HC Deb 01 August 1913 vol 56 cc952-67

Where it appears to the Commissioners on any occasion for the collection of Increment Value Duty, which is a transfer on sale of the fee simple of land, or of any interest in land, or the grant of any lease of land, that the amount of the gross value of the land is more than double the amount of the full site value of the land, the site value of the land on the occasion, if the person chargeable with duty so requires, shall instead of being calculated under Section 2 of the Finance (1909–10) Act, 1910, (in this Act referred to as "the principal Act") be taken to be the site value of the land estimated as on that occasion in accordance with the general provisions of the principal Act as to valuation, with the substitution of the date of the occasion for the thirtieth day of April, nineteen hundred and nine.

Mr. ROYDS

I beg to move, to leave out the words "that the amount of the gross value of the land is more than double the amount of the full site value of the land."

It appears to me this Clause is the very kernel of the Bill and I think the Bill is introduced to carry out the provisions contained in this Clause. The Clause, as it stands, is not quite satisfactory. The need for the Clause is because claims for Increment Value Duty have been made where there has been no rise in the value of the land. I think it is hardly understood that the whole basis of Increment Value Duty was that it was only to be charged when there was a rise in the bare value of the-land after 30th April, 1909. But claims have been made where there was no rise in the value of the site, and these claims have been contested in the Law Courts. Such claims were made in the Lumsden case and in the Richmond case; in the Lumsden case it was a charge upon the builder's profits, and in the Richmond case it was a charge upon the profits of a private individual, where there had been no profit, but where there had been an actual loss. Both claims were made upon the ground that the properties were sold for more than they were worth, although in one case it was the builder's profit, and in the other it was an actual less, and in neither case had there been any rise in the value since 1909. That was admitted by the Government valuer as well as by the valuer for the owner. The Chancellor of the Exchequer justifies the claim for Increment Value Duty in these two cases on the ground that the property had been sold in both cases for more than it was worth, and that the excess of price was in the nature of a fortuitous windfall. In neither case had there been any rise in the value of the land. These claims are, I think, only possible because of the White Paper instructions issued some time ago. By these instructions the valuers were empowered or directed in arriving at the value of property to disregard the price. The price was wholly divorced from their calculation, and it was in consequence of these instructions that it has been possible to make these claims at all. My opinion has always been, and is still, that if these White Paper instructions were withdrawn, there would be no need for this Clause at all, and the position would be far more satisfactory than if this Clause was adopted in the form in which it is put forward. And that we have good ground for taking that view is, I think, clearly shown by the judgment of Lord Justice Swinfen Eady, which endorsed in its entirety the line we have been taking.

The CHAIRMAN

The hon. Member appears to be discussing the Clause as a whole. That can be done when we dispose of the Amendments. This Amendment proposes to leave out certain words "that the amount of the gross value of the land is more than double the amount of the full site value of the land." That is quite a small point.

Mr. ROYDS

It appears to be a small point, and 1 really could not explain the effect of these words unless I led up to it by a short statement. I am not making that statement with any other purpose than that of enabling the Committee to 'understand the introduction of these words. It now appears from the judgment of Lord Justice Swinfen Eady that the Commissioners were perfectly wrong in taking another course and in issuing these White Paper instructions directing the purchase price to be disregarded. The figures that we are anxious to get are those of the bare value of the land. This White Paper enabled the valuer to disregard the price, and so we have had all this trouble. Had the Government not issued the White Paper instructions, or if they were to withdraw them, there would be no need for this Clause at all. At the eleventh hour they have introduced this Clause, and the effect of it will be, if it is passed, that in the future the increment value will be collected as a matter of pure valuation, but it will not be payable unless there has been a rise in the value of the site. Unfortunately, this Clause, as prepared by the Government, only relates to what is called composite property, and it has to be of a particular nature and the gross value has to be double the value of the full site. That means that it will cover an average house and land, but not agricultural land or property with a house upon it where the house is not double the value of the laud. Therefore, a very great part of the land of the country will be excluded.

