HC Deb 29 February 1916 vol 80 cc994-1016
Sir THOMAS ESMONDE

We have been discussing matters affecting the Army at considerable length, but I will now ask the indulgence of the House for a few minutes in order to discuss a matter which affects the Navy, or a not unimportant section of the personnel of the Navy. I allude to the midshipmen in His Majesty's service. The pay of a midshipman in the Royal Navy is not quite what it ought to be. The House will be surprised to hear that the pay amounts to the large sum of 1s. 9d. per day. This country, in view of its wealth and its importance, might treat its midshipmen a little more generously. A private in the Army is paid 1s. 2d. a day, and he is clothed and fed by the State, whereas a midshipman in the Royal Navy is neither fed nor clothed by the State. He clothes and feeds him- self, or his parents do it for him. Nobody will argue, in view of our experiences in this War, that the duties of a midshipman are altogether unimportant. It will be agreed that our midshipmen have carried out many important duties on more than one occasion in the course of the War, and have earned the gratitude of the country. It would be fairer to put a midshipman in the Royal Navy more nearly on a par with corresponding officers in the Army. A midshipman receives 1s. 9d. a day, while a second lieutenant receives 5s. 6d. or 6s. a day. The duties discharged by a midshipman are quite as important in relation to his service as are the duties discharged by a second lieutenant who holds a corresponding rank in the Army. Here I want to spike one of the guns which the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty will shortly shoot at me. I have nothing whatever to say on the question of the allowances made by parents to their sons who are midshipmen. So far as the parents are concerned, I am quite certain that those who are able to afford it are quite happy to pay those allowances. The question of the parents' allowance does not arise, and I do not raise it in any shape or form. I know that where the parents cannot pay the allowance the Admiralty pays it for them. That does not affect the position I take up, therefore my right hon. Friend need not bring forward that argument against me. I deal with the case, on its merits, of the pay given by the State to the midshipmen.

To simplify matters, and to explain to the House exactly where we are in this matter, I should like to give them the budget of a middy in the Royal Navy. He gets 1s. 9d. a day from his grateful country. Before the War the cost of the messing of a midshipman used to be 1s. a day, but since the War, owing to the increased cost of foodstuffs, the cost of messing has been raised to 1s. 6d. Everybody knows that a middy cannot live upon his messing alone, and that he has to pay extras. The right hon. Gentleman may not be aware of the fact, but if a middy asks for a second helping of anything at any of his meals he has to pay 3d. extra. If a middy wants 5 o'clock tea he has to pay 9d. for it in addition to his messing. If he wants to drink such a thing as soda water or Apollinaris or any mineral water he has to pay 3d. or 4d. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell me that distilled water is supplied to the Navy gratis. So it is, but in nine cases out of ten distilled water cannot be drunk because it is a mixture of oil and other compounds. It is the most abominable thing which anybody could drink, as anybody who has had experience of it can bear witness. A middy has to provide himself with some kind of drink, and the least he has to pay is 3d. or 4d. for it. I have worked the thing out very carefully, and the figures which I have given show that he gets 1s. 9d. a day from the State, while the cost of his food alone is 3s., so that he gets 12s. 6d. a week, and his food alone costs him 21s. a week. There are other expenses. When a middy is placed in a turret, he has to pay 1s. 3d. a week for polishing up that turret. Midshipmen are very glad to pay it, and take a great pride in the work, but at the same time it costs them 1s. 3d. a week to keep the turret in proper trim and sufficiently polished. Again, when a middy is promoted to the command of a picket boat, which is a very important thing in the Navy—midshipmen have discharged their duties as commanders of picket boats with great distinction in the Dardanelles and elsewhere—he has to pay another 1s. 3d. for the painting of that picket boat, so that between the turret and the picket boat he has to pay 2s. 6d. a week.

Then he has to pay his servant 3s. a week. I suppose that middies have to have to have servants to look after their wardrobe. Further, they have to pay for their washing, and where coal and oil is used, the washing of collars and cuffs is a somewhat expensive matter. A middy's expenditure on washing is at least 2s. a week. Probably that is as cheap as most of them can do it. Then middies have to buy books for their instruction, by orders of the Admiralty—most appalling books and expensive books—and also notebooks in which they have to make notes when they are going up for various examinations. These notebooks and instruction books they have to provide out of their own pockets, and they have also to pay for outfit in connection with various games. In addition to all that, there is the mess contribution, so that no middy can possibly exist on less than about 30s. a week, while a grateful country pays him 12s. 6d. His parents add to his pay to some extent. They do not complain of that, and those of them who can afford it do not ask to be relieved of that payment. In view of the fact that you pay a private in the Army 1s. 2d. a day, that you clothe and feed him, and that you pay your subaltern in the Army 5s. 6d. or 6s. a day, I think you might do a little better for the midshipman than give him 1s. 9d. a day. I commend this matter to the kindly consideration of the right hon. Gentleman, and I hope he will be able to tell us that eventually some little allowance may be made to make up some of the difference between the 12s. 6d. which the State pays the midshipman and the 30s. he has to pay himself.

