BAGHDAD RAILWAY AND PERSIAN AFFAIRS.

HC Deb 23 March 1911 vol 23 cc623-58

4.0 P.M.

EARL of RONALDSHAY

The opportunities which are afforded to hon. Members of this House for discussing great questions of foreign policy are so few and far between that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will I am sure make no complaint when I take this opportunity of laying before him the views which I and some other hon. Friends of mine hold with regard to the Baghdad Railway. I think it is all the more desirable that we should take this opportunity in view of the statement which was made yesterday in another place by Lord Morley. The House will remember that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State, speaking upon this question about a fortnight ago, laid stress upon the fact that the railway concession was a German concession in Turkish territory, and that that being so, we, in this country, had no title to interfere with the carrying out of the project, and he suggested that if we desire to safeguard our own interests in that part of the world we should ourselves seek for alternative concessions.

The situation has been very largely altered since the right hon. Gentleman, made that speech. Speaking in another place yesterday, Lord Morley declared that, "as a result of an arrangement between the Baghdad Railway Company and the Turkish Government, the company had given up their exclusive rights to the construction of the southern end of the line—the section from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf." And he further stated that negotiations were therefore taking place at the present time between our own Government and the Turkish Government with the view, I understand, of ascertaining how far it would be possible for us to co-operate in the railway project. That is an entirely different situation to the situation explained by the right hon. Gentleman a fortnight ago. And in order that we may put before him the attitude which we hold with regard to the general question of our policy in what is known as the middle East, it is necessary I should remind the House very briefly of the policy which this country has now pursued for a great many years in that part of the world, and of the reasons for that policy.

The keynote of our policy in that part of the world has been the preservation of the independence and integrity of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. The attitude which we have always taken up towards the people of these countries has been one of sympathetic solicitude. We have desired to maintain with them relations of neighbourliness and friendship, and while we always have done all that we could to encourage and foster commercial intercourse with them, we have steadily refrained and we shall continue to refrain from embarking upon a policy of aggression against them or of territorial aggrandisement at their expense. There are two main reasons for our adoption of that policy. In the first place we have acknowledged and respected the bonds which exist between the 60,000,000 of our fellow Mahomedan citizens in India and their co-religionists in these countries; and in the second place, we have realised that the existence of a chain of strong and independent kingdoms stretching from the confines of Europe on the one side to the Indian frontier on the other side is of vital importance to the security of our Empire. There have always been two possible dangers against which we have had to guard. We have had to guard in the first place against the lodgment of a European Power upon what may be described as the glacis of the Indian fort—that is to say, Afghanistan and Persia; and in the second place we have had to guard against the acquisition by a European Power of such a position in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf as might provide a possible basis of attack upon the flank of our line of communication, not only with India, but Australia and the Far East as well.

The first of these two possible dangers has been guarded against, so far as it could be guarded against by Treaty, by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. I say "so far as it can be guarded against by Treaty," because I would not have it supposed that I hold the view that any treaty, convention or agreement ought to relieve us of the obligation of making adequate military preparation to meet any possible attack that might be made upon our Indian Empire. That, I think, would be a very disastrous view to be taken, and it is a view I hope that never will be taken by those responsible for the safety of our Indian Empire. But when we come to the second possible danger to which I have alluded we find our position by no means so secure as it was ten years ago. Ten years ago we declared to the world that it would be impossible for us, from whatever cause, to abandon what we considered to be our rightful position in Persia. Perhaps I may remind the House of the words used in 1902 by the then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs with regard to that particular declaration of policy. He said:— Especially is that true in regard to the Persian Gulf. It is true not only of the Persian Gulf but of the southern provinces of Persia. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will take notice of these words:— Of the southern provinces of Persia and those provinces which border on our Indian Empire. Our rights there and our position of ascendancy we cannot abandon. Point was given to this declaration by the historical tour of the Persian Gulf, made by Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India, in the following year accompanied by military and naval escorts suitable to the representative of a King-Emperor exercising suzerain rights over the chiefs of the Persian and Arabian littoral. Our policy was again plainly declared by Lord Curzon in his speech on the Indian Budget of 1904, in which he used the following words:— India is like a fortress with the vast moat of the sea on two of her faces and with mountains for her walls on the remainder. But beyond these walls extends a glacis of varying breadth and dimensions We do not want to occupy it, but we cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes. We are quite content to let it remain in the hands of our allies and friends, but if rival and unfriendly influences"—— And these are the words to which I desire to draw particular attention— creep up to it and lodge themselves right under our walls, we are compelled to intervene, because a danger would thereby grow up that might one day menace our security That is the secret of the whole position in Arabia, Persia and Afghanistan. … And the whole of our policy during the past five years has been directed towards maintaining our predominant influence, and to preventing the expansion of hostile' agencies on this area which I have described. And he pointed to the fact that he was referring especially to the country bordering on the Persian Gulf, and he went on to say:— It was for this reason that I visited that old field of British energy and influence in the Persian Gulf. I recall these utterances because they contain a clearly defined and frankly expressed policy with regard to the countries whose shores are washed by the waters of the Persian Gulf. But since that time our policy has undergone a considerable amount of modification, and it really is desirable that we should be told to what extent the policy then laid down has been modified. For instance, under the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 we have admitted Russia's claims to a position of equality with ourselves in the whole of the southern provinces of Persia west of Bunder Abbas. That is a very material modification of the policy laid down in 1902 and 1903. Moreover, west of Persia, in Asiatic Turkey, very considerable developments have taken place in the last ten years. It was only during the close of the nineteenth century that the seeds of German ambition were sown on Turkish soil. In 1902 the scheme of the Baghdad Railway was in embryo, and the joint opposition to that scheme of Great Britain and Russia in 1902 and 1903 may be said to have driven it, for the time being at any rate, out of the sphere of practical politics. A great change in the situation has taken place since 1903, and a great change has taken place in the last two or three years, and more especially in the last two or three months. Germany and Russia have talked over their respective interests in the neighbourhood of the Turko-Persian frontier, more "specially in regard to the matter of railway building; as a result, an understanding, it is assumed, has been come to by those two Powers, and the opposition of Russia has been withdrawn from the German railway scheme. We are face to face with the probability of the Baghdad Railway scheme seeing consummation in a not very far distant future, and if that forecast is correct we are face to face with the probability of German influence becoming paramount in Baghdad and the neighbouring region. I would like to say, parenthetically, that I am not one of those who expect to see German army corps carried across Mesopotamia by the Baghdad Railway; nevertheless, I should regard a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf almost exclusively in the hands of Germany as one of those rival and unfriendly influences against which Lord Curzon, in 1004, said we should be compelled to intervene. I should like to say a word to explain my use of the word "unfriendly" in connection with Germany. Viscount Morley, speaking in the House of Lords last night——

Mr. PICKERSGILL

On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to ask whether it is in order in this House for an hon. Member to refer to Debates which have taken place in the House of Lords?

Mr. SPEAKER

The rule was and is that Debates in another place should not be refered to in this House. I think the real intention of that rule was that speeches made in another place should not be answered specifically and in detail here. I do not see how you can possibly carry on Debates here without referring occasionally to what has been said in another place.

Mr. PICKERSGILL

I raise the point because I am anxious to maintain the rights of this House. I think information with regard to Foreign Affairs ought to be given in this House, and not in the House of Lords.