The effect of the Clause will be that this pernicious system, which the House has never before sanctioned, of taxing land where there has been no rise in the value of the site, will be continued in regard to all land which does not come within the rule that the gross value is double the value of the site. The object of my Clause is to make this new provision extend to all land without regard to the comparative value of the gross and full site value. I should like to make it clear that the effect of this Clause will be that the increment will be assessed on the difference between the two values—that is, the original value and the value on the occasion. The price which the owner gets will have nothing to do with it. The owner may snake a profit or a loss. He may get a higher price or he may sell it at less than it is worth, but none of those facts influence the amount of the increment. A statutory defined benefit is being set up in this case. In the case of reversion the benefit is deemed to be not the cash that comes into the man's pocket, not the benefit 'which he actually receives, but a statutory defined benefit, which is very often a great deal less than the benefit he actually receives. The effect of this Clause will be that you are setting up a statutory defined increment and the Increment Duty to be paid will have no relation to the cash that comes into the man's pocket or his profit or loss on the transaction.

This Clause will put a direct premium upon owners to exact as high a price for their property as possible, because if they sell for less they will have to pay on the value placed upon it by the Government valuer. If an owner of land sells a piece of land for a chapel or a school or institute at less than its full value, say, for £300 when it is worth £500, he would be assessed on the £500, although he was willing to sell the land for £300 for this particular purpose. If this Clause is passed into law it will have that effect. It removes one grievance and it does confine the taxation to a rise in the site value of land. My Amendment extends that concession to all lands, whether it is composite property or not, whereas the Clause as inserted in the Bill confines it to composite property only and leaves it open to the Government to continue this irregular process of taxing land where there has been no rise in the value of the site. The House, I am sure, will desire to reinstate itself in the position in which it was when it authorised this tax upon a bonâ fide rise in site value. This Clause brings us back to that position, and the House has never sanctioned, and I hope will not sanction to-day, any taxation except upon a bonâfide rise in the value of land.

The CHAIRMAN

May I point out that I do not think it is desirable to discuss the Clause as a whole on this Amendment?

Sir J. TUDOR WALTERS

This Amendment is the very way to arrive at the unfortunate position where a landowner may sell land for less than it is worth. That could only be accomplished by accepting the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman opposite. The difficulty we are faced with in the Lumsden Judgment and in the matter of builders' profits is the difficulty of finding out the price that has been obtained for a composite property of land and buildings. If you sell merely land and take the price paid for the land, it presents no difficulty, because it does not require any dissection. It is a definite price, and the process of calculation is very simple, but the difficulty arises when you sell a composite property—namely, a house standing on a piece of land and you want to find out the value of the land. You find it out by a process of deduction. You take the price paid for the composite property and deduct the value of the bricks and mortar and you assume that the remainder is land. That is where the great hardship arises because that means all the profit and all the windfall in the sale of a house is brought into the site value and on that you have to pay increment. These words simply say that when you sell a house and land for a certain fixed price instead of arriving at the site value by that complicated and unsatisfactory process of deduction you simply put this one question, what is the site of this house worth if divested of the buildings? You have it in the original valuation and you get it on an occasion, and, unless it has risen in value, you will not pay Increment Duty and not one penny will be attributed to the buildings. I think that the particular words the Chancellor of the Exchequer has adopted safeguard the matter of land. It is because of the exceedingly complicated nature of the Act that you must have some device of this kind. I am not putting it forward as ideal, but, having found it almost impossible to assess the increment on a piece of land on which there is a building when you have only the composite price before you, you must adopt some words of this sort and to omit the words as suggested would make nonsense.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I agree to a certain extent with the hon. Gentleman who has deep knowledge of the subject, but he did not really deal with the point. Why should you draw the line at the case where the buildings are of greater value than the land? That is the whole point of the Amendment. The hon. Member has pointed out that these Amendments are caused by the extraordinary complication of the principal Act, and we are in a great difficulty in passing legislation of this character which must impose heavy burdens on the subject in the form of taxation quite outside the taxes imposed. We ought, therefore, to take care not to tax people we do not intend to tax. The Clause with these words in draws an arbitrary line. The owner of any composite property where the buildings are of higher value than the land upon which they stand gets a privilege conferred by this Clause, because if the sale price involves an increment he will have the alternative of asking that the land should be revalued, and of paying only on the difference between the original value and the value on the occasion. That privilege is not conferred on all composite property, but only on that particular kind where the value of the buildings exceeds the value of the land on which they stand. On what possible ground is that distinction made? I suppose that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will say that it is necessary to draw the line somewhere. I do not see why it is necessary to draw the line, or why the owner of any land with buildings upon it should not have the right to claim this particular option which is conferred by this Clause. There are many trades and industries where the value of the buildings upon the land does not exceed the value of the land, and why those particular properties should be excluded from this benefit I fail to under- stand. Perhaps the Chancellor of the Exchequer will explain why he has thought it necessary to draw this line.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