8.0 P.M.

Colonel YATE

The point I want to raise is the question of the men who are discharged wounded and invalided out of the Service. I have received to-day a letter from a man in a sanatorium in my county, a divisional engineer of the Royal Naval Division. When he enlisted he was in receipt of £3 10s. a week as engineer of a central station in a tramway and lighting works. He has now returned from the fighting line wounded in the right leg and the right hand. He has been discharged from the Service, and is apparently suffering from some form of consumption. His wife is an invalid with a child. His home has had to be broken up, and he has nothing whatsoever coming in. His case has been sent to the Admiralty. He tells me he has received a letter from the Admiralty offering him the magnificent sum of a gratuity of £3—not a pension, but a gratuity. I ask that the question of the interpretation of the warrants and regulations regarding the pensions and treatment of these men who are thus invalided out of the Service may be reconsidered. I do not believe that the Pensions Committees which give these decisions do this willingly, but I think they are simply hidebound by red tape. We know what we hear about red tape. Sir Frederick Milner has been writing to the papers, and he says: My experience of public officials is that they are more like machines than human beings. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to try to give a wider interpretation of the warrants and regulations regarding these pensions. I believe it can be done by administrative order. We want these permanent officials who try to save every little petty thing they can to have their horizon widened and deal with these things more generously than they have hitherto done. It is impossible to go into the question of the way money is wasted. We had an instance at Question Time to-day with regard to the appointment of a man to superintend the inspec- tion of frozen meat for the Army, and the sum given was £28,000, which someone has obtained from the beginning of the War to the 31st December. Think what that £28,000 paid to that man for inspecting Army rations would do in the way of pensions to these poor invalided men. If economy is to be effected, it should be done in that way and not in this. Another man writes to me to-day—I am just taking letters which happen to come into the post to-day—and he says: Tens of thousands of pounds are wasted without apparent profit or benefit to anyone by the War Office method of buying, by the appointment of large numbers of inspectors without expert business, knowledge or experience to supervise manufacture and delivery. He ends by talking of the "great hordes of recently created officials who know nothing of what they buy, and whose ignorance of business training is only equalled by their complacent incapacity. "These are the opinions which are general amongst manufacturers and merchants in the country, and I ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider this question, and to try to save in other ways and not on the poor unfortunate personnel of the Army or the Navy who come back wounded and diseased from the front and who deserve every consideration, and give them something better than a mere gratuity of £3.

I should like to bring to the notice of the Under-Secretary for War the extraordinarily mean way in which they are also treating the poor unfortunate nurses who are serving the sick men at the front. I have to-day received a copy of an Army Order of 25th January, and this is what it says: The Army Council have decided that none of the allowances mentioned in Army Order 501/14, namely, lodging, fuel and light, shall be drawn by members of the Queen Alexandra Military Nurses Service and other nurses after 31st January, 1916. These poor nurses have been drawing this allowance ever since the War commenced. They are doing most heroic work at the front, and our wounded men owe an enormous debt of gratitude to them. They have provided their own clothing, and have doubtless been put to enormous expense to keep themselves, and yet, after a year and a half of war, the Army cuts down all these allowances at five days' notice. Can you imagine anything more mean than the way you treat these nurses? I ask that this question shall be brought to the notice of the Government and the whole matter reconsidered.

