§ Special Commissions (Dardanelles and Mesopotamia) Bill.
§ Amendment made: After the word "Dardanelles," insert the words "and Gallipoli."—[Mr. Chamberlain.]
§ Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."
§ Commander BELLAIRSWhen the proposals of this Bill were first before the House—before, in fact, it was introduced—I ventured to offer my opposition to the whole principle of having these vast inquiries during war time. When the Second Reading came on I did not speak, because the Prime Minister made an appeal to the House that only Committee points were being dealt with, and we might well get into Committee, whereas I wanted to explain my opposition to the Bill as a whole Since that time we have had indicated to us the opposition of Australia, so far as Australia is represented by its Press, and the Australian Minister of Defence has clearly stated that he cannot regard Mr. Fisher as a representative of Australia, because Australia was never consulted in regard to this Bill. I do not throw that out as any count against the Government, because in the very nature of things the Government could not consult Australia in the time at its disposal, but it is a point which ought to be considered by the House 108 in regard to passing the Bill. I would myself make a suggestion to the House, and it is this: we all have expressed unanimously the most sincere regard for Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Staff, and he has been made to a very large extent the arbiter as to the production of Papers which this House was led to expect, and it has not got, because the military authorities object. The author of these inquiries, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dublin University, in his speech expressed the greatest possible admiration for Sir William Robertson. He showed implicit confidence in his judgment, and I think he and all parties would be agreed that if Sir William Robertson were to say that no possible good could result from these inquiries being held during the War, that they would mean taking up a great deal of time by very important officers at the War Office and probably at the Admiralty too, the War Office being already undermanned, that they would tend to want of unity of the Services because of the jealousies which they would create, and the schools into which it would divide the Services—I am perfectly certain if he were asked those questions, and gave that answer, every Member of this House would be against passing this Bill and setting up these Commissions. Perhaps I am wrong there, but I think, after all, we are out to win this War, and if it were to have, in the opinion of the military authorities, any effect militating against the winning of the War, I believe the majority of the House, at any rate, would object to the passing of this Bill. We should reflect that we are carrying this Bill in the absence of something like 140 Service Members. They are the best judges of what the effect will be on the Service, and they are not here to exercise their judgment.
I would ask the House to remember to what the original inception of this Bill was due. It came on the morrow of the defeat of the Government; in fact, almost two defeats—one on the question of registration, and one at the hands of the Welsh Members—and it came as the greatest surprise to the House that the Government itself proposed to adopt the demands of the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University. He might indeed have guessed they would look upon it as straining at a gnat after swallowing a camel, if they accepted these two Commissions, because the Government have already set tip in 109 connection with the War over 100 Committees; in fact, the maxim of the Government would appear to be that there is safety in the multitude of Committees. But these Committees, I submit, are altogether exceptional, because they would be on a great scale—an inquisition into the Services which might have bad effects both on discipline and on unity. They follow out an ingrained habit of the country, which is rather a peace habit than a war habit, of referring everything to a committee. When Douglas Jerrold said that if England were submerged by a tidal wave the survivors would make it an excuse to hold a dinner to celebrate the event, I think he could with even more truth have said the survivors would make it an excuse for a committee, or several committees, to study the tidal wave. It is a harmless habit in peace; it may be a very dangerous habit indeed in war time. We have two inquiries which, I think, to a certain extent have lessons for us in regard to the Dardanelles and the Mesopotamia Commissions; they are the Irish Inquiry and the Air Committee. We have had the results of the Irish Inquiry and nothing whatever has been done by the Government on their Report; hence, what is the value of it? We have had another inquiry during the War on the Air Service—I think it was on 13th April that the terms of reference were given to this House. The Prime Minister stated that it would be set up as expeditiously as possible. We were led to believe that the time of Sir David Henderson and his valuable staff would not be unduly wasted. It has been sitting ever since. Those skilled officers have had to waste their time preparing their case, diving into the archives of the past in this War and defending their reputations. We are still waiting for the Report. We do not know when we will get it. I would also point out to the House that the chances are very strong indeed we will not get the Report from our new Commissions until after the War, and, if that is true, there is far more value in holding them after the War, when the whole of the diplomatic correspondence and everything connected with the War can be examined in the light of full publicity. In that case I think the British public would attach greater weight to the Reports, but, if they are to come after the War, how do we suppose we can in any single degree gain from these inquiries during the War? I fail to see it.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Somerset (Colonel Aubrey 110 Herbert) has been a prime mover in this matter, and I am glad to see he agrees with me with regard to the Dardanelles, that we had better not have this inquiry during the War. His speech leads me to make one remark with regard to the Mesopotamian Expedition. He is himself very certain of good resulting from the inquiry into Mesopotamia. He tells us that a great many people are shaking in their shoes because of this inquiry, and that they will put in more work in the next few days than they have put in during some years, or words to that effect. Later on in his speech he indicated who was responsible—the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Finance Minister of the Council, Sir William Meyer.
