILLI do not suppose that anything I can say is likely to do any harm, and therefore I may be forgiven if I express my view, which is one very commonly held both inside and outside this House. This situation in Greece is only one illustration of which we might produce a great number to show that all the troubles, disasters, and disappointments that we have suffered in this War are directly traceable to the continual blundering of our own Foreign Office, and the reason for that is to be found in the inveterate tendency of the Noble Lord who now controls our foreign policy to favour our enemies and to discourage our friends. The most conspicuous example of that at the present time is the treatment of M. Venizelos himself. I do not think any- 111 thing could be more ridiculous than the attitude which the Government are taking up in this respect. What could be more absurd in a complicated and critical position than for the Government to come forward before all Europe and to acknowledge practically two Governments, one the de jure Government in Athens, composed of our enemies, and the other the de facto Government in Salonika, composed of M. Venizelos and his adherents. Then we are told in answer to questions in this House that the line of demarcation between these two authorities is that the King and the constitutional Government of Athens control old Greece whilst M. Venizelos and his Government control new Greece. No sooner is that laid down than numbers of districts in new Greece itself are subject to the persecution and terrorism of the Court at Athens and M. Ve|iizelos and his adherents apparently look in vain to His Majesty's Government or to any of the Allies for help and support. We have been told that new Greece is the part of the country where M. Venizelos is acknowledged and yet in Epirus and in part of South Macedonia districts which only a year ago in a constitutional election returned enormous majorities in support of M. Venizelos we find this persecution going on. I ventured in a question the other day to call the attention of my Noble Friend to a precedent in Greek history which seems to me to offer guidance to His Majesty's Government and to the Allies at this time. In the original Treaty, I think of 1834, the protecting Powers of Greece guaranteed to Greece an independent State.
§ Lord R. CECILAnd the Monarchy.
§ Mr. McNEILLNothing was said about the Constitution. In 1862 the then reigning King of Greece, a German Bavarian, King Otto, was deposed by the protecting Powers because he had overridden the Constitution guaranteed by them, and he was taken away from Greece on board a British ship. When I asked my Noble Friend the other day to instruct the British Minister at Athens to call the attention of King Constantine to this precedent, my Noble Friend, unduly flattering me, said that he thought my question would be a sufficient reminder to His Majesty. I wish my Noble Friend in some more formal manner than any question of mine would remind His Majesty of his duty in this respect and recognise the attitude that the Allies 112 ought to take. I am fully conscious of the fact that on occasions of this sort the Government ought only to act in strict concert with our Allies, but I agree with my hon. Friend that it is the duty of His Majesty's Government also to give a lead to the Allies, and I find it very difficult to believe that the Powers of Russia, France, and Great Britain, in view of their antecedents with regard to the kingdom of Greece, are going to stand out against legitimate pressure by His Majesty's Government to do their duty by their friends in this time of War, even if it should be necessary to go to extremes against an unconstitutional King. I join in asking my Noble Friend to give a frank statement upon this subject. If the difficulty with which our Government are confronted arises from a disagreement among our Allies with regard to such a policy, would any harm be done by stating so? I do not believe that this House and the country would refuse to acquiesce in a policy distasteful to themselves if they were told that it was due to an arrangement with our Allies, but until we are assured that difficulties of that sort have arisen the dissatisfaction and indignation that are growing in this country will continue to grow, and will reach a pitch very dangerous to His Majesty's Government.
Sir H. DALZIELI rise principally to urge upon my Noble Friend the extreme advisability of making a considered statement with regard to the whole question of Greece at the present time. I do not suppose that he is probably able to give us to-night that full and adequate statement which the House has a right to expect, but I think he ought to take into consideration the desirability of making a full and considered statement at the earliest possible moment. A considered statement ought to be made, because, in the first place, we have really had no information in regard to this matter at all. The House has been silent except for a few questions, and there has been no Debate. There is, however, real anxiety outside the House in regard to the whole matter, and therefore, if only in the interests of the Government itself, I think that statement ought to be made. It ought to be made because of our friendly relations, which we all hope will continue, with our Allies. The people of France have nothing but praise all day long for our efforts, but anyone who knows the big business men in Paris or in France knows that they entertain grave doubts 113 about our policy in the Balkans. That is the impression, and it is overwhelmingly held in France. That is another reason why, if there is any misunderstanding or misapprehension on the subject, the Government ought to state their policy fully in this House and to the world. Is it surprising that there is misunderstanding and misapprehension? What have we been reading in our papers day by day almost for the last year? One day we refuse to recognise M. Venizelos' Government, and the next day we recognise it. Not only that, there is an announcement one day that M. Venizelos is going to be recognised, but he has never been fully recognised up to this moment. It is not at all surprising that there is real anxiety in the country with regard to our attitude towards Greece. We see, for example, Prince George of Greece coming over to this country and accepting of the country's hospitality. We see him visiting the Foreign Office, and a few days afterwards we see that he is received by the Kaiser in Berlin. That, surely, is a most suggestive state of things. The Prince, who is admittedly proGerman, comes over here and, having been received by our Foreign Office, rushes off to Berlin, is made a great fuss of by the Kaiser, and finally gets back to Athens. There ought to be some explanation given. Diplomacy ought to be carried on through the proper channels. Incidents of that kind give rise to misunderstanding and misapprehension. I therefore urge the Government to make a full statement. It would do a great deal to clear the air, and if the Noble Lord cannot make it to-night, I hope that he will make it with the least possible delay, and that it will be a full and adequate statement.
