HC Deb 21 January 1913 vol 47 cc376-84
Mr. BAIRD

I desire to call attention to a subject, of which I have given the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial I Secretary notice, namely, the condition of the interior of Somaliland. I asked the right hon. Gentleman in October last a question on the subject, and his reply was that he regretted to state that there had been recently a considerable amount of inter-tribal fighting and looting among the friendly tribes, and that the formation of a native camel corps 150 strong had been approved with a view to taking the necessary police measures. I can understand that hon. Members opposite who, although they sit in the Imperial Parliament, take no interest whatever in Imperial affairs, should laugh at a matter which has no votes attaching to it and cannot possibly affect their electoral prospects. Having lived amongst these unfortunate Somalis, and realising to what a condition of affairs the policy of His Majesty's Government has reduced them, I venture to raise the question in the House in an endeavour to elicit more information from the right hon. Gentleman than he has seen fit to vouchsafe so far. On the 15th of this month I again asked the right hon. Gentleman whether he could give any information with regard to the state of affairs in Somaliland. The reply was:— So far as I am aware, there have been no recent developments of importance in the interior, with the exception of a dervish raid on the Dolbahanta Jama Siad, in which the latter lost about 400 camels and had two men killed. The phrase "so far as I am aware," is unfortunate, because, after all, we are responsible for the country, and if the Secretary for the Colonies is not aware of what is going on in the interior of Somaliland, who can be? You come to the Dolbahanta raid where they lost 400 camels—that is an exceedingly severe loss for these people. Camels are their sole wealth, and if they lose them it means ruin for a large number of people who are just as much entitled to the protection of this House as are the payers of Super-tax in this country. That apparently does not seem to move the Colonial Office very much. With regard to the coast district, steps are being taken— the right hon. Gentleman continued— and with considerable success, to put a stop to intertribal raiding. An engagement recently took place in which the Government camel Corps heavily defeated a body of raider." [OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th January, col. 2051, Vol. XLVI.] I think the coastal district was precisely that portion of the Protectorate which we decided to retain when we gave up the remainder. I suppose it is admitted we have given up the remainder? At any rate, we did not enforce law and order in the interior, and it was to be supposed that on the coast we might have obtained order! The House will welcome some additional information in regard to the operations in the coastal district.

With regard to the whole question, I should like to remind the House of a portion of the speech made by the present Secretary of State for War when he was Under-Secretary for the Colonies. A certain number of us on this side bitterly opposed—and from knowledge, because we had been in the country, and served there—the proposals of the Government in regard to the evacuation of the interior. The right hon. Gentleman, with that genial and confident optimism that we so welcome, said:— It is very likely in our view, and in this we are supported by our military advisers, that the fact that we are abandoning those ports wilt, in the long run, make the lot of the people in Somaliland far happier and far better. We criticised that. In the later portion of his speech the right hon. Gentleman said:— I think I have disposed of the question of the friendly tribes by a reference to the Blue Hook, where it is plainly stated that the withdrawal was to be continued on their being able to protect themselves. That is a delightful way—settling the friendly tribes by a reference to a Blue Book, It looks like the paper safeguard in another sphere! It has the same effect, and is as efficient! So far as the friendly people are concerned, it matters little whether they are handed over to the Mullah of Warsawgel's country or any other Mullah! I raise this point because the Somalis are great travellers. They wander to the southern part of Africa, and to the Soudan, and the state of affairs in Somaliland is such that it is derogatory to the credit of the British Government, and cannot help having an unfortunate effect on the other tribes over which we hold sway at the present time, and on this country, where it is necessary that our name should be respected, as it has been in the past. In this connection I should like to quote an extract from a paper published in British East Africa. It says—dealing with the Annual Report on the Somaliland Protectorate:— This document deals entirely with the coastal administration, and contains not a syllable relating to the anarchic condition of the interior, which is the dual outcome of the policy introduced two years ago. That is written in a country where a large number of the very best Somalis emigrate from the coast for business, or go there as hunters or settlers, or for some other purpose. They read this, and it cannot enhance their feelings of respect or regard towards the British Government that has let them down so badly. The paper says:— The Government have all along endeavoured to suppress this kind of information. I do not say they have suppressed it, but they are without information in any shape or form. They have scuttled out of the country and left the people there to shift for themselves as best they can. Having been supplied with a vast number of arms, and a great quantity of ammunition, the natives have every facility for carrying on tribal disputes which were more or less harmless when they were armed with spears, but which are now very serious when they are armed with Martini-Henry rifles and great quantities of ammunition. That cannot redound to the credit of this country. I turn to this Report, and it is true that there are a few references to Somaliland for which we are still responsible. Until we have given it over to somebody else we are responsible for that country, and for law and order there, because we have not done what the Secretary for War said we should do until we, namely, evacuate the country, after we had made certain provisions for the natives to protect themselves. If you look at the last Report on the Somalis the references to the state of the tribes in the interior are sufficiently sinister to warrant the statements made in the Paper from which I have quoted. Here is one phrase:— Coincident with the stoppage of Grants owing to the evacuation of the interior there is an unprecedented demand for skins and hides. That is the case because they cannot get to the coast. There is no credit because we cleared out of the country. That does not seem to bear out the suggestion of the Secretary for War that the people would be happier and far better oft when these posts in the interior were abandoned. There is another passage in which reference is made to the unsettled condition of the hinterland of Berbera. That is not very satisfactory, and you have reference made to the departure of the European officers and Indian troops and to the suspension of building operations and the inability of the natives to purchase luxuries which cause a relative degree of suffering. They are not better off, and they cannot afford to purchase luxuries that they could get when they were governed by us. I am not going to elaborate these points. In the present condition of business in this House this is the only occasion on which it is possible to raise a question of this sort, the importance of which I venture to think is far greater than some hon. Members opposite seem to think. It is not only Somaliland, it is a question of our relations with all the subject races with which we have to deal as masters. They have been led to trust us. In Somaliland treaties have been made by request of Governments of the party opposite as well as by the Governments of the party on this side of the House. On the strength of these treaties the Somalis yielded up in the past institutions they enjoyed and placed themselves under what they believe to be, and had reason to believe to be, was the protection of the Union Jack. If you withdraw that protection you produce the state of chaos that existed before, but ten times worse, because those people are no longer able to protect themselves as they were in the past. It is because of the information I received from Somaliland in private letters, which I am willing to show to the right hon. Gentleman, but which I am sure he would not wish me to read in the House, showing that the condition of affairs is chaotic and derogatory to the British flag, that I venture to ask for more information than it was possible for me to exact by a method of question and answer across the floor of the House.

The SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Harcourt)

I do not complain of the inquiries which the hon. Gentleman has made. I am happy to assure him that the whole of my information leads me to believe that there is nothing serious whatever in the situation in the interior of Somaliland. He knows that there has always been an inclination to tribal looting. That has gone on for some considerable time. The hon. Member, I think, is wrong in thinking that they have an unlimited amount of ammunition, although I know they have arms. Most of their ammunition has been expended, and they find much difficulty in getting fresh supplies suitable for the weapons they possess. In order to stop any tribal looting I thought it desirable that steps should be taken, and last summer I authorised the raising of a camel constabulary of roughly about 150 men and three officers. That constabulary was completed, and seemed to be a very promising and admirable force by the early days of December. One tribe caused us a good deal of trouble, or rather a combination of tribes, who were looting caravans on the way to the coast. They were also raiding tribes which were our friends. It seemed necessary, therefore, to take some steps to stop these raids and looting. A small detachment of the 119th Infantry, which had been detailed from Aden to garrison Berbera, some time before, was moved inland from Berbera, and the Camelry moved at the same time to a place in the direction of Hargeisa. There they met and engaged the tribes, and the Camelry were completely successful. The tribes lost thirty-eight men. The constabulary had two of the Friendlies who were with them wounded, and captured 1,280 camels, 1,300 sheep, 170 cows, and six horses. They have now returned to Berbera. The whole conduct of the neighbourhood is much more satisfactory in consequence of the action we have taken. I have no disturbing reports of any kind, and in relation to these operations our thanks are due to those in charge of the Camelry, Mr. Corfield and Mr. Gibb, who so admirably manoeuvred the forces at their disposal, and more especially to the Commissioner, Mr. Byatt, for the way in which he has conducted the administration of Somaliland for the last twelve months.