EARL of RONALDSHAY

It is difficult to discuss this question without referring to the Debates in another place A very important Debate on this question took place in the House of Lords last night, where the official spokesman for the Govern- ment made a statement of very great importance. I shall endeavour not to answer that speech more than I can help, but I think it will be permissible to say that Viscount Morley drew attention to the fact that there had been a publicist in this country who suggested that the construction of a railway by Germany in Persia would constitute a serious menace-to us. Have the Government taken the trouble to ascertain where that suggestion originated? I do not think it originated with an Englishman at all. I am under the impression that it originated with a German publicist, whose mission in Germany is to popularise the Baghdad Railway scheme amongst the German people, with a view to securing financial support to the scheme from the German people. My attention has been called to the remarkable utterances of Dr. Rohrbach in the latest edition of his pamphlet, "Die Bagdadbahn," published this year, and this is what he says:— A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out of the question. It is necessary to discover another combination in order to hit England in a vulnerable spot, and here we come to the point where tin-relationship of Germany to Turkey and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, become of decisive importance for German foreign policy, based as it now is upon watchfulness in the direction of England. He says it might very well pay Turkey to co-operate with Germany in some future attack upon Great Britain in Egypt, and these are the words he uses:— Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. The Turkish army must be increased and improved, and progress must be made in her economic and financial position. The stronger Turkey grows, the more dangerous does she become to England. Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would he well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting Turkey which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war with England. Those are not the words of a Chauvinistic Englishman, but of a prominent German publicist whose mission is to secure support for the Baghdad Railway from the German people. Under these circumstances we are absolved, I think, from any possible charge of harbouring animosity or hostility against Germany, and we are entitled, and, indeed, we are bound—to do what we can to counteract the advance of German influence, at any rate in those regions where our own interests are of such paramount importance—namely, the regions south of Baghdad. I have always held—and in this I am supported by the vast majority of those who have made a careful study of this question—that for political and strategic reasons the task upon which we should concentrate our efforts is that of securing control of any railway which may be built in future from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf. But it is impossible, in considering this question to ignore the commercial aspect of it, and I think I shall be able to show that if we consider the commercial, political, and strategic importance of this scheme, we have very good grounds for endeavouring to secure control, not only of the section to Baghdad but also the section from Sadijeh to Khanikin on the Persian frontier.

The trade in these regions is preponderatingly British. The trade beyond Baghdad is not only preponderatingly British but almost exclusively British. I have the latest available figures for the year 1910, and I find that the total value of the goods imported into Kermanshah, which is the largest trade centre in Western Persia, amount to £1,259,138. Out of that total I find that the value of British and Indian imports amount to £1,075,996, leaving a mere bagatelle of £183,142 for the imports of the whole of the rest of the world put together. If the House will bear in mind those figures they will understand why it was that we criticised somewhat severely the provisions of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, which placed the trade route from Khanikin to Kermanshah in the Russian sphere of influence. The explanation given by Lord Fitzmaurice, who was at that time the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was a rather curious one. Speaking in the House of Lords, on 6th February, 1908, Lord Fitzmuarice said:— Whatever our individual views on this question may be, we all know that there is another Power not Russia, which is taking a great interest in the railway communications in the direction of Baghdad. Undoubtedly, whoever may get a railway concession and execute it to Baghdad will desire to carry it up to the Persian frontier, and if we had interfered so as to prevent the railway beyond falling into Russian hands, then I think, in all probability, we would have gratuitously gone out of our way to bring another Power into the field against us. I ventured to point out at the time that to abdicate our own claims to railway construction in that particular district was not the way to prevent the advent of another Power in the field against us. I pointed out myself so long ago as December, 1904, that the great danger we had to face in the future in this connection was the probability of Russia and Germany coming to terms with regard to their interest in railway construction from Baghdad up into Persia, irrespective of the interests of this country. The forecast I made then is obviously being fulfilled at the present time, because Russia and Germany have undoubtedly come to some understanding with regard to a future railway from Baghdad into Persia. I do not say that the understanding is absolutely final, but whether it becomes final or not largely depends upon the attitude which the Foreign Secretary assumes with regard to this question. Undoubtedly some sort of an agreement has been come to, and as a result of it, if it is carried out, we shall see a railway running the whole way from Baghdad to Teheran, the capital of Persia, constructed and exclusively controlled by our two keenest commercial rivals in that part of the world, namely, Germany and Russia. To show how ineffective the policy of His Majesty's Government was, in so far, at any rate, as it was directed to preventing the advent of another Power in Western Persia, I may say quite frankly that I have the very best reasons for supposing that proposals have actually been discussed between Russia and Germany which, if accepted, will invite Germany into Persia itself by giving her a share of the construction and control, not only of the railway from Baghdad to Khanikin but also of the section of the railway East of Khanikin running through Persian territory itself. I hope the Government are fully alive to the effect which such a consummation may have upon our interests both political and commercial. Foreign countries, as we know by experience in the past, are only too ready to take advantage of any lack of foresight upon our part. The Russo-Persian Convention of 1902, which established a Persian Customs Tariff highly favourable to Russian trade, but unfavourable to British trade, comes immediately to one's mind. The erection of the Persian Customs Tariff of 1903 was only made possible by the absurd reliance which we placed upon the most-favoured-nation clause, and as a result of our negligence in not inserting in the Treaty of Paris a clause securing for the Anglo-Persian trade the same specific Customs Duties as were secured to Russo-Persian trade under the Treaty of Turkman Chai. That is a very good example of the advantage which is taken by foreign countries of any negligence, or want of foresight, upon the part of our Government. I hope that example will be borne in mind by the right hon. Gentleman during the negotiations which he is carrying on at the present time with regard to the Baghdad Railway. The right hon. Gentleman, when we suggest the possibility of differential railway rates being imposed to the disadvantage of our trade, always falls back upon Articles 24 and 25 of the cahier des charges. The cahier des charges is a very flimsy guarantee of equal rights and opportunities for our trade, and I am glad to see that does appear to have at last dawned upon His Majesty's Government, because, while the right hon. Gentleman has always pinned his faith on those two articles in the cahier des charges, I notice that Lord Morley last night took a somewhat different view. He said he believed British interests cannot be effectually safeguarded by the plastic stipulations of the cahier des charges. I read that statement with the greatest pleasure, because it did seem to show the Government are beginning to realise that these paper arrangements are not, as a matter of fact, of any great value when it is a question of safeguarding the rights of British commerce as compared with the commerce of commercial rivals.

The ideal for which I think we ought to work in this matter is that which I have practically outlined. We should endeavour to secure for this country the construction, the management, and the control of any future railway which may be built from the Persian Gulf to Baghdad, and we should endeavour to secure to this country, at any rate, equal powers of construction, management, and control in that section which is to be built from Sadidjeh to Khanikin, on the Persian frontier. I quite realise that ideals are not always attainable, but I would ask the right hon. Gentleman not to underrate the strength of the position of this country. Our position, as a matter of fact, is a very strong one. These railway schemes cannot be carried out without money. In 1907 we agreed to allow Turkey to raise her import duties from 8 per cent. ad valorem to 11 per cent. We gave our consent for a period of seven years, so that in the spring of 1914 our consent will again be required if the Turkish import duties are to remain at 11 per cent., instead of reverting once more to 8 per cent. Turkey, far from finding a rate of 11 per cent. sufficient for her needs, is now most anxious to increase the existing rate of 11 per cent. by 4 per cent. to 15 per cent. I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to bear this fact in mind. The trade of the world with Turkey is pre- ponderatingly British. Out of the whole of the imports of foreign goods into Turkey during the last year for which I have figures—I think 1909–30 per cent. represents British goods, the remainder representing the trade of the whole of the rest of the world. I hope the right hon. Gentleman, in any negotiations he may carry on, either with Turkey or Germany, with regard to this question, will make it quite clear to them that we cannot entertain so great a sacrifice to our trade without at any rate securing adequate concessions in return.

