SHIPBUILDIING, REPAIRS, MAINTENANCE, ETC.— PERSONNEL.

HC Deb 24 July 1912 vol 41 cc1197-265

Motion made and Question proposed, 8. Section 1, "That a sum, not exceeding £3,493,800, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expenses of the Personnel for Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, etc., including the cost of Establishments of Dockyards and Naval Yards at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1913."

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara)

I think it would be for the convenience of the Committee if I say a few words as to the scope and purpose of this very important Vote. Perhaps I should say to the Committee that the First Lord of the Admiralty cannot be here until late as he was at the Fleet exercises yesterday at Tor Bay, but probably he will be here before this speech is over. This Vote 8, in its three sections, is easily the largest vote in these Estimates. It comes out, as hon. Members will have seen, practically at half the entire Estimates. The amount of the original Estimate to be voted under Vote 8 this year was £21,626,200 and the Supplementary Estimate debated on Monday was £990,000. Of the £990,000 there is handed over to Vote 8 £646,000. Therefore the total to be voted this year, 1912–13, under Vote 8 is £22,272,200, Then there has to be added to that, Appropriations-in-Aid, £577,300. The gross total, therefore, of the Vote which the Committee is now asked to discuss is £22,849,500. Let me, if I may, make one or two short analyses of this very large sum. In the first place, as between the contractors that supply the various services and the Royal Dockyards. The total contract services of one kind and another which will be met out of this Vote, come to the very large figure of £18,990,700. That leaves a gross total to go to the Royal Dockyards in wages and salaries of £3,858,800. These contract services involve the very large1 sum of practically £19,000,000. First of all there is the cost of the ships which are built under contract. There is the machinery for the ships and shore establishments and the materials sent into the yards by the contractors. There are stores of various kinds— including fuel for the fleet—and miscellaneous supplies which I need not go into. The broad fact remains that of this gross sum of £22,800,000 odd, we shall pay contractors of one kind and another nearly £19,000,000.

Mr. JOHN WARD

That also includes the construction of docks?

Dr. MACNAMARA

That is on Vote 10.

Mr. PRETYMAN

Floating docks?

Dr. MACNAMARA

Floating docks are included as ships. I do not think my hon. Friend referred to them.

Mr. JOHN WARD

No.

Dr. MACNAMARA

Of the gross Vote, there remains £3,858,800 to go to dockyards for salaries and wages. Let me make another analysis. This gross Vote, as I have said, is for £22,800,000 odd. Of that 14½ millions, roughly speaking, will be applied to the new construction of this year's programme, or of previous years.

Lord CHARLES BERESFORD

Does the £14,500,000 include the Supplementary Estimates that have been brought before us?

Dr. MACNAMARA

I will give the Noble Lord an answer in a moment. Out of the total of £22,849,500, £14,500,000 roughly, is to be spent on new construction in this year's programme, and previous programmes that are still carrying on. Roughly, again, £2,500,000 is for repairs and alterations, £5,750,000 are for fleet coaling, stores for maintenance, and so on, incidental and establishment and miscellaneous charges. I turn to the new construction Vote, which, as I have said, is roughly £14,500,000, and on which the Noble Lord put a question. The new construction Vote will be devoted to completing certain earlier programmes, and starting the programme of 1912–13. This sum is very largely necessary because of the commitments of previous years. As a matter of fact—now I answer the question—of this sum for new construction under Vote 8 of £14,500,000 to complete and to proceed with the previous programmes of 1911–12, 1910–11, and 1909–10, we shall require £12,097,027. That, I think, is an answer to the question. For the 1912–13 programme we have taken £2,516,500; we require this to start with.

Lord CHARLES BERESFORD

Does that include the £600,000 of the Supplementary Estimate?

Dr. MACNAMARA

Yes, it is inclusive. At the very outset I told the Committee that Vote 8 included the original Estimate and the Supplementary Estimate. We require just over £12,000,000 to go on with the programme of last year, of the previous year, and to finish a few items of the year before. I think there is nothing outstanding earlier than that. Now I come to the Supplementary Estimate of £990,000, and its bearing upon Vote 8. We have in Vote 8 £646,000 of that sum. Of this amount £35,000 will go, as I said on Monday, to increase the wages of the men in the dockyards. I need not go into that again, but I have the details with me, and I shall be prepared to answer any questions later. That will leave on the Supplementary Estimate £611,000 for new construction over and above the original Vote 8 Estimate. I may perhaps tell the Committee that when we get that additional £611,000 on Vote 8, which we secure by the Supplementary Estimates, we shall apply it first of all to a necessary new item in the 1912–13 programme—a repair ship upon which we shall spend part of the £611,000. We will spend part of it on accelerating the eight light armoured cruisers.

Mr. BURGOYNE

How much is going to be devoted to the repair ship?

Dr. MACNAMARA

This year we will take £160,000, but I would like to check that figure later. Apart from the repair ship we are taking a certain sum to accelerate the eight light armoured cruisers of the 1912–13 programme, and we hope to have these ships completed in June, 1914. Then we are taking a certain sum in addition to that already calculated upon for submarines. This sum will be between £160,000 and £170,000. We are also taking a sum for airships—as a matter of fact we have roughly doubled the provision in the original Vote 8. With regard to the programme of 1912–13, to which we are applying £2,500,000—to take the gross estimate again—the programme of 1912–13, when complete, will roughly cost £12,500,000. By taking £2,500,000 to start this year we execute 20 per cent. of the cost of that programme within the financial year. If I may say so, this is a very respectable portion, and very rarely is exceeded. Indeed, I think once only has this been exceeded. Apart from this provision for a repair ship, for cruisers, submarines, and airships, we have decided to lay down the two dockyard-built armoured ships of this year's programme somewhat earlier than was anticipated, but not very much earlier. We propose to lay them down in November. These two dockyard ships are two of the four armoured ships of the 1912–13 programme, which have been slightly accelerated as being laid down in November. I think I ought to say to the Committee, before I sit down, we are very much hastening the destroyer programme of 1912–13 programme. There were twenty destroyers in that programme: two of these we hope to have in October, 1913, three in November, 1913, thirteen in December, 1913, and the other two early in 1914. That is a very great acceleration of previous years' work in regard to destroyers. I think the Committee ought to notice there are forty destroyers in the 1911–12 and the 1912–13 programmes and all these forty destroyers we expect will be completed between December, 1912, and March, 1914. That is a very substantial addition in a very short space of time to our destroyer flotillas, and I think that the Committee will do well to note we are to have forty destroyers of the 1911–12 and 1912–13 programmes between December, 1912, and March, 1914.

Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Do they replace old destroyers?

Dr. MACNAMARA

The old destroyers have their use. The point I am making is we hastened the destroyer programme.

Mr. FALLE

How much is to be spent on those two dockyard ships in this financial year?

Dr. MACNAMARA

I said they would be laid down in November. That is a small acceleration, and if the hon. Gentleman wants to know the difference between that and the original estimate it would be difficult to say offhand. I am afraid I cannot answer as to what the additional cost would be. I have only one other word to say to the Committee, and it is this: It is necessary that I should tell the Committee for the purpose of financial propriety and compliance with the views of the Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor-General, that I should say this. We had three protected cruisers in the 1911–12 programme: the "Birmingham," the "Lowestoft" and the "Nottingham." We originally proposed that these three should be built by contract, but for reasons which seem to us to be good we propose to build two in the dockyards, one, the "Lowestoft," at Chatham, and the other, the "Nottingham," at Pembroke. The three were originally intended to be built by contract, and we are now going to build two of them in the yards. It is necessary that I should state this to the Committee, because the change entails a slight re-arrangement of certain sums of money, and is an alteration in the details of the programme of 1911–12 which was submitted to the Committee. I think with that short explanation of this Vote 8. I leave matters in the hands of other Members of the Committee.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE

Can the right hon. Gentleman give us any information about oil tanks?

Dr. MACNAMARA

No, not now.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I think the Committee finds it rather difficult to turn itself to this kind of detail on finance and to questions of the difference between the expenditure of money for the building of ships as between contractors and the dockyards in view of the feelings produced in our minds by the Debate on Monday last. I am glad to see the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty in his place, and I think I may assure him that so far as this side of the House is concerned, at any rate, after the speech we heard from him the other night, I think the whole Committee, with very few exceptions, would be pleased to say it is not now so much their duty to examine minor financial details or even financial details that may appear to be of somewhat considerable importance, but that the real question which should occupy us is whether the provision made in this Vote is sufficient to meet the situation in which we now find ourselves. And I am bound to say I think the Committee will feel that we are bound in this situation to leave these details largely to the Board of Admiralty. I do not say we ought not to put questions; of course, any hon. Member with special knowledge has a right to ask questions; but the real point for us, and the point which I am bound to say I feel very much inclined to urge, is that we should follow the example of the Reichstag and vote these Estimates without a word. That is the kind of spirit which I think many of us feel, and provided we were assured that sufficient provision was being made we should not wish at this time to inquire too much into the minutiæ of detail. But are we quite satisfied? I feel myself we have had great lacunæ to fill up. As the First Lord stated on Monday, a long time is required and great foresight to provide for naval requirements in any form. What is the corollary to that? It is that insufficient provision or insufficient foresight at one period does not revenge itself at that moment, but comes to its fruition in two or three years after, and it is impossible without every desire and without every realisation of the situation for the Admiralty to make provision in time for a situation in which we may find ourselves in a few years' time. Are they doing their utmost? I myself very much doubt whether the immediate provision made is sufficient to meet the situation in which we shall find ourselves in 1915. The First Lord told us, and the figures I may say were sufficiently alarming, that in 1915 our position would be that we should have in the North Sea thirty-three capital ships as against twenty-nine for Germany.[An HON. MEMBER: "No."]

The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill)

Not fully commissioned. Thirty-three ships in full commission against twenty-five German ships in full commission. There are in addition eight ships not fully manned that can be available.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I understood it was thirty-three to twenty-nine. I may take it now that it is thirty-three to twenty-five in 1914, in full commission. The whole twenty-five German ships are in full commission. That is a fair comparison. I am only dealing with ships in full commission.

Mr. CHURCHILL

If the four German ships in reserve are taken into account there would be twenty-nine, but it would be absurd not to count our eight ships maintained with full nucleus crews which in exceptional circumstances are ready practically when they can get up steam.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I mean ships in full commission apart from Reserve, and I understand now that the ships in full commission ready for immediate striking would be twenty-five German ships against thirty-three British. Does that thirty-three include the Gibraltar ships?

Mr. CHURCHILL

Yes.

Mr. PRETYMAN

That is not very satisfactory; it will be a situation of considerable anxiety in view especially of the First Lord's own statement, which obviously is a perfectly just one, of the appalling suddenness with which a naval war may break out, because the moral effect of the issue of the first stroke in a naval war must be incalculable. It is perfectly obvious that twenty-five German ships in full commission in the North Sea as against thirty-three British ships, of which eight are at Gibraltar, certainly cannot be called a 60 per cent, margin.

Mr. CHURCHILL

No one ever pretended we could keep a 60 per cent, margin of fully-commissioned ships.

Mr. PRETYMAN

Do the Admiralty consider that is a sufficient margin?

Mr. CHURCHILL

Yes; that that is sufficient force for the year 1914.

Mr. PRETYMAN

That is the opinion of the Admiralty? Of course the Admiralty must be taken as forming its own opinion in this matter, and it is to that extent reassuring that the Admiralty think it is a sufficient force, but I am bound to say that the impression made upon me by these figures is that it is very near the mark indeed—a close shave, and close shaving is a danger at sea. So far as the expenditure on providing these ships is concerned, I am perfectly certain I am expressing the opinion of everyone on this side of the House when I say that none of us would criticise any expenditure which is shown to be necessary to provide not only the heavy-armoured ships but also the auxiliaries necessary to make these ships effective. Personally I am rather doubtful as to the sufficiency of the destroyers. No doubt considerable lee- way is being made up, and the acceleration of forty destroyers provided in this year's programme and last year's programme does to a certain extent overtake the deficiency. The wear and tear in war time upon destroyers and their crews is of a description which can scarcely be realised, and that means the necessity for large reserves, and I take it that we may assume that the first brunt of the contest in a naval war must fall upon the destroyer flotilla, and particularly upon our destroyer flotilla more than upon any other class of ships in the British Navy, because they would have to make our frontier the enemy's coast; and to maintain destroyers perpetually at sea in all weathers, the strain upon the vessels, which are necessarily heavily constructed and not so lightly constructed as they used to be, would be very great. In the construction of destroyers the Admiralty made a very wise and necessary departure when they promoted ships of twenty-five and thirty knots an hour which can keep up that speed in average weather in the North Sea; that is a far more satisfactory class of vessel than the lighter craft, which in perfectly smooth water could do up to thirty knots, but which came down to fifteen or eighteen in heavy weather. What we want to consider is not the speed that can be attained in favourable weather, but the speed that can be attained when these destroyers find themselves in heavy weather. The strain on such craft and crew is enormous, and although it would not be in order for me on this Vote to refer to any detailed question of manning, I may be allowed to point out that there is no use building ships unless you have sufficient men to man them. That, I think, is the real difficulty, and that point appeared in the speech made by the First Lord of the Admiralty on Monday.

Rumours, and more than rumours, have reached me that within the last few weeks destroyers which were actually ready had to have their commissioning delayed because the men were not available to man them. That is a most serious matter, because the crews who are to man our destroyers require to be the pick of the Navy and require special training. The idea of drafting an untrained crew on board a destroyer to take part in a naval war, as any landsman can see, must be a fatal policy. Putting the figures together, the Admiralty are now building within these two years forty destroyers, and within those two years they are also increasing the personnel of the Navy by 12,000 men—2,000 to meet the deficiency, 5,000 new men in this financial year, and 5,000 in the next financial year. You have got to train 12,000 newly enlisted ratings within the next two years, and none of these can be available for your forty new destroyers. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will realise that this is a most serious problem, because he has not only to build the ships, but to see that they are efficiently manned. The Secretary to the Admiralty told us that out of the £14,500,000 which is provided for new construction £12,000,000 is for what we used to call the old programme of new construction, and £2,500,000 is for the new programme of new construction, and that £2,500,000 represents 20 per cent. of the total cost of the new programme.

Dr. MACNAMARA

This year's.

Mr. PRETYMAN

Yes, for this year. The new programme means this year, and the old programme means all ships which were included in programmes prior to the current year whether last year or the year before. The new programme means ships in this financial year only. The Financial Secretary told us that 20 per cent. of the total cost of the new programme would be spent in this financial year in which the programme was introduced, and, with perfect justice, he claimed that that was an almost unprecedented preparation. I agree that this involves very early laying down, because with ships you have a great deal of work to do before any money can be effectively spent; and if 20 per cent, actually goes that means that rather more progress is made on the new construction, and that more than 20 per cent. of the time necessary after the order has been given has elapsed. That is not a bit too much. The object of accelerating these ships is not so much to accelerate the new programme, but to prepare for the programmes of the years which are to follow, which will be even more vital than this; and there is really no moment when you can separate the new programme from the old. The whole progress of naval construction has to be looked at as one continuous whole. Speaking for myself, I think that the financial provisions for new construction also ought to be looked at as a whole. When we look into these figures one fact which forces itself upon the consideration of the House of Commons is that we are obliged at the beginning of a financial year to take from the Admiralty Estimates of the maximum amount which they hope to be able to spend in view of the necessities of the country at the moment. They have to eliminate in that Estimate all chances of strikes, delays, and innumerable difficulties which may occur.

