§ Mr. J. M. ROBERTSONMy object in desiring to move the reduction of the Vote ("That Item Class 2, Vote 8 (Board of Trade), be reduced by £100") for a service which I hold in the highest esteem is solely to ask from the Government an assurance, which I hope they will be able to give, on a subject which is causing great disquietude throughout the country. There are three 1756 sets of facts before us which, taken together, set up the disquietude of which I speak. First, we have the very important announcement of the Government that they will shortly take part in a fiscal conference with our Allies with the object of making some arrangement with regard to a future joint fiscal policy. Second, recent speeches have been made, one by my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Runciman) and one by my right hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Montagu), in each of which some expressions were used which have, I think, been misinterpreted outside, but which would quite naturally give rise to misapprehension. My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade used expressions as to measures which would be used for keeping down German trade after the War. My right hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury made remarks as to the probability that after the War we should have to face different sets of circumstances and a different state of things with regard to trade from that which existed in the past. Knowing as I do the high economic competence of both of my right hon. Friends, I interpret both these statements in a sense which gave no ground for apprehension as to any steps to be taken at the coming fiscal conference which would put in jeopardy or in peril or old-established fiscal system or give rise to any premature innovation in that system. I think that my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade had in mind some scheme which has actually been discussed with the object of preventing the exploitation of the resources of many parts of the British Empire by German capital, and I attach a somewhat similar meaning to some of the expressions used by my right hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury.
But that was not, and I am afraid I must say naturally was not, the sole interpretation placed on those speeches outside, especially seeing that there is going on in some large sections of the Press a two-fold propaganda with the object of securing a speedy decision of the Government by way of making a radical revolutionary alteration in our system. It would be quite improper to go into the question in detail. I want simply to set before Ministers the kind of propaganda that is going on, and the reason why that propaganda, taken with the forthcoming fiscal conference, is creating the dis- 1757 quietude of which I have spoken. For instance, there is a propaganda in many quarters calling for the decision in advance to establish after the War a boycott of German trade. Put in a general way, it amounts to saying that the Allies should take measures to prevent, so far as they can, the exportation of goods by Germany after the War. In so far as suggestions of the kind are inspired by a desire to keep Germany after the War in a position in which she would not be dangerous to the rest of the world, I entirely agree with the idea. Germany deserves nothing at the hands of the Allies but the bread and water of affliction, and if it can be secured that any trade measures whatever would keep Germany in future in a position of economic weakness, and thereby in a position of military weakness, without at the same time creating economic injury to the Allies, I do not see that any objection could be taken to that course in this country. The Allies would be morally bound, having regard to the moral and political evolution of Germany in recent times, to take any steps in their power to prevent a rapid recovery of strength by Germany provided that those steps are not dangerous to themselves.
But those who have proposed this policy of trade boycott do not appear to have given the slightest attention to the question of what the effect of such policy would be upon our own trade. To put the matter in the simplest and broadest way, the Prime Minister has more than once declared that it is the settled purpose of the Government to secure compensation for Belgium and Serbia—to name no other Powers. That is to say, the Government hope, and we all hope, that one of the first results of the War will be an adequate indemnity to Belgium. An adequate indemnity to Belgium cannot possibly be paid save by the export of produce on the part of Germany. I had a letter this morning from a trade union organiser putting the question whether we should do anything to assist Germany to pay an indemnity, and urging upon me that it was Germany's business to find out a way of paying the indemnity. Obviously it is. There are only three ways in which an indemnity can be paid. It may be paid in specie, in scrip, or in produce. The whole of the bullion in Germany would be quite insufficient to pay an adequate indemnity to Belgium alone. Payment by scrip would simply mean in future a necessary ex- 1758 portation of German goods in order to pay interest on the scrip or to redeem it Indeed, an export of all the specie in Germany would have the same result; Germany would need to buy her specie back by produce; and those schemes of boycott directed again German trade would simply have the effect of preventing the payment of an indemnity by Germany. In that case, I should say that if we took part in the prevention of the only possible mode of paying an indemnity, we should ourselves be morally liable to pay it. I cannot suppose that those who advocate this policy have realised for one moment its economic results.
Then we have a somewhat varied Tariffist propaganda. The tone of that propaganda in some sections of the Press seems to me to be a flagrant breach of the party truce. We have a number of journals openly vaunting that the cause of Tariff is won, that Free Trade is at an end, and that tariffs must now and will now be imposed. Some of the organs carrying on the propaganda actually demand that we should impose import duties on food now while the War is in progress, this at a time when nearly all, if not all, the belligerent Powers have actually taken the food duties off. One Power perhaps has not, and another Power has not taken off all its food duties. The enemy Powers have taken off, so far as I am aware, all the import duties on food. They have had to do so, and this is the time at which the Tariffist organs in this country are demanding that we should not wait for the conclusion of the War, but should impose food duties at once with a view to securing an adequate protection of food in the future. I do not intend to-day to discuss in general the very large, wide, and familiar fiscal question, and I want to limit myself solely to the effect any kind of policy will have on our national interest after the War is over. In the first place, the proposed tariff is either to be one of preference to our Dominions over our Allies and neutrals or one of preference to our Dominions and Allies over neutrals. There may be a third, but these are the only two to which I will call attention.