Major NEWMAN

I want to bring forward a point in connection with a gallant sailor who served his country well in the past, and at the call of his country came forward again at the outbreak of the War. The Debate on the Air Service on 16th February left on my mind, and on the minds of a great number of the general public, the feeling that this sailor, one of those people who manage to get things done in this great crisis of our country, has been somewhat harshly treated, and was left by this Debate in a very dubious position. At the end of September and beginning of October we had two or three air raids in London, and a certain amount of damage was done, and the public very rightly demanded that the question of the air defence of London should no longer be a battledore and shuttlecock between the Army and the Navy, but should be seriously taken up and that someone should be made responsible for it. The Government, not for the first time in their history, sheltered themselves behind a great name, and they chose Sir Percy Scott, I suppose one of the greatest experts in gunnery in the world, to take in hand the defence of London. He at once set to work to improvise, on the spur of the moment, the defence of London against aircraft. He was entrusted with the job of getting together guns which would have a chance of bringing down Zeppelins if they came again to London. He found only a few guns, and those insufficiently manned and served. He managed to get a scratch team of gunners together. I do not think this is betraying public confidence. After all, our German friends know everything we are doing. He got together guns which in the ordinary way would have gone to foreign countries—to Greece and to Russia. He got some 4.7 guns which we did not want for the moment, and more important, he was able to get together, or to get constructed, carriages for the guns. He did more than that. He got special shells from our Allies, and in a comparatively short while he managed to improvise a fairly efficient defence of London in the way of guns. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and since, I think, the middle of October we have not had a Zeppelin raid over London. The last time Zeppelins came they did not come to London but to the Midlands. The Debate on 16th February was introduced by my hon. Friend (Mr. Joynson-Hicks. Towards the close of the speech of the Under-Secretary for War he made the following remark: A Standing Joint Naval and Military Committee will be formed to collaborate in and to coordinate the question of supplies and design for material for the naval and military Air Services. This has been done, and Lord Derby, I understand, is at the head of it. My hon. Friend (Mr. Joynson-Hicks) interrupted and said: Does the statement of the right hon. Gentleman mean that Sir Percy Scott has no longer anything to do with the matter? Mr. TENNANT: I hope the hon. Gentleman will not go away with any such idea. Sir Percy Scott is still in the position he was in. There has been no change in reference to Sir Percy Scott. What ultimately will be done I do not like to say. Sir Percy Scott's position is what it was. He is in command of the gunnery.… If the arrangement which I hope is going to be completed is actually completed, the services of Sir Percy Scott will be transferred from the Admiralty to the War Office. It is a little inconvenient to answer these questions when the arrangement is not actually quite completed. We hope it may be so. Sir F. BANBURY: I understood you to say that it came into effect to-day."—OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th February, 1916, col. 100, Vol. LXXX.] That last remark was a correct remark. As a matter of fact, on 16th February, before the Debate took place, Sir Percy Scott had been relieved of his command. It left the general public with a very erroneous opinion. For instance, supposing on February 18th or 20th there had been an air raid on London, people would have said it was Sir Percy Scott's fault. As a matter of fact it would not have been, because he had no more to do with the defence of London than I have myself, but that would have been the effect. Perhaps, unwittingly, the Government did not make the position clear. They did not tell us on that day, "At twelve o'clock to-day Sir Percy Scott has given up the position he holds in the defence of London against aircraft and we are now going to have this Joint Committee, of which he will not be a member." That was not done, and things were left as they were. On 24th February I put a question to the Secretary to the Admiralty, who answered me as follows: Sir Percy Scott's responsibility to the Admiralty ceased on the transfer of the Anti-Aircraft Defence of London to the War Office. He has accepted the appointment of advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, in regard to gunnery matters relating to such anti-aircraft defence. That is the position of Sir Percy Scott at the present time. He is merely an adviser. If his advice is asked of course, he will give it to the best of his ability, but if it is not asked he will have nothing to do whatsoever. I put it to the Government and to the Secretary to the Admiralty that that really is wasting a man of Sir Percy Scott's ability, I think it is quite right that the whole of the air defences should be co-ordinated and that London should not be a separate unit, but that the Midlands, the East, the West, the North and the South should be co-ordinated in one general scheme of defence against aircraft. I can well imagine that perhaps Sir Percy Scott would not be a big enough man to put at the head of the whole of this great system, but at any rate he ought to be employed; he ought not, as a reward for getting things done, to be put upon the shelf. His ability ought to be recognised, and in a crisis like this it ought to be made use of. I trust the right hon. Gentleman (Dr. Macnamara) will be able to tell us what the War Office is going to get Sir Percy Scott to do. We cannot afford to let him be wasted at the present juncture. I think in deference to public opinion, and in view of the gallant Admiral's services, we ought to have a satisfactory answer.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara)

I will take the three points that have been raised in the reverse order, beginning with the question raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Enfield (Major Newman). He has raised the question of the circumstances associated with the transfer of the anti-aircraft defences of London, with particular reference to the position of Sir Percy Scott. I associate myself with the tribute he paid to Sir Percy Scott's great knowledge and experience. In regard to that transfer, on the 16th of February, as my hon. and gallant Friend properly stated, the Under-Secretary for War set out in full the conditions of the transfer, which will be found in columns 99 and 100 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of that date. On the 24th February, in response to a question by the hon. and gallant Member, I said: Sir Percy Scott's responsibility to the Admiralty ceased on the transfer of the Anti-aircraft Defence of London to the War Office. He has accepted the appointment of Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, in regard to gunnery matters relating to such anti-aircraft defence, and he is also, under an arrangement made in November, 1914, available for consultation in regard to naval gunnery when the Board of Admiralty desire his advice. I am afraid I cannot add anything to that. That is a plain statement of facts, and I cannot go beyond the reply which I then gave to the hon. and gallant Gentleman.

Major NEWMAN

He is not on the Joint Committee, I understand?

