NAVAL AND MILITARY MOVEMENTS (INQUIRY). (Hansard, 28 April 1914)

§ Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN
I beg to move, "That, in view of the serious nature of the Naval and Military Movements recently contemplated by the Government against Ulster, of the incompleteness and inaccuracy in material points of the statements made by Ministers, and of the continued failure of the Government to deal frankly with the situation, this House is of opinion that there should be a full and impartial inquiry into all the circumstances."
I rise to make the Motion which stands in my name on the Paper. I do so with unfeigned reluctance, for the Motion is not merely a criticism of the policy of His Majesty's Government, bad and even criminal as I think that policy to be—it is a demand for an inquiry into the circumstances in regard to which the Government profess to have told us the whole truth, but in regard to which I have to allege that they have shown a lamentable want of candour and frankness in dealing with the House, and have been guilty of material misstatements of fact in order to conceal the plans which they were trying to carry out. I repeat it is with unfeigned reluctance that I rise to make a Motion of that kind against men, between whom and myself, as the Prime Minister reminded me yesterday, relations of courtesy, if not more, have always prevailed. I should not do it unless I felt that in the present circumstances it was the plain duty of this House to try and elicit for itself in the first place, and for the information of the country in the second place, the real facts which have underlain recent events. I do not know how the Government propose to meet this Motion. I observe upon the Paper a large number of Amendments to it standing in the names of different Gentlemen who sit behind which propose entirely to omit all events which had taken place when notice was given of this Motion, to burke the demand for inquiry, and to substitute for the Motion a declaration that in view of what has since occurred the Government would be supported in any action that they take. I have not to deal with subsequent facts. I have only to deal with the facts as known to us when notice was given of this 1551 Motion, and with the story which the Government told up to that date. If the Government had told a different story, if they had avowed widespread plans for action against Ulster, the Amendments, notice of which have been given, would have been relevant to the discussion, but they are incompatible with the story which the Government have told, and which they have tried to persuade us to accept as the full truth.
I must ask the House to recall, very briefly, the history of the recent crisis. I am obliged to bring back to the memory of Members of the House facts which are familiar to all. We had a discussion in this House on 9th March, in which the Prime Minister at last revealed to the House the suggestion for the alteration of the Government of Ireland Bill which he had foreshadowed much earlier in the Session. He concluded his speech on that occasion by the most solemn appeal to all of us, by the memory of our great political traditions, by the memory of great acts of statesmanship of our forefathers, to settle this question peacefully. I will read only the last words he uttered:— This is a testing case. The best traditions of our past, no less than the undisclosed and fateful issues of the future, appeal to us to-day, with imperious accents, to pursue, if we can, the way of unity and peace."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1914, col. 918.] The right hon. Gentleman had been answered by the Leader of the Opposition and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Trinity College (Sir E. Carson). They had told him that the particular proposal which he made, and the particular form in which he had cast it, did not, in their opinion, offer any possibility of a settlement of the great issues that divide us.

§ The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith)
I was told it was a "hypocritical sham."

§ Mr. AMERY
It was after the Bradford speech.

§ Lord HUGH CECIL
It was not on that occasion.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
As my Noble Friend reminds me, the observation which the Prime Minister quotes was not made on that occasion.

§ The PRIME MINISTER
It was made in reference to those proposals.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Since the Prime Minister recalls my attention to that particular phrase, let me say that I think the 1552 phrase was not unmerited. The right hon. Gentleman knew at the time he solemnly made that proposal to the House that it could not be accepted. He knew it. That observation was not made on that day. What did happen on that day was that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin said that if the right hon. Gentleman would change the form—and I admit the substance of his proposal—and, instead of proposing that the counties should only be excluded for six years and then automatically come in unless the decision of Parliament were reversed, that they should be excluded until Parliament directed that they should be brought in, he would take that proposal over to his friends in Ireland for consultation with them as a possible basis of settlement. Compromise was not impossible at that moment. The Government had made an advance, and we recognised that they had made an advance. What is the next fact that was known to us when these events first came before us? That Debate was adjourned to a day not then named in order that the House and the country might have full time to consider the effect of the right hon. Gentleman's offer. Five days later, on 14th March, nothing fresh having occurred, the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Churchill) went down to Bradford, where he made a speech which has now become historic. He announced to his audience there that there are worse things than bloodshed, even on an extensive scale. and he concluded a threatening, menacing, and provocative speech with the words Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the proof. 4.0 P.M.
He was rapidly followed by a speech from the hon. Member for West Belfast (Mr. Devlin) and another speech by the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Dillon). One said that the last word of conciliation had been uttered and talked of meeting force with force, and the other replied that the one request and demand urged throughout by the Ulster people should never be granted as long as the world went round. When the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty returned on the Monday following to the House of Commons, his return was made the subject of a demonstration of warm approval by the whole of his party, who gave every sign that they appreciated that a new stage of the problem had been reached, that new-intentions had been formed by the Government, 1553 and that the spokesman of the party of force was now in the ascendant. When the Prime Minister was asked whether he approved of the tone and temper of the observations of that right right hon. Gentleman, he stated across the floor of the House that he did. That was the first fruit of the appeal to their policy in the way of unity and peace. I am trying to carry the mind of the House back to the events as they occurred, and as we knew them at the time. If I omit anything that is material, the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me; I am not con sciously doing it. On 20th March Sir Arthur Paget met the officers and made to them the observation which immediately led to the incidents at the Curragh. These were generally known on the Saturday. Fuller reports, and, because fuller, more alarming, became known on the Saturday night, and on the Sunday night the Prime Minister issued the first statement on be half of the Government—the statement which he contributed to the "Times" newspaper, and which was intended to allay excitement. The whole object of this was to show that there was no great schemes afoot, that the preparations of the Government were on the most modest scale, that they were confined entirely to the protection of some stores immediately menaced, that everything that had been contemplated had been successfully carried out, and that nothing more had ever been under discussion by Ministers of the Crown. That was the statement on the Sunday. On Monday—

§ The PRIME MINISTER
The right hon. Gentleman has attributed to me statements which I have never made.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Does the right hon. Gentleman want me to read the whole of his speech?

§ The PRIME MINISTER
I want you to read the passage in which I said that no preparations of any different kind had ever been contemplated.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
I did not say the right hon. Gentleman said that in so many words. I said that the whole intention of the statement was to reassure the public, which was alarmed, and convince them that the intentions of the Government were of the most restricted character, that they were simply to give additional protection to certain stores which were menaced, and that no wider operations had ever been in the mind of the Government.

§ The PRIME MINISTER
I never said anything of the kind.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
(reading): The intention was simply to give additional protection to arms, munitions and military stores scattered about the country, that might become the objects of a raid. Of course it has become necessary for the Prime Minister now to deny the plain suggestion of these words. It has become necessary for him to assert that when he said the operations were simply to do this and that no further movement of the troops was in contemplation, that they had contemplated and had prepared for much greater movement.

§ The PRIME MINISTER
The Government believe that these operations, which were all they contemplated, would be peaceably carried into effect, and so they were, and in undertaking these operations they had necessarily to take into account the possibility that they might not be-successful.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Yes, Sir, we know that now, but why did not the Prime Minister say at the time—

§ The PRIME MINISTER
Because, in accordance with the anticipation of the Government at the time when I made that statement they had been peacably carried out.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
I thought I was going to give a colourless recital of the facts at this stage, coming only to debatable matters later on. We have arrived at this point, that the Prime Minister thought it right, thought it candid, and thought it truthful to suppress the major and more important part of the Government's policy. I suppose he never would have admitted it if it had not been wrung from him bit by bit by the process of cross-examination. Then, merely to complete this sequence of events, on Monday, we had the explanation of the Secretary of State in the House of Commons, followed by that of the-Prime Minister. On the Tuesday we have a singularly bitter revolt by Gentlemen sitting below the Gangway against the attitude of the Government. [Ministerial cries of "All?"] I accept the correction of hon. Gentlemen opposite—a revolt of the whole party against the attitude of their leaders up to that date. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"] Accordingly on Wednesday that attitude was modified, and we have the first resignation of the late Secretary of State for War. I ask 1555 the House to remember that the Government professed from the first to put the House in full possession of every relevant fact. On the 24th the Secretary of State said:— I propose to publish the material documents which will remove all mystery in the matter. The Prime Minister, on the same day, in asking for the postponement of the discussion, said:— We can conduct the Debate under better conditions, when all the material documents have been printed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th March, 1914, col. 206, Vol. LX.] And, again, the Secretary of State, on the next day, said:— I can assure the House that I hope to conceal nothing, and to tell the whole story."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2oth March, 1914, col. 392, Vol." LX.] When the White Paper was published, which was to contain every material document, it contained eight. We have now got from them fifty-five, and no man will venture to say that all of those which were first withheld are not material, and that some are not of the first importance. We have elicited a great deal more, but we have still not got the whole, and the Prime Minister now states that he will publish nothing further. He refuses information that is as material as anything that is given, and not one whit more confidential. The Government professed, even at that early date, to have made a perfectly frank confession of every material fact. I will recite only some of the material information, which not only was not revealed then, but which is still withheld. We have been refused any knowledge of the information on which the Government acted, except that it came generally from the police. We have been refused any account of the orders and instructions conveyed to General Sir Arthur Paget, when he visited the War Office on the 18th and 19th, and when he had repeated interviews with Ministers both there and in other places, including one with the Prime Minister in Downing Street, of which we learned by accidental reference from the First Lord of the Admiralty. We have been refused any information from the Government as to what General Sir Arthur Paget said to the officers whom he summoned to a conference to consider ulterior movements at two o'clock on that Friday in Dublin. We have been refused any record from Sir Arthur Paget as to what is his recollection of what he said to the officers when he visited them at the Curragh. All these things are most 1556 material. We are told that we cannot have some of them, because they were not written at the time. That excuse goes, for the Government have got from Sir Arthur Paget an account of what he said to the first officers, which was not written till many days afterwards, and they have published it. The right hon. Gentleman himself has, I think, admitted that he has some further account. He admitted it yesterday in answer to a question which was not reached, but his answer to which is now printed. He admitted that there were notes of the instructions given to Sir Arthur Paget.

§ The PRIME MINISTER
Refer to it.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
If the right hon. Gentleman will look at his written answers [OFFICIAL REPORT] yesterday, he will find it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Quote."] I have not brought my copy with me, but I thought I would at least refresh the right hon. Gentleman's memory. Here it is. It has just been handed to me by one of my hon. Friends:— Mr. George Faber asked whether there is any record at the War Office or in the possession of Sir A. Paget of the instructions, or the nature of the instructions, orally given to Sir. A. Paget at the meetings of the 18th and 19th March? The Prime Minister: Yes. Sir. There is a record summarising the instruct ions verbally given to Sir Arthur Paget.

§ The PRIME MINISTER
That record is exactly the same as the one which appears in the White Paper with regard to the protection of stores.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Why not publish it?

§ The PRIME MINISTER
Because it is the identical thing, and it conveys no information of any sort or kind.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Then it is very incomplete as a record of the conversations which took place. Here I call the attention of the House to how much must have passed in these conversations which the Government will not allow to be described as instructions. All that was material was not instructions; that was imparted in conversations. Before I leave the subject of this information, two other points to which I wish to draw the attention of the House are these: We do not know what are the instructions that were given to the General Officer sent over to take command in Belfast. We ought to know them. Lastly, we know from an answer of the right hon. Gentleman given on the 27th that the telegram, No. 14, of 20th March, 1557 published in the White Paper, is not published in its complete form, but that a part of it is suppressed, and that the Government refuse to publish it. I have spoken of the information which is still not forthcoming, even at this stage. How much more incomplete the information was when we first debated the matter the House will readily remember. What was the explanation which the Government gave of their proceedings at that time? I quote from the late Secretary of State for War, who said:— Owing to Information received the Government thought it necessary to take steps to strengthen the guards at certain depots of stores. You would suppose, and anybody would suppose, that a decision of that kind was taken immediately on the receipt of the information to which the Minister referred. We now know that the material information was given last December, and we have no explanation of why the Government which declined to act last December suddenly thought it necessary to act and to act precipitately at the moment when they did act. In the second place, what was the character of the danger to the stores which this information led the Government to expect? [An HON. MEMBER: MEMBER "Gun-running!"] The Secretary of State said:— Owing to information received by the Government I considered it necessary to take certain steps to safeguard certain depots … from the possibility of attack by evilly disposed persons. That is in the OFFICIAL REPORT, column 393, of 25th March. He continued:— I was then, and am now, aware that any such attempt would be discountenanced by the responsible leader of the Ulster movement. That is a statement of the grounds for the action of the Government, and of the kind of danger they had to apprehend, made by the late Secretary of State, in which he has never wavered. He repeated it in the first speech he made to his constituents in slightly different words. He said:— It came to my knowledge, as Secretary of State for War, that there was a real risk that hot-headed persons, not under any kind of discipline or order, might attempt to rush certain places in Ireland where there were large stores of arms and ammunition. What the Government, therefore, asked us to believe was that the danger against which only they had to provide was the rushing of certain stores by a few evilly disposed and hot-headed persons, not under any kind of discipline.

§ Colonel SEELY
I hope I may not be taken as agreeing to what the right hon. Gentleman has said in this and other 1558 matters, and should I have an opportunity of catching your eye, Sir, I hope to deal with what he says, but I wish to say at once that this particular statement is inaccurate.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
I am not quite certain what my inaccuracy was. Let me try and state it in the words of the right hon. Gentleman:— The danger against which they had to guard was against the raiding or the possibility of attack upon these stores by evilly disposed persons who would be discountenanced by the responsible leaders of the Ulster movement"— By men elsewhere described by him as hot-headed persons, not under any kind of order or discipline. Therefore, it was not against any organised force that these preparations were made. [An HON. MEMBER: "The 'Fanny' had not arrived."] That is the case which the Government gravely presented to the House. It was reinforced and repeated by the Prime Minister on the same day. To put it shortly, the whole gist and bearing of their defence was that the Opposition were making a mountain out of a molehill, that what they had done and contemplated was a very minor matter, and that there was no ground for the wider suspicions that had been aroused. The same story, the same attitude, the same defence, was continued on 25th March, when the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War resigned for the second time and effectively. That brings me to the first clear departure from truth made by Ministers in their utterances. We had from the Secretary of State for War on that clay an explanation of the reasons for his resignation. The explanation put forward by the Secretary of State and by the Prime Minister was that the Secretary of State alone—though I think that is not definitely stated by him, as it was by the Prime Minister—was responsible for adding two paragraphs to a Cabinet document which was disapproved of by the Government. The whole story of these peccant paragraphs, as they have been called, is still wrapt in mystery, but it is interesting as illustrating the attitude and methods of the Government. The Secretary for War told us that he had seen General Gough that morning, that he had said to General Gough all that was put into these two paragraphs, that he had gone from the meeting with General Gough to the Cabinet, and had told the Cabinet what had passed between him and General Gough, including, I 1559 presume, that he had informed General Gough that he himself, the Secretary of State for War, thought it necessary, after the misunderstandings that had taken place, that what he had then said should be put in writing, and that General Gough should have it in writing. We do not hear that when the Secretary of State told that story to the Cabinet there was any protest. It is not suggested that they at once said, "But you had no business to say anything of the kind to General Gough." It is not suggested that any sort of protest against his having said it was made in the Cabinet. What Ministers objected to is not what he said, not to the guarantees which he gave, but to the reducing of those guarantees to writing. The Prime Minister stated in reply to my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) that no other Minister had seen these paragraphs. That may have been an accident.

§ The PRIME MINISTER
made an observation which was inaudible in the Reporters' Gallery.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
It is in the OFFICIAL REPORT, If the right hon. Gentleman will look at the speech he will find the question put by my right hon. Friend, and his answer, very explicit and laconic, No. Sir, to the question whether it had been seen by any other colleague. I have no reason to think the Prime Minister knew that it had been seen by any other colleague at that moment, and I do not suggest it. That does not apply to the First Lord of the Admiralty, who spoke the last thing in the Debate that night and who invented an elaborate story to bolster up this statement which was inaccurate from beginning to end. After Lord Morley had spoken, and after I had brought to his attention—for I spoke just before him—what Lord Morley had said, the right hon. Gentleman said that Lord Morley never revised or examined these paragraphs or took any decision upon them. He went on to say:— He happened to be there when the box was opened.… Lord Morley, as he was indirectly and remotely brought into contact with it, considered it right and proper to say that he takes fail responsibility for it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th March, 1914, col. 503.]

§ The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill)
Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that what I said is not the fact?

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
All I can say is that it was not the fact, and, if the right hon. Gentleman did not know by that time that it was not the fact, his ignorance was extraordinary and, I must add, inexcusable.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
I still believe it to be correct.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
The right hon. Gentleman has a standard of evidence and credibility which I confess I cannot emulate. Lord Morley admitted that the statement was drawn up in collaboration with him. He admitted that he made minor corrections in it, and he used the statement himself to represent the views of the Government. Does the right hon. Gentleman still pretend to believe that Lord Morley never revised or examined these paragraphs or took any decision upon them?

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
I understand that Lord Morley was considering what he was to say in the House of Lords as representing the general policy of the Government, and the Secretary of State for War was considering what was the character of the document which he was to give to General Gough. There is a very great distinction between the two.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
This in comparison with other issues at stake is a minor matter. I am content to leave the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, never withdrawn or qualified by him, in comparison with the account which Lord Morley gave of the same events in the House of Lords. I do not think I can do better in parting from this subject than to part from it in Lord Morley's words. He said:— I regret that I have had to take up so much time on this secondary point in the history of this controversy. What I have said is not particularly interesting. I am not sure that it is very important, but it is quite true. Ministers do not usually think it necessary to conclude their statements by the assurance that they are true, but Lord Morley rightly felt that, in the particular circumstances of this controversy, that statement marked his declaration from many of those of his colleagues. I have alluded to the circumstances of the resignation of the late Secretary of State. I am not sure that I do not owe the right hon. Gentleman an apology. I spoke on the night on which his first resignation was announced by him, leaving the Prime Minister subsequently to announce that it had not 1561 been acted upon, and I described his resignation as a put-up job. I thought the right hon. Gentleman had been trying to dupe the House of Commons. I see now that I was wrong. The right hon. Gentleman himself was only the tool of more astute and more unscrupulous men. We know now why his resignation was not accepted on that day. Had it been accepted, then Lord Morley would have resigned also. But not only that, the Government were then making desperate efforts to induce the then Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant-General to allow their written word to be dishonoured and still retain office. It must have been evident to everyone, most of all to the Ministers concerned, that if they allowed the Secretary of State to resign when his word was broken they could not refuse the same liberty to two great soldiers. When the Government found that they could keep Lord Morley in any case, and that they could not keep the soldiers in any case, they let the right hon. Gentleman go.
I return to the summary of events for the purpose of drawing attention to what are the facts as far as we now know. The 9th March was the date of the Prime Minister's suggestion. On 11th March, when the Cabinet had just invited us to pursue in common the way of unity and peace, the Cabinet decided that the Battle Squadron should be sent and the appointment of a Cabinet Committee to consider affairs in Ulster. On the 13th the Committee meets at the War Office. On the 14th the War Office suddenly became alarmed about these stores, and wrote to Sir Arthur Paget—alarm is consequence of information received last December. It is not wholly an accident that the decision to send a Battle Fleet to Ireland, the decision to appoint a Committee to deal with Ulster affairs and the inquiry as to the protection of these stores, coincides so closely in point of time with the truculent speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty at Bradford, made on the 14th. On the 16th the First Lord of the Admiralty is back in town, and then the Committee becomes singularly active and singularly urgent and pressing in its telegrams. It telegraphs:— Please wire not later than 8 a.m. to-morrow what steps you have taken"—

§ Mr. JOHN WARD
What date?

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
16th March, No. 3 in the last edition of the White Paper. Please come over bringing your plans in detail. 1562 Plans what for? Did ever any reasonable man hear of a Government of reasonable folk sending for a general to come over from Dublin to this country to bring plans in detail for moving four companies of Infantry to guard stores against hot-headed persons, discountenanced by the leaders of the only organised force? What happens then? On the 18th Sir Arthur Paget is in London. On that and the 19th Ministers and Sir Arthur Paget are very busy. For the first time in a telegram of the 18th there had been mention of Dundalk and Newry. They were not thought of on the 14th. Matters are so urgent on the 18th that the battalion in Belfast, not thought of and not alluded to on the 14th, was moved out so quickly that it was doubtful whether it could carry away the rifles stored, and had to withdraw their bolts if they could not carry away the rifles. The whole of the movements which were ordered were to be simultaneous, and were to be completed by dawn on Saturday, the 21st. On the 19th the Staff Officer was ordered to confer with the senior Naval Officer, and orders were issued for the Battle Squadron to proceed to Ireland.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
Ireland?

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
To Lamlash—I stand corrected by the First Lord—to proceed off the coast of Ireland, where it would be convenient to have it in case of serious disturbance occurring there, and it was sent there with that purpose in view. Then we have the Admiral inquiring whether he may take on board field guns to exercise his men, not if there should be bad weather, as the First Lord told us, but in case of the bad weather which may be expected. I do not know Lamlash, but I am told on what I believe to be good authority—the authority of people who have been there—that it is not a place where you could exercise eight field guns. That does not appear to have been a usual practice, but the Admiral quotes a precedent, and what is the precedent which led the Admiralty at once to accede as a matter of routine to his request for field guns? It is the precedent of a squadron proceeding to the Mediterranean at a time when war in the Balkans had just broken out, or was obviously just about to break out. On the same day Sir Nevil Macready is appointed to proceed to Belfast, and arrangements are made that he should be given all the powers of a magistrate. I believe, though I am not certain, that the Prime Minister stated that it was never contemplated to appoint 1563 a Military Governor of Belfast. For all practical purposes Sir Nevil Macready was made the Military Governor of Belfast. One of the safeguards usually necessary before troops can be employed against a civil populace is that a magistrate should requisition their aid, but in order that no difficulty of that kind might arise in this case, that no civil magistrate might be able to impede for a moment the free action of the soldiers against the civilians, the General in Chief Command of the district is made a magistrate, so that he may requisition himself and comply with his own requisition. And all this in order to move four companies of Infantry to places where there were stores, which some hot-heated persons, discountenanced by the organised Ulster loyalists might, it was expected or feared, attack!

An HON. MEMBER
Did you say loyalists?

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Yes, Sir, I said loyalists, and I meant it. The original instruction contained in the War Office letter of 14th March had already been acted on by General Sir Arthur Paget. He telegraphed on 16th March that he had issued general instructions and taken all available steps, and that he would send details by post to-morrow. He telegraphed, on the 17th, that under the present circumstances he was not moving troops north for the protection of the four places referred to. "A sufficient number, however, are in readiness to move at short notice. Am dispatching letter of explanation to-day." In his letter with reference to the four places specially mentioned he points out that Enniskillen is guarded by a company from an Infantry battalion, and as we subsequently learn from the Press, the sentries were doubled. I believe that particular company was afterwards sent back and two other companies substituted for it. The Government were anxious to have as little moving of troops as possible, so as not to alarm the populace. Why was all this marching and counter-marching of companies likely to leave men where they were, on your own showing, merely reinforcing them if you thought that necessary? But Enniskillen is guarded, Carrickfergus is guarded, and the detachments will be increased at Armagh and Omagh. Steps are being taken to remove the reserve arms and ammunition to Dublin and Enniskillen, 1564 respectively. That would take about eight days. He goes on to say:— It would be preferable from the point of view of safety only to provide guards at once for Armagh and Omagh from the Infantry battalions at Mullingar, and to evacuate the recruits at these places; but in the present state of the country, I am of opinion that any such movement of troops would create intense excitement in Ulster and possibly precipitate a crisis. For these reasons I do not consider myself justified in moving troops at the present time, although I am keeping a sufficient number in readiness to move at short notice in case the situation should develop into a more dangerous state. That is, when the General has made these dispositions adequate in his opinion—not the best that could in other circumstances have been devised—for guarding the points to which his attention was called, he is summoned to the War Office, and when he comes over here the movements of troops which he deprecates and considers he would not be justified in undertaking, because they might "possibly precipitate a crisis," are at once ordered by the Government through him.

