§ In cases to which this Part of this Act applies an appeal from the Supreme Prize Court shall lie to the International Prize Court.
§ Mr. JAMES MASONI beg to move, at the end of the Clause, to add the words "save in respect of questions upon which no agreement exists in the Declaration of London."
The object of the Amendment is to limit the jurisdiction of the International Prize Court to a certain category of questions dealt with in the Declaration of London. I think it has always been agreed, maintained, and supported that in order that an International Prize Court should be successfully set up you must have a code of law which it will be its duty to administer. I think that has never been denied. In this case a code has been devised, called the Declaration of London, which it is thought will be sufficient for the International Prize Court to administer. But we must remember it has been laid down that where the Declaration of London does not deal with a particular point the International Prize Court can judge in accordance with the principles of justice and equity—in fact, that the International Prize Court should make law for itself as it goes along. It appears to me that if appeals are to be allowed on any conceivable subject of international law, apart 1220 from any laws laid down, the result may be very injurious to this country, and may lead to a position of considerable difficulty. Let us take, as a case, the contention of a good many nations that the conversion of merchant ships into warships should be legal. We have always refused to acknowledge that, and we still refuse to do so, and that question of the conversion of merchantmen is ostentatiously left out of the Declaration of London and is not in any way dealt with. The International Prize Court may very easily deal with that question, and make its own laws as it goes along, and in a manner extremely disadvantageous to this country. Holding the view that this country does, that the conversion of merchantmen into war ships is illegal, it is quite obvious that if that view is denied by other countries, it will be open for us to treat them as pirates, but the International Court may lay down rules which would make it easy for other nations to carry out the conversion. Bear in mind that under this Bill we undertake in our own Courts here to enforce the judgments of the International Prize Court, and we may therefore find ourselves obliged to enforce judgments given by the International Prize Court dealing very leniently with the conversion of merchantmen, while we are maintaining in our own Courts that the conversion of merchantmen is entirely illegal. Therefore I think the Clause should be so altered as to limit it to matters in the Declaration of London, and to exclude the particular case I have just referred to, and others.
§ Sir A. CRIPPSIn seconding this proposal I should like to call attention to Article 7, which states that if no positive rule is laid down, then judgment is to be given in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity. The general principles of justice and equity used in that indefinite sense give no test whatever. Of course, when you are dealing with justice and equity applied in accordance with the views of a particular Court you know what you mean. The learned Selden, who is often quoted as an authority, said that a principle of justice and equity, if it is merely the Chancellor's statement, might mean in a great many cases the grossest injustice and the grossest iniquity. If you have no proper test to determine justice and equity, in this case it means the test which the representatives of each country like to apply as regards their own case. There is no such thing here as principles of justice and 1221 equity. They all differ. But when you come to the conduct of a Court where for a series of years certain principles have been laid down for the guidance and conduct of justice, it is an entirely different thing. In the absence of that it is quite wrong that a Court should be given a power of this kind, more particularly an International Court, the majority of which is composed of representatives of foreign countries, before which extremely important questions may arise. On those grounds I support the Amendment of my hon. Friend.
