MR. MCKENNA'S STATEMENT.

HC Deb 16 March 1911 vol 22 cc2457-559

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. McKenna)

I remember when I first had the honour of sitting in this House it was the practice of Mr. Goschen, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, to reserve the publication of the Estimates until immediately before the time at which he spoke. He was able to secure by that means in explaining the Estimates to the. House all the advantages which is to be gained from surprise. In the present year not only is there no element of surprise about the Estimates, which have been in the hands of Members for many days, but as a matter of fact we have already had an important Debate on the subject, and the main principles in defence of the Estimates have already been discussed. So far from complaining of this fact, I think that in present circumstances it has some advantages. It enables me to confine myself chiefly in the statement which I have now to make to the House to what may be called the details of the Navy, rather than to questions of international policy. The Estimates for the ensuing year which I now propose to the House amount to £44,392,000. In mentioning that sum to the House I have told the whole story. I have given the complete account of the expenditure. There is nothing behind. There is no borrowing. That sum represents not merely the total estimated expenditure for the year 1911–12 for Naval services, but it includes no less a sum than £1,300,000 for interest upon former loans. I hope the House will bear in mind, in considering the total amount, that a deduction should be made not only for the amount of the loan charge, but for the fact that we are paying our way as we go along to the last shilling.

I know it has been suggested in various quarters that this is a moment when borrowing would be a useful expedient for us to adopt. I need hardly say, as the Minister who at the moment is responsible for introducing these Estimates, that it would be very agreeable to me if I could conceal £5,000,000 or £10,000,000 behind a loan. But I should not be doing my duty to the House if I did not point out the mischief of such a policy. We have got to maintain a Navy—a supreme Navy—not merely for the year 1911–12, but for so long as the British Empire is to last. Now a loan is a temporary expedient, and I would never advise this House to adopt a temporary expedient for the purpose of supplying a permanent need. I do not say this in the spirit of a pedant. If there were exceptional circumstances as war would be, if there was something new and alarming in the situation which we might not see repeated for a hundred years, I would be the last person to say that the exceptional circumstances should not be met by an exceptional expedient. But these are the current Estimates for the year, and though they are exceptionally high, and I hope they have now reached their highest point, still they only meet the needs of the Services of the year, and they ought to be met, therefore, by the expenditure of the year. The increase over last year is £3,788,800. Nearly the whole of that increase is due to additions of Votes VIII. and IX., which are the Votes upon which the charge falls for new construction and armaments. The total increase in Votes VIII. and IX. is £3,350,000, out of the total increase of £3,788,800. The charge for new construction in the year is £15,063,000. In speaking of new construction, the House must distinguish between "old programme" and "new programme." Of this charge of £15,000,000 for new construction over £13,000,000 is due for payments in respect of old programmes and the charge for new programme—that is for ships which will be laid down for the first time in the year 1911–12—is £1,738,000. I heard a cheer from the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord Charles Beresford), which is a forerunner of the argument he is going to address to the House.

Lord CHARLES BERESFORD

How do you know?

Mr. McKENNA

Well, of the argument he has already presented to the House, and which, I presume, he will not miss the opportunity of presenting again. I do not mean any offence to the Noble Lord, because I know it is a very favourite topic of his. On the subject of the amount of money allocated for new programme, let me say in the first place that the amount proposed to be spent in the ensuing year has only been exceeded in previous years when I have had the honour to introduce the Estimates. In no earlier case has there ever been such a large amount spent on new programme within the year. I only preface what I have to say by that statement to show that in this particular respect if it be an evil to spend only a small amount on new programme, I am the least of all the sinners. But what are the real merits of the case? We have laid down our ships at such a time as to enable us to have them in commission at a particular date. According to our forecast of the development of other Navies, we require a Navy of a certain strength in the spring of 1914.

4.0 P.M.

The spring of 1914 is therefore the date at which we want to have our ships ready for commission, and the date at which we should lay them down is there fore determined by the length of time which we take to build. If we built these ships at a slower rate than in fact we do we should have to lay them down earlier. If we laid them down earlier there would be a heavier charge for constructional new programme in the year, but inasmuch as we are building our big ships regularly at the rate of two years each there is no need to lay down our programme of five large armoured ships earlier than either December of this year or January of next year. Having determined the dates at which we should lay our ships down we then reckon the amount of money to be spent in the year, and the total amount of new construction is made up of the necessary amount to be spent within the year in order to give us all our ships at the time that we need them. Let me remind the House that to lay down ships earlier than you require them, and to take longer than you need in building them involves waste. From the moment you lay down a ship you are spending money on her which is no use to you until she is put in commission. Therefore you want to make that period of time as short as you can. We have, therefore, postponed laying down our ships to as late a moment as is consistent with having them ready on the definite date, in the spring of 1914.

I pass now to the details of the new programme for this year. As I have said, we propose to lay down five large armoured ships. They will not be laid down before December of this year. They may be laid down in January of next year. The contract time for the construction will be two years. As to the types of the ships, the House would not expect me at this moment to disclose particulars as to tonnage, speed, guns, and so forth, of ships that are not yet laid down; but it may be of interest to the House for me to remind hon. Members of the type which was laid down in November, 1909—I refer to the battleship "Orion" and the cruiser "Lion"—and I can say generally that the new ships of the coming year will be of the type of the "Orion" and the "Lion." In the "Orion" we have for the first time a ship carrying 13.5-inch guns, which has ten such guns all carried in the centre line of the ship. Her speed will not be less than that of the original "Dreadnought," and I will content myself with saying that her armour protection will be adequate. With regard to the "Lion," she will carry eight 13.5-inch guns also all arranged upon the centre line of the ship, which I need hardly remind hon. Members means that all eight guns in the case of the "Lion" or in the case of the "Orion," all ten guns will be available on either broadside. As to the speed of the "Lion," there, again, I can with safety go so far as to say that it will be a material improvement upon the speed of the "Invincibles." This progress in size, in guns, in speed, in power, and in cost has not been of our seeking. I have already explained to the House the other evening the reason why we adopted the change in the style of ship, not so much in the style as in the size and power of ship, and I have nothing more to say on that point. But I am happy to be able to tell the House that the cost has not increased in anything like the same proportion as the power. Perhaps it may be interesting to the House, because it would clear up a good many misapprehensions, to be reminded of some facts as to the real cost of these ships. Speaking of the earlier "Dreadnoughts," of which we have now eight ships in commission, the average cost of these ships was £1,710,000 each complete with guns and everything including armour.

Mr. BURGOYNE

Does it include Reserves?

Mr. McKENNA

It does not include Reserves. It includes the cost of the ship when it is commissioned, but not Reserves. We have been accustomed to hear sometimes in this House, but more often in the Press and from a great many reports that reach us from abroad, that when the "Dreadnought" was first invented it represented such a great leap in cost that the whole Navies of the world were revolutionised and that the British Admiralty were responsible for putting naval expenditure on an entirely different standard. What are the real facts? The "Dreadnoughts," the eight battleships now in commission, cost, as I have said, £1,710,000 apiece. The cost of those eight battleships is precisely the same to build as the cost of nine "King Edwards." But the upkeep of the eight "Dreadnoughts" costs £50,000 less a year than the upkeep of the nine "King Edwards." Let any hon. Member ask any distinguished Admiral he likes whether he would rather command a Fleet of eight "Dreadnoughts "or of nine" King Edwards," and I should be surprised if he does not say that he would prefer to have the eight "Dreadnoughts" with their possible eighty 12-inch guns, their speed of twenty-one knots, and their very considerable armour protection, to the nine "King Edwards" mounting thirty-six 12-inch guns with a very much lower speed. But if he says he would prefer the eight "Dreadnoughts" I must remind the House he would be saving £50,000 as well, so that upon the two counts we must conclude that as an engine of warfare the "Dreadnought" is an economy as compared with the "King Edward."

I turn to a later type than the "King Edward." I turn to the "Lord Nelson." There are only two "Lord Nelsons" built, but taking into account the actual cost of those two I find that I can get thirty "Lord Nelsons" for the cost of twenty-nine "Dreadnoughts." And that the cost of the twenty-nine "Dreadnoughts" to maintain would be £15,000 a year less than the cost of maintaining thirty "Lord Nelsons." You can appeal to any expert whether he would rather have a Fleet of twenty-nine "Dreadnoughts" or of thirty "Lord Nelsons," and I think as in the previous case there can be but one answer, that as an instrument of economy as well' as of warfare the "Dreadnought" is an improvement upon the "Lord Nelson." I am quite disinterested in making these statements. Neither the Board of Admiralty with which I am now concerned or any Board of Admiralty with which the present Government was concerned had anything to do with the laying down of the "Dreadnought." The credit is due to the Board of Admiralty of the day, and they deserve the fullest credit for having had' the courage to introduce a type of ship which is far more effective as an instrument of warfare, and at the same time is more economical than the types which it supplanted. Now I turn from the earlier "Dreadnoughts" in commission, the eight battleships now in commission, to the later type of which the "Orion" is the forerunner. That type covers with slight alteration all battleships laid down at the present moment. The cost, with the guns, approximates to £1,900,000 or an increase of £200,000 upon the earlier type of "Dreadnought." The House must remember, in justification of this increase of £200,000, that an increase of £500,000 in cost of new ships has been made across the ocean, comparing the ships laid down by Germany in 1907 with those laid down in 1908; and I do not think that hon. Members can charge the Board of Admiralty with having been extravagant in making what is com paratively speaking such a small increase in the cost of ships.

Mr. ROBERT HARCOURT

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned the "Hercules" or the "Colossus." Do those belong to the "Orion" or to the earlier type?

Mr. McKENNA

The "Orion" was laid down in November. The "Hercules" and "Colussus" were laid down in July. The "Orion" was the first new ship carrying 13.5-inch guns.

Mr. BURGOYNE

The right hon. Gentleman has told us the main armament of the ships. What is the secondary armament?

Mr. McKENNA

Four-inch guns. That was the development to which the Admiralty went in November, 1909, and those were the lines upon which they have proceeded with the construction of these large ships since. I do not wish to enter into the question now of primary and secondary armaments, either as to the merits or the demerits of the secondary armaments or as to the cost. But I would merely make this incidental remark that if we had been able to obtain ships of their great power like the "Orion," and at their comparatively low cost, it is due to the fact that we have not got what is generally spoken of as the secondary armament. We have anti-destroyer armament, but no secondary armament that can be used on the broadside in battle, and by suppressing the secondary armament we are enabled to get at less cost a very material increase of power in our primary armaments. On these questions of naval policy, perhaps, it is always difficult to be certain, but I think there are good grounds for believing that the Admiralty which in 1905 adopted the principle of primary armament only was right, and I have never had any hesitation in supporting the policy introduced by my predecessors. I am rather afraid that when I show how comparatively cheap our ships are, and how we have not made that gigantic increase of expenditure on shipbuilding with which we are charged, I shall be told that I am proving too much. It will be said to me, "You get your ships at so much less than other people, you are satisfied with their power, but how comes it that nevertheless you are asking for £44,000,000, the total of your expenditure, as compared with £22,000,000, the total amount demanded for the ensuing year by the second Naval Power in the world, surely you must be asking for more than the two-Power standard when you are doubling the strength and you are asking for double as much as the second Naval Power?" But you must compare like with like. It is true that I am asking the House for £44,000,000, and that the German Naval Estimates for the ensuing year are £22,000,000; but I think that if the House examines the Estimates they will agree that these totals do not represent comparable quantities. Nobody can dispute that, if items on the one side or the other are inserted in respect of charges which do not appear in both Estimates, those charges ought to be struck out. For instance, as I have already said, I have upon my Estimates £1,300,000 for interest on loans. In Germany there has been precisely the same system adopted of borrowing for expenditure on large works; but the charge for the loans is not put on the Navy Estimates, but upon the Estimates of the Minister of the Interior.

I should be very happy to dump the £1,300,000 on the Estimates of the Home Secretary. That £1,300,000, if you are comparing my total with the German total, must be struck off. You have got to take the whole of the items included in Votes 13, 14, and 15—the Votes for pensions, retired pay, and other things. These also are borne on the Civil Estimates in Germany, and not on the Naval Estimates. If my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board will take my Votes 13, 14, and 15, I can reduce my Estimates by between a further £2,000,000 and £3,000,000. Then, again, it is our National policy not to have Conscription, a policy, I am bound to say, I strongly support. I think that we pay very little for maintaining our voluntary system. But still we have to pay for it, and it is not fair if that factor is left out of account. If I were to put upon my Estimates the charge for pay on the same scale that the Germans have, I should reduce my Votes 1, 2, and 3, which cover not merely pay, but clothing, medical charges, etc., by just upon £3,000,000. That is the sum we pay for voluntary service. Taking all these items together, and if you allow such charges to rest on the German Estimates and not on ours, then you have to make a total reduction of £8,000,000 from the total of £44,000,000, so that the true comparison is £36,000,000 to £22,000,000.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

There are Appropriations-in-Aid—are they to be taken into account in a comparison of that kind?

Mr. McKENNA

On the gross expenditure?

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

Yes.

Mr. McKENNA

It would not be quite fair. There are certain Appropriations-in-Aid, but of very small amount. I quite agree that there are certain items which ought to be included, as my hon Friend has mentioned. For instance, contributions from the Dominions certainly ought to be included, but such Appropriations-in-Aid as we get from the substitution of food for mess allowance and so on, I do not think ought to be included. I think only items which appear on both sides of the account should be considered.

Mr. CHIOZZA MONEY

Has the right hon. Gentleman included works?

Mr. McKENNA

Yes; I have included them, but I have not gone into details. Given the deductions I have made, £8,000,000 is a fair reduction.

Mr. LEIF JONES

Can the right hon. Gentleman tell me what the Germans spend, as compared with the £8,000,000 deducted, on the same items as he has deducted?

Mr. McKENNA

It is a nett reduction. There is half-a-million on those items which are on the German Estimate and not on ours, which. I have deducted, and that leaves a nett reduction on our Estimates of £8,000,000, which ought to be deducted. My hon. Friend must remember that I am only engaged in showing what ought to be deducted. Of these £36,000,000, some portion is spent on the maintenance of the Fleets which we keep entirely in foreign waters, on grounds of Empire. We have to maintain Fleets in the Pacific, the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. I do not refer now to the Mediterranean Fleet, which for this purpose we may regard as a Fleet in home waters. I am only speaking now of our Fleet on foreign stations, which, while invaluable for the protection of commerce, could not be made available in the first line of battle in the event of any war in home waters. I allow for the Fleet of ships kept in foreign waters by Germany, and, deducting the full allowance for all those ships, I still have to meet a charge upon our Naval Estimates of at least £2,500,000 a year; after allowing for the items which my hon. Friend has referred to as Appropriations-in-Aid, I have to allow £2,500,000 a year for the maintenance of our China, Indian, and Australian Fleets and for other isolated ships in different waters. This is a charge of Empire, a charge which we ought, in any comparison with any other Fleet in the world, to deduct from the total of our Navy Estimates. I thus reduce for comparative purposes the £36,000,000 to £33,500,000, which can be properly compared to the German £22,000,000. I admit that it is a heavy demand to make upon the taxpayers of the country to ask them for £33,500,000 when the next strongest Naval Power is only spending £22,000,000. I admit the amount is large, but I do not think that it is necessary for me to remind hon. Members, or to appeal to them to remember that the importance to the maintenance of our supremacy by our keeping open the highway of the ocean, is so overwhelming that not merely must we be in a position of safety in a protracted struggle, but that we cannot afford to be in doubt for a fortnight.

We must, therefore, maintain an adequate superiority, and I am bound in the performance of my duty to ask the House to give me the adequate money. It would be affectation on my part to ignore the fact that the Board of Admiralty, and, unfortunately for myself, I also, have been the subject of considerable attack in the Press, in quarters where I personally thought they were least likely to happen. But I cannot help thinking that much of that attack has been due to misunderstanding and honest ignorance. I select only one item of administration, and it so happens that it is an item which was selected by me purely at random. There was a recent publication by an old friend of mine, whom I highly esteem, Lord Eversley. It was in many respects moderately written; it contained considerable wealth of detail in support of the general charge that the demands made by the Admiralty were extravagant, and that we ought to be called to book for the gross-ness of our expenditure. I selected out of that publication the first statement which caught my eyes. It was this: that in 1897–8 the expenditure on coal for the Fleet was £525,000, and that in 1910–11 that expenditure had risen to £2,329,000, which was more than four-fold. That struck me so strongly, so severely, that I investigated it at once. It appeared to be monstrous that we should be spending four times as much on coal as we were content to spend thirteen years ago. Lord Eversley rightly pointed out that in such circumstances there must be waste. What are the facts? First of all, between 1907 and 1910 there was a, change of system in preparing the Estimates. What appears under the heading of fuel in 1910–11 includes not only fuel, but such items as lubricating oil, bags, and sacks, and other materials, reducing the amount by no less than £493,000. None of those items appear in the corresponding figures for 1897, so that the total of £2,329,000 has, in the first instance, to be reduced to £1,836,000. The Admiralty cannot be held responsible for the price of coal, and I feel therefore perfectly justified in making a comparison in the prices of coal. Coal was 25 per cent. cheaper in 1897 than m 1910, so that we have to take 25 per cent. from the cost of the coal. I take off nothing for the cost of petrol and oil fuel, but taking only 25 per cent. of the coal cost the sum of £1,800,000 is still further reduced to £1,436,000. Now we have a comparison of £525,000 in 1897, with £1,436,000 in 1910. We must not stop there. The year 1897 was a selected year. The figure was very low in the Estimates, and so low that there had to be a Supplementary Estimate, or if not a Supplementary Estimate there was money transferred from one Vote to another with the consent of the Treasury, and so appears in the Appropriation Accounts. The actual amount spent in that year was £807,000, so that the true comparison is £800,000, with £1,400,000, or an increase of 80 per cent. instead of a fourfold increase. We have got now to compare the fleets. The increase in horsepower in 1910 over 1897 is nearly five-fold, and certainly over fourfold, so that with 80 per cent. increased expenditure on coal we are running nearly five times as great horse-power. I do not think that that story is evidence of such gross waste and extravagance as hon. Members who may have read Lord Eversley's pamphlet would have been disposed to believe. I have taken that out as a sample. I can assure hon. Members with some experience of more than one office that, let the complaints of the policy of the Admiralty be what they will, I do not think you would be able to find grounds of complaint against our prices. Those who follow the Estimates year after year will have seen that our cost for everything, in spite of the rise in the price of raw materials, has been steadily going down, and we do claim, whether the policy be right or wrong, that we are getting value for our money. I venture to say that we are getting at least as much value as some other nations whose call for expenditure is not quite so great as ours.

Let me turn again to the programme. As I have said, it includes five armoured ships, there are four of what are called small cruisers. Why they are named small cruisers, these ships, one of which is over 4,000 tons and the others 5,000 tons,. I do not know, but it is the habit in relation to the larger ships to call them small cruisers. There are three of the Bristol class, and one of the Boadicea. These ships take about twenty-one months to build, and I am happy to say we have no delay from any of our contractors in any respect. We have, as well, twenty destroyers, which will be probably laid down about the month of July, and will take from fifteen to eighteen months to complete. We have also six submarines. It is not usual to give particulars of submarines, and I do not propose to depart from the practice which has been followed in the past. The programme thus will give us in the spring of 1914, thirty ships, battleships and cruisers of the type which are now described as "Dreadnoughts." My hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Murray Macdonald), speaking the other night, asked what steps we have taken to reduce the cost of maintenance of the Navy by cutting off old ships as the new ships come into being. It is a very pointed and, if he will allow me to say so, a very acute criticism, and it is a matter upon which, were I not standing at this Table, I always would wish the House to direct its attention. There is a natural unwillingness to part with old friends, but it is necessary at all times to keep a constant watch upon the older vessels in order to scrap them when they are not really worth their cost. That is a policy which was originally begun by the right hon. Gentlemen opposite with results of extraordinary success. The large reduction in the Navy Estimates in the year 1905–6 could never have been obtained to the same extent by any other possible means whatever. What are we doing in that respect? We propose to reduce the number of battleships in the course of the present year by seven.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

Is that in the present year now being provided for, or in the year ending on the 31st March?