When that sum was comparatively small it was not a matter of vital financial importance—that, say 5 per cent, of that, should have to be voted twice over; but now what happens is that every penny of the £14,500,000—which is the programme now put forward as being the maximum amount the Admiralty are able to spend— not actually spent at the end of this next financial year will go into the Old Sinking Fund, and will have to be voted again. We have seen the result of putting £5,000,000 into the Old Sinking Fund, which, although financially praiseworthy, has not had the desired effect financially. I am bound to say that if that £5,000,000 had been put aside for this Vote it would have had a better effect on Consols than the action taken by the Government. I am giving only my own view, and that is what I feel about it. I feel that naval security comes first and social security afterwards. This is a vital matter to the financial position of the country at large, and naval security comes first. This Vote is the greatest factor in naval security. I do not wish to labour the point, but personally I believe if we were to vote enormous sums for new construction every year it would meet the case. I admit the enormous financial importance of the Old Sinking Fund rule, but when a sum of £4,500,000 is devoted by this House to a particular programme of naval construction, and when it happens, through unavoidable causes, that a portion of it remains unspent at the end of the financial year, it does not seem to me to be in accordance with the laws of business that that sum should be devoted to the Old Sinking Fund, and should all have to be revoted in the following year or the year after. I think it is worthy of the consideration of the House as to whether money voted for new construction which remains unspent at the end of the year should not remain permanently allocated to that particular service.

There are one or two minor matters I wish to say a word about. I should like the First Lord of the Admiralty to tell the Committee whether the Admiralty have so far had any experience of their floating docks, and whether they have answered their purpose. I am bound to say that I am a little doubtful, because I have seen one of those floating docks two or three times, and I have never seen it in use, and I hear that there are great difficulties in the way of using it. I think if the right hon. Gentleman consults his advisers they will confirm what I have said. To use floating docks with advantage they must be alongside a quay where you can bring the men from the shore straight on to the dock, and where the repairing ships can be alongside. That of course necessitates an absence of tide, and where you have no tide you can utilise a floating dock, because it can be lengthened and the ship can overhang at both ends. I know that although floating docks are more costly to maintain than dry docks, the capital expenditure is not quite so large. But in our tidal waters we may have to go a long way from the shore to get the depth. The difficulties are apparent in the Medway where you are five miles from Sheerness, or Chatham, and every man working on the docks has to be brought from Sheerness and Chatham frequently in winter, through heavy fogs, and the loss of time in working renders the advantage of floating docks very doubtful. I have made these remarks before, and so far as I have heard the opinion of professional men with practical knowledge of this subject, it is not favourable to floating docks. I know that is so far a matter of opinion, and I do not desire to lay down the law or ask the House to accept my opinion, but we have to judge in these matters from practical experience, and I hope the First Lord will tell us whether the Admiralty have had any practical experience and whether it goes to support the principle of floating docks or whether he now thinks that dry docks on the whole are more desirable. One point I wish to mention is where construction and manning again come into play. I am sure the part of the First Lord's speech which met with the most general approval and satisfaction of this House was that part in which he referred to what our sister nations were going to do in the matter of naval construction. The right hon. Gentleman, however, did not mention a matter which is very important in connection with this matter, and that is how are those Colonial ships going to be manned? Will they be manned in British dockyards, are they to be manned with British or Colonial crews, and who is going to take on their maintenance? I suppose they are not included in the Vote we are considering?

The CHAIRMAN

I do not think that question arises under the Vote we are discussing.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I will not refer to that subject, Mr. Chairman, if you think it better for me not to do so. I think the attention of the Committee is concentrated on larger issues, and I was merely dealing with that point as part of the larger issue of construction and balancing it against the men available for our ships. Of course, in the matter of balancing the construction and manning, the question of the Colonial ships is one which cannot be neglected. The Colonial ships have to be manned, and the House will be interested to know whether we are going to man them or whether the Colonies are going to do it. I think the question of the maintenance of those ships is a matter for this Vote. We wish to know whether the expenses of the maintenance of the Colonial ships will be a charge on the Imperial Exchequer or on the Colonies. I hope the First Lord will answer these questions as far as he thinks advisable, in view of the negotiations and discussions which are going on with the Prime Minister of Canada and other Ministers. Of course, I do not press the right hon. Gentleman to give any further answer than he thinks would be wise and proper. With regard to the question of fuel, I understand that a Committee, with Lord Fisher as chairman, has been appointed to consider the question of the propulsion of ships with liquid fuel. We have not heard the reference to that Committee. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman can give us the reference, or perhaps he will be able to tell us generally, because I do not want the exact words of the reference.

Mr. CHURCHILL

To inquire into the supply of liquid fuel and its application to warships' propulsion.

Mr. PRETYMAN

I am glad to hear that, because that was the point to which I was about to refer. There is no doubt we are in a transition state with regard to fuel, and the transition is not one which, looked upon broadly, can be regarded as favourable to this country. We have always enjoyed with our Welsh naval coal supply a unique position among the nations of the world. Now, when oil fuel is superseding coal, and must supersede coal, as a naval fuel, we are not only in no better position than other countries, but we are in a worse position, because we have no large supplies of oil fuel within the British Islands. A Committee has been appointed to consider this matter and therefore I do not wish to give my views upon it. The Admiralty has realised its importance, and I am sure the labours of that Committee will provide them with the material they require in order to enable them to ask this House for the provision necessary not only to secure a supply of oil at its source, but to secure sufficient storage in this country and at all points where our naval requirements demand it. The question of securing supplies of oil is an international question, a question of very great importance covering a very large area, and I hope the labours of the Committee and the proposals which the Admiralty will make upon them will result in securing the necessary supplies for the Navy. It is a subject with which I had a good deal to do when I was at the Admiralty, and I know the difficulties which attend it. I will not detain the Committee longer, but will only repeat before I sit down the suggestion which I made at the beginning of the Debate, that I am quite sure the House will wish to devote its attention mainly to the sufficiency of the proposals which the First Lord is making, and will not in this Debate desire to criticise minutiæ of finance.

Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETT

The propositions of the Government are of so grave a character—and of a dual character—that we cannot very well consider the defence establishment in the North Sea at the heart of the Empire and not instantly bring in the question of the Mediterranean. Some Members of this House were here at the time of the difficulty in the case of Fashoda, and some of them may, as I did at that time, have endeavoured to ascertain the position in the Mediterranean and the proper course to be taken in the case of war. The theory I then formed as a layman I endeavoured to verify by reference to competent authorities. I venture, with diffidence, not to agree with the statement that has already been sent out by the Government, that we may not have to meet in the Mediterranean the alliance of Italy and of Austria. They are members of the Triple Alliance, and the pressure which Germany may place upon them in order to create a diversion from the position in the North Sea may be too strong for them. It is always wise to look at the worst that may occur when devising means of defence or when endeavouring to obtain a solution of a difficulty. Fortunately, the Mediterranean is not of the same importance to us as formerly. The change in the condition of steamers, in the size and propulsion of our steamers and in their rapidity, makes the journey round the Cape and through the intricacies of the Red Sea, always at a low rate of propulsion, a factor that tends to make the difference between the journey round the Cape to India and the Pacific much less now in comparison than it was formerly. I understand, and I quite agree, that in case of war there would be no attempt at all to use the Mediterranean for the purposes of commerce. We could not afford, however strong we were in the Mediterranean, to detail a portion of our force for the purposes of convoys, and, if we did so, it would be a very great danger. Moreover, if we retained Egypt, where we are badly placed strategically, and still commanded the Canal, any ship could by accident throw itself athwart the Canal and get sunk, and there would be a blowing up of banks and such interruptions that would take a fortnight to repair and would be very serious in the carrying on of commerce.

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

Does the hon. Gentleman propose to abandon the Mediterranean food supply?

Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETT

I will deal with that in a moment. First of all, it evidently would be too great a strain thrown upon the Navy to preserve the Mediterranean for the purposes of commerce during war. We should abandon the Mediterranean as a mere fighting place. That would undoubtedly be the case. We should close the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, because our danger would be, not what happened in the Mediterranean, but one of the new cruisers of Italy or Austria escaping through the Straits of Gibraltar and falling on our trade routes in the Atlantic. Provided we could seal up the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean being set aside for the purposes of commerce during a short naval war would really count for very little. Our principal food supplies now are coming from the United States, much more from Canada, and very largely now in the way of wheat, as well as other things, from Argentina, and a little from Australia. The amount which we have from Russia could certainly be compensated for by increased demands upon the two Americas. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh."] We are talking about a naval war.

Mr. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Will the hon. Gentleman say what is the proportion which comes through the Mediterranean?

Mr. PRETYMAN

It is 65 per cent.

Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETT

It is a decreasing percentage. The percentage is largely increasing from Argentina. I happen to know something about it personally. The percentage from Argentina is largely increasing, and the quantity from Canada we can obtain if we require it is so great that in the event of an interruption for a month, and it would be allover in a month [HON. MEMBERS Indicated dissent.] I am speaking of a naval war. I am speaking of a difference of opinion in the North Sea as between ourselves and Germany. Both of us would be eager to try conclusions, and those conclusions would produce the inevitable result in a fortnight probably, and certainly in a month. That, at any rate, is my view. I believe modern naval war at close quarters, where the fighting fleets are within a few hours of one another, must bring an issue in a short time. The moment we had a success in the North Sea, the moment we drove our enemies to cover, and the moment we had sealed them up in their own ports, then we could detach a force as large as you please, and we could sweep the Mediterranean from end to end. We are only considering the time that would elapse while we were trying conclusions with the German Fleet in the North Sea, and whilst we had to keep another eye on the Mediterranean. What is to happen in the Mediterranean? Surely the practical thing is to close the Mediterranean entirely to British commerce. It would undoubtedly have to be so. It would be beyond our power to convoy foodships or any other ships by means of part of our Fleet whilst we were operating against the enemy with another part.

Lord CHARLES BERESFORD

How are you going to do it?

Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETT

I will endeavour to explain. I take it we should place at Gibraltar a squadron sufficiently strong with a proper number of destroyers and we should, as we should be justified in doing, close the Straits at night, warning any ship that attempted to pass at night they would run the risk of being torpedoed. I know perfectly well a modern fleet has run through the Straits of Gibraltar at night unknown to us, but still that was in the time of peace, and we should be on the lookout to prevent it. What we want to do is to throttle the route to India through the Red Sea. We are at present in possession of Egypt, and it would be very unlikely in war that any ship under any disguise would get through the Canal, get down the Red Sea, and get out again, if we choose to prevent it. Supposing the worst happened, and supposing, owing to some military force against us in Egypt, we had to retire to the Soudan, we still have Aden, and a squadron at Aden would close the whole of the route to the East. We could shut up the whole of the enemy in Southern Europe. We have, under these circumstances, to consider what force is necessary to do that, and I quite agree it would hardly be wise to have a fleet at Gibraltar working on a pivot, one side for the Mediterranean and the other side for the North Sea, liable to be called away at a short notice.

5.0 P.M.

The position at Gibraltar must be made undeniable, but Malta could surely take care of itself for a few weeks. That really is our problem. Of course, if you are going to build against Powers that may develop in the Mediterranean, then the charges that will be put on this country will be very large. I believe that is unnecessary. We can effect all we want at much less cost. We certainly shall not be shut out of food, and, if we do any harm to the commerce of this country by that interruption, surely it would be very much cheaper to compensate that commerce by a money value than to build "Dreadnoughts" in order to meet that contingency. With regard to our position in the North Sea, I entirely support all the First Lord has said. I would even suggest, with regard to the margin of safety, that we must take into account facts and circumstances we do not know. The aeroplane is a fact, but we do not know what its effect is. The submarine is a fact, but we do not know what its exact value may be in warfare. The torpedo destroyer is a fact, but, with equal seacraft and with equal bravery on both sides, we do not know what the result of these new factors in naval operations may be. Therefore I urge a margin larger than we would otherwise have undertaken in order to take out a policy of insurance against contingencies not yet known to us. We might very easily, through no blunder on our part, but entirely through had fortune, be brought down suddenly to an equality, or even be reduced below that point of equality, and we have to provide against that and leave a margin sufficiently strong and broad—a reserve, I am not speaking of a mobilised force—but a reserve that will take the place of vessels that may be rapidly destroyed in the first few days of a great war. We have been reminded that ships cannot be replaced immediately. If a battleship is wiped out you have to wait at least eighteen months or two years before you can replace it. I suggest, for these and other reasons, that the issues are so tremendous and the effect upon this country and its future is so far extended, reaching out of all sight, that we must even do more than has been indicated by the provision made at present. We must anticipate as well that we have to face a new addition to our fleet in the proposal for next year, or even in the autumn should circumstances demand it. Any attempt at weakening only means that we are going to bring further trouble upon ourselves.

Germany now is in a condition of stalemate, in so far as her military position on the Continent is concerned. She dare not move, she dare not carry out her projects until the unknown quantity of our strength and power of interference has been determined. The people of Germany, unfortunately, have very little to say in the matter of the provision of their fleet or the policy of their Government. She has thrown down deliberately a challenge to this country, and we have to take it up, in no had spirit, with no heat, but resolutely and determinedly, and to warn her that if she proceeds on the lines on which she is proceeding she will have to surrender all attempts at development in Asia until this question of our predominance is settled. We can be a good friend, or we can do a great deal to interrupt her new projects in Turkey and elsewhere, and nothing must be allowed to make it a possibility that we should suddenly find ourselves transferred from a position of dominance to a position of inferiority. The whole of our Empire, our past and our future, all our social reforms and great political reconstructions are as nothing compared with the dominance of this country at sea, and if that is challenged we must accept the challenge.

