CONVICTIONS IN SUMMARY COURTS (APPEALS). (Hansard, 19 December 1912)

§ Sir F. BANBURY
I desire to call the attention of the House to the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary has dealt with the complaint of a constituent of mine, who states that he has been wrongfully convicted at a Police Court. Some few weeks ago this gentleman wrote to me and stated that he had been wrongfully convicted at a Police Court in the Metropolitan area, and that he had written to the Home Secretary, who had replied to him that it was not in his power to cause a rehearing of the case. I replied to the gentleman that I thought his best course would have been to have appealed against the decision of the magistrate, or to have brought an action for perjury against the people whom he described as having borne false witness against him; but shortly after that I saw in the paper that the Home Secretary had sent a gentleman down, a Mr. Chester Jones, to inquire into the case of an engine-driver who had been convicted at another Police Court on a charge of having been drunk and disorderly, and it struck me that perhaps I had been a little premature in writing the letter I did to my constituent, because it seemed to me if the right hon. Gentleman could cause an inquiry to be made in the case of a conviction in Newcastle he could also cause an inquiry to be made in the case of a conviction in London. Therefore, as I had not the pleasure of my constituent's acquaintance, I took the 1852 best means in my power, as a man who has had some business experience in the City of London, to ascertain what sort of a gentleman he was. There is a book which every man who has-been in business in the City of London will know exists, a book which is frequently in the hands of bankers. It describes the position of people carrying on business in the City of London. I examined this book, and found my constituent was described as "an eminently respectable man." [Laughter.] I do not know why there should be laughter, because it is a serious matter, and I have not brought it forward in a light manner. I have taken the trouble to find out whether there was a possibility of my constituent being right in his request that the case should be reheard. I took further steps to find out whether this gentleman was or was not a person on whose behalf it would be right for me, as a Member for the City of London, to exercise the privilege which I have as a Member of this House, and the further report is that this gentleman is a man known in the district for many years in a moderate way of business, highly respectable and trustworthy, and who would not undertake anything he could not carry through. Under those circumstances, I asked the gentleman to see me at the House, and I have had the advantage of an interview with him. I do not say whether he is innocent or guilty. It is quite impossible for me, having only heard one side of the question to know whether he is innocent or guilty, but his statement is that he was convicted at the Police Court of obstructing the footpath. It seems to me it is hardly likely he would have been guilty of that. He said he stayed for a few moments to listen to a boy who was singing on the street. A policeman coming up directed the boy to cease singing, and my constituent asked the policeman why, as there was no crowd in the street and the boy was doing no harm, he should be directed to cease singing, whereupon the policeman assaulted my constituent. My constituent retired in order to avoid conflict with the police, but he was naturally indignant at being treated in that way. 1853 He went a little way down Oxford Street, but returned to find the name of the street in which the discussion had taken place, as he was desirous of communicating with the Chief Commissioner. On his return he happened to pass the corner where the policeman was, and he was then arrested, taken to the station, convicted, and fined 30s. He is a highly respectable gentleman of moderate means, and he could not do as I suggested—bring an action in the High Court against the people who, he says, had wrongfully sworn as to what he was doing. He wrote to the Home Secretary, who replied that he had no power to re-hear the case. That is so, but why did he not say he had the power to send down Mr. Chester Jones, or some other stipendiary, to hold an inquiry. My constituent says some sort of inquiry was held by the police at the station, but nobody was present, except the policeman himself, and the inspector informed him on inquiry that nothing further could be done. He wrote again, but the Home Secretary has not even had the courtesy to acknowledge the receipt of the communication. I am shortly putting the facts before the House. I do not know whether this gentleman was innocent or guilty, but, primâ facie, he has as good a case to ask for a special investigation as the engine-driver Knox, who was convicted on a charge of being drunk and disorderly. I venture to say that there is no doubt upon it, because it is almost impossible to imagine that an elderly man in a small way of business in the City of London would run the risk of being held up at the police court and convicted, knowing the damage that would be to him in his business which he carried on in a respectable place like the City of London. What I want to ask the House is this: Are we to understand that there is to be one law for a man who is a member of a trade union, and who thought that powerful trade union can make himself disagreeable to the right hon. Gentleman and his constituents, and another law for the ordinary citizen of this country, who is only one by himself, and who, unless he is able to obtain the assistance of a Member of Parliament., has no redress whatever. I have endeavoured to put the case simply, and I believe absolutely accurately before the House. I ask them to consider it carefully. I do not know what reply the Home Secretary is going to make, but I ask them to consider whether, in the 1854 circumstances I have related, my constituent is not as justified in having an inquiry held into his case as was engine-driver Knox.

