HC Deb 15 July 1914 vol 64 cc1945-72

Where the Commissioners of Inland Revenue are satisfied that Estate Duty has become payable on any property consisting of land or a business (not being a business carried on by a company), or any interest in land or such a business, passing upon the death of any person, and that subsequently within five years Estate Duty has again become payable on the same property or any part thereof passing on the death of the person to whom the property passed on the first death, the amount of Estate Duty payable on the second death (if that death occurs after the passing of this Act) in respect of the property so passing shall be reduced as follows:—

Where the second death occurs within one year of the first death, by fifty per cent.;

Where the second death occurs within two years of the first death, by forty per cent.;

Where the second death occurs within three years of the first death, by thirty per cent.;

Where the second death occurs within four years of the first death, by twenty per cent.;

Where the second death occurs within five years of the first death, by ten per cent.:

Provided that where the value on which the duty is payable of the property on the second death exceeds the value on which the duty was payable of the property on the first death, the latter value shall be substituted for the former for the purpose of calculating the amount of duty on which the reduction under this Section is to be calculated.


I beg to move, to leave out the words "on any property consisting of land or a business (not being a business carried on by a company), or any interest in land or such a business passing."

I move this Amendment for two reasons. In the first place, I wish to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer certain questions connected with the words which I propose to leave out; and secondly, I wish to ask the Committee to extend the relief in quick succession to personalty as well as to land or to a private business. It seems to me to be commentary worth noting that even the Chancellor of the Exchequer is rather compelled to ask this Committee to give some relief in the case of the Death Duties. They have reached such a point that even the right hon. Gentleman is convinced that some relief is required in the case of quick succession during the five years specified in this Clause. But even so, I think that the relief which he proposes is inadequate. In the first place, five years is a very short time. I believe there are other Amendments dealing with this point and therefore I would only allude to it in passing. The actual relief which the right hon. Gentleman offers on the Estate Duty is not as large as I think the circumstances justify. Hon. Members will see that if a second death takes place in the course of a year, a relief of 50 per cent. is given, and in subsequent years a relief of 40 per cent., 30 per cent., 20 per cent., and 10 per cent. is given. I should have thought that the relief would have been upon a much higher scale than that. There are other Amendments dealing with this point, and I have merely alluded to it to give point to what I said that the relief which the Chancellor of the Exchequer offers is very meagre.

It seems to me that this relief is unnecessarily restricted to certain kinds of property. It is restricted to property in the form of land or a private business. I quite agree that both in the case of land and a private business some such relief is urgently required, but what I desire to put before the Committee is that personalty also has need for relief, and in actual practice it will be extremely difficult to draw a distinction between land and property in the form of private business and personalty. Take first of all the case of land. Most hon. Members will agree that some relief is urgently required. It is a very heavy charge now upon a property to have to pay one, two, three, or even more Death Duties in quick succession. The injury done is not restricted to the heir or life tenant, but extends over the whole neighbourhood from the fact that labour is displaced, and it may be difficult to keep the estate up in proper working order. Land is often not easily realisable. An estate consisting of land may find it very difficult to produce the large sum required for Death Duties, and all the more so when the Death Duties are required in quick succession. In this connection I want to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what he means by property consisting of land—will that extend to the farm buildings or to the cottage building? That is a point which seems to me not quite clear in the Clause, and I hope, before the Debate closes, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be able to elucidate that point. Will the relief extend not only to farm buildings but to the farm machinery, without which the farm buildings would be practically useless? Does it also extend to mortgages? It is necessary for a farm to have such things as ploughs and wagons and machinery of that sort. Does it include mortgages on the land?

I pass from the question of the relief given to land to the relief which is to be given to property consisting of a private business. There, again, I think it will be admitted, that some relief is urgently required. The death of a partner in a private business may involve the withdrawal of capital, and I think it will be admitted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is right in offering some relief in that case. Here, again, I am not quite clear as to what is included in the Definition Clause. Would the relief extend also to professions? Would it extend, for instance, to a firm of solicitors? If it would not, I fail to see how the distinction can be drawn between the two, because it is equally hard for the capital to be withdrawn in either case. I cannot see how the Chancellor of the Exchequer can restrict the relief to a private business and deny it to the surviving partners in a professional firm. Does it extend to money lent upon the security of a private business? That seems to be a point which needs elucidation. If it does not, I fail to see how the distinction which the Chancellor draws is anything but arbitrary. These difficulties show how impossible in practice it is to draw distinctions between one kind of property and another for relief of this kind. In theory, besides practice, there is a demand for relief in the case of personalty as well. A series of heirs succeeding to property in the form of personalty, and having to pay a series of heavy Death Duties, are, I think it will be admitted, all suffering a very heavy hardship.

I have had sent to me two cases. In one case three brothers, all over the age of seventy, are heirs to a property in the form of personalty. It seems to me, if relief is to be given for quick succession, it should be given in that case. If it is not given, each of these three brothers, who may very well in the ordinary course of nature die in the next year or two, will have to pay a, duty of 8 per cent. That emphasises the demand for extending this relief to personalty. I have another case of the same kind, a case where there are three sisters and two brothers all over the age of fifty, who in the ordinary course of events will inherit property in the form of personalty. There, again, there may be a number of quick successions, with a consequent very heavy charge in Death Duties. It is only necessary to state these cases to show how urgent it is to have some relief in the case of quick successions of personalty. It is all the more urgent for two facts. In the first place, the ordinary Death Duties are being put up this year. That makes the demand for relief all the more urgent. Secondly, this Committee last night abolished the Settlement Estate Duty. That makes demand for relief even more urgent. Under any settlements, the people who eventually benefit will in many cases be brothers and sisters of the same generation. As long as the Settlement Estate Duty was in force each brother and sister did not have to pay the Death Duties, but now that this Committee has thought fit to abolish the Settlement Estate Duty each brother and each sister, very likely owing to the fact that they are members of the same generation, and therefore succeed at short intervals of time, will be compelled to pay a series of Death Duties which in the course of a very few years may eat up the whole corpus of the property. Therefore, with these two objects—first, of elucidating the points which I have ventured to put to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and, secondly, with a view of having the relief extended to personalty—I beg to move the Amendment.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Mr. Lloyd George)

The Amendment moved by the hon. Gentleman illustrates the perils which a Minister has to encounter the moment he begins to make concessions. There are, after all, many points in the Income Tax Laws which a Chancellor of the Exchequer would like to be in a position to put right. This is not the only one by any means. There is later on an Amendment with which I have the greatest sympathy, dealing with wasting assets. There is a good deal in the case of wasting assets that it is almost impossible to resist, and a Chancellor of the Exchequer has only one defence, which is that he cannot afford to do justice to everybody and to rectify all wrongs. I do not mean to say that the relief which in two instances I am giving in the case of quick succession is a perfectly logical proposal, but, at any rate, it is going some distance, and it is certainly as far as I can afford to go this year. The Committee has to decide whether it is worth while making this experiment as a beginning. If subsequent Chancellors of the Exchequer are in the position to do so, by all means let them extend it. There is a good deal to be said for extending it. I am not resisting on its merits the proposal of the hon. Gentleman, but I am now appealing to the Committee, when this concession is made for the first time after repeated appeals, not merely to myself, but also to previous Chancellors of the Exchequer, not to upset the whole thing by forcing the Treasury to go further than they can afford to go. That is really the danger when these appeals are made.