Dr. MACNAMARA

I can ascertain that, but I cannot say. The hon. and gallant Member for Melton (Colonel Yate) raised a very interesting question of the allowances and pensions to disabled sailors and marines. That is a matter which, by Notice of Motion, will be raised on going into Committee of Supply both on the Army and the Navy Estimates, as my hon. and gallant Friend will see by reference to the Order Paper. Nevertheless there are one or two things I would like to say. We proceed under the orders given us in the Report of the Select Committee which was appointed on 18th November, 1914. The reference to that Select Committee is as follows:— That a Select Committee be appointed to consider a scheme of pensions and grants for officers and men in the naval and military services disabled by wounds or disease arising out of the present War. I need not read the other parts of the reference, which deals with the widows, orphans and dependants of officers and men, and so forth. The relevant part of the reference to the question which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has raised is that which deals with: A scheme of pensions and grants for officers and men in the naval and military services disabled by wounds or disease arising out of the present War. In the introduction to the Special Report which the Select Committee subsequently submitted to the House, and which was printed in April, 1915, there appear the following words:— The Select Committee appointed to consider a scheme of pensions and grants for officers and men in the naval and military services disabled by wounds or disease arising out of the present War," etc. It will be noted that they rehearse the terms of reference. So far as we are concerned at the Admiralty, we secured an Order in Council. There is some misapprehension about that. People talk as if it were an antediluvian and obsolete document, going back into the very far Dark Ages when the State did not do the thing so well as I must insist—it is not the present criticism to which I take objection—it is doing it to-day. That cannot be said in regard to this Order in Council under which we proceed, because our Order in Council is dated 12th August, 1915. We paid the old rates down to that date, and they were less generous than those which followed the Report of the Select Committee. This is the procedure. Of course, I am speaking for the Admiralty. The man is examined by a medical board, who give a decision as to whether the man's condition is or is not attributable to the Service. It is a fundamental part of this Order in Council, and of the Army Warrant, which I think is much older than this, and I think of the Select Committee's reference from this House, and the Select Committee's finding, that the disease and wounds must arise out of the present War. It is an essential feature that the invalidity must be attributable to the Service. The case is examined by a medical board, who give a decision as to whether the man's condition is or is not attributable to the Service. Their report is reviewed by the Medical Department of the Admiralty, and if there appears to be any doubt as to the fairness of the decision the man's medical history is very carefully gone into, and the final verdict not infrequently goes in favour of the man. The cases also go to the Accountant-General's Department and are again examined, and if it is felt that any material facts have not been gone into fully in the Medical Department, or if any fresh evidence has been brought, the case is heard again. Further, if in a case such as that raised by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, the decision has been given—I do not promise any revision of decision of this case in what I am about to say—and if there is any new evidence, and if the person appeals to have the case re-examined in the light of some further evidence he can throw upon it, it is gone into again. I may say that the man gets the benefit of the doubt so far as we are concerned.

The hon. and gallant Gentleman is quite wrong when he talks about Civil servants as being guided by red tape and giving rather official and hard-mouthed decisions. That is not true. The contrary is true. I say on behalf of the Accountant-General of the Navy and all the heads of the various branches which deal with the various aspects of this question, that they give the most sympathetic and warm consideration to every case which comes before them. If my hon. and gallant Friend will give me the case to which he refers he may rest assured that it will be gone into with every endeavour to see that if it is attributable to the Service the man will get the consideration which he ought to get, if his condition is the result of the rigour and hardship of the Service which he has rendered to the State at this time. But there are cases which are refused, and they are refused because they are not attributable to the Service. Take the sort of case which comes before the Admiralty. The same is true of the War Office. These are cases where there has been a hasty medical examination. Let us understand where we are. Here is a man who has not been out of this country. He has not been added to the Fleet. He has gone down to the depot to be kitted up, and so on. Somebody finds, on closer examination, that he has got very bad eyesight. He was very eager to get into the Service for a most honourable purpose. There is, perhaps, the same thing as in the Army. We are a small family, and we can keep our hand upon this matter to a much greater degree than where the expansion has been so rapid. But it is suddenly found that his eyesight is very bad, or that he has got flat feet or varicose veins, and he ought never to have been admitted. That man's condition is in no way the result of any exertion or strain, or the result of service which would give him the right to a pension. I do not think that anybody could seriously put that proposition forward.

What I do claim on behalf of our administration is this, that if it can be shown that the man's condition is in any way the result of service—that is to say, suppose he had gone on living the ordinary life of the civilian in fairly easy conditions, it would be assumed that he had five, ten, or fifteen years of very good health, with the possibility of good work before him, and that his condition has been produced in the Service as the result of pressure or drill, or certainly of going with the Fleet or into the trenches, then I say that our administration follows this policy, even if we go beyond the precise letter of the Orders in Council, that we should take such a case into consideration. I hope that my hon. Friend will not ask me to go into the matter further than that, because it will be fully discussed on Notice of Motion on going into Committee of Supply on the Army and the Navy Estimates. I have before me a number of cases of men in the Navy who have been refused. There are many of them, but I may quote one or two. Here is one with defective teeth. He was in our service six days. He ought never to have been passed into it, and it cannot be claimed that because we made a mistake, therefore before he had rendered any effective service he should be given a pension. What we say is that if his service has produced or has hastened or accelerated a breakdown, then some consideration is due. Then there is the case of a man who has got ventral hernia. You may say that that ought to have been discovered by careful medical examination, but if it was not and if the man had no strain of any kind whatever, what is the position? No man in this House would wish to treat those cases with greater consideration than I.