§ Sir WILLIAM BYLES
Are these the King's troops or King Carson's?

§ The PRIME MINISTER
made a remark which was inaudible in the Reporters' Gallery.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
The Prime Minister says not at once. Sir Arthur Paget came over on the 18th. If he was here before, that is not disclosed by the Papers. If the right hon. Gentleman will look at the White Paper, he will see that a telegram was sent on the 18th March to Sir Arthur Paget in these terms:— Bedfords to move to places which have been decided. Battalion of 14th Brigade to go to Newry and Dundalk. And the battalion in Belfast marched out of Belfast with such haste that it was doubtful if it could remove its rifles. I am sorry I have to ask so much of the time of the House, but the case I have to make is a grave one, and it requires the fullest statement. What are the inaccuracies of which I complain in the Motion I have made to the House? I complain, first of all, that the statements of the First Lord as to the circumstances connected with what are known as the "peccant paragraphs" were grossly and flagrantly inaccurate, and that the absence of accuracy was not accidental, because it was material to the particular impression which the First Lord was trying to produce—an impression which was not in accordance with the facts.
I allege, in the second place, that the statement which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister gave to the "Times" 1565 as to the movement of the ships was inaccurate. The Prime Minister announced to the "Times" on the Sunday that, as for the so-called naval movements, they simply consisted in the use of two small cruisers to convey a detachment of troops to Carrickfergus, without the necessity of marching them through the streets of Belfast. He has amended that by saying that he ought to have added "one destroyer." Does anybody, even the right hon. Gentleman himself, pretend that that statement was a fair disclosure to the public of what had happened? If so, words have lost their meaning, and Ministers seem to think that there is indeed no distinction between truth and untruth. What is the defence set up by the Prime Minister? It is that the decision to move the Battle Fleet had been come to by the Cabinet on the 11th, quite apart from the precautionary movements of troops in Ulster. He added that the time for making the movements was left to the Admiralty, that is to say, the First Lord of the Admiralty. Does he ask anyone to believe that it was an accident that the First Lord of the Admiralty chose the 19th to exercise the power of discretion which the Government had given him—the 19th, on which these military movements were ordered? Of course not, Sir. They were taken as part of the larger scheme which was then being evolved by the Government. They were sent there in view of great disturbances arising. They would never have been required if the Government had contemplated nothing more than petty reinforcements to guard a few military stores.
A third point—there is the question of the right accorded to officers to disappear. Let me remind the House that my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour), in the first discussion we had on this subject, laid particular stress upon this point, and said that the story of the Government about the police protection of these stores was incredible, because no man would ever have given the officers such a choice or option if it was merely a question of defending these stores against an unorganised force. What is the Prime Minister's explanation deliberately offered for the acceptance of the House at that time? On 23rd March he said:— AS a matter of fact, as far back as December last instructions were given to the general officers, particularly to the General Officer Commanding in Ireland…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd March, 1914, col. 80.] I now omit unnecessary words that they might have to act in support of the civil 1566 power, and adding that officers who were domiciled in the area of disturbance, wherever it might be, might be and ought to be excused from taking part in the necessary operations. Then the Prime Minister said:— It is a rule which was laid down in this particular case, not in regard to these circumstances which have recently arisen, but as far back as December of last year."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd March, 1914, col. 81.] Therefore the right hon. Gentleman says that this decision was come to without any reference to the recent circumstances, and was communicated to the general officers, and particularly to the General Officer Commanding in Ireland, for their guidance in December last. The General Officer Commanding in Ireland in the account he gives of what he said to his officers uses these words:— The most that I had been able to obtain front Colonel Seely, and that only at a late hour, and by the help of Sir John French, was the following:— 'Officers actually domiciled in Ulster would be exempted from taking part in any operation that might take place. They would be permitted to "disappear" (that being the exact phrase used by the War Office), and when all was over would be allowed to resume their places without their career or position being affected."' Now observe, again, that that inaccuracy was material to the argument which the Prime Minister was making, and he founded his argument upon it. He told my right hon. Friend, in effect, that he had discovered a mare's nest, and that these orders which my right hon. Friend thought were special to the circumstances, and indicated the special character of the circumstances, had been, in fact, given to all the officers, and particularly to the General Officer Commanding in Ireland three months before. Now we know that they were only wrung from the Secretary of State at the last moment in prevision of these particular circumstances. In a printed answer given yesterday the Prime Minister said:— I am not aware that any instructions such as those indicated in the question were given to Sir Arthur Paget in December last."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th April 1914, col. 1339.]

§ The PRIME MINISTER
That is true. [HON. MEMBERS: "What is the point?"]

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
You want the point stated now? The point is that the Prime Minister in the first Debate we had on this subject on 23rd March, in reply to my right hon. Friend—who said that these were extraordinary instructions which prove that extraordinary events were expected—stated that the circumstances were not extraordinary, that they were not given in view of events which are now 1567 taking place, and that they were general instructions given to all officers last December.

§ The PRIME MINISTER
So I was told.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
I accept at once the right hon. Gentleman's statement. I understand that he made his original statement on information received which he now knows was not accurate.

§ The PRIME MINISTER
Well, I did not say that. I made that statement on information which I had at the time. I had no personal knowledge of these matters. I was not at the War Office, but I was told that that had happened. I had no reason to think that it was an inaccurate statement. It was made in perfectly good faith.

§ Colonel SEELY
It is the fact that a general statement to this effect was made by me to the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief in December last, as stated toy the Prime Minister. With regard to the subsequent statement, I was not in the House when it was made, but the first statement is absolutely accurate.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that Sir Arthur Paget is mistaken?

§ Colonel SEELY
No, Sir.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me to put my question, and he shall have a second opportunity of replying, of which I hope he will avail himself. Does he suggest that Sir Arthur Paget was wrong when he said that that was the utmost concession he had been able to obtain for the officers, and that only at a late hour and with the aid of Sir John French?

§ Colonel SEELY
It seems to me that that is a different question. Let no one take it that I am saying anything against Sir Arthur Paget. On the contrary, I hope to make it clear that I support him in every particular; but the first statement made by the Prime Minister is absolutely accurate. The other question is a different one.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
I do not want to challenge the Prime Minister's good faith, but he has made two statements which are in flat contradiction one of the other. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] He himself has not assisted us to elucidate the 1568 truth. He has been supplied by somebody with inaccurate information. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] That inaccurate information has been passed on to us. But observe the whole argument of the Prime Minister. The point which it was necessary for him to make was that these instructions were not special to the occasion, that they had been given many months before without reference to Ulster or recent events in Ulster, and yet we know that Sir Arthur Paget, who is supposed to have received the instructions in December, knew so little of them that he battled with the Secretary of State at the last moment in order to get them, that if he had been left face to face with the Secretary of State he would not have got them, and that it was only the powerful intervention of Field Marshal Sir John French that secured this concession to the officers. I say that that is destructive of the whole case that the Prime Minister made on the first day in answer to my right hon. Friend. Now I come to a minor matter. An hon. Gentleman on this side of the House asked about the position of General Gough. I quote from the OFFICIAL REPORT:— Captain Craig: Will the officers be reinstated. The Prime Minister: It is not a question of reinstatement, because they have never been deposed. I suppose that somebody had told him so, but the White Paper says:— These officers will be relieved of their command, and officers have been sent to relieve them at once. Sir, have words any meaning. [An HON. MEMBER: They have an exact meaning.] We have again the reply of the Secretary of State as to the allegation that Sir Arthur Paget had said that the movements which would take place would set Ulster in a blaze. The Secretary of State ridiculed that, and professing to speak with Sir Arthur Paget's authority said that it was not the country but the Press. He has got Sir Arthur Paget's own words. Is that in contradiction or in correction of the statement that Sir Arthur Paget had told his officers that Ulster would be in a blaze? Sir Arthur Paget, unfortunately, was only asked to report what he had said after the events had taken place, but he says he told them— I thought that the moves would create intense excitement and that the country—if not the country then the Press—would be in a blaze on the following day. [Applause.] Hon. Gentlemen opposite actually burst into uproarious cheers because they find that a Minister succeeded in getting as near the truth as that. I say 1569 that, apart from these inaccurate statements, which are important—because in each case the inaccuracy is material to the story which the Government tell, and their story depends upon its acceptance—the full story is incredible. Who ever heard of a Cabinet Committee to supervise the movements of four companies of troops and two battalions? Who ever heard of a General Officer coming over to London to consult about an operation of that kind? What was the extreme urgency? What was the necessity for secrecy? Why were naval officers to go about in plain clothes? Why were battleships to be moved and destroyer flotillas sent to the scene of their operation in order to render assistance at Enniskillen, Omagh and Armagh? The right hon. Gentleman suggested that my knowledge of geography was not very good. I am not aware that any of these threatened places is a seaport or would be reached by sea except Carrickfergus. Why, more significant than all these, if the Government merely wished to guard certain military stores, did they move the troops which were in Belfast out of Belfast?
The right hon. Gentleman says that the Government would never have scattered detachments like this to places of no importance if they had contemplated anything more serious than that which they have avowed. Like my right hon. and learned Friend who spoke on a previous occasion, the information that I get from people who are competent to speak of strategy, is that the Government seized very important strategical points. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?" "Seized?" and '"From whom were they seized?"] I use the word "seized" in this sense: There is no reason why they should not have done such a thing if they had done it openly and above-board, or on sufficient cause shown. But they deny that they took any strategical points. I say that there were strategical points, and that they occupied them because they were strategical point; and I go further and say that as regards the movement in Belfast it is admitted by the Government that that was a strategial movement. Consider that what they feared was an outbreak by hot-headed people, and they chose the moment of that fear to move from Belfast the troops who might be needed in case any such outbreak occurred in order to preserve the peace and order of the community. That was a perfectly proper measure if they 1570 were contemplating an extensive military operation, but not if they were merely taking police precautions. Look again at the seizure of Dundalk and Newry. I have already called the attention of the House to the fact that these places were not mentioned in the original letter of Sir Arthur Paget, and that the instructions to occupy them were only taken when he had come over to London and was in conference with Ministers. Why were they taken? Was it to protect stores? There were admittedly no stores in Newry. The Prime Minister says that Newry is an outpost of Dundalk. That is a curious military phrase to use in connection with the police protection of stores against hot-headed men. The Government were occupying outposts. Such a movement partook of a strategical character. But now, when you come to a place sixteen miles off—Dundalk—where the stores were, there is a whole brigade of 500 or 600 men. [An HON. MEMBER: "Not a brigade—a battalion."]

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
made an observation which was inaudible in the Reporters' Gallery.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Why does the First Lord interrupt?

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
Because three batteries with nothing but their drivers and guns are an entirely defenceless unit.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
Defenceless against whom? [HON. MEMBERS: "The Covenanters."] I wish hon. Members opposite would remember what is the case of the Ministry. They may have been defenceless against the Ulster Covenanters if the Ulster Covenanters had ever thought of attacking them, but the Secretary of State for War expressly stated that that was not so. Not only did ho not suggest that they would, but he stated that he knew that they would not. Now he says that this Artillery, with its drivers and gunners, is not safe and cannot protect itself against these hot-headed persons under no organisation or discipline, and discountenanced by the whole population.

§ Colonel SEELY
I never said that.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
That is the contention of the Government. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] If they change their contention, then it is avowed that the purposes which were originally admitted were not the sole purposes, and were not the main purposes with which these operations 1571 were undertaken. I think that that is so. I think that the Government had something much more in their minds than anything which they avowed up to the period to which I have taken the story. I think that we get some light as to the current of thought which was drifting along some Members of the Cabinet and others from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty on the 30th. He did not confine himself to the story of the mere protection of stores. He denied indignantly that matters were in a peaceful position when he went down to Bradford. He said, on the contrary, that he had been filled with despair by the reception of the Prime Minister's offer, and he went on to say—I quote the words from page 887 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of 30th March—that this reception struck in my heart a note of despair and made me realise more than anything how hopelessly difficult it is to attempt to arrive at a good solution of these difficulties as long as the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his Friends have in their minds that they have only to bully to prevail. It was on that basis that the measures of the Government have been considered. What does that mean? It means that their talk about the stores was a mere pretence. The First Lord of the Admiralty, a leading spirit of the Cabinet Committee, the go-between betwixt the military and the naval preparations, had come to the conclusion that no settlement was possible until he had shown the power of the Crown by an overwhelming force in Ulster, and he proceeded to take preliminary steps with a view to occupying a position which would make it easy thereafter to carry out those further military movements of which Sir Arthur Paget spoke, and by which 20,000 to 25,000 would be massed upon the Boyne, where the Cavalry would be required to prevent him from bumping into the enemy, and as a result of which one or two things would happen—either that the Government would occupy Ulster in such military force, and all its important military positions in such strength, that they thought they could defy any attempt at resistance on the part of the Covenanters of Ulster. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] Again hon. Members interrupt me by asking, "Why not?" If you had said that this was your object on the Sunday, the Monday, or the Wednesday following, you might have made a case. But you say it was not your object; you disavowed it; you denied it. And we say now that the Gentlemen behind the Government 1572 never believed the Government's denials, and only supported them because they knew that behind the avowed movements were other and wider plans. I say that the Government, or some Members of the Government, had determined to take such measures in Ulster as would either put them in a position in which they thought they would paralyse any possibility of Ulster's resistance or would have already provoked a serious disturbance. And the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty has shown us that that contingency was present to his mind. Ho spoke of there being worse things than bloodshed, even on an extensive scale. He showed the calculation by which he thought that if bloodshed did take place, at any rate the first impression would be favourable to the Government, and the position of the Government in face of Ulster would be rendered more possible. He said:— The first British soldier or coastguard, bluejacket or Irish Constabulary man, who is attacked and killed by an Orangeman, will rouse an explosion in the country. I give the First Lord of the Admiralty credit for having hoped to overawe Ulster without an explosion, but I say it is proved out of his own speeches that he deliberately contemplated the alternative that there might be an explosion, and that he was prepared to face it, because he calculated that it would put the Ulsterman in the wrong and himself in the rights I desire to summarise the charges which I make against the Government. They are first, that they were not thinking of these evilly disposed persons—those hotheads—not under any control, and discountenanced by every responsible man among the Ulster loyalists, but that the measures were prepared on the basis that conciliation was hopeless unless the Government made an overwhelming display of force. That the stores were not the real object of the movements which took place, but were the pretext to cover those objects. That the Government insisted on movements which the General (Sir A. Paget) thought dangerous to the peace. That the General had done what he thought necessary for the protection of the stores. That the orders to the warships, given at the same time as the orders to the troops, were not unconnected with the orders to the troops, and were part of the larger plan which the Government have never avowed, but which their party heartily applaud. That the withdrawal from Belfast is only to be explained on these conditions, that it was a mistake, not merely a mistake, 1573 but a crime, if the Government were expecting anything in the nature of ordinary street disturbances, and it could have no justification an any ground except that on which the First Lord of the Admiralty has justified it, that it was a strategic movement.
So, also, Sir Arthur Paget's announcement to his officers that the Government were going to reinforce him and have an Army of 25,000 men is incompatible with the minor movement which the Government alone avowed, and is only explicable on the ground of their larger intention. I say that the disappointment of the First Lord of the Admiralty, at any rate at the plot having failed, was clearly shown by the taunt he threw across the House against the 100,000 Covenanters of having allowed these movements of troops to take place peaceably. Finally, I say that the story told by the Government is untrue in definite particulars which I have named, and is incredible when taken as a whole. And I ask that we should have an impartial and a judicial inquiry into the whole of the circumstances. Although we know much, and quite enough to justify the charges which are brought, we do not pretend to know the whole, and, indeed, it is part of our complaint that material facts and information are still withheld. When this inquiry was suggested the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, catching up some interruption from these benches behind me, said, "You want a new Marconi inquiry, a fishing inquiry to see if there is any foundation for your charges." I submit that I have shown foundation enough. But was the right hon. Gentleman's interruption wholly a happy one—" a fishing inquiry like the Marconi inquiry "?
Does he remember its history? There, too, we were assured that all material facts had been revealed. There, too, we were told that all the charges made were grossly untrue—lies passed from one foul lip to another. We now know that included in the terms of that denial were some of the transactions which had been charged against Ministers. We now know that the Prime Minister did not know the facts at the time that they occurred, that he was dependent for his information on colleagues who did not disclose the whole truth to him, and that he himself never learned the whole of the story, or the part that one of his colleagues had played in it, until that part was disclosed before the Committee upstairs. This is not a fishing inquiry. We have a case, an ample 1574 case, to justify inquiry on the facts as I have stated them. I ask the Prime Minister himself, who even to-day has had to say, "I gave the information as it was given to me," who even to-day does not know which of the various statements supplied to him is true—I ask him does he not think that, for his own honour, he should refuse to accept the whitewashing vote of a party majority, and that he himself should insist on a judicial inquiry, and a judicial report, on all these dark and tortuous proceedings?

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
This is a Vote of Censure and a demand for a judicial inquiry. In all the circumstances, I venture to say it is the most audacious Vote and the most impudent demand for a judicial inquiry of which our records can provide a parallel. The first maxim of English jurisprudence is that complainers should come into Court with clean hands. Here we get the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson), and the hon Member who sits behind him, fresh from their gun-running exploits—

§ Sir E. CARSON
made an observation which was inaudible in the Reporters' Gallery.

HON. MEMBERS
Behave like a king!

§ Sir E. CARSON
You behave like a cad!

Mr. MacCALLUM SCOTT
On a Point of Order. I desire to call your attention to the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson), who has been shouting across the floor of the House to Members on this side that they are cads.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
It is a most improper expression to use. I do not know whether the hon. Member was one of those who used the taunting and offensive expression, but he cannot deny that there are several of his colleagues who did so. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not repeat the observation, and under the circumstances I do not propose to call on him to withdraw it.

§ Sir E. CARSON
May I say I listened patiently through all these discussions—I always do—and it is only when I am taunted across from the other side that I used that expression. If I have said anything disorderly, I regret it, but certainly I shall not be taunted from the other side without asserting myself.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
I am pointing out, as I am quite entitled to do, the curious position occupied by the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his colleague behind him coming here fresh from their exploits in Ireland to demand a judicial inquiry into the conduct of those responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. A. Chamberlain) made to us a very long speech which was altogether out of date. He began by admitting that his speech was out of date. He said, "I have not to deal with subsequent facts." How very convenient! Subsequent facts, he clearly sees, are fatal to the Motion. Are we quite sure they are "subsequent facts"? It is very convenient, no doubt, to represent that after the revelations of the fiendish plot it was necessary for the law-abiding people of Ulster to obtain weapons to protect themselves from such horrible machinations, and that what took place at Larne and other places on Friday night last was the answer to the events which are now under discussion before the House. I do not think that is the case at all. On the 18th of February, a month before we had made these preparations to protect our depots, the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir E. Carson), speaking at the Cannon Street Hotel, said:— They were daily entering into commitments of thousands of pounds, and he himself in the last few days, it was not any harm to confess"— I agree. I think he has always been perfectly frank.

An HON. MEMBER
He always tells the truth.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
I would point out to the hon. Member that he has not the power to insult me. had authorised the expenditure of at least £60,000 to £80,000 towards their defence that became immediately necessary, So I think it is quite clear that the large consignments of arms which have lately been landed in such lawless fashion were part of the policy which the right hon. Gentleman was carrying out before the Government even embarked upon the military precautions. A great many hard words are used about us, and the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down used the expression "criminals" with regard to us, and his supporters in the Press use extraordinary language. But we can meet those accusations with composure. We have not broken the law, and 1576 we are not engaged in breaking the law; Anyone who is familiar with the law knows perfectly well that there are half a dozen Statutes, some of the gravest character, which are being openly flouted and defied at the present time by Members who sit opposite to us, and by their followers in Ireland, and that they are being flouted and defied with the full connivance and approval of those hon. Members. So what we are now witnessing in the House is uncommonly like a vote of censure by the criminal classes on the police. [An HON. MEMBER: "You have not arrested them!".] Is that the complaint—that we have not arrested the criminals? Is it the complaint, that we have been too lenient? That is the only accusation I am not prepared to answer. Language is used of us—let me read to the House language of the laws of this country: 12 Victoria, cap. 12 (Treason Felony Act, 1848):—
"Be it enacted that if any person whatsoever after the passing of this Act shall within the United Kingdom or without compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend to deprive, or depose Our Most Gracious Lady the Queen, her heirs or successors, from the style honour or Royal name of the Imperial Crown of the United Kingdom, or of any other of Her Majesty's Dominions and countries, or to levy war against Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, within any part of the United Kingdom, in order by force or constraint to compel her or them to change her or their measures or counsels, or in order to put any force or constraint upon or in order to intimidate or overawe both Houses or either House of Parliament, or to move or stir any foreigner or stranger with force to invade the United Kingdom or any other of Her Majesty's Dominions … every person so offending shall be guilty of felony.."
I should like the House to note that the offence of using force to induce the King to change his counsel or of trying to intimidate and overawe either or both Houses of Parliament, is placed on a level with two of the foulest crimes, namely, endeavouring to subvert the throne of this country, or to bring in the foreign enemy. We have to face every day the revilings of your ferocious Press, but your condemnation is contained in the Statute, in the laws of the British realm, in Acts of Parliament, which have for generations and centuries been respected and enforced by the people of these islands, and which are 1577 indeed the necessary foundation, the indispensable foundation, of orderly government and civilised society. Language far stronger, far crueller than any which you have it in your wit to use against us, than any which your most partisan speaker, your most patriotic editor is capable of introducing into speech or leading article, is found in the grave and sober pages of the English Statute Book. Under those circumstances we can afford to retain our composure. But what is the position of the Conservative party in regard to the events which have taken place in Ireland? The Conservative party, the party of the comfortable, the wealthy—[HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"]—the party of those who have most to gain by the continuance of the existing social order, here they are committed to naked revolution, committed to a policy of armed violence, and utter defiance of lawfully constituted authority, committed to tampering with the discipline of the Army and the Navy, committed to obstructing highways and telegraphs, to overpowering police, coastguards and Customs officials, committed to smuggling in arms by moonlight, committed to the piratical seizure of ships and to the unlawful imprisonment of the King's servants—the Conservative party as a whole committed to that. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the Walton Division of Liverpool (Mr. F. E. Smith) has left us in no doubt about that. He said, speaking at the annual dinner of the Junior Imperial League:— Sir Edward Carson has taken no step, and he will take no step, however extreme it may be, for which we shall not make ourselves responsible here, representing a majority of the English constituencies. That is their position, and all the time while their newspapers are chuckling with nervous glee at each sorry event which is recorded, and while they are hurriedly collecting information as if it was news from Mexico, or some other disturbed area, and bringing out special editions with the utmost satisfaction, all the time that that is going on, let me point out to the Conservative party, and those who are associated with them, that there is in this country a great democracy, millions of whom are forced to live their lives under conditions which leave them stripped of all but the barest necessities, who are repeatedly urged to be patient under their misfortunes, repeatedly urged to wait year after year, and Parliament after Parliament, until, in the due workings of the Constitution, some satisfaction is given to their clamant needs, all the time 1578 this great audience is watching and is learning from you, from those who have hitherto called themselves "the party of law and order" how much they care for law, how much they value order when it stands in the way of anything they like! If that great audience is watching here at home, what of the great audiences that watch in India. Think of the devastating doctrines of the Leader of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman may laugh in a brief leadership of the Conservative party, but he has shattered treasure which greater men than he have guarded for generations. Think what the effect of his doctrines would be applied, let us say, to the people of India or of Egypt. Take his doctrine in regard to the Army—his doctrine of what the officers are entitled to choose or not to choose. He was obliged to carry that further, and to say that the men might choose also. I am not going to push this matter too far, but consider the application of that doctrine to the native officers of the Indian Army, or to the native soldiers of the Indian or Egyptian Army, and you will see that, in his insatiable hunger to get into office he is subverting principles which are absolutely vital to the continued organised government of the British Empire.
I say that we can remain calm under all the abuse to which we are subjected, and even in the face of all the difficulties of the situation. We are proceeding strictly along constitutional lines. We are not breaking the law; we are upholding it. We are striving to defend the State from anarchy and affronts. But you—I do not wonder that there are two views, very apparent to us, in the party opposite. There are the old Conservatives. I do not wonder that they are uncomfortable. My nerves arc, I hope, as good as those of most Members of this House, but I thank God, that I have not to play for the stakes to which they are committed. Then there is another section, I think a minority, who take a much bolder line, and to whose initiative it is no doubt due that this Vote has been moved to-day. There are those who say, "We are Tories. No laws apply to us. Laws are made for the working people, to keep them in their proper places. We are the dominant class. We are the ruling forces of the State. When laws suit us, we will obey them. If they do not suit us, so much the worse for the laws. We will not bow down to the rules appropriate to the common herd of British subjects. It will be time enough 1579 for us to talk about law and order when we have got into office, and have to deal with Irish Nationalists and British labour men." May I ask—[Interruption.]