To give preference to the Dominions over our Allies would be an extremely dangerous policy. It would set up heart-burnings of a serious description. To give preference to Canadian and Australian wheat over Russian wheat, to Austra- 1759 lian wines over French wines, would be setting up difficulties of a serious kind the moment it came into force. I cannot imagine that that course will be taken, though it is very vehemently proposed. If you should give preference to our Dominions and Allies over neutrals you would be creating a set of circumstances which would give rise to special difficulties, and which might, in future, cause a very unstable and nationally dangerous political situation. But perhaps the most serious aspect, certainly not the least serious aspect, of the two schemes I have seen promulgated is that they contemplate better terms to the Dominions and Allies than are to be given to neutrals. If that policy be adopted, the inevitable result will be to drive all the trade of the neutrals into the hands of Germany, and neutrals will desire to resume trade with Germany as soon as possible. If we give worse terms to the neutrals than to the Allies, Germany will absolutely and inevitably do her very best to offer terms to the neutrals that would secure their trade.
Let me remind the House what neutral trade means. It means South America, the United States trade, the China trade, and the trade of a number of European Powers, not of the first magnitude, but which, collectively, are of very great commercial importance. To all those Powers Germany would offer special treatment, giving them advantages which would in turn give Germany a very large trade with them. The Allies by a system of trading among themselves might in part compensate for that, but I cannot conceive anyone saying that trade between the Allies would compensate any of them, and us in particular, for the substantial loss of a great mass of trade with neutral Powers. Let me remind hon. Members that, after the War, we shall be under the economic necessity to export a large quantity of goods to the United States. We shall be bound to do so in respect of our heavy debts in that quarter. Germany will be equally bound to export goods in all directions for obvious financial reasons. If Germany were placed on specially good terms with the United States, then we would be under a double disadvantage. We should be compelled to make good and square our accounts, and the result of a fiscal system of preference of the Allies over neutrals would be to inflict the very greatest commercial disadvantage on this country at a time when freedom of export and equal power 1760 of competition in foreign markets will be of the very highest importance. There are arguments as to a preferential duty on food which are of a military description, and I make no demur to the use of arguments of that kind. We can find various methods of dealing with this subject at the conclusion of the War. I shall assume that this War will be concluded only on terms under which Germany is compelled to pay indemnity. I do not contemplate any other issue. There may be another issue, and I do not dispute that we may be committed to other measures of a different kind.
But when we are told that there is to be an import duty on food, and that there is to be tariff in regard to agriculture after this War, I am bound to say that such a line of argument is nothing short of fraudulent. In a country like Germany, with a larger area and a proportionately larger population than we possess, this War has disclosed the fact that she is unable to feed herself even with a system of agricultural protection. Since the War she has reduced the food duties, but yet has totally failed to make Germany adequately feed herself. If in a great European war Germany has thus failed, what prospect is there that this country, under a similar plan of putting a duty on food, could make herself self-feeding, unless our large surplus population was driven out of the country at an unprecendented rate? In view of the military considerations which are urged upon us, surely there must be regard to the importance of that consideration, in view of the possibility of a future European war. The importation of food to this country is largely the basis of the British mercantile marine, and without men for it we could not remain a maritime State on the present scale. I notice with some apprehension the propaganda for boycott and tariffs; but I do not think, on patriotic grounds, that that is compatible with the formation of a sound economic basis. Some of the propagandists are making the greatest efforts, and one journal declares that those who make any objection to tariffs are German importers and foreign importers. We are accustomed to that sort of tactics on the part of our upper class journals.
It may be that it is taken for granted by the advocates of a tariff system that Germany, after the War, will remain, as she has been, a highly Protectionist country. I do not for a moment pretend that 1761 there is going to be any change of heart in Germany after the War. We have seen plenty of deliverances showing the present frame of mind of the German people, which is no more favourable to international relations after the War than it has been in the past. There are still multitudes in Germany whose conception of international life is the promotion of the interests of their own country at the expense of all others, and hon. Members will do well to ask themselves whether it is possible for Germany after the War to remain Protectionist. I learn that there has recently appeared an article by Prof. Delbrück, writing in the "Preussische Jahrbücker." He urges that Germany, after the War, should set up a Free Trade system. I cannot pretend to estimate the probability of that, but it seems to me that enormous difficulties will be found in Germany in reimposing food duties after the War. With a population who have been half starved for a period of two years, will the German Government be able at once to impose food duties which would continue to keep food dear for that half-starved population? I cannot imagine that a militarist and Protectionist Government in Germany would face such an undertaking at an early date, but if the food duties could be reimposed, the strongest collective force in that country is the Social Democratic party, who have the support of millions of voters. It is a strong political combination for that one purpose, but it will not be very strong after the War. There is strong probability that Protectionist Germany, having already suspended the food duties under the stress of war, will not reimpose them after the War is over, and if the food duties are suspended, and all things tend against the reimposition of any other form of impost, there is a distinct probability that the Protectionist enemy might prefer a policy of Free Trade after the War. What position should we be in if an insensate propaganda were carried on making demagogic appeals to impose duties on food? We should find ourselves resorting to the policy of tariffs at the exact moment the enemy were resorting to Free Trade?