In the second place, it is within our power either to facilitate or to hinder the acquisition of a suitable terminus for the railway. We can, if we are met as we ought to be met, withdraw our opposition to the terminus being set up at Koweit. We can offer or refuse the mail contract of India to the Baghdad Railway Company, a matter of considerable importance in the case of a railway which will run through vast stretches of country which are at present unproductive, and which therefore for many years to come must remain un-remunerative. We can point out to Turkey that we have always declared ourselves ready to build railways for her without demanding from her the heavy financial burdens which have been imposed upon her by the Baghdad Railway Company under the concession of 1903. That, in the main, is, I think, the position which we take up on this side of the House. I speak, at any rate, for myself and one or two of my hon. Friends who have made a special study of questions in that part of the world. It is because Lord Morley made so important a statement last night, suggesting that His Majesty's Government were ready to waive their objections to the terminus of the railway being fixed at Koweit and their objections to a further rise in the Turkish Customs Duties, without at the same time telling us what sort of concessions we were going to get in return, that I have ventured to lay before the right hon. Gentleman the views which we hold, in the hope that he will be able to give us some rather more satisfactory assurance than we have been able to elicit from the Government up to the present time as to the concessions which we are to receive in the event of our acceding to the requests made by Germany and Turkey.

Mr. DILLON

I have listened with great interest to the powerful and eloquent speech of the Noble Lord as to the British interests, which are undoubtedly considerable, in this matter. I desire to say a few words on behalf of another nation whose interests are equally involved and for whom there are few to speak in this House. I mean the interests of Persia. I want, first of all, to draw the attention of the right hon. Gentleman to the fact that it was only on 3rd April, in response to a question in this House, he refused to lay Papers on the Table in addition to the Papers laid two years ago. He then said he did not consider it desirable to lay Papers until the negotiations on the question of the Southern Routes were concluded. Last night, in another place, Lord Morley announced that Papers would be laid. Are we to understand that information, which I must say has in my opinion been very unfairly denied to the House of Commons, is instantly given when a demand is made in the House of Lords by so important a person as Lord Curzon. I really do think the House of Commons has been somewhat scurvily treated in this matter. I beg to remind the right hon. Gentleman that last May I put a similar question to him, and he gave us a conditional promise that before last Session concluded Papers would be laid. Yet no Papers were laid last Session, and, when the matter was revived only a fortnight ago, he stated he did not think it desirable to lay Papers until after the negotiations on the Southern Routes had been settled. Are we to conclude from the statement of Lord Morley that the negotiations with regard to the Southern Routes are closed? That is the first question I wish to put to the right hon. Gentleman.

Last November the British Government suddenly, like a bolt out of the blue, addressed to the Persian Government a Note of, I think, the most aggressive and insulting character. It was one of a long series of acts by which this Government has seriously shaken the new Government in Persia, discrediting it in the eyes of its own people, and enormously increasing the task which, God knows, was sufficiently difficult to maintain order in that country and to set up a new Government. That Note was somewhat ambiguous, and, in order to understand its full meaning, one has to read it in the light of subsequent speeches and commentaries made upon it. The Prime Minister, speaking at the Mansion House shortly afterwards, used language which clearly indicated that, if the Persian Government declined to accept this proposal of British Indian officers to maintain order on the Trade Routes, England would insist on sending them. That meant taking possession of the country. I want the right hon. Gentleman to tell us frankly whether this threat is still hanging over the Government of Persia. Is the Persian Government still to understand that, in the event of refusing to accept the assistance of British Indian officers, the British Government will force these officers upon them? I want to ask how he can reconcile the sending of that Note to the Persian Government and the speeches delivered by the Prime Minister and indeed, sentences in Lord Morley's speech yesterday, with the declarations of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. One of the first articles in that Convention is that both Governments pledge themselves to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Persian Empire. The Persian Government, shocked, and, I think, naturally amazed, by the agreement between two rival foreign Powers to divide their country into spheres of influence, addressed a remonstrance and a request I for an explanation to the British Government. The British and Russian Governments instructed their representatives to wait upon the Government of Persia and to state that there was nothing in the Anglo Russian Agreement calculated in any way to interfere with the sovereign rights and independence of the Persian Empire. Furthermore, they used this remarkable language:— The object of the Anglo-Russian Agreement was to bind the two Powers by a mutual agreement not to intervene in the affairs of Persia under the pretext of their own interests. Those are very remarkable words, and I remember taking a note of them at the time. Yet, in face of that fact, there has been now for a period of two years a Russian military occupation of the greater part of the northern provinces of Persia, and a threat from the British Government that, if the Persian Government does not restore order within a limited period over the southern trade routes, the British Government will bring in Indian officers and do it themselves. I was amazed to hear the right hon. Gentleman argue on one occasion that the loan, as he phrased it, of British Indian officers to the Persian Government in order to restore order on the southern routes was no interference with the sovereign rights and independence of Persia. If anybody is in doubt upon that, and I do not think anybody can be in doubt, let them read the Note of the Persian Government in reply. It is an admirably drawn Note. The Persian Government immediately addressed a remonstrance last November in reply to the British Note, protesting against this proposal and offer as an infringement, and a gross infringement, of their independence and sovereign rights, and they recalled to the recollection of the British Government the language used both in the Anglo-Russian Convention and in the subsequent communications made by the Ministers of England and Russia to the Persian Government. That is not all the injury that this Government has inflicted on the Persian people. It is a matter of notoriety to any one who has devoted the slightest attention to recent events that the condition of the southern roads in Persia is largely due to the action of the Government in preventing the Persian Government securing the loan which they had negotiated almost up to the point of receiving the money. It is necessary in order to put in operation measures to restore order on the southern roads that they should have this money; but up to this day we have never been able to obtain from the right hon. Gentleman a frank and full statement with reference to the negotiation of the loan. When the Persian Government took charge of that country two years ago they were faced by a condition of financial chaos which made it almost impossible for them to maintain order.

Sir E. GREY

To which loan is the hon. Gentleman referring?

Mr. DILLON

I am speaking from information which I have gathered from outside sources. I am giving the Persian view. I do not pretend to be well informed as to the English side, because the right hon. Gentleman has declined to give us any information on this matter. According to my information, the Persians have been obstructed in obtaining their loan. The object, according to their view, is to compel them to accept a joint loan—a divided loan—a loan partly British and partly Russian, but with conditions attached which the Persian Government maintain are inconsistent with the integrity and independence that both England and Russia have declared it to be their wish to preserve. That is the first complaint I desire to make. There are one or two questions I wish to press upon the right hon. Gentleman. First, I want to know whether he intends to lay Papers, and up to what date those Papers will carry us? Secondly, I am anxious to know what is the present situation as regards the question of the Southern roads? Are we to gather from the speech of Lord Morley yesterday that that question is definitely settled. Thirdly, I desire to ask what is the present situation as regards the loan negotiations, and are the Persian Government free to accept a loan negotiated with any Power which may be willing to lend the money without affixing conditions which they consider inconsistent with their integrity?

There are other points on which I will also ask information. We know that the condition of Persia is one of great disturbance. Unhappily more than one assassination has taken place. Within the last six weeks the Minister for Foreign Affairs was assassinated at Teheran, and the assassins were claimed by the Russian Government as Russian subjects. Can the right hon. Gentleman give me any information as to the grounds on which that claim was made? What will be the nature of the trial of the men, and is there any prospect of their being brought to justice? I believe they were taken red-handed. I think the right hon. Gentleman told me, in reply to a question, that he had no information whatever, and that no information has reached this country. At any rate I have not heard that the assassins in this instance have been brought to justice, or that they have been put on their trial, and I think that such a position of affairs is calculated to make impossible the task of the Persian Government, if when a Persian Minister is assassinated in broad daylight in the streets of Teheran, a foreign Government immediately steps in and claims the assassins as its subjects. If there is to be any delay in dealing out justice in this case it is a scandal, and I claim that we are entitled to any information which the Government may possess.