Mr. BURGOYNE

The right hon. Gentleman has given us a very precise statement of what he intends to do with the sum he is now asking for new construction. I do not think that, whatever emphasis he lays upon the reasons for allocating a sum here and a sum there, he really satisfied anybody on either side. I do not believe, any more than the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, in dealing with these matters on party lines. We want to take the Navy, particularly after the grave statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, upon a somewhat higher plane; so I would ask the Committee to believe that, in the few remarks I am about to make, there is certainly no desire to play a party game, but that they are animated with the object of finding out the exact situation, so that we may judge if the efforts which are being made by the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are adequate to meet the situation. There is nothing much to comment upon in the statement as to the armoured cruisers and the submarines. The right hon. Gentleman tells us that 20 per cent, of the total cost of the programme to be commenced this year is to be expended in the financial year, and he takes credit for that as something which has never been done before, except, possibly, on one occasion. I do not think, however, when dealing with a situation entirely without precedent that we should look to what we have done before in regard to expenditure, during the first year of a naval programme. We have to look rather to the exigencies of the case, and I am certain there is not a single hon. Member on these benches who will support the contention that the sums taken in this year are sufficient to meet this particular danger. In his statement the Financial Secretary dealt with the four battleships. They are really more important than pushing on the small cruisers which no doubt are a larger matter numerically. But it is the big battle craft that we have to consider. The right hon. Gentleman tells us he is going to accelerate the construction of the two battleships in the dockyards by, roughly, a couple of months. In ordinary circumstances they would be laid down in January. I understand they are to be laid down in November. But what reason is there why the two contract battleships should not be laid down immediately?

Mr. CHURCHILL

The drawings have not been completed.

Mr. BURGOYNE

That is really an explanation which can be carried to an absurdity. Evidently we are always waiting for a better ship. We are waiting until the time comes when we can get a superior ship, but I would rather put forward the argument that a good strong ship ready for sea is better, from the point of view of national safety, than a little better and stronger ship still on the stocks. Is the right hon. Gentleman still going to tell us that he is not going to spend more than £2,800 on the battle cruiser this year? If that is the total sum the thing is too ridiculous. It scarcely pays for the collecting of the plans and the signing of the contract. I want to refer to the delays which have already taken place. We have rubbed this matter in on other occasions, and have had replies which, no doubt, have been honestly given, but they have not dispelled the feeling of discomfort which still exists in regard to these delays. In regard to the 1909 programme eight ships were provided for; only one of those eight was completed within the contract time of two years. Of course, if the right hon. Gentleman wishes he can make a meticulous point, and say he pushed forward the date of giving out the order by two months, but we in this House are accustomed to accept from the Admiralty certain estimates of strength at the close of a financial year—at the close of any specific financial year, and if ships are to continue to be delayed to the extent of two, four, six, or eight months how are we in the future to accept the Estimates of the right hon. Gentleman or his successors as those upon which we can base our conclusions? I should like to get from the right hon. Gentleman assurances that will allay a certain amount of discomfort which is in the minds of those who take an interest in these things in no party spirit, but with a real desire to press at all times for that supremacy which is essential to us. Two assurances which I ask for are these: First, is the right hon. Gentleman allowing a certain amount of time in his calculations in regard to construction for possible contingencies which in respect of delay cannot be foreseen, or is he perfectly assured that, having given these ships out for construction in two years, they will be built within that period? I would like, further, some assurance that he will obtain from the contractors before tenders are accepted an undertaking under penal clauses that they will deliver the vessels by a specific date. I ventured to put that view into the Press some time ago, and as a result I got three communications from firms, in one of which was this sentence, which, I think, the right hon. Gentleman will take an interest in, and which, no doubt, he will understand:— If Churchill tries chat game we will make him sit up, for no single reputable firm will tender. That comes from a reputable man belonging to a reputable firm, and I think it well the Committee should know there is a feeling amongst some of our biggest shipbuilding firms that they have got the right hon. Gentleman in the hollow of their hands. That is not the kind of situation which should exist where our naval strength is concerned. I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman further, in regard to the two contract-built ships, whether, if they were ordered to be laid down now, it would make any difference whatever in our declared naval strength at the end of 1914? Would it not be possible to allay the undoubted feelings of discomfort aroused by the grave statement of German naval progress by hastening oil the designs and getting out the tenders, and telling the contractors, "We will give you so much to be spent within the financial year, but if you can spend more we will indemnify you and promise that Parliament will sanction our indemnity."

I come to the later programme. There is one ship, the "Audacious," to he delayed to end of August next year. Why could it not be completed within the financial year ending the 31st March next? Then I want to know, in regard to a much more dangerous thing, the reason of the delay in connection with the "Conqueror," which has only recently finished her gun trials, which I believe were witnessed by the right hon. Gentleman. I hear that this vessel has shown great weakness in her gun-mounting, and if that be not so it would be well to have a definite assurance that, if the designs of our ships are good the gun-mountings supplied by the gun-makers shall be up to those designs. I believe these particular mountings were the first issued by the Coventry Ordnance Works, and it certainly is not to the credit of the Navy that there should be any difficulty in this direction. Next I wish to turn to the question of fire control platforms. This is not a subject I should have approached except for the fact that one knows well that little defects do exist and have now been remedied. Obviously a ship may fail if the training of her guns is militated against by the position in which her range finders are placed. It is a fact that the fire control platforms on some of our latest vessels have been so placed that the effect of the heat from the furnaces prevents the range finding and the efficient working of the gun layers. I hope I am making my point sufficiently clear to the right hon. Gentleman. It is very well known to a great number of people that the control platforms in the majority of our ships have nothing in them whatever. The range finders have been brought down and placed in another position. These matters have cost a great deal of money, and it would be satisfactory if the right hon. Gentleman could tell us that the difficulties which had been experienced by those in charge of the guns in the past have been removed, and that the position of the control platforms is now such that our ships will be able to go into action as efficient as they ought to be. I would like, Mr. Whitley, your ruling upon this further point. My hon. Friend just now wanted to discuss the question of the Colonial ships. I did not wish to interrupt, but it occurred to me that if we might not discuss the "Australia" we could discuss the "New Zealand," because she is a ship given to this country.

Dr. MACNAMARA

There is no money in the Vote.

Mr. CHURCHILL

I understand, Sir, that your ruling referred to the method of manning the ships rather than to the actual progress made in construction.

The CHAIRMAN

That was as far as I went. I think that remarks referring to the ships, in so far as they affect the adequacy or inadequacy of the programme, are in order.

Mr. BURGOYNE

That is all I wanted to do. These two ships have been very much delayed, and the reason for that delay is perfectly well known to be that they cannot get their armour. I am not very clear upon the point, and should not like to make any charge in regard to it. It appears that armour of a certain type was provided for in the contract for these vessels, and that when the plates were sent in for trial, I believe not one of them passed the test. I should not like to press the matter too severely, but nevertheless a new batch of armour had to be ordered, with the result that the completion of these two ships was delayed. If they were ready now, they would make a vast difference to our naval strength. One final remark on the the question of Supplementary Estimates. Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us why he did not this year bring forward a Supplementary Estimate for a division of ships to take the place of those he has sent to the Mediterranean? In his statement on the Naval Estimates, the right hon. Gentleman set out what he believed to be absolutely necessary for our strength in the event of Germany introducing her new Estimates. In making that statement he made no reference whatever to the Mediterranean. Apparently he had not discovered the Mediterranean. He said we should require, instead of three battleships next year, five. We are now going to get the five. But he did not state that, in the event of Germany introducing a new naval law, he would be called upon to send to the Mediterranean immediately a squadron of our battle cruisers. Had he known that he would have had to modify his claims in regard to the North Sea in that speech, and would have had to tell us, in spite of the promises he gave us for "Dreadnought" vessels, that we should be four short of the total required.

That being so, why did not the right hon. Gentleman, when he made the statement on the Mediterranean two days ago, state at the same time that it was his immediate business to lay down four ships to replace those sent to the Mediterranean? I am one of those who think that the battle cruisers in the Mediterranean are a finer squadron than those battleships he has withdrawn, and that our disposition for some time to come of our squadron in those seas is adequate to meet all the exigencies, but what are we to do with the gap that has been left in home waters? These ships are to be based on Malta; they are not to be facing both ways at Gibraltar. They cannot be brought home. At the present moment I believe I am right in saying that there has never been greater prosperity in the shipbuilding trade. That is not so much due, although it is largely due, to building for naval purposes, but it is chiefly due to an abnormal influx of orders for the mercantile marine. I do not think I go too far in saying that we have never had such a boom in shipbuilding as at the present time. Is it not a fact—I know this was denied in the course of an interpolation on Monday last—that you could not at the present time get tenders from British builders immediately to lay down four vessels of that size?

Mr. CHURCHILL

No.

Mr. BURGOYNE

Then if that is not the fact, has the right hon. Gentleman given us any valid reason why he could not go straight ahead with the programme of four ships?

Mr. CHURCHILL made a remark inaudible to the Official Reporter.

Mr. BURGOYNE

I should have thought the very reason that he has taken ships from the North Sea and transferred them to the Mediterranean—a feature he never touched upon in introducing the Naval Estimates—was more than sufficient justification for replacing that security in the North Sea and building immediately. I hope we shall hear that the right hon. Gentleman intends to set about getting this business through, and that he will be able to give the Committee assurances as to what he intends to do. So notable was the omission of any reference to new construction in his speech on Monday, that it was picked out by everybody on that day. What is at the back of it? One could not but come to the conclusion that the right hon. Gentleman had been bluntly frank with regard to the German position. He was very wise. There is no harm in stating your views frankly. Will he not to-day be equally blunt and frank as regards our position in this matter, and as to what he intends to do in the future, and so save the reputation he was rapidly developing, and which is very useful even to a Radical Minister? I venture to say that the right hon. Gentleman on that occasion had the chance of his life. He certainly had all the Conservatives in the country behind him, and I am convinced he had 50 per cent, of the followers of hon. Gentlemen opposite behind him. If a Minister with three-fourths of the population at his back cannot take the strong line which I believe the-right hon. Gentleman wants to do, and intends to do, but has not the pluck to do—if he cannot do that, he does not deserve to have that support which he knows as well as anybody else he would have obtained. These are a few queries upon which it will be interesting to have some statement from the right hon. Gentleman this evening.

Mr. ROBERT HARCOURT

I do not intend, because it is more appropriate to the discussion we shall have to-morrow, to dwell at any length upon large questions of policy and strategy. But there is one declaration which ought to be emphasised by almost every speaker upon this side—I mean the declaration which fell on Monday last from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour). Some of us in the past have, in our petty way, jibed at his naval arithmetic, but none of us would be otherwise than sincerely respectful towards the almost unequalled authority with which he speaks on matters of high State policy. I had the chance, by the accident of the Debate, last year in speaking immediately after the right hon. Gentleman, to pay my humble tribute to the statesmanlike attitude of encouragement he took towards the speech of President Taft. That speech of the right hon. Gentleman was not very cordially applauded by his own party at the time, and I noticed that on Monday he had the usual tribute of stony silence from the benches behind him. What did the right hon. Gentleman say in reply to the amazement of the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord Charles Beresford)? I think the statement of the right hon. Gentleman is a peculiarly appropriate answer to the very remarkable speech, coming from the Liberal benches, by my hon. Friend the Member for Osgoldcross (Sir J. Compton-Rickett), who has fired his broadside and left the House. What did the hon. Member for the City of London say? He said:— It is extremely improbable that we as a solitary Power should be engaged against the Triple Alliance."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd July, 1912, col. 879] That, I venture to think, is the kernel of the situation. Why should we suppose that our enemies are to have allies, while we are to have no allies at all? Why, in the words of Lord Crewe, speaking in another place— are you continually to produce these blood-curdling combinations? That is not only the opinion, which is entitled to respect, of a British ex-Prime Minister, but it is also the opinion—and I repeat what I said in March—of the most representative German strategist you could possibly produce. The hon. and gallant Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) quoted yesterday from a book by General Von Bernhardi. He quoted its most purple passages. But put the worst possible construction on German aggressive intentions as can be found in this book, you have also to bear in mind the opinion of the same writer, which I ventured to quote last March, almost immediately after the book was issued, and which I have never seen challenged, the opinion on which he whole argument for large namely, that in his opinion the Triple Alliance was a broken reed, and that in a naval war he feared the possibility of Germany standing absolutely alone. I should like, in a sentence, to say that I think we ought all on this side of the House, whatever our views may be, to congratulate the Admiralty, not only in having extricated themselves from an absurd two-Power standard, which included America, but also in refusing to replace an impossible standard in the Atlantic by a no less excessive and unreasonable standard in the Mediterranean. I want to give an individual view which I think may be of some slight interest to the Committee. I want to put the position of an ordinary man, and to say that I, who after my fashion was a critic of the Estimates of 1909, have no difficulty whatever in supporting the general plan which was announced last March. I remember, when I said a few words in March, the hon. Member for Chester (Mr. Yerburgh) chaffed me upon supporting the First Lord and deserting the economists.

Of course, the personal consistency of a humble individual is of no particular moment to the House of Commons, but what was significant in that Debate was that no reduction was moved and that no Division was taken. I do not think it means that I have ratted or that the hon. Member for Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Murray Macdonald) has run away. There is a vital distinction between the two situations. It seemed to some of us on this side of the House that the Estimates of 1909 rested upon prophecies. As I understand the Estimates for 1912, they do not rest upon prophecy at all. Some of us on this side of the House—and I stand by all I said—in 1909, 1910, and 1911, criticised and challenged certain figures, and I say dogmatically that in all the controversies which clustered round the famous date of March, 1912, as to the number of our ships and of the German ships, and so on, all that we said was amply justified. What the Germans have in 1912, is precisely what they said they would have, and precisely what some of us as far back as 1908, before the Estimates of 1909 were produced, also said we believed the Germans would have. There was in those days a conflict of opinion as to the maturing of the programme, but to-day there is no conflict of opinion, there is no element of surprise, and there is no suggestion of acceleration. The figures which have been given by the First Lord might equally well have been given by a German Minister. They are in accordance with the ordinary German law, and are based on a construction period, not of two, but of three years. We have to get our figures of X plus Y, and it may be Stated without doubt—I am addressing myself to my friends of the little Navy party—with regard to the Estimates of 1912 that the German X is not a disputed quantity. I want to take, by way of illustration, a single figure of the First Lord which was repeated by the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Mr. Pretyman) as to the end of 1914 (I would point out that this is before the 1912 programme comes in)—thirty-three British to twenty-nine German ships in full commission. Of course these are not "Dreadnoughts" alone, and I rather wish, if the First Lord could properly do so—of course he must bear in mind considerations of strategy and secrecy—that he could give the actual classes of the ships; because it seems to me after reading the Press for two days, and after listening to the Debates, that this thirty-three to twenty-nine is the kind of crystal which is very likely to do duty upon the platform as the material for a new Navy scare.

Lord C. BERESFORD

It is his own statement.