Colonel HERBERTI indicated that the responsibility must lie between those two gentlemen, but I did not go further than that.
§ Commander BELLAIRSHe indicated that the responsibility must lie between those two gentlemen, and he concluded his speech by suggesting that whoever was the guilty party should meet the fate of Admiral Byng. I do not think that is a good spirit in which to approach inquiries during war, and nothing but harm will result if that is going to be the spirit in which these inquiries are set up. I do not believe there is a large body connected with the Army or the Navy who, as a result of setting up what is practically a civil Commission, will put in more work in a few days than they have in the past years. I spent my early years in the Service in close contact with military men, but that type of Army or Navy officer, with such a low tradition, is quite unknown to me, and I do not honestly believe he exists. My further objection was indicated in an Amendment during the Debate on this Bill. I pointed out that the entry of Turkey into the War was due to the escape of the "Goeben" and "Breslau." That will be excluded. We would not exclude it in a peace inquiry, nor would we exclude diplomacy. Naval people maintain that the Foreign Office never informed them that Turkey had a secret treaty with Germany. All these things would undoubtedly be looked into if we had an inquiry after the War. I will not pursue that subject; it may be out of order. What I should like to say to the House with regard to the responsibility of soldiers and sailors is that you have rapid machinery ready to hand if the Government choose to use it, for they can bring those soldiers and sailors to a 111 court-martial, and such Courts used to be held in public and the proceedings submitted to this House. It is an entire mistake to suppose that you must have complete evidence of guilt before you can bring an officer before a court-martial. That is not the case. That sort of court-martial took place in regard to General Whitlocke in 1807 for neglect and incompetence in surrendering Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, but in 1805 there was the typical court-martial on Sir Robert Calder, who won a victory. That victory might in some degree be compared with "the glorious 1st of June," but Nelson had taught the country to expect a higher scale of victory, having regard to the somewhat inefficient navies of France and Spain. The result was that, although Sir Robert Calder drove the French Fleet into Ferrol Harbour and won a victory, he was brought before a court-martial and his career was broken, because the victory was not up to the high standard of the profession in those days.
I submit it is always possible, on the slightest suspicion of an officer not having done his best, to bring him before his peers, that is a court-martial, to get at the whole of the facts, and I submit that step ought to have been more frequently taken. You will not by a civilian Committee get at the whole of the facts. We have the example in the Crimean War Committee. A certain number of officers were impugned. They were reported against by the Crimean War Committee. What did these officers do? They at once put in an application to be tried by their peers, by their own profession who understood all the difficulties with which they had had to contend. They submitted their evidence to a Committee of seven generals, and they were exculpated. I think on the whole the House has sufficient fairness of mind to say that the report of seven generals on a question of military efficiency was more likely to be correct than the Select Committee this House itself set up. I have already said that these Commissions may have bad effects on the discipline and unity of the Service. I do know that reputation is everything to an officer, and he will defend his reputation by all means in his power. If he knows his reputation is to be shortly inquired into, he will constantly be talking matters over with other officers, and there will be a tendency in the Service 112 to resolve itself into cliques and schools, and this in the middle of a great offensive war. I have here what I think was a remarkable document, namely, Lord Randolph Churchill's Minority Report to the Hartington Commission, in 1886, and he remarks on this matter that for the officer
Professional reputation is everything next to life itself, and the loss of it means professional ruin.7.0 P.M.That is how it affects the Army or Navy. But it is totally different with a statesman or politician. If cliques and schools are caused by these inquiries, and the knowledge spreads that officers are being dragged before these inquiries, it will be harmful to the unity of the Service I believe that no good, in regard to the conduct of the War, is likely to result, because the Reports of the inquiries are not likely to come out during the War. Many changes have already been effected. In Mesopotamia the War Office has taken over the direction of affairs, and I believe Sir William Robertson has had charge of them since last February. I know there were some questions of supplies which remained to be dealt with, but I believe they have been dealt with, and therefore all the good that can be effected by these inquiries has already been accomplished. What we desire is that the Government which chooses the men in command, and so is indirectly responsible for any inefficiency, and which is responsible for all the administrative mistakes which preceded the War, and for the whole preparation for war, and for subordinating military to political considerations, should be brought to book. There is no machinery at present by which we can do that. We used to have publicity, and that was feared by statesmen, but now our statesmen, under conditions of secrecy, which they say are necessary, escape altogether, and I think what we desire is some machinery which will bring those responsible to book. If inquiries are held in public after the War we shall have that machinery during the whole of the sittings of the Commission. The Reports of these Commissions are not likely to come out during the War, and therefore all the gain that would otherwise result to this War is lost.