That is the position I want to put to the Government, and it is a seriously vital subject at present. Many good citizens think that the conference with the Allies will in some degree settle some basis of fiscal policy after the War. I myself do not share any alarm expressed by my 1762 Friends, but I do think the country is entitled to an assurance in this matter to this effect, that whatever negotiations may be entered into, nothing shall be done that shall commit us to any serious change in our fiscal system, without an absolutely adequate and complete discussion of the subject in this House. I do not think that is too much to ask. I am not saying that the Government should have its hands tied, and should be unable to make any arrangements, and I have indicated some of the arrangements which might fitly be made, and I have no doubt those are the main arrangements as to the future that the Government have in view; but in view of the declarations which are being made outside and the open boasts in many quarters that the policy of tariffs is now settled, and that the Free Trade system is done with, I respectfully appeal to the Prime Minister and to the Government to give the country an assurance that no such decision will be taken at the forthcoming conference which will amount to any gratification of that boast, and that whatever is to be the future of the fiscal policy of the country, a change shall come only as a result of absolutely free discussion in this House, and that we shall in no way be morally committed to our Allies in advance on a matter of such vital importance.
§ Mr. HOLTI desire to support the right hon. Gentleman, and I need hardly say that I agree with every word he has addressed to the House. I wish to make a protest against negotiations with our Allies being carried on in such a way that when this matter comes up for discussion in the House, as it must, because it must become a taxing matter if any engagements are entered into, and against them coming to the House in such a form that the Government can get up and say that they have pledged themselves to our Allies, and that the repudiation of any agreement which they have entered into involves their resignation, and is, indeed, not compatible with good relations with our Allies. We ought to have the position so left that we can discuss a matter which is not only free in name, but in fact. I think we have great ground for feeling anxious as to the position of Free Trade Ministers in the Coalition. There have been very disquieting speeches. Nothing has disquieted me more than the remarks of the Chancellor of the Duchy, when he called upon us to have open minds on the 1763 fiscal question. That surely could only come from a right hon. Gentleman who was seriously contemplating the possibility of changing his own mind. When we have a declaration of that sort coming from an avowed exponent of Free Trade, then I think that those who are attached to Free Trade principles have some right to be anxious. The Prime Minister, no doubt, is a staunch supporter of Free Trade. He was also at one time a staunch supporter of the voluntary system of recruiting.
§ The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith)And is still.
§ Mr. HOLTSome people think the right hon. Gentleman may serve the Free Trade cause in the same way that he has served the other. A policy of Protection and Tariff negotiations are already being discussed. I, of course, make no complaint, and could make no complaint, against those advocates and those people who have always been in the habit of advocating Protection, Colonial Preference, and all the various Tariff Reform proposals, except that it is hardly fair at a time when we are supposed to have a party truce to be using the special circumstances of the War to push forward an issue of domestic controversy, which has been decided against those people three times at the polls, and at a time when the issue cannot possibly affect the conduct of the War, in order to secure a decision after the War is over. I do not think that that can be described as fairly adhering to the party truce. It is not adhering to the party truce to use the circumstances of the War as a lever for obtaining a change in the fiscal system after the War. Amongst those who are inclined to agree to some system of tariff after the War, but who were not Protectionists before, there are two classes. First, there are those who are actuated by a genuine desire to make our trade independent of Germany. They point to supplies of dyes, zinc, potash, in which we have been very dependent upon Germany. If anything is to be done in that direction I should say, as a Free Trader, that a tariff would have nothing to do with it, and in those cases it would, I think, be a question of establishing, either under direct State control or by subsidy, means which would make us independent in those respects. Whether you could be independent with regard to a supply of potash, which depends, I understand, on natural sources, I very much doubt. An effort to do so which 1764 is not successful seems more likely to end in disaster. I am not at all sure that the idea of nations being self-sufficient and independent is a good idea. I believe that the idea of the interdependence of nations is a far better idea, and one which is more directed to establish peace and good will on earth. I do not believe in the idea of proud self-sufficiency in any nation.