Some time ago there appeared in "The Times"—and I do not suppose the House will attribute to "The Times" a desire to give information of an embarrassing and hostile character to the Russian Government—an account of a Cossack attack on a village. I forget its name, but the Cossacks sacked that village, outraged the women, slaughtered the men, and killed a great number of children. I want to ask the Government whether they have any information as to that incident, because one of the things which I have more than once complained of, and I know it is a source of very great irritation and discontent on the part of the Persian Government, is that during the last two years they have been flouted and insulted and belittled before their own people by the representatives of the British and Russian Governments. Now, such incidents as this sacking of a village put the Persian Government in an almost impossible position. Unless there is prompt and full reparation their prestige is weakened, and if they are subjected to microscopical and not too friendly criticism by the representative of foreign Governments, whenever there is a slight disturbance of the public peace, their position is seriously endangered. I ask the right hon. Gentleman in his reply to tell us whether he has any information upon this incident. I am only selecting two cases from a long list of grievances which the Persian Government feel they have. I have given a Russian case. I will now give a British case. On the very day that Parliament rose last November I put a question to the right hon. Gentleman as to a very extraordinary proceeding. It appeared that the Persian Government had allowed to get into arrear for some days or weeks the salary of the ex-Shah, who had been interned in Odessa by the Russian Government, and who had left that place and was travelling about Europe. The condition was that he was to be paid this salary only so long as he lived in Odessa. The Persian Government were informed that, after he left Odessa, he engaged in intrigues of a most dangerous character with a view to upsetting the new Government. They therefore temporarily stopped his allowance, but the British Government actually sent bailiffs into the house of the present Foreign Minister and treated him just as if he had been a bankrupt until the salary was paid. When I asked the right hon. Gentleman whether the Government accepted responsibility for this proceeding, the answer the right hon. Gentleman gave was that he understood it was the custom of the country. I do not believe it is the custom of the country, but, if it should be, it is not for the British Government to uphold so offensive a practice, seeing that it is calculated to degrade the Persian Foreign Minister in the eyes of the people.

5.0 P.M.

Persia is obliged to submit to any treatment that England and Russia choose to inflict, and, that being so, the English Government at least ought to show the greatest possible consideration, and not to indulge in these unfriendly and uncivil acts, which are calculated to destroy the Persian Ministry's chances of establishing a really firm Government in that country. It appears to me that the whole policy of the British and Russian Governments in Persia has been marked by an extreme want of wisdom. We have heard a great deal in these Debates about British interests, but I have never heard a single sentence about the interests of the people concerned on the spot. The people of Persia are by no means stupid. The debates that take place in this House are fully reported, and are published in Teheran, and they must have the most unfavourable and embittering effect on the people of Persia. When the revolution took place in Persia two or three years ago England was undoubtedly most popular, and the Persian people looked upon her as sympathetic with a nation struggling to be free. They felt that England desired to aid them in getting rid of a most detestable tyranny. But a change has come over Persian opinions since then, and the Persian people regard England as little worse than the Russians. There is a spirit of hostility to England growing up, and, in my humble opinion, in the interests of England herself it would be much wiser to adopt a course of policy which would secure the sympathy and confidence not only of the people of Persia but of that great wave now passing over the Mahomedan world. Instead of that we have lost the affection of the Persian people. When the revolution broke out in Turkey the Young Turks were devoted to the English people. They believed in the English people, and the whole fabric of German influence in Constantinople was thrown to the ground. But within two years, or I might even say, within one year, that work was absolutely wiped out and undone, and at this moment the English people are thoroughly disliked and mistrusted in Constantinople and Teheran, and it is to Germany that the Young Turks look to for sympathy and support. That policy has had the same effect both in Persia and in Constantinople, and this new movement in favour of liberty and nationality is a movement with which sympathy is felt throughout the entire Moslem world. The Moslem world is bound together just as much as the Christian world, and men travel through India and Afghanistan, through Persia and Turkey and on to Cairo to study international questions there, and a great movement is springing up through out the Moslem world. This is the new spirit, and, believe me, that the policy which has been pursued by Great Britain and her Government in respect of Persia and the Young Turk movement—the new revolutionary movement in Turkey—will yet bring forth most unpleasant fruit in Egypt in regard to the Government of that country.

Mr. PONSONBY

I wish to make one or two remarks on the subject which has been dealt with by my hon. Friend who has just sat down, and to ask the Foreign Secretary one or two questions. I was very much gratified at seeing in the King's Speech the phrase to the effect that our proposals with regard to Persia in any case would have no other object than to see the authority of the Persian Government restored and trade protected. I sincerely believe that that is the case, but on the other hand we have threatened the Persian Government with the policing of the southern roads should order not be restored, and I would ask, are our commercial interests of such magnitude and of such importance as to justify an act which must be a disregard of Persian nationality and an infringement of the sovereign rights of Persia? I hope to hear from the Foreign Secretary that this threat that we find ourselves obliged to make will in no event be carried out according to the present intention of the Government. With regard to Northern Persia, I fully endorse what has already been said by my hon. Friend who has just sat down. It has been an embarrassment to the Persians in their extremely difficult task of restoring order and good government to have Russian troops situated in Northern Persia. The instance that the hon. Member for Mayo just gave of an outrage which was committed in a village in Northern Persia is not the only one which could be quoted to show the conduct of the Russian troops in that territory. We have agreed with Russia to restore order and to respect the autonomy of Persia, and our object undoubtedly is to do all we can to see that order is restored. But I very much doubt that being the object of our allies, the Russians in Persia. If we ask a country to come and help us to restore good government in a third country we have some right to look into the Government of that particular country, and when we look into the Government of Russia we find that it is the worst governed country, I should say, in Europe, if not in the world at the present time.

If we look at passages in the newspapers giving us details of what takes place in foreign countries and we see no events of importance chronicled we assume that none are taking place. But that is not so in regard to Russia. Our ignorance of the state of things in Russia arises from the fact that newspapers are not issued there dealing with the facts, and our Press is as ill-informed as we are. It is therefore very difficult to arrive at the truth. But it is well-known at the present time that Russia is suffering from a very bad Government. They are going through a crisis at the present time which means practically an attempt once more to get the power back into the hands of the autocracy. The Russian Government can never in this respect, however, be associated with the Russian people. It in no way represents the Russian people, and we know that outrages of every sort are continually taking place there. Only the other day a batch of administrative exiles were sent to their fate under circumstances of great aggravation, and had to suffer most cruel hardships. We have reports in the newspapers, of floggings in the prisons to such an extent that men have been forced to commit suicide in order to avoid the suffering. We have editors and newspaper men imprisoned. We have no attempt at freedom of speech, or the freedom of the Press, and there is a Duma which is only a travesty of representative Government. It may be said that is no concern of ours, and that is perfectly true. I only referred to it because I say this is the country that we are asking to help us to restore good government in Persia, and it appears to me that it is this alliance with the Russian Government—not with the Russian people, I always wish to make a great distinction between the two—it is this alliance with the Russian Government upon which we seem to have been so blindly determined during the last five or six years that has led us into serious difficulties.

It is true that none of them have reached a critical stage, but I feel that in regard to this particular incident in Persia we may find ourselves in a very serious dilemma. The object of Russia in Persia is the same object that the Russian Government has in other parts of the world, that is the extension of their territory by the acquisition of further territory. And in this particular instance they want to come down until they get to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. Our presence in Southern Persia is with a view of preventing that, but I cannot say that we are thereby respecting the rights of the Persians con- cerned, and that I think is very serious, because it is a distinct change of the Liberal foreign policy which we have been accustomed to in the past. That foreign policy was a respect of nationalities, the upholding of international justice, the safe-guarding of nationalities and sympathy for them when they are undergoing persecution or are struggling with revolution. The Foreign Secretary, with regard to the case of the Turkish Revolution, was exceedingly sympathetic. I recollect his saying in July, 1908, just as the Revolution was about to break out:— At the present time I can only say this, that our sympathies must be with those who are trying to introduce reform, and I should be the last to prophecy that they will fail. If they succeed they must succeed by their own efforts, but our sympathy is with them. When he came to the struggle in Persia he was somehow or other unable to show the same sympathy. For myself, I think that for these Far Eastern countries to adopt our Parliamentary system is a matter about which anyone may be doubtful. I think it is like engrafting upon some tropical plant a growth which has been accustomed to a harder climate. I am doubtful of its success, but at any rate we have taught them to believe that our Western ways are the best ones and that our democratic form of Government is likely to bring the greatest prosperity to them, and of one thing I am perfectly certain, that when they are struggling, and when they are going through the various difficulties they must encounter in reforming their Government, they should have our sympathies and they should not be interfered with, but should be allowed to work out their salvation for themselves. In the case of Persia, however, we have seriously interfered, and I feel rather doubtful as to what eventually the issue will be. The two questions therefore that I would put to the right hon. Gentleman are these: Have the Government finally abandoned the idea of interfering in Persia to the extent of sending British officers to help to maintain order on the southern roads, and, secondly, when will the Russian troops in northern Persia finally clear out of that part of the country and allow the Persians to work out themselves the difficult problem of reforming their Government unaided?