§ Sir J. SIMONIt was difficult to decide whether my hon. Friend (Mr. Mason) was considering the case which may unhappily arise of this country being a belligerent or the case of this country as a neutral, because he raises the question, what would be the result if an Amendment is not accepted upon the claim of this country to deal as it pleases with an enemy which chooses to convert merchant ships on the high seas? The answer is that the Declaration of London does not confer upon any Power that is belligerent, the right to appeal to the International Prize Court at all. The rights of belligerents in this matter stand where they did, and so far is it from being to the point to say that the Declaration of London limits our rights, we expressly reserve the view which obtains now, and always has obtained, that the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas is improper, and those who do it against this country must take the consequences of their action. That question does not arise at all. What does arise is, what is the position of a neutral ship if you exclude this element from the jurisdiction of the International Court? The situation now is that if, this country being neutral, the owner of a British merchantman considers he has grounds of complaint, because one of two belligerent Powers, by means of converted merchantmen, has damaged or sunk his ship, the only tribunal to which he can appeal is not an International Tribunal, not his own tribunal, but is the tribunal of the very Power which has commissioned the merchantman and authorised the destruction that has taken place. In this instance what prospect is there of a British owner getting satisfaction in the only tribunal to which he can go? If the hon. Member's Amendment were carried it would remain the only tribunal to which he could go. The real effect of the hon. Member's Amendment is that the British 1222 owner, who has hitherto felt that he was labouring under a gross hardship, would have to submit to the decision of the foreign belligerent Court of Appeal against the belligerents themselves who had authorised the Act of which he complained. The result of the Amendment would be to leave him in that position, whereas we, by the Declaration, and by the proposal carried in this House, provide that he should have, at any rate, this remedy, the only possible remedy, that he can appeal from that hostile tribunal to a Court which consists of a majority of neutral representatives. Are we to deprive the owners of British commerce, British ships, and cargoes of that portion of that right of appeal? It is only by confusing the position of this country when we are neutrals with the position of this country when we are at war that any plausible argument can be presented in the opposite direction. If it is true that when this country was at war and might be engaged in fighting for its life, then in those circumstances it would have to submit itself to the belligerent's action by appealing to an International Court, there would be immense force in the argument of the hon. Gentleman. But that is not true.
The position is that, if this country was at war, it claims a right to deal with its enemy if that enemy converts merchantmen on the high seas, as it pleases, when it pleases, and where it pleases. There is nothing in this Act of Parliament or the Declaration of London which in the least degree modifies that; on the contrary, it is the topic on which at the time we were discussing this matter with foreign countries, the Foreign Office and those who represented this country expressly reserved our full rights so to act. As to the position of the country when at peace, with its enormous commerce, surely it is not desired to deprive the owners of our own ships of this right. It might be that at this moment two Powers, each friendly to us, are unhappily engaged in war. Surely it is not desired that we should deprive the neutral British owner of the opportunity of taking his case from a hostile Court to an International Tribunal where, at any rate, he he appears before a majority of judges appointed by the neutral Powers, and where he is not appealing to the very body which has authorised the wrong of which he complains. The attempt to cut down appeal on those matters which the hon. Gentleman includes in his Amendment is a proposal which I hope the House will not support. Can anything be more inconvenient 1223 than that a neutral appellant should find the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal is to be narrower than the jurisdiction of the tribunal from which you appeal? In the nature of things you cannot have any superior body to decide the exact boundaries of that jurisdiction, and surely the natural and proper thing to do is to say, that the neutral, whether subject or State, should have the right of appeal to this Court and to argue his case before the International Tribunal by the same arguments which it has urged before the belligerent Court.
§ Sir R. FINLAYMy hon. Friend by his Amendment deals only with appeals from our own Prize Courts. Making a Supreme Prize Court in this country is for the purpose of accommodating ourselves to this Convention. I suggest that we could not decently give an appeal to any foreign tribunal from the King in Council, and we have created the judges who advise the King in Council to a new Court, to be called the Supreme Prize Court. That change has been made in order that an appeal may lie. The question is not one as to an appeal from the courts of foreign countries who are the wrong-doers in the case put by the Solicitor-General. The question is whether we should legalise appeals from our own Privy Council to the International Court in certain cases, which I will deal with presently. The Solicitor-General made some remarks which I think require some observations on the subject of the conversion of merchantmen into men of war. He said there is nothing in the Declaration of London about it. Of course there is not. There is a separate Convention with regard to this subject, which contains nothing but the most absolute platitudes, and the only thing of any importance in it is the statement that the Powers were totally unable to arrive at any agreement as to the circumstances under which conversion might take place on the high seas. But the Solicitor-General forgets that a neutral might bring an appeal to the International Prize Court on the subject of the validity of a capture by a converted cruiser, and when the International Prize Court laid down the law, that law as so laid down would pass into a principle or rule, which would be binding on us. The law will be laid down for us, and, with very great deference, I think my learned Friend is wrong in saying that our position will not be most seriously affected. It will be affected by this 1224 circumstance if this Bill passes with regard to the International Prize Court, that you may have a principle of law settled according to the discretion of that Court, without any code, in a manner which would be binding on us.