Mr. R. HARCOURT

I hope the Noble Lord will believe that I am not trying to criticise or controvert, but only trying in my ignorant way to understand precisely what the situation is. I think the German total of twenty-nine includes only twenty-one "Dreadnoughts," and that the British completed "Dreadnoughts" altogether at that date would be thirty-two, and deducting, as I suppose we must, the four which go to the Mediterranean and the two Colonial ships, if it is correct to do so—I am doubtful about that—you would have a proportion of twenty-six to twenty-one "Dreadnoughts" alone in the North Sea. If you add to these the eight "King Edwards" and the rest of it, I should have thought you would have an ample margin. The First Lord very properly deprecated any detailed discussion as to type, but if there is a possibility of a naval scare on that point it is only fair to the Government to point out that they have got ships bf the very newest and latest type. According to the Navy League's statement—I think the Noble Lord (Lord Charles Beresford) rather disputed it the other day, but I believe it is substantially accurate—not a single one of these twenty-one German ships has the 13.5 gun, whereas at least sixteen out of the thirty-two and twelve out of the twenty-six, which I undersand would remain in home waters, have 13.5 guns available on either broadside. With due respect to hon. Gentlemen opposite, what sense is there at this time of day in talking about dropping ships out of the Cawdor programme—that naval Mrs. Harris, which never really, I believe, existed except at General Elections. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] I apologise if that is an unfair statement They complained, as I have always understood the argument, of the dropping of our ships in certain earlier years, when the British proportion was something like three to one, and I really think if they made that criticism they have to decide whether or not at the present day they would rather have, say, two extra "St. Vincents," another "Neptune," and another "Indefatigable," instead of four ships like the "Monarch" and the "Princess Royal." I should say, from the point of view of naval efficiency alone, they ought to thank His Majesty's Government that they resisted pressure and got newer and better ships with two years more life in them before they got on to the scrap-heap.

Something was said about running it too fine, and that raises, of course, the whole question of the construction period, which was very ably dealt with by the hon. Member (Mr. Burgoyne). I believe there is rather an exaggerated idea abroad, generally speaking, with regard to the German power of construction. I was talking to a man the other day who takes a great interest in these matters, and he said the Germans can build in two years. I said, "What do you base that statement upon?" He said, "The 'Von der Tann' was completed in two years." I said, "First of all that is a single ship, and, secondly, I believe the statement is entirely inaccurate." If you take the extreme period from ordering to full commission it would be over three years; if you take the period from laying down to commissioning, it would be two years and eleven months; and if you take the most favourable period, which would be from laying down to commissioning for trials, it would still be two years and six months. If you are to take the latter period you will be perfectly entitled to take a single ship like the British "Vanguard," which was completed for trials in one year and seven months, as opposed to two years and six months—still an advantage of eleven months. If you take a Return which was given by the Admiralty in reply to a question of mine on 1st March, one would be perfectly justified in saying that not a single German vessel, with the exception of the "Nassau" and the "Westfalen," which are exceptional cases, because they belong to the programme of the year before, have ever been completed in less than three years. The other day I came across an answer of the Home Secretary, who, I think, in the Debates which have passed, was inclined to put the German power as high as it was possible to put it. He said on 31st May, 1911:— The hon. Member must remember that British ships only take twenty-four months to build, and German ships thirty-six to forty, and consequently the fact that the same number of ships are being built does not mean that the two countries are only making the same naval preparations. I am purposely excluding the ships of 1909 because they have been exhaustively dealt with by the hon. Member (Mr. Burgoyne). I fully agree that there should be searching criticism of these delays but if you take the statement which has been issued by the hon. Member himself, in respect of nine German vessels, the construction period was 35.12 months, and the British period was 25.98 months, a difference of 9.14 months. I only mention this because it seems to me vital to the whole question of continuity in naval programmes, and I quite agree you have to consider construction as a "whole and not merely the instalment of the first, second, and third years. It seems to me, therefore, that with due regard to national security, you can allow the Germans to lay down ships, so dealing with a certainty, and not with a hypothesis, and that you can then build British ships, possibly of a superior type, several months later, and still have a current programme completed well in advance. If that is so, it is an enormous advantage. It is a capital consideration. I believe it to be a fact, and my reason for supporting the Estimates is that, broadly speaking, the Government are dealing with facts, they are not inventing hypotheses, and they are making provision which is ample, but which in my view is not certainly excessive for the responsibilities of the Empire.

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

The First Lord's answers to questions which I have put to him have been singularly honest and straightforward, and much as I hate him politically, he certainly has spoken like an honourable man whom the country can trust in his answers to my questions. There have been two or three criticisms on Vote 8. There are firstly, criticisms of the hon. Member (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald) who thought the Estimates were inflated; but while he said that, he gave us no criterion whatever to judge what is inflated and what is not. He did not even say whether he was in favour of any Navy or not, and I wanted to ask him whether he is.

Mr. BARNES

He expressly said so.

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

I did not catch it. Then we had some criticisms from the Prime Minister. He said the Vote was not to threaten the Triple Alliance. He left Italy entirely out. The Triple Alliance is an association of three Powers to fight tinder certain circumstances, and I cannot conceive how this can be judiciously, fairly, patriotically, and wisely left out, and if one leaves it out, as far as one's self is concerned, we must remember that we have an entente, and that if the three Powers attack France we shall have to defend France, or else the entente is a sham which ought never to have been made. It is perfidious Albion again. It is leather and prunella. Let me give a few facts I have deduced from the answers that the right hon. Gentleman gave me to the questions with which I have so much troubled him. In the spring of 1906, when the present Government came into power, we had 30 completed battleships not more than ten years launched. We have now 27 battleships to Germany's 18. The superiority of 100 per cent, has dwindled to a superiority of 50 per cent. In these Estimates we ought to have five more battleships at least, and we ought to hasten several of those on which we are now at work. Take another point. In the spring of 1906 we had 34 completed protected cruisers, not more than ten years launched, to Germany's 16. Now, in 1912, we have 15 such vessels to Germany's 20.

The superiority of 89 per cent has been exchanged for an inferiority of 25 per cent. Is that maintaining our strength? We ought, in this Vote 8, to have had some more cruisers. Take another point. In the spring of 1906, when the present Government came into power, we had 99 completed destroyers not launched more than ten years to Germany's 44. Now we have 104 such vessels to Germany's eighty-eight. That is to say, our superiority has been reduced from 102 per cent, to 18 per cent. That is not main- taining our standard. Remember that in commissioned waters we have only sixty-seven destroyers fully commissioned, and that Germany has sixty-six. Remember, too, that we have forty-eight destroyers older than the oldest in the German navy. At the beginning of 1906 we had thirty-one battleships in full commission to Germany's fifteen. We have now in full commission thirty-seven to Germany's nineteen. Our superiority of 107 per cent, has been reduced to 42 per cent. We are now to have thirty-five fully-commissioned ships in the North Sea, and Germany is to have twenty-nine. I do not think it is quite fair of the First Lord to reckon the eight battleships at Gibraltar as part of the North Sea Home Fleet. It takes three and a half days to get from Gibraltar, and the fate of England might be settled in twenty-four hours. I think these ships at Gibraltar should be left out of account. In the spring of 1906 we had eight battleships in the Mediterranean, and now we have none. Do we need them less? I think we need them as much as ever. I speak as a landsman. We have more food than ever coming through the Suez Canal. On 1st July, 1906, we were building sixteen armoured ships as against Germany's eight. At the present time we are building thirteen to her ten, but two of the thirteen are four months overdue, and the proper comparison, therefore, would be that we are building eleven to her ten. In the six and a half years immediately preceding the accession of this Government to power we launched fifty-four battleships to Germany's nineteen. What has this Government done? In the subsequent six and a half years we have launched thirty to Germany's twenty-two. In the last four and half years we have launched eighteen to Germany's eighteen.

These are rather puzzling figures, and they are difficult to follow. I shall be glad to give any hon. Member a copy of them. They are very serious indeed. They mean that a disastrous change has taken place in the naval relations between Germany and England. They mean, too, that we have been taking battleships from the Mediterranean at the very time that Austria and Italy are beginning to pour more in, and that during a time of war. In my opinion, for whatever it is worth, we cannot hold both the North Sea and the Mediterranean with our present Vote No. 8. We cannot hold the North Sea with thirty-five fully commissioned ships against Germany's twenty-nine. We cannot hold the Mediterranean with two cruisers against the ten battleships of Austria and Italy. It seems to me that this question of figures has been very wearisome, and therefore very much neglected. We have been, if I may so say, going down a precipice with our eyes open, and with a passive will, without due regard to where we are. The loss of the North Sea to us would mean the loss of our independence. As to what the loss of the Mediterranean to us would be, I think I can best state the case by quoting Admiral Mahan. He says that the Mediterranean symbolises to us the loss of Egypt, India, Australia, and New Zealand. He adds:— Do I say that Germany intends to attack England? Nothing of the sort. I neither say that she intends to attack England nor that she intends to support England. I call your attention to strategy, and history as rule follows strategy. I think we should try to use a little common sense in considering this question. I think we ought to do one of two things. We ought either to secure peace by increasing our fleet by five more battleships and fifteen more destroyers, or we ought to secure peace by making adequate concessions at once. We ought to prepare to fight, or we ought to give in.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE

We will not give in.

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

I appeal for adequate preparations. In the pamphlet I refer to Admiral Mahan describes war as an appeal to force, and he says we have had more bloodless wars within the past generation than in any previous generation. I will not go into that; but the bloodless wars have consisted in the calculation of power on one side and of power on the other. They have been settled without firing a shot. We could arrange that. A highly intelligent German to whom I was talking the other day said, "Give me five minutes' talk with your Foreign Secretary, and I will enable him to dispense with your Navy." I asked "What would you tell him," and he replied, "I should tell him to draw a line across Australia, and let us have half and keep the other half." Will any Member of the Labour party say that? Will the hon. Member who interrupted me (Mr. Barnes) accept that?

Mr. BARNES

Wait and see.

Mr. MIDDLEMORE

Will the hon. Member next him accept that? No. He tries to blush and says nothing. I say that anything is better than what is thoroughly inadequate, and consequently expensive and useless. Then comes the question what is adequate? Adequacy is what in the opinion of experienced experts is adequate. Whenever I have spoken to hon. Gentlemen opposite, or people not of my way of thinking, they have laughed at the very name of expert. If they are ill, they send for a doctor, because they want an expert. If they want a new bridge they send for an engineering expert. If they want a peerage, they send for the Patronage Secretary. But if they want a naval expert, they put their hands on their breasts and say, "I am he; I will tell you all about it." I believe the most expensive reductions—the most theoretically costly reductions—we have ever made were made in 1906, 1907, and 1908. They have cost us millions, and we shall have to build twenty new "Dreadnoughts" as a consequence. The Noble Lord (Lord C. Beresford) has done noble service again and again by calling attention to that fact. I say again we should use our common sense. We should carry out the plans of the experts, for every year that you evade carrying them out you are piling tip taxation, humiliation, sorrow, and dishonour for those who will come after us.

6.0 P.M.

Mr. CHURCHILL

The House will feel with regret that towards the end of the hon. Gentleman's speech he showed some signs of suffering from the fit of depression and even despair into which his earlier remarks might well have thrown him. The hon. Gentleman has paid me the compliment of saying that the answers I have given on behalf of the Admiralty to his questions have been perfectly honest answers. I can assure the House that I have nothing whatever to conceal except In the public interest, and, so far as I am concerned, the House will have the fullest information which is available on all matters which do not appear to affect the general interest of the country, and in my turn I will pay the hon. Gentleman the compliment of stating that his questions and statements on naval matters are always inspired by very close, accurate, up-to-date, comprehensive, and searching knowledge of the naval situation. I am quite certain that if he had applied his mind, or any mind at his disposal, to the investigation not merely of points which produce alarm, but to those points which we might look to for some feeling of reassurance he would have been able to have given the House this afternoon the obverse of the medal as well as the reverse. The hon. Gentleman states as his main proposition that the provision which the Government is making at the present moment is inadequate. We contend with absolute confidence that our provision is not inadequate. I will not base that remark on mere assertion, but I will in the course of my observations give some reasons why we are of that opinion. First of all, let me refer to the statement which the hon. Gentleman made about the departure from the Cawdor programme. I do not know whether he was in the House when my hon. Friend behind me answered by anticipation that argument. In the year 1906–7 we dropped one ship from the four which the Cawdor programme would have required; we dropped one more ship in 1907–8, and we dropped two ships in 1908–9—four ships in all. Those four extra ships were built in the year 1909–10.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE

How were they built?

Mr. CHURCHILL

Never mind how they were built. Let us just see whether we are worse off or better off.

Mr. PRETYMAN

What about the moral effect?

Mr. CHURCHILL

I will come to the moral effect in a minute. I will deal with the material effect first. I think that there is a moral lesson to be drawn from it too. Suppose we had laid down a ship in 1906–7, it would have been a "Bellerophon," that is to say, a ship with ten12-in. guns, of which only eight can fire on the beam. Suppose we had laid down a ship in the next year, it would have been a "Vanguard." That, again, only fired eight 12-in. guns on the beam. If we had laid down the two ship sin 1908–9 they would have been possibly "Neptunes," which indeed would fire ten guns on the beam, but would have only a very small are of training from the centre turret. Instead of that we have laid down four ships which fire ten 13.5-in.guns, and from every point of view are faster, stronger, more powerful, and more modern. So much for the great material advantage of never laying down a ship until the last moment compatible with full security. That is my answer also to the hon. Gentleman below the Gangway(Mr. Burgoyne), who is urging the immediate construction of new ships before the moment when the best designs can be completed.

Mr. BURGOYNE

The point I want to make is rather that the right hon. Gentleman has got to assure us that the time has not now come to lay down the ships, whatever the design, with the best design that he has.

Mr. CHURCHILL

It is the essence of my case that we are laying down in due time all the ships that will be necessary for all the particular aims of our policy in the future. So much for the material factor. I think the sequence of the figures is a very striking one. Four British ships were laid down in 1905–6, and two by Germany. Three were laid down by this country in the next year, and three by Germany. Three were laid down the next year by this country, and three again by Germany. In 1908–9 we dropped to two and they rose to four, which shows in the sequence of the four years a complete reversal of the proportion of building. But I do not wish to draw any conclusion from that, except one which we are entitled to draw to vindicate our own position, that we have not been responsible for driving forward this competition in naval armaments, and we have not been responsible for it, and that we have not merely preached the doctrine of moderation, but we have practised it, thus giving every encouragement to others to imitate our example, and yet, as I have shown, we have not in the end suffered in the least in material strength.

Sir C. KINLOCH COOKE

In your judgment.