Colonel YATE

We have listened with interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Dillon), but I cannot help thinking that if he had been more familiar with Persia he might have spoken to us in father a different strain. I do not think, for instance, he would say in that case that we, the English, have lost our popularity in Persia, or that we have forfeited the confidence and affection of the Persian people simply on the strength of statements in the newspapers published at Teheran. If the hon. Gentleman had any acquaintance with all the southern towns or the southern ports, or, indeed, any other part of Persia, he would know that there is great interest felt in this country and a great friendship between the English and the people there. The whole of Persia is not concentrated at Teheran, and the newspapers of that place do not accurately reflect the feelings of the people of Persia, and I must say I should like to express my entire dissent from what he has said about the English Note offering aid to Persia for maintaining the safety and accessibility of the southern roads. The hon. Member (Mr. Dillon) described that Note as of an aggressive and insulting character, and talked as if we had been trying to take possession of the country and were no longer trying to maintain the independence and integrity of Persia. A century ago the names of some of our officers were household words in Persia. Since then we have seen Austrian and Belgian and Russian officers lent to the Persian Government to help them maintain their authority in their own house, and here we have roads, absolutely impassable, where our own officers and others have been killed and wounded, and in offering to lend a few British officers to strengthen the Persian gendarmerie, there is nothing which could possibly be put down as treating the Persian Government in an aggressive or insulting manner. I remember when I was in Baluchistan, some robbers came over the Persian frontier and we drove them out, and we sent troops to help the Persian Governmen to attack them on their side. The Persians co-operated cordially, and that border has been quiet ever since. If we send a few men now to help and strengthen the Persian Government we can do nothing better for Persia, and the hon. Member's remarks, instead of being a help to Persia, will be exactly the converse.

I should like to join with the Noble Lord (Earl of Ronaldshay) in asking the Secretary of State not to underrate our interests in the question of the Baghdad Railway. We have seen now that Germany has got a new concession for a line from Alexandretta. What has Germany given up in exchange? They have reserved, I understand, the right of equal participation in the line from Baghdad to the Gulf, if it is to be built by any other company. If that other company undertakes to build a line from Baghdad to Busra, will it have equal participation in the branch line from Baghdad to Khanikin? Without that the right of any other company to build a line from Baghdad to Busra is worthless. It is mostly Manchester goods and Indian goods that travel by that route. At the present time we can send a ton of Manchester goods by sea to Busra, worth, say, £100. It is landed at Busra and goes up by river steamers to Baghdad. The goods, if the railway is built, will not have to pay 25s. per ton to go up the river as they do now, but 80s., the extra Customs dues and railway freight in addition amounting in all to about 100s. This shows us how unimportant to us the question of the Baghdad-Busra line is. The only important point of the whole line to us is the question from Baghdad onwards to the Persian frontier and the entry of our goods into Persia. Lord Morley, speaking yesterday of our railway rights in southern Persia, stated that, provided strategic and commercial considerations could be satisfied, His Majesty's Government would not construe their preferential rights in any narrow spirit. That is a statement of great import, though there is a suspicion in it of surrender which one does not like. Russia's measures have always been for her own exclusive benefit, and if anything is done by which our rights are in any way whittled away it will be disastrous to our trade, which is the main trade in the country. I hope that the House may have an opportunity of discussing the proposals which are under consideration before any final consent of the Government is given. I believe there is a precedent for that.

Mr. BAIRD

I shall do my utmost in anything I say not to embarrass the right hon. Gentleman. It may be presumptuous in me to think anything I can say can embarrass or assist him; but I will not offer my remarks in any spirit of captious criticism, but simply with a view to drawing attention to the importance which a great many people attach to this question of the Baghdad Railway, which is perhaps quite out of proportion to the intrinsic merits of the case, so far as the amount of trade affected is concerned. We are bound, naturally, to depend to a large extent on what we read in the public Press for our information, and I think that the large amount of attention which is being devoted to this question in the Press of Europe at present ought to be a warning to us that it is not a question that can be lightly entered upon, and that other nations realise that this move of Germany's may have far-reaching and important results in the future. The comments of the foreign Press, so far as I have been able to obtain them, have not been on the whole very favourable so far as we are concerned. There has been undoubtedly a note of alarm in the French Press lest Turkey, falling under the influence of Germany, should throw in her lot entirely with Germany in this matter, and that the result might be detrimental to the interests, not only of Great Britain, but of France, which has very considerable interests out there. I take it from that attitude, which is not by any means seldom shown in the French Press, that the French are no less anxious than a great many people are in this country as regards the outcome of the negotiations which are at present pending. The German Press adopts a different line. There is a tone of exultation—and perfectly justifiable exultation—in alluding to the arrangements which have been come to in regard to this railway. But at the same time there is also a note of alarm lest Germany may give up something—that is indeed the exact remark which I saw in the "Taglische Rundschau." The Germans feel that they have a very good bargain, as undoubtedly they have, in getting an outlet to the Mediterranean for their railway, which the late Sultan always refused to give them. Indeed, the late Sultan used the expression that he would not allow them to go within half a day's journey to the coast, which is fifteen miles' camel ride. That has been a very great drawback, and it is not difficult to understand that the Germans should be very pleased indeed to have got this further valuable concession for a branch from Osmanieh to Alexandretta, and it is quite conceivable that they gladly surrender the concession for making the branch railway which is to connect Baghdad with the Persian Gulf in return for that valuable concession.

I should like to ask to what extent has the German Government given up its right to construct the terminal section of the line which it undoubtedly possessed as far as Turkey could give it. It is difficult to understand from what has appeared in the Press and what has been stated by authoritative persons, whether the German company has definitely abandoned all claims for making that terminal section of the railway on the understanding that that section will be made by a company formed by the Ottoman Government in which German capital shall participate to the same extent as that of any other country, or whether, in the event of the Ottoman Government finding it impossible to form such a company, the present German company will resume their right to build the line. That I think is a very important point, because there are differences of opinion as to whether or not it is desirable for us that there should be a line from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf at all. At any rate, if no line is built, we have still a monopoly of the transit between the Persian Gulf and Baghdad by the British line of steamers which have been running for the past hundred years, and, so far as we are concerned, I take it that meets the requirements of our trade. But it is very desirable that we should obtain a security more efficient than that afforded by Section 24 as regards the non-preferential treatment of merchandise which has been transported along the Khanikin section of the railway. There is another aspect of the question. It is one put forward in the "Neue Freie Presse," a translation of which I find in the "Echo de Paris" of yesterday. It is impossible to get the original documents relating to these things on account of time, but if the "Echo de Paris "correctly represents the view of the "Neue Freie Press," which is a very authoritative paper published in Vienna, it is a matter of some importance. The "Neue Freie Presse "points out that:— in spite of the Convention (the agreement come to between Turkey and Germany) it will be necessary to open negotiations on the subject of the terminus of the line. The Porte declared that the terminus must be Koweit, but whom does Koweit belong to? England and Turkey do not seem to be in agreement on this point. The 'Neue Freie Presse' believes that, if England refuses its consent, the Ottoman Company which is on the point of being formed can finish the line without England's consent. I think that emphasises the point which was drawn attention to on the last occasion when this question was under discussion. The hon. Member for Staffordshire rather doubted whether the Government were prepared to take as strong a line, not only as the facts of the case warrant, but as they are expected by the friends and allies on the Continent to take, for the safeguarding of our common interests. I think that is a point on which we may quite justifiably ask the right hon. Baronet to give us a specific declaration, and I hope, in doing so, we are not in any way embarrassing the course of the negotiations. There is doubt in the minds of people in touch with active members of the Diplomatic Service that our prestige in the diplomatic world suffered a considerable rebuff at the time of the upset in the Balkan Peninsula in 1907. I do think that one can fairly say, without any disrespect to the right hon. Gentleman, that it is hoped not only by those who bring up this question to-day, but also by all who are prepared to support him as the Foreign Minister of this country in whatever he may do abroad, that he will find it possible to adopt a stronger line in discussing this matter and in settling the matter than he has seen fit to adopt hitherto. After all, yielding must come to an end one of these days. We cannot go on for ever yielding to Germany, or giving way for that matter to anybody. In view of the interests at stake, the effect on our prestige, and the power of our successful negotiation in future, I venture most respectfully to express the hope that the right hon. Gentleman, when he comes to sup with Germany, will take a longer spoon than he used on the last occasion.