Mr. McKENNA

During the Financial Year 1911–12. During the present year we shall be able to reduce the number of ships in commission by seven, five Royal Sovereigns and two others. The number stated by my hon. Friend of pre-"Dreadnoughts" at the time that he spoke, was fifty-one; as a matter of fact the figure ought to be reduced to forty-eight. There are only forty-eight at present, and that number will in the course of the year be reduced to forty-one. I mention those figures now only to remind the House that the Board of Admiralty have this policy very closely in view. I cannot make any forecast at the present time as to how much further we shall scrap in the years 1913 and 1914, because it must depend upon the number of older ships which are retained by other navies; but I assume that other navies will be compelled by cost to follow the same policy as we have adopted, and that we shall be able to make still further material reductions in the older ships as our newer "Dreadnoughts" come into commission.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

May I ask are you carrying the same principle to protected cruisers?

Mr. McKENNA

Yes; protected cruisers will also be reduced. The "Powerful" will be converted into a hulk in the course of a year to take the place of the "Impregnable" at Devonport as a boys' training ship. The "Arrogant" will be converted also into a hulk immediately. There are numerous other vessels—old submarines, destroyers, small cruisers—which will from time to time pass out of the Navy. I only mention these facts as an assurance that the Admiralty are alive to the importance of this policy, and that it does not escape the constant attention of the Board. Of course, if I feel justified in anticipating a reduction in expenditure in the year 1912–13 and in the year 1913–14, it is only because I anticipate we shall be able to continue the policy which we are now carrying out of scrapping the older and more useless vessels.

Let me before I close say one word about Rosyth Works. The contract date for the completion of Rosyth is September, 1916. I am informed by the contractor, who has assured me that he did not believe himself to be over sanguine, that he would complete the works two years in advance of the contract time, and that he would be able to move out in September, 1914. Our own estimate, of course, does not bear out the contractor's view, but we certainly hope ourselves that he will have completed it by September, 1915, and I think, looking at the progress of the work, that we may look upon that now as an outside date—September, 1915. We are building there, and Parliament has already authorised us to build there two graving docks. We have a further dock in the lock, and we are building a basin and other considerable works. As time goes on we shall have to extend Rosyth, and probably have to convert it into a first-class dockyard. All that cannot be undertaken immediately, and as it takes a long time the cost is necessarily spread over a large number of years. We have got two large floating docks building, both of which are expected to be finished by the end of this year. One is to be stationed, as the House knows, in the Medway, not far from Chatham, and the other is to be allocated to Portsmouth—possibly one or other will be ultimately removed to Rosyth. We are building, also, a hospital ship. The experience of the "Maine" is so satisfactory that we thought we could not do better than follow the example set us by the generous Americans who gave us the "Maine," and we are now building a second hospital ship for ourselves.

As regards the last item, which is the first on the Estimates, that is the number of men. We are asking for an increase of 3,000 men. It might have been expected that as we are pursuing a policy of scrapping we should be able to man the whole of our new Fleet without being called upon to ask the House for an addition to Vote A. But although we shall scrap battleships and, to a considerable extent, cruisers, we have to remember that destroyers cannot be scrapped at the present time as fast as we are building them, and that the new ships, particularly the new cruisers, carry much larger complements than the older ships which are scrapped. Having regard to the immense increase which has taken place in the matériel of the Navy in the course of the last few years, I think that the demand for men has been kept at a very low figure. At the same time, it must be understood that we have enough men. We base our estimates of men on war requirements, and, judging by what our requirements would be in war, the numbers of men are adequate, but not more than adequate. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Murray Macdonald), who has taken a particular interest in this side of the question, will feel that, with the increase of destroyers, submarines, and smaller cruisers which has taken place without any corresponding scrapping, together with the larger complements in the ships, I have given him adequate reasons for the additional number of men for which we are now asking. That is at present the sum total of the explanation which I can offer to the House. There are many topics which I have not touched upon. First of all, if the House will forgive me for referring to myself, I do not feel strong enough to do so; but we shall be very happy, either my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary or myself, in the course of the Debate, to answer any questions that may be put to us.

Mr. ARTHUR LEE

I feel sure that I shall be carrying the whole House with me when, in the first place, I express to the right hon. Gentleman our sympathy with him in the peculiar difficulties which accompanied the making of his statement. Further, whether we agree with it or not, both sides will concur in stating that he has this afternoon certainly made a statement distinguished above everything else for its lucidity and interest. There is another ground on which I feel sympathy with the right hon. Gentleman, and I hope it will not do him any harm, namely, that he finds himself, not for the first time, under fire from not one quarter only of the House. If I make any complaint at all at the tone of his speeches on naval policy, it is that they are, from our point of view, altogether too apologetic. I think that the pressure which is being brought to bear upon him by his own friends has led him to make rather regrettable and rash prophecies with regard to expenditure in future years. I do not think that even he himself can possibly say that he knows what may be the demand upon us for naval expenditure in the course of the next few years. He has frankly admitted that it depends upon the progress of naval shipbuilding in other countries. Under these circumstances, whilst I fully realise his difficulties, I think it would have been better if the right hon. Gentleman had not indulged in or held out hopes of reduction which may not be realised, and the holding out of which may possibly lay up for him in ensuing years a rod in pickle at the hands of his friends below the Gangway. It seems to me that in his statement to-day, perhaps even more than in the statement which he made on Monday last, he has fully made out his case as against his critics below the Gangway.

I may add that we on this side do not care very much whether the Government were or were not justified in the apprehensions and inferences which they put forward in the course of the Debates in 1909. We do not care very much whether or not they were entirely justified by subsequent events. In fact, I will go further and say, thank goodness they were not justified, according to the plea of hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway, because if they had been we should have been faced to-day with a situation infinitely more serious than that with which we are actually confronted—a situation, as admitted by the Prime Minister and the right hon. Gentleman himself in the Debates of 1909, which would have left us at the end of the current year with a small margin of only one of the new type of battleship over one Power, and that Power Germany. Fortunately those inferences have proved too pessimistic, but it is none the less certain that we needed the ships, and that without them we should have been to-day in a position almost desperate. The right hon. Gentleman has fully made out his case as against the criticisms of his hon. Friends opposite; but I am not sure that he has been quite as successful in making out his case as against our criticism. I need hardly remind him that our case is somewhat different. We think that, so far from going too far he has not gone far enough, and that the margin against contingencies which have always to be provided against in these cases is insufficient. The right hon. Gentleman, in the course of his interesting speech, made one observation with which I entirely agree. He said that the important date upon which we have to fix our eyes at the present time is the spring or summer, whatever period you may take, of 1914. And why? Because that is the period at which the programmes which the British Government and foreign Governments are laying down will culminate; that is the period at which they will come into actual fighting existence, and therefore that is the date upon which we have to fix our attention. Although we build ships in two years or a little over—the contract time is two years—we are obliged to look three years ahead, because it has been our practice for many years past—I do not think it is a good practice—not to lay down the ships sanctioned by Parliament in any given year until a long time afterwards—practically twelve months afterwards. Therefore we are obliged to look not two years, but three years, ahead.

On that assumption what will be our actual position as compared with that of our foreign rivals in the year 1914? We shall have twenty-nine ships of the "Dreadnought" type in European waters, one in the Far East, two more which are being built to the order of the Australian Dominion, making in all a total of thirty-two, of which twenty-nine will be available in European waters. Against that, taking the Continental Powers, Germany will have twenty-one, Italy probably four, Austria may have four, and certainly will have two or three, making a possible, and even probable, total, certainly by the end, and possibly and even probably in the earlier months of the year 1914, of twenty-nine to the Triple Alliance. That is, the Triple Alliance will have twenty-nine of these great ships in 1914, and Great Britain will have only twenty-nine in European waters. Will anyone say that that is an excessive allowance? It leaves no margin of any sort or kind for accidents. How necessary that margin is has been sufficiently shown in the case of our Navy during the last few years. We lost the "Montagu" in a few seconds by its running upon a rock, and we as nearly as possibly lost three "Dreadnoughts" the other day in the harbour of Ferrol. These are risks to which every Navy is liable, but more particularly our Navy, which does what no other navy in the world does, namely, visits all parts of the world, and all harbours, making themselves familiar with every anchorage which is exposed to exceptional risks.

It is exceedingly difficult to make comparisons which are very accurate in these matters. We talk of "Dreadnoughts," but I wonder if the House realises—although it may have had some inclining of it from the right hon. Gentleman's remarks—that while the original "Dreadnought" showed an immense increase in fighting power over the ships that preceded it, the new "Orion" type has a broadside fire which is practically double that of the first "Dreadnought." The same thing applies to the later German ships and the ships that are being built by other countries. It is therefore exceeding difficult to reckon in units. But when the Government is accused of forcing the pace and of maintaining a policy which has forced other countries in Europe to adopt an aggressive line in naval preparations, may I recall a few more figures to the House. In current programmes we are laying down five "Dreadnoughts," Germany four. Last year we laid down five, Germany four. In the previous year it is true we laid down eight, and Germany four, but against that, in the preceding year, 1908, we laid down only two, and Germany four. The net result is, taking the record of the present Government, that during the time they have been in office they have laid down altogether twenty-six great armoured ships, as compared with twenty-two of Germany, including the programmes of the present year. In the face of that can anyone say that we have been forcing the pace? The right hon. Gentleman has very properly exposed the irrelevance of trying to compare the money Estimates of this country with the money Estimates of Germany. The two things are not comparable, because the units which compose them are entirely different. I say that, so far from forcing the pace, the Government have gone so slow that in my view they have actually encouraged this competition on the Continent of Europe, which they and we equally deplore. So far from this programme being excessive, I think it is below the needs of the moment, and that the very barest minimum compatible with the national interests is that we should have laid down six of these vessels this year and six next.

5.0 P.M.

I do not wish to go too much into detail, therefore I shall pass rather rapidly over some of the other items in the programme. I should like to congratulate the Admiralty upon the action they have taken with regard to destroyers during the last three years. I think that that point previous to that time was one of the weakest in our whole naval position. The Admiralty have awakened to that fact, and during the last three years they have not only made a very gratifying increase in the number of ships laid down, but they have succeeded in shortening the time of building in such a way that we are now really building on a scale comparable with that of our chief rivals. In that respect I wish to offer no hostile criticism at all. In regard to docks, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, I do not know that I can be quite as complimentary. I think that a study of the Estimates and the provision which the Government has made for docks in the current year shows clear signs of starving. In this the right hon. Gentleman no doubt has been forced by the economists to a pruning of the Estimates, and it is quite clear that the pruning has been largely upon the items of works. He told us that he expected Rosyth Dockyard, under the present contract, would be completed by September, 1915. He went on to say that the Govern- ment anticipated that it would be necessary in future to have further works, and eventually to expand Rosyth as a first-class naval base. May I remind him that for years past he and his Friends have made it a subject for attack upon us that we originally contemplated, or originally thought, it was necessary to lay out the plans for Rosyth in such a way that if that position became necessary the work originally done should not be wasted. It is quite clear now that we were showing great foresight.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara)

You gave it up.

Mr. LEE

The hon. Gentleman says we gave it up. We did nothing of the kind. We did not proceed with it at once because it was not necessary then. The Government see it will be necessary in the future and are making preparations accordingly. I do not think they need attack us on that point any further. If this work at Rosyth is to be completed by September, 1915, and if only £300,000 is provided for the work in this year's Estimates, it is clear to everyone that the amount of money which will be needed in the Estimates of the next three years will be tremendous. It will be an amount which will go far to falsify the hopes which the right hon. Gentleman has held out to hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway that the Naval Estimates can be reduced. It is simply the case which has distinguished the policy of the Government throughout, the case of deferred liabilities. You cannot have it both ways. Deferred liabilities lead to increased Estimates in the future, and the right hon. Gentleman will have to make his peace with his Friends below the Gangway in regard to this matter in future years. There is another point of detail to which I would like to draw the attention of the right hon. Gentleman before I pass to a bigger question of principle. It is that of the Royal Marines.

I have noticed with the deepest regret and even pain the progressive reduction which the Government has been carrying out during the last few years in the strength of the Royal Marines. The reduction amounts to 3,000 during the Government's term of office. There may be some good reason for this policy; if so, I think it is only due not only to the Royal Marines themselves, but to the House of Commons, that the Admiralty should give their reason for it. They have never given any reason for it, although appealed to again and again with regard to their policy. They have absolutely refused to give any explanation. Here we have a distinguished corps which is being literally slowly bled to death. It is a corps which is not only unique in regard to its duties but unique in regard to its composition, because it draws recruits from a strata which is not touched or tapped by any other portion of His Majesty's service. It is very largely an hereditary corps. If you go to Eastney you will find recruits for the Marines drawn largely from the sons and the grandsons of old Marines. They will not go into anything else. The right hon. Gentleman is cutting off this invaluable source of supply to His Majesty's service, and giving no reason for it. I think it is time he made some explanation. My right hon. Friend has asked me to put a question in regard to the Naval Medical Committee's Report. I am afraid I am not familiar with it myself, but I would like to know what action the Admiralty is taking upon it, and when they think they will be in a position to lay the Report itself.

I come to another matter, that of the cruisers. I cannot help feeling that the provision which the Government is making in its present programme for new cruisers is lamentably deficient. It seems to me that the Admiralty have made no recognition of the new perils which are going to affect our trade routes in the future if the Government decide to ratify the Declaration of London. It would not be in order, and it is not my desire, on this occasion to discuss the Declaration of London. But there was one thing revealed in the course of the International Discussion which took place upon the Declaration of London—I think there is nothing in the Declaration about this point—the fact that it was not only the policy but it was the intention of foreign Powers to adopt a system which can only be described as in the nature of privateering—a system of arming merchant vessels wherever they may be and setting them loose to prey upon hostile commerce. This is a new factor which the Admiralty has most seriously considered. It is a policy which was insisted upon in spite of our protests by a number of the great Maritime Powers. It is a new policy in this sense that when the whole question of our food supply came before the Royal Commission it was a preliminary presumption that such dangers did not exist. They certainly exist now. Therefore, it seems to us that there is a vital necessity that the Admiralty should increase the number of cruisers which are available, not for purposes of war in the sense of fighting hostile fleets, but which are available for the purpose of patrolling our trade routes, and protecting our commerce against the inroads of privateers or armed merchantmen. The right hon. Gentleman in a very striking passage in his speech on Monday last said that the principal function of the British Navy was to ensure that in all contingencies we shall have the freedom of the highways of the ocean. The Admiralty recognising—I do not speak about the First Sea Lord, but the Admiralty as a whole—that fact has laid it down in the official documents laid upon the Table of this House that the really serious danger this country has to guard against is the interruption of our trade, and the destruction of our merchant shipping. In view of that fact I cannot help thinking that the very small provision for commerce protection cruisers which the Admiralty has made in their programme for this year is entirely insufficient, and in many respects the most unsatisfactory feature of their Estimates. I said just now that the right hon. Gentleman is in the unfortunate position of being under fire in two directions. So far as I am concerned, I have expended the greater portion of the fire that I wish to direct at him. But he has got to meet to-day a renewed, and I have little doubt a more violent attack, from hon. Gentlemen of the Labour party below the Gangway. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I see I am correct in my supposition. Whilst I am extremely reluctant to get mixed up in any way with these domestic infelicities—

Mr. LANSBURY

You have enough of your own.

Mr. LEE

In the meantime I feel it is necessary to say something on the subject, because I see signs that the right hon. Gentleman and the Government are disposed to yield a little to the pressure which comes upon them from below the Gangway. That pressure has had not only this year, but it notably had in 1908 a serious and, I think, a lamentable effect upon the Navy Estimates. It is not altogether easy for one who is an outsider to understand precisely the attitude which is taken up by the Labour party in regard to these matters. I have studied the terms of the Resolution of that party, which will be discussed in a few moments, and which I shall not have an opportunity of speaking upon; and I look back over the past years, and am struck by the fact that the opinions in favour of naval reduction which are put forward by hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway—which were put forward on Monday last—are not merely in my view distinguished by lack of common sense, but distinguished by lack of unanimity. I have noticed when Members of the Labour party happen to represent a dockyard constituency or a district in which armaments are created that there are no greater jingoes in the House. The dockyard men or the maker of armaments then is almost canonised as the saviour of his country. Then comes a rapid change of scene. If the Labour Member represents a constituency in the Midlands—Leicester, for example—we are told that those who work in dockyards or in the creation of armament—we were told that by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leicester (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald)—are parasites existing as a burden upon their more honest fellows. I have had a painful experience of this in my part of the political world. The Labour party were wooing Portsmouth or Chatham. I should acknowledge the warm support that I received in previous years on many occasions from the old Member for Chatham (Mr. Jenkins), whose absence personally I greatly regret, for I have no doubt he would on this occasion have supported the Opposition, and thrown his shield over the right hon. Gentleman. In these cases, I say, when the Labour party are wooing Portsmouth, battleships and cruisers and all the rest of it are "the" thing. Great stress is laid upon the fact that out of every £2,000,000 spent upon a battleship that £1,500,000 or thereabouts goes in wages.

Mr. BARNES

Would the hon. Gentleman quote anybody who has said that at Portsmouth. I have said the reverse.

Mr. LEE

But the hon. Member was not standing for Portsmouth.

Mr. BARNES

I was supporting the candidate.

Mr. LEE

As a result he did not get in. I do not think the hon. Member will deny that Labour candidates when they stand for these places express the greatest ardour in the cause of national armaments. Therefore I think it is a little hard that they should come down here to-day, and make a concentrated attack upon the right hon. Gentleman for endeavouring to do what he can for the defences of the country. In the absence of the hon. Member for Leicester I do not wish to pursue the subject any further. If he were here I should like to draw his attention to the speech he made recently at a Labour Conference and also to speeches he made at other times. It really seems to me a more serious and extraordinary view for hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway to hold that, because they, a small section of this House and a few of their friends in the German Parliament, who on this question of the reduction of armaments, have no practical influence upon the policy of the German Parliament, and never succeeded in making the slightest reduction in the German Naval Estimates, happen to agree—the Government should alter the plans and Naval Estimates they consider necessary for the safety of the country in order to suit their wishes.

What is it really these gentlemen and the reductionists on the Liberal Benches want? I should like to be perfectly fair with them. It appears to me what they want is a cheap Navy. They do not go so far as to say they do not want any Navy; they want a cheap Navy that will look well on paper, and will cost very little. Surely a Navy of that kind would be absolute waste of money. It would be better far, if that is their view, to have no Navy at all. I see the hon. Member for Leicester is back in his place. I am sorry he was absent a while ago, because I should have liked to have drawn his attention to some of his remarks; but perhaps he will allow me to say this now, I have the greatest possible respect for his broadness of view upon many questions, but I think we have some cause to complain of the difference of his attitude in this House and outside. In this House he will attempt to justify his support of the Motion to be moved by reasoned argument, but when he spoke before the National Labour Conference at Leicester the other day he did not argue the case against armaments, but he put forward a plea which I do not think he will venture to put forward in this House, because he has too much respect for the House, that "righteousness alone provides for the safety and comfort of the nation." He knows that is not so in this workaday and wicked world.

Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD

I am loth to interrupt the hon. Member, but that passage came in at the end of a somewhat elaborate argument which was directed simply to one point. I have left out the other points, because I was in the chair at the Conference, and other speakers to follow me were to speak to a resolution which raised points that I am sure are in the hon. Gentleman's mind. If he will do me the honour to turn to other speeches he will discover I have not always confined myself to an argument of the kind he mentions.