That is what I propose to do. I cannot follow the hon. Member (Mr. Royds) into what seemed to me to be a general dissertation, not merely upon this Clause, but also upon some of the difficulties outside the Clause altogether. The point is a very small one. I am asked, "Why should you draw a distinction between land where the buildings exceed a certain value in reference to the land and land where the buildings are beneath that value?" I want to safeguard this case: There is a piece of land which is valued at £50 or £100 an acre and is not worth more. The moment there is a public demand for it for a communal purpose and the county council buys it for the purpose of building a school, a charge of £900 or £1,000 is made in respect of the land. There are many cases of that kind. I have seen worthless pieces of waste land sold at extravagant prices purely because the community wanted the land for a public purpose. I do not see why, when you bring in a Clause for the purpose of protecting the builder against having his profit taxed, you should give the protection to the person who really spends no money upon the land. The difficulty in the case of composite property is to value the site of the building. It is difficult to say how much increment is due to the buildings and how much to the land. There was a danger that you might attribute an increase in the value of the land to what was really due to the skill of the builder as a salesman, and therefore, in order to protect people like Mr. Lumsden, we have introduced this Clause, but we do not want to let the other vendor of land escape. I agree that the hon. and gallant Gentleman put very fairly the argument which I would urge in answer to his criticism. I say that you must draw the line at some point or other, and I say that this is a very fair way of putting it. In the vast majority of cases this would really only be covering the case where the value of the building was insignificant in comparison with the value of the land.

Mr. PRETYMAN

You are introducing an unnecessary complication. I quite take the right hon. Gentleman's point and that the House would not wish to exempt such a case. There would otherwise be no object in having an Increment Duty. It exists for the purpose of the case of a piece of land such as the right hon. Gentleman described which apparently has no great value and which is sold for a very much higher value. I venture to suggest, however, that his point is met by this ordinary fact referred to in Lord Justice Swinfen Eady's judgment. When land is sold at a certain price, unless there is some strong reason to the contrary, the fact of it having been sold for that price is absolute evidence of its value. Is it conceivable, supposing a man succeeded in selling a piece of land to a public authority for £1,000, and he was charged Increment Duty on the basis of that sale, that any Court would decide that £1,000 was not the value of the land? If it did, the public authority would be convicted of having committed an act absolutely contrary to their duty. If the public authority buys the land at a certain price, I believe any Court Would hold that that price is the value of the land. There is the protection.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

Assuming Increment Duty is to be levied at all, then that is a fair case, and it is merely a question, of introducing words which will meet it. I cannot think of any better form of words than those I have suggested. But I cannot agree that you can leave it to be dealt with as a matter of ordinary interpretation. Suppose you have to value the land a second time, would any value say that, the site value had gone up from £50 to £1,000 in a year or so? Is it not the case that the landowner has taken advantage of the needs of the community to secure, a price which is out of proportion to the real value of the land?

Sir F. BANBURY

The seller takes advantage of the demand in order to get his price.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I am not criticising the action of the vendor. I only say it is a case in which he should pay Increment Duty. Does the hon. Baronet deny-that?

Sir F. BANBURY

I do.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

Then the hon. Baronet is not in agreement with the hon. and gallant Gentleman who replied to me.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I think the House is trying to legislate on a fiction. Market price does not mean value, and if you go into that region of hypothesis and begin to argue thereupon, if you begin to say the price may be one thing and the value something wholly different—and such a case might conceivably arise—you will do a great deal more harm than good by imagining such a case. A man will always get the best price he can, and, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, the price paid for a particular piece of land would be accepted in any Court of Law as evidence of the value of that piece of land. But that has nothing to do with the value of the adjoining piece of land. If a similar demand subsequently arose for the adjoining piece of land, it might fetch the same price or it might not. But we need not legislate for imaginary cases of that kind.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

We have to safeguard ourselves in cases of that kind. Assuming that Increment Duty is to be levied, that is a case in which it should be paid, and I want to get some words into the Bill which will make it perfectly clear that in such a case the vendor is liable to Increment Duty on the difference between the recorded value of the land and the price which he gets for it. If the words I have suggested do not command the assent of hon. Gentlemen opposite, I am quite willing to accept any other words which will meet the case, but I cannot agree that it would be conclusive evidence of the value of the land, that £1,000 has been paid for it. Unless I get something clearer to make the man liable in such a case I must adhere to the words which appear here.