The Solicitor-General said, "We reserve our rights to deal with those converted cruisers as we think fit." How does the Solicitor-General propose to deal with them? He can do nothing more with them than with any enemy's ship. I remember on the Debate on the Second Reading the Foreign Secretary said, "We will destroy them, we will destroy every enemy's ship." What more could we do? Do they propose any special penalties upon the men found on board those converted cruisers. They have no power to do anything of the kind. Do they propose to try and hang them as pirates. I do not think this subject has really been thought out before this Convention. "We reserve our rights" said the Solicitor-General. That reservation of rights is of no use to us at all, because we may have a law laid down in the International Prize Court which would tie our hands absolutely. The statement that we are going to destroy them or do something dreadful, which nobody has ventured to approach a definition of, is one that really can carry no weight whatever. I submit to the House that there is a great deal to be said for this Amendment. It is in the recollection of everybody that when this Convention was entered into for the creation of an International Prize Court that at that time there was no code whatever, and there was a general outcry in the country. Everyone said it is preposterous to refer questions of such magnitude to an International Prize Court without providing a code for its guidance, and accordingly an attempt was made to provide a code for its guidance. If it was reasonable to say that an International Prize Court should not be allowed to act without a code, and to deal with a certain class of subjects, every argument that was used against allowing the Court to decide without a code on those subjects is equally valid against allowing it to deal with matters with which that Convention failed to deal. The general words which the Government have used about destroying these cruisers or doing something to them which nobody can define do not advance the discussion one little bit.
There is another remarkable thing with regard to this appeal from His Majesty in 1225 Council, for that is what it really comes to, although an attempt is made to disguise it by calling it the Supreme Prize Court. Annexed to the Convention is a Protocol stating that by the Constitution of the United States no appeal lies from the Supreme Court of the United States to any other tribunal. Accordingly there is to be no appeal at all from the Supreme Court of the United States, but an endeavour is to be made to secure the opinion of the International Prize Court by instituting a fresh suit before it, and damages are to be paid in accordance with the decision of the Court. It puts this country in a very different position compared with the United States. In August last an hon. Member on this side put a question on this very subject to the then Under-Secretary of State. I will read the question and the very remarkable answer:—
Mr. Eyres-Monsell asked the Prime Minister whether his attention has been given to the statements in the Blue Books [Cd. 4554, pp. 103 and 71, and Cd. 4555, p. 253] relating to the proceedings of the Naval Conference of London at which the Declaration of London was signed; is he aware that the effect of those statements is that, whereas in cases of naval prize an appeal is to lie from the Supreme British Prize Court to the International Prize Court at The Hague, yet no such appeal is to lie from the United States Supreme Court; and can he undertake that, in this respect. Great Britain will be put in as advantageous a position as the United States before ratifying the Declaration of London or the Convention relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court?The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. McKinnon Wood): The hon. Member is no doubt aware that the arrangement foreshadowed in the statements to which he has called attention has been embodied in the Additional Protocol of 19th September, 1910, which has now been signed by all the Powers Signatories of the Prize Court Convention, and which has been laid before Parliament in the Blue Book, Cd. 5564. Under this Protocol, the rights secured under the Convention, either to individuals or to their Governments are in no way impaired. The alternative procedure by way of a direct action for damages is not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, more advantageous than that by way of appeal from the National Courts. On the contrary, it involves the risk, with all the attending practical inconveniencies, of a conflict between the judgments of the National Courts and the judgments delivered in the same case by the International Court. It is only by the system of direct appeal that this difficulty can be overcome, and for this reason His Majesty's Government do not consider the system disadvantageous as compared with the alternative procedure under the Protocol."—[OFFICIAL RHPORT, 10th August, 1911, col. 1347.]I rather resent the position in which the Privy Council—our Prize Court of unrivalled authority—is put as compared with the Supreme Court of the United States. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to consider it an actual advantage that we should be liable to have our decisions reversed, and be compelled to model our law upon the decisions of the International Prize Court, whereas the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are to stand, the only redress being in a 1226 collateral action for damages before the International Prize Court. The matter deserves attention, and I submit that the position in which the Privy Council is put under the Convention is most unsatisfactory. We ought not to have judgments of the Privy Council remitted to a Court of this kind to deal with at their pleasure and according to their notions of equity and good sense. This Amendment of my hon. Friend, I submit, is one which does not deserve the strictures which have been passed upon it.