§ Earl WINTERTON
Oh, let him go on.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
It is an infinite en couragement to me that my words can pro duce a salutary impression, however superficial or transient, upon the Noble Lord. But I would ask the party opposite to consider very seriously for a moment before I come to the point, how the present situation strikes Liberals and Irish Nationalists. Irish Nationalists have always been urged by both great parties in the State to abandon unconstitutional agitation. They have not only been urged to do so, but great violence has been used against them. For a very long time they have staked their fortunes upon constitutional and Parliamentary agitation—[HON. MEMBERS: "Cattle driving." "Moonlighting"]— and now they have brought their cause to the very threshold of success. If by an act of violence and under threats of violence the cause of Home Rule were to be shattered now, I say that the Conservative party would themselves have taught the Nationalists of Ireland the truth that there was in John Bright's famous saying that Ireland never gained anything but by force. You would have discredited utterly and for ever, in regard to every class in this country which is discontented, and in regard to every nationality within the British Empire that is not satisfied with existing conditions, all hope of redress by constitutional means. You, the Conservative party, would have pointed out to them that the surest and most effective method of obtaining redress of grievances is violent, lawless, and armed agitation and rebellion. How does it strike us? We have been nine years in power. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nine years too long."] We have in that period fought three General Elections, so that the country does not agree with the hon. Gentleman. In the whole of that time we have disposed of great affairs at home and abroad. When we came into office—I must put this point if I may—there were five great questions upon which Liberals desired to legislate: Education, Temperance, Welsh Disestablishment, Plural Voting, and Home Rule. Not one single one of those have we yet succeeded in carrying into law. [HON. MEMBERS: "Question."] Now, at the last moment, when after—

§ Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE
On a point of Order. Is not the right hon. Gentleman travelling rather wide of the Question?

§ Mr. SPEAKER
If the hon. Member will have a little patience, I have no doubt the right hon. Gentleman will come to the subject-matter.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
With great respect, I am passing from this point in a moment, but everything I have said is relevant to the subject. I say that the use which is now being made of the Orange Army is a use far outside any question connected with Ulster. Its purpose and intent is to rupture and destroy the whole movement of Liberal and Radical reform. Its object is to show that, if the veto of the Lords is gone, there still remains the veto of force, and, by the use of that veto, to deny to at least one-half of the nation that fair share of political rights and political activities to which they are undoubtedly entitled. I now come more directly—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"]—it is impossible to consider any of the questions on this subject without facing the issues which are before us, and we shall not shrink from facing them. It is from this point of view that I would take up the discussion of the particular points to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred. If I may go back to that controversy, I would like to begin at what I must consider the turning point in the Home Rule discussion—I mean the rejection of the Prime Minister's offer on the 9th March. The right hon. Gentleman tried to make out—it was necessary for his argument that he should make out—that there had been no rejection. But he quoted, with approval, the expression "hypocritical sham," which had been applied to those proposals of the Prime Minister. He said, "The Government had made an advance, and we recognised it." How did they recognise it? On the 10th March, the day after the offer, the right hon. and learned Member for Dublin University wrote:— It is clear to my mind, so far its our preparations are concerned, that the pronouncement of the Government, if anything, necessitates a still more forward movement. 6.0 P.M.
That is what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. A. Chamberlain) describes as the Government making an advance and the Conservative party recognising it. I cannot understand why, when that pronouncement was made by the Prime Minister, the spokesman of the party opposite could not have said, "Although this is not what we 1581 need, or what we require, it constitutes the greatest step forward towards settlement that has ever been made." Had that language been used, I venture to think that threads would never have been severed which have now been interrupted. That is the point from which I start in considering the situation in Ireland. We made the greatest offer in our power, and it was summarily and incontinently rejected. What were the results of that act? It was perfectly clear that there was no possibility of settlement so long as one party in the House believed that it had only to go on bullying the other, and in the end the other would be incapable of taking any effective steps to maintain its authority. While one party in a dispute is prepared to go to extremes—and it is firmly believed that under no circumstances will the other party even take the necessary action to defend its right and to discharge its duties—there is no possibility of any effective parley between them. From the moment the declaration of the Prime Minister was made there was no more question of coercing Ulster by this Government. Six years and two elections must intervene before the question of the inclusion of Ulster arose again. It was no longer the question of our coercing Ulster; it was a question of our preventing Ulster coercing us. The smallness of the outstanding differences as far as Ulster was concerned only made the situation more grave and more awkward. In the differences which remain on the subject of Ulster, taking it by itself, there was no foothold and no foundation for civil war—none whatever. It is clear that those who were preparing for civil war had other purposes in their mind besides Ulster. They were preparing to defeat the general policy of Home Rule. They were preparing to subvert the regular system of Parliamentary government in this country. I say that whatever compunction and sympathy we have for Ulster, there is no room for concession or weakness in face of a challenge of that kind. If Parliamentary government is exposed to a challenge in this country, we are bound to take up that challenge and fight it out to the very end. Nothing could be more disastrous than that hon. Members opposite should suppose that they and their Ulster friends are the only people in this country prepared to risk their lives for great issues. The supreme issue lies here; the actual events are taking place on the Irish stage. After the 1582 utter repulse and breakdown of our efforts at conciliation, it was to the military situation in Ireland that we were forced to look.
What was that situation in the second week in March? There was the Orange Army, strong and efficient no doubt—no one can do more justice to it than has been done to it by its own friends. Scattered about Ulster were the scanty police and military forces of the Crown, and depots of arms and ammunition of great consequence to this growing, illegal military force. We had, of course, police and military reports which had been accumulated for a long period of time. We had the information and the advice of the General Officers, and we had many other sources of information as to what was proceeding. We had the statement of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, which I have read to the House, about his expenditure of large sums of money upon anus and ammunition. We had the statement of 10th March about the forward movement, and we were, I say, in view of all these matters, and when we had reached the breakdown of our hopes and efforts at conciliation, absolutely bound to review and survey the whole military scene in Ireland in all its possibilities, actual and contingent. That survey comprised three perfectly separate spheres. First of all, there was the question of a large naval force, in principle a Battle Squadron with its attendant ships, which it was decided in the Cabinet of 11th March, should be stationed upon the West Coast of Scotland with a view to being at hand should intervention in Irish disorders become necessary or desirable. [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear!"] I have never attempted to conceal the fact. It was the details of that force, the date when it should be moved, and as to its actual composition in units which were, of course, left to the Admiralty.
Can anyone say, after what has occurred, that it was an improper or improvident proceeding on the part of the Government to have a naval force available for necessary service in Irish waters in the circumstances which then existed. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why countermand, then?"] The force is now on the spot. That was the first step which was taken in the Cabinet on 11th March. That was entirely separate and having regard to the general situation of the Irish question. It is entirely separate from the particular moves relating to the defence of the depots, which was the 1583 second sphere of our inquiry, to which I now come. I have dealt at length before in the House with the protection of the ammunition depots. I have gone seriatim through the various points. The right hon. Gentleman has expended a great deal of time in trying to make mysteries, difficulties and obscurities out of what is perfectly plain and clear. These large depots of arms and ammunition, ranging from thirty tons to eighty-five tons of small-arms ammunition—the right hon. Gentleman knows exactly how many rounds there are in eighty-five tons!—were scattered about in an entirely unprotected condition, with very small bodies of Infantry, largely recruits, or old soldiers watching them, and these men were in some cases almost equally divided between Protestants and Catholics. There was either the possibility of their being under temptation, either by a serious movement by responsible people or of their being a prey to some spontaneous and irresponsible movement of mischievous hotheads. We were absolutely bound to safeguard these depots once we were clear that our efforts to meet hon. Gentlemen opposite on the Irish question had for the time being failed, and once it became so clearly apparent that perhaps no effort we could make on the Irish question would ever be accepted by them.
In the beginning the only places spoken of were Enniskillen, Armagh, Omagh, and Carrickfergus. When Sir Arthur Paget came over here we had an opportunity of discussing matters with him and with the military authorities at the War Office. Two other points of great weakness and danger in the situation were pointed out. The first was the position of the battalion in Belfast, which, should disorder arise, might, at any rate, be cooped up in its barracks and penned there with the large supply of ammunition; and the second was the three batteries of Field Artillery at Dundalk. Although the Orange Army has since replenished its stores of rifles and ammunition, it is believed to be deficient in Field Artillery. Here were eighteen guns, with nobody but their gunners and drivers to look after them, without any kind of Infantry escort for their protection—

§ Sir E. CARSON
Were they in Ulster?

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
They were within reach. It was the military authorities who pointed out to us that this, on the hypothesis on which we were then proceeding, was most dangerous—possibly 1584 the most dangerous exposure of weakness which our dispositions presented. We arranged to move two battalions of troops to reinforce these various points, and we also sent down General Macready to Belfast in order that he might concert and co-ordinate—I am not going into the details of the measures by which the police and the military were to be concentrated in lines for their protection in the event of a general hostile movement being taken against them by the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his Army.
The only use of ships in connection with this movement were that two Scouts were used to carry two companies to Carrickfergus in order not to rail them through Belfast. It was thought that might lead to trouble. When it was believed that the Great Northern Railway Company of Ireland would refuse to carry these small bodies of troops—a belief for which there was a very good reason, and which was very well founded, extraordinary though it may appear—the military authorities, asked whether they could be moved by sea, and two Boys' Training Ships were diverted in case they were needed to take the companies by sea in the event of the necessity arising. I do not know from what consideration the Great Northern Railway Company consented to move His Majesty's troops, but the necessity of their being moved in this extraordinary way by sea was removed. That is the whole of the movements authorised by the Cabinet—or by any Member of the Cabinet. These were the whole of the movements, as I have repeatedly said, upon which any decision had been taken. Nothing in this movement was disobeyed. Nothing in this movement was countermanded, or has been countermanded. Does anyone say, in view of the desperate steps which have now been taken by the Orange leaders to obtain arms, that the methods which were then proposed, and which I have unfolded to the House, were inappropriate, premature, or unnecessary in any respect?
I now come to the third subject the third sphere in our general survey of the military position in Ireland. We made a free and confidential survey with our military advisers, including the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, who was over here, into the general situation, actual and perspective, not only in Ulster, but in Ireland as a whole. We discussed with the military authorities, not only those movements which I have described 1585 in detail to the House, but the whole of the military situation, and all its foreseeable contingent possibilities. It is the duty of the War Office and the Admiralty to be continually studying contingencies, and to have plans ready for meeting them. We are always doing that, and it does not matter whether we think the contingency is likely to arise or not, and it does not matter whether any decision has or not been taken upon a particular matter. It is the regular recognised process which all military Departments are bound to go through to study effectively all contingencies, however improbable, that may be reasonably apprehended.
A great part of my time and that of the Secretary of State for War is taken up in considering hypothetical propositions which, I am thankful to say, are more improbable than an organised attack upon the King's forces from the Ulster Volunteer Army. We have to consider and make elaborate preparations against unprovoked attack in time of peace by foreign Powers on our ships and Possessions. All kinds of arrangements are made to that end. In this case, however, an element of greater reality was imparted to these considerations by the fact that these small definite movements had been authorised to take place, and were going to take place, and that the General charged with them believed, and stated he believed, they might easily entail far larger and graver consequences. The letter of the General of the 17th March is included in the White Paper, and it was a very representative specimen of the arguments and statements which he made to us when he was over here. We did not accept his views, and the event proved we were quite right in the information upon which we relied and in the judgment and in the measure which we took of the whole situation. But Sir Arthur Paget was also right to be over-cautious, to take into view every contingency. It is a very good fault in the military officer to be prepared as far as his means allows it, against every consequence of his movements which he can reasonably foresee, and we were bound also to be prepared for any development which might take place, however unexpected these developments might be.
I am certainly not going into details of confidential discussions which were held with Sir Arthur Paget and other Generals, nor am I going into the plans and movements which would have been appropriate to the situation which had not yet arisen, 1586 which will probably never arise, but nevertheless which might arise. I think it is a very cool request on the part of Gentlemen, engaged in planning military operations against the organised Government of the King—on the part of Gentlemen engaged in arming, as they tell us, 100,000 men with rifles and ammunition to shoot down the King's servants—I think it is a very cool request that they should come forward and ask to be informed what, in each of these particular eventualities are the precise military or police measures that will be adopted against them. Therefore, I have not the slightest intention of going into any of those confidential matters; but broadly speaking, and of course, my responsibilities are limited, I am anxious to take in the fullest and largest sense the fullest responsibility for everything I have said or done, either publicly or confidentially in this matter. And broadly speaking, the contingencies which we considered were these.
First of all, an armed attack upon our small depots, or upon the forces marching to protect them, including the guns at Dundalk, before they could be reinforced. Secondly, we considered the measures which would be appropriate, provided the Cabinet approved, if a Provisional Government were set up in Belfast, either consequent upon these small moves we were making, or at a later period. We considered that under two heads, whether that Government were set up bloodlessly, or whether it was set up after the murder of a number of police and other officials. No movements of any kind were authorised beyond those which I have described; but in view of the fact that Sir Arthur Paget thought that grave events might follow from these movements, although we did not agree with him, and were right in not agreeing with him, we certainly gave him to understand that large reinforcements would be sent if those contingencies arose, and he left with the confidence that even if the most extreme and improbable contingencies arose, he would be properly supported by the Government, as he has been, and is, and he will be, if necessary. Now, I want to know, does anybody dispute the propriety of that? If British troops, marching on the King's highway, were shot down and slain by rebel rifles, if the guns at Dundalk had been attacked before they could be covered by Infantry, if we saw that the eighty-five tons of ammunition at Carrickfergus had been assailed, it would 1587 be the duty, the absolute duty, of the Executive Government, to strike back with every man or gun they could command, and it would be the duty of the Military Departments to be fully prepared to execute any orders they might receive from the Government. As far as I am concerned, I wish to make it perfectly plain that if British troops were attacked and fired on, and loss of life occurs to them, I will take every measure that is in my power and that I have authority for, to secure that the persons making that attack will receive most condign chastisement at the time, and are afterwards proceeded against with the full rigour of the law.
But hon. Members opposite may say, and I think from their cheers they are inclined to say, these things could never have happened, that they did not happen, and that they never could have happened. Then, in that case, nothing would happen on our part either. In that case, none of these purely hypothetical contingencies which we are considering could have existed; none of the measures which we considered would be appropriate to such a state of affairs could be taken or would have been taken. What I am anxious to impress upon hon. Members is that the use of force rests with them, and does not rest with us. It rests with them. They are the masters of the situation in that respect. We shall not use force till force is first used against the representatives of law and order. We shall in no circumstances use more legal force than is necessary to maintain or restore order. Unless they take life first, their own lives will not in any sense of the word be in danger; but if they do, we are bound to use all the force at our disposal, and to take all necessary measures to secure the vindication of the law and repression of disorder. From that there is absolutely no escape. Whatever mistakes hon. Members opposite may make, do not let them imagine that they are dealing with a Government or individuals who will flinch from doing their duty in this respect. Let me make it quite clear, however, that though the movements we were making in Ulster were these limited movements—and none were approved, authorised, or ordered in any way, beyond them—the Government have absolute right, if they choose, at any time to make movements far in excess of these.
We have a perfect right, for instance, if we at any time think fit, to put 40,000 or 1588 50,000 men into Ulster, to begin the arrest of leaders, the seizure of arms, and the general prevention of drilling. We have always rejected the idea of such measures, and we do not consider, and have not at any time considered, that they would be wise or proper in the circumstances with which we have so far had to deal. But I am very anxious indeed that no word should come from me or any Member of the Government which would seem to admit for a moment that we limit at all our rights to dispose of His Majesty's forces within the King's Dominions in any way we may choose to maintain law and order. The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down treated us to an illuminating insight into his mental position on this subject when he accused us of having wished to seize strategic points. To what a pretty pass we are come when we are told that British troops may not march about the United Kingdom in any way they choose! I did not believe at the time, when these definite precautionary moves were authorised, that they would provoke an outbreak, nor did they, but we took every care so to carry them out that there would be the smallest possible chance of an interference or outbreak. Speed and secrecy were essential. Nothing was to begin before Friday night. Everything was to be complete on Saturday morning. Nothing began before Friday night, and everything was complete on Saturday morning. Naval officers in plain clothes, troops taken by sea to avoid going through Belfast, were only a part of the careful measures which we took to prevent it being possible to bring armed opposition to bear upon these small bodies or small movements while they were actually in process of completion. I think it was a good thing we did so; for what did the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the Walton Division of Liverpool (Mr. F. E. Smith) say when speaking upon this subject three weeks ago? I really must ask the House to give their attention to that. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London fully appreciated the position to which he is committed by the right hon. and learned Member. This is what he said:— If an attempt was made in force to seize the decisivt strategical positions in Ulster, I say, though I know is will be received with extreme dissatisfaction on the other side, that my right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson) would have justified everything that hits-been said on the other side of the House in disparagement of himself and of the Ulster Volunteers, if he had allowed that movement to be carried through."— 1589 Here is the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken who says, "If you wish to seize strategical points, why not do it openly? Who would ever complain of your doing it openly?" The other right hon. Gentleman who sits further Along the bench says, "If we had known that you were going to seize these strategic points openly, we should certainly have used force to prevent you occupying them." What more does the House or the country want, I should like to know, to justify the precautions we took than the statement made here in the name of the Conservative party by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the Walton Division of Liverpool (Mr. F. E. Smith), a clear statement that if he and his Friends, rightly or wrongly, interpreted the movements of His Majesty's troops in the United Kingdom as being of a nature to occupy strategic positions they would, without delay, have attacked those troops, and prevented their arriving at the stations to which they had been ordered. No, Sir, nothing more is needed to justify the extreme apprehensions of Sir Arthur Paget, and nothing more is needed to justify the care and pain with which we considered all the contingencies and possibilities that might arise from the limited and restricted precautionary movements we were making. All this talk of civil war has not come from us; it has come from you, from the party opposite. For the last two years we have been forced to listen to a drone of threats of civil war with the most blood-curdling accompaniments and consequences. What did they mean by civil war? Did they really think that if a civil war came it was to be a war in which only one side was to take action? Did they really believe it was all going to be dashing exploits and brilliant, dramatic, gun-running coups on the side of rebellion, and nothing but fiendish plots on the part of the Government?
These two right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Members who have come up here and honoured us by their presence to-day, do they really suppose that they will be able to be conducting a campaign against the Government and the Crown in the field on the one hand, and at the same time asking the Government, the Prime Minister, and the Minister for War all the awkward questions they can think of about their military operations on the other hand? A sense of humour ought, at least, to have saved them from that. I do not believe myself, even at the present time, 1590 that rebellion or civil war will come, but I wish to make it perfectly clear that if rebellion comes, we shall put it down, and if it comes to civil war, we shall do our best to conquer in the civil war. But there will be neither rebellion nor civil war unless it is of your making.
I have only a few more remarks to make, and then I will conclude, because I have already addressed the House at length on these points. References have been made repeatedly to my Bradford speech, and especially to the concluding words of that speech. I would like, if the House will permit me—and I am very sorry to have to read my own words again—in fairness to myself, to read the actual context in which those words are bound, because I believed it then, and I adhere to it most strongly now, that it is part of all I have said on this subject during the whole period it has been under discussion. I said:— If Ulster seeks peace and fair play she can find it. She knows where to find it. If Ulstermen extend the hand of friendship it will be clasped by Liberal and by their Nationalist countrymen in all good faith and in all good will; but if there is no wish for peace, if every concession that is made is spurned and exploited, if every effort to meet their views is only to be used as a means of breaking down Home Rule and of barring the way to the rest of Ireland: if Ulster is to become a tool in party calculations, if the civil and Parliamentary systems under which we have dwelt so long and our fathers before us are to be brought to the crude challenge of force, if the Government and the Parliament of this great country and greater Umpire are to be exposed to menace and brutality, if all the loose, wanton, and reckless chatter we have been forced to listen to these many months is in the end to disclose a sinister and revolutionary purpose, then I can only say to you: Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the proof. I say so still, but I will venture to ask the House once more at this moment in our differences and quarrels to consider whither it is we may find ourselves going, and I will ask them to consider whether we ought not try even at this period, and even so far as this Debate may be a vehicle of such matters, to make some final effort to reach a better solution? Apart from the dangers which this controversy and this Debate clearly shows exists at home, apart from those dangers, look at the consequences abroad.

§ Mr. HUNT
Who brought it about? [HON. MEMBERS: "You did!"]

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
Anxiety is caused in every friendly country by the belief that for the time being Great Britain cannot act. The high mission of this country is thought to be in abeyance, and the balance of Europe appears in many quarters for the time to be deranged. Of course, foreign countries never really understand 1591 us in these islands. They do not know what we know, that at a touch of external difficulties or menace all these fierce internal controversies would disappear for the time being, and we should be brought into line and into tune. But why is it that men are so constituted that they can only lay aside their own domestic quarrels under the impulse of what I will call a higher principle of hatred? Why cannot we find in our own virtues and our own wisdom, without the pressure of external danger, some higher principle of amity and some new basis of co-operation in regard to vital things? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) said in the course of a speech the other day—which was not very helpful, and less helpful to the cause of peace than my most vehement utterances—that the House was not agreed, but frightened. That is an inadequate view, because on both sides of the House some of those who are least frightened are most anxious to agree. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Sir E. Carson) is running great risks—and no one can deny it—in strife. Why will he not run some risk for peace? The key is in his hands now. Any day some event may happen which will condemn us all to a continuance of this struggle on the hateful lines on to which it has now got, and shatter perhaps irretrievably the greatness of our country. Let the right hon. and learned Gentleman consider whether he will not run some risk for peace.
To-day I believe most firmly, in spite of all the antagonism and partisanship of our politics and our conflicting party interests, that peace with honour is not beyond the reach of all. To-morrow it may be gone for ever. I am going to run some little risk on my own account by what I will now say. Why cannot the right hon. and learned Gentleman say boldly, "Give me the Amendments to this Home Rule Bill which I ask for, to safeguard the dignity and the interests of Protestant Ulster, and I in return will use all my influence and good will to make Ireland an integral unit in a federal system." If the right hon. Gentleman used language of that kind in the spirit of sincerity with which everybody will instantly credit him, it would go far to transform the political situation, and every man would be bound to reconsider his position in relation to these great controversies. If such language were 1592 used, I firmly believe that all that procession of hideous and hateful moves and counter-moves that we have been discussing and are now forced to discuss, and that hateful avenue down which we have looked too long, would give place to a clear and bright prospect, which would bring honour and not discredit to all concerned, and would save these islands from evils for which our children will certainly otherwise hold us accountable.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
I think under the circumstances it might be well that the House should recollect the nature of the Motion before the House. The First Lord of the Admiralty has made a somewhat lengthy, and I do not think, a very relevant speech. May I remind hon. Gentlemen opposite that the question which Mr. Speaker is going to put from the Chair, and on which we are going to be asked to vote, is not upon any of the questions which the right hon. Gentleman has dealt with in the course of his speech. It is on the simple question whether or not you are to have an inquiry into the nature of the movements contemplated by the Government, into the accuracy of their statements, and into their failure to deal frankly with the situation; and every hon. Member on that side of the House—you may turn and twist it as you like—who votes against that said Motion is voting for burking inquiry. There may be a good reason for that; but is it contended, as my right hon. Friend said a moment ago, that we now know the whole truth. He has enumerated many points upon which we have not only got little information, but absolutely no information. More than that, I have to make a charge, and I do make a charge, against the Home Secretary of wilfully misleading the House in regard to the supply of information, and I am going to justify it. It is not a charge I am in the habit of making. It is in regard to a reply to a question of a Member, not of this party, but in reply to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Stoke (Mr. John Ward) on 2nd April. Here is what the Home Secretary said:— Arising out of that answer, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that, after all, it is impossible to sup press full discussion on the subject "—

§ Mr. PRINGLE
What subject?