Mr. LEE

My point is this, that it is really an injury to the class which the hon. Member specially professes to represent, and has a right to represent, to hold out to them the idea that a mere statement of that kind, a quotation from the Scriptures and so forth, can be any substitute for the proper defences of their country. If the defences of the country are neglected, they would be the very first class to feel the disasters that would come upon us, and it is in their interest above all that a proper naval supremacy is maintained.

Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD

In that very speech I made the point, and elaborated the argument that we stood for adequate national security.

Mr. LEE

Of course, it all depends upon the word "adequate." Before the hon. Gentleman came in, I was developing the suggestion that what hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway want is a cheap Navy.

Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD

Adequate.

Mr. LEE

A cheap Navy. There is the argument put forward by a distinguished Radical organ, the "Nation," last week, in which they advised the Radical party not to confuse two things—a strong Navy and a costly Navy. I am sure I and the right hon. Gentleman the First lord of the Admiralty would be glad to know how you can get a strong Navy without its being also costly, I say the most costly Navy you can possibly get is one not strong enough to meet all contingencies, because if it is not strong enough, it will lead to one thing and one thing only, and that is an indemnity against your country amounting to several thousand millions, and possibly more. The critics of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty and of the view we, on this side of the House hold, have nearly always referred in their calculations to one Power only, and they show to their entire satisfaction that as against one Power the Admiralty are building too much.

I was struck, in the course of the Debate on Monday last, by someone suggesting, when the Triple Alliance was mentioned, that the right hon. Gentleman opposite was building for a three-Power standard. Can we really separate, for the purposes of this calculation, the different countries composing the Triple Alliance? Can we really break them up and say that we are not to consider the Triple Alliance as a contingency against which this country is obliged to provide? If so, hon. Gentlemen opposite completely throw over the statement of the Prime Minister made in the course of a similar Debate on the 2nd March, 1908, when he said:— We must safeguard our position against all contingencies that can reasonably enter into the calculation of statesmen."' And he went on to say:— The standard which is necessary for this country is one that will give us complete and absolute command of the sea against any reasonably possible combination of Powers. Is anyone prepared to say that the Triple Alliance is not "a reasonably possible combination of Powers"? I believe these matters are always difficult to deal with, but I must call the attention of the House to one Power, Austria, which has trebled its Navy Estimates as compared with what they were in the past. I must call attention to the remark made by the Official Reporter of the Is Naval Estimate on the 9th January last. He said:— 'It is impossible seriously to entertain the view that our naval efforts are inspired less by our own well-considered interest than by those of our northern ally, whose Navy our Dreadnoughts "reinforced. This recognition of the Triple Alliance, I think, answers the points of hon. Gentlemen opposite, when they state the Triple Alliance is something we ought not to consider.

Mr. PRINGLE

Can the hon. Gentleman quote anything similar as to Italy?

Mr. LEE

I do not think I could quote anything similar, because I do not think any speeches have been made, but everyone knows Italy is a member of the Triple Alliance, and if we consider the reasonable possibility upon which the Prime Minister laid stress, we have to consider the Triple Alliance as a whole. And the reason for most of this controversy is we have no recognised standard in this country which is officially adopted by the Government and published for the information of the world. As was pointed out by the Leader of the Opposition, Germany has a standard which is laid down by Act of Parliament. There is no question about it, and every speaker in this. House has always recognised that, and make no complaint. Therefore, there is no objection to having a standard. The Foreign Secretary the other night attempted to define a standard entirely different from anything ever announced by the Government before. It is in direct contradiction of the standard the Prime Minister categorically accepted in 1908, and it introduces a new factor with which we are entirely unfamiliar, and the moral I draw from all is this, the two-Power standard serves its time and was excellent in its day, but it is now dead.

The two-Power standard is dead because new, as the result of the action of Ministers, it has been made capable of so many meanings and interpretations. It has completely outlived its usefulness. The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Murray MacDonald) told us that the two-Power standard was done with, and it was time we reverted to the old standard. I agree with him, I suppose for the first time in my life. What was the old standard? If the hon. Gentleman looks back upon our naval history, he will find that for a hundred years or more, through all the long period of our great Napoleonic wars, and through all our great naval conflicts, the standard, as against the next strongest Power, was two keels to one.

Mr. MURRAY MACDONALD

A First Lord of the Admiralty of the party opposite maintained it to be three to two, and certainly Mr. Gladstone said the strength of our Navy ought to be three to two as against France.

Mr. LEE

If the hon. Gentleman wishes, I will show him the figures privately, but I maintain that our standard was two to-one; and, more important still, it is now admitted as the standard necessary to safeguard us against the danger of invasion. That is the standard admitted by the Admiralty now in the book to which we have referred, and that is the chief value that emerges from these debates. We have got rid of the two-Power standard, which has become meaningless, and we have got from the Admiralty the admission of two keels to one. And our case is that the Navy ought to be raised to that standard without delay, and ought never to be allowed to fall below it. The last word I have to say is this—that if we are not satisfied with the policy of the Board of Admiralty and with the Estimates they have laid before the House this year it is because, in the first place, they have refused to follow up, and give effect to the standard that they themselves have tacitly sanctioned, and to make it clear to the world that that is the standard we are going to maintain in the future. Instead of that, they are following a policy in these Navy matters of hand-to-mouth, a policy of strength which is determined less by national need than by the pressure which is brought to bear upon them by their own internal and domestic embarrassments. In the framing of these Estimates and in defending them they are too much influenced by those sections in the House and out of it who do not seem to realise that there is no remedy in the world for loss of sea supremacy and no substitute for it of any kind whatever.

Mr. GEORGE ROBERTS moved as an Amendment, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the question, in order to insert instead thereof the words, "In the opinion of this House, the increasing expenditure on the Navy is not justified by foreign events, and is a menace to peace and to national security."

It has been rather suggested by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Lee) that there has been a violent attack on the Navy from these benches. I am sure the hon. Gentleman will agree that my criticism has been one of extreme mildness. Nevertheless, it is perfectly true that I contemplate making some criticism on the right hon. Gentleman's policy, and I will proceed on similar lines to those which I adopted on a previous occasion without an undue desire to offend his susceptibilities. In rising to make the Motion standing in my name I am conscious of the fact that the Debate which took place on Monday last somewhat anticipated the matter which will have to be discussed to-day. Nevertheless, on these benches we regard this question of naval expenditure as one of such vital importance that it requires no further justification for its consideration to-day. I would like to preface my observations with a most emphatic repudiation of the charge of Little Englandism, lack of patriotism, or a wanton desire to destroy our national defences which is so often attributed to us by certain of our opponents. I have previously stated in this House and in the country that I desire an adequate and efficient Navy to be maintained. As the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) admitted in a reply to an interjection from these benches the main contention between us is that of the question of what is considered adequate. We believe that our foreign relationships do not warrant the great increase of expenditure which has characterised the Estimates of the past few years.

I think the history of these great developments in expenditure on armaments dates back, as far as I am able to gauge it, to the period in which the South African War broke out, in 1899. We all know that a great deal of ill-feeling was aroused on the Continent against the action of this country in that war, and apprehensions were very widely entertained in this country lest some other nation might take advantage of the absence of our troops in such large numbers in South Africa and intervene between us. Subsequently peace was restored, our troops returned to this country, and the ill-feeling which had previously prevailed very soon died down. I think that should have given us a reasonable expectation that the warlike expenditure of this country would then have reverted to a peace footing. At the election of 1906 this question was very largely canvassed, and I claim that the unexampled majority returned in support to the Liberal party in this House at that election was in no small measure due to the criticism upon the wanton, the wasteful, expenditure of their predecessors in office. It is quite true that the years 1906 to 1908 witness some slight reduction, but since then the panicky scaremonger seems to have prevailed, and the expenditure has leaped up. I believe the Labour party are voicing a considerable force of Liberal sentiment in the country when I say that we feel the time has come when an emphatic protest should be entered against this heavy expenditure upon armaments and that retrenchment should be once again a characteristic of the Liberal party.

The Resolution to which I am moving makes references to our foreign relationships, and I feel that at this moment I may be pardoned if I review those relationships. The war between Russia and Japan in 1904 witnessed the almost complete extinction of the Russian Navy, and one would have thought that that fact would have helped to relieve the tension which had previously prevailed respecting this point. Subsequently an entente was arranged with France which secured a settlement of two long-standing differences between us, France recognising our position in Egypt, and we recognised France's position in Morocco. Since that time I believe we may claim that the relationship of those two great nations has developed into one of the most cordial character. In the Far East an alliance with Japan relieved us of anxiety in the Pacific Ocean. Again, our natural friendship with America has been materially strengthened of late years, very largely, I believe, owing to the high diplomatic services of Mr. Bryce. Later a closer understanding has been reached with Russia. In this connection I have to acknowledge that we of the Labour party protested at the time against any arrangement being made with what we regarded as a despotic power. Nevertheless, that understanding was consummated, and we claim that this, with the other facts I have mentioned, should have tended to relieve the international situation. Later we were able to discern more friendly relationship between ourselves and Germany. At any rate, I believe the fact is that the friction which prevailed for some little time between this country and Germany respecting the development of the Baghdad Railway has been settled on a friendly basis. Reviewing the whole of our international circumstances, I think we may justly claim that there is not a cloud on the international horizon, and yet the craven spirit of the Jingo cannot even now rest.

We recognise that our estimates are chiefly determined by matters of policy, and I wish for a moment or two to make reference to the Hague Conference in 1907. Previously in this House I have expressed the opinion that this country committed a great error in refusing to acknowledge the neutralisation proposals of the Maritime Conference. I am glad to observe that this question is far removed from any party category, and that the representatives of all parties in the State are inclined to accept the view that we did commit an error in this connection. Therefore it cannot be charged against us that in pursuing this matter on this occasion we are putting forward simply a Labour party point. The United States delegates proposed the immunity from capture of private property at sea. We claimed the right to destroy or drive from the sea all the enemy's sea-borne commerce, but we cannot uphold this claim and then induce other nations to believe that our Navy is of a non-aggressive character. These nations feel, and rightly feel, in my I opinion, that their commerce is at the complete mercy of this nation. Hence it is that they have one of the most powerful arguments for the extension of their respective Navies placed within their power, because of the direct action of this country. In the year 1909 the overseas commerce of Germany amounted to £850,000,000, as compared with £1,285,000,000 of this country. We know that of late years grave apprehensions have been entertained by certain groups of people in this country that Germany is arming against us. On the other hand, we may reasonably contemplate that apprehensions are equally existent in Germany that our great Navy is a detriment and a danger to their oversea commerce, and that they feel it incumbent upon them to have this greatly increased Navy of their own in order to protect the valuable commerce I have just mentioned. If we agree to abandon this right of capture we should at once demolish the main reason for naval expansion amongst other nations. Further, I believe the maintenance of this practice to be highly dangerous to our trade as well as to our food supply. Neutrals may have their property captured without being entitled to any compensation. I remember that when the party with which I am associated initiated a debate on this question the First Lord of the Admiralty advanced this argument against our position. He said:— A military force captured the roads and railways, and the Navy, regarding the sea as a road, declared it should not be used except under the penalty of the enemy losing their goods. I want to make one or two observations I on this question. First of all, there is this notion that you can maintain the contention that the sea is the private property of this nation. The sea cannot be regarded as the private property of any one nation. There is no analogy between the two situations. Roads and railways are not captured only so far as they are necessary for the conduct of military operations, and property going by road or rail, if it is not subservient to warlike purposes or the carriage of it does not obstruct military operations, is allowed to proceed. I do not want to speak at too great length, therefore on this occasion I will not pursue that matter any further, but simply conclude that part of my observation by saying that, in my opinion, the refusal of this country to acquiesce in the proposal of the United States has contributed very largely to the expansion of the navies of other countries, and indirectly is, in a considerable measure, the cause of the inflated Estimates we are now considering. Of course, it is necessary that I should make some observations respecting the happenings of 1909. Evidently the right hon. Gentleman in the course of his interesting speech rather contemplated that we should make this part of the case against him to-day. Now we repeat that there was no foundation for the scare which he and his colleagues promoted on that occasion. It will be necessary for the purposes of my case to repeat in some measure some of the points that were made in the course of the Debate on Monday last. On 16th March, 1909, the right hon. Gentleman said:— The difficulty in which the Government finds itself placed at this moment, is that we do not know, as we thought we did the rate at winch German construction is taking place.

The gravamen of the charge I make against the right hon. Gentleman is that he could have known, and that it was his business to have known. I am reinforced in that contention by what happened in the course of the Debate in the German Reichstag on the second reading of the Naval Estimates on 14th February this year. Dr. Schrader referred to the conviction widely held in this country in March, 1909, that Germany would have nineteen or twenty capital ships completed by the end of 1914. Dr. Schrader said:— That was a remarkable mistake, for what we intended to build could be seen in full in our Navy Law and in our Estimates. These are public and must have been known to the British Naval attaché and the Ministry. It seems that they were unable to read these, in themselves, not particularly obscure documents.

Mr. LEE

Dr. Schrader's name has been mentioned many times in these Debates. What is the precise official position of Dr. Schrader that gives particular weight to his utterances?

Mr. GEORGE ROBERTS

I was just going to make reference to the fact that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition the other night rather sought to disparage the value of Dr. Schrader's utterances. I would not have quoted him again to-day but for the fact that Admiral Von Tirpitz, following in the same Debate, endorsed what Dr. Schrader had said. It was necessary for the purposes of my argument that I should once again quote Dr. Schrader in order that I might hang on to that quotation the endorsement of it by Admiral Von Tirpitz. It may be, as the Leader of the Opposition said the other night, that Dr. Schrader's-standing in the Reighstag is not greater perhaps than the ordinary Member in this House. I have no particular knowledge of that, but I have been privately assured that Dr. Schrader is a man of considerable experience and standing in the Reichstag. But that is not material. The point I am seeking to make is that Admiral Von Tirpitz endorsed the sentiments expressed by Dr. Schrader, and went on to say:— The assumption in England that we wished to accelerate the building of our Fleet beyond the provisions of the Navy Law is really an astonishing mistake. That was publicly declared by Prince Büilow as well as by myself at the time. How could such an acceleration be possible it the Reichstag did not give it consent? He goes on to say:— I should like to say that, as far as we were concerned, from first to last information was never withheld. He followed, as hon. Gentlemen will remember, by expressing friendly sentiments toward this country. We have never been told who really misled the Admiralty on this occasion. We have never been assured that before the statements were made in this House the Admiralty took the necessary steps to verify the information upon which they based their utterances. Perhaps, if it were possible to have the source of information revealed, it might help us to be a little more wary as to how we accept statements on subsequent occasions. Those statements, of course, have been modified. The right hon. Gentleman now admits that there was no basis whatever for the statement that Germany was accelerating her shipbuilding. We are now told it is a question of the alteration of size and one of quality and not of acceleration. The right hon. Gentleman revealed that in a printed answer issued thirteen days after the Debate in question. I want to know why it was he did not then come to the House, take the House of Commons fully into his confidence, admit he had made a mistake, and say that, after all, he was doing the right thing by making reparation as early as possible. We hear a great deal at the present time, in the course of the constitutional controversy, of the necessity of maintaining the supremacy of this House as part of our Constitution. I am beginning to think that as soon as we get that question settled it will be necessary for this House to wrest the power and control from the permanent officials.

I want to pursue the matter a little further. The correction made by the right hon. Gentleman on 29th March, to which I have referred, was still inaccurate. The right hon. Gentleman then said we should have a margin in April, 1911, not of one, as he had previously forecasted, but of three. We now know the fact to be that there is a margin of seven at present. We have twelve of these capital ships to Germany's five. Therefore his correction was still four ships out. Later he stated that in 1912 Germany would have seventeen, being an addition of four to the programme. He now admits that no information is obtainable as to whether these vessels are either ordered or commenced. All he is able to say is that it is expected they will be delivered from the shipyard in the spring of 1913. I apprehend from the information we possess respecting the rate of shipbuilding in Germany that if it is true these vessels are neither ordered nor commenced, they are not likely to be delivered in the spring of 1913. Furthermore, he has stated that in 1913 Germany would have twenty-one of these vessels, but on 8th February this year he admitted:— I do not expect twenty-one German 'Dreadnoughts' to have been delivered in the calendar year of 1913. I have simply given these quotations for the purpose of stating to the House that these erroneous statements extracted from the House the extended Estimates of 1909–10, and secured the laying down of eight "Dreadnoughts" in 1909 and five in 1910, besides scaring our Colonies into coming to our assistance by providing two additional "Dreadnoughts." My argument is that these Estimates have been entirely founded on scare and error, and we are now able to prove beyond question that the only reasons then assigned had no foundation in fact or reason. We feel, therefore, we may, without exaggeration, charge the Admiralty with having made out no case for the extended Estimates of the past two years. The right hon. Gentleman on Monday last was frank enough to admit that he had been misled, and that, in turn, he had misled the House, but he rather indicated that he was afraid to come to the House and admit the error he had made. I would like to inquire in this connection whether throughout the whole of these proceedings the Opposition Leaders have been taken into the right hon. Gentleman's confidence.

Mr. LEE

indicated dissent.

Mr. GEORGE ROBERTS

It is an apprehension that existed in my mind, and I think I was not exceeding the ordinary Parliamentary practice in venturing to make the point. Of course, I accept the disclaimer at once. The right hon. Gentleman was faced with two fires of criticism, the criticism of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House who wanted further expenditure, and the criticism of hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House who wanted retrenchment. He felt the position was an untenable one, and that he had better by half avoid such embarrassing circumstances. We expect Liberal Ministers to accept the whole responsibilities of their positions. If they lack the courage to come out and face the full force of oppostion criticism perfectly properly made—we understand that the views represented by the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) and those of my hon. Friends are quite irreconcilable—then I respectfully submit it is their duty to retire in order that they may be replaced by others who possess the necessary courage. We feel that the error committed by the right hon. Gentleman and his superiors has resulted in considerable loss to the nation. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Fareham this afternoon rather felt that if it had not been for the scare of 1909 the Estimates that he supports, although he criticises them because they are not large enough for him, would never have secured the sanction of the House of Commons. I have again to emphasise that they were secured because the House of Commons was misled, and we repeat our view that they have not as yet been justified. The nation has been involved in the expenditure of several millions of money which might have been devoted to better purposes, and which thus represents a direct loss. We feel that, after all, the very kindly relationship now existing between the two Front Benches in this matter is very ominous. It seems to me the right hon. Gentleman is directly playing the game of his opponents. Naturally, from the party point of view, they want to see the tenure of office of this Government as much a failure as possible, and they would delight in seeing the fruits of the extra taxation imposed by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer absorbed in such a way that the common people would feel they had gained nothing by these reforms of taxation. This may all be regarded as a proper part of the party game, but I respectfully submit it is not a performance in which we can acquiesce, and I have also to state the opinion that if this policy is further pursued it means the wreck of Liberalism as we understand it.