§ Mr. LYNCHThe House is face to face with one of the most amazing situations which has ever occurred during the progress of this War. Again and again we have seen this country presented with chances which seemed to open the very gates of victory, and again and again we have seen the Government throw away those chances by sheer incompetence. But here we have another element, and to that incompetence has been added something which I can hardly venture to characterise. It has been said by an hon. Gentleman that it is only a part and the minority of Greece which sympathises with the Allies.
§ Mr. HENDERSONThat is not exactly what I said. I said that there are a great number of Greeks who do not want to fight.
§ Mr. LYNCHI will make a digression simply to say that since I nave been urging the recognition of M. Venizelos I have received expressions of approval from two influential bodies of men, the latest including the President of the Merchants Guild and all the members of that Guild at Athens itself. When I rose the other day in order to call attention to the extreme gravity of this situation, I pointed out what was happening in Roumania, and the few days which have intervened have only served to enforce my argument in a terrible manner. The very capital of Roumania is now in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy. The feeling of the masses is that this campaign in Roumania depends on the situation in Athens. That is right. I think I can venture to say that it was the strategic plan of General Sarrail at the very moment of the entry of Roumania into the War to make one of those bold strokes that tell in war, to seize the capital of Bulgaria, to join hands there with the Russians and Roumania, who would push from the other side. That would have been one of the greatest strokes in this campaign separating Turkey from Germany, obliterating Bulgaria, and opening up one of the paths to victory. That campaign has been hampered and baffled by the situation in Greece, and the full responsibility for that situation lies at the door of the Foreign Office. It has been put forward, I believe, that the Republic of France is at the bottom of this existing situation in desiring to keep on his throne a king who is one of the bitterest enemies of the Allies. I say that that is absurd, and although the Noble Lord may assert definitely that that is not the case I will say that I cannot accept his explanation, being sure that some quibble will underlie his negation.
The other day I spoke of King Constantine as an outpost of Germany-; but those words are not forcible enough to describe his real character. Greece, under the hands of Constantine, forms an enemy salient of a very dangerous character. The Front Bench in all its answers for the Foreign Office talks continually as if it were not in a state of war —as if there were not that wonderful electrical state which sweeps over every nation at times such as these, when every energy of the man is drawn out, when nations are transformed, when waves of enthusiasm sweep over peoples, when wonderful thoughts are conceived incredible in times of peace, when 115 marvellous things are done, when the very air is electrical; yet in the midst of that atmosphere the Foreign Office have pottered and fumbled like pettifogging lawyers, unable to see the gravity of the situation and unable to grasp the situation until its character has been forced upon them. I want to drive one or two home truths—
§ Lord R. CECILI do not wish to interrupt the hon. Member, but I would remind him that there is only a quarter of an hour left me in order to deal with the questions raised.
§ Mr. LYNCHI shall be as brief as possible. I want to point out the gravity of the situation not only for this country, but for our great Dominions, those great democracies. I wish to ask what answer can be given them when they demand to know what we are fighting for. Are these glorious ideals which sent a wave of enthusiasm to Australia, South Africa, and Canada when the flag of Liberty and Progress was held up, when they were spurred by one of those electrical movements, and by that spirit which in the early days of the French Revolution made men feel it was a good and noble thing to give their lives to uphold a great ideal that would shine in the eyes of the world and, immortal, live in history? But all that has been thrown away, and for what? To keep a King on his throne. And what sort of king? A German king? A German, for he is related to them, and is one of their bitterest and most desperate supporters. The whole policy of the Foreign Office has been directed to keeping that man upon his throne.