I know perfectly well the consideration which weighs with the Chancellor of the Exchequer when they come to consider concessions. You have no sure foothold the moment you begin to depart in the direction of concessions. Somebody will say, "If you are going to do this, why not do that?" And "if you do that, why do you not do the next thing?" I agree logically that if you do this you ought to do that, and, if you do that, you ought to do the third thing. We recognise that there is a certain grievance in the matter of quick successions, and we have decided to make an experiment in the direction of a concession in the case of two classes of property where payment of Estate Duty within a very limited period does more harm than in the vast majority of other cases. This concession will cost about £156,000 a year. Let us look at all the concessions which have been asked from us on the basis of this one. I have just been working out what they would cost. First of all, there is the proposal that you should extend it to every class of property. That quadruples the cost at once; that brings you up to £624,000 a year. Then there is the proposal that you should extend it to nine years. That would bring it up to £1,800,000. If all the concessions asked for were made, it would come to £3,500,000. No Chancellor of the Exchequer could possibly face that in the course of a single year, and surely not a Chancellor of the Exchequer who is putting a tax on other property in order to make this particular relief. I agree, if the hon. Gentleman likes to make out a case, that I am making an unfair preference, that he is entitled to do so. He is entitled to say, "You ought to have done it in respect of something else instead of these two." Why have these two particular classes of property been chosen? It is not because of any distinction between realty and personalty; it is not because we are favouring realty against personalty, for a business is personalty. It is because of the difference between what I may call fluidity and inconvertibility. That is really the distinction. The concession has been made with regard to businesses and land. It is not made because of any difficulty in realising land. No one would argue that there is any difficulty in realising agricultural land at the present time.


indicated dissent.


I am putting the case against myself. Let us asume for the moment that there is no difficulty in realising agricultural land. Take the case of a ringed fence estate. There may be, and I think there is, a good deal to be said for breaking up the whole estate, but to break up a ringed fence estate is not an economic proposition. Coming to the second proposition, that of a business, the hon. Gentleman must admit that it is an exceptional case, because there you are damaging the business. It is not realisable. You can raise money by means of an overdraft or by means of a mortgage, but it is not very easy—there is the cost of the operation—and it cripples the business. We have therefore taken two cases where there is a special reason for making a start against other classes of property. There is no comparison, after all, between the man who leaves a fortune in stocks and shares, and the man the whole of whose assets are locked up in a business. He may on paper have a very considerable sum of money which, for Estate Duty purposes, will rank at £100,000 or £200,000, but he may be subject to a charge either at the bank or elsewhere which would have to be cleared off, and in addition to that you raise money for Death Duty purposes. If that comes repeatedly, it hampers and cripples the business.

There is, therefore, a special case with regard to a business which does not apply to a person who dies with a fortune. That is why we have chosen these two cases, and I would ask the hon. Gentleman seriously to consider if he can think of any extension beyond those two which would not force the Chancellor of the Exchequer to admit the whole case. I could not afford to do that without coming forward with a fresh proposal to raise taxation this year. Any Chancellor of the Exchequer would be faced with a serious deficit which he would have to impose on somebody else. It is a great mistake to suppose that the money for these concessions comes out of some inexhaustible revenue of the Treasury. There is only one means of getting the money, and that is by taxing something else in order to face the deficit. I put the matter very seriously to hon. Gentlemen who have been pressing me ever since I have been at the Treasury to recognise the case of quick successions. I have for the first time made an effort to meet those cases in two particular instances, and I ask them whether they think it is fair, and whether it is really wise, to press the Chancellor of the Exchequer to go beyond what he can afford when he is really making an effort to meet them in two cases where the subject is hardest hit. On the merits, if the hon. Gentleman were to press me, I should say that there was a good deal to be said for all the propositions before me to-day, but I do trust he will take into account the considerations I have urged in very good faith now that this effort has been made to redress this grievance.


I think great sympathy must be felt on both sides of the House with the plea the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put forward, but before I deal with that I should like to say we all agree that the necessity for some exemption of this kind really arises from the very high rate of duty now imposed—a point which we discussed yesterday. Hardships which are only extremely severe under one rate of duty become intolerable under another rate. With regard to the right hon. Gentleman's plea as to the difficulty of finding money, perhaps he will allow me to remind him that in that regard we, on this side of the House, have already voted against the decrease in the rate of Income Tax on the ground that the Death Duties proposed by the right hon. Gentleman press much more hardly upon the taxpayer than the. Income Tax.


The hon. Gentleman is hardly doing justice to himself. That was not the ground of opposition to decreasing the rate of Income Tax. The opposition to my taking a penny off was not in order that there should be a pool from which money could be drawn, instead of from the Death Duties, but because hon. Members opposite wanted temporary Grants to be given to the local authorities this year. The other suggestion was merely alternative. If the money were to be applied for temporary Grants. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that every penny of it would be wanted for that purpose, and it would also be needed next year.


Our position was alternative. In the first place, we desired to retain the penny in order to give the money to the local authorities; but, if these Grants were not to be given to the local authorities, then we still preferred to retain the penny rather than raise the Death Duties, as proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I said that in the Debate, and I adhere to it now. Having said so, I have a right to repeat it now. I do not put it forward in a controversial spirit, but I felt bound to remind the right hon. Gentleman, in view of the argument, which he put to the Committee. I ask the Committee to note this, because I think it is a most important admission which makes the whole difference in the point of view from which the Committee should regard this proposal. If the right hon. Gentleman had put it forward as a full gift, if he had risen in his place and argued he was meeting the justice of the case by these proposals, then my hon. Friend would have felt bound to persist in his Amendment, and we should have been obliged to press it very strongly on the right hon. Gentleman. But when he tells us it is not a full gift, but that it is merely an experiment, and when he further admits that very much larger concessions than this are required by. the justice of the case—and that it what his statement really amounted to—I am glad to see he assents to it—and when he asks us, from that point of view, to accept this as an experiment, admitting that it is not a full gift, then I think it is an appeal which we shall find it very difficult to resist, and on that distinct understanding, I, for one, am prepared to accept it.