§ Mr. McKENNA
Until the conclusion of the hon. Baronet's speech I was in some doubt as to whether he complained of my not having inquired into the case of this, gentleman or whether he complained of my having inquired into the case of engine-driver Knox. I understand that the substance of his complaint is that I inquired into the latter case.

§ Sir F. BANBURY
Not at all. On the contrary, I made no mention of whether it was right or wrong. I did not allude to it. It would not have been relevant if I had, but as the right hon. Gentleman had made an inquiry into a case which seemed to me to be parallel, or not even quite so good a case as the case of my constituent, I asked the right hon. Gentleman to follow the course he had already followed in one instance.

§ Mr. McKENNA
I am quite at a loss to understand the hon. Baronet's reference to a powerful trade union. The hon. Baronet considers that the two cases are precisely on all fours—[HON. MEMBERS: "He did not say so."]

§ Mr. BARNSTON
made an observation which was inaudible.

§ Mr. McKENNA
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be so good as to withdraw that observation. [Interruption.] I desire to ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether the hon. Member is in order in saying to me, in an audible voice across the floor of the House, that I am not so stupid as I pretend to-be?

§ Mr. SPEAKER
In consequence of the noise which was going on the observation did not reach me. If it had, I should at once have called the attention of the House to it, and asked the hon. Member to refrain from using an offensive observation——

§ Mr. McKENNA
The hon. Baronet assumed that the cases were parallel, or, if not parallel, that there was a better ground for inquiry in the case of Mr. Favelle than in the case of Mr. Knox—as good or better. The facts are these in the two cases. In the Favelle case the incident occurred upwards of three months, ago. Mr. Favelle contended that his case was not properly heard before 1855 Mr. Meade, the magistrate. Mr. Favelle suffered from being deaf, and he was under the impression that inasmuch as he had not been able to hear all the evidence he had been prejudiced. He was also under the impression that his own case had not been properly presented before the Court. Mr. Favelle's method of bringing his own case was to read to the Court a very full letter in which he set out the whole of the circumstances written by himself to the Commissioner of Police. The whole of the case from Mr. Favelle's own point of view was presented in this letter and it was read. Subsequently Mr. Favelle asked for the minutes of the proceedings in the Court. They were sent to him, but a copy of the letter which he had read and which constituted his own evidence were not included in the minutes which were forwarded to him. It was not included because inasmuch as it was a copy of Mr. Favelle's own letter and he had the original, it was conceived unnecessary to send it to him. In consequence of this omission, Mr. Favelle was under the impression that his own case had never really been fully before the mind of the magistrate. These circumstances were represented to me. I inquired of the magistrate, I saw the notes, I read Mr. Favelle's case, and I read the evidence of the police. I got a further report from the magistrate upon the case, and I was entirely satisfied upon the whole evidence that Mr. Favelle had had a fair and proper hearing from the magistrate. The impression that he had received, that he had not had a full hearing, was simply due to the fact that he himself was slightly deaf, and that no evidence had been given against him except evidence which was true. I was satisfied of that upon a very full investigation, both by the Home Office and by the magistrate.

§ Sir F. BANBURY
You did not ask the Newcastle magistrate.

§ Mr. McKENNA
I understood that was not the hon. Baronet's complaint. In the case of Engine-driver Knox a charge was brought against him by the police of assault upon the police. He was charged with being drunk and disorderly—a very trifling charge. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] The fact of his being an engine driver would make no difference at all so far as the Courts were concerned.

§ Sir E. CARSON
I quite agree. I think it is just as serious a charge, if anything, as obstructing the footpath.