Mr. PEELThere is one point, perhaps it is rather of a technical nature, which I should have thought was of great importance, and which the Solicitor-General only mentioned at the end of his speech, if, indeed, he did attach any importance to it. It was that it was rather an absurd system to have an International Court whose jurisdiction was narrower than the Courts from which the appeal lay.
§ Sir J. SIMONI did not quite say that.
Mr. PEELI so understood the Solicitor-General, but I accept his disclaimer. I think that the attitude of the Government to this particular Amendment throws a very peculiar light upon their whole attitude in this matter of the Declaration of London. May I remind the House why the Declaration of London came into being at all? This Court was agreed to at The Hague. Then it was said, and said very rightly, "What is the use of a Court if you do not know what or what law it is going to administer?" The British Government said, "Very well, we will call this Conference of London, who will decide what the law is going to be." After all, if justice and equity were not enough there were plenty of international laws flying about the world, and every Court and every country took a different interpretation on a great many points. If justice and equity had been enough it would have been quite sufficient for the Government to say, "We will have an International Court, and it shall decide according to the principles of justice and equity." The Government felt that the position was absurd, and that the law must be more closely and more clearly defined, and it was for that reason that they agreed upon something by the Declaration of London. They found that on a considerable part of law they would come to no agreement at all.
The Government go back upon their former position, and say, "Oh, you do not 1227 want law; justice and equity is quite enough: this Court will be able to decide upon the principles of justice and equity" on a subject which perhaps is more vital to this country than almost any other question involved. I say on this subject, because, of course, our advantage lies in the fact that we have bases all over the world, and as the Powers interpret their right under this particular proviso they can put themselves on an equality with us as regards bases—because neutral ports become the bases of the enemy. The right hon. Gentleman says, "Oh, yes, when we are belligerents how shall we be worsened? We shall have the right to destroy these vessels or to treat them as pirates." My right hon. Friend has dealt very clearly with the question of how you are going to deal with these pirates. After all, is not the proposition impossible? You have cases decided by this Court. This Court will decide possibly that there is a right to convert in this way on the high seas. Does anyone, this Court having laid down the law on this subject, really suggest that this Government, if we were at war, would have a right to treat as a pirate anybody who is merely following out what the law has been declared to be as laid down by this International tribunal? The thing is impossible! And then I take the other side of the question, when we are neutrals. The Solicitor-General says "you gain when you are neutrals, although you may not gain particularly when you are belligerents, because you are confining the power of doing damage, and you have a right to this International Prize Court, but you would have to look at the composition of the Court." The Court is composed of representatives of these very Powers who refuse to come to any agreement as to the conversion of merchantmen on the Declaration of London. Why? Because they knew right well it would be very much against their interests as naval Powers to limit their rights of converting merchant vessels. They knew there was no right which they claimed which put them more on an equality than that. Then the Solicitor-General says you go to this International Prize Court. What chance is there of this International tribunal taking the view Great Britain takes?
§ Mr. HAROLD CAWLEYThe majority of the Powers do take that view.
Mr. PEELNot a majority of the Powers who are to be represented upon 1228 this tribunal. I do not wish to make any suggestion about the judges, but after all, when it is the interests of the majority representing the Powers at that Court to support their right of conversion, do you think it likely that the Court is going to take notice of a British claim that these vessels shall not have the power of converting themselves into war vessels, and when they like re-converting themselves into merchant vessels. That is a great blot upon the Convention and the Court. We are left in a worse position than before, as we may have to declare by the Supreme Court that this right which we always contested is the true interpretation of national law.
§ Sir EDWARD GREYIt is absolutely necessary to controvert the arguments used by hon. Members on the other side, and to enter a very distinct caveat against the conclusion, which I believe to be absolutely without foundation, that they are laying down. In the first place they are assuming that the International Prize Court is going to decide that merchant vessels may be converted on the high seas. It is to their interests to make the assumption that they want the International Prize Court to decide that way, and I do not believe there is any ground for that assumption.
