§ It shall not be lawful for any registrar, marshal, or other officer of the Supreme Prize Court or of any other Prize Court, directly or indirectly to act or be in any manner concerned as advocate, proctor, solicitor, or agent, or otherwise, in any prize appeal or cause.
§ Mr. W. PEELI beg to move, at the end of the Clause, to add the words "on pain of dismissal or suspension from office by Order of the Court."
The prohibition in this Clause is very strong and very wide. I suppose that the intention is that the prohibition shall be carried into effect, but I cannot see anywhere in the Bill any penalty at all. It can hardly be assumed that these gentlemen will take the suggestion of an Act of Parliament as a sufficient hint to them not to act in this direct or indirect way. I therefore propose to add these words by way of penalty at the end. Some penalty is necessary to enforce the rule.
§ Mr. BUTCHERI beg to second the Amendment.
§ Sir JOHN SIMONI hope my hon. Friend will not press the Amendment. It would, of course, be in the nature of things an offence which could be dealt with in a disciplinary manner if need be, and I suggest to the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Butcher), more particularly as a practising member of the profession, that it is not desirable that we should, on the face of the Act of Parliament, describe exactly the penalty when we do not know the extent of the offence. I suggest to the House that if the matter is left as it stands we have a quite effective prohibition. There is no difficulty in enforcing it if only as a matter of contempt of court. I should have thought in the interests of legislation it would be better not to try and prophecy before the event, but to leave a certain latitude for the case to be dealt with when it arises.
§ Mr. BUTCHERThe Solicitor-General suggests that a breach of the enactment of this Clause should be dealt with as contempt of court. I am not going to put my opinion against his, but I have never heard of such a case of contempt of court, and I have heard of a good many. I think it is exceedingly doubtful whether it could be dealt with as contempt of court.
§ Sir J. SIMONwas understood to concur.
§ Mr. BUTCHERIf it is not contempt of court how is it to be dealt with? The Solicitor-General says in a disciplinary manner. I suppose there might be an inquiry, at any rate in this country, before the Discipline Committee of the Law Society. That does not seem to me to be a proper way of dealing with it. In putting down this Amendment my hon. Friend has followed a precedent which I think is of some value, that of the Naval Prize Bill which was brought into this House, and ordered to be printed on 16th May, 1902. It does not follow that because an officer of the Court commits this offence therefore he would be dismissed or suspended. All that is provided by the Amendment is that if he commits this offence he does it on pain of dismissal or suspension; in other words, that a motion has to be made before the Court for his suspension or dismissal, and if the Court thinks it a proper case they will dismiss him. I appeal to the Solicitor-General as to whether it is not desirable on the face of the Bill to point out to the officer that this provision is not a mere brutum fulmen, but is meant to be enforced, and will be, if necessary, by suspension.
§ Mr. POLLOCKI quite feel the weight of what the Solicitor-General has said in respect, of some of these officers who are referred to in Clause 16, but that does not meet the case of a registrar or marshal or other officer of the Supreme Prize Court, because it must be recollected that this Statute itself is setting up a Supreme Prize Court. It is a new name which is introduced by virtue of Clause 1 of the Act, and no doubt, in the case of the High Court as it exists at present, there will be no difficulty and there would be a disciplinary power over the offending person. I doubt whether all the cases which are required under Clause 13 are met by the hon. and learned Gentleman's observation. Perhaps he may consider it worth while considering whether in regard to the new person who is set up by this Act, namely, the registrar 1189 of the Supreme Prize Court and other persons, it may be necessary to have some such words as those suggested.
§ Sir J. SIMONOf course, I should be very glad to see that consideration is given as my hon. and learned Friend asks. In some sense the proposal made just now by my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Atherley-Jones) bears on the present point because the Clause we have just passed as it stands at present, amongst other things, empowers rules of court to be made which will regulate the proceedings and conduct of practitioners, and, no doubt, those rules might be available for the purpose of enforcing the contents of Clause 14. I promise that I will consider whether it is right to keep these words in, and if we did not keep them in I should have felt that there was great force in the suggestion. The two things are related. I think the right thing to do would be to deal with the two things together, which I promised to do, covering the marshal and the registrar.
§ Mr. W. PEELI saw that relation, but I had some doubt as to whether those words would go as far as the Solicitor-General thought. Of course, if he thinks so, I will withdraw.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.