6.0 P.M.

I know that there are hon. and right hon. Gentlemen in the House who would be inclined to the view that this is not a matter of concern to the Labour party. On the other hand I am free to admit that I occupy a seat in this House because a considerable number of voters in the city of Norwich gave me their support, and many of these people do not agree with me in matters of speculative thought or political philosophy. Nevertheless many have written to me, and others have seen me personally, and have begged me to associate myself with the protests against Liberalism being stimulated in these turbid waters. On 16th March, 1909, the hon. Member for the Tyneside division (Mr. J. M. Robertson) gave utterance to these words. He said:— I think the First Lord of the Admiralty must realise if his information turns out to be inaccurate he will have incurred a very grave responsibility indeed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1909, cols. 979–980.] I think these words were almost prophetic. The right hon. Gentleman did err on that occasion, and he incurred a great responsibility, the effects of which will be felt by his party for many years to come. It is estimated that Germany will have twenty-one "Dreadnoughts" in 1914, as against our thirty. But in this estimate we omit the two Colonial vessels, as well as the "Lord Nelson" and the "Agamemnon," which were built just prior to the "Dreadnought," and which are stated to be preferred to "Dreadnoughts" by some naval men. This gives us thirty-four vessels in all. The hon. Gentleman who preceded me stated definitely that the party with which he is associated has entirely abandoned the old theory of the two-Power standard, and he has compared the position of this country with what is known as the Triple Alliance, namely the three-Power standard. I am inclined to think if they keep on this road they will not be satisfied to remain at the three-Power standard, but they will want to include other Powers. But while we are making these calculations we lose sight of the preponderating superiority of this country in vessels of the pre-" Dreadnought" class. I do not know why these vessels are always ignored in these Debates, but we hear nothing of them from the other side, and in the same way speakers on this side omit to refer to them. I am not going to repeat the figures given on Monday by the hon. Member for the Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Murray Macdonald). It seemed to me that by quoting the Dilke Return he clearly demonstrated that we have an overwhelming preponderance in these other vessels and in guns and in personnel as well, and, taking into consideration our pre-"Dreadnoughts," with the effective fighting vessels of the pre-"Dreadnought" type, it would appear that the superiority of this country is unquestionably preponderating. We have no crisis at all. Panic-mongers and interested persons are always foretelling periods of crisis. First it is to occur in 1911. We reach that year and we find there is no reason to disturb our sleep at night. It is then postponed till perhaps 1914, and of course they will subsequently postpone it till 2014 if they feel it will serve their purpose.

The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty told us on Monday night that we had reached the high water mark of our expenditure, and he rather indicated that we might look forward to a reduction in the Estimates next year. But already the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) has expressed some scepticism as to whether a reduction will be possible. The difference between that hon. Gentleman and myself is this: I feel the Government might have made a reduction this year, and at any rate I have to say that we expect a reduction to be made as early as possible; therefore we are glad to believe that the criticism which has been passed and the pressure which has been exercised has compelled the First Lord to recognise that there is a great demand for retrenchment, and that a case has been made out for it. I am glad to note that the right hon. Gentleman claims the Admiralty always get good value for their money. I am prepared to accept that claim. Nevertheless, disquieting statements have been made in certain newspapers of late, and notably by Mr. Arnold Hills, the Chairman of the Thames Ironworks Company, I do not suppose that anybody would pay much attention to ordinary statements, but one emanating from a gentleman of his standing is we feel worth consideration. He states that the Admiralty pays from 40 per cent. to 50 per cent. too much for armour, in consequence of the manufacturers' ring. I may be informed, of course that this statement is being investigated. But if it should prove to be true we get some reason for the cries of patriotism, because if manufacturers are able to extract huge profits from Admiralty contracts it is pretty certain that they will be prepared to invest money fox the purpose of working up an agitation to secure extended expenditure. I should like, if I may, to refer to the momentous statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. We regard that perhaps as the most hopeful pronouncement. We wish him success in his endeavours to consummate this agreement, and we trust those efforts will not be confined to the United States of America, but that the right hon. Baronet will seek, in his diplomatic capacity, to bring Germany and France into this covenant of peace. There are two great factors making for peace to-day. There is the dissemination of the economic theory that a nation gains no profit even if it is victorious in war. If we are able to convince the financial and commercial interests of the day that they have nothing to gain from prosecuting a war we have touched them in a vital spot, and may be we will find them associating themselves with this demand for peace. It is constantly urged that we have a united Germany desirous of attacking this country. But the real fact is this, that there is as large a peace party in Germany as we have in this country, and these parties working in their respective countries will do a great deal in our opinion to prepare the nations for a possible understanding which will result in peace of an enduring quality. We find that in France there is a considerable public opinion developing in the same direction, and we trust that the foreign policy of this country will be shaped so as rather to foster that friendly relationship which must necessarily be the prelude to any international arrangement. I would like to make reference to one point which the hon. Member for Fare-ham sought to make against the Members of this party. He referred to the undeniable fact that certain of our Members who sit for dockyard constituencies do not associate themselves with the particular attitude I am adopting. We have never denied that. We regret the existence of this circumstance. There are exceptions to every rule. But I am speaking for the party as a whole in giving expression to these views. We feel that a case has been made out for a reduction in the Estimates.

We protest against the waste and folly of building beyond our actual needs. I believe I have stated sufficiently this afternoon to prove that our needs are perfectly satisfied, and that there might have been a restriction on building. There is great danger in too hasty building, and it would, perhaps, be a good policy if we were to delay building in order to take advantage of new models. May I express a hope that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will pursue the line he indicated to us the other night. We believe the great nations of the world are now ready for peace proposals. We believe an agreement may be entered into. We want to put a stop to some of this great expenditure which we believe to be unproductive in character. We believe that our national resources ought to be invested in the most productive fashion, and we protest against unnecessary expenditure on preparations for war because of their unproductive character. We have not submitted this Resolution because we want an immediate or entire abolition of armaments. We recognise that that is an impracticable and Utopian idea. We admit the necessity, as things stand at present, for the maintenance of an adequate and efficient Navy, which we believe we have already got, and we hold that no case has been made out for any expansion of it. Therefore we think we have justification for calling upon the Government to proceed with a policy of retrenchment as early as possible, in order that money may be released for great schemes of social reform. We want to see the Government of this country making war on the great poverty problem, in order to remove that curse, which falls almost exclusively upon the class we represent. I refer to the great curse of poverty, and we believe that by reducing the expenditure on armaments the Government will be able to give greater consideration to these social problems. It is for that reason I move the Resolution which stands in my name.

Mr. ADAMSON

It is with great deference that I rise to second the Amendment of my hon. Friend. It is the first opportunity that I have had of addressing the House, and therefore I crave the indulgence which Members usually extend to a new Member. I have no intention of trying to deal closely with the Naval policy and programme of the Government. I do not feel that I have sufficient knowledge to enable me to deal in an adequate mannnr with such a weighty subject. I leave that to others who are better qualified to deal with matters of that description, and there are only a few points that I desire to deal briefly with, and which I consider of importance from the standpoint of the working classes, whom we on these benches represent. The other evening we had a Gentleman on the benches opposite claiming to speak on behalf of the working classes, and at the same time stating that he was not satisfied that we were spending a sufficient amount on our Navy to protect us in an adequate manner. He further stated that the British working man could easily understand that the question of most vital importance to him was his food supply—a full, free, and unrestricted food supply. He further dealt with the question of famine prices being charged in the event of war. We on these Benches also claim to speak for a considerable section of the working classes of this country, and that class has given a considerable amount of attention to the question of our food supply and to the probability of famine prices taking place in the event of war. We feel that there is an alternative policy that can be pursued with a view to securing our food supply, that alternative policy being that a better and more adequate use should be made of the land which has been given to the people of this country by Divine Providence than has been taken advantage of for a very considerable number of years past. We feel that if this alternative policy were to be put into operation, not only would it help us to secure an adequate food supply under any circumstances, but it would at the same time enable us to deal with the unemployed problem, which, to my mind, constitutes the great danger to the security of this country.

So long as we have a huge unemployed army we have in some respects and to a considerable extent a danger which is almost as great as that which any of the Fleets of the neighbouring States can bring about. So long as we have a certain section of our people fed through charity organisation and other questionable means of that description, we are taking a short cut to undermine that section of our people of their manhood, and do not let us forget that it is upon manhood that nations are built and maintained, and that unless we take proper precautions to secure the physical fitness of our people we are endangering the Empire itself. No matter what else we may do, if our people are not physically fit to bear the burden of Empire we are eventually bound to fail. That brings me to the second point that I want briefly to deal with. The other evening we had the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty stating that if no further Amendments of the German Fleet Law were made, and he had every reason to believe that there will be none, the Estimates for 1912–13 will show a reduction. We are thankful for that small mercy, but there is another side to this question of reduction which means that while we have a continuation of these fluctuations of work and wages they seriously affect that section of our people engaged in the constructional work for the Navy. These fluctuations are in the very nature of this question for the simple reason that they are brought about and are the effect of a cause which is external rather than internal, and no amount of forethought on the part of the Government, no matter which party is in power for the time being can prevent them so long as we have this insane competition in armaments going on between nation and nation. In one year we have a scare which is created in consequence of the increase that has been made in the combined Fleet of Russia and France, and up goes that portion of our Naval Estimates providing for constructional work by several millions, with the result that large numbers of men are attracted to Barrow, Newcastle, Glasgow, and other centres where Naval construction is carried on. Following that we have a war between Russia and Japan, and the destruction of the Russian Fleet. Moreover, a better understanding is come to between ourselves and France, and down goes that portion of the Estimates for constructional work by several millions with the consequent displacement of a large number of men in those centres with all the misery which a sudden addition to the unemployed army entails. More names are placed on the unemployed book, and a huge strain is brought upon the unemployed funds of our trade unions.

Again, we suddenly discover, as has been mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich (Mr. George Roberts) that Germany has been increasing her fleet, and we have a repetition of our former experience of swollen Naval Estimates amounting to several millions of pounds, with a promise that we will have a reduction in the future, which will mean a repetition of the former experience of our people as far as unemployment is concerned. The worker's greatest evil is the uncertainty of the demand for his labour. No temporary pay can compensate him for that uncertainty. It must not be taken that I am pleading for a continued high expenditure at all with regard to the Army or the Navy, and these fluctuations will continue to exist whatever the scale of expenditure may be. I am using this point to illustrate how uneconomical the whole of our expenditure on armaments is, and how uncertain are the earnings of the workmen engaged in that particular industry. I am trying to urge the necessity that there exists for the Government being prepared to do something which shall mitigate the sufferings which arise from these fluctuations. In the opinion of many of the Members on these benches, the best way that this can be done is by gradually reducing the cost of armaments and investing the money thus obtained in developing our national resources. In dealing briefly with my third and last point, I want to express my appreciation of the attitude taken up by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the other night. I am sure that that statement must have been a great encouragement to all lovers of peace in all parts of the world. To my mind, we could have no better way of commemorating this Coronation year than by an earnest attempt being made to put the sentiments contained in that speech into operation by the Government using its powers of influence with the other nations of the world to try to bring about a reduction in the armaments, which, if persisted in, will end in international bankruptcy. I hope the other Members of the Government will support the right hon. Gentleman in his effort, and not only that they will support him in his effort, but that also my distinguished fellow-countryman, the Leader of the Opposition, will support him.

Mr. BALFOUR

As I understand many of my hon. Friends behind me desire rather to deal with the Motion that you do leave the Chair than with the Amendment, perhaps I may say a few words upon what is, after all, a continuation of the Debate that we had on Monday last. I shall do nothing to delay what I believe the majority of the House are anxious to do, to get to a discussion upon the details connected with policy.

Mr. ADAMSON

I should like to ask whether the Debate is not quite as wide under the Amendment as under the original Motion. It would be rather inconvenient I think to prematurely close the discussion on the Amendment.

Mr. SPEAKER

The Amendment having been moved the Debate must be confined to the terms of the Amendment. When that is disposed of we go back to the general discussion.

Mr. BALFOUR

I hope the House will feel, under these circumstances, that my hon. Friends on this side of the House who are anxious to deal with the Navy Estimates have some right either to an ample opportunity on a future day, or to the rapid close of the particular discussion now before the House. Under the Speaker's ruling, strictly in accordance, I believe, with precedent, we are absolutely precluded from dealing with all the points connected with the Navy, which cause much interest and some anxiety on this side of the House. I want only to emphasise three points. In the first place I want to emphasise the position of our battle fleet under the existing programme, which carries us up, let us say, to 1914. I have nothing to do with later years on this Vote, because nothing we are doing to-day affects later years. 1914 is the year to which we have to look. The hon. Member (Mr. Ramsay Macdonald) and his Friends and other Gentlemen on that side of the House have, on Monday last and to-night, reiterated what I will not call platitudes, for they are much too important to be called platitudes, but what are really commonplaces on which all are agreed. Everyone on both sides of the House dislikes the magnitude of our Navy Estimates. Every unofficial Member of the House feels as strongly as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, I am sure, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that these constantly growing Estimates are more than a national inconvenience, and the only question is whether it is not only worth while, but absolutely necessary for us to endure the almost intolerable burden of these growing Estimates rather than submit to the possible dangers which we see in front of us, and that is the point which hon. Gentlemen opposite must address themselves to. We are also all agreed that if diplomacy can do anything, if soft words can do anything, in heaven's name use diplomacy, use soft words, do all you can. But, so far, they have done nothing. They have been trying, but they have failed, and what we have got to do is to face the hard facts of the existing situation in 1914. That is the immediate problem before us. It is not denied that the position in 1914 is that which was stated by my hon. Friend (Mr. Arthur Lee). There will be twenty-nine, and only twenty-nine, British ships of the "Dreadnought" type in European waters. The Government standard of building is to build against two European Powers—quite a new standard and a different standard from any of the various versions of the two-Power standard which from time to time we have had, but one which was enunciated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Monday last.

I want to know whether in 1914 hon. Gentlemen in any part of the House think our situation is so secure, even under this programme of shipbuilding, that we can, as the hon. Member who moved the Amendment said, sleep perfectly comfortably in our beds. The way my hon. Friend put the problem was how can you be satisfied when the Triple Alliance will have twenty-nine ships in 1914 and we have only twenty-nine ships in European waters? I am taking the Government's own standard. It is a European water standard, and I am arguing on their premises. I do not say I agree with them, but I am taking them for the sake of argument. Let me put the thing without special reference to individual nations or combinations of nations. Let me put the broad question of national defence somewhat differently. We are situated in European waters, in addition to all our other responsibilities in other oceans and other quarters of the world. We have special difficulties in European waters in this respect, that we must keep a supremacy in home waters, and we must keep a supremacy in the Mediterranean. That is a double task which is thrown upon no other nation. It is thrown upon us, as everyone knows, in home waters because of the defence of our shores and of our commerce as it issues from our ports and comes to our ports. Is it less true of the Mediterranean? In the Mediterranean we have not only the great fortresses of Gibraltar and Malta, but we have Egypt, and we have the road to India.

For more than two centuries the Mediterranean has been regarded by all great British administrators as one of the greatest interests that this country has for defensive purposes. Our position in the Mediterranean has been regarded by every great strategist and every great sea captain as one of the most important interests that we have to protect, and time has not made that interest less. It has made it greater on political grounds and on commercial grounds, and I am quite certain there is no living Admiral who would not agree with the great Admirals of the past and no living student of national defensive strategy who would not agree with me that the idea of abandoning the Mediterranean in order to make our position in home waters absolutely secure is to give up that which we have never been content to give up in all the days of our maritime greatness. I do not say who is to be our enemy or possible enemy in the Mediterranean, but it is quite clear that at this moment there are at least three maritime Powers building the same kind of capital ship that we are building. You cannot ignore it, and therefore I think, without taking the Triple Alliance or the Entente or anything else, we have to consider where we stand in the case of possible hostilities in the Mediterranean, and you cannot, from the point of view of considerations like that, eliminate the great Mediterranean Powers. Therefore, when my hon. Friend pointed out, taking the Triple Alliance simply as an example, that in 1914 the last year to which we can look forward under these Estimates, our total force was only equal to the total force of the Triple Alliance, he brought before the House a matter of enormous importance from the point of view of strategy.

Mr. McKENNA

My hon. Friend (Mr. Lambert) reminds me that the forecast made by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lee) is not a forecast which the Admiralty would accept.

Mr. BALFOUR

I am obliged for the interruption. I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree that I have put forward a very important point of view when we are dealing with the magnitude of the Estimates, which is the point raised by the Amendment.

Mr. McKENNA

Oh, very.

Mr. BALFOUR

Then I come to the only other point on which I mean to trouble the House. It arises directly on the speech of the Foreign Secretary the other night. In the last half hour of that speech he called our attention, in connection with the magnitude of our Estimates, to a recent utterance of the President of the United States, in which that eminent statesman suggested that the existing treaties of arbitration might be extended so as to include points of national honour as well as points of national interest. He based upon the suggestion of President Taft great expectations for the future, in which armaments would consist simply of the necessary policing of the seas, and in which no expenditure would be indulged in in the provision of ships of war or armies, except for the purpose of coercing those Powers who were either too uncivilised to be counted among the community of progressive nations or else, being progressive nations, refused to come into the terms of arbitration which he sketched m anticipation. I do not know whether that system of universal policing, in which those who are ready to accept arbitration are to coerce those who are not ready to accept arbitration, will prove to be a very practicable or a very peace-producing policy. It may or it may not, and I do not dogmatise on the subject. But certainly I do not see any particular difficulty in carrying out, as between particular nations, the first part of this suggestion of President Taft. It requires careful consideration, I agree, and it is not, perhaps, between every kind of nation that in the present state of the world such treaties of arbitration could be carried out, but I cannot see why it could not be carried out between this country and America. There may be difficulties and objections, but I should have thought between these two great kindred communities there really was no fundamental difficulty in devising some such arrangement as that which President Taft suggested, and which the right hon. Gentleman opposite looks on with favour.

I was a member of the Government which some years ago did its very best to make a treaty of arbitration with the United States. It was very close to our hearts to make such a treaty of Arbitration with that great nation. Lord Salisbury's Government and the Government which succeeded it were fortunate enough to make a very large number of treaties of arbitration. Where we did fail was with the United States, the Senate of which refused to carry out the suggestions which Lord Salisbury laid before them, but which were distinctly approved of by the President and by the American Cabinet for the time being. I hope we may take the obiter dicta—I do not know that it is more than that—of President Taft that not merely the Cabinet of America are now in the same frame of mind as when we failed to carry out an arbitration treaty some years ago, but that they represent the general feeling in the United States that the time has come when those two great countries should, whatever other countries may do, at all events recognise that, so far as they are concerned, peace is the greatest of their interests, and that the time has come when they may at least be bound in some mutual obligations by treaty to refer all questions that can possibly produce anything so horrible as war between them to some arbitration tribunal. The right hon. Gentleman opposite, if he sees his way—if the Government of which he is a Member see their way—to carrying out any arrangement of that kind, he will find no heartier friends of the policy than we who sit on this side of the House. It is indeed the consummation of a policy for which we have consistently striven and which we have always desired to see carried into effect.

I hope I shall still carry the House with me on a less cheerful subject of consideration. I am afraid, however successful the right hon. Gentleman may be—and I wish him every success in this particular arrangement—it hardly affects, and can hardly affect, the immediate future of the Navy Estimates of this country, for we are not building, and have never built, ships against America. That is not the keynote or the occasion of our maritime policy. The right hon. Gentleman may have access to other means of information which are closed to me, but I have never seen or heard the suggestion that any European Power would be prepared to come into the general scheme which the right hon. Gentleman has suggested, and as these Navy Estimates, as we know by the right hon. Gentleman's own specific statements, are framed to deal with the European situation, I cannot see in this suggestion, however admirable in itself, anything that directly affects, or can directly affect, the expenditure thrown upon this country. It is recognised on these Benches, and I am glad to see that the Mover agrees with us, that we must have an adequate Navy. All we differ upon is as to what an adequate Navy is.