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
The whole matter— and had he not better publish the whole of these Papers? Mr. McKenna: I have explained to the House that that has been done. 1593 That is 2nd April. All the telegraphic messages have been published and there is nothing further to add. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Stoke was a little more sceptical about the Government assurances than some hon. Gentlemen opposite apparently are, and he went on— Arising out of the further reply of the right, hon. Gentleman, is it not a tact that a similar statement to what he has now made was made before, yet there were other telegrams which were not published? Mr. McKenna: No, Sir: my hon. Friend must not misunderstand the point. I think anyone who studies the telegrams—"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd April, 1914, col. 1361.] [HON. MEMBERS: "Where is the Government?"] I am sorry that the absence of the Members of the Government prevents me saying these things to their faces. I think it is sufficiently remarkable, after the Prime Minister has indignantly denied the reflection upon the honour of Ministers, that they should care so little about these reflections upon their honour that the First Lord of the Admiralty never made one single attempt from the beginning to the end of his speech to repudiate the charges, and now, as soon as the right hon. Gentleman has sat down, not one Minister is here to defend their honour. [At this point Mr. Churchill entered the House, followed by Mr. McKenna.] I am glad the Home Secretary has come in, and I think it only right that I should say that in his absence I have accused him of what appears to amount to a deliberate attempt to mislead the House in respect to the supply of information by his answer given on 2nd April to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Stoke, who asked him whether he would not supply full information and publish the whole of the Papers. The right hon. Gentleman's answer was, as I have explained, "that has been done." "All the telegraphic messages," not the relevant telegraphic messages—the right hon. Gentleman distinguishes them later—" have been published, and there is nothing further to add." And yet since then the whole of this White Paper has been added.

§ The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. McKenna)
If the hon. Gentleman will kindly look at the original question asked me he will see the explanation. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Bonar Law) asked me a question as to whether there were any further telegrams to be published with regard to the resignation of officers. I then read out five telegraphic messages—I think there were 1594 five—between the War Office and Colonel Hogg, and I was then asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke whether I would not publish all the messages, and I replied, "I have published all." I had that morning gone through all the documents with regard to the resignation of officers and had extracted every single telegram. I was not replying for the Admiralty or with regard to the orders given by the Admiralty to the ships, nor with regard to military orders, but simply to the question put to me by the Leader of the Opposition as to telegraphic messages relating to the resignation of officers.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
I can only read again the question of the hon. Member for Stoke:— Arising out of that answer, dues not the right hon. Gentleman think that, after all, it is impossible to suppress full discussion of this subject, and had he not better publish the whole of these Papers?

§ Mr. McKENNA
My hon. Friend said, "arising out of this answer," had the right hon. Gentleman better not publish all the communications with regard to the subject? What subject did he refer to except that of the resignation of officers? Besides, the hon. Member must remember that I was answering then for the War Office, and it would have been impossible for me, in replying to the question of the right hon. Gentleman, to have answered with regard to telegrams sent by the Admiralty.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
I am not going to argue the matter with the right hon. Gentleman. I have made my charge against him. I have given the evidence on which I stated that charge. I have read it out to the House, and the House must judge between the right hon. Gentleman and myself.

§ Mr. LEIF JONES
On a point of Order. The hon. Member charged the Home Secretary with a deliberate attempt to mislead the House.

Mr. STANLEY WILSON
He has proved it up to the hilt.

§ Mr. LEIF JONES
I ask, first, whether that charge in itself is not a disorderly charge; and, secondly, whether, having listened to the answer of the Home Secretary, which amply proves that he has not endeavoured to mislead the House, the hon. Member ought not to withdraw his statement?

§ Mr. SPEAKER
It is a matter of opinion whether the "answer" is an answer or 1595 not. The hon. Gentleman has cited what appears in the OFFICIAL REPORT, Some hon. Members may come to one conclusion in regard to it, and other hon. Members may come to another conclusion. There is nothing improper in the charge which the hon. Member has made.

§ Mr. McKENNA
May I ask on the point of Order whether it is proper, at any rate, to make a charge of wilful misrepresentation based upon a supplementary question without giving the original question to which that question was supplementary?

§ Mr. SPEAKER
I thought the hon. Member had given the original question.

§ Mr. McKENNA
No, Sir, he had not. [HON. MEMBERS: "You were not here."] He did not in my hearing. He did not read the original question put to me by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition upon which the supplementary question was founded, and to which my answer necessarily related.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
It all depends upon the meaning of the words "the whole matter." The Home Secretary says, quite naturally, that he understood that they referred to the resignation of officers, and the hon. Gentleman opposite has put the interpretation upon the words "the whole matter" the whole of the incident which led up to and included the resignation of the officers.

§ Mr. McKENNA
The supplementary question was founded upon the opening words, "arising out of this answer," and I would submit that it is not proper for an hon. Gentleman, when the case is so perfectly plain, to make a charge of wilful misrepresentation.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
The words "arising out of that answer" have now become the common form, under the cloak of which hon. Gentlemen sometimes ask totally irrelevant questions. It is quite possible that what the right hon. Gentleman has said is perfectly correct, but I do not think that he must attach too much importance to that formula, which has now come to be the regular one with which hon. Gentlemen preface supplementary questions.

§ Mr. POLLOCK
May I submit that my hon. Friend is perfectly right in urging the point he does as the ground on which this Motion is founded, and in support of the necessity for a judicial inquiry to decide 1596 between one side of the House and the other?

§ Mr. SPEAKER
This Motion deals specially with the incompleteness and inaccuracy of material points and statements made by Ministers.

§ Mr. PRINGLE
Not wilful.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
That is part of the inference, whether good or not. I do not profess for one moment to express any opinion. That, I understand, is part of the evidence which the hon. Gentleman brings forward. It may be totally fallacious and wrong, but surely he is entitled to bring it forward.

§ Mr. LEIF JONES
Do I understand you to rule that it is in order to charge a Member of this House with wilfully misleading the House? The point I raise is on the word "wilful." I have always understood hitherto that it was out of order to charge a Member with deliberately misleading the House.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
The objection the hon. Gentleman takes could be made against the whole of this Motion. If there is any substance in the words "continued failure to deal frankly," they must mean misleading the House. I cannot imagine any other meaning which could be attached to them.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
I can only say that is the meaning which I attach to the words of this Motion, and I was endeavouring to justify some of the words in the Motion. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman does not agree with me. He does not take the same reading that I should have thought was the obvious reading of the right hon. Gentleman's answer. The hon. Member for Stoke did, in point of fact, take the same reading of them as I do, and it is therefore obvious that the right hon. Gentleman's answer was at least open to misunderstanding. I submit that whatever hon. Gentlemen may think about the rights or wrongs of the matter, no one can pretend that we have got all the information with regard to the whole truth of the subject, and I do not believe anyone will pretend that this House is in a position to give a fair and final verdict on the matter without having that information before it. The Prime Minister talks very grandiloquently about the grand inquest of the nation, but it has not before it at the present time the means of arriving at a verdict. This is the second ground 1597 of argument for our Motion. It cannot get the means from the Government. The truth only comes dribbling out. The process of getting information from Ministers is not only extremely difficult, but it is practically impossible. It can only be extracted from them by a process which I can but describe as resembling that by which the reluctant winkle is compelled to leave its shell on the point of a pin. I want to say this quite frankly, that even if we had the whole of the information, even if we had all the facts, under existing political conditions I would not trust this "great inquest of the nation" or those grand inquisitors opposite to return a fair verdict. In saying that, I hope hon. Gentlemen opposite will understand that I would not presume, and, indeed, do not attempt to impugn, their judicial integrity in private affairs. But I do say this, that under existing political conditions, with the Government strength in the balance, and with the Goverment Whips at the door, I would not trust this present House of Commons to return a fair verdict on any evidence on which the fate of the Government depended. The right hon. Gentleman has taken a line of argument which is also followed by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and which is followed, too, by his Press. He talked a good deal about the virulence of the Tory Press, but I do not think he would have to go far from home to find a comparison. It is an argument which says that, whatever the Government did, it "serves you right." The only thing the Government are to blame for, according to this argument, is that they did not take similar action long ago.
Let me observe, in the first place, that is not the charge which we are making against the Government. If you are going to adopt the defence which the right hon. Gentleman seemed to adopt, that, after all, the Government were only taking strategic measures such as they really ought to have taken long before, you cannot absolve the Government from the charge of having wilfully misled the House of Commons because the Government did not say, through the mouth of the Prime Minister, on 23rd of March, "We have a right to take strategic measures to protect ourselves against possible movements in Ulster." What they did say was, "We are moving four companies in order to execute purely protective operations at Armagh, Omagh, Enniskillen, and Carrickferpus, and that is the whole thing." It is all very well for them to take the 1598 other ground now. If they do, they convict themselves; and if hon. Gentlemen on those benches take that ground, they convict the Government of having misled the House when they said that the operations which they had undertaken were purely protective operations. I have this further to say with regard to that "serve you right" argument: If the movement in Ulster had been legal, the "serve you right" argument is out of court. But if, on the other hand, it was illegal, I challenge contradiction when I assert that the proper line for the Government to take was not through the Army or through the Fleet, but through due process of law. But this "serve you right" argument says that the Courts are not to count, that the Government are to be the sole judges of what is right or wrong, and that the Army and the Navy are only to exist as ministers of their decrees. This new style of argument is, I think, a good illustration of the pass to which hon. Gentlemen opposite are being brought in their attempts to prevent the disclosure of the truth.
Let me say a word or two with regard to some of the details I had hoped the right hon. Gentleman would deal with, but which he never touched upon. The Government described all these operations as purely protective, but I find it very difficult to reconcile that with the speech we have just listened to, with all its talk about considerations as to armed attacks on military depots, and about whether the Provisional Government was to be established bloodlessly. I find it very difficult to reconcile that with the mild' description which the Prime Minister gave of these movements on the 23rd March, and I shall be interested to see what the right hon. Gentleman's description of them will be when he comes to speak later on. I know hon. Gentlemen opposite do not profess to have much interest in these details, but I do want the House to consider one or two facts. What happened? Sir Arthur Paget got his instructions in the War Office letter of the 14th. He got them presumably either on Sunday night or on Monday morning, and on the Monday morning he also received an urgent wire from the War Office asking what he was doing. His instructions were to protect the four places I have named. What was his answer? It was:— Have issued general instructions, and taken all available steps. And then he goes on, in a later dispatch, to describe the steps he has taken. He 1599 adds that "in the present state of the country" he is of opinion "that any such move of troops would create intense excitement in Ulster, and possibly precipitate a crisis." What it all amounts to is this: On the 17th, General Paget, as a soldier, was satisfied that the precautions which the War Office required from him either had been taken or were in course of being taken. That was his view as a soldier. As a practical man, as a man who knew Ireland, and who had been in Ireland—and none of the Members of the Government except the Chief Secretary have been there—as a practical man he told the Government that, in his opinion, any attempt to move troops at the present moment might possibly precipitate a crisis. In that state of mind General Paget comes over to London, and again I want hon. Members opposite to try and remember facts. First, learning as a soldier that the precautions he was asked to take had been taken or were being taken, and, secondly, knowing as a practical man that anything more might precipitate a crisis, he comes over to London, and then this unfortunate veil of secrecy is drawn over the proceedings. May I say further I think it is very unfortunate that the right hon. Gentleman and the Government are still refusing to disclose the instructions which Sir Arthur Paget did receive from the War Office? They were promised as explicitly as words could state by the Prime Minister on the 24th March. They will be found on page 205, in which it is set forth that the Memorandum on which these instructions were based should be printed. It was promised it should be in the first White Paper. It is not even in the second White Paper. We have not got this necessary information to act on, but the result was tolerably clear, for it comes out in the extraordinary telegram number 7, the first of the series sent to Sir Arthur Paget from the War Office. He went over there, having told the Government that any movement of troops would probably precipitate a crisis. Yet he makes these arrangements:— Bedfords to move to places which have been decided Battalion of 14th Brigade to go to Newry and Dundalk Battalion, Victoria Barracks, Belfast, to go to Holy-wood with all ammunition and bolts of rifles if unable to move rifles themselves. These movements to be simultaneous if possible and to be complete by dawn, Saturday, 21st, with all secrecy. The right hon. Gentleman has not explained why Dundalk, with 18 guns and 540 men of the Royal Artillery, could be 1600 considered to be menaced by a few evilly-disposed persons. He has not yet explained why Newry was to be occupied, although there never were any stores there, and there are not likely to be any. He has not explained some of the remarkable orders which were issued in Belfast. May I call the attention of hon. Gentlemen opposite to Number 10 on the White Paper? Your telegram received. Depot. Victoria Barracks, is not to move, but it is at discretion of Officer Commanding district to send recruits to their battalions if internal dissension is feared. A guard of not more than fifty men, under selected officers, must remain to hold the barracks. I ask why should internal dissensions be feared if the movements were purely precautionary? Is it suggested that the Government were of opinion that the Army was likely to refuse to protect these places? Is it suggested that internal dissension was likely to break out in Belfast, and that the movements were purely precautionary? It is absolutely incredible these sort of telegrams should be exchanged if that was the sole basis of the Government's action. But, with these instructions, whatever they were, Sir Arthur Paget goes back to Dublin and confers with the six Generals and Colonel Hill. He tells them about the Disappearance Clause, which my light hon. Friend has already referred to, and on which the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord never attempted even to begin an answer. Sir Arthur Paget also refers, as he states himself quite plainly, to the clause about the dismissal of officers. We are told that the statement regarding the Disappearance Clause was made on the instructions of the War Office.
I should like to know from the right hon. Gentleman, or from the Secretary for War, whether General Paget's alternative with regard to dismissal was also put forward on instructions from the War Office. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman is in a position to say or not, but I understand it has been twice denied, once by the Foreign Secretary, on the 31st, and yesterday by the Prime Minister, that any such instructions were issued. How is it then that General Paget, an officer of such experience, came to make this statement? How came he to tell the officers that they would be dismissed under certain circumstances? Is it the Government's case that the whole of this is an invention on the part of General Paget. That is apparently what was stated by the Prime Minister and the 1601 Foreign Secretary. The Government were very concerned to deny that General Paget had ever said anything about active operations. He now admits quite frankly that he did mention contingent active operations, and he says there was a misunderstanding with four of the Generals. It is extremely chivalrous on the part of General Paget to take the blame of that misunderstanding on his own shoulders. There is a further question about that. These misunderstandings, he says, arose at his first conference with the Generals, at 10 a.m., on the 20th March. Why was no step taken by General Paget to remove this misunderstanding? He knew of its existence, because he knew that General Gough had elected to accept one of the alternatives he thought he was offered. Ho made no attempt to remove that misapprehension. There was a second conference with the Generals at two o'clock, but he made no attempt to remove the misapprehension, and the Prime Minister says that the reason why he made no attempt to do so was because he thought the matter had been taken out of his hands by the fact of these officers having been summoned to the War Office. If that is the only explanation the Government can give, it is manifestly untrue, and I will tell you why. It is quite true that the telegrams in this Paper bear no record of the time at which they were sent and received; but the times have already been given. [An HON. MEMBER: "By whom?"] By the Government. They were given in the first White Paper. We know that the first information which the Government ever had about the resignation of the officers was received at 7.35 p.m., and the first telegram which went back ordering these officers to report themselves to London was only dispatched at midnight on the 20th. [HON. MEMBERS: "How do you know?"]

§ Mr. SPEAKER
I must ask hon. Members not to keep up a running commentary on the hon. Member's speech. As they will have an opportunity of answering it in Debate, it is not fair to the hon. Member who is speaking that they should keep up a running commentary and indulge in loud conversation.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
I am trying to put the facts as fairly and as frankly as I can before the House. My case is that the Prime Minister's explanation that General Paget never attempted to clear up this misapprehension on the 20th, 1602 because the officers had been summoned to London, will not do, because, in point of fact, the officers were not summoned by telegram to London until midnight on the 20th. It is very obvious that some other explanation will have to be found by the Government on that particular point. I go on to ask why is it, if this explanation about the misapprehension which General Paget has so chivalrously given is true, that he made no attempt on the 21st to clear up the misapprehension? He was not talking to the officers who were summoned to London then, but to the whole of the Cavalry Brigade. He did not just go to see them and go away again, but made a speech to them for an hour. He knew that practically the whole Brigade were almost unanimously electing to take dismissal, and he was afraid that the men were going to refuse to move. If all this was due to the misunderstanding, is it credible that General Paget would have talked to these men for an hour about the weather or anything else and not made any attempt to remove that misunderstanding? It is perfectly and completely incredible. As a matter of fact, so far from removing the misunderstanding, he actually deepened it. There is apparently corroborative evidence of that. I am not very sure that the right hon. Gentleman was entirely correct in the dates which he gave. The First Lord of the Admiralty said that on Sunday morning he got a personal telegram from Colonel Hogg, of the 4th Hussars, who had been at the meeting and heard General Paget.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
I made a mistake. It was Saturday morning.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
That explains the discrepancy, on which I will not dwell further. I withdraw anything I was going to build up on what Colonel Hogg said in that telegram, although the right hon. Gentleman has not taken the steps which are ordinarily taken in Government circles to correct the OFFICIAL RETORT.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
I think I have. I have corrected it both in the OFFICIAL REPORT and in the "Times."

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
It is now clear that the right hon. Gentleman received the telegram on Saturday. Even at the end of General Paget's speech that misapprehension still prevailed among the officers, and continued to prevail when the officers came over to London, and it was 1603 only removed from their minds by these two very peccant paragraphs. I will not comment on some of the other misunderstandings, but the misunderstanding as to the howitzers at Kildare is another remarkable thing. A whole Howitzer Brigade was warned to be ready to move instantly. We are told that this was due to a misapprehension. I think a great many people in this country will think it is a very cowardly part to play to attempt to put the blame for your actions on subordinates. I should like to say a word about the First Lord of the Admiralty's own particular concerns. The right hon. Gentleman, I admit quite frankly, has always been perfectly consistent in the defence he has given as to the movements of the Fleet. He has always said that the Fleet were ordered to Lamlash following general instructions given by the Government on the 11th March, and the particular instructions given by him on the 19th. Why they were given by land wire I have never been able to understand, and it seems rather a curious way of sending instructions.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
(who was indistinctly heard): The wireless code was known to the whole Fleet, and we wished to send our instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, the Vice-Admiral, by telegram privately.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
The question is whether the movement of the Fleet from Arosa to Lamlash was only an ordinary movement. The right hon. Gentleman said the Fleet happened to be coming to Lamlash. His defence of the movements of the Fleet has always been consistent. He has always said it was sent to Lamlash to be handy in case of trouble. The Prime Minister said that its presence at Lamlash had nothing to do with precautionary moves, whereas the right hon. Gentleman said that its visit to Lamlash would be delayed. Why? Because the precautionary movements had been carried cut satisfactorily. Just one word about these extraordinary field guns and the extraordinary precedent, by which the action of the Admiralty is buttressed up. Perhaps I had better leave that subject to these more able to deal with such matters than myself. I will only say that I know Lamlash—I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman does or not—

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
Yes. I do, perfectly well.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
I should say a goat battery would be much more appropriate. I should like to know whether there has ever been a case before of any Fleet putting in at Lamlash and attempting to exercise on shore with field guns. I should like to know whether a Battle Squadron has now gone to Lamlash, whether they have got field guns on board, and whether they are going to exercise with them on shore. There is the further question of the destroyer flotilla. The account given by the Government on the 23rd April was that the Prime Minister knew all about the movements of the destroyer flotilla on the 11th March.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
indicated dissent.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
I think the right hon. Gentleman will find that is so. It was stated in answer to a question by the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Worthington Evans).

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
If I said that, I did the right hon. Gentleman an injustice. I said that the Cabinet gave authority for the employment of certain ships, but left the Admiralty to fix the details and the units. As a matter of fact, instead of sending eight battleships I only sent five. I did send the destroyers, because they were; suitable vessels.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
The right hon. Gentleman is hastening to defend the Prime Minister. It is the Prime Minister's statement, and not that of the right hon. Gentleman, to which I am referring. It appears in the OFFICIAL REPORT of the 23rd April, column 1108. It is to the effect I stated that the Prime Minister on the 11th March was aware of all these naval movements. He was asked:— Whether the Prime Minister was aware on the 23rd March that orders had been given by the First Lord of the Admiralty, on the 19'th and 20th March., sending seven vessels of the Third Battle Squadron and eight destroyers of the Fourth Flotilla and the collier 'Salvus' to Lamlash? The Prime Minister replied:— My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty had full authority from the Cabinet and me to make such a movement. whereas on the 24th March he told my hon. Friend:— I know nothing whatever about eight destroyers. The right hon. Gentleman will no doubt be speaking in the course of this Debate, and I hope he will attempt to deal with that. The First Lord of the Admiralty has accused us, in the only relevant portion of his speech, of having attempted to provoke trouble. That is a charge which, 1605 if it is made against anyone, ought more properly to be made against himself and the Members of the Government. At the very moment when they were making pacific speeches, when the Chief Secretary in this House on the Thursday night was speaking about "winning Ulster," the right hon. Gentleman was sending orders in the early hours of the next morning to the battleships to go to Lamlash. That is the way he was going to win Ulster. The excuse of the right hon. Gentleman now is that he was quite entitled to do that, because the Government had given him a blank cheque on the 11th March. It is a very rash thing on the part of even this Government to give a blank cheque to the right hon. Gentleman. I do not know how he feels about the issue of this business. I do not know whether he feels quite happy. My judgment on the right hon. Gentleman's proceedings would be that he was looking to gain something of the reputation of a Napoleon or of a Moltke, and that he would be very lucky if he escaped the notoriety of a Cumberland. The right hon. Gentleman perhaps does not know the history of Cumberland.

§ Mr. CHURCHILL
I do.

§ Mr. MITCHELL-THOMSON
I would advise him to read up his Scottish history, or to ask one of the hon. Gentlemen behind him. I have attempted, whatever the right hon. Gentleman did, to deal with the actual points in the case which we make, and I hope that before this Debate closes someone from the Government Bench will do us the courtesy of trying to reply to one or two of the cases we have urged. Our case is that we do not know the truth, that the country does not know the truth, that it ought to know the truth, and that the only way it can get at the truth, in the present state of opinion in this House and having regard to the way in which information is doled out from the Treasury Bench, is by a judicial inquiry on oath, and every hon. Member who votes against this Motion is voting in favour of burking the truth.

§ Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD
I rise under a considerable amount of difficulty. I have listened in silence to speeches which have been delivered from the other side of the House, and I have been doing my best since this Motion has been on the Paper to understand what it means, and even in the light of the speeches I am bound to confess that I do not understand 1606 what it means now. The hon. Member (Mr. Mitchell-Thomson) ended his peroration by warning us in a very perfervid way that if we voted against the Resolution we were voting against some sworn judicial inquiry. That is not the case. There is no such thing as a request for a sworn judicial inquiry in the Resolution, and that has been omitted for a very good reason indeed. My difficulty is this: Does anyone mean to say that, first of all, the Government agreed, and then that this House consented, to give two days of precious time to discuss the points raised by hon. Members opposite? Has anyone ever had any experience of five or six men sitting together discussing a complicated situation, with perhaps a little heat and with nerves perhaps a little tingling, and then asking each of the men individually and separately to give an account of what happened at the cessation of the discussion? Of course, everyone who pursues the method of Jack Horner and sits down in his corner and pulls out a little inconsistency here and a little inconsistency there can make those speeches, and if his partisan passions are so violent as to justify him in making accusations based upon those inconsistencies of a wilful attempt to mislead, or, to use the language of the Leader of the Opposition, using the expression "misrepresentation" or "lie," they can do it. But a debate upon those points, and language like that, is neither consistent with the dignity nor the honour of this House. I do not know, consequently, how far the Resolution is going to allow me to go.
I would be much more inclined to agree to an inquiry if the inquiry was complete. Why do hon. Members opposite confine this inquiry to what General Paget said and what he did not say? Or why Colonel Hogg sent a telegram on Sunday morning or on Saturday morning? If hon. Members put down a Resolution, and I think perhaps inadvertently they did, although, according to the speeches, they do not mean it, asking this House to appoint an inquiry into the whole circumstances of the military position in Ulster to-day, I should be rather inclined to support them in their request because that would have involved three things. It would have involved, perhaps, the action of the Government. I should like to understand what the Government had in mind when they consented to the movement of the troops. Hon. Members opposite apparently complain that the Government 1607 in moving troops did something which was too small. I should like them to make that statement in front of a sworn inquiry. Is their accusation against the Government that the Government really were taking precautions to maintain law and order in Ireland, but for purposes of expediency said they were only protecting stores? Is that the amount of the untruth that the Government is guilty of? If it is, if any untruth is justified, that untruth is. Hon. Members have stated to-day that if the Government had come here and said definitely that the movement of troops was for the purpose of maintaining law and order, and meeting the devices of the poor deluded creatures whom they themselves have supported in their speeches in the House and outside the House, they would have supported the Government in what they did. But their accusation today, if it amounts to anything at all, if there is any intelligence in it at all, is that the Government did its duty, yet, for the purpose of diplomatically handling a difficult situation, told us it was only to protect stores, and we are going to take two days to discuss that point, going into all the inconsistencies and all the mistakes, mainly pettifogging mistakes, which have been made during the last week, in explaining that situation to the House.
I listened to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Chamberlain's) speech, and as I listened I was bound to confess that I regret that the chief author of this Debate did not open it himself. It is not our business to interfere with the arrangements of the Opposition, and I do not propose to make any reflections upon it. But when an hon. Member makes accusations, and as a result of those accusations, persuades this House to give two days to a Debate, that hon. Member ought to have opened it, and not waited until the end of the Debate, when the only answer that could be given to him will be an answer on the spur of the moment, I understand by the Prime Minister, according to the arrangement which has been made. But in the very interesting speech which the right hon. Gentleman made, with most apparent lack of heart, he just forgot one thing. It was rather an important thing, but he forgot it. He assumed that these military movements were simply the movements of four battalions of troops in Ireland. Why did he not fill in the background? His assumption was that there is no trouble in Ulster, there are no threats, no preparations, no arming, and 1608 for the purpose of keeping up the delusion which was in his mind all the time, he refused to come more up to date than last Saturday afternoon. He knows perfectly well that the picture which he painted was an absolutely inadequate and an incomplete picture. He knows perfectly well that in order to have explained the movement of these four battalions he had to tell us what his own party had done. He had to tell us that for two years they had been working up the present state in Ulster. He ought to have told us, and he would have told us, with the candour which characterises him, that when this volunteer movement was still in its infancy, his own Leader nurtured it and encouraged it by his wild and wicked words.
He then would have told us that the members of his own party have actually subscribed money in order to make funds possible for the conduct of this disloyal and anarchist movement that the Government have had to meet by moving these troops. He would have had to tell us, and he would have done it, by demonstrating to us that hon. Members sitting behind him are actually wearing in this House a disloyal badge, and have signed a Covenant, and finally he would have had to tell us that nine-tenths of the fears and suspicions that animate these honest men in Ulster to-day have been aroused by the leading articles and the cooked news that appear in his own partisan newspaper. That is the background to the moving of the four battalions. If the inquiry that is proposed, whether it is sworn or otherwise, was in that sense, I should have been rather inclined to consider the advisability of voting in favour of it. This situation, which he did not describe, reminds me of a condemnation which was made of a certain section of public opinion, and a certain form of public action in this country by a right hon. Gentleman who is still a Member of this House. He said, with reference to that section, that they were self-styled loyalists who, with fulsome professions of their devotion to the Crown, insult and defy the representatives of the Crown in Ireland, who break the law themselves, whilst they pretend to defend it. That is how the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Joseph Chamberlain) characterised Ulster loyalists some years ago, and that characterisation is absolutely and accurately proved in every detail of the position at the present time.
Another point I should like this inquiry to deal with, if this House is going to 1609 decide in favour of an inquiry, is what part Army officers played in the movement of troops in Ireland. Why did all these telegrams come and go? Why did Sir Arthur Paget ask the officers to meet them? Why was it necessary to take General Gough to London? As a matter of fact, why was there a trouble at all with the officers? Why was there a single memorandum, a single letter or a single telegram published in this White Paper which is the basis of these charges? I want to have that inquired into. I should like to know why it is that certain hon. Members apparently had earlier information about what was going on from these officers. During the last two or three days I have had various letters from officers, and I should like to read an extract from one of them which would be very interesting raw material for cross-examination before this inquiry that is proposed. He says:— Perhaps the following may be of interest to yon. All the officers of the various garrisons are in complete daily touch with one another by wire and letter. The information given oat is surprisingly accurate and early. Thus a major gave out at the Dover Club, which is supposed to be non-political, on Friday afternoon last details of the Curragh Cavalry Brigade negotiations, five hours before their receipt at the War Office as detailed in the White Taper. The percentages of officers who will decline to serve at Portsmouth was given out to-day. At the Dover Club every afternoon serving officers and those on the retired list congregate and vie with one another in loudly criticising those in command who are supposed to be willing to carry out the orders of the Army Council and the Executive Government. Never before have I heard officers in public so vilify those in authority and applaud those who they think will not comply with orders. The clear instructions contained in the King's Regulations forbidding public criticism of those in authority being disregarded, a definite policy of open discussion is adopted.

An HON. MEMBER
Who is that from?

§ Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD
It is not an anonymous letter. The officer's name is appended to it. He is an officer. I have taken the precaution to look up the Army List, and it is perfectly all right, and it is only one of several letters of the same kind that I have received from officers in other parts of the country. The fact of the matter is that the situation there is perfectly clear that these officers were so worked upon by the speeches made by the Leader of the Opposition, and by various Members of the House of Lords, that they at last began to doubt whether it was their duty to be loyal to the King or loyal to the political party to which they belong. It is a purely partisan movement. It is purely an expression of the political opinion of those officers that has given rise to all the present trouble and which apparently hon. Members—at any rate, 1610 judging by the way they have drafted the Resolution—are very anxious should not be the subject of inquiry, but if there is to be an inquiry, this must be inquired into too. A private soldier writing to me the other day stated that a number of privates having met detailed one to write to me about their officers, and he used this expression:— We have always suspected that, the Army was the tool of the 'Upper Ten.' What has happened' with our officers in respect to Ulster now convinces us that we are perfectly right. Hon. Members are also making a very great mistake if they imagine that the matters brought up here to-day are regarded with any interest by the public outside. The country has got this sense; it brushes aside pettifogging things of this sort, and takes the big fundamental issues, and the issue we have got to face now is: Are the Opposition, or are they not, going to challenge the right of the Government to move troops as the Government desires to move them in the face of the present situation in Ulster? That is one of the questions in which the public is interested. The public is also interested in this—and it is the one thing they want to have an inquiry upon—if this House is going to inquire into anything at all, there ought to be an inquiry into the conduct of the officers on these two issues, and these two issues alone. The country is not going to be governed by the officers of a mess, and the inquiry which is now asked is to cover up the mischief hon. Members have done themselves by their speeches, and the mischief they have done themselves by the signing of the Covenants—both Irish and English. It is to cover up the mischief they have done by opening the columns of their newspapers to funds for the purpose of maintaining this anarchy, disorder, and disloyalty, and for the purpose of trying to mislead the public—to cover up their own crimes in subscribing from their own pockets to these funds—that this Resolution has been brought forward this afternoon. We will make them a fair offer. [An HON. MEMBER: "Who are we?"] So far as we are concerned, we have never cut the abject figure of subservience to a great party that they have done.

§ Earl WINTERTON
Do you mean the alliance?

§ Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD
The Noble Lord is leading a disruptive revolution of the mob. What right has the Noble Lord to talk about an "alliance"? 1611 [Interruption.] What right has the hon. Member who interrupts me to talk about certain sections supporting other sections, in view of the extraordinary part taken by the Tory party in allowing itself to be ruled and controlled by a handful of people who are fomenting disorder and lawless ness at the present time? If you are going to have an inquiry, let it be a full inquiry. Let it be an inquiry into all the circum stances of the case. Let us bring up the conduct of hon. Members themselves. Let us compel them to tell us where they got their information. If there is going to be the production of documents, let the production be from both sides. If that is their proposal, and if that is what they want—

§ Earl WINTERTON
Will you agree to have an inquiry?

§ Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD
We have not made up our minds yet, and I have yet to learn that the Noble Lord is the Leader of his party.

§ Earl WINTERTON
I am more the Leader of it than you are of yours.

§ Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD
If that is what they want, then we will consider it; but this piecemeal and partial attempt to get an inquiry, which will not be an inquiry at all, unless for the purpose of covering up the crimes of hon. Members opposite, will certainly not receive our support.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I do not know why it is that some hon. Members opposite have such a violent animosity against officers of the Army.

§ Earl WINTERTON
made a remark which was inaudible in the Reporters' Gallery.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
It is not necessary that the Noble Lord the Member for Horsham should assist the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth by interrupting and making observations. It would be much better to allow the Noble Lord to make his own speech.

§ Earl WINTERTON
I only did so because of the attacks made from the other side.

§ Mr. SPEAKER
The Noble Lord is quite capable of answering for himself.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I should have thought that even in the interest of fair 1612 play, the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald) would have been a little less violent in his criticisms of Army officers, but he does not appear to me really to understand the case. He is perfectly right in saying that officers should not pick and choose. Who started the picking and choosing? For the first time in the history of any country in the world the Government instructed the General Officer commanding to ask the officers if they would obey certain orders.

§ Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD
Does the Noble Lord mean to say that before these questions were put there were no statements made publicly and privately by a large number of officers that they would not serve and obey the King's Regulations in Ulster?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I see many remarks of that sort in the Press. I have seen many remarks in the Press which have not been correct. May I say that that was a fatal proceeding. Officers and men have got to obey their orders no matter what they are, and, as I said the other day in answering the hon. Gentleman, there are times which might happen when hon. Members would have violent feelings, and when they would consider that in conscience and in honour they would not obey an order. It has happened in every country in the world, and it might be that the hon. Gentleman opposite in the course of his life would be in that position. But the officers were perfectly prepared to take their punishment. The punishment is very severe, but they were prepared to be tried by court martial. When Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts said that the utilising of the forces of the Crown against Ulster would break up the Army, they did not explain what they meant. I will endeavour to show more clearly what would happen if these forces were used against Ulster. What the Government did was to ask whether the officers would or would not obey definite and distinct orders, and it was stated that there would be a certain number of officers and men who would refuse to obey these orders and take the punishment. But there are a large number of others, equally conscientious and equaly honourable, who would regard the carrying out of an order as sacred, even the shooting down of their own relations. There is the position, and that is how you break up an Army. That is how civil war always occurs; and when the hon. Gentleman 1613 said that a two days' Debate on this subject was a waste of time, I say it is surely not a waste of time. I speak as an Ulster-man, and I feel that my countrymen are most bitter about this matter. I believe there was a plot. I may be wrong. I feel very bitter about it, and I say it is possible that there may be civil war. I feel bitter with the Government. My countrymen were getting on very well. The Government themselves say that for six hundred years Ireland had never been so peaceful, and that never was there so little crime and such progress. Who have put Irishmen at each others throats again and brought about a situation in which they may fight? The Government. The Government have brought up the Home Rule question that was gradually dying out.

§ Mr. PATRICK O'BRIEN
It will never die out.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I say it is dying out in the South and West of Ireland, because the foundation of it was the former position of the tenant farmers. The tenant farmers were occupiers, but now they are owners, and they do not want Home Rule. They know that they would be taxed. The hon. Member opposite said that the officers refused to obey orders I say they were given an alternative. They did not refuse to obey orders. Both Lord Morley and one of the Ministers of the Front Bench said there was no order disobeyed at all. That was the beginning of the whole of this terrible mess. The other point which caused what has occurred was the fact that the right hon. Gentleman the ex-Secretary of State for War and the first Lord of the Admiralty have usurped the position of the Executive, instead of carrying out their business as administrators. Before this Government came into office these duties were perfectly defined. There was the Cabinet, which was responsible for policy. That was turned over to the Administrative to administer, and they turned it over to the Executive to give orders. An order was given by the distinguished officers in the Army Council and in the Admiralty, but now it has been all done by the Secretary of State for War—that has come out in the White Papers—and the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is always taking charge of everything, whenever he sees an opportunity, on every single occasion. In referring to the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, 1614 may I say that I wish that all his speech had been on the same lines as the last part, which was conciliatory and statesmanlike, and which made to Ulster an offer, whether that offer is good or bad. I would ask the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down why should he be always bitter about Ulster? What have any of you done on that bench; what has the Government done to win over Ulster? What have my countrymen below the Gangway done to win over Ulster? Hon. Members opposite have given nothing but threats, and hon. Members below the Gangway have given nothing but insults, and we are a proud people, and we intend to fight for our liberties. If you choose to shoot us down for it that is your business. The First Lord of the Admiralty is perfectly right in saying that the Government can move their troops and move their ships, and take any action they like. We do not deny that. What we find fault with is that it was done as a plot to irritate and provoke Ulster. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Then why were the police to begin first, when you know that the Belfast people do not like the police? The police are very unpopular in Belfast, but if the police had begun searching for arms and seized the headquarters, there would have been firing. And it was stated that it was the police who were to begin and to provoke the Ulstermen into firing.

§ Sir RYLAND ADKINS
Who stated that?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
It was stated by Sir Arthur Paget to his officers.

§ Sir R. ADKINS
How do you know?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
It was stated by Sir Arthur Paget to his officers, and it has never been denied on the Front Bench. It may be denied by the hon. Gentleman opposite. But the police were to begin it, and I am not quite sure that the police did not object to begin. The police said that they were for police duties, and were not to be put there to be shot down first in order to provoke the Ulster people. [Laughter.] I am always astonished when hon. Members laugh at these things. Surely we regard the question as serious. We do not want civil war. You do not want civil war. The question is as serious as ever it can be, and in these discussions naturally those of us who belong to Ulster get warm over it. But still, we do not laugh over it. It is very serious, and anything that we can do to elucidate the matter should be done. The hon. Gentleman who 1615 made the last speech said that he would certainly vote for an inquiry that would include the whole circumstances of the case. I think that that is a very fair offer, and I would be very glad to vote for the same kind of inquiry. Let us have the whole thing out in public. As for our arming against what we consider an attack on our civil and religious liberties, let us have the whole thing out in public, and, if so, there are many people who now find fault with us who would think that we were right to arm. I do not say that we have not broken the law. We have broken the law in this late raid. We did not break the law before, but we did break it in the late raid. Why did we break the law? Because we were certain from our point of view that there was a plot to surround us with the most enormous number of military men and to cow us into submission to the Home Rule Bill. The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that bad law will provoke rebellion. It is the same as bad discipline, which will provoke mutiny. Both are equally wrong, but the people who bring it about are the people who should be responsible and not the people who commit it. The Frst Lord of the Admiralty spoke about the impudence of this Motion, and hon. Gentlemen cheered him. The First Lord of the Admiralty is the best judge of impudence in this House. There is no individual who can be more impudent than a man who has sat on both sides and has been equally odious to his opponents on whichever side he sits, and who is now as odious to the Navy as he has been to each side in turn.

§ Mr. FIENNES
No!

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
The hon. Gentleman must know more about the Navy than I do, and so I apologise. The speech of the First Lord had hardly anything to do with the Motion. It was divided into two parts. One was one of the cleverest, demagogic, Socialistic, electioneering speeches that ever was heard. The other part had nothing to do at all with the Motion before the House. I would like, in a few words, to refer to what has been clone in the Navy. There was the same initial mistake made in the Navy as in the Army. Officers and men were asked what they would do if they were sent against Ulster. That I consider to have been a criminal mistake. It is so prejudicial to discipline that it is enough to upset the Services for a very long time to come. The hon. Gentleman opposite may say that 1616 they cannot ask officers and men what they were going to do if they were certain—

§ Mr. FIENNES
Who were "they"?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
Has the hon. Member not read the White Paper? They were asked.

§ Sir. R. ADKINS
You have said the Navy.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
You do not know about the Navy, but I happen to know that the officers and men in the Navy were also asked what they would do in the event of their being sent against Ulster.

§ Mr. FIENNES
What did they reply?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I cannot say that.

§ Mr. FIENNES
Who asked them?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
They were asked on board different vessels.

§ Mr. FIENNES
Will the Noble Lord say which vessels?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I think that if the hon. Gentleman will get the Navy List he will find what ships are in commission in the Channel and Home Fleets, and he will be able to discover for himself.

§ Mr. FIENNES
That is a vague charge.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I am making a charge which is true.

§ Mr. FIENNES
By whom were they asked?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
They were asked by either the master-at-arms or the chief petty officer on board the ships what they would do in the event of the Fleet being employed against Lister.

§ Mr. FIENNES
May I ask the Noble Lord who gave them the authority to ask them?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
God Almighty knows that. Now the First Lord of the Admiralty has sent all his vessels about the West Coast of Scotland, with their searchlights, to find out if there are any more arms going to be landed. It is rather late for him to do that. I should think that if we want any more we should probably get them. Anyway, it appears to me as very slack of the Admiralty, when they knew, as everybody knew, about the "Fanny"—for it was in all the papers—to allow these arms to be landed. How it was allowed I do not know, but we did land a large quantity of arms, and what the First Lord of the Admiralty 1617 always calls "my fleet" does not appear to have been very effective. The hon. Gentleman who represents the First Lord there will probably attack me with great violence when I make the statement that it is perfectly well known who made up the whole plan of campaign, naval and military. The principal actors were the First Lord of the Admiralty and Admiral Bayly. The First Lord of the Admiralty was the Napoleon in all this. He made out the whole plan. He got hold of the small Cabinet Committee and carried it through, and between him and Admiral Bayly, they made out the plans. In reference to the telegram sent by Admiral Bayly, may I say that I have had many manœuvres, and I am pretty quick in picking up codes. The telegrams said he wanted the use of field guns for exercising men in bad weather. That was the code arranged between the First Lord of the Admiralty and Admiral Bayly, and the bad weather was that whenever he got to Ulster he had better have guns in case there was going to be a disturbance in Ulster. Admiral Bayly showed that he was a good officer. He would be much better off when he had four guns—four guns in each ship I believe it was intended to be—than merely with company, small arms, without guns. That was the code arranged between them, and anybody can see through that. [Laughter.] It is all very well to laugh. Has the hon. Gentleman ever seen codes? Does he understand anything about handling a fleet, or troops! Does he understand anything at all about military manœuvres?

§ Mr. FIENNES
A certain amount, anyway.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I think it is very little.

§ Mr. FIENNES
Just as much as the Noble Lord knows.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
It must be a good bit.

§ Mr. FIENNES
A pretty fair bit.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I believe that the hon. Gentleman was a yeoman in South Africa for a short time, and that may have enabled him to handle a fleet with great precision. Now we come to the telegram which went by land. The First Lord of the Admiralty has said that it was because every other ship would take it in, and he did not want the world to know. But I believe that I am right in saying that the telegram went from 1618 the Consul. The Consul could not get off to the ship for several hours. Then I believe that he took it to the "Britannia," instead of to the flagship, as all telegrams sent from the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief go to the "Britannia." But, anyway, the order did not allow the Fleet to leave Arosa Bay at the time it was intended. All these questions which we have had and the questions that have been put on to the White Paper were put down as honest misunderstandings. Take the case of the Lord Chancellor. There was an honest misunderstanding in his case. He put into the OFFICIAL REPORT a word which made what he had said absolutely contradictory.

§ Mr. LEIF JONES
No.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I think that is a fact. What does the keeper of the King's conscience say? That no orders were issued, no orders will be issued, and no order is likely to be issued for the coercion of Ulster. He said that on the 23rd March, when he must have known all the time that those arrangements were made and would be for nothing else than the coercion of Ulster.

§ Mr. LEIF JONES
No.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I need not speak about the Home Secretary, because he has got a genius for stating things contrary to fact that commands the admiration of both sides of this House. Then there is the question of the amazing contradiction between the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, who declared that the ships were sent to Lamlash to be in close proximity in case of serious disturbance in Ireland. The Prime Minister declared that they were not going to be used at all as extra precautions. Having said that, he said also that the Fleet did not go to Lamlash, because precautions were not necessary, as the guarding of magazines had been carried out. The whole of these statements are entirely contradictory, and that is why we want an inquiry into the whole state of affairs as it existed in Ireland. The captain of the "Firedrake" was ordered to use guns and shells, and to use his searchlights, in case of any disturbance. Who was going to make any disturbance? Certainly not the Ulster men. They are under perfect control. They have had a great deal of irritation, but the right hon. Member for the University of Dublin has got them under 1619 complete command, and there will be no disturbance with the Ulstermen, unless they are provoked by the Government.
Hon. Members below the Gangway are equally under command. There will be no disturbance, I believe, between Protestants and Catholics in the North, unless it is provoked by the Government. And we believe they did their very best to provoke disturbance by massing troops or intending to mass troops; but it was when the officers were asked whether they would fight against Ulster or whether they would not, and they accepted the alternative of dismissal, losing everything, their pensions and emoluments, that the whole plot was brought to the ground. What was the story about those naval officers going about in plain clothes, a thing totally against orders and totally against instructions? What were they afraid of? Why should they not go on shore in uniform, if ordered on duty. It was the duty of the Government to order them, and it was the duty of the officers to obey. Why should they have gone about in plain clothes? I put it to the First Lord of the Admiralty, but he did not seem to know it, that plain clothes are not part of the kit of a naval officer, and it is laid down in the instructions that all officers on duty are to be in uniform. Why did the plot fail? [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I will give them a very good reason. The plot failed because they had a Committee of a Cabinet, before the plan of campaign, to organise matters. Who were members of that Committee? They were the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Attorney-general, the late Secretary of State for War, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and the Secretary of State for India. The failure of the plot is no longer a mystery. Did you ever see such an array of naval and military talent, and of knowledge of strategy and tactics and warlike operations? Fancy those six Gentlemen sitting in a room discussing the question, when not one of them knew very much about it. I should think the Secretary of State for War knew most. The First Lord of the Admiralty was a terrible failure in the Army. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no!"] I am told he was.

§ Mr. FIENNES
That is a very unfair statement to make.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
Why is the First Lord of the Admiralty not here? I believe 1620 he was a newspaper reporter most of the time. I have always heard that from officers.

§ Mr. FIENNES
We hear various statements about officers in the Army, but we do not always believe them, or quote them in the House of Commons, and I think it very unfair to do so.

§ Mr. HAMAR GREENWOOD
I ask the Noble Lord this question. I am one of those who never believe in attacking officers; but does the Noble Lord know of any officer, whether he is in the British Army or in any other Army, who has seen more active service than the First Lord of the Admiralty?

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
He did not see more active service in the Army. [An HON. MEMBER: "Certainly!"] But I am not attacking his pluck and ability.

An HON. MEMBER
You said he was a failure.

§ Mr. WHITEHOUSE
It is a scandalous attack.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
Tell him to come in.

§ Mr. ROBERT HARCOURT
On a point of Order, Sir. May I ask where the military capacity of the First Lord of the Admiralty has anything to do with the Motion before the House?

§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Whitley)
It seems to me a matter of taste rather than of order.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
Why I am saying this about the First Lord of the Admiralty is that, in referring to my hon. and gallant Friend behind me, he said that he was an Army officer who had taken to politics, and was very offensive to one who is a most distinguished officer, as acknowledged by everybody in the Army, no matter what are their politics. The First Lord was not a distinguished officer in the Army, and did not get on with the rest of the officers of the regiment.