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFAIRS (Sir Edward Grey)

I think only two questions have been raised—the Baghdad Railway and Persia. With regard to the speech of the hon. Member who has just sat down (Mr.' Baird)—as to the tone of which let me say I have no complaint whatever to make—when he says that we yielded about the Baghdad Railway, I ask what have we yielded?

Mr. BAIRD

I did not say that the right hon. Gentleman had yielded with regard to the Baghdad Railway, but I thought that he had yielded with regard to the Balkan Peninsula, and I hoped that he was not going to do so again.

Sir E. GREY

We did not yield with regard to the Balkan Peninsula. The attitude we took up was that an international treaty had been altered by the act of one Power, and that we could not recognise that alteration of the treaty until the other treaty Powers were also prepared to recognise it. The treaty Power most deeply interested was Turkey, and we held out against any recognition of the alteration until the other Powers who were parties to the treaty were satisfied. The hon. Member will remember that the time came when the Turkish Government, by an arrangement with the Austro-Hungarian Government, was satisfied, and eventually all the Powers who were parties to the treaty recognised the alteration, and then, but not till then, we said that the conditions were such as to be internationally compatible with the recognition of the alteration of an international treaty. I do not call that a rebuff to our policy in the least.

With regard to the Baghdad Railway, of course we have done nothing in the nature of yielding at present, because we have nothing, so far as we are concerned, to yield. If we had given way about the customs duties without getting satisfactory terms, no doubt then we should have been yielding. But that is precisely what we have not done. We have kept up to the present moment every lever. Every diplomatic card we hold in our hands we had in our hands when we came into office. I do not want to make a very long speech about the Baghdad Railway this evening for three reasons. First of all, I went over the ground the other day; in the next place Lord Morley went over the ground yesterday in another place; and the third reason is that, so far as I am able to judge the speech I made in the House a little time ago has not made the atmosphere unfavourable to the negotiation of a settlement, and so far as I can judge the pro-liable effect of the speech of Lord Morley elsewhere last night, and let me say also the speech of Lord Curzon are not either of them likely to make the atmosphere unfavourable for negotiation. There is always a certain risk in making speeches that one may say something or that something will not be fully reported, or not reported with the context which may make the atmosphere unfavourable. I specially wish to keep the atmosphere what I may call genial at the present time, because the Turkish Government have made certain proposals to us which they desire should be regarded as confidential, and which indeed in any such circumstances between two Governments must be regarded as confidential at this stage, because it is impossible for any two Governments to carry on negotiations if at the very beginning what passes between them is made public. We know perfectly well as to the Baghdad Railway being a German concession, Germany must be much interested in any arrangements made by Turkey with regard to it, and from the answer I gave in the House this afternoon the House will realise that negotiations have been passing, and that something has been signed between the Turkish Government and the Baghdad Railway Concessionaires. I do not want to comment on what has been signed further than to say that, although it does not give Turkey an absolutely free hand—that is to say, free from all the conditions of the old concession with regard to the railway from Baghdad to the gulf, it does open the question of the continuation of the railway from Baghdad to the gulf, and opens a field of negotiation which was not open so long as the Turkish Government remained bound to the terms of the original concession. What the future of these negotiations may be it is too early to say. I frankly want to see an agreement, because, if an agreement is come to which is satisfactory to Turkey, to ourselves, and to Germany, it will, at any rate, remove one possible cause of political friction. It will be an advantage to have that out of the way. The political friction would be due to the apprehension which exists in public opinion as to the effect which the Baghdad Railway, if carried out under the original concession, might eventually have on the political and strategical interests in the gulf, or on British trade. If an agreement is come to which satisfies public opinion that when the Baghdad Railway is completed British trade is not going to be subjected to differential duties, that, not only in theory, but in practice, it is assured of being able to use the Baghdad Railway and its branches as arteries of trade, and that trade and commerce will be just as open to Britain as to any other country, then one great apprehension and one source of possible friction will be removed. That is one object we have in view.

Another point is, of course, the political and strategical interest of the Persian Gulf. Lord Lansdowne, in his speech of two years ago as to the Persian Gulf, made a great point that there should be no possible risk of there being in the hands of another Power a fortified position on the Persian Gulf which might be used on the flank of our communications with India. Of course, in any arrangement come to with regard to the Baghdad Railway that must be amply safeguarded, but I do not see that there need be any difficulty in doing so. I believe that an arrangement can be come to on the lines that the Baghdad Railway shall be a purely commercial undertaking. But when the Noble Lord opposite (Lord Ronaldshay) asks me to state exactly what we shall require before we can give our consent to an increase in the Customs Duties which may be essential to the completion of the railway, of course I can only state in general terms that there are two objects we are endeavouring to attain. The particular demands we may make with regard to control, participation, and so forth, I cannot make public. They are, of course, things to be put forth in the course of the negotiations, and they cannot be judged until the negotiations are concluded. The Noble Lord, I frankly admit, made a most interesting speech on the subject, and spoke, as the House must have felt, from the point of view of general interest in the matter, and without any desire to make party points or political capital. In dealing with the guarantees for British trade he referred to Articles 24 and 25 of the cahier des charges as not giving a sufficient guarantee for British trade. The other day, when I quoted one of the Articles in the House I was told that I had quoted it in a truncated form. I looked at it to see what had been omitted, and found that it was a matter of no importance at all. The part I omitted was that the railway authorities were to have the right in an emergency to impose certain rates before they got the approbation of the Turkish Government. That does not impair the value of the Article. It means that in case of emergency they may impose certain rates, but they have got to get the approbation of the Turkish Government afterwards, and we should be in the position of claiming from the Turkish Government that there should be no differential treatment of us. The Noble Lord said it had at last dawned upon us that these Articles were not in themselves a sufficient guarantee. I thought I made it clear when I first mentioned the matter in the House of Commons that I did not regard them by themselves as an entirely sufficient guarantee. "What I said almost on the first occasion was that they seemed to me as complete as paper guarantees could be, and certainly when I spoke the other day I did not put them forward as being absolutely and completely sufficient to set our minds at rest with regard to any future differential treatment. I do not put them forward so now, but when I am asked as to whether these which are on paper are sufficient and satisfactory, of course, I say my desire is to exact on every occasion when it may be required the fulfilment of these guarantees in what, I believe, their real sense is, that, namely, of absolutely fail-treatment of trade. It is to our interest that these should be as full and complete as possible, and for us to begin in advance before we have had any discussion with the Turkish Government to take the view that these particular Articles as not so express as to be a binding obligation upon the concessionaires not to give any differential treatment, seems to me to be throwing away a perfectly good lever in our hands, and one of which we ought to make the fullest possible use. The concessionaires are bound by these Articles to give fair treatment to the trade of all countries. It is to our interest to put the fullest force and greatest weight upon these which they will bear. I shall maintain, and I shall leave it on record for anyone who succeeds me here, that any differential treatment of British trade is a breach of these Articles, and that these Articles are one of the first things we can bring up if there was any differential treatment of British trade as something that had been broken, and which we had a right to demand should be kept. Negotiations are going to take place and we will do what we can by them or by other arrangements which may be made by having some active share in, at any rate, a portion of the Baghdad Railway which shall in such a sense make us parties that we shall be in a position, not merely to decide that some breach has taken place of these treaty articles, but that we shall be in a position to secure that no breach does take place.