I gladly welcome the principle laid down in this Clause, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has now developed, as to the sort of relief that ought to be given in the case of Death Duties. It seems to me that this form is certainly the fairest and most adequate way in which relief can be given.


Before my hon. Friend proceeds, I wonder if I may be allowed to put a question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman did not reply to my hon. Friend's very important question on the question of definition. We do not want litigation. We are most anxious to avoid it. But there is no Definition Clause in this Bill showing exactly what is meant by land or by business. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to give us some reference, if he can, to some other Act. The right hon. Gentleman will, I am sure, be the first to admit that what he states in Debate from that bench has no weight whatever in Courts of Law. We therefore want something put into the Bill which will make it absolutely clear what are the intentions of the right hon. Gentleman as regards "land" and "business."


I apologise to the hon. Gentleman for not having answered his question. I certainly had intended to do so. With regard to the first point, "land," of course, includes buildings.


But will you state that in the Bill?


The hon. Gentleman knows that it always includes buildings. With regard to farm machinery, and fixtures, which sometimes go with the land, I should hardly like to give an answer off-hand. On the second point, as regards personalty, mortgages are included, and if they come in you must also include stocks, shares, and other kinds of property. Then I am asked to define what is a business. I am very loth to attempt any sort of definition. I have inquired, and I am told that it will be possible to work this administratively. I agree there may be some difficulty, but I am assured by the experts of the Department it will not be so very difficult to work. A good many conundrums have been put to me relating to cases just on the border-line. Of course very much depends upon the class of business. A good deal of business is purely personal. But there is a class of business—long-standing firms—which are transmitted from one generation to another, and I should have thought, although I do not like to express an opinion, that they would have come within the definition. Still I should like to get the views of my legal advisers on that point. I could not have imagined there would have been any general difficulty in deciding what is or is not included.


The words the right hon. Gentleman has just spoken show what a difficulty there is. As I have pointed out, what the right hon. Gentleman says here will not be noticed in the Courts of Law. I am asking him, not so much for an explanation, as for an undertaking that he will consider with his legal advisers whether he cannot insert a definition into the Bill; otherwise we may have perpetual litigation as to what a business is. What we want is a real definition.


The danger of definition is that it is exclusive and not in-elusive. I am assured by my legal advisers that there will be no difficulty in interpreting the word "business." There would be much greater difficulty in interpreting a definition, because the moment you begin to define, that moment you begin to create points for litigation. That is the real difference between the drafting of Bills a hundred years ago and the drafting to-day. There is much less litigation about an Act of Parliament, the purposes of which are put in a few brief Clauses, than about one which covers many pages. I think it would be a very dangerous thing to attempt to define a business. You may leave something which should be included, and you may put something in which should not be there. It would be far better to leave it to the common sense of the judges to decide what a business is. And, I repeat, I do not believe there will be any difficulty of interpretation in this matter.


I was saying, when I was interrupted, that the principle embodied in this Clause is one of extreme value, and, although I admit it is impossible for the right hon. Gentleman to carry it very far this year, we may hope that on a future occasion it will be extended, and many obvious injustices dealt with. It seems to me that the carrying forward of this principle of relief in cases of rapid succession is of even greater importance than the reduction in the general scale of the Death Duties, because one of the principal evils of the Death Duties seems to be that the duty is in the nature of a penalty on weak health and short life. It is quite obvious that in a family extremely healthy, in which lives are habitually long, the Death Duties fall with comparative lightness, because each succeeding generation lives longer without having to pay the duty, and, as the successors come to manhood, a great deal of property can be transferred during lifetime. But it is in the case where lives are short through accident, or though the fact that brother succeeds brother, where this duty falls with a severity out of all proportion to that with which it falls on any other class. That seems to be one of the great evils of the Death Duties which would obviously be overcome if this principle were carried somewhat further. It is one of the reasons why I have consistently favoured Income Tax as a preferable form of direct taxation to Death Duties. The other day, on the occasion of the Division to which the right hon. Gentleman has just referred, on the proposal to reduce the Income Tax by 1d., I deliberately voted against that reduction, on grounds which I thought were very ably put by the hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Hills), in which he defended the case for devoting the money, providing it could not be used for Grants in relief of local taxation, towards relieving the Death Duties instead of reducing Income Tax by 1d.

I rose principally for the purpose of asking for some information as to the effect of the Clause as it stands. The relief proposed to be given here is on land and business. I do not quarrel with the amount of it, because the right hon. Gentleman has said he cannot afford more. But I would like to know whether in the case of settled estates, which have been sold under the Settled Estates Act, and the proceeds of the sale of which remain vested in the hands of trustees under that Act, those proceeds will be treated as land or not. There are a great many instances of settled estates in which the trustees are able to dispose of any amount of land provided they retain the proceeds in their own hands, subject to the same conditions as obtained with regard to the settled estate, and I want to know whether land held under the Settled Estates Act will or will not be included in the term "land." What took place yesterday with regard to the removal of Settlement Estate Duty proves that a very good case can be made out now for extending the relief, which is applicable to land and businesses only, to the case of settled estates, which have been so hardly hit by the removal of the conditions with regard to the Settlement Estate Duty.


I want to make my right hon. Friend quite comfortable—I do not ask him to make a single concession on this Clause. I have not asked him for any concessions which are in this Clause, but I would point out that the Clause as it stands is quite indefensible as a measure of justice, and that once you have adopted this Clause it will be absolutely impossible for the law to remain in the position in which it will be left. The distinction between a landed estate or a business and a company is one that cannot be maintained. I am a shareholder in a company in which the tranfer of shares is strictly limited by the articles, so as to make sure that only members of a certain family can ever possess them. A shareholder in the company is in precisely the same position as the owner of land. Precisely the same conditions exist in regard to land and businesses. We talk about companies as if they were large public companies in which the shares are held an very small fractions proportionately to the whole of the capital. As a matter of fact, the great mass of companies consist of those in which the shares are held in very large proportions compared with the total of the share capital. They are companies in which the transfer of shares is strictly restricted, and in which the shares can only be passed among a certain group of persons. These companies, to all intents and purposes, are private businesses, and cannot be distinguished from a partnership, except for the fact that a company has been formed as being more convenient and handy for certain financial transactions. One looks at the papers almost every day and sees notices that this or that old-established firm has converted itself into a limited liability company. But the position remains precisely the same as regards the ownership of the shares in that company, and it has become a sort of business. Suppose you have the majority of shares in the company, or, if not the majority, such a block of the shares as practically gives you the power of controlling the management.