Mr. CHURCHILL

I am dealing with facts. These are facts. The hon. Gentleman below the Gangway asks about the progress of the various ships, and I dare say the Committee would like to have some information on the various ships which are now under construction. The "Thunderer" has already been completed. The "Conqueror" is expected to be completed in October this year and in commission. These two ships will complete the "Orion" class. The "King George V." and the "Centurion," which are building in the dockyards, have made most satisfactory progress, and will be quite up to programme date and delivered very early next year, in January or February. The "Audacious" and the "Ajax" are behindhand in their progress and cannot be expected to be completed earlier than three months after their programme date. The four ships, the "Iron Dukes" of the 1911–12 programme, have all been laid down and are due for completion in the month of January or February, 1914. There is no reason at present to anticipate any delay in these cases. The delay in the "Conqueror," about which the hon. Gentleman asked me, is partly due to labour troubles, but more particularly to delays encountered by the Ordnance Works and the contractors for the hydraulic mountings. The hon. Gentleman is perfectly well aware of the importance of broadening our supply of gun-mountings, by bringing additional manufacturing firms into this very expensive branch of trade, and that great advantage has undoubtedly entailed some disadvantages; and I agree with him that there were some defects, none of a serious or irremediable character, which manifested themselves in the "Conqueror's" gun trials, but which will be rectified by the time she comes out in the month of September. I have ordered the gun-mountings over again from the beginning, and I am advised that there is no reason at all why she should not be a perfectly satisfactory vessel when the defects have been put right. The delay in the "Audacious" and the "Ajax" are directly due to labour troubles. The "New Zealand" and the "Australia" have been delayed1 five and seven months respectively by the fact that the very high qualities of armour insisted on by the Admiralty were not reached by some of the plates which were brought up for inspection, and a new quantity of armour has had to be created for these ships. That is a disadvantage, but against it we have this advantage: We have good reason to believe that we are getting a greatly improved armour, which offers a better protection and a greater resisting power certainly than anything was thought possible a short time ago, and which, if not superior, is fully equal to any armour used in foreign countries. It is hoped that the "New Zealand" may be delivered before February, 1913. The contractors are making special exertions to complete her. We are most anxious that she should be completed then, because we wish her to go right away to the Dominion of New Zealand in order to make a cruise in those waters, visiting all the principal ports which it is thought desirable she should visit by the Dominion Government, and then she will return and take her place in the First Battle Squadron of the Home Fleet. The "Princess Royal" has been slightly delayed through labour troubles, and also because the "Princess Royal," like the "Lion," has undergone some extensive alterations in regard to her compass platform, her fire control station, her masts, and her funnel. These alterations have been entirely satisfactory. They have cost a great deal of money, but the results have been satisfactory.

Lord C. BERESFORD

How much?

Mr. CHURCHILL

I will not answer by giving figures which I have not got on my Paper.

Lord C. BERESFORD

Sixty thousand pounds.

Mr. CHURCHILL

The reports so far received from the "Lion" have been most satisfactory, and as regards the fire control the arrangements are so much approved of by the gunnery officers who have inspected them that I believe the approaching battle practice will fully justify the expense involved. So much for those great vessels. There have been some delays with the minor cruisers. The "Dublin" and the "Southampton" have been delayed from three to five months by labour troubles. The "Chatham" has been delayed because the machinery was delayed in delivery by the contractors. The hon. Member who spoke last will be glad to know that there is no delay by the "Birmingham." The "Nottingham," the last small cruiser in the programme, was not laid down until the beginning of this year, whereas it ought to have been laid down last year, but the delay was due to my repeated and prolonged efforts to give the Thames Ironworks, or some firm taking it over, a chance of constructing it. No serious consequences will accrue from the few months' delay that have taken place in these ships. While on the subject of these delays I may refer to a point raised by the hon. Member for Chelmsford, who spoke earlier in the afternoon.

The Committee will see how enormously difficult it is to estimate in advance the amount of money the Admiralty will be able to earn in the year in carrying out the construction approved of by the House. When we spend £14,000,000 or £15,000,000 a year, labour troubles for a fortnight or three weeks will throw us £1,000,000 out, or any serious hitch which may occur in the construction of these enormously complicated vessels will make a difference of hundreds of thousands of pounds in the account. It is a matter of very great difficulty, and makes absolutely impossible an accurate forecast of the amount of money which the Admiralty, or which the contractors, will be able to earn in the course of the year. The methods of accounting are, of course, very, very peculiar. The House orders certain ships to be built; the contracts are made, and must be carried through; and as the obligations mature they must be met in regular course. But, owing to some delay, the money cannot be earned in the course of the year, and therefore a large surrender has to be made to the Treasury and the money has to be revoted in a future year. This surrender is called savings. It is not, of course—it is only a failure to earn the money, whereas the liability continues quite undiminished; and the fact that all this money, every penny of it, has to be revoted in a future year, in order to carry out and discharge our liability, artificially inflates our Estimates. If it be true that bloated Estimates in one country provoke bloated Estimates in other countries, then I say we are artificially bloating our Estimates over and above any bloatiness which may disappoint us in any other quarter. I am very much inclined to think that it will be desirable at some future date to make proposals to the House with a view to adopting a financial procedure more closely fitted to the actual position of the present time.

For my part I am very anxious indeed that the House of Commons should have the fullest possible control over the expenditure of Admiralty money, but a system under which you may easily be a million up or down through delays over which you cannot exercise any reasonable provision, does not lend itself to accurate Parliamentary control, and I am not so certain whether it is the best system from, the point of view of thorough Departmental economy. Let me say, in regard to another matter, that the new construction of destroyers is progressing very rapidly. There have been considerable delays in the past, and we have recently conferred with all the contractors with a view to accelerating, I will not say accelerating, but with a view to the punctual completion of all the vessels on which we are now engaged. As the Committee knows, there are twenty destroyers of this year which were laid down at the very beginning of the year, the arrangements having been made in the previous autumn, so that nothing will be required but the sanction of the House for the work to begin. We have, therefore, three or four destroyers left over from the 1910–11 programme. The twenty destroyers of the 1911–12 programme are all under construction at once at the present time, and all these fine craft will come to hand in the course of the next eighteen months.

Mr. BURGOYNE

When the right hon. Gentleman introduced his Estimates he said that we would have the destroyers at the beginning of October, but we now find that the Estimate has been extended by three or four months, and we shall not have them until December of this year. What are you going to do next year again?

Mr. CHURCHILL

I was not present when my right hon. Friend made his statement, but the statement which I made six months ago holds good in every respect, so far as I am aware. It may be that the progress will not be as rapid as we hoped, but there are special reasons. Take the "Badger" and the "Weasel," which have fallen under the searching eye of the hon. Member (Mr. Burgoyne). Those two boats, which were fitted with special engines, have taken a very long time. In regard to destroyers, we have made certain experiments as to one or two new types, and this very often involves a great deal of trouble and delay, but the advantage is that you are able to get a general design for destroyers on the very best lines. We are fully alive to the great importance of increasing the speed of destroyers. We aim in our destroyers at gun power, torpedo power, and seaworthy qualities. These are the essentials, and it is our intention to add by any reasonable means to the speed of the vessels without detracting from those three important primary qualities, to which the service has always attached such importance. I come now to the submarines. The progress on these vessels is very satisfactory. The great development of design in submarines in other nations has been carefully studied, and the time has come when it is considered desirable to embody certain new features in our own design, and these will be introduced into the vessels of this year's programme, all of which have been ordered. The Supplementary Estimates will greatly hasten the delivery of those vessels, and will also provide for an augmentation of the numbers.

There is one other branch of Vote 8 this year. A new Department has been formed by the Admiralty to co-ordinate the various branches of the navigation of the air, and to develop the matérialand training to the best advantage. A captain has been appointed to take charge of the Air Depart- ment, and it is expected that good progress will be made on lines which will avoid wasteful enterprise. A good deal has been said on this subject on this occasion and on previous occasions, but I should like to tell the Committee that we are not neglecting the airships and aeroplanes, and that everything that can be done, without wasting money, is being done to secure us a higher development of knowledge with regard to airships than we have hitherto had in this country, and the beginning of an airship flotilla. So far as aeroplanes are concerned, progress is excellent. All the officers concerned are being encouraged to push forward with the utmost vigour. I have repeatedly asked them to make proposals for further expenditure, and the only reason why expenditure in the Supplementary Estimate stands at £60,000 is that that is absolutely the greatest amount of money we can spend within the year without being foolish or thriftless.

But I confidently look forward to the Naval Aeroplane Service attaining adequate proportions during the course of the next year. I do not think we can afford to use naval officers exclusively for the purpose of conducting aerial navigation, and I hope it will be possible to offer a career—an adventurous career—as airmen to some of the younger petty officers and other smart and really competent youths who come so largely into the Navy every year. Such a career might well be one of the avenues in certain circumstances to commissioned rank in due course, where other qualifications are satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman asked me about floating docks. The two large floating docks are progressing as follows: one has already been delivered at Sheerness and is moored there. It has not yet been tested, but my advisers have shown me that there is no reason to anticipate failure. I quite agree that one of the advantages attached to floating docks is that they are not placed in close proximity to the quay of the dockyard. At the same time, there are enormous advantages. First of all, they are cheaper from the point of view of capital expenditure. Capital expenditure is a very important thing to the Admiralty. We are in the position of a firm with a very large income and no capital. These docks can also be moved to suit the needs, within limit, of the strategic situation and requirements; you can get them much quicker, and therefore they have responded to a need which would otherwise not have been met. Then, of course, they can be lengthened and adapted to ships of larger size without any of that expense which attends the enlargement of an ordinary graving dock. The first dock has already been delivered, and the other is due in September, and will probably be delivered in October, and go to Portsmouth, in the first instance. Everything is being prepared for its reception there at considerable cost, and it will be alongside the quay and in close proximity to the dockyard. We have every reason to believe that in all respects it will be effective. The small floating dock at Harwich has been delivered, and it is to dock two destroyers at a time. The small one for Dover has been delivered at Sheerness, and is getting ready for trial. There is another small one just ordered for Portsmouth which will also be able to take two destroyers at once.

Mr. PRETYMAN

What I wanted to know was whether there is any actual experience of their use, and whether they have been found to be satisfactory?

Mr. CHURCHILL

The actual experience is just about beginning, but no difficulty is anticipated. These floating docks are used in many parts of the world with the greatest success.

Lord C. BERESFORD

We have had one at Bermuda for years.

Mr. CHURCHILL

Modern engineering is every day more competent to carry out the construction of these docks. Then there is another question, that of repairs. I have been greatly struck by the amount of straggling from the flag in the course of recent years. The proportion of vessels coming into the dockyard from quite small causes has reduced the ships available for the different admirals' commands. The matter is of the highest importance to reduce them to an absolute minimum. We had a Committee of Inquiry presided over by Sir John Jellicoe which made a very valuable report on the subject. We hope to adopt the various methods suggested to reduce the number of vessels going into dockyard hands from the seagoing squadron, and consequently to strengthen those squadrons.

Mr. SHIRLEY BENN

Is it on the present proportion?

Mr. CHURCHILL

In different periods of the year. I am hopeful we may be able to provide for repairs at seasons when we are least likely to require the fleet at full strength, of the fleet has to be done at all times, but it is greatly to be hoped that we shall succeed in keeping a much larger proportion available during the summer months, which are the months when the German high fleet is at its fullest strength, than has been the case hitherto. One of the ways in which it will be possible to reduce the work to be done in the dockyards on these ships will be the new fleet repair ships which is provided for in the Supplementary Estimates. The work of those ships has been excellent, and far more than pays for their cost and upkeep in preventing small defects growing into large ones, and dealing with them promptly on the spot. We are considering a scheme of manning the fleet repair ship by dockyard employés instead of by active service ratings. That will further add to our resources from the point of view of the manning of the active service squadron. That, however, has to be tested.

I have just given the House, as I thought it was proper to do, what is a general account of the position of new construction, and I should like to say a word on the larger issues which have been raised in this Debate. I see that Lord Selborne, speaking yesterday in another place, referred to me as having said that in the near future we should have only a margin of four ships in the North Sea. Nothing that I said ought to support so very inaccurate and inadequate and misleading a conclusion. Nothing that I said ought to support so very inadequate and misleading a conclusion in regard to the naval strength of this country. Let the Committee look at the facts. We shall have thirty-three battleships, that is what I said, in full commission, by the time that Germany has twenty-five. That is the fact. We shall have a Fifth Battle Squadron of eight more, fully manned with active service personnel against the four German parent ships which are in the reserve. We shall thus have a total of forty-one battleships manned with active service personnel against a total of twenty-nine. It is quite true to say that eight out of those forty-one will be at Gibraltar; but they will very frequently be in home waters—very frequently, and we shall arrange that they are in home waters at such times as it may be considered that their presence will be required, and they will certainly be in home waters at any time when the Fifth Battle Squadron is cruising away from its home port, and consequently is not instantly available. Therefore, I am stating the absolute British minimum of fully commissioned ships at thirty-three on the ground that we shall have always four out of the five squadrons immediately available. I am contrasting this absolute minimum of fully commissioned ships instantly available with the absolute maximum which might, under certain circumstances, be available on the German side. We consider that is quite sufficient, taking everything into consideration, taking into consideration what I said about the average moment and the selected moment, and also taking into consideration, as you must do, the quality of the ship and the squadrons on each side. But that is not the whole of our resources. In addition, there will be the Seventh Battle Squadron, which contains eight battleships, and which is to be manned with the immediate reserve. We hope that this Battle Squadron on this new basis will be available within a very short time after the immediate reserve, are called out. We can call them out without going through the process of a Royal Proclamation; and we can summon them at any time it is desirable to increase our margin of naval strength available.

Lastly, we have the Eighth Battle Squadron, for which, of course, mobilisation is to take place, but which, as a squadron, is incomparably superior to the last Reserve Squadron of any other country in the world. Behind all this, we shall have at the end of 1914 twelve other battleships—that is to say, if we do not sell any of them—twelve of the oldest battleships in material reserve—that is to say, they are available to replace any ships which are either undergoing long repairs or should become out of action. I do not wish to dwell further in detail and at length, and especially as I do not desire to make comparisons between British squadrons and squadrons of any other Power. Such a proceeding only tends to lead other people to make renewed exertions. I remember particularly when, some time ago, it was stated that battleships of over twenty years of age could not be counted as effective; the only result was that it produced an immediate response in some of the other Powers with whom we are forced to reckon. Therefore I do not wish to do that, but I do ask the Members of the Committee to go to the publications which deal with the naval strength—to the official Papers which are laid on the subject, and to publications like that for which the hon. Member for Kensington (Mr. Burgoyne) is responsible. [LORD C. BEREESFORD made an observation which was inaudible.] The Noble Lord has his own statistics, but I am content in this matter with the statistics of the Navy League Annual, which are extremely accurate, which are very fairly compiled, and which do not attempt to make out a case either for a scare or for apathy. I say if hon. Members will go to those figures and statements and see what our squadrons actually will be they will see how very unfair it is to try to whittle the naval strength of this country down by a statement like that that we should have only a margin of four ships in the North Sea.

Mr. JAMESMASON

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether the forty-one ships he has mentioned are to include the four armoured cruisers which will be sent to the Mediterranean?