The Noble Lord said he hoped we would realise that our position is a very strong one because of the Customs Duties. Of course I realise that. I was the first to point it out to the House. The Noble Lord I thought at one time was almost quoting part of a speech I made the other day when I said we were not so helpless in the matter as might be gathered from the speech which preceded it. All that he said about the three per cent. and the four per cent. afterwards I brought to the notice of the House the other day. I did so on purpose that the House might know really what our position in the matter was. I do not think I need go over that ground again. Now I pass to Persia, and I would say on a point that has been raised first of all as to the railways in Southern Persia I have not had time to study closely what passed in another place last night, and, indeed, we have not yet got the OFFICIAL REPORT. We could not have the OFFICIAL REPORT of what passed in another place last night. Therefore, I think it would be inconvenient for me to comment even if it was in order, on the particular statement that was made which we could not have had time to study and with which we may not be quite completely acquainted. With regard to the exclusive rights respecting railways in Southern Persia, it was clearly affirmed last night in reference to the assurance that had been given to previous Governments by the Shah with regard to those railways when we took over the exclusive rights that we are none the less watchful in safeguarding our Treaty interests in Persia; but we feel bound to admit that, as far as purely commercial things are concerned, what we are seeking for in Persia is not exclusive rights. We admit the principle of the open door for trade in certain parts of Persia with regard to treaty rights and so forth. I do not believe we shall have any difficulty in having those regarded and not infringed by other Powers, provided we are quite clear that respect for our strategic interests in any part of Persia is not going to be injurious to the commercial trade of any Power that may have hopes of acquiring property there. That is the construction I would put upon the phrase that we are claiming exclusive rights.

I must go to the other points that have been raised with regard to Persia. The hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Dillon) raised the question of Papers. I must find out what Lord Morley has promised, and, of course, whatever he has promised will be given. I have admitted, I think, on one occasion before at least, that I quite understood it must be the natural desire of the House of Commons, after all that has passed, to have Papers; but I should be anxious in laying Papers to do nothing which is likely to prejudice or make things difficult for the present Government in Persia; and, though I quite admit further Papers must be laid, it must be some little time before the correspondence can be read. Among other things, we have to consult other Governments—the Russian Government, of course—with regard to what passed between us and them. This is the case with every foreign country. Before we lay and publish any communications made to us by any foreign Power we have to consult them beforehand, as they consult us; and that is a thing that takes time. I do not say that negotiations about the southern roads are concluded, but I think they are in a more hopeful state. The hon. Member for Stirling Burghs (Mr. Ponsonby) asked me a question which, at any rate, I think I can answer definitely: Have we finally abandoned any idea of British Indian officers being lent to the Persian Government? I answer "No"; we certainly have not abandoned that idea. I think that for the Persian Government to organise a Persian force under British Indian officers lent to it by us would be one of the most effective ways of securing the southern roads. The Persian Government is not averse to the employment of foreign officers for this purpose. It knows that foreign officers can with advantage be employed to organise the force on the southern roads. Certainly, if the Persian Government were willing to choose that particular method of employing British Indian officers in organising a Persian force to protect the roads, it is a way in which we should be very glad to assist them.

EARL of RONALDSHAY

I am assuming in what the right hon. Gentleman says now that he means that the British officers would be responsible to the Persian Government?

Sir EDWARD GREY

Yes, they would be in the employment of the Persian Government. But our object in this would have every possible respect to the independence and integrity of Persia, and our sole object is that the southern roads shall be made safe for trade. Hon. Members who criticise me for taking any action about the southern roads have not got, as I have, to answer the complaints from British traders whose trade may be stopped on these roads. Do they really advocate that when complaints come of trade being stopped and when we are unable to point to any prospect of roads being made secure for trade that we should say: "No, we can do nothing in the matter at all?" That is an impossible attitude, and I think what we were bound to do was to press upon the Persian Government such measures as we suggest would be effective in securing order on the southern roads, and I say that the continuance of chaos and insubordination among the tribes there is far more detrimental to the independence of the Persian Government than the loan of foreign officers to organise a Persian force to restore order. We have now said to the Persian Government that if they would take any other method of securing order on the roads than the employment of Indian officers we would not press that upon them, provided they would adopt some other method that was likely to be effective. I think the present idea of the Persian Government is that they should employ foreign officers from some minor Power that would be absolutely neutral, and whose employment could offer no risk of political complication. If order can be restored on the southern roads in that way we have no objection. Our sole object is that order should be restored. But we must keep on pressing the Persian Government to do something or other until order is restored, and if they will not accept the suggestions we make and will not make efforts of their own, it is quite clear that the state of chaos which would continue would be a far worse danger to the integrity of Persia than anything that could result from the loan of British Indian officers.

The third question which the hon. Member for Mayo put was with regard to the Seligmann loan. I am speaking without reference to any Papers, because I have not had much time to refer to Papers. I did not know until this morning that the question of Persia was going to be raised, and certainly not this point of the loan. But my recollection is with regard to the Seligmann loan we never said a word thereon one way or the other. All I did in the matter was when the time came and I was asked to give support to that particular project of a loan I said that I was not in a position to give actual support, but that I do not think would be fairly construed as having prevented the Persian Government from making a loan. All that can be alleged against us in the way of preventing the Persian Government from making a loan is that we have given the Persian Government to understand some time ago that if they make new loans they must not make new loans against the securities which have been already pledged for previous loans. That is a perfectly natural stipulation, and the Persian Government have known it all through. As regards any securities which were not already pledged for previous loans, there is no interference from us whomever they borrow from if they borrow on securities which are free. As a matter of fact, not only is it untrue that the British and Russian Governments have been preventing the Persian Governments from making loans on their own account through other financiers in order to force upon them a loan to which a political condition would attach, but we agreed some time ago last year that the Anglo-Russian Governments would be prepared, if they were asked, to make a small loan to the Persian Government without political conditions. In the first place, some conditions of a political character were asked for. Later on it was agreed that it might be lent without political conditions attaching, and since that time we have not been attempting to force anything upon them; but the Persian Government have been perfectly free to make loans with private firms and they have had at least one loan on offer for some time under which they could have got money, and which it would have been in their power to conclude whenever the Persian Government had an interest in doing so.

6.0 P.M.

The hon. Member for Mayo asked me various questions on which I do not think it is my business to give such a complete answer. He asked me about the assassination which had been committed by certain Russian subjects. If they had been British subjects who had committed the assassinations I would feel bound to give the fullest information to the House, and not only give the fullest information, but get the fullest information. I do not understand that the Persian Government itself has raised any question whatever that the assassins in this case were Russian subjects. That being so, no question having been raised by the Persian Government themselves—I think it is admitted not only that no question was raised, but it is admitted that they were Russian subjects. I do not see how it is possible to raise the question in this House. The hon. Member says the assassins were caught redhanded. As far as I know that is the case; I do not dispute it for a moment. I admit perfectly freely—of course everybody must—that if they were caught redhanded whatever authority claims them of course must be responsible for proceeding so that proper justice is executed. I have no doubt that the Persian Government would have natural cause of complaint if the assassins, having been caught redhanded, had not justice executed upon them. That is a matter between the Persian Government and the Russian Government, and I do not think it is one in which I can be expected or called upon to investigate the facts and provide information. The hon. Member for Mayo asked about certain proceedings which had been taken, and which he said were not very dignified, to secure payment of the salary due to the ex-Shah. He connected that with the question of the supposed intrigues of the deposed Shah in Europe.

