DECLARATION OF LONDON. (Hansard, 9 March 1916)

§ Sir J. D. REES
The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in answer to a question which I put to him, said that the Declaration of London as such had no existence, and he rather hinted that one ought to know that. Later, the Attorney-General said that it was not binding upon any nation. If that is so, why cannot we completely repudiate it? Why should we continue to cling to the remnants of a discarded and almost discredited Declaration? The War has now reached that stage in which the pressure of high prices may be most brought to bear in the same way in which the Germans were able to take Paris by keeping out all supplies, and in which we were able to defeat Napoleon by raising prices all over the Continent with our blockade. Although the Declaration of London has, no doubt, been greatly modified and minimised by Proclamations and Orders in Council, there still remains a residuum which dangerously affects and impedes the action of the Fleet. The German nation, having their merchant ships all bottled up, are particularly dependent upon neutral countries like Scandinavia. We cannot blockade the Scandinavian coast, and therefore it becomes important that we should do all we can to capture all enemy property on the high seas wherever it is. I submit that the Declaration of London still impedes the Navy in that all-important task.
In regard to this question, there have been four Royal Proclamations and three Orders in Council since the War began. The first of these was put forward with the reason that we must act with Russia and France, but a subsequent Order cancelled that, and also threw over the Report of the Drafting Committee, which was described in the earliest Order as a text or manual of law and an exposition of the Declaration for the use of our Prize Courts, or, as I understand, for the International Prize Court, had we not mercifully been 1783 spared that by the action of the House of Lords which threw out the Naval Prize Bill. This document, which is in French, is impeding the action of the British Navy. The Foreign Secretary said that it was the most that could be obtained by consent, that is by consent of Germany, France and Russia. Military Powers then agreed to curb sea power. When war broke out a new list of absolute and conditional contraband was made. Aeroplanes were created absolute contraband, contrary to Articles 23 and 25 of the Declaration, and so were iron ores, unwrought copper, lead, rubber, and hides. These were added to the conditional contraband, contrary to the Declaration of London. These lists were withdrawn later, and the lists in the original text of the Declaration were withdrawn, and new lists made prescribing further restrictions contrary to Articles 15, 32, and 35 affecting neutrals as regards carrying contraband. Whether these restrictions and alterations were really legal, or whether this unratified Declaration was ever binding at all on Prize Courts, I do not know, and I believe there has been no judgment j to teach me or others whether they are really binding or not.
The Declaration of London was to be adopted during hostilities. There was a provision to minimise trouble to innocent neutral trade, about which I submit the Government have been far too careful; in fact, they have gone to the extent of putting neutral trade almost before the destruction and capture of enemy trade and property. What is left of the Declaration of London? When the War began it was held under Article 45 of the Declaration of London that German reservists must be allowed to return in neutral ships to their own country to fight. Since then there has been a demand for the withdrawal of those orders, and they have been withdrawn. I believe that if the public were fully instructed as to what this Declaration is, or what remains of. it, the whole of it would have to be withdrawn, and it would be impossible for the Foreign Office to maintain any portion of it in force. I cannot for the life of me see why it should not be withdrawn, because all sorts of creeds and beliefs have now gone by the board. Those who wanted a small Navy, against whom I had the honour to act with all my might and main when I sat on the other side of the House, have altered 1784 their tune, and now they want a large Navy. Why should the Foreign Office not hold that this Declaration and its policy was drawn up to meet special circumstances, and that it is now impossible to carry it out? Why not say so if that is the case, because it would be a comfort to the country. There is the greatest alarm in the country about what remains of this Declaration. May I quite rapidly run through a few stipulations and conditions in it, by which I understand, subject to correction, and my object is to get information, the action of our Fleet is still grievously hampered. By Article 14, 16, 17, 19 and 20 help is given to the enemy to break a blockade by forbidding the right of the blockading power to capture blockade runners at any time up to the end of the ship's voyage. The enemy is helped by restricting the right of capture to the blockading force. Are the Navies of the Allies one force for the purposes of this Article? Are the different divisions or sections of the Navies one force for the purpose of this, apparently, and on the face of it, most disastrous Clause? I really do not know, and I have never heard anyone explain.

§ The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Lord R. Cecil)
I did not catch the Clause the hon. Member was speaking about.