§ Colonel GREIG
Let him ask the Noble Lord next to him what he thinks of the First Lord of the Admiralty.

MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE
I think I would rather not say.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I think I may say—

§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER
I think the Noble Lord is wandering too far away from the point.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I am sorry hon. Gentleman should think my statement is in bad taste, but I have made a statement which I believe to be correct, and I would not have made it had not the First Lord of the Admiralty attacked my hon. and gallant Friend beside me.

§ Mr. LEIF JONES
If the First Lord of the Admiralty had been here, the Noble Lord would not have done this. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw!"]

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
Why is not the First Lord of the Admiralty here?

§ The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. H. J. Tennant)
Since the Noble Lord asks me that question, I may state that the First Lord of the Admiralty requested me to say that he has been called to the Admiralty on very urgent business.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
I wish to reply to the charge of the hon. Gentleman opposite, who states that I would not have said to the First Lord's face what I have said behind his back. That is very unworthy of the hon. Gentleman.

§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER
I must ask the Noble Lord to keep to the Motion before the House.

§ Lord C. BERESFORD
Yes; I apologise. What we say is that there was a secret underhand plan to strike at the people of Ulster, and this was done at a time when the Government were saying that they wished to be conciliatory to Ulster and were doing their best to bring about a peaceful settlement. We say that their action towards Ulster was underhand, mean and cowardly, and that there was a plot. We now ask that there should be an inquiry, and we are perfectly ready to adopt the plan of the Leader of the Labour party, who asked that we should have an inquiry into what occurred with the officers as well. The First Lord of the Admiralty referred to the state into which this nation had been brought in the eyes of countries abroad. It was not we who forced this, and I think it has put the country in a very unsafe condition that the idea of civil war should go abroad, and Members on that side are just as anxious to prevent it as we are. We have a very strong opinion on our side that there was a Government plot. The evidence, both of the White 1622 Paper and of the answers that have been given, points far more in favour of our contention than it does in favour of the contention on the other side of the House. If the Government do not give an inquiry I think they ought to go to the country as soon as they can; and why I say that is not for any other reason but the following: If the Government cannot govern and the troops and the officers will not consent to coerce Ulster—that is the position—[An HON. MEMBER: "Won't they? "] I do not believe they will. At present we know they will not, and that they would sooner be shot down than go and coerce Ulster. That is as far as we know. Hon. Members know just as much about it as I do, but if that is the position, the Government cannot govern if it is a question of coercing Ulster, and therefore they ought to go to the country. I only hope and trust when they do go to the country that they will make the cry "The People versus the Navy and the Army," because I am certain it will not hold water for one minute.

§ Mr. TENNANT
I am not going to make a speech, but in the course of the Noble Lord's (Lord C. Beresford) remarks he said that nobody on this bench denied the fact, as he stated it, that the police were to be employed in Ulster for seizing arms, and that that was to be the act of provocation, and he said that had been stated by General Sir Arthur Paget. I have been through the letters and telegrams in the White Paper while the Noble Lord was speaking, and I find there is no reference to police whatever in any one of his statements. Therefore, it was not necessary for anybody on the Front Bench to deny something which had never been stated until the Noble Lord stated it. I think if the Noble Lord will refresh his memory he will find that statement was first made by the Ulster Unionist Council.

§ Mr. R. HARCOURT
I do not propose to occupy the time of the House by replying to the comic-opera attacks of the Noble Lord (Lord C. Beresford) upon the military capacity of the First Lord of the Admiralty partly because I have had the opportunity I think more than once in the course of Debate, and this is not the first time that he has brought this kind of charge, of permitting myself one or two observations upon the continued vindictive ness which the Noble Lord shows to my right hon. Friend, because, so far as I can make out from the latest utterance of the Noble Lord, the First Lord of the 1623 Admiralty had the temerity to be born some years after the Noble Lord. The answer to the demand from the other side for an inquiry, although I do not think any Member of the Opposition has condescended to particularise what kind of inquiry it is that they want, that can be made on this side of the House is perfectly plain and perfectly simple. The Noble Lord said something about the landing of naval officers in plain clothes. What we say is that plain-clothes lawyers who review plain-clothes troops have no right to ask from those who are in charge of the forces of the Crown that they shall give them any further particulars of what they did in the past, what they are doing in the present, or what they propose to do in the future. I must say when I hear this demand for an inquiry put forward from the quarters from which it is put forward, I feel, as a Member of Parliament, very much as I should have felt in the days some years ago when I was a Foreign Office clerk if the head of a great and friendly Power were to ask the Ambassador at the Court of St. James to ask for the minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Noble Lord said that in this matter he feels strongly and bitterly. I should like to say that I feel deeply and even passionately in this matter, because I think hon. Gentlemen opposite would do well to recollect that there are other people besides gunrunners and highway bravoes who can feel deeply and passionately. I have got over my desk at home an engraving of a Field-Marshal, the last Lord Harcourt, who sat in this House and was a past Colonel of the 16th Lancers. Really, I must permit myself to say that some of the ideas of military duty which are put forward on the benches opposite are enough to make the old man turn in his grave. I was looking up a letter of his which, I think, is very-relevant to the situation at the present moment, and written on 30th March, 1772, to his father, who was just going to be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, as follows:— The counties of Down and Armagh, oppressed with a great and injudicious rise of the rents of land, have made at: insurrection. Was it said that Ulster was right in those days to fight in defence of tenant right? Not a bit of it! He went on:— They have assembled in large bodies of three or four thousand armed men "— Three or four thousand were large numbers in those days— and they have actually committed such outrages in the neighbourhood of Newry that it has been judged 1624 necessary to reinforce the six companies in those parts with five more from the garrison of Dublin, besides which one of the Light Dragoon regiments has also been put in motion. This force will, it is hoped, prove sufficient to quell them, but their affair has so far alarmed the Government on this side of the water that it has actually had in contemplation to send a reinforcement from Scotland, and in consequence of it Gage's Regiment has received orders to hold them in readiness to embark. I do not find in this historical document, dealing with a similar situation in the past, any mention of the conscience of the officer. I do not find any action, taken in support of the Crown being-described as plots and pogroms. I see no defence of the oppressed Ulster tenants, though I believe there was something to be said on their behalf. I think we ought to bear in mind, and it is an indisputable historical fact, that whenever Irishmen in the past have suffered real injustice, instead of merely-fancied or prospective injustice, all the King's horses and all the King's men have been sent to carry out the law, because it was the law, with the general assent of the governing classes of this country, because they were the wrong kind of Irishmen, and so it did not matter. I do not wish to weary the House with quotations, but I wonder if some of those Ulster Gentlemen have read the history of the Tithe War of 1831, when six millions of Catholics refused to pay tithes to six hundred thousand Episcopalians. I take this single sentence from Barry O'Brien's life of Thomas Drummond:— In April, 1832, a cow seized for tithes was put up for sale in Doon, in the county of Limerick. Sixty men of the 12th Lancers, fifteen companies of the 92nd Highlanders, a strong force of police, and two pieces of Artillery were in attendance. The peasants fell on the police and drove them out of the village. The Lancers and Highlanders charged and tired upon the peasantry scattering them over the fields, wounding many but killing rone. The cow was knocked down to the owner's brother for £12. An so you might go on. What we have to deal with at the present moment, and that is the point of this Debate, is no mere local disturbance of men resisting tithe with pitchforks. It is a gigantic organised conspiracy, engineered by Privy Councillors, raised deliberately to a point when the civil power is impotent, and looking for its effect to the paralysing of the armed forces of the Crown by the sedulous preaching of genteel sedition—resting on the amazing doctrine, which is the undercurrent of all these speeches, that in the mess-room opinion is to be substituted for obedience; that Ministers are to be lynched on lamp-posts if they protect the servants of the King; that, in the 1625 words of the "Morning Post," the Army will refuse to fight in spite of all the General Elections in the world. We find that military officers who exact conditions for their service become heroes, while those who do their duty without fear or favour are sneered at upon the floor of the House of Commons. I do not wish to enlarge upon that; but you have only to contrast the language of the Opposition about General Gough and Colonel Hogg. I do not know whether it will be said by the Opposition that the recent gun-running operations in Ulster are only the answer to the reprisal for what they describe as the "Government plot." If they do, I will only point out that that argument has been disposed of in advance. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University, at any rate, is estopped from making it, because in an interview, a report of which appeared in the "Times" of yesterday, he said:— There is nothing novel in what we have done … we have not deviated one iota from the policy laid down two and a-half years ago. That is to say, it is not an isolated act. It is an, aggravated act, accompanied by violence, and taken in defiance of the law, but an act which is to be read in connection with the previous history of the case. Very well; if you are to take the history of the whole two and a half years together, as we are invited to do by the right hon. Gentleman, what kind of doctrine has he been preaching to the volunteers? There are many of these speeches. I take a single one at random, which I turned up yesterday in the Library, and which I think is representative of dozens of others. It is a speech delivered at Ballymena, on the 18th July last year. In order not to weary the House I will give only a sentence or two, but I do not think I shall be accused of garbling what he actually said. He described three alternatives. The first was that they should give way. That was an impossible alternative, which he did not discuss. The second was compromise. These are his words:— He, put compromise out of the question … The third alternative was to right it out to the end, and he used that word in its literal sense. For his part he would rather have a good row, and have done with it. There is nothing in the speech about the awfulness of bloodshed. He went on to say in the same speech:— It would smash the Army into pieces, because it would divide the Army into men who in no circumstances would tight against, Ulster. … In this speech there is nothing said on the question of obeying orders. There is 1626 nothing said of the extraordinary doctrine put forward by the Leader of the Opposition that the Army thought that we had not got a mandate at the present time. I suppose that that speech will not be described as influencing the Army. There was no seduction. No seduction is required. Perhaps the metaphor is not a very convenient one to pursue in detail, but I think it is generally accepted that you do not want to seduce what is already yours by consent.

MARQUESS Of TULLIBARDINE
The hon. Member is basing the whole of this on the assumption that some officer has disobeyed some order which he has been given. Will the hon. Member tell us what officer?

§ Mr. R. HARCOURT
I beg the Noble Lord's pardon. I do not desire to pursue that argument, and I did not put it forward. I am dealing with the speeches of the Leaders of the Ulster Army, and not with the act of any individual British officer. The point I was going to make was that, if the argument of the right hon. Member for Dublin University was correct, it was not necessary, that any of this process of seduction should be exercised, for he has said over and over again in public speeches, "the Army is with us." That is not denied. Really one is inclined to ask, why bother about these rifles if no one is to be allowed to shoot back at the volunteers? In this same speech the right hon. Gentleman went on:— He absolutely refused to be drawn into this controversy as to the result of a General Election.… He denied the right of any Parliament or any Government before or after one or twenty General Elections to drive them out. … He preferred a good row. Having given vent to that very Christian sentiment, I need hardly say that he was promptly presented with a Bible. "He denied the right of Parliament." That is the issue in a nutshell. He denies the right of Parliament; we assert it. I think the issue can be joined upon those cardinal, propositions. We propose to maintain Parliament against all your armed camps, because Parliament is the hope of the poor man. I see one danger, and one danger only, threatening Parliament, and that is that the great masses of the working population shall see us show the white feather to privileged law-breakers, that the coal-miner, the railway man, the transport-worker, the engineer, and the textile worker shall see us show favour to these latter-day pro-Boers, who have so tardily discovered, as one of the fellow-countrymen of the Noble Lord has, that General 1627 Botha is a man; and who, if General Botha ruled in London, would be promoting their associations and provisional governments in St. Helena. My criticism of the Government, if I have any, and I think it is the criticism of the working classes outside, is not that they have plotted too much and too soon, but that they plotted too little and too late; not that the Fleet was ordered to Lamias, but that the Fleet was countermanded; and that, because we did to a certain extent abdicate responsibility, this gang of conspirators, who tap telegraph wires, occupy railway stations, hold up the King's highway like so many Dick Turpins, have exchanged the chant "Oh, God, our help in ages past," for the more practical melody "Carson rules the waves." What I say is this: That if these waters had been controlled and patrolled by the British Fleet this treasonable conspiracy of the importation of foreign rifles from foreign shores would have been dealt with as any foreign raid ought to be dealt with—by the guns of British battleships! I wish myself that the Prime Minister had asked the Admiralty to act, and to find out the "Fanny," wherever she was, and to pit the White Ensign against the Jolly Roger. I am perfectly serious. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] I repeat I am perfectly serious in this matter, and I ask the House to consider what precedent is established once you sanction unlawful communications on the high seas by armed men controlling a rebel enclave in British territory? This Motion speaks of operations against Ulster. The right hon. Gentleman who moved it solemnly talked about "seizing positions" in British territory. Ulster is not a sovereign international state. For the purpose of executive acts of national sovereignty, for the vindication of the authority of the Crown, for the movement of armed forces, there is no such place as Ulster, and there is no such place as Ireland. No separatist distinction is to be tolerated in these supreme matters of high State policy. If the Government of Ireland Bill were law to-day, for all purposes excepted and reserved from the power of the Irish Parliament, the Imperial Executive retains an undiminished authority and an uncontrolled discretion.
We welcome the declaration of the First Lord of the Admiralty that we shall send the Army where we please. We shall not ask permission of the Irish Prime Minister under Home Rule as to the disposition of His Majesty's forces and we shall not 1628 under the Union ask the permission of prospective Presidents of Provisional Governments. Let us look a little—because I do not think sufficient attention has been directed to that point—to what actually took place upon that famous Friday or Saturday. I cut out an extract from the "Morning Post" from a correspondent who heads his contribution, "The landing at Bangor: a personal experience":— At one o'clock this morning, everything being quiet in the city of Belfast. I proceeded with a colleague to Bangor. We had no precise information as to what was to be expected, but the words Bangor about, three o'clock' was a hint sufficient to justify the journey. The Press are always welcome upon these occasions. What a pity it was too dark for the cinematograph! Great as was the speed of our car, motor cyclists of the Ulster Volunteer Force flashed past us at the rate of fifty miles on hour. As we lessened rapidly the distance between us and Bangor we noticed our approach was being 'lamped' from point to point and that we might expect to be stopped at any moment. This did not occur, however, until we bad reached the entrance to the town of Bangor. A red lamp was swung round from side to side and other lamps suddenly appeared all round our car as it was brought to a stop. There was a sharp challenge and a demand to know what was our business. We produced certain credentials, and our identity having been established as friends we were passed through the outer cordon. Of course, they were Tory journalists, and it was all right! Further interrogations followed and we ultimately convinced the officer on duty "— Officer on duty! that we should be allowed to pass. This is a claim on the part of armed men; to control the King's highway and examine the credentials of the subjects of King George. I suppose in the future ordinary citizens will be furnished with passports viséd by the loyalists, who control and administer large tracts of British territory in the intervals of threatening the House of Commons and Psalm-singing in Hyde Park. What I want to know is this: If the precedent is established, if the Fleet is to be neutralised and shore communications are to be blocked, what is to prevent the landing of a hostile force, since we have deliberately been told by the Leader of the Opposition that his allies prefer the government of a foreign country? I will only say this in conclusion: I have heard once or twice in Debate a comparison of the case of the North of Ireland with the case of the North in the famous struggle in America. When we remember that all polite society in England at that time was screaming for the South, while the humble workpeople were buttoning up their waist-belts rather than bolster up slavery; I say that the words that my American grandfather, J. L. Motley, wrote, are as true 1629 to-day as on the day of 22nd September, 1861, when he wrote them:— The real sourer of the exultation which manifesto itself in the 'Times' and other organs over our troubles and disasters is the hatred not of America so much as of democracy in England. There is a plot! There is a plot against the orderly development of democratic ideals, a plot to give practical effect to the Tory dogma, that whenever the people vote Liberal the people must be drunk; that democracy is well enough so long as it votes as hon. Members opposite like. These are grave matters. It is you opposite who have put them to the proof. It remains for the Commons House of Parliament which controls and inspires the Executive Government of these free Dominions to justify with a good courage and without fear or flinching, the authority and the majesty of the British Crown.

§ Sir R. POLE-CAREW
I never detain the House very long, and I assure hon. Members I shall not do it now. We have had many very long speeches, but all I want to do is to raise a humble protest against what I consider is the scandalous manner in which the Army has been treated in this miserable affair. I also wish to express my deep sorrow and regret—and that feeling, I believe, is shared by every right-thinking man in this House—that the Army has been dragged into the business at all.

§ Mr. T. RICHARDS
Who is responsible?

§ Sir R. POLE-CAREW
If you wait a moment, I will tell you. The Army has been put in an appallingly false position, if only momentarily. I have been asked who is responsible. I will tell right hon. Gentlemen who ought to be on that Front Bench and who are not. I should like to know where the Government are. These matters have been put before them by me more than once. I regret to say hon. Members opposite do not seem to be able to understand them. It has been put before them more than once even to-day, that the Army was asked a question. I do not say that asking a question is the correct way to transact an affair with the Army, and I agree with the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord Charles Beresford), that the Army never should have been asked a question. It was asked a question, and that question was, practically, whether they would consent to shoot down their loyal fellow-subjects in Ulster because they had made a demand that they should not be turned out from under the flag for 1630 which they and their forefathers had done so much, and that before they were dismissed by the British Government they wanted their case put before the electors of the country. The officers, as we know, were offered an alternative, either to be butchers or to be dismissed the Army. I ask, could any sane man for one instant doubt what answer they would give. That is the whole question. The hon. Member for Leicester put a question just now. He did not seem quite able to understand what is the charge that the Unionist party are bringing against the Government. I can tell him what my opinion is of the charge. My opinion is that Gentlemen who are sitting on the Front Government Bench opposite have laid themselves open, at any rate, to the charge of having engineered a massacre, and not only that, but for their own political ends. I say this, that before the payment of Members in this House, I believe that the mere suspicion of such an atrocity, unless they took every means, amongst other that of judicial inquiry, or any other means to clear themselves of that charge, I believe it: would have cost them the support of the Back Benches and of their office. But since we have had the payment of Members brought in, it seems to me that hon. Members on the Back Benches are perfectly prepared to swallow anything from Marconis to massacre, provided their consciences are salved by £400 a year. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!" and Interruption.]

§ Mr. R. HARCOURT
Does that mean that we hold our tongues for money?

§ Sir R. POLE-CAREW
I mean exactly what I say. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!" and "Withdraw!"] I say that they are ready to swallow anything in the world, from Marconis to massacres, so long as they get their £400 a year.

§ Mr. R. HARCOURT
You ought to be ashamed of yourself!

§ Sir JOSEPH WALTON
Do you take your £400 a year?

§ Sir R. POLE-CAREW
I do not in the least desire that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have it, and therefore I take it and give every penny of it to the Unionist headquarters. It is simply a drop in the ocean to turn out the Government from office. I say the Army has been placed in a terribly false position by the manœuvres of Gentlemen who occupy the benches opposite. It has been suggested 1631 that the Army has been guilty of insubordination, or of disobeying orders. [HON. MEMBERS: "Insubordination!" and Interruption.]

Mr. DEPUTY - SPEAKER
I think hon. Members should hear patiently opinions, even if they do not agree with them. It is natural on both sides.

§ Mr. LEIF JONES
There is something more in this than opinions we do not agree with. Almost every sentence the hon. and gallant Gentleman has uttered is an insult or a charge against us.

§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER
I heard no individual personal references, or it would be my duty to interfere.

MARQUESS of TULLIBARDINE
Is it in order to say that we are "all liars together"?

§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER
I did not hear that at all.

§ Sir R. POLE-CAREW
I have not the slightest wish to tread on hon. Members' corns. If they leave me alone, I will leave them alone, but I do object to be interrupted. I state again that the Army has been said to be guilty of insubordination, and charges have been brought against it which are more than unfair and biassed, and I am here to speak for the Army. I say that the Army ought never to have been brought into this business at all, and would not have been brought into this business if there had not been, as the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth has said, an intolerable and increasing usurpation by the Secretary of State for War of the powers and position of the Commander-in-Chief. We have had an example of what has happened by the usurpation of these duties on this occasion. The first thing that happened was, that certain oral instructions were given to General Paget. Oral instructions are inadmissible. We are then told that no documentary evidence existed in regard to these oral instructions. We are denied the text of these instructions, and it is suggested that these instructions were given by the Secretary of State without any reference to the proper channels of the Headquarters Staff. I wish to point out to the House that I have got certain experience as a soldier, and my experience will not permit me to place much credence in any one of these excuses, and I will tell the House why. 1632 In the first place, as I said already, oral instructions are not admissible. We have elucidated from the mass of mystery, that Ministers of the King have thrown over this affair, that there was a certain Council held on the 18th or 19th March, at which several members of the Headquarters Staff were present. We know that the instructions sent to General Paget, or given to him, were considered, and I say that no Staff Officer could have ventured to have given these instructions otherwise than on paper. I say deliberately that if the Secretary of State had ventured to give them over the heads of the staff, no self-respecting member of the Army Council could have retained his office. Therefore it is impossible for me to place credence in that theory of what we have been told about these instructions, and I say further, unless the Government will publish these instructions given to General Paget, they must submit themselves to a judicial inquiry.
We have been told this afternoon that General Paget never said certain things which my Noble Friend the Member for Portsmouth said he did. There is not the slightest doubt about it. We had it from the Press at once that General Paget had made certain offers to his officers, and he told them besides that Ulster would be provoked or words to that effect into taking the initiative, and therefore they need not be afraid to go on active service against Ulster, because they would not have to fire the first shot. If that is not a plot I do not know what is. What does it mean? If that is not a plot, I do not know what is. I go further and say that no general officer in the position of the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland could have possibly accepted oral instructions without putting them on paper. I would remind the Government and the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, however much the latter may now attempt to screen the Government, that the instructions which he passed on to the officers under his command were written down, committed to paper, and many copies exist. And more than that, there are not a few men in responsible positions who are perfectly ready to testify to them on oath. That is why the Government object to our demand for a judicial inquiry. For the sake of the officers and the men in the Army, and for the sake of the country generally, the Government should be called upon to publish those instructions at once.
1633 I think the meanest trick ever played on the Army was when the Prime Minister tried to throw dust in the eyes of this House with his famous Army Order in three sections. As my Noble Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford) has pointed out, the first of those instructions was simply a severe censure on the late Secretary of State for War. I do not in the least object to that, but I see no reason for including it in the Army Order. The other two sections of that Army Order have nothing in them which, if not actually included, word for word, in the King's Regulations, has been embodied in them, and thoroughly understood by all ranks ever since the days that Regulations have existed. I agree with what was said by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Mid-Devon, when he stated that the publication of that Order was nothing more nor less than a bitter insult added to a gross injury inflicted on the Army. The real meaning of that order was this: "We, the Government, have committed a hideous blunder. We, the Government, do not in the least mind if, incidentally, we have gone near to ruining the Army in trying to wriggle out of our blunder; but inasmuch as that blunder has recoiled on our own heads in a manner we did not anticipate, we desire to prevent its being possible to happen again." That is what that order means, and the real fault lies in the usurpation by the Secretary of State of the office and powers of the Commander-in-Chief. It is no use making this suggestion to the present Government, but I put it forward for consideration by a Unionist Government, which cannot fail to be in power very soon, that that Army Order should be expunged, and in its place should be substituted one which I put down as a new Clause to the Army (Annual) Bill last week and which was ruled out of order. [An HON. MEMBER: "It is out of order now."] It was ruled out of order at the last moment. I fancied the Army (Annual) Act dealt with matters of discipline, and I thought my Clause would have been in order. I should like to read it to the House, and I assert that, if what I suggest had been in force, the present situation as regards the Army could not possibly have arisen. These are the words I suggest:—
"That no orders or instructions, either documentary or oral, shall be issued by a Secretary of State to any officer, noncommissioned officer, or man, except 1634 through the proper channel and with the signature of the Adjutant-General or other military head of the Department."
I know I have laid myself open to having uttered in this suggestion what I may call an Irishism, and I apologise to all my Irish Friends who happen to be here. I know it may be asked, "How can you have a signature to an oral instruction?" I quite agree, and I should never have put in those words but for what happened the other day. I say all oral instructions are impossible if they go through the proper channel, but this is said to have happened, and therefore I have put those words in. I know that up to now the Secretary of the Army Council has been in the habit of signing instructions sent out by the Army Council. I purposely left out that gentleman for this reason: I understand that the present secretary is no longer an Army officer. We were told the other day by a Member of the Front Bench that an Army Council can be held without any military members being present, and if that is the case it would be the greatest mistake ever to permit instructions to be sent out to the Army by a pack of civilians with a civilian secretary. That is why I purposely left that out. Never again could the present impasse arise if that order existed. I regret, for the sake of the Army, that it should have arisen.
I used to think that the hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. John Ward) was a friend of the Army, and I was very sorry to see him make the attack upon it which he did the other day. May I point out to the hon. Member that so far from the position we are in being the fault of the Army, it is the fault of the Government. They chose to offer certain alternatives to the Army. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Who says "No"? [An HON. MEMBER: "We all say 'No!'"] There is every proof that what I say is true. The Government offered certain alternatives to the Army, and no reasonable man could possibly expect the answer to be anything different to what it was. I have heard civil war mentioned this evening. I have heard it said that the Army or the Navy is always to be depended upon in the case of civil war. If those who say that will only read history, they will see that it has always been the same. Soldiers and sailors are citizens as well, and when it comes to civil war can you possibly believe that troops of the same race, whether serving on sea or land, will shoot down their fellow citizens because of a political 1635 difference of opinion? You may demand it, but I can tell you one thing—the answer to that demand has always been the same, and it is, "I shall do what my conscience tells me."