By inquiry after the War the great gain you will get is that you will not disturb the Army and Navy during the vital peril of this War. You will not try General Townshend in his absence. The investigation will be public and it will include the diplomacy and give you full scope to carry 113 out a full and impartial instead of a partial inquiry, and by the machinery I suggest you would preserve the unity of the Services, the importance of which everybody knows. We all know the spirit which Chatham infused into the Services when he took the helm, and he did that by bringing them into absolute unison. Clive and others worked together in India with successful results, because the French failed in this respect. Wolfe and Saunders worked in unison in Canada and the French did not, and we won Canada. Hon. Members can seek the advice of any soldier or sailor now serving at the front; again, let them ask anybody serving at the War Office—are they not undermanned at the present moment in regard to the work which they have to do? Will not the setting up of these Commissions mean that six, seven, or ten of the very best officers at the War Office have to be employed getting together the evidence, and they will have to be constantly watching what the Committees want instead of concentrating their efforts on the great offensive against the enemy? That is a question upon which the House should give a considered verdict with a sense of reasoned responsibility, and they should come to no decision which in the slightest degree entails any loss to our successful offensive in this War.
§ Mr. SAMUEL ROBERTSWe have listened to a most remarkable speech from the hon. Member for Maidstone, but I venture to think that he will be quite alone in the opinions which he has just expressed in this House. I know that great mistakes have been made, and the country will not be satisfied until they have been cleared up and until those responsible have been brought to book.
§ Commander BELLAIRSYes, inquire after the War!
§ Mr. ROBERTSI was going to allude to that point. When the Prime Minister introduced this Bill he made an appeal to the House not to enlarge the numbers of the Commissions in both cases, and I think he was right. No doubt his reason was that the smaller the Committee the sooner you get the result. We all know what happens on a Royal Commission. I had the honour of serving on one two years ago, and in my opinion there were too many on that Commission. Each member of a Royal Commission has the right to put questions to every witness, and the chairman calls upon each member in turn all 114 round the table to put what questions they like. Therefore, the more you have on a Commission the longer the inquiry will take. The other day the House did not follow the advice of the Prime Minister, but increased the Commission on the Dardanelles to nine and the Commission on Mesopotamia from six to eight members. I am not going to say a word against the policy of having a Navy and an Army officer on these Commissions, but would it not have been better to have put them on in the first instance? I think the Committee should have been kept smaller in both cases. I am afraid these Commissions will sit for a long time, and when they report the public will have forgotten the circumstances. Public memory is very short indeed, and by the time you get these Reports published public attention will have been drawn to other things, and they will have forgotten the circumstances which we are now considering. For these reasons I regret that the numbers of the Commissions have been increased. I appeal to the Government to impress upon the noble chairmen of both these Commissions the very great importance of having their Reports as soon as possible. The chairman of a Commission has great influence, and he can speak to the members and tell them what the House of Commons wants to have their Report as quickly as possible, and if they cannot furnish the whole Report quickly that they should present an Interim Report as quickly as possible, dealing with the most important questions. If the right hon. Gentleman will convey that hint to his colleagues I shall be very much obliged. Of course I support the Third Reading of the Bill.
Sir H. DALZIELI regret that the hon. Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) thought it his duty to make the speech which he has made. I think that speech is one which ought to have been delivered on the Second Reading. I agree with the hon. Member who has just sat down in thinking that the hon. Member for Maidstone will find himself almost alone in the views he has expressed to-day. My hon. Friend began by referring to Australia, and I think on the strength of an isolated extract from one of the Australian papers—
§ Commander BELLAIRSTwo extracts.
Sir H. DALZIELOn the strength of two extracts the hon. Member for Maidstone stated that Australia was against this Bill. For my part I do not believe a 115 word of it, and I think we may very well leave the views of Australia in the hands of Mr. Andrew Fisher, who has consented to be a member of the inquiry, and I cannot believe that Australia, which has sacrificed so many brave men in the Dardanelles, could be against an inquiry such as that which we are now setting up.