It is just as much a hardship to be asked to break up that block as it is for a landlord who has an estate inside a ringed fence to be asked to break up his property. The hardship is precisely the same. The hardship consists in being asked to break up property which, as a whole, is more valuable than any one of its component parts. I quite agree that under the present financial circumstances it is not possible to give the same relief to all. My right hon. Friend talked of this as an experiment. It is an experiment which can only have this end, that finally everybody will have to be treated alike. I hope that as the proposal is put forward, it is put forward with a clear realisation of the fact that this relief, good or bad, will have to be extended. I am not at all sure that I am anxious to see the relief given at all, and if my right hon. Friend says that he would make a great concession and would withdraw the whole Clause, I should be perfectly satisfied. If the relief is going to be given at all, it will certainly at an early date have to be given to everybody. I hope that in framing future Budgets my right hon. Friend will bear that in mind, and realise that this relief will have to be extended to every form of taxpayer.

Mr. F. HALL (Dulwich)

I was surprised to hear the remarks made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer this afternoon as to what is going to be a business and what is going to be a profession. He seemed perfectly happy in his own mind to leave the question in abeyance and let it be worked out in the Law Courts, as such questions have hitherto been decided. The right hon. Gentleman has not appreciated the difference between a business and a profession. Take the case of a firm of surveyors or a partnership in accountancy. In each of those cases the gentlemen have to pass their examination in order to become fully qualified. The same question is likely to arise in those cases as would arise in a merchant's business. One partner dies and a large amount of capital is withdrawn. Perhaps, unfortunately, another partner dies and another part of the capital is withdrawn. Will a case of that kind be treated as a business or will it not receive the advantage which is proposed in this Clause? The hon. Member for Hexham (Mr. Holt) drew attention to a point of the greatest moment. My hon. Friend's Amendment leaps over the words with regard to a private business or a company. I would suggest to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, so that there should be no hardship on those who have for family reasons turned their businesses into private limited companies, that he should agree to the addition of the word "public" before the word "company." That would meet us to some extent. If, on the other hand, the matter is left as it is, I suggest that many people in business who have for various reasons turned their businesses into private companies which to all intents and purposes are ordinary businesses, with two or three directors in place of partners holding practically the whole of the shares, will have no relief granted to them under the Clause. When this Clause was framed, was it the intention to give relief to those concerned in private companies as well as to those engaged in business, and, if so, does not the right hon. Gentleman think it is necessary to put in the word "public," in order that there should be no difficulty? I would like the Chancellor of the Exchequer to reply on that point.


I think my right hon. Friend has done something which he will afterwards regret. There is a good deal of misunderstanding as to what the Clause really means. An hon. Member opposite asked whether, if settled estates were sold and the money was invested by the trustee, it would be free. Certainly not; nor would an investment in anything else. If there is a partnership business and one partner dies, his estate pays full Estate Duty, and if the same interest is continued to his son and he dies also, then relief is given, but the other partners get no relief. The moment the share is turned into money it becomes the same as any other property, and is subject to the usual Estate Duty. So far as companies are concerned, there is a good deal to be said for including them, for the reason that a great many limited companies are created for the purpose of continuing the interest of the partners in the families. One has advised over and over again, in instances where partners were getting on in years, that they should turn out their businesses into companies, so that their share, instead of passing to the surviving partner, should continue and be distributed among the testator's relatives or the next of kin. It is for that reason that nine-tenths of the limited liability companies are formed, so that the capital invested in it may be limited and be continued in the shape of goodwill to the family, instead of, as it generally did, merging in the surviving partners' interest. I hope my right hon. Friend will not attempt a definition of business. The more general the terms are, the less difficulty will the Somerset House people have in saying what a business is; whereas if we try to define it as lawyers try to define things we should shut out a great many businesses, because they do not come directly within the words put in the Act of Parliament. I agree with the hon. Member for Hexham that this is an experiment and in what he said as to what must come hereafter. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is doing what Sir William Harcourt did in regard to the Settlement Estate Duty. He is creating some relief which his successor will do away with. Sir William Harcourt gave relief to settled estates which they should not have had, and, subject to proper compensation, we did away with that yesterday. The same thing will occur here, for the drawing of the distinction cannot possibly survive. I am not wishing to oppose the relief such as it is.

5.0 P.M.


On the general principles of this Amendment I confess I have great sympathy with what was urged by the right hon. Gentleman as to the impossibility of finding a firm foothold once he begins to make concessions. To us on this side the attraction of seeing the right hon. Gentleman in the position of an advocate for economy is so great that I would not willingly vote against him when he makes that appeal. There is one point that has not been mentioned in the Debate, which to me outweighs even those considerations, and which would cause me, if my hon. Friend goes to a Division, to support him. It seems to me that you are at the present moment really doing a great injustice, because even taking the right hon. Gentleman's own case, that he wishes to limit this concession to two particular forms of property, I would ask him to consider another point. All the arguments this afternoon have turned upon the consideration of three distinct forms of property—land, business, and personalty. What happens when you have not got those properties all distinct, but have them mixed? I have in mind the case of land which forms part of a property of which the other half is personalty. I should not mind if you applied your principle of dividing the duty between the two. For the purposes of Estate Duty you lump the two together and charge the Estate Duty on the land on the higher figure which you have arrived at by aggregating them. When you come to relieve, you divide them, because thereby you will only have to grant a smaller measure of relief. If you aggregate in the one case, you ought to aggregate in the other. If you do not, you will merely be asking us to do what we always have to do when playing with the Chancellor of the Exchequer—it is a case of heads he wins, tails we lose—namely, to aggregate when it suits him and to divide when it does not suit him. For that reason, if my hon. Friend goes to a Division, I shall support him. I would urge him not to assent to a definition of the term "business." The arguments which have been put forward against it seem to me conclusive, and there is one more conclusive to my mind than any—that is, that if the term were defined I believe even lawyers would find it very difficult to say whether membership of Parliament were a profession or a business. I hope therefore that the right hon. Gentleman will be firm upon that point, but that, in spite of the menacing tone adopted by the hon. Member (Mr. Holt) towards the end of his speech, he will not lose courage, and withdraw the Clause altogether. I think the Clause is of a certain value though it is illogical, and I think he could quite easily improve it.