From my place in the House—and I believe my words will go to the ends of the earth—yes; I have had two cables since I last spoke on this subject, which show the importance of the situation—from my place here I will invite the democracy of the Dominions to appeal to the Foreign Office to know definitely what is the line on. which their policy has been based. What are the great cosiderations which present a situation which leaves them in amazement and despair. I will also appeal to M. Venizelos to electrify the world by one of those bold strokes which strike the imagination for ever in the annals to proclaim the Republic of Greece; thus to place this country and the Allies face to face with a situation which will demand that they shall choose between this great 116 champion of democracy and friend of the Allies, and that representative of a tottering royalty, that champion of a vanishing mist, that brother-in-law of the Kaiser, that enemy King, that man more German than Germans—
§ Mr. SPEAKERI have already pointed out to the hon. Member more than once-that he must not take advantage of his place in this House to denounce a King, who at all events is at present neutral, and who, so long as he remains so, must be treated as a Sovereign of a friendly State.
§ Mr. LYNCHI will accept that. What I have said has sufficiently exposed the situation. That will speak for itself.
§ Lord R. CECILI fear that what I have to say can hardly be expressed within a quarter of an hour, but I will do my best. In the first place, I wish to make my acknowledgment in answer to an observation which fell from my hon. Friend the Member for the St. Augustine's Division (Mr. R. McNeill). The hon. Gentleman said, with great truth, that the Foreign Office has nothing to complain of in regard to the way in which these questions have been treated by this House. I hope that no words that may have dropped from me in Debate have ever given a contrary impression. I certainly have never intended that they should. I am personally exceedingly grateful to the House for the way in which it has treated me since I have had the honour to be connected with the Foreign Office, and I have no kind of complaint to make on this particular head. I wish once again to answer the hon. Member who has referred to a phrase of mine as if I denied the right of the House of Commons to inquire as to matters of foreign policy. What I said then, and what I repeat now, was that the House of Commons has its responsibility in regard to public matters and the Government has its responsibility, and the Government cannot put any part of its responsibilities on the shoulders of the House of Commons. That is all I have said, and I think it is a perfectly sound constitutional doctrine.
Several hon. Members, including the right hon. Gentleman who introduced this Debate (Mr. Ellis Griffith) have complained that the Government would not have a Secret Session. It is not for me to decide a point of that kind. But I do not understand that to be the attitude of the Prime Minister. I understood him to say that if he were satisfied there was a 117 general demand for a Secret Session he would reconsider the question, but that he was not at present satisfied there was such a demand. That seems to be a reasonable thing to say. I know many hon. Members of this House do not think that a Secret Session would be a convenient way of discussing foreign affairs. They may be right or they may be wrong, but I think hon. Members who consider the course of debate on foreign affairs may feel no great advantage would accrue from the point of view of the. frankness that would be possible. So much for the purely Parliamentary aspect of this matter.
I want to say a word if I may about Allied diplomacy. It has been said more than once in this Debate, "we quite admit that the Allies must decide, but we think that the British Government ought in these matters"—and I quite admit there is a strong public opinion in favour of M. Venizclos—"to give a lead."What does that really mean? Suppose the British Government held a view different from one or more of its Allies. That must happen at times. Human beings cannot always be expected to think exactly alike. But suppose that does occur. Is the representative of the British Government to come down to the House of Commons and say, "We think so and so, but our Allies do not." Is that really what is suggested? Would that be fair procedure to our Allies? Would it be treating them honestly and fairly? Surely they would say, "By doing that you are changing the position. The discussion between us is no longer on equal terms. You are trying to force us by appeals to the public to change our opinions. That is not fair dealing. We do not do it with the British Government. We do not go to the Chamber of Deputies, or the Senate in France, or the Parliamentary Assembly in Italy, or the Duma in Russia, and say we want this, but the English will not let us have it." We ought not to put them in a position to say that. I cannot think hon. Members, if they reflect upon it, would wish that the British Government should behave in that way.
I quite agree that an alliance in war is. not an easy thing to carry on in any circumstances. This Alliance has been carried on with an amazing want of friction, with a smoothness and general agreement and want of dispute and quarrel which has no precedent in history, and we want it to remain in that condition. We do not want to take action which will cause friction and which will cause trouble to our Allies; 118 therefore it is absolutely essential not only because of the ordinary reasons, which require discretion in the discussion of diplomatic affairs, but chiefly because of the fact that when we speak of diplomacy we speak not for British diplomacy only, but Allied diplomacy as a whole, and it is absolutely essential that we should show discretion and even reserve in dealing with every matter relating to diplomatic affairs. I say so much, and even what I have said now is capable, I am perfectly aware, of misconstruction. I do not want it to be understood for a moment that in this particular case we wanted any particular policy which the Allies would not follow or they wanted a policy which we did not think right. So far as I am aware, we have agreed on every point. I do not say that there has not been discussion; there has necessarily been discussion, but we have been absolutely agreed. I do not want the House or anyone else to think for a moment that there is any particular line of policy which this Government has pressed on the Allies and which has not been followed. My observations are general.