§ Commander BELLAIRSThey want it after the War.
Sir H. DALZIELWhat right has the hon. Member to speak on behalf of Australia? I venture to say that the opinion of Australia to-day would be found to be in favour of this inquiry if the people had an opportunity of expressing their views. It is no use my hon. Friend saying "after the War." One of the principal reasons for urgency in regard to an inquiry of this character is that many of the most vital witnesses will probably be dead after the War. Many of them are old men, and they are available now and they may not be available after the War. The hon. Member says there should be one grand council to inquire into the whole subjects connected with the War, but I can assure him that there will be plenty of other subjects to inquire into when the War is over for which we shall require the appointment of many other Commissions besides those which we have set up already. I was very sorry that the hon. Member brought in the name of Sir William Robertson, and he said that he thought no one would be more opposed to these Commissions than Sir William Robertson himself. He stated that if he thought Sir William Robertson was asked he would say that this inquiry ought not to be held.
§ Sir E. CARSONSir William Robertson never said so, because he holds a different view.
§ Commander BELLAIRSI never said that Sir William Robertson said so.
Sir H. DALZIELThe hon. Member left the distinct impression by his remarks that Sir William Robertson did not welcome this inquiry, and if he refers to his speech to-morrow he will find that there is no other possible interpretation to be placed upon his words.
§ Commander BELLAIRSI suggested that questions affecting the Army could wait and that Sir William Robertson ought to be asked by the Government, in view of the high testimony the House has paid to him, and which the right hon. 116 Gentleman the Member for Dublin University had paid to him, whether any gain in this War will result from the setting up of such an inquiry as this, during the War.
Sir H. DALZIELI think that is rather ingenious on the part of my hon. Friend. No one in the whole of the House has said a word against Sir William Robertson, and I think it is rather unfair that his name should be introduced in the way it has been by my hon. Friend. He asks why was Sir William Robertson not consulted about it. I have not the slightest doubt that he was consulted before this inquiry was promised. If he was not, I think the Government neglected their duty in not consulting the Imperial General Staff, as they did when they promised to give us the Papers. Sir William Robertson's action is not being inquired into because he was not at the War Office at the time, and consequently his time will not be occupied in regard to any of these inquiries. It is not a question of whether the Government were right or wrong in having these inquiries, because they had no other choice. I believe if the Government had opposed the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Trinity College it would have been carried against them in this House. Therefore, the Government were compelled to recognise the position and grant the inquiry which was asked for. My hon. Friend opposite does not seem to realise how widespread was the interest in these inquiries. Does he remember that there were over two hundred thousand casualties in the Dardanelles? Does he not know that we lost hundreds of men because the slightest steps were not taken to find water within forty-eight hours of the landing, and that valuable lives were thrown away by the neglect of certain persons? Are these questions which ought not to be inquired into without delay?
§ Commander BELLAIRSI indicated a much more rapid method of inquiry into these disgraceful disasters, and that was an inquiry by separate courts-martial. It is the duty of the Government to court-martial the officers responsible.
Sir H. DALZIELYes, but I understood that my hon. Friend is in favour of no inquiry until after the War, so whatever applies to this inquiry would also apply to the courts-martial. There is a civil 117 side to this question. The civil population has a right, in the first place, to know who was responsible for the Dardanelles Expedition, under what conditions it was launched, what was the plan which we were going to pursue, and how far are the Government responsible for its failure. Up to the present day the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee (Mr. Churchill) has had to bear all the unpopularity and all the burden of censure in regard to it. Let us know, as the result of this inquiry, who were the persons responsible, and let the public know, and let the public judge. No more important inquiry in the interests of the nation has taken place for a very long time than these inquiries which we are now setting up. With regard to the Mesopotamian Expedition, my hon. Friend asks what immediate good you are going to do. If it were shown to be necessary to make entirely different arrangements with regard to medical supplies, surely that would be some immediate good, and we have instructed the Mesopotamian Commission to give us a report as soon as possible. Does the hon. Member know that men wounded in Mesopotamia were first attended in London? I met a young man the other day who was hit in one eye in Mesopotamia, and he never saw a medical officer till he came to London, although he travelled through India looking for one. His eye might have been saved, but now he may lose both of them. These are the sort of things we want inquired into. We want to know who was responsible, and that in future they will have no further responsibility or power. As one of those who asked for the inquiry, I thank the Government, having once granted the inquiry, for the spirit in which they have met the suggestions we have made. I believe we have provided machinery for a good inquiry into both cases, and I hope that the result will be a satisfaction to the country as a whole.