I regret that the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not see his way to accept the Amendment, because I think it would remove a great many hardships which will otherwise arise through the operation of the Clause. He bases his objection to it on two grounds. He says, in the first place, he has not got the money for the purpose, and secondly, he referred to what he called the fluidity of personal estate. With regard to finance, seeing that he contemplates an enormous burden on the taxable capacity of the country by increased death duties, I should have thought that the very first consideration which would have occurred to him was to give relief in such cases, where great injustices are daily occurring. In other words, contemplating as he does to raise £800,000 in the first year and next year £3,000,000 from increased Death Duties, he might have considered giving a wider application to the Clause, which would only cost him £600,000. I do not see how you can establish a distinction between the principle of personalty and realty, which are tangible assets, such as land or business comprising machinery and stock-in-trade. The test that the right hon. Gentleman laid down in the Budget speeech was that as regards assets you should be sure that in an estate that is being transferred it is composed mainly of non-liquid assets. A banker or a financier is admittedly carrying on a business. It is largely composed of shares and stocks. Does he come within the interpretation of business? I disagree entirely with the hon. Member opposite, and also with my hon. Friend (Mr. Wood), who hoped that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would give no definition as regards the meaning of business. I believe that unless business is more closely and clearly defined, it will lead to endless confusion and litigation. Take the case of a solicitor. A solicitor's business does not merely consist of his professional business. It is also composed of personal estate. He has also stocks and shares. Is that going to be included in business, and is he to be exempt and get the relief or not? It is an important question which ought to be decided by some definition.

Take the case of partnerships. Private persons carrying on business frequently convert their business into a limited liability concern. They want to apportion the different interests of those who have participations in the business, or between those who are partners with them. Why should a private person who converts his business into a limited liability company not come into the benefits of this relief, while another man who continues to carry on business gets all the advantages under the Clause? The only difficulty I see in the Amendment is that to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer referred, but it can be overcome. Stocks and shares are mobile, and it is extremely difficult to trace them when they are passing through different hands, and to identify the original interest. But the difficulty can be overcome because the Inland Revenue Department will be confronted with it in any case under the operation of this Clause. You can easily meet the difficulty by converting certain stocks into inscribed stocks, or you can keep separate accounts for an estate which has been transferred to a new heir. But what is going to happen under the present Clause? Supposing a business consists of realty and largely of personalty, and it is transferred to a man who only holds personalty. Supposing the business is shares and stocks which he inherits. It passes to an heir who has personalty—stocks and shares. They are merged into one, and he carries on his business, and uses his own personal property indiscriminately in the operations of that business. How are you going to divide the two, that is, the assets which have been transferred and on which already Death Duty has been paid, and that which the heir already owns and has merged in the whole operation of his business? You will have to set up machinery for that purpose. That is the great difficulty, the fluidity of personal property, and as you are confronted with that difficulty under this Clause you might as well at the same time extend the operation of it and remove the great injustice and difficulty which will otherwise arise under it.


The longer this Debate progresses, the more convinced I am that the suggestion of the hon. Member (Mr. Holt) was really the best way of dealing with this matter, namely, to withdraw the Clause altogether. I thought so until I heard the last speaker, but he has convinced me, with the pathetic picture that he has drawn of the number of difficulties, and the seriousness of those difficulties which would arise in the application of this Clause, that this is another instance of the evil of attempting in any way to apply preferential methods in the application of taxation, and that really the difficulty and the trouble that are likely to arise in the application of this Clause are so serious that we should be well advised, if it were possible to do so, to abandon altogether this attempt at concession which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put forward, and to refrain from placing ourselves in very much the same difficulty as we found ourselves in yesterday by reason of the legislation which took place years ago with regard to settled estates. Here is an attempt to do justice, no doubt, but, as the last speaker so forcibly pointed out, the attempt is so likely to lead to injustice that in the long run this Section will have to be repealed at some time or other, and then when that is proposed I suppose we shall be met with the charges of breach of contract and want of faith that were made yesterday, as it seemed to me, with very little foundation indeed. I, for one, should be very glad if the Chancellor of the Exchequer could announce that, although he intended this as in the nature of a concession, he now finds that the application of it so extremely difficult, and the difficulties have been so well pointed out on the other side of the House, that really the best course would be to abandon the attempt altogether.


I would suggest that my hon. Friend is drawing a gloomy picture which need not disturb us very much. It did not seem to me that there was a shadow of substance of any kind in the arguments about contracts yesterday. But even those who differed from me in that cannot believe that there is any case whatever for making out a contract between the subjects and the State if this concession is made this evening. The argument that the Death Duties should be graduated, not only according to the amount of the estate but to the number of years which have elapsed since it last passed, has not always found favour universally. There are those who argue still that, taking an average number of years, the misfortunes of life and death tend to equalise themselves, and that the hardship need not really be very great in that Death Duties can themselves be translated into terms of Income Tax by those who insure themselves against them. That has always been the argument when it has been attempted to resist a concession of this kind. It seems to me that the argument could easily be answered, because a victim of a particular misfortune is not likely to be comforted by being told that it will be all right if he is regarded as an integer, and secondly, that you have to consider in this matter the damage which has been done in particular instances by the misfortune of quick succession. That being so, and the argument for graduation according to the terms of years which have passed since the last death being admitted, the question is whether you shall wait until you can do the whole thing or whether you shall make an experiment and begin with the money which you have at your disposal. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pretyman) and the hon. Member (Mr. James Mason) made remarks about the penny which was taken off the Income Tax, and warned the Committee that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would use the argument of not having enough money if that penny was taken off when it came to the Death Duties. It is not really fair to say that the penny was taken off the Income Tax. It is better to say that a penny was not put on the Income Tax. The distinction is that the penny is only delayed because it will be wanted next year for these Grants which it is the intention to pay into local authorities as from 1st April, when the proceeds of the penny will have to be used for that purpose, and for that reason it would have been impossible, having regard to the future immediate needs of the State, to use the penny which would be put on for the reduction of existing taxation.

That being so, and there being not sufficient money to make this full concession, it seems to me to be clearly wise to make a concession in the most urgent cases—the cases of those properties which are most likely to be damaged either by the withdrawal of working capital in the business or by the forced disintegration of a landed estate, with all the hardship which that involves upon a rapid succession of deaths. Hon. Members talk about the difference between a business and a private company, and they say it would have been better to draw the line between private companies and public companies rather than between businesses and companies. But in an experiment of this kind the necessity is to draw the line where it is easiest to work. We are assured by those who advise us in these matters that it will be possible to distinguish what a business is. What we have in view was described in the White Paper circulated to Members of the House. It would not be easy if you put in companies of any sort or kind to distinguish between them and other undertakings of the same kind. The Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to the difficulty of getting a foothold when you once get to the making of concessions. On the whole it seems to us that it is easiest to include those properties which are most likely to deserve relief, and for the present, and until we have more money at our disposal, we must resist all attempts to make the concession wider. We can only hope for the fortunate day when the Chancellor of the Exchequer will have more money to spare and no other competing demands upon him. In answer to the hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. E. Wood) I would say that I do not think he understood the situation when he talked of the difference of property which was half personalty and half realty. In the case of a property of £60,000, of which £30,000 is personalty, the rate on the whole would be 7 per cent., and the relief on £30,000 under this Section would be 3½ per cent.