We have, then, people actuated by hatred of Germany. I confess it is very difficult for anybody who looks upon the atrocious way in which this War was planned, and in which it has been carried out, to feel anything but hatred of Germany. That is a sentiment which, though not praiseworthy, is one which I believe there is scarcely a single man in this country but feels at the present time towards Germany. But it is an extraordinarily bad sentiment to entertain in trade and finance. In commercial operations there is no more fruitful source of loss and disaster than to allow yourself to be led away by sentiments of hatred. I observe that like feelings are not expressed with regard to trading with either Austria or Turkey. I do not know whether those who want a tariff wall against Germany also want one against Austria and Turkey. In my judgment, whenever peace comes, it must be a really complete peace. You cannot have a peace which merely means the cessation of military operations in order that we should get ready to perfect ourselves in the almost more equally operations of a tariff war. This idea of following up your war of arms by a war of tariffs is repugnant to common sense, and really means no peace at all. I entirely agree with the statement of the Prime Minister as to the terms on which we are going to make peace. I agree equally with my right hon. Friend (Mr. Robertson) that it is quite impossible that Germany should pay an indemnity to Belgium, France, Serbia, and the other nations whom she has outraged and violated if you are going to completely break up her trade. It is only a prosperous Germany that can be in a position in which she is going to make an adequate return to those she has wronged. To make complete peace it must be on the basis that when Germany has made restitution she shall be accorded forgiveness. You cannot have restitution which involves admission of wrong-doing without following it up with forgiveness for the wrong-doing if you want to have a lasting 1765 and enduring settlement. Whatever happens, if you are going to have a peaceful settlement such as everybody longs for and looks to as the only tolerable result of this War, it must be one providing for Germany an honourable position in the family of nations with which a reasonable Germany can reasonably be satisfied. I question the doctrine that economic weakness in Germany is going to be necessarily followed by military weakness. I think it is far more likely if you refuse opportunities of economic expansion to Germany that she will be driven back to the Prussian policy of expansion by military force.
I would also remind the House that the most generous peace ever recorded to a foreign nation was that given in the terms which the Liberal Government at the commencement of its period of office accorded to South Africa, and that has been by far the most successful in producing a lasting and honourable settlement. Suppose it were possible to crush German trade by a tariff combination with our Allies, let us consider what the probable results to our-selves would be. What are we going to get out of it? We trade with Germany, not because we want to please Germany, or build up Prussian militarism, but because we want to develop the economic position of the United Kingdom. You cannot cut off trade with Germany after the War, any more than before the War, without inflicting injury upon the people of this country. I want to put this question to hon. Gentlemen who think we can do without trade with Germany. Suppose we were to divide the world into two tariff camps, as it is now divided into two military camps: those tariff camps consisting of the Allies and their Colonies on the one side, and the Central Powers with a body of neutrals on the other. In that event, what is going to happen to London, as the money market and insurance centre of the world? Surely it must be obvious that if you have those two divided camps carrying on no business, or very little business, with one another, that the central place must be in one of the neutral countries which is on speaking and friendly terms with both sets of warring nations. I do not think it is possible to reject Germany from the circle of trading nations without destroying ourselves as the great financial money centre of the world. We shall have some difficulty to defend that position after the War. The power and the wealth of neutrals has increased at a very rapid rate, and out of 1766 all proportion to anything we ourselves have been able to do. Apart from any question of tariff against Germany, there may be grave reasons to doubt whether the money market after the War may not of its own accord move to New York, or, perhaps, to Amsterdam. I submit that that is a most serious consideration. I believe it to be an inevitable result of any refusal to open our markets and ports freely to all the nations of the world.
My right hon. Friend alluded to the position of neutrals, many of whom are very friendly. What beneficial result can anybody suppose will happen to us, either as a commercial Power, or a military Power, by trying to drive neutrals into the camp of the Central Powers. Look at the position of Holland. It has most valuable colonies—one of the most prosperous portions of the globe—and under this proposal Holland would be driven into the German orbit, out of which we are very anxious to keep her. We should suffer most serious loss in that direction. Under this proposal, too, as far as we can judge from what has been adumbrated, we would have all the difficulties associated with Colonial Preference on a larger scale. You would have Colonial Preference with one scale, and another for the Allied Powers, and yet another for friendly neutrals, and yet another for neutrals less friendly, and, finally, a scale for your enemies last of all. That is, in my judgment, an absolutely impossible position. How are we to refuse to neutrals, who give us Free Trade, commercial terms equal to those we give to our Allies, who will not and do not give us Free Trade? I think it is necessary to direct the attention of the House to the record of our Allies in the matter of trade, because we are going to discuss this, I suppose, as a business proposition. It is no use blinking the fact that in the past the views of Russia and France have been more inimical to our trade expansion than those of almost any other country, except possibly the United States of America. I do not think that we ought to make that a ground of complaint against our Allies. They, no doubt, adopted a fiscal policy which they believed to be good for themselves, just as we adopted a fiscal policy which we believed to be good for ourselves. French colonial expansion destroyed our trade in Madagascar and many other places, and endeavoured to destroy every other nation's trade in those places, and in the opinion 1767 of many good judges it was largely responsible for reviving Germany's extreme unwillingness to witness the colonial expansion of others.