The ex-Shah has always been warned that if he engaged in political intrigues the salary would not be paid. The delay in paying the salary on this occasion, as far as I remember, was not connected at all with the question of political intrigues. The hon. Member for Mayo said certain proceedings were resorted to as to the payment of the salary which were not very dignified, and, he added that I said on one occasion that they were the custom of the country. When I heard of the proceedings I inquired, and I was told that they were the custom of the country, and I believe they are the custom of the country. Therefore I am sure that in Persia they did not bear the complexion which they would bear in this country. I freely admit that when I heard of the custom it did not seem to me to be one which it was desirable to encourage, and I quite agree that it is a custom, so far as I can judge of it, which would be better discontinued. But it is the custom of the country, and there it did not bear the interpretation which in this country would be placed on a proceeding of that kind.

Mr. DILLON

The Foreign Minister complained bitterly.

Sir E. GREY

I expect because he knew perfectly well that that particular custom would bear a different interpretation in any country outside Persia. No doubt that complaint was made by him knowing that it would appear very differently elsewhere from what it did in Persia itself. The other point with which I have been asked to deal by the hon. Gentlemen the Member for Stirling Burghs and the hon. Member for Mayo is the question of the Russian troops in Persia. It has been assumed that the presence of the Russian troops in Persia have been a great hindrance and damage to the Nationalist Persian Government. If you go back to the beginning, it will be seen that if it had not been for the presence of the Russian troops at Tabriz the Nationalist party would have been overthrown altogether. It was the coming of the Russian troops to Tabriz to remedy the state of disorder which had been interfering with Russian trade at the time which raised the siege of Tabriz. Tabriz otherwise was on a point of falling, not into the hands of the Nationalist party but into the hands of the Reactionists. But for the Russian troops being present at Tabriz the Reactionary party would have won there, and I do not think the last Shah would ever have been deposed at all. The action of the Russian troops, at any rate, when they first came to Tabriz, was on the Reactionary side; and we have to remember that if the Russian troops had intended to side with the Reactionists it would have been absolutely impossible for the Shah to be deposed or for the Nationalist Government to come into existence at all. Hon. Members say, "Yes, but they remain in Persia long afterwards." It is quite true that they have not been withdrawn from Tabriz, nor from the place called Hamadan. On more than one occasion I have had reports—on one occasion certainly. I remember, from the British Consul some time ago—raying that if the Russian troops were withdrawn there would immediately follow chaos and disorder in those places.

I do not say that the situation continues as dangerous as it was then, but certainly there have been times when the premature withdrawal of the Russian troops would have led to that state of chaos and disorder which would have been certain to lead to interference again. I am a little surprised that the hon. Member for Mayo and the hon. Member for Stirling Burghs passed without notice the fact that within the last few weeks the Russians have been withdrawn from Kasvin, a place to which the Persian Government attached by far the most importance, because Kasvin is the place most within easy reach of the Persian capital, Teheran. Kasvin was the place where the presence of the Russian troops caused the most political prejudice to the Persian Government, because it was the place which was within easy reach of Teheran, and because the Russian troops were originally sent to Kasvin when there was fear of great disorder in Teheran. I think there are some hon. Members in this House who assume that when the Russian troops went to Kasvin originally they were certainly going on to Teheran afterwards. The Russian troops did not go to Teheran, and they have now been withdrawn from Kasvin. I think the fact of their having been withdrawn from Kasvin, which, I am sure, is recognised by the present Persian Government as an advance towards good relations between the Russian Government and the Persian Government, might, in the stream of criticism which has been poured on these Persian affairs, have received some little recognition, because it is a very important fact. I do not believe for a moment that the Anglo-Russian Agreement has been detrimental to the independence and integrity of Persia. The hon. Member for Stirling Burghs spoke of this Anglo-Russian Agreement as having been detrimental to the independence and integrity of Persia. The chaos in Persia was bound to come under the late and previous Shahs. The Government had been going from bad to worse, and it was becoming so inefficient that chaos in Persia was sure to come.

Does anybody suppose that if there had been no Anglo-Russian Agreement, and Persia had fallen into a state of chaos, and if there had been still going on at Teheran what Lord Morley, I think, described as the squalid rivalry between Russia and England in Teheran—does anybody suppose that the amount of interference there has been in Persian affairs would have been limited to the amount that has taken place? It is solely the Anglo-Russian Agreement, I believe, which has prevented, during all this time of chaos and difficulty of all kinds in Persia, interference from going further than it has gone. The hon. Member for Stirling Burghs complains of us for having kept in touch with the Russian Government. There is nothing in the Anglo-Russian Agreement to make one Government responsible for anything which the other does. I do not hold that we are responsible for everything that the other does, either we for them or they for us; but undoubtedly it is necessary for the working of that agreement that we should keep in touch generally with regard to Persian affairs, and we have kept in touch. If we had not kept in touch, and if the old squalid rivalry and suspicion and jealousy had been the rule in Teheran, I am quite certain that things would not have gone as smoothly as they have done for Persia. If the hon. Member for Stirling Burghs is prepared to advocate that we should tell Persia that we are prepared to protect her single-handed against all aggression, that at any rate is a definite policy. But is he prepared to say that? I am not prepared to say that. I think that would be an undesirable policy, and an enormous extension of our Imperial obligations. But unless the hon. Member for Stirling Burghs and the hon. Member for Mayo are prepared to say something of that kind, then depend upon it co-operation and good understanding between the neighbours of Persia are absolutely essential to the independence and integrity of Persia, as long as Persia continues in the weak, defenceless, and chaotic state to which she has been brought by the bad Government which existed under the late Shah.

There is, of course, a third policy, which is that of abstention altogether from Persian affairs. I do not believe that is a practical policy. Considering our commercial and other interest, I do not think it would be practicable. But even if it were practicable, certainly it would not have helped the Persian Government at all in recent times. I do believe that at the present moment the Government in Persia is making a genuine effort to put its House in order. The Regent has certainly given some exceedingly good advice. He made a speech the other day—I think it appeared in the newspapers in which he pointed out that they must have a stable Government in Persia if any progress was to be made; and if they were to have a stable Government the Medjliss must make up its mind to provide a majority to support the Government. It must settle which Government it wanted, and, having settled the Government it wanted, provide that Government with a majority. Last year one of the great difficulties of the Persian Government, and the reason why it did not conclude loans, amongst other things, was that the Medjliss had not formed a stable majority which would give support and confidence to the Government of the day. If the new departure which the Regent has advocated is to be made, then, I think, there is a chance of Persia progressing. But the Persians surely must realise that to have Parliamentary Government without providing a majority for the Government which has to carry on the affairs of the country leads not to progress, but chaos, and makes things impossible. I am most anxious-that the prospect of improvement which there is since the Regent took office should have every possible chance, and, as far as we are concerned, we will not either by the southern roads or anything else, so long as that Government convinces us that it is doing what is in its power, and has a real intention to do its best, we will not press upon them inconvenient requests, and we will do all we can to encourage signs of improvement, and not to-put difficulties in the way. But the House must remember that the most we can do is small, and that the experiment of Parliamentary Government in Persia does rest upon the Persian doing what they have been advised by the Regent to do, and what every Parliament must do, that is using its Parliament, the Medjliss in Persia not in continually checking, but to give the support and confidence of the majority to the Government of its choice.