§ Mr. McKENNA
That makes no difference to the Courts. Knox had two charges brought against him, one of being drunk and disorderly, and the other of a violent assault upon the police. That is a serious charge. The case was heard, and the whole of the evidence was directed to the charge of assault upon the police. That is a very serious charge under the circumstances. Knox alleged that he had been wantonly attacked by a couple of policemen, handcuffed, and brought in, and charged at the police office with assaulting the police. His case was that the police assaulted him, and so there was a very serious case which must have an effect on Knox on the one hand or on the police on the other.

§ Sir FREDERICK BANBURY
My man says that the police assaulted him.

§ Mr. McKENNA
I do not think the hon. Baronet says that Mr. Favelle asserts that the police treated him with violence.

§ Sir F. BANBURY
dissented.

§ Mr. McKENNA
Well, it was violence of a very different kind. Knox says he was knocked down and injured. The whole of the evidence of Mr. Favelle three months after the event was that he had been violently assaulted by the police, but that was never raised by him at the Police Court. I am dealing with Knox's case now. The charge of assaulting the police against Knox was dismissed, but the charge of being found drunk and disorderly was found good against him, and he was fined 5s. and costs. Here the two cases are perfectly similar. Knox was a man whose record up to then had been irreproachable. [An HON. MEMBER: "He had been convicted."] The fact that he was convicted of assault thirty years ago is beside the mark. He was a married man, whose character was irreproachable. We need not go into that. He had been acquitted of the serious charge against him. His statement to me was that the fine was trifling, that he did not want to be troubled any more with the case, and that he did not think anything more was to happen. He paid the fine, and thought no more about it. He had a period within which he could appeal. After that time had elapsed he heard, for the first time, from the Railway Company, that, in consequence of his having been fined, he was to be degraded. That is to say, what was merely a trifling fine of 5s. became a very serious matter. I was 1857 informed that had he been told that he was to be degraded before the period of appeal had elapsed, he would have appealed.

§ Mr. RAWLINSON
He could not have appealed.

§ Mr. McKENNA
He could. The point of Knox's case was, not that he had been fined and disputed the justice of the fine, but that he had been degraded in consequence of it, and had been degraded after the time for the appeal had elapsed. Mr. Favelle was never degraded; he lost nothing by it. It has not been alleged in all the correspondence that he has lost anything by it. Nor do I understand that the hon. Baronet alleges it.

§ Sir F. BANBURY
A gentleman in business in the City of London who is convicted in the Police Court naturally loses a great deal by it.

§ Mr. McKENNA
Knox, on the other hand, actually lost. He was degraded in the service. In view of the fact that Knox's chances of appeal had gone by——

§ Mr. HORNER
There was no appeal.

§ Mr. JOYNSON-HICKS
He could not appeal.

§ Mr. McKENNA
The hon. Member is wrong. In the case of a charge of being drunk and disorderly there is an appeal. There is not in the other case. I had before me a case exactly similar to Knox's case in the month of May last. There was a case which nobody ever heard about. There was no strike, no trade union, and none of the incidents of publicity that attended Knox's case. A man received a sentence of a month's imprisonment on a charge of being concerned in a poach- 1858 ing affair, and suffered his punishment. In consequence of his being convicted he lost his employment under the Thames Conservancy Board. The man claimed that he was innocent. The evidence was brought to my notice, and exactly as in the Knox case there was primâ facie ground for believing that this man was in fact innocent, and had been punished not only with a month's imprisonment, but with the loss of his employment. As in Knox's case, I ordered a precisely similar inquiry. A representative was sent down to the place in the country to examine the witnesses and look into the whole circumstances of the case and to report to me from such re-investigation as he could make what were the real facts of the case. I came to the conclusion that this man had been wrongfully convicted. He was granted a free pardon and has been reinstated in his employment. In the case of driver Knox, I followed that exact precedent. The circumstances of this case are wholly dissimilar. This gentleman has not got a primâ facie case. He has not on the evidence in the slightest degree satisfied me that there was ground for reopening the case. In the case referred to by the hon. Baronet, the person was not further punished by the loss of his employment, and there being no primâ facie ground for believing there has been a miscarriage of justice, I see no reason whatever for sending a magistrate to make a further investigation of the case.