What is really going to happen? Is France going to be asked in the name of good will to give up the surtaxe d'entrepót system, a fiscal arrangement which is most injurious to the trade of this country? Is she going to be asked to throw open her coasting trade to British ships? Is she going to be asked to make what she would regard as a very great sacrifice in order that we in return should make what we believe to be a very great sacrifice by abandoning our Free Trade system? How can you build up mutual friendship and good will between two men on the basis of asking each to make what he believes to be a sacrifice to the other but which the recipient does not believe to be of great advantage to himself? That is not the way to build up friendship. If we are going to build up friendship with our Allies—and I hope we shall—I submit that we have got to go on with it in the way in which we began making our political alliance or political friendship with them, wholly independently of any fiscal question. Such fiscal friendship is not possible as long as they and we entertain wholly different ideas on intellectual grounds as to what is best in order to promote the financial and economic strength of the country.
I submit that the fiscal policy of this country after the War, just as before the War, ought to be dictated by a regard for our own interests. I submit that the facts which have come to light during the course of the War constitute the most triumphant vindication of the policy of Free Trade anyone has ever seen. What was the greatest injury which the Protectionists of this country believed they could confer upon Germany? It was the system of total protection presented to Germany by the British Navy under the name of blockade. What is at present regarded by most people as the greatest injury we ourselves are receiving? It is the modified system of Protection caused by the blockade of our trade, brought about by the reduction in the supply of merchant shipping throughout the world. You have got a very good system of Protection going on at present, brought about by the enhancement of freights, and I cannot make out that there is any large number of people in this country in favour 1768 of the continuance of that system. Is it not a fact that of all the warring nations we alone, the Free Traders, are solvent? Germany and Austria, as we believe, are in terrible financial straits, and we know from the Estimates that very large sums of money have to be produced by us for the assistance of our Allies. Free Trade as a method of financing war, at any rate, has been justified above the expectation of any human being; The mercantile marine of this country is built up on Free Trade. The mercantile marine could never have existed without Free Trade. I am certain that I have heard my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade allude to that circumstance in his Free Trade speeches with a considerable amount of satisfaction, which satisfaction I share. That mercantile marine has been necessary to keep us going. It has been necessary to keep our Allies going. Our Protectionist Allies would have been absolutely on their beam-ends had it not been for the mercantile marine of their Free Trade comrade.
Is it suggested that our Free Trade policy, which has provided us with a mercantile marine without which it would have been impossible to carry on the War successfully and without which we could not have taken an expedition across the seas, is during the War to be scrapped? It has given us something that our Allies have not got. We have an organisation enabling us to get the goods we require from almost every quarter of the world. With that great organisation we have been able in times of difficulty to get imports from places where we were not in the habit of getting them. That is exactly what many of our friends have not been able to do. The prosperity of this country before the War depended on our Free Trade policy; our safety throughout the War has been based upon our Free Trade policy; and I submit that there is every reason to believe that our recuperation from the evils of the War and the losses of the War will be best provided for by Free Trade. On Free Trade alone have we reason to hope that a solid and durable peace can be based. I hope we may have emphatic assurances from the Front Bench to-day that that Free Trade policy will not be departed from in any conference with the Allies at Paris.
§ Sir F. BANBURYI rather regret the speech just delivered by the hon. Gentleman opposite. I do not understand what 1769 the object of that speech was, any more than I understand what was the object of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman beside me (Mr. Robertson). The right hon. Gentleman said that the only request he would make was that the House of Commons should have an opportunity of discussing any proposals which might be made in the direction of Tariff Reform.
§ Mr. ROBERTSONThat we should not be committed to any serious change of policy until it had been debated in the House of Commons.
§ Sir F. BANBURYI do not see that that alteration makes much difference. It would be quite impossible to have any alteration in the fiscal system of this country until the House of Commons had been consulted. Any alteration must involve the imposition of taxation, and taxation cannot be imposed until this House has been consulted and has approved of it. [An HON. MEMBER: "We might be committed to it!"] Nothing can commit the House of Commons except a vote of the House of Commons itself. That really is the answer to the hon. Gentleman opposite also. From the beginning of his speech I could not understand of what he was afraid. As far as I know what is proposed is that there shall be in Paris a conference of the Allies to consider what is to happen in regard to trade questions after the War. Why is the hon. Gentleman afraid that the Government, including the President of the Board of Trade, are going to do something that will be injurious to English interests?
§ Mr. HOLTThe right hon. Baronet apparently expects a reply from me. I am afraid that our delegates may come back from that conference, present to the House a report which has been agreed upon there, and tell us that unless we vote for it the Government must resign. Therefore, although we shall be technically free, we shall be in fact bound.
§ Sir F. BANBURYHe believes that this Government, which is a Free Trade Government [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] The majority of the members of the Government are Free Traders. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO!"] The majority of the Cabinet surely are Free Traders, or they were Free Traders two years ago. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] The course of events has shown that they were wrong. They have had the courage to see that they were wrong and to admit their error. That is what hon. Members mean.