I had intended to press this Amendment to a Division, but for two reasons I shall not do so. I understand, in the first place, that my right hon. Friend (Mr. Hayes Fisher) is going to move an Amendment on the subject; and secondly, after what has been said by hon. Members on the other side that this is a first instalment and that it cannot possibly stop where it is now, and in view of the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has signified his approval of this statement, I have changed my decision, and I do not wish to press the Amendment to a Division.


Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.


The hon. Member did not ask to withdraw the Amendment. He only said he would not wish to press it to a Division. Is he entitled, or are you entitled, to say that the Amendment is, by leave, withdrawn?


Is not the hon. Member too late in asking this question?


When the hon. Member (Mr. Hoare) said that he would not press the Amendment to a Division, I think it was pretty clear what he meant.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.


I beg to move, to leave out the word "five" ["and that subsequently within five years"], and to insert instead thereof the word "fifteen."

The right hon. Gentleman has said today that there are always great difficulties in making concessions. The Chancellor of the Exchequer plainly indicated in his speech that the small concession which he makes in this Clause to-day cannot be thought to be final. There will have to be some day a resettlement of the whole scale of Death Duties. The whole of this matter will have to be reconsidered with the view, undoubtedly, to further concessions. Yesterday we had a very animated Debate on the subject of the Death Duties, and there was a general consensus of opinion that, whereas a graduated Income Tax probably more nearly approached perfection—if you can have an approach to perfection in any kind of taxation—than any other, the Death Duties are perhaps as full of imperfection as any tax that could possibly be devised. There was one very glaring defect in the application of the Death Duties which was pointed out quite as much by hon. Gentle- men opposite as by those who took part in the Debate on this side, and that was the inequality with which this tax falls upon different estates, the fact being that, whereas there are families which are famous for their longevity, there are also families which are famous—if I may coin a word—for their shortivity, and the consequence is that one estate may not have to pay these Death Duties more than once possibly in a hundred years, while other estates may have to pay them ten or twelve times in a hundred years. That is a matter of great concern, not only to those who have to pay the duties, but to the local community which suffers from the excessive payments which have to be made. The Chancellor of the Exchequer recognises that in the case of quick successions, where there are a series of deaths in a short number of years, there is real injustice and hardship which ought to be remedied; but, while he recognises the principle that the injustice and hardship ought to be remedied, undoubtedly his concession does not go anything like far enough. Under this concession an estate where there are two deaths in five years will have to pay the whole Estate Duty twice in that period. According to this concession, when the second death occurs in one year, the estate would have to pay the whole Estate Duty on the occasion of the first death and half the Estate Duty on the occasion of the second death, even although it occurred only one 5"ear after the first death.

My proposal is that no estate should be called upon to pay the whole Estate Duty twice until an interval of fifteen years has elapsed. I believe that some day or other we will arrive at some logical conclusion on this matter, and that, whenever we do so, it will be generally agreed that no estate should be called upon to pay these heavy Death Duties—which have been made much heavier by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer—twice in less than a period of fifteen years. After all, fifteen years does enable a man to do what the Secretary to the Treasury said he ought to do, namely, to put by enough of his income to insure against the period when the estate will be called upon to pay. In less than fifteen years there is not a fair opportunity of putting by that money to insure against the time when the duties will have to be paid. There is another reason why this Amendment should be accepted: There is great inequality in these taxes. There are lives that cannot be insured, and, therefore, in those cases there is all the more necessity that the time should be extended so that some annual amount may be put by against the time when a second large amount of the estate may have to be taken out of the estate. I do not apply my remarks only to estates—I apply them almost equally to businesses. It was stated again and again yesterday by hon. Members on the other side that it was a serious matter when a great lump sum had to be taken out of a business and then, owing to the death of the son, another lump sum had to be taken out within two years of the occasion of the first lump sum being taken. My remarks would apply to cases of that kind. If my Amendment were carried, there would be a graduation of the duties payable in cases of quick successions and after fifteen years the whole amount would be payable. I cannot help thinking that when the whole of this case comes to be reviewed hereafter, and when we will have another Chancellor of the Exchequer who will regard this matter from a more favourable point of view, he will say that for fifteen years, at all events, an estate should escape from paying the full penalty which is now exacted from it. These duties may have to be exacted. I admit that we must get money from somewhere. I admit that these estates do provide a large amount of money for the various services of the country. But we ought to avoid harsh and unequal taxation wherever it is possible. Even although it may only fall on a few, yet these victims ought to be able to appeal to justice, and in all our taxes we should endeavour to avoid harshness and inequality of this kind.


I think it is really unreasonable to move this Amendment after the hon. Member who moved the previous Amendment did not even proceed to a Division upon it. When the last Amendment was before the Committee the argument which was addressed to the Committee by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was so appealing and moving that the hon. and gallant Member for Chelmsford (Mr. Pretyman) expressed

sympathy with it, and it was withdrawn on the ground of the expense it would involve to the Exchequer. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Fulham now comes forward with an Amendment which would cost the Exchequer £624,000. In regard to the previous Amendment, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said he could not afford the cost of £550,000. I cannot help thinking that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Hayes Fisher) was most ungenerous in asking us to accept this Amendment, seeing that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has taken a favourable view of the case in the concession he has already made. My right hon. Friend is the first Chancellor of the Exchequer who has inaugurated this principle at all. We are not able to make the concession larger.

Captain CLIVE

The hon. Member has stated that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is the first to inaugurate this principle. So far from this Clause being a gratuitous concession on his part, it seems to me that it is the necessary corollary of the abolition of Settlement Estate Duty. People find themselves in a position of hardship when rapid successions become possible. Before Settlement Estate Duty was abolished it was possible for a man to provide against rapid succession either by transferring his property in his lifetime or by leaving it to one of the next generation and not to one of the same generation as himself. This Clause is obviously the minimum of concession that should have been made in order to prevent the abolition of Settlement Estate Duty being attended with partial effects. My right hon. Friend's Amendment does not give one life. It merely deals with the period up to fifteen years. Everyone knows that the average succession is thirty-three years. It appears to me that before the right hon. Gentleman enjoys the proceeds resulting from the abolition of Settlement Estate Duty, he ought to make provision for doing away with the injustice which will otherwise be created.

Question put, "That the word 'five' stand part of the Clause."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 297;. Noes, 175.