§ Sir R. FINLAYI did not assume so.
§ Sir E. GREYI was dealing with the speeches that preceded his. I quite agree with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said upon that point, but I do deprecate using language which will be quoted afterwards, that they expect the International Prize Court would take that view. The right hon. and learned Gentleman put the point that the International Prize Court might not take the view we hold about merchantmen being converted on the high seas. I would like to lay down what the powers of this International Prize Court are. They are going to decide the rights and merits as between belligerents and neutrals, not as between belligerent and belligerents. If a belligerent catches a merchant vessel converted on the high sea and treats it in any way it pleases there is no appeal whatever to this International Prize Court. That is a question between belligerents. Hon. Members opposite say "Yes, but supposing in a war in which we were not concerned between two Powers, one of these Powers converted a merchantman on the high sea, and then 1229 seized a neutral carrying contraband, and the neutral ship which is carrying contraband carries an appeal to the International Prize Court against its seizure by a merchantman converted on the high seas, and the International Prize Court gives its decision that the neutral is not entitled to compensation—I think that is stating fairly the case the right hon. Gentleman is presuming—all the International Prize Court has decided is what is to stand and hold good in any appeal which comes before it as between a neutral and a belligerent. That is what I wish to lay down, and as far as this country is concerned, we should refuse to be bound in our action as belligerents against belligerents by things which may have been decided as to what is right between belligerents and neutrals. We have made it perfectly clear all through that we were not going to have our views with regard to converting merchantmen on the high seas prejudiced, and I would enter the strongest protest against it being assumed in this House that any decisions which may be taken by the International Prize Court between belligerents and neutrals are going to curtail our rights when we are belligerents in dealing with belligerents.
§ Sir R. FINLAYDoes the right hon. Gentleman say that if the International Prize Court laid down principles of law we should not be affected afterwards by them?
§ Sir E. GREYI should lay down that the rights between belligerents and neutrals are not to be taken as binding between belligerents and belligerents.
§ Sir R. FINLAYThat is not the point. My point is, in case the International Prize Court decided that the conversion of merchantmen on the high seas was lawful, does the right hon. Gentleman say we should pay no regard to that principle of law.
§ Sir E. GREYI should say certainly as belligerents dealing with belligerents, we were not bound by that, and the whole proceedings all through have made it clear that whatever we agreed to we were not agreeing to anything which is going to circumscribe our rights as belligerents in dealing with belligerents.
§ Mr. BUTCHERThe doctrine laid down by the Foreign Secretary is of such an extraordinary character that it is certainly new to us on this side of the House. The doctrine which has just been laid down by the right hon. Gentleman that we are 1230 to pay no respect to the principles of law laid down by the International Prize Court when we are belligerents dealing with belligerents appears to me to be contrary to every principle of justice. If the Foreign Secretary is right and intends to abide by that it might be advantageous to us, but I think he ought to embody it in this Convention and put it in some form in which foreign, countries will respect it. If it is simply stated in this House upon the authority of the Foreign Secretary I am sure foreign countries will take very great objection to it when you propose to act upon it in practice. I have to look at this question from the point of view of British interests and British interests only, a point which I think was insufficiently attended to when the Convention was drawn up. From that point of view I should like to say a word or two about justice and equity, which are very pleasant words and sound most admirable. What I want to know is, when the right hon. Gentleman says that there is no rule of international law to go upon and that the International Prize Court has to decide upon the principles of justice and equity, does he mean anything more than this: That this International Court will decide exactly as they think is the best. The words "justice and equity"—admirable words—differ enormously in systems of jurisprudence from this to Peru and from Eucador to Great Britain, and what seems justice and equity in this country according to the settled laws which have been laid down by great judges like Stowell and others may be exceedingly different from what recommends itself to gentlemen nominated by the Great Powers of Europe, and still more by the smaller nations of the world. When, therefore, we use the words "justice and equity" as governing the decisions of the International Prize Court, do not let us delude ourselves into the belief that they afford any protection for the reasonableness of their decisions. Let me assume a case where we are neutrals. A belligerent arms a merchantman and sends it out on the high seas to make a capture. The belligerent Court decides that the capture is quite right, and the neutral appeals to the International Prize Court. The international Prize Court lays it down as a broad principle of international law that it is perfectly right for a belligerent to arm a merchantman, and perfectly right for that belligerent to capture a neutral ship. I say if that is decided as a question of international law we should have 1231 to abide by it, and it would most gravely hamper us. That will be the position if the Amendment is not accepted.