Mr. CHURCHILL

No, I was only dealing with battleships. I have not touched battle cruisers or armoured cruisers or any other class at all. It is quite complicated enough to discuss the matter on the basis of battleships only. There is one point of view from which we ought to examine the composition of the squadrons, and that is from the point of view of the construction of "Dreadnoughts." That has been a subject often discussed in this House. Perhaps I may tell the Committee what our forecast is in regard to "Dreadnought" construction. We expect in the fourth quarter of 1913 to have-eighteen "Dreadnought" battleships by the time that Germany has thirteen. In the fourth quarter of 1914 we shall have twenty-four and Germany will have sixteen, according to our calculations. In the fourth quarter of 1915 we shall have twenty-seven and Germany seventeen. I am leaving the cruisers out. I am rot counting the two "Lord Nelsons," although those vessels are counted as "Dreadnoughts" by the French, and certainly are vessels of very great merit and power. The House will see, looking at these figures, which omit cruisers and just give battleships, that the statement that we have only a margin of four ships in the North Sea does require to be qualified by a good many other observations.

Major ARCHER-SHEE

Will the right hon. Gentleman give us the number of battle cruisers?

Mr. CHURCHILL

We shall have eight battle cruisers when Germany has four in the fourth quarter of 1913. In the fourth quarter of 1914 we shall have nine when Germany has five, and in the fourth quarter of 1915 we shall have ten when Germany has six, and those are the total figures. That leads me to another point. I hope I am not detaining the Committee too long, but I am very anxious to put the country and the Committee in possession of the facts. I have heard it said that the Mediterranean battleships were brought home because they were wanted here. That is not quite, I think, the right way to describe what has taken place. They were brought home, first of all, because they were no use where they were. I thought I made it abundantly clear that the continued utility of those vessels of that class would vanish entirely when the newer Austrian and Italian ships came into commission. They would be in peace a charge and in war a weak defence. They would have been perfectly ineffective for useful purposes out there, and would have deceived nobody. I should like to point out that you cannot deceive people in regard to naval, matters. Every general staff in Europe knows exactly the value which a ship possesses, not only actually but relatively—compared, that is to say, with other vessels which might be brought into contact with them. So having those vessels there would have been no use for the purpose of defending our interests, and it would not even have been a successful piece of bluff. They have been brought home, first of all, because they could do no more good where they were; and, secondly, not because they were so much wanted, but because their crews were wanted in order to man the much stronger ships of the "King Edward" class, and the new vessels of the "King Edward" class, which otherwise would have been relegated to the Reserve. So you have gained doubly, because not only has the number of fully-commissioned battleships in home waters been increased, but also the quality of the squadrons has been greatly improved. Now let me deal with the argument that the four battle cruisers cannot be spared. The hon. Member for North Kensington has touched on this. He seemed to attribute to me the position that every single ship must be concentrated in home waters, and that if four have to go to the Mediterranean we are therefore four to the bad on what the Admiralty considered earlier in the year was the irreducible minimum.

Mr. BURGOYNE dissented.

Mr. CHURCHILL

I am glad the hon. Member does not attribute it to me. We never said anything of the sort, because the 60 per cent, margin of new construction was always intended to cover a certain amount of oversea obligations. As a matter of fact, when I came into office, two battle cruisers were going to the other end of the world—one to New Zealand and one to China. Both of those ships are now available for service much nearer home. No one has ever defined fully what are the oversea obligations which the Admiralty have to meet. It is quite clear that beyond a certain point there would have to be an increase in the strength of the Fleet—if, for instance, a large new development takes place. If a very great development takes place in the Mediterranean strength of other Powers, it will be necessary for us to add to our force in the Mediterranean, possibly to change its character, to recreate a "Dreadnought" battle squadron there. It may be necessary, but that position has not been reached yet, and it is no use our deciding on that until the time comes. [An HON MEMBER: "It will then be too late!] Not at all. Why should the hon. Member say that? It is no use our deciding on that until the time comes to lay down the ships, so that they will be ready when they are wanted. It will be quite easy to deal with the situation in various ways in plenty of time to make the necessary reinforcements. Quite apart from any further extension of our building programme, we should be in a position in 1915—if necessary—without new construction, somewhat to increase the force that we have in the Mediterranean. So far from feeling the anxiety of the hon. Gentleman opposite, we shall have by 1915 a few ships in hand which, if necessary, could be sent to the Mediterranean.

Sir R. POLE-CAREW

Will the right hon. Gentleman have the men?

Mr. CHURCHILL

The men will be available at the date I mentioned—1915. In 1915 it will be possible, if necessary, to increase the number of battleships in full commission above thirty-three—possibly to raise it by three or four ships above that total. Until 1915 is reached the situation is perfectly satisfactory. I have always to consider this question as a dual form of attack. Anything which I have to say to reassure hon. Members opposite may be used immediately afterwards as an argument for saying that what we are asking now is not sufficient. I have to try to prove that what we have got is exactly enough—neither too much nor too little. But there are some statements made which really require to be contradicted. I have seen it stated—it was stated by an hon. Member the other day in the House—that I had described the dangers with which we are faced, and yet I was doing nothing to meet them. That was the statement of the Noble Lord. Let us look at that for one moment. We are doing nothing to meet these dangers. We see them clearly; we have described them plainly; and yet we are sitting still, taking no steps to meet them. We are spending £45,000,000 this year. Is that nothing? We are going to spend more next year. Is that nothing? We are raising the personnel of the Navy from 133,850, at which it stood on 31st March, 1912, to 141,150, which is the figure we hope it will reach on 31st March, 1913. Then we propose to raise it from 141,000, at which it will stand on 31st March, 1913, to 146,000 at the end of 1914—another rise of 5,000; and there will be further increases in the future into which it is not necessary for me to go. I do not think the Committee will say that that is nothing. Even the Noble Lord has not asked for more than an addition of 5,000 men a year.

Lord C. BERESFORD

That is four years ago.

Mr. CHURCHILL

As far as the next few years are concerned we are entirely at one. There is no difference between us on that. We are creating an immediate Reserve, which has already reached 2,000, and next year we hope it will be up to 5,000, in order to man the extra squadrons. Then take new construction. This year Germany laid down two new ships. We have laid down four. Is that nothing? Next year we are told that Germany will lay down one extra ship. We shall lay down two. Is that nothing? This year Germany has laid down two small cruisers. We are laying down eight small cruisers, not quite so large as the German ships, but much faster, and we consider them perfectly well suited to the work they will have to do; and we are accelerating the construction of those eight. It is quite true that this year Germany accelerated the construction of twelve destroyers; we have accelerated the construction of twenty destroyers. In the course of the next eighteen months it is expected that the German fleet will be reinforced by twenty-one destroyers. We shall be reinforced by forty-three destroyers in the same period. The main principle of the German Navy Law is the creation of a third battle squadron, which will be gradually developed and become effective towards the end of 1914. We have already created our new Third Squadron—it is already in full and perfect existence—of eight "King Edward" battleships, and as far as pre "Dreadnoughts" are concerned it is unmatched in the whole world. That is nothing! We are told that this is merely foreseeing the dangers, describing them accurately, but failing to take any steps to meet them. Such statements defeat themselves. I do not think that very extreme statements are at all likely to serve the cause of methodical, steady, and tireless naval development, which is the cause I stand here to plead.

I see that Lord Selborne yesterday, going twice as far as the hon. Member below the Gangway, demanded the new construction of eight "Dreadnoughts." I do not know that if eight "Dreadnoughts" were to be newly constructed at a cost of £20,000,000 it would be possible to man and officer them by the time they were ready, unless you were prepared to lay up, or put on a very low-grade reserve, ships which are quite good enough to do the work they will have to do in the next few years. With all my pride in the great Service which I have the honour to represent in this House, I should not feel the slightest pleasure in being charged with the duty of adding eight more "Dreadnoughts" to our naval construction at the present time. I could not come before the House of Commons and the country and say, as I can about every penny in the Estimates at present, that I believe them to be necessary for the security of the State. We have the situation well in hand. There is no need whatever for panic or alarm. It will be entirely our own fault if we are not able to produce at the different dates in the future the margins necessary for our security. We submit that if our recommendations are accepted by the Committee, if the ample provision for which we ask is granted, we shall have adequate margins of security for our purposes in 1914. In 1915 we shall be no worse off than we are in 1914. In 1916 there will be a slight upward tendency in the proportion of ships that we shall have. No new development which can affect 1914 can take place now. Any new development which affects 1915 or 1916 can be dealt with effectively when it makes itself known. I am very much obliged to the Committee for allowing me to make another long speech on naval matters. I hope I shall not have to trouble them again; but there were some misunderstandings which I wished to clear up, and I thought it would be for the convenience of the Committee if I took this opportunity of doing so.

7.0 P.M.

Lord C. BERESFORD

The right hon. Gentleman is always interesting on whatever subject he speaks, but he is not always accurate. He made three very important statements in the speech he has just delivered. He said that he was certain that what the Government were doing was adequate for the future, that it was compatible with full security, and that the Government were not responsible for the competition. I hope to prove by facts that what the right hon. Gentleman said is not correct. The right hon. Gentleman rather took me to task for a statement I made the other day. What I said was that the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the right hon. Member for the City of. London (Mr. Balfour) made the most serious statements, and pointed out the grave peril of the future; and what I wished to say was that the Government were not doing nearly what was necessary to meet the dangers that they see in the future. May I adopt an, argument that is often used from the Front Bench opposite? We have only to wait and see what is going to occur next year. We will have another scare next year—that is certain. The Estimates next year will be enormous. I think they will be over £50,000,000, and they will be bigger the year after. [An HON. MEMBER: "NO."] We shall see. They will be very enormous if they have to meet the case that will be presented to this House by the Government. On this Vote 8 depends the whole security of the British Empire. There is no Vote that is more important than Vote 8. I maintain that what the Government put in the Supplementary Estimate and in the previous Estimates they produced in May is not nearly equal, as a matter of fact, to what they may have to meet in regard to Germany and the Triple Alliance. It is not wise of us to scoff at Italy and Austria. Italy and Austria have an offensive and defensive alliance with Germany, and Germany is the over-lord, who is perfectly in the position to demand that that alliance shall be kept. We have an entente with France and Russia; but that is not an offensive and defensive alliance. So far as it goes, for naval operations, the Russian navy will not be ready for perhaps fifteen years. The French navy will not be very effective in the near future. That is my opinion, and. I will give reasons for it.

The First Lord of the Admiralty juggled with figures the other day in a most extraordinary manner. I could not make out what he meant, but that was possibly because of my ignorance of finance. He mentioned £1,600,000—most of it for construction—that we had not spent—and that was going to be spent in the future. That is what I understood him to say. Am I incorrect? There was also £990,000 upon the Supplementary Estimates, of which he has given us a description. I hope that is going to be spent; but what I maintain, and many who think with me, is that this money—the whole of it—ought to have been spent on the Navy this year, and not put into the future. The First Lord of the Admiralty said on 18th March that a large expansion was necessary. So far from being a large expansion it is a large contraction. As a matter of fact, we are spending £610,000 less than was the Vote for the Navy in the original Estimate.

Mr. CHURCHILL

When I spoke of a large expansion I referred to increased organisation.

Lord C. BERESFORD

I understood the right hon. Gentleman was speaking about finance at the time. Very well; I beg his pardon if I made a mistake, but I so understood him. What I want to know is, What is the serious thing the First Lord speaks about, that the Prime Minister spoke of, and that the late Leader of the Opposition, the senior Member for the City of London, spoke of? Is it war? We are told it is not war. What is this serious thing? Is it pestilence? Is it famine? The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well it is war, and war of a most horrible description. What we ought to do is to do everything we can to stop that war. I maintain that the Estimates that are being put forward for construction are not sufficient to prevent war. On the face of it the right hon. Gentleman would not be talking about this serious thing if the construction Vote was strong enough. It is war—nothing but war! Our efforts should be to stop the war and to keep the peace, no matter what it costs us. I quite agree with a lot that has been said in this House as to the appalling nature of war. Such a war would put back the civilisation of the world for a couple of centuries. Therefore we ought to have no doubt as to what the Government are doing to meet the serious peril which they themselves have pointed out. On the face of it, they are not doing enough. But one of the most curious speeches which I ever heard was that of my right hon. Friend (Mr. Balfour) below me. He said war was impossible, owing to the grouping of the Powers. Then he pointed out what value the grouping of the Powers is to us. It is very little, so far as naval defence goes, because the ships are not there, and you cannot get them there. I am sorry my right hon. Friend made that speech, because what will be read in this country are his words, "War impossible," without the context. That is a bad thing to be put forward by any hon. Member, much less by one with the commanding ability of my right hon. Friend. Then he went on further to look at the matter from a naval point of view. It seems to me, he said, that the fleets of the Triple entente are not inadequate now, and are not going to be inadequate, to any strain that is going to be placed upon them. If that had been said on the other side of the House below the Gangway, I would not have been astonished. But I am amazed that those remarks should have been made on the question of this grouping of the Powers, as the whole thing is a naval question. The other Powers cannot help us in any way comparable to what the Triple Alliance can do. I am only calling attention to this because it is a most serious statement to come from this side, and more particularly from a man of the commanding ability of my right hon. Friend. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty has endeavoured to answer me. The right hon. Gentleman, however, has not cleared up this question of the thirty-three to twenty-nine. Let me read his own words. What he said was:— Thus we shall have at the end of 1914 a minimum of thirty-throe and a maximum of forty-one battleships, fully manned and in full commission, against which the comparable German figure is twenty-nine. Thirty-three to twenty-nine does not perhaps sound a very satisfactory proportion, and it certainly is not an excessive proportion, but it is impossible to settle this question merely on numbers."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd July. 1912, col. 848.] If that means anything, it means what hon. Members on this side of the House have said, and also what Lord Selborne in the House of Lords said. I am only able to make a margin of four, but the right hon. Gentleman said himself that it did not sound a very satisfactory proportion. He is marvellously able—and I give him credit for that—he said that the proportion was four. There are his words. What he says now is different.

Mr. CHURCHILL

What I said was:— Thirty-three to twenty-nine does not perhaps sound a very satisfactory proportion, and it certainly is not an excessive proportion, but it is impossible to settle this question merely on numbers.

Lord C. BERESFORD

I suppose I have the same method of reading Anglo-Saxon as the right hon. Gentleman. There is what he said. Is it different from what he said and from what Lord Selborne repeated? He said there was only a pro portion of four. He himself was finding that that proportion is not too satisfactory! I make out he is quite right in saying that, and I make out that the numbers he gave of "Dreadnoughts" and battleships are not correct. I cannot put them down, but I make out they are not correct. I shall be able to correct them in the morning. Then he produced the Navy League return of ships and said it was very valuable. I do ask the House to be very careful in believing anything the Navy League says. I am not going to do that without giving my reasons. Let me show the value of that return. The Navy League have taken the whole of the torpedo-boat destroyers of our Empire, China, the Mediterranean, and wherever we have got them, and have put them down in the list and have taken the German destroyers at home. Could anything be more monstrously ludicrous and unfair? You have to take the classes of ships in the narrow seas which can immediately, perhaps, without warning, go out to fight. That is the whole principle of these Navy League returns. We know perfectly well who made them out.

Mr. CHURCHILL

How many boats are there?