I beg the right hon. Gentleman before he comes to a final conclusion on that point seriously to consider, not merely the expenditure which the European situation inevitably throws upon the responsible Government of this country in respect of battleships, but what the burden is which we must bear to protect our commerce, quite apart from and beyond battleships. I do not know how adequately to discuss this question of commerce protection in this House, partly because I am not sufficiently an expert, and partly because the matter is so technical and depends so much upon expert knowledge that it is almost beyond the competence of an assembly like this. As soon as we can have an arithmetical comparison of the size of battleships in weight and broadsides, as soon as we get into the consideration of complex strategical questions in relation to protecting the great trade routes, it may be that we get beyond our depths. I would remind hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway, and I would remind the House generally, that we have it on the authority of the First Sea Lord himself that that is the subject which causes him the greatest anxiety. The First Lord of the Admiralty, I have no doubt, endorses the view of the First Sea Lord. The protection of our commerce means the protection of our food supplies and raw materials. I do not go the length of saying, as has been said by some hon. Gentlemen who speak for them, that the working classes of this country are more interested than others. I think we are all deeply interested in it, and there is no use balancing and comparing who is going to lose most by the absolute destruction of their country for the time being as a great commercial and independent Power. We have to depend upon these sea-borne supplies, and, frankly, I cannot help saying that in the present Navy Estimates there is not only an inadequate provision against possible contingencies in the way of battleships when we come to the year 1914, but that I see no adequate provision, no adequate plan, for preserving those long lines of commercial communication on which our very existence as a nation depends.

Mr. ROBERT HARCOURT

I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend on his recovery to health, and, in view of something which he himself said, I would express my regret that his recovery is not quite complete. He has a very vigorous colleague beside him (Dr. Macnamara), who will no doubt answer any criticisms that may be offered. I think I will be able to show that he has answered even his own official chief. The First Lord spoke of the economy of the "Dreadnought" type. I should have thought that there were points, such as the provision of greater clocks for the accommodation of our "Dreadnought" Fleet, which made the economy not quite so great as it would appear. I have been reading the whole of the Debates in the Reichstag recently, and I find that one official speaker after another has complained not only that the type was forced upon them, but that it has been the great cause of expenditure. The First Lord, in referring to expenditure, set up a new standard, namely, that we should have to deduct something in respect of interest on loans and not merely look at the gross sum. He also entered into an elaborate and interesting comparison of this country and Germany, and by that process he reduced the comparative figure to £33,500,000. I am not absolutely convinced that he has duly instructed his colleagues on the same Bench. I remember reading a newspaper article by the hon. Member for East Northants in which there was a headline, "Fall in Naval Expenditure." I thought that was a paradox worthy of the best efforts of Oscar Wilde or Bernard Shaw, that "so far from the year 1910–11 showing an increase in the Estimates, the Liberal Government has actually reduced them." The Secretary to the Admiralty is an excellent pamphleteer, like my hon. Friend the Member for East Northants. The Member for East Northants reduced the Estimates of £40,600,000 to something considerably less, but the Secretary to the Admiralty, in his pamphlet "Concerning the Navy," which is the official defence, or rather the unofficial General Election defence, of the Admiralty, used these words in regard to the expenditure of 1910–11:—

Generally the charge against the present Administration is that it has neglected national defence in this vital particular, the maintenance of adequate sea-power, to which my first general reply is that the Navy Estimates of 1910–11 stand at £40,600,000, the largest sum ever voted in the Estimates of any one year by the British people for their Navy. These Eestimates, which were the largest ever known, have been increased by £3,750,000 in the present year. Passing from that I should like to make the general observation that it is rather difficult for a plain man to know what the many unofficial bodies of naval opinion who secede from one another at frequent intervals and form themselves in kaleidoscopic organisations, each more expert than the other, are really driving at. We had last year the Estimates of the Government, and we have this morning the estimates of the Navy League. There are five Unionist Members of the latest type on that League. There are a Duke, a Viscount, and one or two gentlemen I cannot find in any book of reference. There are several very militant ladies, who also signed the estimates. I assume that they did, but one has to be extremely careful in referring to the feminine signatories of letters in "The Times" newspaper. They say, and apparently some hon. Gentlemen repeat, that the two-Power standard is abandoned. If these formidable people mean that this Government was ever silly enough to say that this country would, if it could, or could if it would, build ships numerically equal to Germany and America, they had better rid themselves of that idea.

The Leader of the Opposition, as I understand, associates himself with the view that that would be absolutely impossible and ridiculous. The Navy League has also dropped the two-Power standard. What is it that these wild men—it would be discourteous to say wild women—want to be done? It is our old friend, "Two keels for one." The Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth has on several occasions gibed at that idea. I ventured to challenge the hon. and gallant Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) on the subject last year. He was most discreet, but I understand that he has now officially committed himself to the policy of two keels for one. Has he also committed his leader? I have carefully studied the declarations of the Tory caucuses. They tried to commit the leaders of the party to it, and I think a renewed attempt has been made this afternoon. When is your standard of two keels to one going to begin? This year, next year, or never? The Navy League, in "The Times" this morning, say what they expect, and I think their policy coincides with what the hon. Member for Fare-ham asked, for he said that they wanted six this year and six next year. I find that there was an article in the "Observer "by Mr. Fiennes. He occupies a position of splendid isolation. What does he want? I remember that in 1909 the Leader of the Opposition referred to the position of extraordinary peril in which we should find ourselves in 1911.

7.0 P.M.

I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman adheres to that view. We have twelve to five at the present moment in "Dreadnoughts" alone. I suppose our position is something like three to one. But Mr. Fiennes says that 1915, and no intermediate date is the time when the real crisis in Naval affairs will come along. My hon. Friend the Member for Norwich did not go beyond 1914. What does this Gentleman who writes in the "Observer"—first of all among the scare newspapers—desire? He desires to build not merely against Germany, Austria, and Italy, as I understand the Opposition want, but against Japan as well. So that the position would be that in 1915 the British Empire would have a total of forty-nine, while the four Powers would have thirty-nine. He wants ten "Dreadnoughts," or twenty- five per cent. above the strength of the four Powers. Is he going to get the Opposition with him? That gentleman and many writers on naval subjects interpret their two keels to one as meaning that at a given date there will be altogether completed two to one, and not merely two to one beginning from 1912–1913. There are also many other gentlemen, and there is the Noble Lord who sits opposite. I saw also in the "Observer" an interview with him, in which he said he adhered to every word he said in the London Chamber of Commerce in June, 1909. I have studied his speech again, and I have studied again the answering speech of the Secretary for the Admiralty, I think at that time the Noble Lord wanted the Government to build six. They subsequently built five. Therefore, as I understand it, he wants only one, and the Government are building four.

Lord CHARLES BERESFORD

I wanted four built in 1904, six in 1905, six more in 1906. That would give us twenty-six.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara)

We have got thirty.

Lord CHARLES BERESFORD

If the foreign Powers went on with their competition by the two keels to one suggestion we would have to build seventeen this year according to the doctrine laid down in 1909. Six is what I want built this year, and it seems that the Government are going to build five.

Mr. ROBERT HARCOURT

I will not attempt to reply to the Noble Lord. I was merely mentioning that the Government were building four more than the original demand. If it is not so, it would be impossible, if the Noble Lord is going to fire his broadside into me, that I should attempt to compete with him. I must leave that to the Front Bench.

I listened with the greatest possible interest to the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) and the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Balfour) this afternoon and on previous occasions, and though my right hon. Friend the First Lord does not, I am afraid, enjoy my absolute and undivided confidence, I was almost persuaded by those distinguished men to give to him again my wavering support. When they do commit themselves from time to time to criticise His Majesty's Government, I would like to mention, with due humility, that they themselves are hampered by a singularly lurid past. They have to purge themselves of utterances which have produced that very strange form of twentieth century patriotism by which the British lion is to get under the bed whenever the German Chancellor blows his nose. I do not want to recall all the old statements, but I remember, particularly in 1909, the hon. Member for Fareham worked himself up into a state of great indignation, saying that he challenged the Government to disprove that four German vessels, making thirteen, would not be ready by January, 1911. That is the kind of prophecy that was indulged in. The Leader of the Opposition talked of thirteen in December, 1910, whereas there are now five. There were to be twenty-five in March, 1912, whereas, I think, the actual figure will be nine. It may be thirteen. But the right hon. Gentleman was wrong by sixteen, which is an error of four years in the period of only three years' effluxion of time. He made the German's build eight per year, two years' programme in each one year—the celebrated quart in the pint pot—and added an extra four in April, 1910, which belonged to no programme at all. The public has learned to expect in his declarations a very useful and convenient "if," which he applied the other afternoon to my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling, to be produced when the case goes against him. That, of course, is extremely important. There is, of course, the classic example, "If pigs had wings." If that was true it would certainly be a most dangerous situation. It all depends on the "if." That is really the point of the situation.

The right hon. Gentleman once wrote a book concerning an imaginary island. It did not meet with that entire favour which it deserved from the more animated members of his own party, so he proceeded to get out a second edition investing that imaginary island with a purely imaginary hostile fleet. Since the days of Jules Verne there has been nothing like it. He is the prince of lightning calculators. Like the conjuror he produces you rabbits out of a hat, though I am bound to say that my right hon. Friend the First Lord was certainly the indispensable assistant without whose painstaking co-operation those prodigies could never have been performed. I trust therefore that my right hon. Friend will allow me in the kindest possible spirit to refer to one or two things in the history of the past. I do not think that these feelings of disappointment and astonishment are confined to the members of the Little Navy party. I read a leader in the "Morning Post" of 10th March discussing the Navy Estimates in terms such as these:— The popular outcry which two years ago followed the introduction of the Navy Estimates, was due to a general belief that a rival power had stolen a march upon this country in the race of armaments. There is no need to rake up old controversies, but it is to the point to refer to that belief and to notice that the event has proved that it was in some measure unfounded. During the past two years the rate of ship construction in this country has been higher than ever before, while no corresponding acceleration has taken place abroad. The old fears depended for their validity on the supposition that in the future foreign construction would prove to be at least as rapid as ours and that foreign programmes would be anticipated as a matter of course. But possibly as a result of Great Britain's increased efforts these suppositions have proved to be unjustified in the way that has been said. It may thus be said we hare returned to a normal state of things though, thanks to rivalry, on a higher level of course than formerly. I merely give that as a very fair example of the opinions entertained outside those walls and not confined to the Radical party.

I do not wish to go over every point in the declaration of 1909, but it will be remembered that my right hon. Friend started his prophecy not with the "Oldenburg" and her sisters, but with the four vessels of the 1908 programme, making nine vessels, the normal expectation being that they would be ready in February, 1911. He said, "We now expect them to be completed in the autumn of 1910." I think that the German Admiral never at any time made a statement with regard to those particular vessels. So in spite of the right hon. Gentleman's declaration of the 39th March that prophecy remains on record. I said something about my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty occasionally answering not only critics but his own official chief. The next day after that statement the Secretary to the Admiralty said:— Under normal conditions in the autumn of 1910. we shall have ten 'Dreadnoughts' and Germany will have five. A. conclusion in which my hon. Friend has been shown to be perfectly right, which does not often happen on that bench:— But it is pointed out— He forgot to say by his own chief:— that Germany has hastened the preparation of the four ships of the 1908–09 programme, and that those ships might really be completed by the close of 1910, which would give this country ten and Germany nine. And, he added, I do not believe that can possibly happen, the very next day after his chief had said we may expect them to be completed in the autumn of 1910. I think that is a very fair example of Admiralty methods. The fact remains that the ships are not completed at the present moment.

Let me deal at once with an answer which will certainly be made outside those walls. Germany, it may be said, could have built these ships, and would have built these ships, if we had not sung "Rule, Britannia!" and laid down our great programme of 1909; without that acceleration by us Germany would have forged ahead, and one consequence of our efforts is that they have slowed down. I cannot imagine that that will be stated seriously in this House. Nothing we did in 1909 could affect the situation in the autumn of 1910 in the smallest posible degree, because, of course, the ships would not be ready at the time. And I would like to ask my right hon. Friend could he explain to the House why he thought it necessary to bring in those vessels, although he could not possibly affect construction by any programme he was asking for then? As late as 14th March, 1910, he said:— As regards the statement I made last year I have nothing to withdraw. He drew a distinction between facts and forecasts which I understand.

Mr. McKENNA

My hon. Friend drew that distinction at the time when I said I had nothing to withdraw.

Mr. R. HARCOURT

I was not disputing that. I ought perhaps to have made that clear. The First Lord said that all along. But when speaking on March 14th, 1910, he then knew the state of progress of those four vessels of the programme of 1908–09. Three had been recently launched, one of them has not yet been launched, and he must have known perfectly well, though launching is not a final test of completion, that those ships could not possibly be ready at the date given, and yet he made no correction. I now turn to the more delicate point of German intentions and the thirteen vessels, the reason why the "Oldenburg" was anticipated, and as a corollary the question whether or not effective completion would be accelerated by the earlier date of building. But in perfect fairness, I ought to say, one accurate statement was made by a Member of the Cabinet, and he has been the subject of a constant campaign of Imperial condemnation—I mean the Home Secretary. "It is admitted on all hands," the Leader of the Opposition said, on July 14th, 1909, "that the Germans will have thirteen 'Dreadnoughts' in 1911." The right hon. Gentleman was interrupted by the Home Secretary, who said, "No, no." In the report of the Debate which took place on 14th July, 1909, Mr. Balfour said:— Yes, that is right. There is no doubt that they will have thirteen on the 1st April, 1911. Mr. McKenna: My own opinion is that they will hare thirteen completed in August, 1911. That is instructive, and the monosyllabic interruption is the only statement that has not been ludicrously falsified. We must bear in mind carefully that the statement of policy to the country did not say very much for the Cabinet's solidarity. On 17th March a very interesting speech was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnard Castle (Mr. Arthur Henderson), who filled a peculiarly responsible position, as he was going to divide the House. He quoted the statement by Admiral Von Tirpitz:— In accordance with the Navy Bill, Germany in 1912 would have not seventeen but thirteen, and according to the programme not till the autumn of that year. He did not know on the strength of what data other figures were arrived at in England. Mr. McKenna on that occasion rose in his place and claimed to move, "That the question be now put," and that was his answer to the Labour party. On 18th March, Mr. McKenna spoke again. He maintained his previous statements:— They will have two to be completed about April, 1911. The two last I do not think will be completed till August, 1911. I would ask the House to accept this statement. The Vote of Censure was not put down till the next day, Friday, and probably that was the last opportunity the First Lord of the Admiralty would have had to make any statement on the subject.

Mr. McKENNA

I should like to give an explanation of this point, because if it were left unexplained it might have the appearance that I have not accepted the word of the German Admiral. My hon. Friend understands what took place at that time. The explanation had been made to me that there would be thirteen. I took that thirteen to mean thirteen battleships. We were speaking of battleships, and I took it to mean thirteen battleships, and that the four cruisers made seventeen. The moment the point was cleared up, that the thirteen included both the battleships and the four cruisers, I accepted the statement in this House, and I have never gone back upon it.

Mr. R. HARCOURT

We are so much accustomed to deal with "Dreadnoughts" as including the "Invincible" cruisers that I confess the point which the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned had not occurred to me. The First Lord of the Admiralty on 16th February, 1911, said, in reply to a question:— We now know that the early promise of contracts was made only for financial and Labour reasons. There was no intention on the part of Germany to deliver her ships from the shipyards at date" in anticipation of the year in which the final instalments are voted. This is his own interpretation of his statement of March 29th, 1909. Speaking again on Monday last, the right hon. Gentleman said:— I gave the House the official German figures as to the date when the German ships would be delivered, and in no speech I have since made have I withdrawn from the acceptance, then made in good faith, of the assurance given on behalf of the German Government as to the date when the ships will be delivered. The right hon. Gentleman abandoned the point as to acceleration. But what about July, 1909. He was asked by the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon):— Have the Germans anticipated or have they adhered to their understanding given to the Foreign Office as to shipbuilding? Mr. McKenna: They laid down five ships in 1908 four only for the programme of the year. The fifth the "Oldenburg." was laid down last year under the programme of the current year. And here I reply to the hon. Gentleman who put the question to me, that that was an acceleration which is admitted, and of which the only explanation that can be given is, that it is desirable, in the opinion of the German Government, to have the ships completed as early as possible.

Mr. McKENNA

I believed that that was the only reason that could be given, namely, that it was intended that the ships were to be finished earlier. If the ships were laid down, I presumed it was desired to complete them.

Mr. R. HARCOURT

The First Lord at the same date, 29th March, 1909, says, "Only for financial and labour reasons." And yet later, in July, 1909, he said, acceleration was the only reason. He went back to the charge of deliberate acceleration after he had formally abandoned it. On Monday he said that six German vessels of a new type (four of the 1908 and two of the 1909 programme) were being built. But the point was when were they to be ready. He said four were to be ready in December, 1910, and that statement was not withdrawn. The right hon. Gentleman answers those with the "Orion" and the "Lion," m November, 1909. How many of them were to be ready by December, 1910? Not a single one. Only ten British vessels were to be ready in December, 1910, con- taining not a single Super-" Dreadnought," to nine German, containing four Super-"Dreadnoughts." By June, 1911, according to the original calculations still maintained, there ought to be twelve British "Dreadnoughts," but still none of the new type, to eleven German, with six of the new type. I really ask the First Lord of the Admiralty how he can properly say that in March, 1911, the number twenty to thirteen is sufficient, and not more than sufficient, whereas he said on 18th March, 1910, that if the worst fears of the Leader of the Opposition were realised ten to thirteen was "an overwhelming superiority."

Mr. McKENNA

I was speaking of the state of the Fleet in 1910, which was something very different from the state of the Fleet in 1914. In 1914 we shall have struck off a large number of ships which would have given overwhelming strength against what Germany had in 1910.

Mr. R. HARCOURT

That is not the point. I was speaking of 1912 not 1914. Does he really say that a lapse of fifteen months make the older types so obsolescent that he wants ten more "Dreadnoughts" than previously constituted "overwhelming superiority?" My general contention is that we have built far too early, and I believe because we have done so we have lost in value. As to the "Hercules" and "Colossus" of the 1909 programme, I hold that if they had been begun in January, 1910, instead of being speeded up in July, 1909, they would have had the 13.5-inch guns instead of the 12-inch guns, and they would have been far more valuable vessels; so that you have managed to get inferior ships at a time when you did not want them. Why could you not have waited a few extra months, say between July and January, instead of depriving yourselves of the advantages of your new experiments? I now turn to the programme of last year. The Prime Minister, speaking on 14th July, 1910, said: "I ask if the programme for the present year (1910–11) is excessive, which will give us twenty-five in the spring of 1913, having regard to the number then in existence in European waters, namely, Germany, twenty-one. "I admit the Prime Minister did not say 1913. but 1913–14. What is the whole point of this? Are the twenty-one German ships to be ready at the same time as when we have only twenty-five, or, on the other hand, are there not to be twenty-one German ships ready until we have twenty-five plus our present programme, or thirty to twenty-one? That is the point I want explained. In other words, did the Government in 1910 ask for a standard of twenty-seven to seventeen, or twenty-five to twenty-one. I would desire to quote from the First Lord on 14th July, 1910, but it is a little difficult to do so, because, if I may say so, he was diplomatically diffuse. On that date he said that they had got ten, that was six to five launched, four to three on the slips. That meant twenty to seventeen if he had not ordered any ships in the year 1910–11. He added that Germany had given orders to four contracting firms for four other ships, the orders for which were given in the April previous. He proceeded to say: "Mark the consequences. How do we stand? If I do not give an order… for these five…" The Germans are entitled to give an order for another four large armoured ships next April (1911). He added:— I cannot get permission from Parliament until next April to lay down any more."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th July, 1910, col. 727.] He further stated that the position would be, unless five were ordered, ten built against five built, six launched against five launched, three on the slips against seven, and none ordered against four ordered. The totals then would be twenty to twenty-one. He then asked for five ships, and for a standard of twenty-five to twenty-one. While if you take the Estimates of the present year the standard is to be thirty to twenty-one. It appears to be, therefore, that in the programmes of last year and this year you are asking for two different British totals compared with the same German total. It is a very wearisome process to go through all these facts and figures, and it is a little difficult in the absence of the official knowledge which he possesses to be absolutely correct on every point. I have endeavoured to put the case, which I feel very strongly, that we have at each point been asked for four "Dreadnoughts" too many, and also in the case of the "Hercules" and "Colossus," we have got less valuable ships.