§ Sir J. D. REES
I am sorry, but I have not got the Clause with me. It is there. Lists of contraband are made by the Government instead of leaving it to the Prize Courts. I can show the Noble Lord the Clause. They are to be communicated by the Government to other Governments. I consider that implies that the Government make lists of contraband, and indeed they have done so. I maintain that contraband is not a matter of any hard and fast rule. It cannot be laid down in a list like goods for sale. It depends so much upon circumstances; and it is a matter for the Prize Courts in its discretion, as I maintain it was formerly under the Law of Nations. Formerly, it was for the Prize Court to determine what was contraband, and this is a departure against British interests as is every departure. It is therefore still further hampering the Fleet. Then there is an Article by which the condemnation of a ship carrying contraband is restricted to cases in which the contraband amounts to over half the cargo. Can anything be more monstrous? If a ship has a cargo of 200 tons and 100 tons or more is contraband, that ship may be condemned, but if 1785 a ship has a cargo of 20,000 tons and something less than 10,000 tons is contraband, that ship apparently goes free. I may be wrong in this interpretation, but I should like to have the opinion of my Noble Friend. The matter is of the utmost importance. Finding that this Declaration put grievous shackles upon the Fleet, on 11th March, 1915, an Order in Council was issued, which no doubt freed the Fleet to some extent, though I submit not sufficiently. It was provided in that Order in Council that no merchant vessel, neutral or other, should take goods to or from a German port, and that every merchant vessel bound to other than a German port and carrying enemy goods or goods of enemy destination, even although not contraband, might be required to be discharged in a British or allied port. This is an exceedingly difficult matter, and I dare say I do not understand it all. I am endeavouring to get information from my Noble Friend which will be of benefit to myself and others in the like case.
Germany complained that we were dropping the Declaration of London. That, no doubt, was a grievous matter with Germany. It was pointed out immediately after the issue of the Order of 11th March, 1915, by which the freedom of the Fleet was to some extent restored, that we did not stop or confiscate cotton, and when we did subsequently take in hand the stopping of cotton, we did not confiscate it; we paid for it. It was also provided that United States citizens wishing to import goods of German origin via neutral ports might produce proof of payment and then the Fleet was not to interfere. What is the position of cotton? The Government contemplated the issue of measures to relieve any abnormal temporary depression in the cotton market consequent upon these regulations. I do not know how far that goes, or whether it amounts to anything. It might amount to hundreds of millions. Again, the Foreign Secretary in his dispatch to the American Ambassador says that Prize Court decisions may be reopened and subjected to review by an International Court. I do not understand whether that contemplates the establishment at any time of an International Prize Court such as the predecessors of this Government attempted to get and could not get, owing to their Bill being thrown out by the House of Lords. The Foreign Secretary also laid it down that the question of the freedom of the seas might 1786 reasonably be a legitimate subject for discussion, definition and agreement. I again urge that the Foreign Office should throw this Declaration over, once and for all, because they do not want definition and discussion. Definition is the worst thing in the world for the most powerful naval Power. They want these things left open. Leave it, therefore, to the Prize Courts merely to interpret and carry out what was known as the Law of Nations and what was undoubtedly in favour of the greatest naval Power. There was one provision of The Hague Convention, upon which the Declaration of London was based, which has proved to be good in effect. By legalising the conversion of merchant ships on the high seas, the abolition of privateering by the Declaration of Paris was practically cancelled. It was in return for the abolition of privateering that the main feaure of the Declaration of Paris was accepted by the British Government. I submit that with the disappearance of that consideration the concession also disappears. There was another provision, the authorisation of the laying of mines, which was carried by Germany, really with an object with which we are all now familiar. Another provision allowing neutrals to harbour prizes taken by belligerents is all in favour of the weaker Power.

§ Lord R. CECIL
May I ask the hon. Gentleman what are the Clauses to which he is referring?

§ Sir J. D. REES
I am now on Clauses 19 to 23. I am merely running through these to show upon what the Declaration of London is based, and how disastrous to the strongest sea Power was every single decision of The Hague Convention, upon which the Declaration of London was based.

§ Lord R. CECIL
I cannot find that all these observations which the hon. Gentleman has recently made have any reference to Clauses 19 to 23.

§ Sir J. D. REES
If my Noble Friend will look at the Clauses he will see what I was referring to. I do not wish to be led off on to the origin of the Declaration; I wish rather to urge that it is disastrous to British interests, that it has been modified and altered in many respects, and that there can be no object in British trade having shackles imposed upon it by any remains of that Declaration. Why does not the Government now provide for the 1787 confiscation of enemy goods captured? It can do that under the Order in Council of 11th March, 1915, but it rarely does it and I should like to know why. I will not say a fear of neutrals, but, as I think, an excessive regard for the feelings of neutrals has no doubt weighed with the Government in their action in this respect. Instead of proceeding under the pre-existing law which governed in all these cases prior to The Hague Convention and' the Declaration of London, they have endeavoured to effect their object by concluding agreements with the different Powers concerned. Those agreements are not concluded with the neutral States themselves, but with subjects of those States, and there is no guarantee that those agreements are not for the benefit of such neutral subjects. It is extremely improbable that they are concluded solely for the benefit of this country. Does the Cabinet or the Admiralty sanction these agreements? The Admiralty was certainly no party to the agreement made in the case of Denmark. I do not know why this method of dealing with this subject should be preferred, rather than that of trusting to our own Prize Courts. Why are we only detaining neutral and not enemy goods? Why do we only sometimes detain enemy goods instead of generally?
It seems to me that our delegates, in concert with those of other nations, at The Hague Convention had instructions to handicap the British nation so as to reduce us to a position of equality, or almost of equality, with lesser naval nations. I submit that the Declaration and the two Orders in Council under it might now with advantage be withdrawn. If I liked I could bombard my Noble Friend with these articles, clauses, and provisions, but I hope he will admit that I have made my general plea clear. I really want to ask him why the Foreign Office cannot own up to it that the instructions given to our delegates at The Hague Convention, to put it mildly, were a mistake and that the action subsequently taken was an error. They admit that the Declaration of London is no good, although they pretended to cling to it after it was practically destroyed in another place, because no sooner did it become confronted with the stress of war than they issued an Order in Council practically abolishing the whole thing. They knocked the whole stuffing out of it. Nevertheless, there are certain 1788 articles left which I think prejudice us at the present moment. It is of the utmost importance that the Fleet should be able to exercise the right of search and capture of property without let or hindrance according to all that clear and uncomplicated law which obtained before that era of perfect peace was expected which only ushered in a period of war, extremely likely to last through the lives of this generation. Is it not time then to throw over the whole thing? Would it not be a sign of a glorious repentance? Nobody blames them for taking this view. They did it out of love of peace, it is presumed. Let them now, out of a love of justice and out of a desire to let the country see that the spirit which now animates the Foreign Office is totally remote from that which animated The Hague Convention and the Declaration of London, finally repudiate the Declaration and the two unrepealed Orders in Council which have been issued under it.