Mr. KING

Take it out of the doctor.

Dr. MACNAMARA

You cannot give a life pension on that. Take the case of a man with epilepsy. He is with us four months. He is suddenly discovered suffering from epileptic fits. What are we to do if suddenly he has an epileptic fit to which he is subject and which is in no way aggravated by the service? Is it then to be said that we are to give him a life pension? I do not think so. What we must do is to consider carefully whether our Orders in Council enable us to give assistance to a man who may have contracted or be susceptible to a form of disease, not due to misconduct, which everybody rules out, but that although he may have the germs of or be susceptible to it before he enters the Service, yet if it can be shown that entering the Service aggravated, developed or hastened the breaking down of that man, then I think that we have got to give such a case sympathetic consideration. That is the way in which I state the case to the House. That is, broadly speaking, the line on which we have gone in our administration. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than to go into the case to which my hon. Friend has referred.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wexford referred, as he has done on more than one occasion—and I have failed to convince him up to now—to what he considers the inadequacy of the midshipman's pay. I will try again. The midshipman's pay is 1s. 9d. a day, which is 12s. 3d. a week. Then, says my hon. Friend, "you must not take into account anything else." I cannot allow the case to be taken in that way. I must take into account the fact that it is part of the duty of the parents to make an allowance of £50 a year, which is 19s. 2d. a week, so that if you add the two together he gets a total of 31s. 5d. per week.

Sir T. ESMONDE

No, only 21s. 5d.

Dr. MACNAMARA

I beg pardon. It is 31s. 5d. I have the advantage of my hon. Friend. I was once a schoolmaster. Out of this there is the compulsory messing, 7s. a week. Then he has got to pay some other matters, into which I will go in a moment. There was a tuition charge of 3d. a day against him which has been waived for the period of the War. The only compulsory charge against him is the 7s. a week messing charge. I agree that there will be extras which will have to be added. He will have to pay for his washing. He will have to make a contribution for his servant. But suppose you double the 7s.—that is the messing charge of the Government—that makes 14s., and suppose you add another 7s. for incidental charges, he has still got 10s. a week in his pocket out of the 31s. 5d. On the whole, I really do think that is enough for him considering his age. The ages would be from fifteen years and ten months up to nineteen years and six months, and the average would be roughly seventeen years and eight months. My hon. Friend says that he ought to be more on a par with a second lieutenant in the Army, but, after all, his service, his age, and the charges against him are not comparable with those of the second lieutenant in the Army. A second lieutenant in the Army is paid higher, I agree, but the expenses of military messing are higher, and the age of the second lieutenant is higher. As regards parents' allowance we announced long ago, as I think my hon. Friend knows, that we are prepared to give favourable consideration to an application from the parent that it should be waived in part or in whole for the period of war if it can be shown that the War has made it more difficult, by reducing income, to make the payment, and if that is done that is an increase of 19s. 2d. a week to this young lad from State funds. I happen to know every application because, with others, they pass through my hands as well as those of other persons. We have refused three only, and said "Yes," very rightly said "Yes," in the other cases. In all those cases 19s. 2d. is granted to these young men, and taking all these facts into consideration I hope my hon. Friend will not press his view further. I am aware how proud he is of these fine, eager, and gallant lads, and I know he looks to them to render fruitful service to their country in the future, but I think he will see, on reflection, that we have not done so badly for them, and I trust, therefore, that he will at any rate revise his view on this matter.

Mr. CURRIE

I wish to refer briefly to a point raised by the right hon. Member for Swansea, which has direct application to married men who are joining the Army, and which I think should be really dealt with by the Government. I think the plea put forward is both just and reasonable, and the Government should lose no time in dealing with it. The principle direct obligations of these men are rents and insurance premiums. My view of these obligations is that they are national and should be shouldered by the nation, that is the taxpayer. I know that in other quarters the idea is being pressed that the obligation should be placed on the landlord—a moratorium of rents, or, in the case of the insurance companies, a moratorium of premiums. Against that idea I protest strongly indeed. I think it would be extremely unfair and might have very disastrous results. I think the Government should lose no time in giving an answer to the question that has been raised, and, of course, I would like to hear something on the part of the Government in regard to it.