§ Mr. PRINGLEThey have submitted to the squeeze.
§ Sir F. BANBURYThat does not touch my point. The hon. Member for Hexham is afraid that the President of the Board of Trade, who, if I may say so, is a business man of considerable experience and in the shipping trade too, of which the hon. Gentleman opposite knows something, is going to change all his past beliefs and advocate with the Allies a policy of Protection, and that when the right hon. Gentleman comes back from Paris the House of Commons will be obliged to accept that policy because the right hon. Gentleman has inaugurated it. In order to prevent that the hon. Gentleman has given us this afternoon his homily upon Free Trade. If it is correct that the Free Trade members of the Government have changed their opinion, I think it is a very great triumph for the Tariff Reformers, and a very great evidence that the Tariff Reformers were right. At any rate the matter should be considered without pressure either from the Tariff Reformers or from the Free Traders.
I think the speech of the hon. Gentleman was very unfortunate at the present moment. As far as I could understand it, it was devoted to endeavouring to make an arrangement with Germany in order that Germany might be prosperous, while not making an arrangement with our Allies. The hon. Gentleman said that it was necessary to have a prosperous Germany. I do not think it is at all necessary to have a prosperous Germany. I shall be very glad to see Germany in future not prosperous. The hon. Gentleman said that the crushing of German trade would be bad for us. Why should it be bad for us? Why should protection or a tariff be bad for us if it was good for Germany? Germany prospered under a tariff for many years. If Germany prospered, why should not we? If it has the effect of crushing Germany I shall be very glad to see it and approve of it. The hon. Gentleman went into a long discussion about the solvency of our Allies. Surely that was a rather unfortunate and foolish thing to do, if he will excuse my saying so. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"] The hon. Gentleman said that owing to Free Trade we were the only solvent nation in the War. That is saying by implication that our Allies are not solvent. France, at any rate, is solvent. The last loan raised by France has gone to a considerable premium—I 1771 think four or five, certainly three or four—whereas none of the loans raised by' England has gone to a premium at all; in fact, they have all gone to a discount. I do not mean to say that England is not solvent, but it shows at any rate that France is able to raise money. The return on French Loans at the present rate of exchange is about 5 per cent., which is the rate which the Government has to pay on Treasury Bills. It is quite true that if the exchange alters the rate of interest will increase, but at the present moment any person taking French Loans would only receive 5 per cent. upon his money.
§ The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. McKenna)In France?
§ Sir F. BANBURYNo, in England. The hon. Member for Hexham said that our Allies had in the past always looked after their own interests and done what they could to injure our trade. He said that they were looking out for their own interests. We all look out for our own interests, more or less. Is it not a good thing that at the present moment something of this sort should take place? Is it not a good thing that we should try to cement the alliance which we have already made with the nations which are fighting for us? Is it not a good thing that we should try to cement those alliances in other ways? Is not that what the Government are going to do? I do not know that I am always prepared to support the action of the Government, but I am surprised that in a matter of this sort anyone should have risen in the House to object to it. If the Government enter into arrangements with the Allies which are not wise, then it will be the duty of the House to object. At the present moment all that is proposed is that there should be consultation in order to see whether or not some arrangements can be made. Surely the Government ought to enter into that conference unfettered and with their hands untied.
§ 5.0 P.M.
§ The PRIME MINISTERI do not propose, nor I imagine would it be relevant to the Vote which is now before the House, to enter into a discussion of a dialectical or controversial kind on most of the topics, interesting and important as they are, that have been raised in the speeches of my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. J. M. Robertson) 1772 and of the hon. Member who followed him (Mr. Holt). I think, if I may say so, that my right hon. Friend opposite, one of the most skilled economists in this country, presented for the consideration of the House and the country points which were not academic, but of very practical interest, in such a way that must command, and ought to command, the very gravest attention and consideration. My hon. Friend who followed him, speaking from a very wide commercial experience, illustrated and emphasised some of those points. But both my right hon. Friend and my hon. Friend expressed some apprehension—and here I come to what is strictly material to the Vote before the House—as to the contemplated or possible administrative action of the Government in the conference which is about to take place in Paris. I wish to say, in the plainest and clearest terms, that no such apprehensions should in future exist; that nothing will be done, and nothing will be said, by the representatives of His Majesty's Government in Paris which will in any degree fetter the free action either of the Government or of the House of Commons. I do not think it would be possible for us, and I am quite sure that my hon. Friend behind me will not differ from me here, to decline the invitation offered to us by our Allies, particularly by France, to join in consultation and conference with them, first and primarily—and this is a matter of real, urgent, and pressing importance—as to whether it is possible or not during the War, as part of the War, as a belligerent operation, to put some kind of economic-pressure upon our opponents, or to offer some kind of economic assistance to our friends. Strictly speaking, I think we shall all agree that that has always been within the scope of the concerted action of the Allies, who are engaged in the common purpose and desire to use even-legitimate and expedient means for the speedy attainment of their purpose. So far I am sure we shall all be on entirely common ground, and any measures which seem practicable as belligerent measures, for warlike purposes, for the better attainment of that end, will command a general assent of the Allies and of this House. But with regard to the future, that is to say as to how we are to meet the changed economic conditions—for changed they will be most materially in many respects by a vast conflict of this kind, which has produced enormous destruction of fixed 1773 capital, prodigious loss of life, unexampled dislocation of industry, and a necessary alteration in, I will not call them sentimental relations, but in relations which are not merely industrial or material, but which none the less have a very great influence on the commerce and trade of the different nations of the world.