Division No. 172.] AYES. [5.30 p.m.
Abraham, William (Dublin, Harbour) Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R. Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbarton)
Acland, Francis Dyke Agnew, Sir George William Allen, Rt. Hon. Charles P. (Stroud)
Addison, Dr. Christopher Ainsworth, John Stirling Armitage, R.
Adkins, Sir W. Ryland D. Alden, Percy Arnold, Sydney
Baker, Harold T. (Accrington) Griffith, Rt. Hon. Ellis Jones Morison, Hector
Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.) Guest, Hon. Frederick E. (Dorset, E.) Morton, Alpheus Cleophas
Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark) Gulland, John William Muldoon, John
Baring, Sir Godfrey (Barnstaple) Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway) Munro, Rt. Hon. Robert
Barlow, Sir John Emmott (Somerset) Hackett, John Murray, Captain Hon. Arthur C.
Barnes, George N. Hall, Frederick (Yorks, Normanton) Needham, Christopher T.
Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick Burghs) Hancock, John George Nolan, Joseph
Beale, Sir William Phipson Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Lewis (Rossendale) Norman, Sir Henry
Benn, W. W. (T. Hamlets, St. George) Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) Norton, Captain Cecil W.
Bentham, George Jackson Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale) Nugent, Sir Walter Richard
Bethell, Sir J. H. Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West) Nuttall, Harry
Black, Arthur W. Haslam, Lewis O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny)
Boland, John Plus Hayden, John Patrick O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool)
Booth, Frederick Handel Hayward, Evan O'Doherty, Philip
Bowerman, C. W. Helme, Sir Norval Watson O'Donnell, Thomas
Boyle, Daniel (Mayo, North) Henderson, Arthur (Durham) O'Dowd, John
Brace, William Henderson, John M. (Aberdeen, W.) O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.)
Brady, Patrick Joseph Henry, Sir Charles O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N.)
Brocklehurst, William B. Herbert, General Sir Ivor (Mon., S.) O'Malley, William
Brunner John F. L. Hewart, Gordon O'Neill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.)
Bryce, J. Annan Higham, John Sharp O'Shaughnessy, P. J.
Buckmaster, Sir Stanley O. Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H. O'Sullivan, Timothy
Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas Hodge, John Outhwaite, R. L.
Buxton, Noel Hogge, James Myles Parker, James (Halifax)
Byles, Sir William Pollard Holmes, Daniel Turner Parry, Thomas H.
Carr-Gomm, H. W. Holt, Richard Durning Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek)
Cawley, Harold T. (Lanes., Heywood) Hope, John Deans (Haddington) Pearce, William (Limehouse)
Chancellor, Henry George Howard, Hon. Geoffrey Phillips, Col. Ivor (Southampton)
Chapple, Dr. William Allen Hudson, Walter Phillips, John (Longford, S.)
Clancy, John Joseph Hughes, Spencer Leigh Pirie, Duncan V.
Clough, William Illingworth, Percy H. Pollard, Sir George H.
Clynes, John R. Jardine, Sir J. (Roxburgh) Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.
Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock) John, Edward Thomas Pratt, J. W.
Collins, Sir Stephen (Lambeth) Jones, Rt. Hon. Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea) Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central)
Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J. Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil) Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.)
Cornwall, Sir Edwin A. Jones, Henry Haydn (Merioneth) Priestley, Sir Arthur (Grantham)
Cotton, William Francis Jones, J. Towyn (Carmarthen, East) Primrose, Hon. Neil James
Cowan, W. H. Jones, Leif (Notts, Rushcliffe) Pringle, William M. R.
Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth) Joyce, Michael Radford, G. H.
Crooks, William Kellaway, Frederick George Raffan, Peter Wilson
Crumley, Patrick Kelly, Edward Rea, Rt. Hon. Russell (South Shields)
Cullinan, John Kennedy, Vincent Paul Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough)
Davies, David (Montgomery Co.) Kenyon, Barnet Reddy, Michael
Davies, Ellis William (Eifion) Kilbride, Denis Redmond, John E. (Waterford)
Davies, Timothy (Lines., Louth) King, Joseph Redmond, William (Clare, E.)
Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.) Lambert, Rt. Hon G. (Devon, S. Molton) Redmond, William Archer (Tyrone, E.)
Davies, M. Vaughan-(Cardigan) Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade) Rendall, Athelstan
Dawes, James Arthur Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, West) Richardson, Albion (Peckham)
De Forest, Baron Leach, Charles Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)
Delany, William Levy, Sir Maurice Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)
Denman, Hon. Richard Douglas Lewis, Rt. Hon. John Herbert Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs)
Dewar, Sir J. A. Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford)
Dickinson, Rt. Hon. Willoughby H. Low, Sir Frederick (Norwich) Robertson, J. M. (Tyneside)
Dillon, John Lundon, Thomas Robinson, Sidney
Donelan, Captain A. Lyell, Charles Henry Roche, Walter F. (Pembroke)
Doris, William Lynch, Arthur Alfred Roche, Augustine (Louth)
Duffy, William J. Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester) Roe, Sir Thomas
Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness) Macdonald, John M. (Falkirk Burghs) Rowlands, James
Duncan, Sir J. Hastings (Yorks, Otley) McGhee, Richard Rowntree, Arnold
Edwards, Clement (Glamorgan, E.) Maclean, Donald Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter
Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor) Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J. Russell, Rt. Hon. Thomas W.
Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid) MacNeill, J. G. Swift (Donegal, South) Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)
Esmonds, Dr. John (Tipperary, N.) MacVeagh, Jeremiah Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees)
Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.) M'Callum, Sir John M. Scanlan, Thomas
Esslemont, George Birnie McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald Seely, Rt. Hon. Colonel J. E. B.
Falconer, James M'Laren, Hon. H. D. (Leics.) Sheehy, David
Farrell, James Patrick M'Laren, Hon. F.W.S. (Lines., Spalding) Sherwell, Arthur James
Fenwick, Rt. Hon. Charles M'Micking, Major Gilbert Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John Allsebrook
Ffrench, Peter Manfield, Harry Smith, Albert (Lanes., Clitheroe)
Field, William Markham, Sir Arthur Basil Smith, H. B. Lees (Northampton)
Fiennes, Hon. Eustace Edward Marks, Sir George Croydon Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.)
Fitzgibbon, John Marshall, Arthur Harold Soames, Arthur Wellesley
Flavin, Michael Joseph Meagher, Michael Spicer, Rt. Hon. Sir Albert
France, G. A. Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.) Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)
Furness, Sir Stephen Wilson Meehan, Patrick J. (Queen's Co., Leix) Sutherland, John E.
Golder, Sir W. A. Millar, James Duncan Sutton, John E.
George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd Molloy, Michael Taylor, John W. (Durham)