I ask the House to allow me a few words on the epoch-making declaration which we heard on Monday night as they affect the naval situation. The question of America means much to me. I have pressed again and again in this House and outside against including America in your hostile standard. I have justified it by facts and arguments, but I frankly confess I was moved most by sentiment— I am not ashamed of the American blood in my veins. I am proud to be the son of the Englishman who led this House, and I am no less proud to be the grandson of the American who wrote the "Dutch Republic," and who raised his voice against negro slavery. There is talk of American dollars. America is not peopled only by those who buy the pictures and the firstborn of the British aristocracy at a price somewhat higher than the figure in the Home market. America is a sister whose pulse beats with our own. We believe that practically it is impossible that two nations speaking the same tongue can widen still further by the crime of war the breach which, had not Lord North anticipated the great watchword of Lord Milner, need not have been made in their essential unity. If the House will forgive me for having made that observation, I would like to say in a far more serious spirit how much we welcome both the interview, which I understand has been given to the Press by the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord Charles Beresford) and the very grave and just words which have fallen this afternoon from the Leader of the Opposition. I only hope in view of the reception of the Foreign Secretary's speech in the House on Monday night that he will carry the whole of his party with him. I believe, if I may say so, the risks are great, and that they may have immediate effect upon the Estimates which we discuss upon the Ides of March each year. It may act upon Europe as a sedative, but it may act as a stimulant. It may mean disarmament or Armageddon. It is a risk worth taking, but it is a risk to be faced. It may mean an Anglo-Saxon areopagus, or it may mean the North Sea and the Pacific packed with war vessels, and a strain so tense that it will be snapped, as was suggested, by war or internal revolution. It is all or nothing—Black Death or a new life. It needs great courage and abiding faith, but I shall hold strongly to the belief that the Liberal party will reassert for Britain that which is the greatest in her destiny, the leadership of peace.

Mr. FRED HALL (Camberwell, Dulwich)

I rise with great diffidence, but I am prompted to do so as the diffidence is somewhat relieved by the universal courtesy which I notice is extended to Members of this House when first they address it. I have listened with very great patience during the whole of the afternoon to the speeches, and I cannot help thinking that one important point is missed by certain hon. Members on the other side, and that is the absolute necessity of keeping our Navy up to the great point that was attained in the olden time. The Fleet of England is undoubtedly her all in all, because, if I may say so without any respect to party feelings, the majority of us are not particularly frightened as to the question of invasion provided that we keep our Navy up to such a pitch as to ward off any dangers to our mercantile marine. That brings me to the question as to a phrase which very often is not so well understood, and that is the question of what I may term the command of the sea. In the language of strategy I would like to point to the words used by Admiral Bridge in his book on war and naval defence, in which he tells us it means control of maritime connection, that is to say, of the ocean paths which connect one part of the Empire with the other, and over which vessels must travel and the sea-borne commerce must traverse, and along which the belligerent expeditions must necessarily proceed. I think myself the important feature that this House has to consider, as a very few moments' consideration will serve to show, is how exceedingly vital to this country is the command of the sea. To us as an insular Power in time of peace the phrase has been, practically speaking, of little importance. But in time of war it is most essential for us to have a naval force by means of which we can control, and will control, the ocean paths, so that no merchant ship or warship of any enemy may pass along without extreme danger.

I am of opinion that in the event of such a calamity as the outbreak of hostilities between ourselves and any foreign Power that it would begin on the sea and end on the sea, for the simple reason that if our Fleet were by any chance destroyed we should be starved out at a very short space of time. I venture to suggest that that is one of the most important points that His Majesty's Government should consider. In that connection I may use the statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, in which he stated that the dream of an invading legion on these shores had no terrors for him, and that it was the march of hunger, if anything, which gave him anxiety. I think that was a very important speech, and one that requires the very gravest consideration. Any Power which would assail us must necessarily seek to wrest from us the control of the sea. Looking at the matter from the point of view of invasion, I may quote from a speech made by the First Sea Lord, in which he stated that the real, the serious danger that this country has to guard against in war is in the invasion of our trade and the destruction of our merchant shipping. If this be so, I think that it is conclusive evidence that we must, under any circumstances and at any price, retain always the command of the sea in order that we may be protected for the supplies that are required by this country. That is apparently the careful and well-considered judgment of the chief of the General Staff of the Navy, the man to whom this country has committed its security on the seas, for he states very clearly that the strength of our Navy is determined by what is necessary to protect our trade, and that if it is sufficiently strong for this it would necessarily be sufficiently powerful to prevent invasion, since the same disposition of ships, to a great extent, answers both purposes.

Naturally the main object aimed at by our Fleet, whether for the defence of commerce or for any other purpose, is to prevent any ship of the enemy from getting so far to see as to be able to do any mischief before she is brought into action. Any disposition that is moderately successful in attaining this object would almost certainly be effective in preventing from reaching our shores a large fleet of transports, which I think it is admitted it would be very difficult to hide. That goes to prove without fear of contradiction that we must have a Fleet strong enough to prevent any ships of the enemy from getting far enough to sea to do any mischief whatever before they are brought into action. An important point to my mind is the amount of money spent by this country on the upkeep of the Navy as compared with that spent by other countries in proportion to their respective mercantile marines. Suppose we take the respective mercantile marines on a 100-ton basis and compare the amounts expended by the different countries. On the 100-ton basis the amounts spent work out as follows:—United Kingdom, £2 14s.; Japan, £5 12s.; Germany, £11 4s.; Russia, £12 4s.; France, £12 8s.; United States, £25 1s. When you compare the amounts spent by other countries with the £2 14s. spent by this country, I cannot see under what circumstances hon. Members opposite can possibly complain that we are by any means spending too much on our Navy. It seems to me that we should be a great deal better advised to spend more, because it is after all a question of insuring the means for our mercantile marines to move safely from one part of the Empire to another. Sir Geoffrey Hornby says:— I consider that I have the command of the sea when I am able to tell my Government that they can move an expedition to any point without fear of interference from the enemy's fleet. Can we say that at the present time? If the answer is in the affirmative, I would ask the further question, shall we be able to say so in the near future, taking into consideration the large shipbuilding operations that are going on in other countries? We have heard a good deal lately about the two-Power standard. The two-Power standard, I maintain, has never necessarily implied a rigid equality in numbers. To attain success in maritime war is, I think, acknowledged by all those who have given the matter careful and thoughtful consideration to be dependent on the margin of superiority, as the lessons of the past have demonstrated. For instance, in the Succession Wars that took place in the Eighteenth Century we doubtless had a preponderance of fighting power, and I maintain that the lessons of our last maritime war should be considered at the present moment when we are going into the Estimates for the ensuing year. It may reasonably be taken that the two-Power standard should be that which would give us good hope of success in war with any political combination such as we had to meet in the olden days. I am one of those who hold the opinion that we should be absolutely certain that our Navy is strong enough to meet any and every combination that might be brought against us. For instance, there is a paragraph in a book which I believe was issued for private circulation, but found its way to the bookstalls, in which the question was put: Supposing one-half of our Fleet were drawn away to some other portion of the world, should we have left a sufficiently strong Navy to meet any foreign Power that might be able to put a force against us? That, I think, is a very important matter, because it was palpably shown that in the ordinary course one-half of our Fleet might be enticed away, and in that case clearly the remainder of our Navy should be strong enough to meet any Power that might come against us.

8.0 P.M.

We have heard in the course of these Debates that in 1914 we shall have twenty-nine or thirty "Dreadnoughts," whereas Germany will have twenty-one. I am not one of those who is satisfied with the position that we shall then hold. Taking into consideration the number of ships of the "Dreadnought" class that will be owned, say, for the purposes of discussion, by the Triple Alliance, I cannot help thinking that the two-Power standard is being dealt with by the Government on too close a basis. Taking into consideration all the risks that battleships necessarily run, the two-Power standard certainly gives a margin much too small. The Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford) told us on Monday last that on one occasion out of a squadron of eight ships under his control six were disable. These are matters that we cannot possibly allow to pass without the gravest consideration, because what has happened once may possibly happen again. The. First Lord of the Admiralty, on Monday last, referred to the Navy Estimates as having reached high-water mark, and he led the House to hope that perhaps next year he would be able to give some relief. I can hardly think, when we remember the amount of shipbuilding that is going on in other countries, that this is a time when we should consider any reduction whatever in the Navy Estimates. So long as other countries consider it necessary to increase their navies we ought, in no circumstances whatever, to entertain such an idea. We must not overlook the fact that we are in a totally different position from that of any foreign Power. Practically speaking, all other Powers are in a position to export food stuffs, whereas we have to import them from every quarter of the globe. It is therefore impossible for us to work to the two-Power standard on such meagre lines. With regard to the risk of accidents, it must be remembered that the putting out of action of one or two "Dreadnoughts" would be a totally different thing from the loss of one or two ships in the olden days. The fighting strength of these ships is so totally different that one or two less might be of the utmost importance in deciding whether we won or lost a battle. Under these circumstances I sincerely trust that the House will not, under any circumstances, accept the Amendment, and that the Government will give the matter most careful consideration before they bring any question of reduction of the Estimates before the House. As far as we are concerned, we are not advocating the building of ships from any spirit of defiance. But we do consider it necessary that ships of such power and such an excess in number should be constructed in order that the people of this country may be secure of their food supply, for which we depend on other countries—

Attention called to the fact that forty Members were not present. House counted, and there being found to be forty Members present—

Mr. BEAUCHAMP

An hon. Gentleman on this side of the House moved an Amendment to the effect that "In the opinion of this House, the increasing expenditure on the Navy is not justified by foreign events and is a menace to peace and to national security." In the former part of his speech the hon. Member tried to show that if private property was immune from capture at sea we should be able to do without a large Navy. That is a matter for discussion. I do not know that would be in order to go into it this evening, and I do not propose to do so. We have to deal with realities and things as they are at the present time. Everybody, I think, on both sides of the House, laments the fact that it is necessary for us to have this large expenditure on armaments, both for our Army and for our Navy. But at the same time what we have to consider is this: whether that expenditure is necessary or not. I believe that the expenditure we are asked to make by these Estimates is absolutely necessary in order to provide security for this country and for our Empire. The Estimates, I think, are accepted by moderate men on whichever side of the House they sit. I noticed that the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) seemed to be perfectly satisfied with the provision being made, with one single exception. That was in regard to our cruisers. Nobody who thinks of this matter, and views our position, and the great interests that we have at sea, can possibly advocate a reduction at the present moment of the amount which we are expending upon our Navy. Who are the first people that would suffer if we were not able to get in the proper amount of our food supplies and raw material? The people who would feel it most are the working people of this country, and the people who have small and limited incomes.

I am not going to labour the question in regard to the report issued by the Royal Commission on Food Supplies in time of war. We all know that at any particular time there is a very limited supply in the country of food. We have small storage of food. In regard to meat we have about six weeks' supplies in hand. In the matter of wheat, I believe sometimes we have only two or three weeks' supply in hand. But if there is any stoppage of the free inflow of food into this country it must necessarily affect the price of food, and that would inflict hardship upon the working people especially. It is not merely a question of the food supply, but also one of the supply of raw material. With regard to the latter, I believe, if the Declaration of London is ratified, that in the future we shall not have the same difficulty in regard to getting in the supply of our raw material. That is the only point, so far as I can make out, in which I can agree with the Declaration of London, which I hope will not be ratified. If we have any interference with the free inflow of our raw materials, that also would prevent the carrying on of our manufactures; and consequently that would deprive the working people of their wages, which would be doubly necessary at such a time, to pay for the enhanced cost of their food. I wish that those hon. Members who are urging a reduction of expenditure could study, as I have to daily, the movements of our great mercantile marine, and that they could see mapped out on a chart the approximate position of every British ship, especially, say, on any one particular day in the year. If they did that I think they would realise the magnitude of the interests that our Navy has to defend.

In the interesting evidence which Sir Robert Giffen gave before the Treasury Committee which was appointed to consider the question of a national guarantee in time of war, he submitted figures with regard to the trade of this country. In 1906 the imports and exports of this country amounted to £1,069,000,000. Sixty-eight per cent. of that was carried in British ships. That means that British ships were carrying £725,000,000 of the exports and imports of this country. To that you have to add the value of the ships, which Sir Robert put down at £212,000,000. He further added the amount of stuff carried in British ships to and from foreign and colonial ports—what ship-owners call "cross-tonnage." The total was £1,200,000,000- That is the amount which our Navy has to safeguard during each year. Comparing our expenditure with that of Germany, which has been alluded to to-day, I look at the amount of mercantile tonnage which this country possesses. It is 13,000,000 tons against 2,859,000 tons possessed by Germany. If you look at the trade coming through the Suez Canal, which, I think, is a very fair index of the comparative trade of the two countries in their respective vessels, you will find that the British tonnage amounted to 10,255,000 tons last year against 2,513,000 tons carried in German bottoms. Then we have to consider also the amount of British tonnage loading in our own ports, and bringing goods into our own ports, and similarly the amount of German tonnage. The entry and clearances of British ships carrying cargo at our ports amounted to 66,000,000 tons. Similarly, the amount of the German tonnage entered and cleared at German ports amounted to 26,000,000 tons.

It is not merely the volume of our commerce, the enormous amount we have to carry. We have also to consider that the sea-board which Germany, has to defend is very small in comparison with the large seaboard that we have to defend. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Fareham regretted it was not proposed to have a larger increase in the number of our cruisers for the protection of our commerce. The Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord Charles Beresford) has also from time to time dwelt upon the necessity which this country has for a larger number of cruisers to protect our commence. I think that to build a larger number would be a great extravagance and a great waste of money. Who is going to attack our commerce in case of war? It would not be the ordinary cruisers of the foreign country that we were at war with. It is said that the foreign country would make use of armed merchantmen, and that in that way they would come down and prey upon our commerce. If foreign nations are going to use merchant vessels to prey upon our commerce, I think it would be far wiser on our part to requisition our merchant vessels, and place guns on board in order to go out and protect our commerce and act as commerce destroyers.

How do we stand in regard to this matter. I have had taken out a list of the fast steamers possessed by this country, and the number possessed by Germany. I find that this country has thirteen vessels of twenty knots or thereabouts, as against five possessed by Germany. In nineteen-knot vessels we are equal; in eighteen and a half-knots we have eight and Germany nil. In vessels of sixteen knots this country possess 114 and Germany seventeen and over; therefore I think we need not go to any great expense in providing cruisers for the protection of our commerce. But it is plain we are spending £44,000,000 against £22,000,000 by Germany. I think if we look at the enormous amount we have to protect, compared with what Germany has to protect, I do not think we can complain that we are spending £44,000,000 to Germany's £22,000,000. Besides this, it is not vital to Germany that she should hold the command of the sea. It is vital to us, and it is less vital to Germany if the Declaration of London is passed and ratified by this country to possess the command of the sea. Everybody will admit if we lose the command of the sea for any length of time, or permanently it would mean the ruin of this country and the break-up of the British Empire.

Mr. ALEXANDER HARVEY

I rise by the indulgence of the House to express my intention of supporting the Amendment now before us. I have followed the Debate to-day with some closeness, and I have found, as I expected to find, that we have been traversing much the same ground as was traversed on Monday, when we considered the Resolution of the hon. Member for Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Murray Macdonald). On Monday last I greatly desired to have had an opportunity of supporting the hon. Gentleman's Motion, but for want of time and from the fact that there were other Members in this House better qualified than I to address it, I did not get my opportunity. I greatly desired it at the time for two reasons.—In the first place, because I feel very strongly upon this subject, and in the second place because I desired to stand by and support an hon. Member who for years past has urged this question upon our consideration, and who in consequence, as I think, may be called one of the most courageous Members of this Assembly. But looking back, as now I do, I am inclined to think I should have preferred, if I had had the choice, that my remarks should have been deferred. I say that because I think in the peculiar circumstances that arose at the end of last Monday's Debate the Resolution had hardly a fair chance amongst Members of the House. It was overshadowed at the end of the Debate by the striking statement on arbitration made by the Foreign Secretary, and I know for a fact that there were many Members of this House who after listening to that statement felt at the moment that to vote for the Resolution would almost have had the appearance of giving a rebuff to the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman. I do not hold that view, and I do not think on consideration many Members who did hold it will continue to hold it. I still support the principle that the Resolution we are now considering lays down. My view is we have gone too fast, and we are continuing to go too fast in this matter in the increase in the Navy, and I am glad of the opportunity to-day to support my hon. Friends in their protest.

Having said that, may I be allowed for a moment to join in the wide-world chorus of approval that has followed the declaration of the Foreign Secretary. His was a bold and significant utterance. The Foreign Secretary has captured a great tendency, and he will, I hope, speedily embody it in a fact. None of us on this side of the House desire a better Leader than the right hon. Gentleman in the advocacy of these great principles. The sentiments that filled his speech the other night are not new to those of us who have followed for some time the expressions of his general motives. I congratulate him upon the position he has taken up, and I am rather inclined to lament, as I am sure he will be inclined to lament, that he was not the proud man to give the invitation which I hope and he hopes he will be soon in a position to accept. All I ask and hope for now is that he may be fairly able to extend to the great nations of Europe a similar invitation and a similar proposal, and if he continues in these noble efforts he will have a united party—aye, I believe a united House of Commons behind him in what he desires to achieve.

I said that to my mind the reasons for this Amendment being put before the House for decision are still operative. For three or four years back some of us have been urging the Government to take more cautious and more temperate views of the immediate European situation. I know that many of us have looked to the Naval programme of the Government as excessive and unnecessary in its extent. I believe that we of all nations owe it, not only to our own people, but to the civilised peoples of the world, to act with caution and circumspection in this matter. I feel that over a period of twelve years that has elapsed we cannot shake off the responsibility of setting an example to the world of increased armaments. I say that great responsibilities entail consequent obligations. There is no doubt about it. I do not wish to rake up a buried controversy, but there is no doubt that the outbreak of the South African war did lead to an enormous increase, following the example of this country, in the armaments—and especially the naval armaments—of the nations of Europe, and I fear it will be some time before the international difficulties created during that period will be overcome. I am afraid hon. Gentlemen opposite will disagree with what I am going to say, but I feel very strongly the fact that one great party in the State has changed its views on commercial matters, and is now advocating a sort of limited protection and preference for our Colonies has seriously complicated the international situation. I suppose we all desire retrenchment, and I believe we all desire, at any rate, if not the lowering of taxation, an opportunity of spending the money we abstract from the taxpayer to the greatest advantage of the community in which we live.

I listened to the statements of the First Lord of the Admiralty most carefully, and with some hope, but my hopes were not fulfilled. I noticed that in delivering his statement he gained the unrestrained approval of the Opposition, and to me that is not a healthy accompaniment to the statement of a Liberal Minister. I also noticed that the right hon. Gentleman did not dwell upon any of the great expectations or hopes which we desire so much to see fulfilled, but contented himself by an expression of opinion that he, as a Minister, was succeeding in getting for the country value for its money when it was laid out under the management of the Admiralty. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does his best, and I know he is surrounded by the most capable officials; but I am confident that there is no gentleman, however highly qualified he may be—there is no Department, however admirably staffed—able to spend with proper economy a sum amounting to nearly £1,000,000 per week. We want to see a return to peace expenditure, and that is the whole question we are fighting for. We should be content to go in this direction by moderate and gradual steps so long as we knew we were moving in the direction we so much desire. I think the Admiralty is putting before us a programme of overbuilding this year. I wish to go bark to a matter we have often spoken of. I mean the four contingent "Dreadnoughts," the request to be allowed to build which was put before us in March, 1909. I really must once more appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to remember the absolute and actual reason which he gave for desiring the liberty to build those ships. He said in the most distinct and definite terms that his only reason for asking for this building construction was that Germany was accelerating her programme. The Prime Minister, with absolute definitenesss, said:— We have taken power, if the necessity should arise—that is, it the acceleration of the German programme goes on—to lay down on the 1st April next four more ships. I take it that both these right hon. Gentlemen meant that if there were no acceleration there would be no contingent "Dreadnoughts." The First Lord of the Admiralty told us in this House that he had an assurance from the German Government that this acceleration would not eventuate. I must put it in rather brutal terms. We gave the right hon. Gentleman the authority to build those four contingent ships, and only to build them if the acceleration of the German programme went on.

