HC Deb 01 August 1916 vol 85 cc41-4
Major ASTOR

(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any further information about the deaths of soldiers from heat stroke on the troop train from Karachi?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

I have a telegram that I have received from India. I will give a paraphrase of it. Ballarat. Your telegram of the 28th instant, 30th July. We can now give a considered opinion, having received report of Committee. The responsibility for diverting the ship from Bombay to Karachi rests with Brigadier-General Roe, who was acting as Quartermaster-General at the time. He knew un-acclimatised troops had never before been sent in large numbers by rail in the middle of summer through the Sind Desert. He knew, or should have known, that the Commander-in-Chief in December, 1915, had decided that Karachi should not be used as a port at which wounded and sick British troops should be landed and distributed to other stations on account of danger of sending them in the hot season through Sind. It follows that before Ballarat was diverted to Karachi Acting-Quartermaster-General should have consulted Commander-in-Chief, and he did not do this. Having taken on himself responsibility he should certainly have warned Karachi military authorities to take special precautions for safety of troops during journey by rail. He did not do this. We therefore must hold him responsible, and propose to remove him from his appointment of Deputy-Quartermaster-General. It is clear from evidence that the mischief began before disembarkation, many men having been seen on deck bareheaded in the sun. All the officers on board were quite inexperienced, and we cannot therefore hold them blameworthy. The General Officer Commanding at Karachi was responsible for all arrangements for railway journey in his capacity as embarkation officer. It is shown from evidence that on the day concerned he was very busy, but he had ample warning of Ballarat's arrival. Though he knew responsible members of his staff, with one exception, were inexperienced, he took no steps nor gave any orders to see that the safety or comfort of the troops was provided for. In this we consider he failed in his duty, and we propose his removal. Special blame we consider attaches to the Assistant Director of Medical Services at Karachi, an officer of long experience of the Indian Medical Service. In the circumstances, it was undoubtedly his duty to see that every precaution suggested by medical science for the safety of the troops was taken. He failed, in our opinion, to do this. We therefore propose to remove him. A number of omissions and errors on the part of other officers were committed, but these were due partly to inexperience and partly to adherence to regulations intending to govern only the ordinary trooping in cold weather. We do not propose to take any action in these cases. The only excuses that can be urged in favour of the officers who are, in our opinion, responsible are that many of the casualties were due to facts that in many cases the men left their carriages bare-headed, and that the temperature during journey was unusually high. Nevertheless, though these facts may have increased the number of casualties, we are clear that there can be no doubt that the train left Karachi insufficiently equipped, over-crowded, and without experienced officers, either medical or combatant. We place for these reasons the responsibility on Brigadier-General Roe, on the General Officer Commanding, and on the Senior Medical Officer at Karachi All that was possible seems to have been done by the local authorities beyond Karachi throughout the journey. I should add that I have expressed my concurrence with the course the Government of India have announced that they intend to take with regard to the three officers. I am inquirying whether special instructions for the removal of drafts of troops during the hot weather have already been issued, and, if not, suggesting that they should be issued at once, and I am communicating with the War Office at once, in order that officers taking drafts out to India may be warned to take all precautions.

Sir E. CARSON

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether any special compensation will be paid to the relatives of those who suffered through the incompetence and negligence of those officers?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

I am not quite certain—I am speaking from memory—how the matter stands, but I gave orders that steps should be taken to treat these casualties as casualties on active service, if that lies in my power. That may require the assent of the War Office.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE

Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to see that these officers are not given other positions of responsibility?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

I think I can trust the Government of India, when they have removed officers from their commands, not to give them other positions of responsibility.

Sir A. MARKHAM

Will the right hon. Gentleman now hold an inquiry into the conduct of the Government of India? Is he aware that a report was made to them before the outbreak of War that with this class of carriage then in existence at Karachi it was dangerous to move troops over the desert even in the cold season, and that report was made to the Government who, nevertheless, allowed the ship to be diverted to Karachi?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

The ship, as I stated, was diverted, not by the Government of India, but on the action of the Quartermaster-General on his own responsibility.

Sir A. MARKHAM

But was that in the hands of a very high officer?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

I have no knowledge.

Sir A. MARKHAM

Will the right hon. Gentleman make inquiries?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

If the hon. Member will give me precise information of what the report was, I will make inquiries.

Sir A. MARKHAM

Will you give an indemnity if I give his name?

Sir J. D. REES

Were no orders issued by Army headquarters in India prescribing some special care should be taken to meet the novel case of the arrival of Territorial troops?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

The Commander-in-Chief in December, 1915, had decided that Karachi should not be used as a port at which sick and wounded troops should be landed from other stations.

Mr. GWYNNE

Will the right hon. Gentleman say why the Government of India did not act beforehand, and not wait until agitation had taken place in this House?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

The first intimation came to me from the Government of India and not from this House, and in the telegram in which they communicated the news of the incident to me, they said they were making an inquiry, the result of which I have now given to the House.

Mr. MacVEAGH

May I ask whether, in the event of compensation being paid to the relatives of the victims, he will see that the cost will fall on Imperial revenue and not on Indian revenue, seeing that the Indian people had nothing to do with it?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN

These were drafts for the Indian Army.

Mr. LYNCH

rose—

Mr. SPEAKER

Notice should be given of any further questions.

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