Gladstone, W. G. C. Molteno, Percy Alport Taylor, Theodore C. (Radcliffe)
Glanville, Harold James Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Taylor, Thomas (Bolton)
Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford Money, L. G. Chlozza Tennant, Rt. Hon. Harold John
Goldstone, Frank Montagu, Hon. E. S. Thomas, James Henry
Greenwood, Hamar (Sunderland) Mooney, John J. Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton)
Greig, Colonel James William Morgan, George Hay Thorne, William (West Ham)
Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Morrell, Philip Toulmin, Sir George
Trevelyan, Charles Philips Watt, Henry A. Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull, W.)
Verney, Sir Harry White, J. Dundas (Glasgow, Tradeston) Wilson, Rt. Hon. J. W. (Worcs., N.)
Walsh, Stephen (Lanes., Ince) White, Sir Luke (Yorks, E.R.) Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Walters, Sir John Tudor White, Patrick (Meath, North) Winfrey, Sir Richard
Walton, Sir Joseph Whitehouse, John Howard Wing, Thomas Edward
Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent) Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P. Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow)
Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton) Whyte, Alexander F. (Perth) Young, William (Perth, East)
Wardle, George J. Wiles, Thomas Yoxall, Sir James Henry
Waring, Walter Wilkie, Alexander TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr.
Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay T. Williams, Aneurin (Durham, N.W.) W. Jones and Mr. Webb.
Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney) Williams, Penry (Middlesbrough)
Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan) Williamson, Sir Archibald
Agg-Gardner, James Tynte Goldman, C. S. Peel, Lieut.-Colonel R. F.
Amery, L. C. M. S. Goldsmith, Frank Peto, Basil Edward
Anstruther-Gray, Major William Grant, J. A. Pollock, Ernest Murray
Archer-Shee, Major Martin Gretton, John Pretyman, Ernest George
Ashley, Wilfrid W. Guinness, Hon. W. E. (Bury S. Edmunds) Prothero, Rowland Edmund
Baird, John Lawrence Haddock, George Bahr Pryce, Jones, Colonel E.
Baker, Sir Randolf L. (Dorset, N.) Hall, Frederick (Dulwich) Randles, Sir John S.
Baldwin, Stanley Hamilton, C. G. C. (Ches., Altrincham) Rees, Sir J. D.
Banbury, Sir Frederick George Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington, S.) Remnant, James Farquharson
Banner, Sir John S. Harmood- Harris, Henry Percy Ronaldshay, Earl of
Barlow, Montague (Salford, South) Helmsley, Viscount Rothschild, Lionel de
Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton) Henderson, Major H. (Berks, Abingdon) Rutherford, John (Lanes., Darwen)
Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks Henderson, Sir A. (St. Geo., Han. Sq.) Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby)
Beckett, Hon. Gervase Herbert, Hon. A. (Somerset, S.) Samuel, Sir Harry (Norwood)
Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth) Hewins, William Albert Samuel Samuel, Samuel (Wandsworth)
Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich) Hibbert, Sir Henry F. Sanders, Robert Arthur
Bennett-Goldney, Francis Hills, John Waller Sanderson, Lancelot
Bentinck, Lord H. Cavendish- Hill-Wood, Samuel Sandys, G. J.
Bigland, Alfred Hoare, Samuel John Gurney Sassoon, Sir Philip
Bird, Alfred Hohler, G. F. Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.)
Blair, Reginald Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield) Spear, Sir John Ward
Bowden, G. R. Harland Hope, Major J. A. (Midlothian) Stanier, Beville
Boyle, William (Norfolk, Mid) Home, Edgar Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston)
Boyton, James Houston, Robert Paterson Starkey, John R.
Bridgeman, William Clive Hunt, Rowland Staveley-Hill, Henry
Bull, Sir Wiliam James Hunter, Sir Charles Rodk. Steel-Maitland, A. D.
Burdett-Coutts, William Ingleby, Holcombe Stewart, Gershom
Campion, W. R. Jardine, E. (Somerset, E.) Strauss, Arthur (Paddington, North)
Carlile, Sir Edward Hildred Jessel, Captain H. M. Sykes, Alan John (Ches., Knutsford)
Cassel, Felix Joynson-Hicks, William Sykes, Sir Mark (Hull, Central)
Castlereagh, Viscount Kerry, Earl of Talbot, Lord Edmund
Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) Lane-Fox, G. R. Terrell, George (Wilts, N.W.)
Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford University) Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar (Bootle) Thomas-Stanford, Charles
Clay, Captain H. H. Spender Lewisham, Viscount Thomson, W. Mitchell-(Down, North)
Clive, Captain Percy Archer Lloyd, George Ambrose (Stafford, W.) Thynne, Lord Alexander
Clyde, J. Avon Lleyd, George Butler (Shrewsbury) Tickler, T. G.
Courthope, Georgo Loyd Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury) Tobin, Alfred Aspinall
Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet) Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey) Touche, George Alexander
Craik, Sir Henry Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Colonel A. R. Tryon, Captain George Clement
Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian Long, Rt. Hon. Walter Valentia, Viscount
Currle, George W. Lyttelton, Hon. J. C. Walrond, Hon. Lionel
Dairymple, Viscount MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh Warde, Colonel C. E. (Kent, Mid)
Dalziel, Davison (Brixton) Mackinder, Halford J. Watson, Hon. W.
Denniss, E. R. B. Malcolm, Ian Weigall, Captain A. G.
Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott Mason, James F. (Windsor) Weston, Colonel J. W.
Duke, Henry Edward Middlemore, John Throgmorton Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset, W.)
Duncannon, Viscount Mills, Hon. Charles Thomas Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud
Du Pre, W. Baring Morrison-Bell, Major A. C. (Honiton) Wills, Sir Gilbert
Eryes-Monsell, Bolton M. Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton) Wilson, A. Stanley (Yorks, E.R.)
Faber, George D. (Clapham) Neville, Reginald J. N. Wilson, Maj. Sir H. (Bethnal Green, S.W.)
Faber, Captain W. V. (Hants, W.) Newdegate, F. A. Weed, Hon. E. F. L. (Yorks, Ripon)
Falle, Bertram Godfray Newman, John R. P. Wood, John (Stalybridge)
Fell, Arthur Newton, Harry Kottingham Wortnington Evans, L.
Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield) Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart-
Foster, Philip Staveley Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A. Yate, Colonel C. E.
Gardner, Ernest Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William Younger, Sir George
Gastrell, Major W. H. Paget, Almeric Hugh TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr.
Gibbs, G. A. Parker, Sir Gilbert (Gravesend) Hayes Fisher and Mr. Butcher
Gilmour, Captain John Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)
Glazebrook, Captain Philip K.

Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill," put, and agreed to.

It being Half-past Five of the clock, the CHAIRMAN proceeded, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 8th July, successively, to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the Clauses to be concluded at Half-past Five of the clock at this day's sitting.