§ Sir E. CARSONI desire to express my very grateful thanks to His Majesty's Government for having granted these inquiries. I think the inquiries were inevitable. The idea that you can have an abandoned expedition in which you have lost something like 200,000 in casualties and have no explanation given or no person held liable is simply ludicrous and monstrous, if this House is to have any authority at all. There is a distinction to be drawn between the Dardanelles and 118 Mesopotamia. The Dardanelles Expedition is a disaster which is over. That is no reason why it should not be inquired into, and why those who are liable for the disaster, if there is anybody liable, should not be brought to book. But Mesopotamia is a living expedition. The sufferings are going on still in Mesopotamia, and I have risen chiefly to say that I hope the Commission appointed with reference to Mesopotamia will commence at the present state of affairs and not at the inception. Let them get at existing conditions, and see how they can remedy them in the interests of our men and, indeed, in the interests of humanity. I believe, if there were nothing else to do, that is good work to-day on the part of the House of Commons. Nobody who has not had the crrespondence with reference to what has taken place there that I have had could believe, if the statements are true, and they come from all quarters, that such a state of negligence could have existed, resulting in the wasting of precious lives of the best men that have ever been sent out to fight for this country. I have only one other word to say. I was glad that the Secretary of State for India to-day read out to this House the telegram saying that there is a real responsibility being put upon officials who undertake to deal with the lives of these men. I think it would be well that we should occasionally, instead of having these things hushed up, have Ministers come here and say, as he did, that a Committee has inquired into the matter and has found this, that, and the other person responsible, and has not hesitated to deal with the situation that has arisen. I am glad that he has shown an example of the proper way of dealing with these matters, and of letting people know that our men, after all, are not mere pawns to be moved about here, there, and everywhere else, but that they are the greatest asset in this country, and that the country is determined to take care of them.
Major-General Sir IVOR HERBERTI rise, in the first place, because I think it is necessary to enter a protest against the view that the hon. Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) has put forward, that it should rest with the Chief of the Staff to determine whether this House should order an inquiry into the operations of war or not. I cannot, as an old soldier, recognise that any officer could assume such a position as that. The 119 Chief of the Staff, whom nobody in this House holds in higher respect than I do, or for whom no one has more personal regard than I have, would be the very last person to assume the position of having to decide whether the House of Commons is wise in its judgment in ordering an inquiry into what everyone admits to be a most unfortunate series of disasters. A certain amount of complication has been caused by the Government, in its anxiety at last to do the right thing, surrendering so completely and dealing with two entirely separate and different sets of operations in the same Bill. I am of the opinion that, whereas the Mesopotamia operation demanded immediate and searching inquiry, the Dardanelles Expedition, as a most unfortunate incident which has now passed into history, might possibly have been allowed to remain until a later period for inquiry. If there be any danger of that which the hon. Member for Maidstone seems to fear—the danger of an interference with those who are directly concerned with the actual carrying on of operations at present—I feel sure that the distinguished Chief of the Staff is quite capable of dealing with that difficulty should it arise.
I can only join with the right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down in saying that I thank the Government for having at last decided to have this inquiry made, though I confess that a great deal of public anxiety might have been spared had the Government began by publishing Papers which we know are in existence, and which are the result of the Departmental inquiries which have already taken place. One reason why I attach greater importance to the Mesopotamia inquiry than to that of the Dardanelles is that it bears upon the condition of co-ordination and co-operation which should exist between the British war administration and the Indian war administration. If we study the Papers which are at our disposal, and which were published some ten years ago or more, at the time Lord Kitchener took over the position of Commander-in-Chief in India, we can realise what the condition of the Indian Army was. In Lord Kitchener's own words, as nearly as I can remember them, "it was not an Army prepared for 120 Imperial Service, but it was a purely local Army." That separation of the Indian Army from the other Imperial Forces of the Crown in itself created a condition of danger which could only lead to the breakdown we have seen when great Imperial operations came to be undertaken. I look to that inquiry which I hope will be carried on with energy, probing the circumstances to the very bottom, to provide the material by which the British and Indian Forces will at no distant date be welded into a stronger and far more important machine for the defence of the honour and integrity of this Empire than has ever been the case before.