Supposing the Amendment is accepted, the Court of the belligerent may decide it is perfectly lawful for an armed merchantman to capture a neutral ship, but that decision would have no effect on our action whatsoever when we were a belligerent. We should be able to act and deal with cases of armed merchantmen on the seas as though no such decision had ever been given. We are not affected by decisions of other nations, and we should pay no attention to them if we thought they were wrong. If, however, you have that priciple laid down by the International Prize Court, I say not only would we be bound to respect it, but we should be most gravely prejudiced by the decision. For those reasons I attach the greatest possible weight to the words of the Foreign Secretary, and if his decision, as Foreign Secretary, is to pay no attention to principles laid down by the Court to be constituted under this Bill, and that we are going to be the judge, then I do urge he should make that quite clear to foreign countries, and get their consent before he proposes to act on that principle. I admit if he gets that consent he will remove one of our objections, but, if he does not, it is one of the strongest reasons possible for assenting to the Amendment.
§ Sir E. GREYThe Government recognise we cannot bring the proceedings to a close this afternoon. May I appeal to the House, therefore, to get to the end of Clause 27 as soon as possible, on the understanding that the Government will give another short day to the further proceedings on the Bill?
§ 5.0 P.M.
§ Sir R. FINLAYIs the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman to give another short day intended to cover the remaining Amendments on the Report stage and the Third Reading?
§ Sir E. GREYYes.
§ Sir R. FINLAYThe right hon. Gentleman should remember that this is practically the first discussion on the Naval Prize Bill, as by arrangement the Debate on the Second Reading was almost entirely confined to the Declaration of London. I would respectfully submit it would not be dealing rightly by the House to give one 1232 short day for finishing the Amendments on the Report stage and the Third Reading. We should have a day for the Third Reading alone.
§ Mr. STUART-WORTLEYIt might be unwise and unpatriotic to make any assumption against the decisions of the Prize Court on the grounds of equity and justice, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in the case of Powers with small navies or no navies at all their interests will conflict with questions of equity and justice. It may be to the interest of a small Power to fit out a merchanman capable of being converted on the high seas. It may be said we have reserved to ourselves the power to deal summarily with belligerent vessels of that kind. The Solicitor-General, adding confusion to confusion, said that that was a very valuable thing for us, but I submit that it may go against us, as in the case of a British private owned ship being sunk by the converted cruiser of another Power and taking his case to the International Prize Court, the highest probability is he would be reminded of that power reserved by the British Government.
§ Lord C. BERESFORDThis is the most important Amendment in the whole Bill. It is this question of converting merchant ships on the high seas and reconverting them at will into merchant ships that started the agitation in the country. I think, in the light of to-day's Debate, that the position looks worse than ever. The Secretary of State told us that, provided we are neutral and two belligerents are fighting, if one chooses to arm her merchant ships and sunk our vessels there would be nothing for us to do. But suppose the Turks so armed six ships and sunk thirty of our ships in the Mediterranean, should we have nothing to say? I venture to think we should not stand it; we should repudiate such a position, and we ought not to assent to such a proposal as this, knowing that under certain circumstances we would repudiate it. I do not think for one moment that this country would stand such a proceeding as that which, according to the right hon. Gentleman, could occur under these Courts. The right hon. Gentleman says: "Oh, we are all right, if we are belligerents." How are we all right? And what are you going to do with these people and the ships which are armed at sea?
§ Mr. H. CAWLEYWhat would you do with them?