Sir F. BANBURY

The right hon. Gentleman asked me if I approved of the Increment Duty. I was bound to give a truthful answer, and I said I do not approve of it. But that has nothing to do with the question now before the Committee. That question is that the gross value shall be determined by the price which is obtained for that niece of land in the open market, and my hon. Friend desires to leave out words in order that, instead of having a hypothetical value put on the gross value of the land, a value which merely originates in the brain of certain people who are sent down, what the land actually fetches shall be taken to be the gross value. That is the question at issue, I take it, before the Committee.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

It certainly is not.

The CHAIRMAN

I do not think the hon. Baronet can have read the Amendment.

Sir G. YOUNGER

I only want to say I entirely agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Chelmsford that in the case which the right hon. Gentleman has put forward, where land is purchased for school purposes, if Increment Duty is to be levied at all, it is perfectly right it should be levied in that case. But why in the world should you put into the Clause words which, while restricting the advantage to the builder, will take away the advantage from other people. Why adopt a form of words which is going to restrict it to cases where the composite value of the property is not double the amount of the land value? It is ridiculous to use a form of words which will give the advantage to one and take it away from the other.

Mr. CASSEL

It seems to me that the Amendment has been lost sight of in the discussion. What is the unit of the land? It depends on the accident of the amount of land which is included in one particular sale or lease. You may have a case where the land is sold in two plots. This Section would apply if the land was all sold in one plot, but not in the case where it was sold in two plots. It might apply if both plots were sold separately, but if they were sold together it might not apply because you would have more land, and the land and buildings together would not be worth more than the price obtained for the land. Suppose the unit is an estate under development with two or three buildings on it, and the larger part still undeveloped. If the whole unit was included in one sale, the gross value would not be more than double the site value. But if, instead of selling in one piece you sold it in two separate pieces on two separate occasions, then the one piece which had the building on it would get the benefit of the Section. It would depend on the mere accident of the quantity of land which happens to be included in one particular transaction. Surely that is unreasonable. We have had it clearly expressed by the Court of Appeal that the Act as it stands at present taxes builders' profits, and I submit that the right hen. Gentleman has to make it perfectly clear that in no case shall builders' profits be taxed and that it shall not depend on the mere accident of the partition of land included in any particular transaction. I submit that this form of words would only be sufficient to exempt the builder from taxation in the case where the partition of land was so arranged as to work out that the composite property was worth more than twice the value of the land. As to the danger which the right hon. Gentleman apprehends in the case of the school to which he referred, I think that is imaginary.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

Oh, no!

Mr. CASSEL

I agree it aught to be subject to Increment Duty.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I had a case in my own county.

Mr. CASSEL

I did not say these were imaginary cases. What I said was that the fear of the right hon. Gentleman that in a case of that kind the land would not be subject to Increment Value Duty, even if he accepted this Amendment, is imaginary. What is it the valuer has to say? He is asked to say what the property might be expected to realise. He knows that the land for this school has realised a certain amount. You imagine that a valuer goes down, and, knowing it has realised a certain amount, that he erroneously proceeds to say it may be expected to realise something quite different. That is really the imaginary danger with which the right hon. Gentleman is dealing. So far as these particular words are concerned, I think they are subject to the criticism that I pointed out in regard to the mere accident of the sale of a particular plot.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I do not want to dispute about mere wards, so long as the Opposition agree in substance. If the Opposition agree that the sort of case I have indicated is the fair subject matter for taxation, I do not want to have a dispute as to the mere form of words to be used for the purpose of meeting a case of that kind. I will promise this, that I will consider with my advisers, between now and the Report stage, whether some other form of words could not be adopted which would not be open to the objections hon. Gentlemen opposite have pointed out. I may say I have consulted them since the Debate has arisen, and I am told that hon. Members are not right in saying that in a case of that kind you would be safe under the new Clause in getting the Increment Duty on the basis of the price which has been paid for the land. If that is the case, I really cannot let these words go until am certain of getting other words which meet the case better. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will, with me, try to find some words between now and the Report stage, I shall be glad. If he is not satisfied, of course it will be open to him to press the matter further. I think I have met the criticisms quite reasonably.