The right hon. Gentleman has told us now that he overstepped the liberty we then gave him because he had come to the conclusion that the German Government were building bigger vessels, and he thought it would be as well to build the four ships, because of the larger size of the vessels ordered for the German navy. I do not think that was proper treatment of this House, and it was not conduct in a Minister which this House ought to pass over in silence. The First Lord of the Admiralty told us on Monday that after all it did not matter very much. He gave us an easy arithmetic sum to do. He said, "Supposing you have eight" Dreadnoughts "one year, five the next and five the next, that makes eighteen; supposing you build six one year, six the next and six the next, that makes eighteen." Then the right hon. Gentleman insinuated there was no difference between the two. I say there is a serious difference. If you build two extra vesels as he confesses he did; if you build eight in place of six, I say you lose two years in the life of those ships, and you lose two years in their worth and value. To lay down eight, and five and five ships to achieve a result that you might have achieved by laying down six and six, and six is to take up an obviously dangerous and provocative position in the eyes of other nations.

If the right hon. Gentleman built two ships before the time was absolutely necessary to lay them down he ran, once more, a great risk of missing the advantages of improvements and new inventions and the risk of having on his hands two ships of a lower type than he might have had if he had waited the proper time. I am not quite sure that amongst all the numerous explanations that have been given we have yet had the right one. The First Lord of the Admiralty and his colleagues in the Cabinet, helped and assisted by Gentlemen on the Front Opposition Bench, raised a scare in this country which was too strong for them to control, and which over-mastered all their efforts to repress. The Government gave the Opposition their chance of pushing their policy of piling up armaments to an extent and degree which has apparently no limits in their imagination. He gave them the chance of going to the country and saying: "We want eight." They said that all the time, and the poetic genius of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover (Mr. Wyndham) put their demand into a couplet:— We want eight And we won't wait. What is the plea that is laid before us constantly and continuously as an explanation for these armaments? It is that by extending the means of making war we are giving to the nation a growing feeling of safety and repose. We have not succeeded in doing that in the past, and we shall not succeed in doing it in the future. There is no sedative about methods of this sort. The constant exhibition of these increases and the pouring out of money on implements of destruction and of war is an irritant not only at home, but also abroad. We have for twenty years been following this course, and I want to ask any Members of this House to look round the country as he knows it and to study the feelings of the people of the country today and say honestly whether the people are showing any more signs of steadiness and satisfaction and of safety than they did when we were spending a third of the money we are now spending on our Navy.

The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down properly told us that we had as a nation obligations and difficulties that no other nations have to meet. Yes, we have certain disadvantages in this matter, but we have many advantages too. He told us that we have a great seaboard which presumably is always open to attack to defend, and vast dependencies which more or less rely upon our protection. Then we have, as he also told us, a gigantic mass of shipping which we cannot afford to run into jeopardy and danger. Those I take it are the natural disadvantages of our position, and we do not intend for a moment to deny our obligations. Those with whom I am proud to be associated, and who have for years fought this difficult battle have been subjected, I do not say in this House where we have been treated of course with courtesy, but in the Press and in the country to jeers and sneers—yes, and to insults too. We are called Little Englanders and Small Navy Men. Of course, it does not much matter, but we are none of these things. We really do love our country, and we really do intend to secure by reasonable and proper means the safety of our people both here and abroad. What are our advantages? I think they ought to be weighed against our disadvantages in the discussion and decision of this matter. This great advantage we have to-day lies in the fact that we have within our Empire a patient and law-abiding population. We have a people attached to forms of settled Government, and at any rate it is not against our own people that we have to provide the means of defence. Then we have in the aggregate enormous wealth. No one can deny that in warlike operations finance and the ready access to treasure is a very important factor indeed. We have also that system of Free Trade which, say what you may about it on economic grounds, certainly does bring confidence and trust to the people. These dependencies which we are told we must look after are growing day by day more capable of defending themselves. They are going in the future to do so, and, as they grow more powerful, I think we may look upon them as grownup children who, if difficulty comes to us, will be ready and willing to come to our assistance. What else have we? We have the best ships of any nation in the world. They are directed by the best commanders, and the men who man them are second to none among the seafaring population of the world. If these things do not make for strength, I do not know what does; and I say these advantages ought to be reckoned and weighed against all the disadvantages that are continually brought to the front.

We are told that expenditure depends upon policy. Well, the Government are following a policy of peace, but the ex- penditure is going up mountains high and by leaps and bounds. What does it all mean? I believe the Government intend to follow a policy of peace. I believe the establishment of good relationships is very dear to the hearts of us all, but do the other nations of the world always sufficiently realise that these are our guiding motives and intentions? I should like to be assured that every effort is being made that it is possible to make to remove international differences and sources of quarrel. I should like to feel that our foreign policy was not only cold-blooded and correct and diplomatic, but that it glowed with warmth and good feeling for other people. I do not say it is not so, but I should like to have the fact of its being so made more obvious. If that were achieved, it would give us a great advantage. If the Foreign Secretary had been here, I should have appealed to him as one of the warmest of his admirers to take up in addition to the question in which he is now wrapping himself, the question of the immunity of private property, the property of honest traders, from capture at sea in time of war. I would ask him, with all respect, to come amongst us more and make us, the representatives of the people, more and more the channel through which his pacificatory efforts may be made known to other nations. The rule and tradition has been to make great questions that tend for peace or quarrel among nations the decision of a small and narrow class, but I fancy the time is now at hand when the common peoples of the world will assert themselves, and when it will be found that you can only make and establish a solid and enduring peace through the individual men and women who form our nations.

Major GASTRELL

It is with great diffidence that I venture to address the House for the first time. I have listened with very close attention to the speeches made last Monday and to-day, and it appears to me that sufficient attention has not been drawn to the contingencies that may arise in 1914 and 1915. I appreciate the effort which the First Lord of the Admiralty has made in introducing his Estimates, and I think he must agree that those Estimates have been received with considerable favour on both sides of the House. They are the highest Estimates ever known, but I venture to think they are quite inadequate.

The right hon. Gentleman, in his statement of the 1910–11 shipbuilding pro- gramme, says that, out of £15,630,000, £13,300,000 is to go to the continuation of ships already ordered, and that only £1,736,000 is to be taken for vessels of the new programme. That I again say I believe to be quite inadequate. Let me ask the House for one moment to consider the position we shall be in in 1915. 1914 has been alluded to by the Leader of the Opposition and by several other hon. Members, but I wish to devote attention to the next year, in which our Alliance with Japan expires. Then the Panama Canal will be completed, and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal will have been so widened that "Dreadnoughts "will be able to go through it, from the Baltic to the North Sea, without any difficulty, while the minor Powers of the Triple Alliance will have each a squadron in the Mediterranean. I suggest that it is our duty to make provision to meet the requirements of the new situation. Not only in this year, but next year and the year to follow, I venture to think the present Estimates, great as they are, will prove to be more than insufficient for our purposes. The Government, as they have done before, are again putting off the evil day.

They appear also to have lost sight of the enormous strides that have been made by our present ally, Japan. Although I would not for one moment suggest that it is possible, it certainly is not probable, we may ever be in conflict with our friends of the past twelve years, I feel at the same time there is a certain amount of insecurity and there are possible contingencies of further combinations, and it is this feeling which has in a measure induced our Australasian States to take steps on their own account to provide a certain amount of Naval defence.

It must also be borne in mind that the Japanese yards have accumulated a vast amount of shipbuilding materials, and of the latest machinery, and that Japanese officers are at the present moment in England getting the very last word in regard to naval construction. Germany has been referred to very many times by Members on both sides of the House. Her programme is familiar to us, but without doubt in addition to what she is doing she can accelerate her output if desired in capital ships, guns, and personnel to a considerable extent. Italy and Austro-Hungary must also be considered, and, in view of these conditions, if we are to maintain the two-keel to one standard, which has over and over again been claimed as neces- sary, I venture to think that the number of ships suggested by the First Lord—the number of "Dreadnoughts"—is not nearly sufficient, and we shall require at least seventeen as a minimum, in addition to his programme, if we are to be secured against any possible combination, I think the House will agree with me that there is throughout the country a certain amount of feeling of doubt and unrest as to our future security. Our Navy is our all in all, and I beg to suggest that it would be wise to supplement the sum already asked for by an Imperial loan guaranteed by the State of not less than £50,000,000, the interest and sinking fund to be contributed pro rata by our assenting Dominions. If that sum were available for a three-years' programme to be laid down, I for one believe that our competitors would see that we really mean to hold what we have, in spite of anything they may attempt to do, and then this disastrous competition, which everyone on both sides of the House deplores, would probably cease, and some means of arbitration would be put forward, such as has been alluded to by the Foreign Secretary, which would be acceptable to all parties, and would certainly be welcome in every part of the civilised world.

Mr. DILLON

I desire, first of all, to warn the Government that they must not for a moment suppose that the figures of the Division, either upon this occasion or on Monday last give them any idea of the state of things either in this House or the country outside as to their course on the Naval Estimates. There is hanging over this House at present a dominant issue, which has made the Irish party, and I believe the majority of the Radical party resolved that they will do nothing to in any way weaken or discredit the Government at this particular moment. Until that great issue is disposed of we are prepared, although to me it is a very difficult task, to swallow measures which, were we free from the influence of that issue, we would oppose to the bitterest extremity. In the course of this Debate to-day there has been a good deal of reference to the great speech delivered the other day by the Foreign Secretary. It was a great speech, which I knew would attract the attention not only of Europe, but of the whole civilised world. I maintain, however, that that speech was a red herring of gigantic proportions drawn across the path of this discussion, and it was drawn across that path most successfully. I shall be able to show, in a very few sentences, that that speech, much as I admired the Utopian aspirations which the Foreign Secretary gave utterance to, had really no bearing at all on the questions which were concerned in the discussions on Monday night and to-night. First, I want to say there are three great blots in that speech. In the first place, it was not directed to the immediate question under our consideration.

Secondly, the proposal of an offensive and defensive alliance between Great Britain and any other Power which entered into an arbitration treaty with Great Britain will be found to create great prejudice against the proposals contained in that speech. As the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said to-night, perfectly accurately, it was the only novel proposition contained in the speech of the Foreign Secretary. Eight or ten years ago Lord Salisbury's Government concluded a Treaty of Arbitration with the then President of the United States of America on precisely the same lines as are now suggested by the Foreign Secretary, with the one single addition that he did not propose to import into that treaty an offensive, defensive, and coercive alliance against other Powers. I very gravely doubt whether that which is the sole and only novelty in the proposal of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will be found to be an advantage. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition alluded to the fact that he and his Government had concluded a treaty on these lines, and it is quite true. He also said that treaty was defeated in the United States. I do not know to what extent the forces which defeated that treaty have been modified by recent events. That is a delicate subject upon which I do not propose to enter, but it is perfectly well known to every man in this House who is not a tyro in politics what were the forces which defeated that treaty. That brings me to the third blot, which seems to me to rest upon the proposal of the Foreign Secretary. There seems to be in that proposal no provision for the position of small nationalities struggling against injustice or seeking for their freedom. This proposal, as I heard the Foreign Secretary lay it before the House, had reference only to mighty Empires, whose position in the world had been established and assured. They were invited by the Foreign Secretary to enter into treaties offensive and defensive, and to coerce other countries, who would not submit to arbitration.

9.0 P.M.

But what about the struggling nationalities who are now crushed under the hoof and in the power of these great Empires? Are they to be admitted to arbitration? What if Egypt asks for arbitration against the British occupation? What if Persia asks for arbitration against the Anglo-Russian agreement which has condemned her to partition? Does the right hon. Gentleman propose that they should be allowed to ask for arbitration? I should like to hear that side of the question, belonging, as I do, to a conquered nation, I should like to hear that side of the proposal worked out before I could give my adhesion to it, or before I looked upon it with any hope and enthusiasm, with regard to its effect on the future of mankind. I must say that, looking at the events of the last few years, I am extremely sceptical as to the immediate effect on this question of armaments which we are considering at this moment of such a treaty, if it were possible to negotiate it as the Foreign Secretary adumbrated. Let us consider for a moment the history of the last few years. The two-Power standard is a common-place in this naval discussion. It has gone, and a very good thing it has gone; a more insolent, aggressive, and provocative proposition never was laid before the civilised world than that of the two-Power standard. I am very glad it has gone; it shows the return to common-sense of Great Britain. What was the origin of the two-Power standard? I am sorry to say I remember it, and it was invented against Russia and France. I remember very well when the two-Power standard was first started in this House. Russia and France were the enemy then. Now, observe what has happened. You have entered, first of all, into an entente with France, and you have entered into the Anglo-Russian Agreement, which, I think, a most iniquitous agreement, because it rested largely upon the partition of a perfectly inoffensive and defenceless country whose protest was trampled underfoot—I mean the country of Persia. Again, here you had no grievance whatsoever, but what was the result of this agreement? Did you get rid of the two-Power standard by this agreement? Did you obtain any cessation or diminution of armaments under these friendly arrangements with Russia and France? Why, I recollect the Russian Agreement was signed in the month of August, 1907, and it was heralded as a great instrument of peace, which was to bring untold blessings to this country. Then we had the entente with France. What was the result? Immediately after the entente with France and the agreement with Russia you had an unparalleled jump in the armaments of this country. I am told by an hon. Member above the Gangway that the two-Power standard has gone. Yes, it has gone, but here is the hon. Member for Fareham, who has introduced its successor—the three-Power standard.

Mr. LEE

No.

Mr. DILLON

Yes, because to-night in my hearing you told the House that there was no safety for this country unless we built against the Triple Alliance. Do you propose, or does any man in this House propose to fight the Triple Alliance single-handed? Then why do you prepare to fight them, and is not language of that kind calculated to convey the impression, if it is not meant to convey the impression that that is what you are preparing for. I interjected an observation on Monday in the speech of one of the speakers who was talking about this question of building against the Triple Alliance, and who insisted for the safety of this Empire on building against the Triple Alliance. I said what about France? I thought that one of the glories of the British Government had been that it had formed an entente with France.

Mr. LEE

It is not the same thing as an alliance.

Mr. DILLON

I should like to know what it is. Some of us have had very uneasy feelings since the other day we read that Monsieur Pichon, the Foreign Minister for France, spoke of constant military conversations going on with England. I say that there is a very uncomfortable feeling among many hon. Members that there is a secret alliance with France, or some understanding which is not known to the Members of this House, and if we are to be told that that is the result of all these alliances and understandings, this country must be prepared to build not according to the two-Power standard, but up to the three-Power standard which was put forward here to-night. Moreover, according to a Gentleman who pointed out that the agreement with Japan would come to an end in 1915, this country at that date would have to begin to build against the four-Power standard, including Japan. That is what we have arrived at by agreement and ententes, and I am not at all sure that if you succeed in fixing up a treaty with America, which I think is not very likely, on the lines indicated by the Foreign Secretary, you would not find that will be made an excuse and a ground for fresh naval preparations, and that it would not have the immediate effect of producing a new German naval loan to protect themselves against this new alliance. Therefore I cannot share the enthusiasm which was aroused in the minds of some hon. Members by the speech of the Foreign Secretary. It was noble in sentiment and most poetic in its aspirations, but there is a great deal of difference between poetic aspirations and Naval Estimates, and what we are considering today is not poetic aspirations but millions to be voted for the Navy. I largely sympathise with the language used by the Leader of the Opposition to-night when he said he had been listening to platitudes and opinions of the most excellent character with which we all agree, but that absolutely the only question before us tonight is whether we are voting enough money for the Navy or too much. That is the question, and not at all whether it would be a desirable thing to put an end to war. Of course, the Opposition agrees with that. It is not the monopoly of the Government to desire to put an end to war. We all desire to put an end to war, but you will not do it by speeches such as the Foreign Secretary made, and I deeply regret to be obliged to say I think the chief effect of the Foreign Secretary's speech was considerably to mitigate the intensity of the revolt in his own party on this question of the Naval Estimates.

The First Lord of the Admiralty who, I think, also indulged in platitudes to a large extent, said he was bound in duty to ask the House to give him adequate money for a Navy capable of defending the country. Who denies that? I am an Irish rebel, at least I have been described as such, but I do not deny it. I address this House from the English point of view, and I do not believe there is a single Member of the House, no matter on what bench he sits, who will not agree to that proposition. But does that carry us any further? The whole question in dispute in this Debate is, have the Government asked for too much money—more than is requisite to provide an adequate Navy. We are all glad to see the First Lord of the Admiralty back in his place. He was an old friend of mine, and we used to sit side by side fighting for economy. I deeply regret to see the demoralisation which has been produced in the old champion of economy by his association with admirals and experts. He went on to devote fully half of his speech to indignantly defending himself and the Admiralty from a charge which has never been made against them in the course of these Debates. He defended himself against a charge made in some pamphlet that he had wasted money on coals. In the whole course of this Debate whoever made such a charge? I believe myself, although I have seen very serious charges made by a ring of armour manufacturers who were getting too much money, that the Navy is one of the best managed Departments in the Government as regards getting value for their money. That is not a question that has ever been raised in these Debates on policy and the adequacy of the Navy, and the right hon. Gentleman in the whole of that part of his speech was adopting a very well-known trick of controversy, that is, when you are attacked on a great matter of policy where you have no defence, to start some other point on which you have not been attacked at all and defend yourself triumphantly. It is a very well-known trick, and the right hon. Gentleman is a very well-practiced debater. But what is the charge that we have made against the Government? It is a charge of yielding to influences which no Liberal Minister ought ever to yield to. On misleading information they induced their party, by promoting a scare, to consent to naval expenditure which was entirely unnecessary for the defence of the country and excessive beyond all the necessary requirements. On 16th March, 1909, the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty created a Navy scare by stating that the German Government secretly and surreptitiously had entered upon a policy of rapid expansion and anticipation of their public programme for the purpose of getting level with this country in naval power. That statement set the country on fire. The i's were dotted and the t's crossed by the Front Opposition Bench. They cannot be blamed for that. They had a glorious opportunity, and the temptation was irresistible, and the result was that these excessive Navy Votes were carried. I suppose owing to some pressure inside the party, they were carried in a very peculiar way, and we had the system set up of the contingent "Dreadnoughts." I will only quote one passage from the speech of the Prime Minister:— But I may say and it is fair and right to the German Government that I should say that we have had a most distinct declaration from them that it is not their intention to accelerate their programme, and we cannot possibly, as a Government, believing as we do most implicitly in the good faith of those declarations, put before the House of Commons and Parliament a programme based on the assumption that a declaration of that kind will not be carried out. We have been told by them expressly and explicitly that that is their intention, an intention not to accelerate, or, in other words, not to do what the right honourable Gentleman contemplates, what he credits them with. I said seventeen was a possibility (in 1912). It is because seventeen is a possibility that we are taking this power. Otherwise we should not have taken it at all. It is possibility against which we may have to contend, and we take the power,"—[OFFICIAL RIPORT, 16th March 1909, col. 960] Now, when in July, 1909, the First Lord of the Admiralty announced that they were going to lay down the four extra "Dreadnoughts," I interrupted him and asked, "Have the German Government been false to their plans and have they accelerated at all?" The First Lord slid off to another subject and declined to answer my question. The Government obtained the consent of the House of Commons on the assertion that they would not demand the four extra "Dreadnoughts" unless the German Government were false to their pledge. They stated to the House of Commons that they accepted the statement of the German Government in good faith, but while they made that statement to Germany they acted as if they believed the German Government were liars, and without a shred of justification they asked the House to vote for the four extra "Dreadnoughts." When I pressed the First Lord of the Admiralty, he took refuge in a totally new explanation, namely, that Austria and Italy had commenced to build "Dreadnoughts"—a thing which we never heard of in March. He said Austria had commenced to build "Dreadnoughts," and therefore we were bound to be ready for the whole force of the Triple Alliance. I want to repeat the charge that the Government gave us what amounted to a pledge, that if Germany should be loyal to her pledge, they would not ask four extra "Dreadnoughts" in 1909 The German Government have not departed one hair's breadth from their pledge. On the contrary, I believe the contention is that they are rather behind what was stated then as to their programme. And yet the Prime Minister in July, 1909, demanded the four extra "Dreadnoughts." All that has occurred since then shows that in this particular matter the German Government acted in perfectly good faith, and therefore, in my judgment, it is impossible to acquit the British Government of the charge of having acted in a provocative manner. Last year the Government called upon the House to vote five more "Dreadnoughts," and on 14th March, 1910, the First Lord of the Admiralty, replying to a question in the course of a Debate, said:— No, it is fourteen 'Dreadnoughts' altogether including these four. The four others might be laid down by 1st April, 1910, and might be in commission, judging by previous experience, in two years and two months from that date. In other words, in March, 1910, he asked more "Dreadnoughts" on the ground that Germany might have ready and in commission seventeen "Dreadnoughts" by June, 1912, in the teeth of the statement made by the German Government in the previous year that they did not propose to have more than thirteen "Dreadnoughts" ready in the autumn of 1912—a statement which both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary then declared that they accepted as made in absolute good faith, a statement, moreover, which has been fully confirmed by all the information which has reached the British Government during the year which had elapsed. Is there any wonder that the German Government should be suspicious? I think the parties who have reason to blame us as to the course of these transactions are the German Government. This year, so far from offering any apology or amende to Germany for the charges that have been made against her in 1909, the charges were by innuendo repeated in March, 1910. You again come with a large programme in 1911, and when faced with enormous Estimates, indefensible, as I maintain, by any grounds of national safety known to the House, and when the First Lord is pressed for justification for his attitude towards the German Government, he bursts upon an astonished House with a wholly new explanation quite unheard of before in any previous year. He states that the reason for the Government demanding four contingent "Dreadnoughts" in 1909 was that the size of the German ships was so formidable and so considerably larger than the original "Dreadnought" type—a preposterous reason, as if it were not well-known that the ships in every fresh year's programme in England exceeded enormously the type of the previous year. It was not only Germany that was building larger ships. What about England? We had it from the right hon. Gentleman the other day that the new type of "Dreadnought" was thirty per cent. in weight, broadside, and fighting strength better than the original type. I remember the perfect chorus of exultation in the "Daily Telegraph," the "Daily Mail," and all that class of newspapers, that our ships were putting in 13.4 guns, whereas Germany bad not got beyond 12-inch guns up to that moment. To tell us now that four extra "Dreadnoughts" were asked for in 1909, because Germany was building larger ships, was practising too much on the credulity of the House of Commons.