In view of that contingency it is surely a wise thing and a provident thing, and not a premature thing, that we should take counsel together, and that we should interchange views, survey the ground, and, as far as possible, forecast the future. And I think we should be very wrong, in that it would not only be an unneighbourly and an unfriendly thing, but even impolitic, to refuse the invitation extended to us for such an interchange of views between ourselves and our Allies. Beyond that we do not intend to go, and my hon. Friends may rest assured that our representatives will return from Paris absolutely uncommitted, as far as the Government and Parliament of this country are concerned, to any specific measures to be taken in the, I hope, not very remote future.
I will only say one thing, speaking for myself—and I think I speak for the whole of my colleagues in the matter—about any measures that may eventually be taken in the future in that contingency, and it is that whatever you do you must be careful that you are not led by passion, or by short-sightedness, or by very natural feelings, I will not say of vindictiveness, but of a desire to make your victory secure and certain, into steps which are calculated to produce greater injury to yourselves than the injury you intend, and rightly intend, to inflict upon the enemy, in order to prevent them having the possibility in the future of using the measures which they have used in the past against you. Nothing can be more important. Just as in private life, in the affairs of man and man, you are very much tempted, under the influence of perfectly natural and legitimate feelings, to adopt short-sighted measures, which in the long run will be more harmful to yourself than to those you intend to injure, so in international affairs you should always keep that possibility strictly in view. I say that, and I believe that in saying it I shall command the assent of everyone in all quarters of this House. It is not a controversial matter, or a question that divides Free Traders and Tariff Reformers. We are all agreed that that is an object we should carefully 1774 keep in view as a safeguard in any possible action we may in future take. I can assure my hon. Friends, speaking on behalf of the Government, that there need be no fear in any quarter that we are going to commit them or the country prematurely at this stage to measures which require the most careful consideration in regard to which we shall have to take into counsel not only our Allies but our own Dominions, and which must have far-reaching results, and possibly tremendous consequences. Having said that clearly, and I hope in language beyond a charge of ambiguity, or the risk of misconstruction, which have occurred in the past, as I know by painful experiences; having said that, I do ask from the House that they will tacitly, at any rate implicitly, give to the Government an assurance that they believe we are right in accepting this invitation and entering this conference, and that they will not believe we shall misuse the trust they have reposed in us.
§ Mr. DAVID MASONThe right hon. Gentleman in his speech said this was an invitation, and that we ought not to refuse this invitation. If I am correctly informed—we have only a Press account to go upon with reference to the matter, and I quote from a report of the "Times"—the speech of the right hon. Gentleman was to this effect:
We have arranged, in concert with our Allies—I think the first suggestion came from the Government of France—to hold a Conference in Paris, which I hope will take place in the course of the next fortnight or so, at which all the Allied States will be represented and at which the whole of this question of the economic and commercial relations inter se, and as between them jointly and individually on the one side, and our present enemies on the other, will form the subject of debate and deliberation.That is hardly an invitation. The right hon. Gentleman, in his speech, went on to say, very properly, and I think he carried the whole House with him, that in the deliberations that are to take place, we shall have to guard ourselves from passion, vindictiveness, and any uncharitable feelings which might affect our judgment, and might do something that would really hurt ourselves rather than the enemy; that we might, perhaps, in a state of passion do something now which would kill and not benefit our trade, or our commercial relation. I ask the House if that is not the most eloquent and convincing condemnation of the proposed conference. Here the right hon. Gentleman is evidently alive to the fact that if you have such a conference in the middle of the War, that of course the liability will be 1775 for you and your actions to be coloured and inspired by feelings which cannot be of a very warm character towards the enemy, and which are, therefore, most likely to, effect the very object which he is anxious to guard against. I say, therefore, that to ask this House to give a tacit consent to such a proposal is to suggest that we are incapable of any judgment whatever. There are many of us who differ on Free Trade and Tariff Reform, but I hope I voice the feeling of a great many of us when I say that there can only be one opinion, and that is that to hold a conference of this character at this time is most unwise, and most calculated to do the very opposite from what the right hon. Gentleman desires. To my mind, he condemned the conference by that very statement which he made, and I hope that he may perhaps take from that lack of confirmation of his pronouncement that there is not a tacit confirmation or endorsement of the action of the Government in entering upon this most unfortunate conference at this stage. To commit such an action seems to me to be premature. The right hon. Gentleman also, in this same speech, spoke of the object of this conference as being to create what is called a Peace Book. I hope he will not inscribe in that Peace Book recipes as to how