§ Sir J. WALTON
The attendance in the House at the present time shows, in my judgment, that the bottom has been knocked out of the Vote of Censure tonight by the recent incident of gun-running in Ulster. I felt profoundly sorry for the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Chamberlain) when he stood up to-day to move this Vote of Censure upon the Government. He had the hardest task that he ever undertook in the House of Commons, and he performed it, I am sure, with less satisfaction to himself than any speech he ever made in the House. I have never been able to understand what is that mysterious, malign influence which seems in the political arena to influence men whom in the ordinary affairs of life we consider absolutely reasonable and of sound judgment. I believe that in the situation now under consideration the climax of political audacity and of political hypocrisy has been reached on the part of the Opposition in the House of Commons. The only censure that I should pass upon the Government is that they have too long delayed taking steps to repress preparation for rebellion in Ulster. I bring the grave charge against many of the leaders of the Unionist party of having persistently invited the people of Ulster to prepare for rebellion when Home Rule became the law of the land, and of pledging the support of the whole of the Unionist party in case of armed resistance. I charge them also with having preached the seditious and treasonable doctrine that the Army ought to refuse to enforce Home Rule and maintain law and order in Ulster. I will prove these charges up to the hilt. Take the Leader of the Opposition. At Blenheim, in July, 1912, he said:— I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster will go in which I shall not be ready to support them. Again, in March, 1914, in this House, he said:— And in our view, of course, it is not necessary to say that any officer who refuses to serve in Ulster is only fulfilling his duty. Take, again, an ex-Prime Minister. All these men I respect and esteem, except for their action in regard to this particular question. The right hon. Gentleman the 1636 Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour), in February of this year, said:— If I were an Ulsterman, I would do as the Ulster-men are doing. If those words have any meaning whatsoever, they mean that he would drill, that he would arm, and that he would prepare for rebellion in Ulster in case Home Rule was passed. But what course did the right hon. Gentleman take when he was chief Secretary for Ireland in 1887? Then there was disturbance in the Nationalist part of Ireland, and on that occasion, not only were forces of police sent there, but 200 troops were brought to the immediate locality of the disturbance, and a telegram was dispatched from Dublin with the right hon. Gentleman's approval—

§ Mr. RAWLINSON
On a point of Order. May I ask whether any part of this speech is relevant to the issue we are called upon here to discuss, as to whether there should be a judicial inquiry into the conduct of the Government concerning this matter?

§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. Whitley)
I must say that speeches on both sides of the House have taken a very wide sweep, but the hon. and learned Member has not given the hon. Gentleman a chance to say anything much beyond his first sentence.

§ Sir J. WALTON
I am criticising the employment by the then Chief Secretary of troops in a case where there was disturbance in a Nationalist part of Ireland, and I am contrasting the action then with the action now, when the whole of the Unionist party object to the use of British troops in maintaining law in the Orange part of Ireland. In 1887, with the approval of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London, a telegram was sent:— Deal very summarily with any organised resistance to lawful authority. If necessary, do not hesitate to shoot them. There is one law when it is a case of Irish Nationalists, and quite another law when it is a case of disturbance on the part of the Orangemen of the North-East part of Ireland. In 1901 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London, as Prime Minister, moved that a Grant be given of £100,000 to Lord Roberts, and he said:— As we ask our soldiers to fight our battles without mixing themselves up with political considerations, so I hold that we ought to have the unanimous vote of all parties in this House, in favour of this Grant of £100,000 to Lord Roberts. 1637 What is the position to-day? He said then that we expect our soldiers not to mix themselves up with political considerations, but for months past the Tory party has been exercising a propaganda and spreading wide the idea that the British soldier and the British officer would be justified in refusing to maintain law and order in Ulster in the event of the passing of the Home Rule Bill. I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Sir E. Carson) is not present. The party opposite deny that they have endeavoured to seduce the Army, but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin, in July of last year, said:— A day never passes on which I do not get at a really low average half-a-dozen letters from British officers a king to be enrolled. Again, in September, 1913, he said:— We have pledges and promises from some of the greatest generals in the Army. They have given their word that when the time comes, if it is necessary, they will come over and help us, Take the case of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts. He said, in February of this year:— It is unthinkable that the British officer should be called upon to fight against the Ulster Volunteers. To do so would he the rain of the Army.

§ Mr. HUNT
Hear, hear.

§ Sir J. WALTON
The hon. Member who says "hear, hear," is quite entitled, of course, to hold that opinion, but I say that for a Field-Marshal of the British Army to sign the Covenant that Lord Roberts did sign, was an act that ought to entail very serious consequences upon him. I refer to the Covenant which he signed, and which he, a great authority, a military man with a high reputation, told the officers of the Territorial Army in this country that there was no reason whatsoever why they should not sign it. What was it he said by signing the Covenant:— I shall hold myself justified in taking or supporting any action that may be effective to prevent the Home Utile Bill being brought into operation, and more particularly to prevent the armed forces of the Crown being used to deprive the people of Ulster of their rights as citizens of the United Kingdom. Here we have a Field-Marshal of the British Army telling the Territorial officers that they would be perfectly justified in signing that Covenant which he himself also signed, and that he would be prepared to support any action that may be effective to prevent the Home Rule Bill being brought into operation! What is that but a gross incitement to rebellion and revolution in this country? Then take the case of Lord Esher, who as President of the 1638 London Territorial Association, brings his influence to bear by publicly stating that if the Government merely send a detachment of troops from England to Ireland, 50 per cent. of the officers in the Territorial Force in London will resign.

§ Mr. HUNT
Was not that a fair warning to the Government—a warning given in a friendly way?

§ Sir J. WALTON
I say it is destructive of all military discipline in the Army. It is provocative, and it is inciting the Army to refuse to do its duty. Then there was the hon. Member from the North of Ireland, who stated at Hyde Park that the plot against Ulster had miscarried because the soldiers, to their eternal honour, refused to soil their uniforms by shooting down, as butchers, the people of Belfast. The hon. Member who interrupted me just now has himself played a remarkable part in his attempt to seduce the British Army, for he used the House of Commons envelopes to send broadcast to sergeant-majors and others an incitement to refuse to do their duty as loyal soldiers of the King and country.

§ Mr. HUNT
As this is a personal matter, perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to explain. All I did was to send sergeant-majors a copy of a letter which had appeared in the Press. I wrote no personal letter myself to them, and I have still to learn that a Member of Parliament is not justified in sending to sergeant-majors who are voters a statement that has been published in the Press, and which, therefore, anybody may see. I, at any rate, cannot see what the right hon. Gentleman has to complain of. Perhaps he will say how I tried to seduce the Army?

§ Sir J. WALTON
By the very nature of the communication which you sent to the sergeant-majors.

§ Mr. HUNT
It was true.

§ Sir J. WALTON
I am not sorry to hear that the Noble Lord in another place (Lord Willoughby de Broke) has disowned any association with the hon. Gentleman. I am sorry that the Leader of the Opposition did not happen to be in his place when I made the grave charge against him that he had degraded his high office by inciting Ulster to be prepared for rebellion against Home Rule should it become the law of the land. The right hon. Gentleman also said that officers 1639 who refused to serve in Ulster would only be doing their duty. We have heard from the Leader of the Opposition many extraordinary speeches, and it is not surprising that he should not wish to listen to them being read in cold blood in the House of Commons. But if he does not care to pay attention to them, I would venture to tell him that the people of this country care, and that if he will go to the great industrial democracies in the North of England and elsewhere he will find how keen is their interest in these attempts on the part of the Tory party to promote rebellion in Ulster and to seduce the Army from its allegiance. As to the point whether the Tory party have not been carrying on a campaign to influence the Army to refuse to do its duty in Ulster, that great Tory organ, the "Morning Post," on the 27th March last, said:— The Army has killed the Home Rule Bill, and when called to task for this extreme utterance, it added— This phrase is not meant as rhetoric, but as a statement of plain fact. Will hon. Members say in face of that that they have made no attempt to influence the Army to refuse to do its duty? One alarming feature in the present situation, in my judgment, is the weakness the Government have shown in allowing the drilling and arming of men throughout Ulster, and failing to take strong measures against those mainly responsible for this movement. No more damning proof of disloyalty to the King was ever shown than in the way the Tory party has spurned and treated the invitation of His Gracious Majesty in the Speech from the Throne, that they should co-operate with goodwill for the permanent settlement of the Irish question. Instead of that, they have rejected every compromise proposed, and they have contributed large sums of money to enable rebel forces in the North of Ireland to be organised and prepared for rebellion. I am profoundly convinced that the Government ought, long ago, to have arrested the leaders of this movement in Ulster. I would have begun at the top. I would have arrested the Leader of the Opposition, the ex-Prime Minister, the Member for the City of London, the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Trinity College, Lord Londonderry, and Lord Roberts. These men have been spreading sedition. They have been doing everything in their power to 1640 encourage rebellion in Ulster, and they have been doing everything they could to influence the British Army to refuse to do its duty. In doing that they have been guilty of treasonable conspiracy, and, in my judgment, they ought to have been brought to trial long ago. I have no doubt that the Government will take a wiser view than that which I, as a detached Member, may take, but the gun-running last Friday night will cause, I feel sure, a stronger line of policy to be undertaken. Still, as a Liberal Member of this House, in touch with the industrial classes in populous districts in the north, I say that if the Army, as it is officered to-day, is a Tory institution, to be brought in to coerce the House of Commons when Liberals are in power, and to dictate the policy and legislation that they shall pursue, then we will break that institution as we have broken the House of Lords. A great deal has been said about the Orangemen of Ulster, and what injustices they would suffer under Home Rule. But what about the Nationalists of Ulster? Even in the North-East corner of Ulster there are many Nationalists, and Ulster Liberals sent to the Prime Minister, the other day, the following resolution:— We Ulster Liberals, living in the centre of the conspiracy against law and order in this province, and exposed daily to threats of physical violence, and danger to our lives and property, through a possible outbreak of sporadic riot against which we have, in our opinion, insufficient protection, nevertheless, are prepared to give you our unwavering support at every sacrifice to ourselves in the present struggle between unscrupulous aristocrats, acting with a sinister disregard of the Empire's welfare on the one hand, and the British democracy representative of the Government on the other. [A Laugh.] The hon. Member for the City of York (Mr. Butcher) is laughing at a resolution passed by his own countrymen.

§ Mr. BUTCHER
The least representative portion of the province of Ulster, the least industrial, and the least loyal.

§ Sir J. WALTON
At any rate the province of Ulster returns seventeen Members in favour of Home Rule and only sixteen against. I question very much the comparative intelligence of the two sections. The Liberals of Ulster say to the Prime Minister:— We look to His Majesty's Government to maintain its authority by all the means in its power against the illegal and tyrannous forces which dominate our liberties of free speech and action in Ulster, and to settle once for all whether the voice of Parliament or the voice of the seditious plotter is to prevail. The Nationalists and Liberals of Ulster ought to receive equal consideration and 1641 thought from the Liberal Government, before they are handed over, in any of the counties of Ulster, to the domination of an Orange majority. With regard to the gun-running, there is no doubt that the Intelligence Department of the War Office is very badly served in Ulster. It is not less amazing that the Ulster Volunteers should have found it possible to completely hoodwink the authorities and to land a cargo of 40,000 rifles, with ammunition to match, without the slightest attempt at serious interference on the part of the authorities. It is a striking instance of the inefficiency of the officials responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Ulster that such a coup could have been successfully carried out. It shows that a change is necessary in Ulster. Personally, I should not be sorry, though I much esteem the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the Chief Secretary for Ireland, if they thought it wise to resign their positions and were replaced by men of stronger character. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I am in the habit of always calling a spade a spade, and whatever hon. Gentlemen opposite may say, I think it is high time that the authority of the King and of Parliament was vindicated in Ireland. I say that an illegal conspiracy has been worked and organised from the Front Opposition Bench, and that a strong section of the Conservative party has been privy to it. The question is not, as the Vote of Censure states, whether the Government took careful precautions when they thought it right to protect depots of arms in Ireland, but why they delayed so long in taking that step. The question that is being asked to-day is, not why the Fleet was ordered to go to the neighbourhood of Ireland a month ago, but why naval precautions were not taken to intercept the illicit cargo of arms on Friday night last.
What is the present situation? The Opposition, through Sir Edward Carson or through the Front Bench opposite, have committed themselves to the use of force against the Government, and are gambling on its reluctance, some say its inability, to use the forces of the Crown against them. The success of the Ulster movement means the breaking up of authority in all parts of the United Kingdom. The Government itself cannot remain in office without power. If its power fails, it must boldly appeal to the country against the promoters of anarchy on the opposite side of the House, and I am confident it will not 1642 appeal in vain. Few Members of the House to-day realise the feeling of the great masses of the working people throughout the length and breadth of the country. If there is one thing they will not tolerate it is the idea that officers of the Army, in any form, directly or indirectly, should attempt for one moment, when a Liberal Government is in power, to dictate their policy or the legislation which they should pass. Meantime, however, let us not forget what the political situation really is in Ulster. Ulster is not-being coerced into Home Rule The Tory party say, "Have a General Election, and if you win it we shall not consider that Ulster will be justified in continuing its opposition." Well, the Government have met that demand, they have met it twice over. They have agreed that every county in Ulster by a one man one vote plebiscite—

§ Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER
I do not think we ought to enter in this Debate upon a discussion of the Government of Ireland Bill. It will occupy too much time.

§ Sir J. WALTON
I apologise for having transgressed to that extent. I wish my final words to be the expression of a hope that men of all parties should approach this question in the spirit desired by His Gracious Majesty the King, namely, to cooperate with good will in a permanent settlement of this question. A few weeks ago we seemed to be near a settlement by consent. Surely we may still venture to hope that, with good will on all sides, a settlement by consent might be reached, and that all the bitternesses that have been engendered in any of the discussions on this question now or in the recent past may be buried for ever in good will and harmony.

§ Mr. CAVE
The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has followed in his speech the example set by every previous speaker on the other side of the House, including the only Minister who has spoken in this Debate. He has travelled over a very wide field. He has referred to gun-running, to the Covenant, to the Home Rule Bill, to the House of Lords which he tells us he has destroyed, and to the Army which he is going to destroy. The only subject to which he has made no reference at all, from the beginning to the end of his speech, is the Motion under discussion. Not even the First Lord of the Admiralty 1643 has made the least serious attempt to controvert the strong case made by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Austen Chamberlain), and that case stands absolutely unanswered. I think it is almost enough to take the Prime Minister's statement made to the "Times" on 22nd March, and put by the side of it the revised White Paper, and these two documents alone will show that the statement was wholly inaccurate, and such as not to give the facts to the public.
I am not going through the dozen or more misstatements to which attention has been called. I want to revive the recollection of the House as to two or three chief matters in which the House has been misled by the Ministers. First, the statement of the Prime Minister was that the movements of troops in Ireland which have been recorded during the last few days, were purely of a precautionary character, and that the intention was simply to give additional protection to arms, ammunition, stores, and so on. Just put that simple statement by the side of the facts as to the movement of troops. You have not only the reinforcement of the depots, but you have the movement of the Bed-fords to Dundalk, and you have the plans made in London on those two days, 18th and 19th March, which were reflected in the conversation of General Paget with his officers, and I defy any man with the least experience in judging evidence to come to any other conclusion but this, that the plans which were framed at the War Office on 18th and 19th March were not planned merely for the protection of the depots, but covered a very much wider field indeed. Take the mere fact, which is happily common ground, that the Minister for War agreed that officers domiciled in Ulster who did not desire to take part in the coming movements might disappear. That alone shows that they were not movements for the mere protection of depots, but that they had a very much wider object, and I am confident that, although as might have been expected, General Paget does his best to take upon himself the blame for the orders and the inquiries which were made, the inquires which he made and the course which he took reflected faithfully the course marked out for him at the War Office during those two days.
So far about the movement of troops. What did the Prime Minister say about the naval movements? I will only read one 1644 sentence and will ask the House to decide:— As to the so-called naval movements, they simply consisted in the use of two small cruisers to convey a detachment of troops to Carrickfergus without the necessity of inarching them through the streets of Belfast. I cannot ask a Minister, because for hours past there has been no Minister here who is acquainted with the particular fact. On 11th March, eleven or twelve days before that statement was made, the Cabinet had sanctioned the movement of a Battle Squadron from Arosa Bay to Lamlash for the very purpose, as the First Lord admitted to-day, of intervention in the North of Ireland in case of need. The First Lord told us on a previous occasion that the Prime Minister knew all about not only the order given at the Cabinet, but knew all about what was being done. Let me recall a sentence, which has not yet been quoted, from the speech of the First Lord to this House on 25th March:— As soon as it was clear that there was no serious opposition, and that the movement had been safely conducted, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who knew exactly what had been happening, though I do not say he kept the exact position of the squadron in his mind, suggested to me in effect, that the movement should be delayed. The Prime Minister, when he made that statement about the two cruisers, knew the orders given to the Fleet, and knew of their withdrawal, and I do not think on reflection the right hon. Gentleman himself will say that that was a full disclosure of the facts. The excuse—I cannot call it anything else—which is given is this: The movement of the squadron and the eight destroyers was no part of the precautionary movements in Ireland. See whether that answer does not wholly evade the point. We were inquiring about all the movements which had been made during these two days in Ireland. We did not believe that the movements were purely precautionary movements for the purpose of protecting the depots, and if the Prime Minister really left out of account all the movements other than precautionary movements, he did not give a fair and proper reply to the question. I say that because he gave that explanation not only in the "Times," but on the following day in this House.
Again, it is somewhat serious that after we had been promised by the responsible Minister that a White Paper should be issued containing all the material documents, so imperfect a collection of the documents which had passed should in fact have been issued. We had the promise 1645 from more than one quarter. One Minister said:— I propose to publish the material documents which will remove all mystery in the mutter—all written documents which have a hearing on this case, and which will elucidate the matter. After the issue of the first White Paper, the Home Secretary said:— All the telegraphic messages have been published, and there is nothing to add. There are no written communications or dispatches, or telegraphic messages relating to the matters in question which have not been published. In face of those two statements, just set side by side the original and the new White Paper. In the first you have eight documents, and in the second fifty-five, omitting the last which was not then in existence, and the omitted documents contain some of the most relevant facts. By omitting those documents you omitted all mention of General Paget's warning to the Government on 17th March, all mention of the movement of troops to Dundalk, all mention of the appointment of General Macready as Governor of the Belfast district, and all mention of the orders given by the Chief Secretary to the police to put themselves under the orders of General Macready. These are some of the most material facts, and some of those which, above all others, the House ought to have known. I am not fond of charging any one with suppressing or misrepresenting facts, but my right hon. Friend is more than justified in the terms of his Motion that the House has not been fully informed, has indeed been misinformed, and, without attempting to distribute the blame among Ministers, I say that the Government, as a whole, have misled the House as to the facts of this case. In fact, the only answer which could possibly hold water—although I do not think that it will—is that foreshadowed by the hon. Member for Leicester, that if ever there was a case in which it was pardonable to misrepresent the facts, this was the case.
I mentioned the orders given to the police by the Chief Secretary, and I wish to say a few words about these particular orders. We were told in the White Paper that the Chief Secretary for Ireland had issued instructions to the Commissioner of Police of Belfast to take instructions from the officer appointed General Officer Commanding there. I want to know by what right and authority these orders were given. I believe that the course taken was wholly contrary to every principle laid down in this House. In a case where you expect civil commotion 1646 the Government have no right—the War Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty have no right—to entrust the Army or Navy with the keeping of order, and they have no right of their own initiative to put the police under the command of the military officer commanding in the district. We have been told that time after time by the Prime Minister himself, and I should have liked to remind him if he had been here, and I want to remind the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is here, of the principle laid down by the Prime Minister more than once. I remember that he has spoken on this subject on more than one occasion. He made a speech on 9th June, 1912, in connection with the Port of London strike. He informed the House what were the duties of the Home Secretary in connection with civil commotion. He first referred to the duties of the Home Secretary as head of the London police. Then he stated that the Home Secretary had a duty, or at all events it was the custom for him, to advise other police forces. Then he said:— Thirdly, in common with other local authorities, he may be called upon in case of need to lend whatever surplus of police may be at his disposal to assist the local authority in another area in the discharge of this duty of preserving order. That is a liability and responsibility which he shares with all police authorities in the country. When I have said that I believe I have exhausted what, under the law and constitutional practice, are the powers and duties of the Home Secretary with regard to the maintenance of order. I should be glad to know of any other. Then my Noble Friend the Member for Oxford University (Lord Hugh Cecil) said:— I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he does not think that the responsibility lies upon the Crown, and therefore upon the constitutional advisers of the Crown, to keep order from one end of the country to the other? In reply to that the Prime Minister said:— That is just where the Noble Lord is entirely wrong. My Noble Friend said:— The King's peace, to which the Prime Minister answered:— The King's peace, according to the constitutional law of this country, it is the duty of the magistrates of the various localities to maintain. They can call, for the purpose of maintaining the King's peace, and have the right to call upon every citizen, be he ordinary layman or soldier—and that is the only way in which soldiers come in—to render such assistance as is reasonable and proper, and is at the time in his power to give. That is the settled law in this country, as well settled as any law can possibly be. 10.0 P.M.
I agree entirely that what the Prime Minister then said, he had said many years before on the occasion of the Featherstone riots. I am now raising the point that in putting the police of Belfast 1647 under the orders of the military the Chief Secretary was going beyond what he had the power to do. That quotation, I think, shows the Prime Minister's opinion on that point. It may be said that they foresaw that, and made the officer commanding in the district a magistrate in order that he might, as my right hon. Friend said, requisition himself and obey his own requisition. That is not a sufficient answer in this case, because you will see it stated in another letter in the White Paper that the Army Council were informed that the Irish Government had already given general instructions to the Commissioner of Police in Belfast to act under the orders of the senior military officer. That is not the commanding officer, but the senior military officer for the time being, who was there only as a soldier. I do say that in that matter the Government mistook their powers, apart from any other question raised by the Motion. It is right that we should have an inquiry for an explanation which will satisfy the House on that point. I venture to quarrel with the statement made by the First Lord to-day as to the power of the Government over the troops. He said the Government can use the troops as they please to maintain law and order. That is not so. They can only allow them to act on the requisition of the civil authority. One of the most important rules of our law with respect to the duty of maintaining order is that it is the duty of the local authority and not of the central authority to maintain order, and that it is on the requisition of the local civil authority that the troops are only called in.
I wish to refer to a few other points made in the speech of the First Lord. The right hon. Gentleman did raise larger issues than those which we have hitherto been discussing. I do not mean, of course, his attempt to turn the issue by referring to what is called the gun-running episode, because if that argument comes to anything it only means this: "If you import guns we have a right to make misstatements in the House of Commons, or if you attempt to overawe Parliament we have a right to deceive it." That does not advance his case very much. Nor do I intend to refer to the lecture he was good enough to give to the Conservative party, of which he is so excellent an adviser. I leave his advice where he left it himself. I want to refer to the final part of his speech, because it was rather surprising, 1648 having regard to his preface, and it was to me extremely interesting. I want, of course, to deal with it quite seriously, and to be sure as to what the right hon. Gentleman said. Speaking, of course, on behalf of the Government, the First Lord said this:— I am going to run some risk of my own in what I sun now going to say. Why cannot the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dublin University, say boldly, 'give me the Amendments to the Home Rule Bill for which I ask, to safeguard the dignity and interests of Protestant Ulster, and I will ill return use all my influence and good will to make Ireland an integral unit of a federal system. The right hon. Gentleman would not have said that without some authority from his colleagues.