Mr. LYNCH

I propose to say but a few words on this occasion before the Bill is finally passed. I believe that we are approaching the moment which may be decisive of the whole campaign. That does not necessarily mean that the campaign will come to an end in a very short time. But I think that, if the history of great campaigns be regarded, it will be found that one certain period has marked the decisive operations, and that the rest of the campaign has been really only working out the logical and ultimate conclusion the factors of which have been already in a great part determined. Therefore, I believe that the next few months are of extraordinary importance. I am one of those not at all reassured by the optimistic views which prevail on the Front Bench, and I am not satisfied that the Government has put forth even its possible energy and has brought out the greatest efficiency within its power. I will dwell very briefly on a topic which I raised before, and that is with regard to the position of Lord Kitchener, though not with any animus whatever against him. I leave all personalities out of account, but it is evident that the Government itself has virtually inflicted upon him a censure more severe than could emanate from any speech delivered in this House by having successively taken from him his chief function, so that he is now left in the ignominious position of being little more than a figurehead. It might be said that this is the best solution of a difficult question. When we consider the great interests at stake, when we consider the extreme importance of this crisis, what are we to say of a Government which, as the best defence for the Minister of War, has to say, "After all, he is little more than a figurehead, and that is the best possible condition in which to leave that officer"? That shows a spirit which does not reflect upon him, but reflects upon the Government, for their want of grit, their want of real honesty, their want of moral courage.

I will point this out and I will hold it clearly to the view of the public until the required impression is made and these statements are recognised to be true, so that we may thus gain a force that will move the Government. We have had too many of those lawyer-like tricks, devices, and shifts, and those semi-honest means which pass in the piping times of peace, although even then they prepare disaster; we want men who will recognise the reality of this grave situation and who will act acordingly. I will touch upon one aspect of the field of the Government's conduct in this War, and in viewing it we come upon some amazing deficiencies arising from want of energy, intelligence, and grit, those winning qualities which are there so conspicuously absent. I will not say that this applies to all who are on that Front Bench, for that would be unjust in certain quarters. Take, for instance, the Air Service. If the representative of the Admiralty will give me his attention, I would like to know whether it is the fact that if a Zeppelin, or any hostile aircraft appears, young men who fly the British machines, excellent and brilliant young men for the most part, and who are eager to go out and fight those hostile craft, are not allowed to ascend until they get permission from some headquarters. Thus during the interval the enemy aircraft have time to do their damage and disappear. I believe it is so; I am informed that is the case. What speech delivered in this House, even of the most caustic character, could be a more biting comment on this inefficiency than that mere statement. When these airmen do ascend they are insufficiently provided with means of fighting the enemy, and even when by remarkable foresight and exceptional brain power, so to speak, the Admiralty provides them with guns, those guns are incapable of being set at the proper elevation to do their work. In a moment of crisis like this, the great leaders of a great nation should be such that wherever one touched their activities one would be startled by the energy which emanates from them, as in touching an electric machine. But what is the fact? We have flabbiness, procrastination, a glossing over of problems, lawyer-like speeches, instead of great military energy and foresight. I think the Government know that themselves. I think they have become habituated to recognising that this is their official character.

The situation on the Western Front is grave. I do not wish to exaggerate the gravity of the situation, because I am consoled to think that this main thrust by the Germans has to some extent been anticipated and provided for by the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces. Those who know General Joffre best tell me that he is still entirely confident, that he has been master of the situation from the beginning, that he has had his reserves in hand, and that he can use those reserves and push them forward at the right moment, and that the next phase of this gigantic conflict will be the astonishing reverse of the German. I would like to believe, and I hope that may be so, because the one bright character of the news which has reached us lately has, at any rate, been this, that the French troops have displayed the most dazzling courage against overwhelming odds, and that the Frenchmen of to-day are not a whit inferior to their glorious ancestors who made their names illustrious in the great days of Jena, of Austerlitz, and of Wagram. This particular thrust may not be the really decisive attack of the Germans on the Western front. A disquieting feature has been this, that it has not been replied to by a counter attack on the British side. Right along the line where one might have anticipated that, we still have the Germans taking the initiative, the Germans taking the aggressive, the Germans, who have so many fronts to maintain, and so many enemies, always developing their plans, and fighting them out according to their own preconceptions. I anticipated this thrust long ago, and said so in a speech delivered in this House some six months ago. The events since then have borne out what I said at that time. I will repeat that any nation, any fortress, or any army, which tries always to play the safe game and to rely entirely upon the defensive is doomed to ultimate defeat. Even a draw on this occasion would be the equivalent of ultimate defeat. Those who organise their plans in this way of defence leave out what is one of the most decisive factors in war, and that is the psychological factor.