§ Lord C. BERESFORDI would hang them as pirates. I should probably be hanged myself. They are pirates, and you are legalising pirates, and I do not think your officers and men will stand it; they would see what ought to be done, whatever their orders were. The hon. Gentleman asked me what I would do, and I have told him pretty straight. On 4th May I asked the First Lord of the Admiralty of those days whether, in view of the official statement that the Government do not admit the right of foreign nations to convert merchant ships into men-of-war on the high seas, he will state to the House what action the Government will take if foreign merchant ships are so converted, and whether, in the event of such ships preying upon our mercantile marine, they will be treated as pirates when caught? What did the right hon. Gentleman reply? For once he was not evasive. I must not say too much against him, because he is not here. [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes he is."] Where is he? What did the right hon. Gentleman say? "The action to be taken will be a matter for the decision of His Majesty's Government when the occasion arises." That, to a landsman, might be very clever, but to a seaman it is important to know what he meant. Our argument and that of those who have been excited about this question of the Declaration of London is that the trade routes are not properly defended, that you have not got enough cruisers, and that you had sixty and now you have twenty-two. If these ships are armed, and they take the trade routes, we cannot do anything. If the trade routes are snipped you will get a panic in this country, and what would be the use of sending out afterwards? It is like putting a fire service into a house after it is alight. If the trade routes are not guarded, they may be cut by these pirates, and then the right hon. Gentleman says he is going to do something afterwards. That is the real danger.
§ You had a strike the other day in this country, and I am informed that you were within two days of starvation in London. You would have had riots if you had had starvation in London. You have no right to be in that position at all so far as your defences are concerned. This is the most important Clause in the whole Bill, and this is the most important Amendment that has been raised, and it raises the whole question of what I describe as, piracy. Whether you are a belligerent or whether you are a neutral you are almost in equal danger with regard to your trade routes, because they are not properly defended, and I shall certainly vote for the Amendment.
§ Mr. SANDYSI cannot understand the right hon. Gentleman's statement that in the Bill as it stands there is nothing to curtail our rights as belligerents. It seems to me this is the most important question, of all as to our position as belligerents. Though the right hon. Gentleman may say it does not curtail our right, our actual interests undoubtedly must be seriously affected by the action of armed merchantmen attacking neutral vessels engaged in carrying food to this country. There is no question that in the event of war this neutral commerce between foreign countries supplying us with food would be very largely increased indeed. A large quantity of our food supplies would come from neutral vessels, and, therefore, if those neutral vessels were liable to attack by the armed merchantmen of either of the belligerents, it is perfectly obvious that although our rights might not be curtailed, our national interests in the result of war might be very largely affected unless the Amendment is accepted.
§ Question put, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."
§ The House divided: Ayes, 64; Noes, 136.
1235| Division No. 364.] | AYES. | [5.10 p.m. |
| Arkwright, John Stanhope | Coates, Major Sir Edward Feetham | Hambro, Angus Valdemar |
| Ashley, Wilfrid W. | Cooper, Richard Ashmole | Harris, Henry Percy |
| Baird, John Lawrence | Cralk, Sir Henry | Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire) |
| Balcarres, Lord | Dalrymple, Viscount | Hill, Sir Clement L. (Shrewsbury) |
| Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.) | Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott | Hoare, Samuel John Gurney |
| Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth) | Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M. | Houston, Robert Paterson |
| Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich) | Falle, Bertram Godfrey | Hunt, Rowland |
| Bennett-Goldney, Francis | Fell, Arthur | Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr |
| Beresford, Lord Charles | Finlay, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert | Kirkwood, John H. M. |
| Boscawen, Sir Arthur S. T. Griffith- | Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead) | Lewisham, Viscount |
| Boyton, James | Forster, Henry William | Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey) |
| Bull, Sir William James | Gastrell, Major W. Houghton | Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Col. A. R. |
| Butcher, John George | Greene, W. R. | Lonsdale, Sir John Brownlee |
| Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) | Hall, Marshall (E, Toxteth) | MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh |
| Macmaster, Donald | Rolleston, Sir John | Welgall, Captain A. G. |
| Mallaby-Deeley, Harry | Sanders, Robert Arthur | White, Major G. D. (Lancs., Southport) |
| Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William | Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells) | Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.) |
| Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington) | Swift, Rigby | Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart- |
| Peel, Hon. William R. W. (Taunton) | Talbot, Lord Edmund | |
| Pole-Carew, Sir R. | Terrell, George (Wilts, N. W.) | |
| Pollock, Ernest Murray | Thomson, W. Mitchell- (Down, North) | TELLERS FOR THE AYES.— |
| Ratcliff, R. F. | Touche, George Alexander | Mr. James Mason and Mr. Malcolm. |
| Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall) | Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid) | |
| NOES. | ||
| Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour) | Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward | O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) |
| Acland, Francis Dyke | Guest, Hon. Major C. H. C. (Pembroke) | O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) |
| Baker, H. T. (Accrington) | Hackett, John | O'Dowd, John |
| Beauchamp, Sir Edward | Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) | O'Grady, James |
| Benn, W. W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.) | Harmsworth, Cecil (Luton, Beds) | O'Shaughnessy, P. J. |
| Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine | Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.) | Palmer, Godfrey Mark |
| Boland, John Plus | Haslam, Lewis (Monmouth) | Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek) |
| Bowerman, C. W. | Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry | Phillips, John (Longford, S.) |
| Brocklehurst, William B. | Hayden, John Patrick | Pirie, Duncan V. |
| Brunner, John F. L. | Hayward, Evan | Power, Patrick Joseph |
| Bryce, J. Annan | Henry, Sir Charles S. | Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central) |
| Burke, E. Haviland- | Herbert, Col. Sir Ivor | Price, Sir Robert J. (Norfolk, E.) |
| Burns, Rt. Hon. John | Hinds, John | Pringle, William M. R. |
| Byles, Sir William Pollard | Horne, C. Silvester (Ipswich) | Raphael, Sir Herbert H. |
| Carr-Gomm, H. W. | Howard, Hon. Geoffrey | Reddy, Michael |
| Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood) | Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan) | Richardson, Albion (Peckham) |
| Chancellor, Henry George | Jardine, Sir John (Roxburgh) | Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln) |
| Chapple, Dr. William Allen | Jones, William (Carnarvonshire) | Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford) |
| Collins, Godfrey P. (Greenock) | Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney) | Roche, John (Galway) |
| Collins, Stephen (Lambeth) | Joyce, Michael | Rose, Sir Charles Day |
| Compton-Rickett, Rt. Hon. Sir J. | Keating, Matthew | Rowlands, James |
| Condon, Thomas Joseph | King, Joseph (Somerset, North) | Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland) |
| Cotton, William Francis | Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade) | Scott, A. MacCallum (Glas., Bridgeton) |
| Craig, Herbert James (Tynemouth) | Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'r'ld, Cockerm'th) | Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B. |
| Crumley, Patrick | Leach, Charles | Sherwell, Arthur James |
| Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy) | Low, Sir Frederick (Norwich) | Shortt, Edward |
| Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth) | Lundon, Thomas | Simon, Sir John Allsebrook |
| Dawes, James Arthur | Lynch, Arthur Alfred | Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West) |
| Denman, Hon. R. D. | Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester) | Sutton, John E. |
| Donelan, Captain A. | Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs) | Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander |
| Doris, William | McGhee, Richard | Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent) |
| Duffy, William J. | Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J. | Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton) |
| Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness) | M'Laren, Walter S. B. (Ches., Crewe) | Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan) |
| Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor) | M'Micking, Major Gilbert | Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney) |
| Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid) | Mason, David M. (Coventry) | Watt, Henry A. |
| Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master of | Masterman, C. F. G. | White, J. Dundas (Glas., Tradeston) |
| Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.) | Meagher, Michael | White, Patrick (Meath, North) |
| Falconer, James | Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.) | Whyte, A. F. (Perth) |
| Farrell, James Patrick | Menzies, Sir Walter | Wiles, Thomas |
| Ffrench, Peter | Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C. | Williams, John (Glamorgan) |
| Flavin, Michael Joseph | Murray, Captain Hon. Arthur C. | Wood, Rt. Hon. T. McKinnon (Glasgow) |
| Gelder, Sir William Alfred | Nannetti, Joseph P. | Young, William (Perth, East) |
| George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd | Nolan, Joseph | Yoxall, Sir James Henry |
| Glanville, Harold James | Norman, Sir Henry | |
| Goldstone, Frank | Norton, Captain Cecil W. | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.— |
| Greenwood, Hamar (Sunderland) | Nugent, Sir Walter Richard | Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland. |
| Greig, Colonel James William |
Question put, and agreed to.