Lord C. BERESFORD

At home? Mr. CHURCHILL: No, abroad.

Lord C. BERESFORD

I cannot say right off, but I should say that there must be between twenty and thirty.

Mr. CHURCHILL

How many?

Lord C. BERESFORD

Well, how many are there?

Mr. CHURCHILL

About eleven.

Lord C. BERESFORD

A great many more than that. But this is the point. They have taken the whole of the old boats that cannot go to sea at all in the North Sea, and that were built for the narrow sea, that is to say, when we might have had trouble with France. For this they were perfectly adequate. I have tried them over and over again. You cannot put these boats into the North Sea. You always had to send them into harbour. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that the utility of the torpedo boat depends upon the health and vigour of the officers and crew, and there is no living man, even if he were a Hercules, that can keep over forty-eight hours in a torpedo boat and be fit to work and go into action in a seaway. These comparisons are generally nonsense. The Navy League figures are the most misleading of anything I have ever read. I cannot make out the 60 per cent, predominance of which the First Lord spoke. It does not exist under the now plan—which is an entirely novel plan—of sending these four cruisers to the Mediterranean. There has been a complete alteration—a complete right-about-face. It is totally different from what the First Lord told us on 18th March. It was brought about, we surmise, because instead of listening to the statisticians, that is to say, naval experts that learn things in different places ashore, he went to a fighting man, to as good a fighting soldier as we have in the country. After a conversation with that soldier, the First Lord of the Admiralty—with very great common sense—when he saw what was necessary turned round and altered his plans entirely. He stated that in deference to public opinion, and the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, he had sent out a Fleet to the Mediterranean. He had taken the fleet away, and meant to take away! He had abandoned the Mediterranean. I do not think he will deny that, because if he had not why did he remove gun-mountings, the stores, and the ammunition from Malta.

Mr. CHURCHILL

I do not deny in the least that I proposed that the battleships should come home. They have come home—at least they came to Gibraltar.

Lord C. BERESFORD

That is perfectly true. The right hon. Gentleman is perfectly right. But that is not my point. He abandoned the Mediterranean. He was perfectly honest in the matter, and why? Because the ships were not very useful there.

Mr. CHURCHILL

Hear, hear.

Lord C. BERESFORD

They came home because of the men. But the right hon. Gentleman had no right to abandon the Mediterranean without substituting something in the place of the fleet taken away. He has substituted a most excellent fleet. That I say. I mean so far as strength goes. He has restored our prestige. He has protected our road to India and he has protected the 60 per cent, of food that we get from the Black Sea. That I acknowledge. But I am going directly to say why I never have any faith in the right hon. Gentleman. So far as opinion goes, he is like a gyroscope. You never know to what part of the compass he will point. I am saying this because he changed his opinion upon that matter. I do not value any man's opinion who, upon a question of such vital importance to us in connection with our main artery, will at one moment abandon it and in the next moment send a far more powerful Fleet than ever before to it. That is not the way to win wars, and that is not sound strategy. The most extraordinary doctrine I ever heard is that which was told us by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Compton-Rickett) on the other side of the House. No naval officer, and no big Navy man, has ever made such a proposition for the running up of our naval expenditure as he made. What did he propose? He proposed to seal up the Mediterranean. Does he recognise that that would put us at war at once with all the Powers of Europe?

Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETT

If the Noble Lord will allow me to say so, I would point out that France is our ally and Italy and Austria would be at war with us in any case, so that does not leave many Powers to go to war with over the Mediterranean.

Lord C. BERESFORD

Does the hon. Gentleman believe that, allies or no allies, or even bosom friends, would allow us to block up their commercial interests?

Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETT

It was our commercial interest I said should be sealed up in the Mediterranean, and not the commerce of other countries.

Lord C. BERESFORD

The hon. Gentleman is not a seaman. Surely such things as gales of wind and fogs occur. How are you at any time to find out what country the commerce comes from?

Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETT

Seal the Straits of Gibraltar at night; close them to all Powers.

Lord C. BERESFORD

I know the Straits of Gibraltar well, and I can tell the hon. Gentleman that it would be impossible, even with four or five squadrons and three or four reliefs, to do that. Your 325 millions of exports and imports alone between this country and the Mediterranean could never go round the Cape. Are you to send all you obtain from Europe alone by the Suez Canal round the Cape? The mercantile marine have now got cheap engines and they do not carry so much coal, and they reduce their bunker space. They carry only a few tons between places where they go to pick up their coal. The bulk of the ships of the mercantile marine could not go round by the Cape at all; and if the hon. Gentleman knows anything about ships, he knows I am right. But this is an enormous question, and to think of changing our trade route through the Mediterranean and going back by the Cape is absolutely absurd.

Sir J. COMPTON-RICKETT

I am sure the Noble Lord does not want to misunderstand what I stated. I said a naval war in the North Sea would not last more than three or four weeks. That is my theory. I said the greater part of our imports from Europe consist of grain, and that we could do without that grain by increasing our imports temporarily from the United States and the Argentine, and I added that bunker space could easily be added.

Lord C. BERESFORD

I do not think there is any use in pursuing that subject. I am afraid we cannot agree; but I think as to sealing the Mediterranean it will be very fatal for us to run that risk.

Mr. JOHN WARD

Does the Noble Lord remember that in the "Pall Mall Gazette" the other day a notable naval authority advocated that very policy?

Lord C. BERESFORD

With very great respect, it is only a reporter who would say that sort of thing. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty said on the 18th March:— We have a sufficient margin to be able to meet at an average moment the naval force of an attacking Power at their selected moment. I do not want to go into details; but he has since shown that we cannot do that. He also said:— The Admiralty are prepared to guarantee absolutely the main security of the country and of the Empire day by day for the next few years. That was on 18th March; but he withdrew the Mediterranean Fleet from our main artery, and, in face of the Triple Alliance, we cannot afford to conduct our business and strategy under the idea that Austria and Italy will not join Germany. It would be fatal strategy in a fighting man who studies war to allow you to do that. The greatest master of war, Napoleon, did what the First Lord did; that is, he brought his forces home against his strongest enemy. But he kept his lines of communication always guarded—and he did much more: he always had an army in the front of any country with which he was fighting. That is what we have not done; and that is why I entirely combat the view of the right hon. Gentleman in what he calls sufficient strength, and for not having done enough compatible with our security in the future. He has pointed out himself, in the most graphic terms, the dangers we are liable to in the near future. Now I say we cannot do anything to meet these dangers by 1914.

I maintain there are many great dangers—I hope they will not occur—with regard to the Triple Alliance, and what may-occur between now and 1914; and we cannot do anything to meet them except on. the lines I suggested in a circular letter to the Press, to keep our ships manned, to-break up the schools and all the reserves, and to keep the Fleet, which Members of this House went down to see the other day, in commission. What the right hon. Gentleman will do is to send many of these ships back into the reserves, and to send the men back to their schools, and we will not have a fleet fully manned as we ought to have, both in respect to sudden and secret attack from other Powers. We have no right to run any risk. I still maintain I was correct when I stated that we were doing nothing to meet the danger which right hon. Gentlemen themselves have pointed out is very serious in the future. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) said we were running our margin rather fine. We ought to be above all risks which may be run by any unseen contingency. I think the Committee will agree with me there. Hon. Gentlemen opposite know perfectly well you must have spare parts of machinery, and that you must have spare ships and you must have spare men if you are to fight, and you must have a heavy reserve if you are to win. In the Mediterranean I had eight battleships when I was in command. I used to have two laid up sometimes and had to get them right. The right hon. Gentleman was perfectly right to talk of the repair ship. Get the fleet to sea! There are many things which go wrong with machinery in unforeseen contingencies at sea. There were two of my ships laid up; I had two steam trials and the uprights of the cylinders in two of the ships cracked. In one ship the crank head got damaged and in another ship the boiler was badly damaged and I unfortunately lost some men. There were never better men, never more care taken, and yet out of these eight ships, in times of peace, two were laid up for six weeks. That happens with every commander-in-chief, and you have no right to run your margin to this narrow line. What will happen if you go to war when you are not ready? If you are not ready you will be beaten. You will lose your Empire. I say that with the enormous fleet there is on the other side you ought to have a fleet largely better, and you ought to do more now, and the speeches of the First Lord will never turn me from that point. Hon. Gentlemen opposite will shout and howl against large Estimates. I myself told you in 1909 what things were coming to in 1913. We told you that you should spend the money that was necessary because we foresaw this crisis and you would not have got this state of things in 1913 if you had made proper preparation in 1909. Take the question of men alone. You have got 2,000 men this year. No doubt you are miserably short and the right hon. Gentleman knows it. The men are the question; the right hon. Gentleman says we shall have the men at the time we complete these ships. I tell him plainly he will not have them. You cannot train first-class men to take charge of guns, and you cannot train artificers, though you can get trained marines to be fit and proper to go to sea with that knowledge and discipline which would be tremendous in days when you are fighting at sea. You cannot do it under five years, and it was owing to the reduction of men for the sake of economy in 1904, 1905 and 1906 that you arte suffering now. The right hon. Gentleman says he is joining 5,000 men. I am glad to see that he has taken notice that the men were not fairly paid, and that he is going to do something in their favour, but that is not the real thing about the men. It is your nucleus crews and the question of leave. When I was in command I arranged the men's leave. I worked my officers and men forty times more than any other Admiral, but I managed their leave. As a matter of fact they did not get as much leave as the Admiralty gave. We left them home twice in each month for three nights which cost them 14s., instead of leaving them home one night twice a month which cost them 28s. I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. George Lambert) is laughing at.

The CIVIL LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. George Lambert)

I could not follow the Noble Lord's calculation; that is all.

Lord C. BERESFORD

Oh, that is very likely. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that the most serious matter is the question of the nucleus crews, and that is driving the men into a state of irritation. I protested against it for three years. The extra work they have to do at sea is enormous, and when in harbour the ships are in groups. If you take the case of those men who coal their own ships, they will work like Hades to get the ship properly coaled. Under the present system they have to coal this ship and that ship, and they are short-handed to begin with. The men are shifted about from one job to another; they are sent out for so long in a torpedo-destroyer, so long in a catcher, and so long in a battleship, and they are overworked. I ask the right hon. Gentleman to pay attention to the question of the nucleus crews and the leaves, because that is what is making the men dissatisfied.

Mr. CHURCHILL

You are quite wrong.

Lord C. BERESFORD

Who is more likely to know all about the men than I am? The nucleus crew system is an excellent system if it is worked right, but the way it is being worked now is stopping the right hon. Gentleman from getting the men. The right hon. Gentleman was incorrect when he told me some time ago that we were only 240 men short, because we were 2,000 men short, and we had to own it. Why did the men not join, and why are the men leaving? You will not get the men to stay if you do not treat them fairly. The nucleus crew system is an unfair one the way it is now being worked. The right hon. Gentleman knows that I am right, and I have got confidence that he will put the matter right. The right hon. Gentleman's real difficulty is that he has not got the men to man the ships as he builds them. He is short of ships through his Government. He was short of everything, and now, to his credit, ha is trying to fill up the gaps, but he is not doing anything to meet the great danger ahead. I am bitterly disappointed, and I expected him to do very much better. He has been all words and no deeds, or at any rate very few deeds. I admit that he has done something for the men. Why I do not trust the right hon. Gentleman is because he has not done what he said he was going to do, otherwise I should not go into his previous character. I do not want recriminations, but if we get what we call a plausible man or a sea lawyer in the Service, we have a habit of looking at his parchment certificate to see what he has done before. I have been looking at the right hon. Gentleman's parchment certificate to see what he has done before. A few of us tried to rouse the country in the year 1909 about this shortage in the Navy, and this is what the First Lord of the Admiralty said at Manchester in 1909:— I hope you will not expect me to advocate a braggart and sensational policy of expenditure upon armaments. I have always been against that, as my father was before me. [Cheers.] Hon. Members had better reserve their cheers until the next Navy Estimates. In the same speech the right hon. Gentleman proceeded to say:— The Navy scare is a false, sham, lying, panic started in the interests of the Conservatives. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Hon. Members still believe that statement, but we will be more courteous to the right hon. Gentleman and we will not call it a false, sham, lying panic in the interests of the Radical party. I will proceed with the quotation from the right hon. Gentleman's speech:— We are not to be driven by windy agitations of ignorant, interested and excited hotheads into wasting the public money upon armaments on a scale clearly not designed merely for purposes of material defence, but being part of a showy, sensational, aggressive and jingo policy which is supposed to gain popularity from certain unthinking sections of the community. We take our stand against that.

Mr. CHURCHILL

That is my view now.

Lord C. BERESFORD

The right hon. Gentleman had better wait until the next Estimates are introduced. I do not believe in those people who turn sixteen points. At one time the right hon. Gentleman opposite was an ornament to our benches, but he went over to the other side—of course, in the public interest. At first he was a very Little Navy man; in fact, he was the high priest of Little Navy men, and he then became a very Large Navy man, although the circumstances were exactly the same, and there was no difference at all.

Mr. CHURCHILL

I thought the point of the Noble Lord's contention was that the provision we were making was wholly inadequate.

Lord C. BERESFORD

That is perfectly true, but the right hon. Gentleman confines himself to words and not to deeds. The right hon. Gentleman is an enormous Navy man in his words; in fact, he is bigger than I am, but he does nothing. With regard to strategy, the right hon. Gentleman introduced a change of policy by abandoning the Mediterranean, and you have put nothing back there suitable for the requirements. I do not doubt the ability and courage of the right hon. Gentleman. He has got plenty of ability and courage, but a statesman wants more than that. Without being the least bit offensive, perhaps I may point out that you often find plenty of ability and courage in the gaols of our country. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me that courage and ability are often misplaced, and it is only because they are misplaced that those people are in gaol. I think the right hon. Gentleman's courage and ability is there, but it is misplaced. I will not say that I do not believe the right hon. Gentleman because that is not Parliamentary, but I have no faith in him and the statements he makes here that he is going to do a lot for the Navy. I think he will do a lot for the men and the officers, but he is not doing enough for the protection of our Empire, and if what he says is true, and I know it is, that there is a very serious time coming for this Empire and this country, let me warn him that if he goes on with his policy of nothing but words and no deeds, we are as certain to meet with disaster as I am standing up in my place in the House of Commons to-day.

Mr. BARNES

We have had in this Debate a series of speeches of an alarmist, not to say of a Jingoist character, and the most lurid and alarmist of those speeches, I am sorry to say, came from an hon. Member on this side of the House—I refer to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Osgoldcross (Sir J. Comp-ton-Rickett). The burden of most of the speeches has been that we want more ships, more men, and more guns, and, further, that Germany is arming against us, and if we do not get all these things to arm against Germany then Germany will fight and conquer us, and we shall see the end of all things. I think that is a fair paraphrase of the speech of the Noble Lord who has just sat down, as well as of the other speakers who preceded him. Although on this question I speak only as a layman, I think I am entitled to give an expression of opinion, and I give it for what it is worth. In regard to this alarm I do not believe a bit of it; and, in so far as there is danger at the present time, it arises very largely from the provocative speeches made in this House and elsewhere by men of authority, and this alarm is what those speeches have led to. Still, thorp are one or two points upon which I absolutely agree with the Noble Lord who has just sat down.