Mr. PRETYMAN

In view of the promise made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I advise my hon. Friend not to press the Amendment. May I remind the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it is not quite fair to say that because you want to catch a crow you must kill several pigeons?

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I agree. What I want is to safeguard the pigeons, but I do want to get at the crows.

Mr. PRETYMAN

His duty is to safeguard the pigeons, and the only condition upon which he should aim at the crow is that he does not kill the pigeon.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I agree.

Mr. ROYDS

I am willing to withdraw my Amendment, but I understand I am not precluded from moving it again on Report stage if we are not satisfied.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE

I agree.

Mr. ROYDS

I entirely agree that in the case he mentioned of land being sold at a higher price it ought to pay Increment Duty, and I do not think there is any chance of that land escaping the duty under the Amendment I have proposed.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

Mr. POLLOCK

I attach such great importance to this Clause that I hope I may say a word or two upon this Motion, and perhaps I am more likely to be in order than I think the discussion has hitherto been, because I am bound to confess that the caution, if not the ruling, that you, Sir, gave, seems to have been freely disregarded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. My point is that if the Clause is necessary at all, why should it be limited in its scope? So far as I understand the Amendment which stood in my name as well as in that of the hon. Member for Sleaford (Mr. Royds), I cannot see why you want these words at all. I do not follow the Chancellor of the Exchequer's reason- ing up to the present time. Granting that you want some Clause, why should the Clause only obtain in the case where you have got the amount of the gross value of the land as more than double the full site value of the land. I would remind the Committee of what Lord Justice Swinfen Eady has said in the course of his judgment, which is reported in the "Times" of to-day. He says:— It seems strangely anomalous to require after a sale an ex post Facto valuation on what the land might (erroneously) have been expected to realise. I say erroneously, as unless the sum to be arrived at differs from the sum actually realised, there is no object in obtaining the valuation. Those words from a very learned judge call attention to the view that it would be erroneous, not merely in cases within the limited scope of this Clause, but in all cases. The judgment goes on to say:— I can find no justification in the Statute for the contention that wherever the price realised is greater than would have been reasonably expected, the whole of the excess in price is to be deemed to be an increment in site value. I have only to construe the Statute by the language used. Therefore the whole subject ought to be covered by the Clause. Why do you want words which limit the scope of the Clause? It is on the ground that this Clause, which is designed to remedy a grievance, is framed in narrow language which only takes away a certain number of grievances where a particular ratio can be discovered, that I think the Government ought to have accepted the Amendment which my hon. Friend proposed. With regard to the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, no doubt we are grateful for it, but I desire to point out that if you are to have a Clause for the purpose of really remedying the grievance, you ought to sweep away the whole of the grievance and not make the Clause limited in its scope. If Lord Justice Swinfen Eady's reading of the Statute is right, it is necessary to go back in this Clause to the original intention of the framers of the Act, and do away with all the injustices, not only the injustices where a particular ratio is found to exist.

Mr. CASSEL

There is an entirely separate point which arises in connection with this Clause. That is, what is to happen if the House of Lords reverses the decision of the Court of Appeal upon this point? I have been trying, with a wet towel round my head, to find out what the effect of the Clause will be in that case, but have been quite unable to do so. It ought to be made clear that the effect of the Clause will not prejudice the appeal. The position at present is that the subject in that action has been mulcted in costs notwithstanding the fact that the interpretation put on the Act by the Courts was contrary to the express undertaking of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—so far so that he immediately produced an Amending Bill. In a case of that kind it is extremely hard that he should have to bear the costs and that the Amending Bill might prevent a reversal of the decision with regard to costs in the House of Lords. You have two points of hardship in connection with the costs, first that the subject was only putting the interpretation, which was the very interpretation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and when that interpretation is found to be not correct, he produces an amending Bill. In a case of that kind it is a matter of great hardship that the Amending Bill should prevent the subject from reversing the decision in regard to costs which has been given against him. I hope the right hon. Gentleman might be in a position to state that he would reconsider the decision, having asked for costs against the subject in that case, and that at all events he should not be prejudiced in any attempt to recover them or to reverse the decision in the higher tribunal.