From my knowledge of the French, having lived amongst them in complete sympathy for a number of years, I will say this, while no one admires their assailant qualities more than I do, yet, if the War degenerates into a mere war of endurance in trench work, then I would fear that the French would go under before those qualities of the Germans, which are secondary qualities, but which, at any rate, find their most effective play in that kind of solid endurance in which the Teuton has always been brought up. But the French have a higher quality, what you may call a Celtic quality, the quality of dash, of vigour in the attack—a quality which ultimately means victory. I believe the British soldier also is happier when, instead of defending his trench day after day and week after week in indecisive but bloody combat, the word is given to him to go forward to the attack. It is on that note rather that I would close this address, namely, to say that from this out we should fight not for any kind of safety. We should not be disinclined to take risks, but we should fight for victory: we should build our plans entirely to that end. We should nail our flag to the masthead definitely, and, having formed our plan, bend every thought, every disposition, every detail of organisation, every movement of the spirit, towards that end on the plan of attack, an attack which will crush through the German lines, which will roll them back, which will seize their lines of communication, and force them out of the trenches to fight in the open. Then there will be found full play for those qualities in which the Allies excel, in which they are superior to the Teuton—the qualities of dash, vigour, irresistible élan, energy—the great fighting assailant qualities which have burned so brightly in the history of these Isles and of France.

Mr. KING

The House, even though we are present in diminished numbers, always listens with great admiration to the horn Member for West Clare (Mr. Lynch). Sorry as I am that the Government has not heard in greater numbers his views on the War and his inspiring admonitions, yet I feel that those of us who have been here to listen must be grateful to him for his insight, eloquence, and confidence. I am going to ask the House to go from a broad question of policy to a matter of detail. I desire to refer to a question to which I have called the attention of the House on a previous occasion, and to which the hon. Member for Blackburn and the hon. Member for Plymouth have also called attention. I mean the organisation and position of our medical forces and the medical resources of the country at the present time. Apparently without the knowledge or approval of Parliament, or without the due consideration which I think it ought to have received either here or outside, the whole position of the medical forces of this country has been slipping away into a very anomalous and, I believe, very unfortunate condition. We are largely indebted to an understanding—

Mr. JAMES HOPE (Treasurer of the Household)

May I ask the hon. Member what Department he suggests should take cognisance of this matter?

Mr. KING

I should be extremely glad if the hon. Gentleman's Department or any Department will do so.

Mr. HOPE

My Department is that of Treasurer of His Majesty's Household. Does the hon. Gentleman suggest that that Department should take cognisance of it?

Mr. KING

I am very glad to answer any question interjected by anybody on the Treasury Bench. I have already put this question privately and publicly before Ministers. I know they are overburdened and that they have an enormous number of questions brought to their attention. Therefore I shall not feel aggrieved if nobody is here to answer my remarks. Those remarks will stand on record, and if possibly they are considered afterwards, I shall be perfectly satisfied. I raise no objection to nobody being here now especially to answer. The position is this: When the War broke out, there was a greater deficiency in medical men, relatively speaking, than in any other professional skilled class in the community. That was largely due to the Insurance Act and other reasons. Since the War that position has been aggravated. First of all a number of young doctors took commissions or even enrolled themselves in the ranks, a number of medical students did the same, and we are now in a position where the number of medical men in this country has fallen to a dangerously low point. My contention is that the way in which the War Office are treating this question renders the danger and the deficiency even greater. We are indebted to the hon. Member for Plymouth (Mr. Shirley Benn) for having called attention, by means of a question on the 12th January, to the exact position of the medical profession at the present time. From a very long answer given by the Under-Secretary for War it appears that the British Medical Association at its annual meeting last July—I have no doubt acting quite properly at the time with their objects in view—appointed a committee and settled its own terms of reference as follows: To organise the medical profession in England Wales and Ireland, in such a way as will enable the Government to use every medical practitioner fit to serve the country in such a manner as to turn his qualifications to the best possible use: to deal with all matters affecting the medical profession arising in connection with the War: and to report to the Council (of the British Medical Association). 9.0 P.M.

That was a very comprehensive order. The British Medical Association which, while not representing the whole medical profession, is undoubtedly a very powerful and well-managed body, appoints a committee to organise the whole medical profession, and to direct its energies for the whole of the nation both in peace and in war. The committee was appointed, co-opted certain members who were supposed to represent the universities and colleges and other medical bodies, and got to work. The War Office, being, I believe, quite overdone with work and quite unaware, perhaps not having even considered, how it ought to deal with the medical question in the country and in the Army, appear to have fallen down before this committee, and practically, without any authority from this House, or any authority at all, as I understand, have handed over to this self-constituted committee the whole of the organisation and control—it practically amounts to that—of the medical profession. This committee, which is called the central medical war committee, has, since the passing of the Military Service Act, issued a circular numbered W 10, requiring all single doctors of military age to enrol themselves as willing to place their services at the disposal of the War Office, if required to do so. Of course, every single qualified medical practitioner under the age of forty-one is liable to be conscripted, but I am sure most of us would agree that if he was in general practice, or occupying some position in an institution, for instance, he would be considered as doing better work than as a private in the Army. Yet this self-appointed committee take the matter up in such a way that they send out a circular pointing out that all single doctors of military age must enrol themselves, or, if they do not, they may be conscripted. We are told in the "British Medical Journal" of the week before last that there is at present no compulsion except for single doctors under forty-one, but it is desired that the whole medical profession should be attested, and they are now appealing practically to the whole medical profession under forty-one, on the ground of patriotism, backed up to some extent by threats of Conscription, to attest or enrol themselves as ready to come into the Army scheme whenever called upon.