§ Mr. CHAMBERLAINI hope that nothing I shall say will prolong the Debate. I rise rather in the hope that I may contribute to shortening it. I would like, in the first place, to say that nobody can be more conscious than I am of the inconveniences and even the dangers which necessarily attach to inquiries of this kind while we are still at war, but the House was fully conscious of those difficulties and dangers at the time they unmistakably showed their desire that these inquiries should take place. That question was prejudged before this Bill was introduced, and I really do not think that we can usefully rediscuss the propriety of such an inquiry at this late stage of the measure. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Trinity College, Dublin (Sir E. Carson), expressed the hope, which I think is widely felt in this country and which has found embodiment at any rate to some extent in the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Dillon), that the Mesopotamian Commission should begin their inquiry at the present condition of things and report early, with special reference, not to military movements or anything of that kind, but to the provision made for the forces in the country now. I have seen the Chairman of the Mesopotamian Commission, who came to ask me some questions as to the information which the India Office could place at his disposal, and I think without any breach of confidence I may say, first, that it was obviously his desire that the whole of the proceedings of the Commission over which he presides should be as businesslike and expeditious as possible, and, secondly, that he was conscious of the desire to which my right hon. and learned Friend gave expression, and I 121 think will direct the Commission to the fulfilment of that desire, so that we may be provided as early as possible not merely with a Report on the treatment of the sick and wounded generally for which the hon. Member for Mayo asked, but with a Report specially calculated to tell us what is the present position in those respects.
Wider questions have been raised by the hon. and gallant Member below the Gangway (Commander Bellairs), as they were raised by Lord Cromer in another place, questions of great importance, going to the very root of Army organisation in India. From the moment that we establish these Commissions their procedure and, within the terms of the reference, the scope of their inquiries lie with them, and not with us. It is impossible for the Government, which, after all, is on its trial, to issue instructions as to what they shall or shall not inquire into, or how they shall conduct their inquiries. I think, however, that such questions as the right hon. Gentleman has raised will inevitably come before them in the course of their inquiries. All I venture to say is, firstly, that I hope the House will excuse me from arguing any of these questions that are coming before a tribunal now that we have decided to invite the decision of a tribunal on them; and, secondly, that hon. Members will refrain from arguing in advance, or saying what decision they think these tribunals should arrive at. It is not fair to the persons concerned to discuss names and particular responsibility. It would not be possible for me to make the defence which in other circumstances I might make, and should be bound to make, of certain of these people, and I submit to Members in all parts of the House that, having the Commissions the House desired to be established, having confidence, as I think everybody has, in the personnel of those Commissions, we ought now to set them to work as rapidly as we can, and ought not to attempt to pre-judge any of the questions or responsibilities about which we have asked for a Report from them.
§ Colonel YATEI should like to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Chamberlain) on the telegram, referred to by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for the University of Dublin (Sir E. Carson), which he read out to-day, to say with what satisfaction we all received it; and to express the hope that action somewhat similar may be taken in connec- 122 tion with Mesopotamia, as soon as that may be possible. We all have perfect confidence in all the members of the Commission appointed, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, but I would ask him, if there is another opportunity later on, to think of the very serious questions that will have to be considered or inquired into by this Commission when they go to Mesopotamia—the number of men whose names are mentioned, and the very difficult questions that will come up before them. With a view to giving confidence not only in Mesopotamia but throughout the Service generally, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider the suggestion that there should be no possibility of only two members being sent to Mesopotamia. I think it would be fairer to the persons whose names have been mentioned, and to others, if three were given as the number, as two seem too small a proportion to take this very onerous charge upon themselves. If three were chosen I think it would meet with more general acceptance, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will think of that before this Bill is finally passed.
§ Mr. LYNCHBefore this Bill passes I want to say one or two words which strike at the very root of the whole principle. It seems ungracious to press for a Bill, and I am one of those who pressed for this Bill, and then when it is brought in to delay or criticise it over severely. But I think if the Government had properly conducted their business neither of these Bills would have been necessary at all. These are Bills which deal with administration, all the administration which these Bills touch being within the province of the Government, and being, in fact, its proper business. So that the very necessity for the introduction of this Bill—and I believe at this stage it has been necessary—has been the severest criticism of the operations of the Government. I say now here that I hope the country will realise it. Eventually they will. This Government from the very beginning has managed this War with signal incompetence. This Government is not winning this War. Under present conditions, with the factors now in operation, we are moving inevitably to a draw, most disastrous of all results—
§ Mr. SPEAKERThat has nothing to do with this Bill.