Mr. WHELER

I wish to ask a question which arises out of an undertaking that, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given. He has already promised to consider on Report a question of great substance, and on the Clause before this he has given an undertaking to consider the matter on Report. Yesterday the Prime Minister could give no undertaking that the Bill would be considered next week at all, anyhow before eleven o'clock, and therefore if on every Clause we are going to have matters of substance put hack to Report, we ought to have some understanding that we shall know where we are and when the Report stage will be taken, because these matters will not be settled at once when they come up, and if they arise after eleven o'clock we shall be in a greater difficulty than we seem to have been already in the first two hours of to-day. If every Clause is to be referred back we shall have a very large Report stage, and if the Bill is passed we ought to have some understanding as to what time will be allotted for that purpose.

Mr. M'CURDY

I rise for the purpose of making clear, if possible, what is the matter that is to be settled. The discussion seemed to me to proceed almost entirely apart from the Amendment, and sinless it is made clear chat the matter is which is going to be considered, the matters which have arisen under discussion or the matters which arise purely on the Amendment, there is obviously ground for misunderstanding and dispute when we come to the Report stage. In arriving at the increment value of land on a composite subject there are two methods. One is to take the sale price on the occasion as a criterion, subject to deduction, and the other is to have a fresh valuation. As I understand, it is agreed by hon. Gentlemen opposite that so far as the bare land is concerned the method of the principal Act of taking the sale price as a criterion is a satisfactory working method, and it is not desirable to interfere with it. I raise this point because the Amendment we are discussing proposes to abolish that practice in the case of bare land as well as in the case of land and houses. I understand that what hon. Members opposite desire is that so far as composite properties are concerned, the artificial limitation in this Clause, that to valuation where the buildings exceed the value of the land, should be swept away, that the Clause should apply to all composite properties but not to bare land, and that subject to some safeguard being found, the case of a composite property which has been sold at a monopoly price should be protected.

Mr. PRETYMAN

That is not quite the point. I quite see that if you put in the limitation that any composite property should be exempt someone might put a little bit of a building on the land which would take it out of the category. We want to legislate for this on sound commonsense lines and our view is not to draw a hard and fast line as to whether the buildings are worth more than the land, or by using the words "composite property" to encourage people to get round the Clause. We say by this Amendment, by allowing anyone to claim this you will really cover the case because, of course, the bare land is covered by the ordinary law, but where a man sells a composite property the difficulty arises in allocating the difference in price between land and buildings. This Clause would meet the difficulty in the wrong way. The difficulty does not arise because the Courts have ever held that price and value are different. By this Clause you are trying to deal with a difficulty which does not exist. The Courts have never said, and I do not believe they ever will say, that in the absence of some distinct proof to the contrary, if a piece of land, with or without a house on it, has been sold at a certain price, that price is not its value. I do not believe it will be said unless there is some extraordinary reason, which I cannot at present imagine, which makes the case quite utterly exceptional. All we say is that you do not want to alter your test. All you want to do is to give everybody, without exception, the opportunity of proving that the value of the bare land is not greater at the time, or is only to a certain extent greater than it was on the original occasion. What we say on that is that only composite property will escape, and that the man who is selling bare land will come under the. Statute, because he will have no ground for saying that the price which his land fetches is different from its value, whereas the man who has got a composite property, however small or however big, the buildings upon may be, may have a ground for saying that the price which the land fetched does not represent the value of the bare land, because the building upon it was a feature in the value. If it was a poor little building it would be a very small percentage, if it was a large building, or a house, such as is conceived here in this Clause, it would be a very large percentage, but in any case him, and him alone, you automatically protect. You seek for limiting forms of words, you seek to draw a hard and fast line here and there, you never will trust a Court of Law to take a common-sense view, and if you leave the thing to the common-sense view of the Courts of Law, instead of trying to draw up rules and regulations which only confuse the Court of Law and put everyone to work to try and get round them, and leave the thing to work itself out, because the owner of the composite property is the only one who can take such a course, the whole difficulty will disappear.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir Rufus Isaacs)

There is nothing in this Clause which would prevent a litigant from getting his costs if he succeeded in reversing the judgment. I cannot find any words which give the faintest justification for that suggestion.

2.0 P.M.

Mr. PRETYMAN

Will the right hon. Gentleman answer this point? The Clause will not prejudice the question of costs, but will it prejudice the case before the House of Lords?

Sir RUFUS ISAACS

Certainly not. The House of Lords will consider the case upon the law as it then stood and not as it is at present.

Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill," put, and agreed to.