There is the question of the men. If we are to have ships, and if we are going to go on building these immense ships, we ought to have the men to man those ships. I believe that when the time comes it will probably be found that the efficiency and the fighting force of those ships will depend very largely upon the scientific precision with which the men have been drilled, and also, to a large extent, on harmonious working together of all grades, from the top to the bottom. It is necessary to have the men trained, and to have them trained all together, so that when we desire to use them they can be used efficiently. There I shall have to part company with the Noble Lord, because I understand that he wants more ships, and he says, as was stated by the hon. and gallant Member for Chelmsford (Mr. Pretyman), that the ships we have for immediate use are not adequate. Mention has been made of the relative proportion of first-class ships during the next two years. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Chelmsford said we were only going to have a margin of four ships, but that is altogether wrong. As a simple matter of fact Germany will have twenty-five ships and we shall have thirty-three, or a margin of eight in the first rank. Germany, in addition to that, will have a margin of four reserve ships and we shall have a margin of eight. Therefore in first-class ships we shall have forty-one as against Germany a possible twenty nine. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Osgoldcross (Sir J. Compton-Rickett) said it is quite true you may have this margin of ships as against Germany, but part of your margin will be the eight ships in Gibraltar, and you may have to withdraw those ships. Germany may cause a diversion by compelling Austria and Italy against their will to act with her, and therefore we shall not be able to call our ships home. That was the suggestion. Have we not been told Austria and Italy will not have their ships in commission until the end of 1915?

Lord C. BERESFORD

Austria and Italy have now between them six ships launched and complete. They will be there ready early next year, and Austria is going to lay down four more "Dreadnoughts."

Mr. BARNES

Unfortunately we have been hearing about those four Austrian "Dreadnoughts" for years. The fact remains, although we heard of those four "Dreadnoughts" four years ago, in 1908, only one of them is in commission yet. We are now told some of them are to be in commission next year. At all events, we are now discussing the relative position in first-class ships only up to and including 1914, and it seems to be perfectly obvious that within that time Germany cannot use Austria and Italy as pawns, because those ships will not be in effective service and at the control of the Triple Alliance. We are told, just as we have been told often before, that Germany is going to do so and so, and we must be armed against her. I do not profess to be any authority as to how many ships are necessary in order to checkmate Germany in the immediate future, but as one outside, having no technical and detail knowledge of these things, I have got to go to the declarations made on these benches during the last few years to ascertain just what we are up against. We were told four years ago by the predecessor of the right hon. Gentleman that Germany was going to have seventeen "Dreadnoughts" this year. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour) improved upon that, and told us that for certain on 1st April this year Germany would have twenty-one ships, and might possibly have four more, making twenty-five. Those are the statements upon which this House was induced in 1909 to authorise a certain inflated programme of shipbuilding, and upon which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, like Silas Wegg, dropped into poetry. We had a statement from the First Lord of the Admiralty only a little while ago that Germany actually will not have thirteen ships until the latter end of next year, and that she will only have seventeen at the end of 1914, which is now, if you please, a psychological moment. I can only say that, if these experts have been wrong before, it is quite as likely they are wrong now; and for my part I am not going to be alarmed by speeches made either on the Front Benches, or by the Noble Lord opposite. If we built against a nightmare before, and we did, then I think it is quite possible, and even probable, we are being asked to build against nightmares now.

Something else has happened in the meantime. We have spent our money, and we have the ships in commission, and we have entered into alliances which have brought us weakness rather than strength. Last year we were brought into trouble in regard to a filibustian expedition by France into Morocco, and brought within an ace of war in regard to something which was not our concern at all. We have, moreover, been compelled to make alliances with the most backward nation in Europe, and to actually aid that nation in suppressing the Persian people struggling to be free. It, at all events, looked to me like an alliance when I heard the Foreign Secretary this year and last year repeatedly defend Russia. We are being brought into all sorts of entanglements which are contrary to the. best traditions of the Foreign policy of this country. My position is perfectly simple. I believe if Germany has exceeded her original programme of shipbuilding, then she has been provoked to do it by the action and speeches of responsible people in this country. Germany started a certain programme in 1900. She amended that programme to get more ships in 1906 and 1908, but it was explained to us, and I see no reason to doubt the explanation, those increases of the German programme were due to later methods of shipbuilding, and, as a consequence, to the shorter life of ships. It is only one of the amendments of the German shipbuilding programme that is now in question, and that is the last one which came into operation this year, after Germany had been humiliated by this country last year. That, therefore, may account for it. At all events, last September we had the events which I need not now further mention with regard to Morocco. We had, I am sorry to say, that speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the City of London, by which it was made perfectly plain even he has joined the jingoes of the Cabinet, and I think it very likely had a good deal to do with the last amendment of the German Naval Law. An hon. Member put it quite clearly the other night. He said last year Germany suffered a silent defeat and we won a victory for our allies. I can only say these victories are dearly bought if we get into these entanglements with foreign Powers, which involve an immense expenditure, and the end of which we cannot see.

The hon. Member for Birmingham a little while ago attacked my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald) because he had said he was opposed to the expenditure now under discussion, because it was inflated expenditure. He was quite justified in that observation. It is true we are only being asked to spend a little more than last year; but we are being asked to spend 50 per cent, more than in the year which opened this century. The First Lord of the Admiralty was quite frank. He told us he had further proposals to make to us next February or March, and hon. Members can therefore quite see these Estimates are not the Estimates that must be submitted to the House if the policy at the back of them is to be backed up. He said these Estimates were only a small and preliminary instalment of what is to come as the result of the alteration of the German Naval Law. After that the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty, with strange inconsistency, said these Estimates were not intended as a menace to anybody, and we wished all people well. For my part, I am against the policy that lies behind these Estimates; the policy of the isolation of Germany, and of our entanglement with other countries. It is leading us more and more not only into expenditure, but into entanglements the end of which no man can see. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London, as a sort of consolation for himself, and I suppose he suggested it as a consolation for other people, said he thought, after all, it might lead to peace and maintain peace, because of the frightful possibilities of war breaking out. Surely that involves an equilibrium. If one Power gets a great preponderance of power, then to the extent that they get that preponderance they can get these silent victories over other people; but there is always going to be the desire of other people to come up to the preponderating power, and there is therefore going to be a never-ending vista of increasing expenditure. There is at least a chance of the country keeping free from danger from the fact that the same financial interest that determines the expenditure may prevent its being used; but I am old-fashioned enough to believe there is at all events a danger in the presence of these things—a danger that these things being there they will be used.

I do not say, and I have never said, that the country cannot afford to pay both for armaments and for social reform; but it seems to me the spirit which these armaments engenders is altogether opposed to social reform. It brings about a spirit of national braggadocio and hysteria altogether contrary to social reform. It is for that reason mainly I oppose them. As a matter of fact, the man who shouts for armaments and "Dreadnoughts" is, as a rule, the man who cares very little for the ravages of disease or for the substitution of order for the anarchy that now exists around us. I shall say no more about the programme of shipbuilding except to express my regret the Government have been induced by some unseen influence to enter upon a road altogether contrary to the best traditions of Liberalism. For my part, I have voted against these increased Estimates every time, and I shall continue to vote against them. It will probably be expected that I should say a few words in regard to the increased wage bill mentioned by the Parliamentary Secretary the other day. I do not, I am glad to say, speak as a Member for a dockyard town, and I do not even speak on behalf of any particular class of workman in the dockyards—

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE made an observation which was inaudible in the Gallery.

Mr. BARNES

I have a perfect right to speak as a Labour Member, and, speaking as a Labour Member—

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE

The hon. Member has made a mistake—

The CHAIRMAN

On Monday I had to request the hon. Member not to make speeches during other people's observa- tions, and I thought he had exhausted himself.

8.0 P.M.

Mr. BARNES

I do not speak with any special mandate on behalf of any class of men in the dockyard, neither do I speak for any dockyard, and I am very glad I do not. As a Labour Member I can only express a very modified and chastened satisfaction at the increased Wage indicated by the right hon. Gentleman. He told us he was going to give a total of £41,000—

Dr. MACNAMARA

Spread over the men at present on the Votes for a year.

Mr. BARNES

And I understood also it was to come into operation on the 1st August, so that, in a period of eight months, there is to be £41,000 divided between 50,000 and 60,000 men. I can only characterise that as a pauper's prize. It amounts, I calculate, to less than 6d. per week, or Id. per day per man. I doubt, if my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. Wilkie) is satisfied.

Mr. WILKIE

I shall have plenty to say about it. later on.

Mr. BARNES

I can only congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on the achievement of the 6d. But if I were a shipwright I should be inclined to say to the Government, "Keep your 6d. until you can give us something more substantial." Or I might have said, "Put 6d. on to the 1s. and bring the labourers more nearly up to a decent wage. "You are giving the labourers in the dockyard 22s. per week. It is a disgraceful wage for any Government to pay an adult man. It does not cover the decencies of life, let alone the comforts of civilisation. I myself shall never be satisfied until the Government pay a minimum of 24s. a week to every man, whether in Ireland or in Great Britain. The right hon. Gentleman the other day took credit for the Government for giving at least as much money as was given in the area of the dockyard. But it is doing nothing of the sort. It is giving 22s., an increase of Is., upon the miserable and paltry wage paid up till now. In Chatham the corporation pay 25s. 6d., in Portsmouth 24s., Devonport 24s., and Plymouth 25s., the local co-operative societies 24s., while the building trade rate is 27s. 9d. This is for unskilled labour, while the Government, which professes to be in the first flight of employers, is only paying 22s., or from 2s. 6d. to 3s. less than the local district rates for similar labour.

I mentioned the engineers just now. I am not speaking specially for them, but the right hon. Gentleman must know that the engineers' rate for contractors in dockyard towns is a minimum of 40s. per week, agreed upon by the federations of employers and employed. You pay them 34s. 6d. per week with privileges which they often lose, and when they are off the establishment you give them 36s. per week, or 4s. below the rate agreed upon between the associations of employer and workmen. Then take the case of the rivetters. Here I may quote the Board of Trade figures. At Gateshead the rate is 37s. 6d., at Middlesbrough 33s., Newcastle 37s. 6d., Southampton 38s., South Shields 37s. 6d., and London 38s. You pay 25s. a week. Or take the case of the iron caulkers. Their rates in the various towns I have mentioned vary from 33s. to 38s. You pay them 29s. as a maximum. I could go into other classes of labour, but I need not do so; perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee will supplement what I have said in this regard. Although we are going to take the 1s. offered, and to hope for more, I must say I am more concerned With dealing first with the men at the bottom. I hope and trust the Financial Secretary will give a little more generous interpretation to the views he has expressed, and that he will give them the 2s. in the immediate future. I also hope that the men afloat will be treated more generously than the men ashore. The right hon. Gentleman must know about the increased cost of living. It is felt as much in dockyard towns as in other towns. The increase of wages by no means corresponds with the increased cost of living, neither does it correspond with the increased wage paid outside in ordinary commercial undertakings. This applies even more to the stokers. They now have, I believe, about 2s. a day to start with. That is a miserable, wretched, disgraceful wage for any Government to pay to full-grown men. The artificers get 5s. 3d. per day.

The CHAIRMAN

I told the hon. Member that these matters did not come under this Vote.

Mr. BARNES

I was only using them as an illustration. I am sorry I travelled beyond the bounds of order. Let me say a word, however, on the question of the Colonies. One of the most satisfactory features that has emerged from this Debate is the foreshadowing of the better relationships between the Mother-country and the Colonies. The Colonies have grown up under the protection more or less of the British Fleet. They have done things which we ourselves would not have done. They have disfranchised men of non-European origin. They have had men sent to them free, so to speak; men fully trained and educated at our expense. It is satisfactory to find, after all, that the obligations they have been under to us have been recognised, and that the recognition is coming in a material form in the shape of something in the way of Imperial defence. Of course, that will carry with it representation on some sort of Imperial authority. I do not know what that Imperial authority may be. I am disposed to leave that to the logic of events. But whatever it may be it must depend to some extent on the sort of aid that they give us, and it is in regard to that I want to say a word. I noticed a curious phrase in the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty on Monday. He said that the Canadians desired to give us aid of a supplementary character, outside the provision made by the British Admiralty, so as to increase our margin of safety. I did not like that phrase. It seemed to me to take away from the grace of the gift. It makes the givers, after all, more or less outsiders, and for my part I should like to see them come in frankly as co-partners with us in the defence of that great heritage which is of as much importance to them as to us, and even more so. In that event they could have some sort of representation in common with us on the basis of the help given. I only mention that because it seemed to me that was the fly in the ointment so far as the help coming from our Colonies is concerned.

I would again urge the right hon. Gentleman to give the question of wages his earnest attention in the immediate future, and to give a liberal interpretation to the professions he has so often and so sincerely made. I desire the betterment of the conditions of our workmen in the dockyards and in our fleet. I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that these men are not benefiting as other men have benefited as a result perhaps of agitation. They have not benefited so far as the dockyard men are concerned as much as similar grades of men in dockyard towns outside the dockyards. I hope that in the immediate future the right hon. Gentleman will see that their wages are brought up to a standard which will enable them to live better lives. While, as Labour Members we are not disposed, as has been suggested, to give Australia to Germany or anybody else, we are disposed, whenever we deem it necessary, to oppose what we regard as inflated and unnecessary armaments. We believe that this year's armaments, although they are not a very great increase upon those of last year, do embody a policy which, if given full effect to, is going to land us in a very much larger increase of armaments next year and the year after. We are looking ahead. We do not want the resources of the country frittered away in this manner. We believe that the resources of civilisation would be better spent; not in arming against nightmares; not in arming against imaginary fleets; but by engaging in a great effort to give the people of this country a larger life, and to lead them into spheres where they may have more hopeful and more healthy conditions.

Sir R. POLE-CAREW

I have been very sorry to hear the speech just delivered. It seems quite impossible to convince a certain portion of our population of the enormous importance of the British Navy to this country. They do not seem to be able to realise the fact that without the Navy the British Empire cannot exist. What is the British Navy to us? I would invite the particular attention of the hon. Member to this, because I hope I may possibly persuade him that the proposed increase this year is not only necessary, but not half enough. The British Empire exists entirely by the Navy. The British Empire is the Empire of the sea, and nothing else. If our lines of communication were not maintained, does anyone suppose for an instant that Canada could stand by itself; that Australia could stand alone; or that India would remain in our possession?

And, it being a Quarter-past Eight of the clock, and there being Private Business set down by direction of the Chairman of Ways and Means, under Standing Order No. 8, further proceeding was postponed without Question put.