to make future peace or future wars, because to enter into any Zollverein as between the Allies against the Central Powers at this stage seems to be to make absolutely certain that we shall have this, or a similar war, again within a very short period.I do not think so far this House has shown any enthusiasm for this conference. We have still a fortnight, according to the right hon. Gentleman's statement, to make known our views, and possibly even at the eleventh hour we may be able to make some impression on the Government that the holding of this conference is a great mistake. In view of the fact that there is still a fortnight for us to make known our views, I do hope that many hon. Members will express their views, whatever their fiscal opinions may be, more on the general principle that the holding of a conference of this character at this time is most unwise, most premature, and most unlikely to bring about the object which the Government may desire. But we must assume it is likely to take place, and, therefore, perhaps one ought to offer some observations on the facts as 1776 regards our Allies, and as to the likelihood of anything emerging from the conference of a useful character. Take, for example, France. It is well known that in 1860 we did enter into a commercial treaty with France, and that treaty lasted from 1860 to 1871, when it was again renewed. There was an attempt to renew it again in 1881, but the negotiations fell through. The basis of this Treaty was that all reductions of duties should apply to all countries alike. As a result of that policy, the foreign trade of this country went forward by leaps and bounds. The foreign trade of France expanded for a time as a result of the Treaty, and, if I may be allowed a personal reference, my own father, who subsequently sat in this House, helped Mr. Cobden in that famous Treaty of 1860, and the sum of that Treaty was largely to expand the foreign trade of France. But when France cancelled it eventually, the foreign trade of France declined, whereas the foreign trade of this country went forward and doubled and quadrupled itself. When one has regard to that fact, what prospect is there of France, which has adopted a high tariff, of Russia, which has adopted a high tariff, and of our Dominions, which have adopted high tariffs, altering their fiscal policies now? I think we may regard it as fixed for good or ill, and it is difficult to imagine we are likely to bring them to our way of thinking and to bring about the dream of Cobden, who hoped that the result of Free Trade would lead to other nations adopting it. But they did not do so, and, so far as we are concerned, we regret it, but I think the enormous expansion of our trade is the most eloquent testimony to our policy of Free Trade. But it does not blind us to the fact that these countries, faced with enormous deficits, largely as a result of their military expenditure, have adopted a different policy, and to imagine now. in the middle of a war of this character—
§ Mr. SPEAKERThis is hardly an occasion for a general review of the history of Free Trade and Protection. The hon. Member must endeavour to come a little closer to his subject than that.
§ Mr. MASONI mention it only to show that it seems to me so unwise for us to waste time in a conference when history shows how unlikely they are to change their fiscal policy and come in on a Free 1777 Trade basis. It is much more likely, if we enter into such a conference, that we shall rather give way on our principles and sink to a Protectionist level than draw other countries into Free Trade. I will not develop that further, but I wish just briefly to point out the same with regard to Russia and our Dominions. Those Dominions have built up tariffs, and they are not likely to alter them now at the bidding of this country; but I would like to emphasise the supreme importance of even now urging the Government to reconsider their decision with regard to this conference. We cannot go to the conference and deceive our Allies by the mere presence of our delegates that we are inclined to give way on our principles or our policy, and, therefore, to my mind it is contrary to kindness to agree to this suggestion of a conference. We must necessarily deceive them if we go there, because, if we go there to do nothing, then I should say that our alliance, instead of being cemented, would tend towards disintegration. I think Mr. Gladstone once said with regard to the Crimean war that a war in which we were engaged with Allies, should be short, sharp, and decisive. The tendency of a war with Allies was towards disintegration, and it seems to me that to hold such a conference, instead of tending to the advantage of an alliance would tend rather to disintegrate it. I say you cannot go back on your principles, and the Prime Minister says he does not desire to do so, but I submit that if we go there and nothing results from the conference that will tend to have an irritating effect on our Allies, and tend rather to disintegrate the alliance than to consolidate it. The right hon. Gentleman said there was another point of view, and that was the coming together with the object of trying to evolve some economic pressure upon our enemy. I cannot follow how you can evolve any economic pressure further than a military pressure or a blockade when you are not trading with an enemy. There can be no economic result in that case from a conference, and I think the wording of the Prime Minister's speech, which I have already quoted, shows, if his earlier definition is a correct one, that this is with the object of formulating some proposals after the War either with the Allies or with our Dominions, and I do think, as I have endeavoured to show, that such a proposal is most unwise, and calculated to have 1778 the very opposite effect to that intended. I do hope, therefore, even now at the eleventh hour some pressure may be brought to bear upon the Government to reconsider the attitude they have taken.