§ Mr. JOHN WARD
He said he had not.

§ Mr. CAVE
I assume that he had.

§ Mr. WARD
Well, he said that he had not.

§ Mr. CAVE
The hon. Member must not take it upon himself to speak for the Government, because this is a serious matter. If I understand it as I think I do, the offer made was this: If my right hon. and learned Friend would make this proposal," give me the Amendment which I ask in the Home Rule Bill," that is, the exclusion of Ulster from the Home Rule Bill until Parliament otherwise determines, if he will be satisfied with that, and will then use his influence and good will to make Ireland an integral unit in a federal system, then that proposal will, at all events, receive favourable consideration from the right hon. Gentleman, and I suppose from the Government. Of course, if that is the proposal of the Government, we should all of us be interested in hearing from some Member of the Government who speaks after me, or to-morrow, exactly the meaning of the proposal, and whether it is adhered to by the Prime Minister and his colleagues. It is a new departure altogether in these discussions. I am quite sure that if it means what I have suggested, and if the Government means, what the right hon. Gentleman says, the suggestion will receive the most serious consideration in every quarter of this House. I only regret that a sentence of so much moment should have been introduced by a speech which was the worst possible preface to it, consisting mainly of very grave attacks on the party of which I am a Member. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord devoted a considerable part of his speech to accusing this party and my right hon. Friend in 1649 words which plainly were measured words, and which were somewhat violent in terms, of illegality. If my right hon. and learned Friend deserves, and if we deserve those charges, what right has the right hon. Gentleman to parley with us at all? I do not say that for the purpose of making a rhetorical point, because I want to go on to say that, after all, I think that he feels, and the Members on that side of the House feel that we are not merely persons promoting illegality and outrage, but that there is a serious force behind the steps which we take.
The position which you have brought about during your eight years of Government is this: that you have aroused in Ireland the ancient antipathies which were beginning to slumber, and that you have divided Ireland once again into two hostile camps, and camps in no metaphorical sense; and we believe, rightly or wrongly, that your proposal is not to enact an ordinary law dealing with local government, but to surrender a part of the King's territory to the rule of a new Parliament altogether, and that many of those who have opposed such a surrender are not willing to have their lives, their persons and property put under that new jurisdiction, under that new political sovereignty, and that they are prepared to resist. And their strength is not, as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to suggest, that they are prepared to attack others, but that they are prepared to suffer attack themselves. The strength of the Ulsterman which appeals to us is not that he is willing to shoot, but that he is willing to be shot. I do not say that he is willing to be shot without some attempt at defending himself, but at all events, he, knowing that Ulster alone is but a small unit in the great mass of the Empire, is willing to run the tremendous risk of defending his life and his position as a subject of the King, ruled by this Parliament, and he is willing to go to the furthest extremes in doing SO. It is no good telling us that we who sympathise, as we do, with our whole heart and strength with their position are mere defenders of lawlessness and anarchy. It is not true. Things have got far beyond that. You are trying to force men whom we know to be loyal subjects of the King, attached to their position as citizens of this kingdom, and ruled by this Parliament, into another rule which they distrust. Under the plea of giving better Government to Ireland, you are bringing terrible unhappiness into every part of the kingdom. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Hon. 1650 Gentlemen below the Gangway know that the measure which they desire must be followed by years of strife and disaster.

§ Mr. HAYDEN
How do you know what we know?

§ Mr. CAVE
We have got to this position-to-day, and I am speaking seriously. You have brought us to this position. Some issue or another must be found out of the deadlock into which we have got. The first alternative is that you should force on your measure and use all the necessary coercion, and that you should produce, if necessary, bloodshed, as the First Lord said, "on an extensive scale." I do not think that in this century you can, or will, take that course. The second alternative is that you should recognise facts, and take the course foreshadowed by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and make some arrangement for the exclusion of Ulster from your Bill. It may be a bitter pill to swallow, but that course may be necessary. The third, the only other way out, is that you should do what we have pressed upon you, refer the question to the jury of the country and ascertain whether you have the people behind you. I say to the right hon. Gentleman that the proposals which he made we take seriously, and will consider seriously; but I hope that he and Members behind him will believe me when I say that our position is serious, too, that we have our own side of the matter to consider, and will give us the consideration which we are willing to give to them.

§ Colonel SEELY
The hon. and learned Gentleman will forgive me for saying that he has shown conclusively how unreal this Debate is. We listened, as we always listen, to him with pleasure, because he always speaks well to the point, but more especially because he is a brilliant exponent of the law. He saw fit to deliver a lecture to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on the question of the lawful use of troops, to which I will refer in a moment. But first, with regard to the Motion—to which the hon. and learned Gentleman devoted a portion of his speech, though not the latter portion—calling attention to the action contemplated by the Government, presumably illegal action in his view, and action quite contrary to the law in Ulster, during all the time of this supposed plot of ours, this hypothetical plot, and yet the law has been broken in Ulster by a plot which is not hypothetical, and which 1651 has been actually carried into effect. So strange a situation I do not think has ever confronted this House before. It is perfectly true to say that the right hon. Member for East Worcestershire was at pains to make no implication in his opening remarks that he in any way condoned those very grave acts of illegality which have occurred—acts, in my judgment, so grave that the Government cannot possibly fail to take the most drastic action in regard to them. All that I have claimed during the years I have been at the War Office, the whole basis of the action of the Army Council, which ultimately ended in the storm which was naturally followed, in the end, by my resignation, was bound up with this point:
The Army in these islands must never be used except within the law. But "within the law," to use the phrase which is to be found in the Army Orders, and which was found in the paragraph to which exception was taken, and which I wrote, "All the forces of the Crown must be available to maintain law and order, to support the Civil power in the ordinary execution of its duties." The civil power has been impeded in the ordinary execution of its duties, not on a small scale, but really on a gigantic scale. No group of workmen on strike has ever committed an outrage so grave as that which was committed only a few days ago, and I think we have a right to know, as a matter of fact I frankly ask it now, and I think we ought to have an answer either to-night or certainly tomorrow, seeing that we are charged, and, for the matter of that, I am charged, that, as Secretary of State, I was primarily responsible for this so-called plot—we are charged, and I am charged with having fomented disturbance by taking illegal action—we have a right to know, and I ask, Does the Leader of the Opposition, or does he not, on behalf of his party, support or condemn the illegal action taken by armed forces in "Ulster? I think we are entitled to have a reply to that question, for it governs the whole course of this Debate, including the words spoken by the hon. and learned Gentleman in the concluding part of his speech. But this I feel bound to say, as it is so intimately connected with the action which has been taken by the Army Council in this matter. It is true, no doubt, that the House is more interested now in the immediate present and in the 1652 future than in the events that are past, but it is my duty to speak not only because the House has a right to know all there is to know, but also because of this fact, which I think has been overlooked by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, that if there were a wicked plot to take illegal action and to massacre defenceless men, those who acted with me as Secretary of State are equally involved in it, men who cannot defend themselves, the members of the Army Council who were associated with me, General Sir Arthur Paget. They also were implicated, and if anything that is said about me be true it involves them also. Therefore, it is right that I should speak for that reason if for no other.
For my part, I should welcome any kind of inquiry, the more inquiry the better; but I do wish to protest against the doctrine put forward by this Motion, that you must have a judicial inquiry on oath if you are to get the truth from a Member of this House. If I say, as I do say, to hon. Gentlemen in all quarters of the House, that what I say is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and if I say to them that no oath that I could possibly take would, in my judgment, seem to me so binding as an honourable obligation that one Member of this House bears to another, to speak the truth in all vital matters. If that be denied, I say that it is a new doctrine which I indignantly repudiate. During my time in this House, which has been comparatively short, though it has been stormy, so far as I am aware, I have never charged any hon. Gentleman with evading speaking the truth, and I expect them to take the same line with regard to myself and other hon. Gentlemen in this House. I speak just then the same as if I had taken not one but fifty oaths. Now for the facts, in order that I may contribute all I can. There were two quite distinct things to be done. The first was the actual movements to be carried out in order to safeguard the arms and stores, and to protect the guns, and the second, and quite distinct point, was the further action to be taken in the event of this move being obstructed, or in the event of grave disorder arising. As to the first, I will not deal at length with the various reasons which made me think, as Secretary of State for War, that it was my duty to recommend the Cabinet to reinforce those garrisons. I had weekly reports from the Irish Government showing the 1653 growing strength and numbers of the Ulster Volunteer forces, and I had reason to believe that though many of them were under discipline that a certain number of them would be undisciplined persons, but, more than this, and this I think will convince the House finally; I knew that there was an intense desire on the part of all members of the Ulster Volunteer forces to get more rifles and to get more ammunition. Had I said this five days ago somebody might have said, how did you know that. In view of what has since occurred, I think nobody will ask further questions. And when I say that there was lying right at hand, so far as I know—and I can only tell from the published reports—more ammunition than was imported in the piratical expedition, for which I suppose the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson) was responsible—was he responsible?

§ Sir E. CARSON
Yes.

§ Colonel SEELY
Yes, quite. Now we know that he was responsible for importing a very large number of rounds of ammunition, some say 1,500,000, some say 2,000,000. There was other ammunition lying ready to hand, with small guards. The criticism directed against me to-night and against the Government—principally against myself—is, Why did you not do it before? To that reply, I took the step at what I thought was the proper moment, and events have proved that it was the proper moment. It was undesirable to run the risk of creating excitement in Ulster until it was absolutely necessary. In point of fact, we chose the right moment. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"] Because we carried out the movements, and the ammunition was not rushed.

§ Viscount CASTLEREAGH
Who was going to rush the ammunition?

§ Colonel SEELY
The fact that other ammunition is bought from overseas has nothing to do with this part of the case. The next point made is that these particular movements were part of a strategic design to surround Ulster preliminary to and, indeed, coincident with a great movement of troops, which, in the words of a Belfast newspaper, were to "shatter the Ulster movement by a day or two of butchery." That is the claim made outside, and it is, in fact, the claim put forward, though not in such violent language, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcestershire.

§ Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
I do not recognise my speech in the paraphrase of the right hon. Gentleman.

§ Colonel SEELY
I was about to say, in order that we may define our terms, that I should like to use a form of words to which the Opposition will agree. If we have done nothing wrong, what is the good of this Motion? The idea was that we were going to use a great force to provoke Ulster into resistance, and then shoot down enough of them—is not that it? [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear."] I thought so; and then shoot down enough of them to make the rest submit. On the point of the movements to Carrickfergus, Omagh, Armagh, Enniskillen, Dundalk, and Newry, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcestershire said that he had had an opportunity of consulting a strategist, and that that strategist had told him that those movements to Omagh, Armagh, Carrickfergus, Newry, Dundalk, and Enniskillen, were well designed as part of a strategic movement. I should very much like to know who that strategist could be; for I can tell him that anybody with the least acquaintance with even the elements of war must know that the first thing you must do, if you contemplate taking the initiative against a foe, is to concentrate your forces and at once to withdraw your outlying weak detachments, and that to dot about at great intervals of 50, 60, and 100 miles, little forces of 100 or 200 men is positively a fantastic proposal. I took the trouble yesterday afternoon to ask Field-Marshal Sir John French, whose knowledge of strategy is, I think, probably equal to that of the adviser of the right hon. Gentleman. I said to him, "I do not know if the ridiculous claim will be made that these particular movements were part of a great plan to take the strategic offensive." He said to me, "As part of any strategic movement, such movements would be idiotic." I said, "Sir John, you put it as high as idiotic?" He said, "Yes, because there is no stronger word." I ask, in all candour, any hon. Member who has ever thought about war, or been to war or even considered a war, to think what idiotic folly it would be, if, in face of considerable opposition, which you might naturally expect, you were going to move 25,000 or more men as part of a great movement to capture Belfast and overawe the population, to dot your little forces about in this way. I hope that will dispose of the matter. If 1655 it does not, may I say that when we decided to reinforce these posts, all these military officers who were present, and whose names have frequently been mentioned in the course of these Debates, pointed out the military dangers of sending such small forces to protect these stores.
It was for that reason that Sir Arthur Paget, as is made plain in the White Paper, proposed to withdraw the ammunition from two of these places, because he thought it was dangerous to put small parties of a hundred men or so in an exposed position. I may be asked why I did not agree to withdraw these stores and all the guns, whose weak position was pointed out to us by our military advisers; indeed, anybody who considers it and who knows what a brigade of Artillery is, must see that their position in the event of any revolutionary people acting, or even any people capable of the mobilisation of 30,000 men, as was done last Friday night, will realise what the danger of the position of a brigade of Artillery unsupported by Infantry must be. It was pointed out to us how dangerous it was to leave these small posts. I said, "That may be all very well," but to withdraw the guns—as I was advised to do—and to withdraw the ammunition and everything else, would give the appearance of retreating before a superior force, and in so doing would infallibly have tended to precipitate the very thing we wished to obviate—a crisis in Ulster and in the South and West of Ireland. Looking back on it all, I think that hon. Members of this House will agree that to have taken the step of making a considerable withdrawal from Omagh, Armagh, Enniskillen, and Dundalk, would have given the impression that we were retreating, and might very easily have precipitated a crisis: certainly it would have given the impression that we were afraid to maintain the King's forces at any place you please, and as such I would not be a party to it. I have endeavoured to dispose, and I hope to the satisfaction of most reasonable men, of the theory that the initial moves were part of a combined movement.
I come to the greater allegation that we did anything to simultaneously pour troops into Ulster to overawe her. I have been asked on this point by my hon. Friends, "Why would there have been 1656 anything wrong if you had done anything of the sort?" I will give the reason. I think it would have been wrong at that time, and for this reason. No over tact of lawlessness had been committed by the people in Ulster, unless the whole proceedings of the creation of the Ulster Volunteer force was in itself illegal. We could hardly take that line in the absence of any new movement, because if so, we ought to have taken it two years before. I share the full responsibility for having taken a view that a force which was avowedly led and organised by a Member of His Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, which was officered in considerable degree by ministers of the Christian religion, whose colours had been blessed by bishops of the Christian church, could not possibly be designed to kill their fellow countrymen. I see the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir Edward Carson) laughs. I think it is a very serious point, a very serious point which justifies our action. And I should like to know what is going to happen now? How can great ministers of religion possibly justify joining a force which, as the Prime Minister said, will not be attacked by the Army unless they break the law, and which therefore can only be designed to kill their own fellow countrymen. I see no answer to that. The situation is very unusual, for to have ministers of the Christian religion as members of a combative force, as the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University knows, is a thing which does not obtain in Regular Armies designed to fight their country's enemies. Is it not rather a strange thing to have ministers of the Christian faith forming part of an Army which can only, ex-hypothesi, be designed to shoot their own fellow countrymen.

§ Lord HUGH CECIL
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Bishop of Deny was killed at the Battle of Boyne?

§ Colonel SEELY
Yes, Sir, I am very well aware that in the bad old days of the Church there were many bishops and ministers who took an active part in killing their fellow men, but I have yet to learn that the faith of the Christian Church is other than that of loving your enemies, and doing good to those who hate you. There is another reason why it would have been wrong to have taken action. My right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland was, at the very 1657 moment that we were carrying out these movements, making an appeal in this House for a settlement of the Irish question. He was appealing for the co-operation of Ulster, and I do not think it would have been right for us to have chosen that particular moment to have taken aggressive action against Ulster. This is what did take place—and here I want to make my own position quite clear. It has been said in many quarters, and repeated to-day, and it was claimed in the "Times" newspaper the day before yesterday—a claim upon which the right hon. Member for East Worcester, I think, seemed largely to have founded his speech—that if we could only know what the Secretary of State for War and the Cabinet Committee had said to Sir Arthur Paget, and what Sir Arthur Paget said to the Secretary of State and the Cabinet Committee, all the mystery would be over. That is a paraphrase of what was in the "Times," but I think it represents the substance of what was said in a portion of his speech by the right hon. Gentleman. That is what took place. We said to Sir Arthur Paget, "You must carry out these movements at Omagh, Armagh, Carrickfergus, Enniskillen, and Dundalk, to which he replied, "I will do so, but the result will be a state of grave commotion in Ireland. I think the moves may be resisted, and in any case, to quote his own words in the last letter which appears in the White Paper—and we had better be quite accurate— I said I personally did not share that opinion, and that I thought that the moves would create extense excitement and that the country—and if not the country then the Press—would be ablaze on the following day. That was the view Sir Arthur Paget took. As he stated in that letter, we did not share that view.

§ Mr. T. M. HEALY
Why did you allow Sir Arthur Paget to overawe the Chief Secretary, the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary to the Admiralty?

§ Colonel SEELY
Sir Arthur Paget did not overawe us at all. On the contrary, he said: "I think there is grave risk in making these movements," and, as published in the White Paper, it shows he did not actually make the precautionary movements because he was so afraid it might precipitate a crisis, which we all so wished to avoid. I take the fullest responsibility for having said, whatever the consequences, we must by lawful acts protect those stores against unlawful acts. Far from Sir Arthur Paget having overruled 1658 us, it is perfectly true to say that we overruled Sir Arthur Paget, although he adhered to the view that it might cause grave trouble. We said that, whatever the consequences, it must be done. Sir A. Paget said: "Yes, but suppose I am right; suppose these movements are opposed by armed forces, or whether they are opposed or not, the actual movement causes a state of grave disorder in Belfast, and possibly, in other parts of Ireland as a consequence thereof, may I expect then to receive adequate reinforcements?" To which we replied, "Certainly." Now comes the plot. Sir Arthur Paget was asked what number of troops he would require in the event, which we thought improbable, of a grave state of disorder arising. What he wanted was to be able to retain practically the whole of the forces he now has in the South and West of Ireland, and to bring his force in the North of Ireland up to about 25,000 men. If that is a plot, I wish to say this: We said at once, "Cerainly you shall have that and more than that." If I am accused of a plot I go further, and on my own responsibility, I said, "not only may you have a force to bring you up to any number of thousands you may require to maintain law and order, but you can have as many more as you find necessary, even to the last man." We said then, for the first time, what I said again at a more critical time, which ended in my downfall, that the forces of the Crown shall be available to support law and order and the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty. That was what we said. If that be a plot, then I say no Government who does not make such a plot ought to remain in Office.
As I now speak from an independent place, I go further and say that I shall support any Government that maintains this plot, and I shall oppose any Government that shrinks from taking the necessary steps to maintain law and order. There is a material point here which was referred to by the First Lord of the Admiralty. It is said that we secretly plotted to do this. I have told the House that it was our bounden duty to do it, and we should have failed in our duty if we had not done it. We are asked, why did the troops not go? I say it would have been wrong to send them at that very moment. Why did they not go? Did they refuse to go? Not a man has disobeyed any order given. Then why did they not go? The only other 1659 possible explanation is that counter orders were issued. I have taken the trouble to inquire. No counter orders of any kind have been issued, and I am therefore right in saying, if this be a plot, so long as I was Secretary of State the plot stood, and, so far as I am aware, the plot now stands. I am here to defend those who have been wrongly attacked, and I do believe that great officers of the Army have been grossly attacked. If one tithe of the things that have been said by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen were true, you have got to assume that some of our greatest soldiers have been guilty of nefarious designs to illegally kill their fellow - men. What I have said to-night does, I hope, dispose of that; but I come for one moment to a point of substance and of importance. I may be asked, "Why, if you take this strong view that you have now expressed, did you take the other line in condoning the indiscipline of certain officers?" To that I reply, "First of all, there was no indiscipline, but there was some misunderstanding, and all that has happened, I think, will show how great this misunderstanding was." I do not want this Debate to result in unfair accusations against anyone. I have heard the name of one particular officer loudly cheered by my hon. Friends in this House. I mean Colonel Hogg, who showed in a special degree a desire to render faithful service to the Crown. This was apprehended by my hon. Friends, and for that reason, to my surprise I confess and to my gratification, when his name was mentioned it was greeted with loud cheers. Have my hon. Friends realised that so complete was the misapprehension that this gallant officer—I do not wish to differentiate him from others, but I wish to point out that they cheered him because they were sure that he wished to render exceptionally loyal service to the Crown—when put this question himself refused to agree? I do claim that was the justification for myself, though I do not wish to defend myself in the matter at all—I have done with my own personal part in it—absolute justification for the line taken by the great officers associated with me. "We will make it quite clear to all concerned that no illegal action shall be taken, but all lawful action shall be taken." And for that reason the document was given to the officer. Let it not be supposed for a moment that anything 1660 then done by them, and of course by myself—I was the principal responsible—was so wholly and utterly subversive of discipline that there was any idea of making a special bargain with a particular group of officers and men. Such a proceeding would have been grossly unfair to the rest of the Army. To say, in effect, "All the rest of the Army is to do a disagreeable duty in support of law and order, but you shall be specially exempted," is a thing so unthinkable that I ask the House to accept this statement that any such idea was remote from the minds of any responsible person. What was said was meant as a distinct declaration of policy. It was wrong no doubt to put it into a document and give it into the hands of a particular officer—that was my fault; but as a statement of policy no hon. Gentleman has challenged one word of it, and, if he does, I shall be very glad to hear his ground. The whole matter has now become academic, for, be it observed, under the two paragraphs, as stated by Lord Morley in the House of Lords, all the forces of the Crown are now available for service in Ulster. Let us hope and trust that the forces of the Crown will not be required in Ulster, and let us realise that event more smoothly and take into account the Prime Minister's declaration of the 27th March last. Let us know clearly what the position is. The Army order was referred to by one speaker as unnecessary, and by another as an insult, but the Prime Minister's declaration that the Army will not be asked to perform any service outside the terms of that order makes it perfectly clear that the law will be respected as to the use of the troops, and makes it equally clear that every man, whether he be a soldier, a sailor, or even a civilian, is bound to assist the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty.
I hope and trust we may find a solution of the Irish question. It is quite true, I care more for Home Rule than I do for my own proper pride. It is quite true, I do regard it as the most vital issue before us, but I also regard it as vital that we should not, if we can possibly avoid it, fight against the Army on a false issue. If the Army obey all lawful orders in support of the civil power for Heaven's sake let us not commit the error, or indeed the great folly, that of bitterly opposing brave men who have served the Liberal party in the past just as much and just as faithfully as they have served the party 1661 opposite. I do honestly believe that the Army is only concerned with this, to make quite sure that they shall have lawful orders to obey. If I dwell upon that, it is because I am aware of the fact, which I think my hon. Friends may not be aware of, that every officer in the Army is bound to know the law as stated by the Prime Minister in his declaration of the law in response to the Motion of the Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Keir Hardie). He is bound to know the law in order to remain in the Army; he has to pass an examination which involves a knowledge of military law, which lays it down clearly that if he acts unlawfully, even under orders, he is liable to be tried by the Civil Court and possibly to be condemned for murder. The Army cares much more about observing lawful orders than about anything concerning Ulster or the Irish question. I hope and believe there will be no further trouble of this kind, and if anything I can do will avoid it, it shall be done. My last word must be this: That the trouble which has arisen has now passed, and a new situation which has been caused has been caused by the definite defiance of the forces of the Crown in Ulster last Friday. All questions of plot and whether orders are lawful or not, have now disappeared, the law has been broken on a grand scale, and I say the law must be vindicated at all costs.