Mr. GLAZEBROOK

As one who has taken a very deep interest for several years in Somaliland, I should like to give a very short sketch of what has been going on in that country. Of course, there has always been inter-tribal fighting and feuds from time immemorial, 'but during the British occupation those feuds were in a state of suspension and there was comparative prosperity in the country. Now that we have evacuated the country and handed over a large number of rifles, I think 20,000, to the Friendlies to protect themselves against the Mullah the inter-tribal fighting 'has broken out again throughout a very large portion of that country. The Mullah, partly probably for purposes of revenge and partly to collect rifles, has been attacking those small bodies which have been supporting us and whom we have now left in the lurch. I travelled through the country before the evacuation. Then there was no sign of fighting anywhere. I have now just returned from it again since the evacuation, and though of course the country is closed and one may not penetrate into (he interior, I must confess that I did not keep strictly within the law, and I was very much struck with the extraordinary difference. The white men were confined to the towns and the trade routes were impassable. The Habr Yunis were raiding over the Abyssinian border. I attended the Law Courts, and found that there were many cases nearly all connected with cattle or camels. When members of our tribes, British subjects, tried to bring a case of any kind for damage to camels or cattle looted by Abyssinian tribes, the response was invariably the same. They admitted that there might have been looting by their tribes, but said that our tribes were far worse, and that we did nothing to control them owing to the evacuation. The result was that nothing could be done by our Consuls or officials to help these tribes, who relied on their status as British subjects and claimed damages against the Abyssinians. I also heard strong rumours of fighting going on on the coast east of Berbera, and I was told by the natives there that a cruiser had even been sent out within a few days of my arrival for the purpose of taking up certain officials to investigate the result of that fighting amongst, I believe, the Toljaala tribe. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman could give us any information of what fighting there was on the coast among the Toljaala tribe. The fighting in the interior is not only on our side of the border, but all along the border line, and fighting has increased on the other side of the border in the Abyssinian territory. For instance, the Habr Awal and Abbasque were actually conducting a raid in my presence, and they successfully looted about 1,100 cattle within two miles of my camp. They killed several men, and apparently there was not the least sign of any attempt on the part of any of the authorities to inquire into the raid or to check the raiders in any way. Perhaps I might be allowed to suggest a remedy. I admit the camel corps was extraordinarily popular. The mere news that the camel corps was coming was looked upon as a practical promise that British occupation was to begin again. Every chief of any importance on the border line used to come into our camp and ask us if we could do anything to bring the English back. They were pretty keen to get rid of the English, but as soon as they had gone they realised they had been pretty useful, because they found that they could not organise themselves and combine against the Mullah, or suppress the turbulent elements in their own midst; and they now demanded that we should go back and protect them practically against themselves. If we could possibly occupy Hargeisa, which is practically the capital of the western half of Somaliland, I believe the effect would be that the whole western portion would again be under control, and that raiding would practically cease. The caravan routes which are now closed could easily be opened if Hargeisa was again the centre of English occupation. If the right hon. Gentleman could only see his way to reoccupy Hargeisa by keeping up the camel corps, which I presume he will be doing, we should be able again to give that protection to the tribes we have taken away from them, and justify the title of "Protectorate."

Sir RANDOLF BAKER

In the few moments which are left to me, I should like to comment on the extraordinary difference between the speech of the right hon. Gentleman and the account he gave us of British Somaliland, and the speech of my hon. Friend who really knows the country. On the one hand, we had the rosy optimistic view taken by the Colonial Oflice of a few slight raids, and, on the other hand, we hear of tribes fighting one another continually, and of a state of raiding all over the country. I noticed the way in which hon. Members opposite received those statements, apparently paying no attention whatever. Does anyone feel surprised that so many people on the Continent look upon us as arrant hypocrites. We cry out about the Armenian atrocities, about the Congo troubles, and about the affairs of Putu-mayo, and here we have a country which we have evacuated, and which, I believe, we shall be forced to occupy again. We are allowing the friendly natives to be raided by the Mullah. I have heard stories of what is going on in Berbera—a place full of half-starved people—and many of the weaker Friendlies are being driven into a state of absolute destitution. Surely we are responsible for the state of affairs described by the hon. Gentleman. If the right hon. Gentleman will only go into the matter more fully and get more accurate reports of what is happening, and of what the Mullah is doing in the southern part of the country, I think he will realise what is essential for British prestige throughout the whole of South Africa. I, for one, think it is absolutely essential we should reoccupy that portion of the country.

Mr. BOOTH

I do not think the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has been quite fair to this side of the House. I listened to every word of the Debate, and I think the general view is that the subject brought before the House is a very suitable matter to be brought forward. I should be sorry to think that the Government I support could not stand half an hour's criticism on its foreign and Colonial policy from hon. Members who have special knowledge of the topic. The conversations to which the hon. Member referred did not indicate a failure to realise the seriousness of the situation. But the hon. Member in his speech introduced the subject of the Super-tax and the Irish question, and was it not quite natural that hon. Members should indulge in some quiet comments among themselves. I am sure hon. Members welcomed the interposition of the hon. Member for South Manchester and of other hon. Members who speak with such knowledge. So far as I am concerned, I would join a little issue with them. I did not intervene earlier in the Debate because I feel it is the natural province of an Opposition to criticise, but I think that in the circumstances I might utter a word of caution. I fail to realise that it is our duty to look over the whole of the globe and be prepared to be moral policemen to interfere in every little tribal conflict. You might just as well say that because there is a conflict in the Balkans, it is our duty to interfere and do something because some people are being killed there. It is purely a question of degree. Hon. Members opposite apparently think that they cannot only run the Empire, but the whole of Africa and some other places, and that we have only to send them out in charge of a few camels and a few obsolete rifles, and the whole thing will be over, and the blacks and coloured men will be smoking the pipe of peace, superintended only by the Members of the Opposition. I am quite willing that they should go. I should have no objection whatever to that. If they perform any useful service of that kind, Members on this side of the House will offer up prayers that they should have a safe journey.

It being half an hour after the conclusion of Government business, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put.

Adjourned at Twenty-eight minutes before Twelve o'clock.