This would be a very serious position in any case. It is doubly serious when it is done without any Parliamentary sanction, or even explanation, by a committee appointed, without any encouragement or suggestion, as far as I know, from the War Office, by the British Medical Association, which is not representative of the medical profession as a whole. I consider it a very serious matter indeed, especially as one sees that this committee is getting more and more power and authority. I might quote, in support of what I say, several statements by the Under-Secretary for War, the "British Medical Journal," and the "Lancet." I do not believe that the country realises that we have reached a position where practically the whole medical profession under the age of forty-one, and to a large extent over, is under the actual control of the War Office and that the War Office are using the medical profession in an extravagant and wasteful way taking far more medical men from the service of the civilian population than are required, and quite ignoring the really vital interests of the health of the civil and working population of the land. This is a very large subject, and might be pursued at some length; but I will now refer to what I believe is well recognised by all who have studied the question, namely, that the whole of the organisation of the medical service is wasteful and extravagant, takes far too many men away from the medical profession in this country, and so not only wastes money, but, what is more important, wastes the energies of skill and necessary men.

A few instances will show what I mean. The War Office organises its medical forces at the front by making the unit a division. Each division has a complete medical service independent of other medical services. That is a very simple arrangement and, I suppose, according to War Office methods which probably existed before the War began; therefore it must exist now. But what is the result? The result is that divisions are staffed with medical men up to the requirements needed when the division goes into action. A division that is at the base or far behind the firing line obviously will need far fewer medical men than if that division is actually in the firing line. The arrangement entails a perfectly unnecessary waste of men and money. I hear from various quarters of the extravagance and waste in connection with it. I was informed by a friend of mine—and I hope I am not giving away anything confidential—that he was asked to prepare a scheme which would be more economical and satisfactory. He is a surgeon of very high position in the country. He gave three months of almost uninterrupted work to a scheme, and was in constant communication with the War Office and with leading men in the leading hospitals and in Harley Street. He brought this scheme forward after being encouraged that the whole new scheme—which, of course, was not his alone—would be put through. He was put down by being told that, after all, the old system must continue. It is most lamentable that a state of affairs like this should be, because by it we are wasting men, money, and the health and strength of our civilian as well as of our military population.

I must just refer to one or two ways in which this extravagance to which I have referred is continued. In the Royal Army Medical Corps practically no commission is given to any officer who is not a fully qualified medical man. That rule may, to some extent, have been modified lately. I do not know. But certainly in the early days of the War it was only under the most exceptional circumstances that any commission was given to anybody but a fully qualified medical man. What does that mean? It means that in the Royal Army Medical Corps there are many officers who have to do such work as direct the ambulance—work that is quite independent of medical skill and qualifications. Many men, again, have to do with provisioning. Say a man is a quartermaster of a large base hospital or of a clearing station. There is no necessity whatever for the man to be a medical man. An officer holding a commission in the Royal Army Medical Corps, according to the present ruling, must be a medical man. He does not of necessity do better certain work that I have specified. You are taking away medical men who are very much needed elsewhere for merely routine, organising, clerical and other duties where their medical qualifications do not come in at all. It is the same way with a large amount of clerical work—the filling up of forms, the making up of accounts, the rendering of returns, and so on. If these things have to be done they ought to be done by men who have not medical qualifications.

I shall not pursue this matter much further to-night. I may have another opportunity, possibly on the Army Estimates. But I have said enough, I think, to show that a great deal of waste of men and of money, a great deal of clinging to old forms, which might have been right before the War, but which ought to be modified now, is going on; that there is still a great deal of incapacity, inefficiency and waste, which a little foresight, or, at any rate, a little attention, might change, with great benefit to our resources of men, money and materials. I call attention to this matter because it affects not only the efficiency of the Army, but the efficiency of the civilian population. The whole of our industrial class is now working at a strain and often under conditions which are trying beyond anything to which they have been accustomed. Everybody who knows anything of the administration of the National Insurance Act knows that the strain and difficulty in connection with the medical service is increasing, and likely to continue to increase as long as the War lasts. If I have said anything to-night which will have the effect of altering matters, I shall be glad. I hope sincerely that the line of inquiry which I have suggested may produce some good, and call the attention of the War Office to the need for greater economy and greater efficiency, while at the same time doing something, not only for the military, but the civilian population of the country.

Question, "That the Bill be read the third time," put, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the third time, and passed.