But in answer to the proposition that we ought to give a lead to the Allies, and I presume to state what that lead is to the House of Commons, I will try within these limitations to answer the particular questions put to me. In the first place, a good deal was made of the point that, whereas we recognised the de facto Government of Venizelos in the districts where it is established, we recognise the de jure Government of the King at Athens. In the first place, I wish to point out—and this really is the whole point— that M. Venizelos governs, as I understand, in the name of the King. All his acts are in the name of the King, and he is carrying on the King's Government. He is carrying it on on lines of his own, I quite agree, on lines he thinks ought to be followed for the whole of Greece. He is carrying on this Government in that part of Greece where he is established.
§ Mr. PRINGLEIs the Declaration of War in the name of the King?
§ Lord R. CECILI do not know. But, that being so, it is plain the only de jure Government in Greece must be the Government of the King, and it is equally plain that we should not be recognising the facts as they actually are if we did not recognise the Government of M. Venizelos 119 AS the de facto actual body which has the administration of the country in the districts which he controls. I do not really think, in spite of my right hon. Friend, that there is anything very subtle about that. It is the inevitable result, and I do not for the life of me see what other course is open to us. So much for that. I was asked about the neutral zone. I understand that what happened was this: The forces of M. Venizelos and the forces of the King came into collision at a place called Katerina. It was felt, and I think everybody will agree, that from every point of view there was nothing to be gained but very much to be lost by the outbreak of civil war in Greece. I think everybody will agree to that. The question was how was that to be prevented. The device was hit on—I do not say it was the only possible device, but it was the one hit upon—that a neutral zone should be established between the two forces and that neither of them should be allowed to enter that neutral zone.
§ Mr. McNEILLWhy could you not have said that you were going to throw your whole support on the side of M. Venizelos?
§ Lord R. CECILThat would have been another policy. The policy the Allies adopted is the one I am trying to describe to the House. For the moment I am not discussing whether that policy was a good or a bad one. I am merely describing what the policy was. Having decided that this was the best way of avoiding a collision between the two forces, the Allies entrusted the French military authorities with the execution of that policy, and the French authorities have occupied this zone. I know it is said that some districts ought to have been included in the zone or ought to have been handed over to M. Venizelos which were not. I am not in a position to discuss that without further information, but, whether that is so or not, that was the way it was done. The matter was handed over entirely and necessarily to the French military authorities, and they were the people who carried out this (policy, which was the Allied policy. I have two other observations to make to which I think general assent will be given. It was said—I am bound to notice it, but I would rather not—that we were there for what are called "dynastic reasons," and that our policy was dictated 120 by dynastic reasons. That is absolutely untrue. There is not a word, a particle, or a syllable of truth in it. The idea that we are bolstering the King for some private and personal reasons is absolutely untrue. So far as I understand the policy of the Alliance, it is simply to do what they think is best in their belligerent interests and in the interests of Greece and nothing else—absolutely nothing else! As for the idea that we are preparing or are willing to throw over M. Venizelos, that is equally untrue. We recognise the great service M. Venizelos has rendered, not only to Greece, but to ourselves, and we shall never abandon M. Venizelos.
§ Sir E. CARSONWill the Noble Lord say will he also protect his friends, who are being persecuted by these others?
§ Lord R. CECILMy right hon. Friend will recognise the difficulty I am in owing to the time. I have already said we have done a good deal to protect those friends. I am going to answer a question to-morrow. I have already assured the House that we do think it part of our duty to protect his friends from unjust and improper attacks. Of course when I say "we," I mean the Allies, not the British Government alone. We are all agreed. There is no doubt about that. All I can say in regard to the dissatisfaction and displeasure of the country is that I quite admit it is exceedingly likely to fall upon us, whether we are right or wrong. We must submit to it. It is part of the price we have to pay in war that the Government is always unpopular. I am quite aware of that. I do not say that the Government is perfect, but I do not agree at all with the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) that it would be a good plan for the Government to take out of the hands of the soldiers the conduct of the War. Still less would it be a good plan for the House of Commons to do so. With all respect to him and to the House, I do not think it would be a good plan for the House of Commons to take out of the hands of the Government the conduct of diplomacy and negotiations connected with the situation and deal with them. We must each try to do our duty in the proper constitutional sphere allotted to us, and, having done it, we must try to put up with it whether we are judged well or ill by our fellows.
§ Question put, and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at Ten minutes before Eight o'clock.