I want to ask one question to which I have never got an answer. What is the relative fighting power of the pre-"Dreadnought" ships, according to the Estimate of the Admiralty? Surely we, ignoramuses outside the Admiralty, are entitled to have the opinion of experts on that point. What is the relative fighting value of the "Lord Nelson" and the "Agamemnon" types and the "Dreadnought" type? The Prime Minister in 1909 said that even if we were only equal in "Dreadnoughts" our enormous superiority in pre-"Dreadnoughts" would amply secure the safety of this country. I think, therefore, we are entitled to ask what is the fighting value of the pre-" Dreadnoughts "as compared with the" Dreadnoughts." On 16th March, 1909, the First Lord of the Admiralty said:— I will deal afterwards with the earlier types of ships, and I will endeavour to lay before the House the view of the Board of Admiralty with regard to the value of these ships in the computation of relative strength in 1912 and later years, for that is the period which we have to bear in mind when considering our present programme. How can the House of Commons form a judgment as to the relative strength of the German and British Fleets unless we are told what is the relative fighting strength of the pre-" Dreadnoughts" and the "Dreadnoughts" themselves. We heard to-night an interesting statement from the right hon. Gentleman as to the cost of "Dreadnoughts." The increase in the cost of a "Dreadnought" over a pre-" Dreadnought" is fifty per cent. He said that the "Orion," or super-" Dreadnought" cost £1,900,000, more than £200,000 over the cost of the original "Dreadnoughts." Therefore, my contention is that on his own statement there is more difference between the "Orion" class and the "Dreadnought" than between the "Dreadnought" and the original "Lord Nelson" and "Agamemnon" class. If that be so then this whole system of arguing wholly in terms of "Dreadnoughts" is a deliberate attempt to delude the House of Commons and induce us, by false representation, to vote more money than is absolutely required. I have read the opinions of the experts, and I find very great differences of opinion on this policy of piling all the money of the country on these huge ships. Many experts hold that it is a mistaken policy, which may be upset by things that will happen within the next year. For instance, experiments are now going on as to motor ships, which may knock the bottom out of the whole "Dreadnought" system.

Lord C. BERESFORD

What are they?

Mr. DILLON

I cannot say. I am only speaking as an outside ignoramus expressing my opinion, as we are all doing, because I do not believe there are five men in this House able to form an independent judgment of their own on the relative value of the fighting machines. For instance, the First Lord of the Admiralty and himself were just as ignorant as I am in that matter until he became First Lord. We have to form our opinion, as men of ordinary intelligence, on the information of the expert. I have read a great many of the statements of the experts, and they are at war on this subject.

Lord C. BERESFORD

Who are they?

Mr. DILLON

For instance, Sir William White, Constructor to the Admiralty. But there are many others. He quoted the names of several admirals. I am not at all sure that I do not see a Noble Admiral now who is doubtful about the relative value of the "Agamemnon" and the "Dreadnoughts."

Lord C. BERESFORD

The original "Dreadnoughts."

Mr. DILLON

The original "Dreadnought" is what we have been talking about. Experts differ, just as doctors differ, or learned men in all branches of science differ. I say, therefore, that the whole of this argument, which is based on the assumption that no ship is to count except a "Dreadnought," is a preposterous argument, and his system in talking in "Dreadnoughts" alone is calculated to deceive and humbug the House of Commons. Our position is perfectly simple, and is not affected a hair's breadth by the dithryambic and poetic speech of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs the other day. We admit the proposition of the Government that it is the duty of this House to give money enough to secure a Fleet that will reasonably secure this country; but we maintain that the demands of the Government have been excessive, and that many millions have been added to the naval expenditure of this country which ought not to have been added, and which the needs of national safety do not demand, and personally, I believe firmly that that the First Lord of the Admiralty, by yielding to these demands, has inflicted a most serious injury on the Liberal party, and when the great issue which is now tying our hands and, to a large extent, paralysing us in our opposition to these great Navy Estimates has passed away and been settled, if this kind of thing goes on these Navy Estimates may be the ruin of the Liberal party.

Mr. YERBURGH

What struck me during the course of this Debate is that, while certain hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Montrose Burghs, have deprecated the opinion put forward both inside and outside this House in regard to the naval needs of the nation, the hon. Member below me and others have not scrupled to put us forward as authorities on this very question. For my part, I entrust this matter of the defence of the country to the responsible naval authorities. I think that they are the best judges of what is required. The hon. Member for Montrose Burghs, in his amusing and instructive speech, packed as it was with arithmetical problems, which, I have no doubt, the First Lord of the Admiralty will answer in due course, told the House that the Navy League has adopted as a standout of naval strength what is known as the two keels to one. One reason why that standard has been adopted, not only by the Navy League, but by other authorities, is that it is a simple one and easily understood.

Mr. LOUGH

What does it mean?

Mr. YERBURGH

The second reason is that such a standard must, in my opinion, do the invaluable work of helping to strengthen the peace party and the small armament party in Germany. Germany has developed a Navy to a great extent because she thought that we were weary of the burden. She pushes onwards, and now finds that her expenditure is wasted. If the two-keel standard is maintained it puts beyond all doubt the possibility that Germany can ever hope to rival it. If for each ship laid down by her two ships are automatically laid down by us—there is nothing provocative in that, nothing more provocative than there is in this Preamble of the German Naval Law in which the policy was declared of making it dangerous for the strongest Naval Power to contend with her. Let me say, as one connected for many years with the Navy League, that I hold as strongly as any one that peace is the greatest advantage which this country can possess. Peace is our dearest possession, and it is because we want peace that we want our Navy strong enough to ensure it.

We remember what has been said that the most effectual means of preserving peace is to prepare for war. The hon. Member for Montrose Burghs has not adopted that doctrine. His doctrine is that to go to war is the best means of preserving peace. I have heard him discuss the doctrine laid down by the Foreign Secretary, who endorsed the great idea of President Taft. But the Foreign Secretary went further than that, and indicated that such an arbitration treaty would probably carry with it the enormous responsibility of the contracting parties, in case a third party wanted to deal with either, and refused to refer the matter in dispute to arbitration, to go to war with that third party to compel it. [An HON. MEMBER: He did not say that.] As I understood the hon. Member for Montrose Burghs to-night, who gave his adhesion to that doctrine, and he went further, and I understood him to say that he would welcome Armageddon to carry out his great principle.

I want to know whether the Labour Members accept the doctrine that you are to agree to arbitration with another Power, and that under the treaty you are to bind yourselves to go to war with another country if they do not refer any matter in dispute to arbitration. I do not believe that is a path on which we should travel. I believe that the right path is to refer matters in dispute to arbitration, and not to the arbitrament of war. We have referred several matters to arbitration, and have gone far in that direction. I have here a valuable book, "The Great Illusion," written by a high authority, who says:— Are we immediately to cease preparation for war, since our defeat cannot advantage our enemy nor do us in the long run much harm? No such conclusion results from a study of the considerations elaborated' here. And as the illusion with which we are dealing does indeed dominate all those minds most active in European politics, we must, while this remains the case, regard an aggression, even such as that which Mr. Harrison foresees, as within the bounds of practical politics. On this ground alone, I deem that we or any other nation are justified in taking means of self-defence to prevent such aggression. This is not, therefore, a plea for disarmament, irrespective of the action of other nations. So long as current political philosophy in Europe remains what it is, I would not urge the reduction of our War Budget by a single sovereign.… On the contrary, I am particularly emphatic in declaring that while the present philosophy is what it is, we are bound to maintain our relative position with other Powers. I admit that as long as there is danger, as I believe there is from German aggression, we must arm. I think I am right in quoting this great authority. Admitting that we must defend ourselves, the question before the House is what is the proper level of defence to be maintained, and are we at the present time devoting too much money to our armaments. Members who have been speaking on this question and who have supported the amendment—and I would place the Member for Montrose Burghs amongst them—have shown no real grasp of the subject. They deal with these islands alone. They are very circumscribed; they cannot go beyond our own immediate shores; they cannot see as far as the Mediterranean; and the Pacific is altogether beyond their ken. In not a single speech made in criticism of these Estimates have I heard a word as to our great responsibility. Are we to put that great responsibility on one side? Are we to shut our eyes to it? What will be the position in 1915? I will put before the House what I think it will be. I have done my best to obtain correct figures. I take 1915, because in that year our treaty with Japan is due to terminate; the Kiel Canal will have been widened for the passage of the largest ships, and the Panama Canal will be completed. What is the position we find? We find that in that year the British Empire will have thirty-two "Dreadnoughts" and forty-nine pre- "Dreadnoughts; the German Empire will have twenty-five "Dreadnoughts" and twenty pre - "Dreadnoughts"; Austria four "Dreadnoughts" and six pre-"Dreadnoughts"; Italy four "Dreadnoughts "and twelve pre -" Dreadnoughts"; making for the Triple Alliance thirty-three "Dreadnoughts" as against thirty-two of the British Empire, and thirty-eight pre "Dreadnoughts" as against forty-nine of the British Empire. Two British ships are destined for Australasia, and I understand that a third is to be sent there, so that will leave ships in our home waters to the number of twenty-seven against twenty-five German. We shall have none in the Mediterranean, and we shall have none of any value in the Pacific. To get an equality in the Mediterranean and to give us a superiority of eight "Dreadnoughts" in home waters, as well as an equality of "Dreadnoughts" in the Pacific, we shall want a programme of seventeen "Dreadnoughts" in the next two years. The idea of the Navy League is that this matter, being an Imperial matter, Australasia coming into the calculations and the other colonies and India being interested, that the whole question should be referred to the Imperial Conference and considered from the Imperial point of view. We might ourselves provide six "Dreadnoughts" next year and six the year following, and the Dominions might provide five. That gives the number (seventeen) required. It seems to me that that should be brought forward at the Imperial Conference, and that the whole position should be debated there.

There are several matters which affect our own country that possibly do not affect others to the same degree. One special point is that, so far as I can observe, and so far as I know our programme, We shall never take the initiative, and therefore we must always be exposed to surprise attack that might mean the loss of two or three ships. In these days of torpedoes and so on that could happen. Then there is the question of accidents. We have recently accidents of grounding, and there is the danger as to machinery, increased dangers of submarine attack by mines, and thus there is the necessity of having in reserve a certain proportion of ships to meet those dangers. That point was very strongly emphasised by Lord Goschen when he had control of the Admiralty, and I have no doubt he spoke on the advice of competent advisers. You have got, therefore, to keep some watch over neutral Powers. I should like to ask, under those circumstances, if a superiority of eight "Dreadnoughts" in home waters can be thought to be too much, considering that the whole Empire depends on it. I desire to direct the attention of the House to the speech by Sir Joseph Ward, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, in which he told us that the time had arrived when the Empire should be joined together in defence, and that measures must be taken in consequence to deal with the situation in order to preserve the command of the sea. The position has altered. The Colonies know they are dependent on our sea Power, and they are ready to help us and do all they can to assist us to boar this enormous burden which hon. Members all unite in saying is a crushing burden. I want, as representing the Navy League, to put before the House the claim which I think the Navy League can justly raise as to the part they have played in bringing home to the great Dominions what sea power means to them. We have been told on responsible authority that in New Zealand if it had not been for the work of the Navy League there the offer made to us, and so gratefully accepted, of a great armoured ship would never have been made.

Mr. PIRIE

Has the hon. Member studied the speech closely enough to know that one of the principal conditions laid down by Sir Joseph Ward was Home Rule all round for England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales?

Mr. YERBURGH

I do not think the interruption is altogether germane.

Mr. PIRIE

It is very germane.

Mr. YERBURGH

I have told the House of what the Navy League has done. The situation has been ably dealt with, so far as he has gone, by the First Lord of the Admiralty. I cannot allow that he has gone far enough. I believe that the situation would be better met if he had laid down another "Dreadnought," and that it would have been better met if he had given us more cruisers than he has done. I think with those exceptions he has done well.

Dr. MACNAMARA

A number of questions were raised at the outset of this Debate by the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee), and if he would permit me, I would leave them over until we come to the general discussion on Monday. I refer to the questions about the Royal Marines and the Naval Medical Committee Report and the problem of Commerce Protection cruisers. I can take those questions up and reply to them on Monday. Meantime, perhaps I may be allowed to deal for a moment with the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Norwich (Mr. G. Roberts) and the Member for West Fife (Mr. Adamson). I am bound to say that I think some of the criticisms passed by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich on the statements made on this bench on 16th March, 1909, were a trifle harsh. What were those statements made by the First Lord? They were two. In the first place the First Lord said, referring to the German programme:— We anticipated that work on the 1908–9 programme would begin on four ships in August, 1908. The preparation and collection of materials began some months earlier. That was the first statement, and the second was:— I am informed, moreover, that the collection of material and the manufacture of armament, guns and mountings, have already begun for four more ships, which according to the Navy Law belong to the programme of 1909–10. 10.0 P.M.

These were statements of fact, and they have never been denied. The First Lord went on to say, as he was bound to say, that if this means building at a faster rate then at these dates Germany might have these ships. I do not see what else he could say. In this vital matter of sea defence an island people like ourselves are bound to consider every contingency. With this schedule of possibilities before us the Members of the Board of Admiralty sat down, just as any other Members of this House would do, and prepared certain proposals; those proposals were brought before the House, and the House accepted them. What is the sequel? We know now that the facts stated did not, as a matter of fact, mean a faster rate of construction. The work was anticipated, as I understand, for financial and labour reasons. We know that Germany had no intention of delivering her ships from the yards in anticipation of the date for which they were voted. Our deductions were wrong; our conjectures were ill-founded. That was all. My hon. Friends say, and they are entitled so to do, "That being so, why did you, in July, 1909, lay down the four contingent ships?" I repeat the reply given by my right hon. Friend the First Lord on Monday last. He said:— Why did I not withdraw my request for the four contingent ships when I knew that these other ships were not going to be built? The House will remember that if the larger amount of the first instalment did not mean quicker building it meant much larger ships. My right hon. Friend goes on later to say:— I availed myself of the power to build four more, and I laid down four more large ships, which would give this country six as against the German six in the spring of 1912. These are ships of the "Orion" type, the super-"Dreadnoughts." Concluding his reasoning my right hon. Friend said:— Let me turn now to my hon. Friends and ask them to consider what they have lost. They have got to make up their minds as to what they believe to be a reasonable margin of security. We have taken as a reasonable margin of security thirty of these ships as against twenty-one. The twenty-one German ships will be delivered by the shipyards in the spring of 1914. Our thirty will be completed by the same date. If they consider that not to be an unreasonable margin does it matter whether that will be reached by stages of eight, five and five, or by stages of six, six and six? I will only add this, which has been entirely overlooked. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking on 29th March, 1909, was perfectly explicit. He said:— A new situation in this country is created by the German programme. Whether that programme is carried out quickly or slowly, the fact of its existence makes a new situation. So much for the criticism of my right hon. Friend and the Board of Admiralty in respect of wrong deductions which were made from established facts. With regard to the programme for this year, on the one hand some of my hon. Friends think it makes too ample a provision, while, on the other, the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford), amongst others, thinks the provision not ample enough. It is very difficult to follow the Noble Lord in this matter. He constantly refers us to the programme which he put before the London Chamber of Commerce on 30th June, 1909, and says that he adheres to that programme in every particular. Let us see what that programme was:— I have drawn up what I think should be our shipbuilding programme in order to put this Empire by 81st March, 1914,— that is when the programme of the current year will be completed— in a state of safety with respect to what is going on abroad. My programme is as follows: ten battleships—I put battleships, they are what are called 'Dreadnoughts,' but probably they will be improved. Ill that ten are included the four which the country is asking for now when they ask for eight. The Government have only suggested four. If they put down eight I only want six. If they do not put down eight I want ten. Later on the Noble Lord proceeds:— I think it necessary to have ten more 'Dreadnoughts," which will, on 31st March, 1914, give Great Britain twenty-six to Germany's twenty-one.' That the Noble Lord thought margin? enough.

Mr. DILLON

You are giving more than the Noble Lord wants.

Lord C. BERESFORD

I am sure the hon. Gentleman does not want to misrepresent me. What he said was perfectly true, but he has omitted that I also said that "This does not allow for Austrian commencement and German acceleration, in which case I shall want six more." That is in my programme, printed everywhere.

Dr. MACNAMARA

In "The Times"?

Lord C. BERESFORD

I do not know about "The Times." It was in my programme in my speech. The fact of the matter is that this year the Government are laying down five; according to my programme, when they ought to be laying down seven. If anybody wants to see my programme they can see it.

Dr. MACNAMARA

The Noble Lord is quite right. I would be the very last to misrepresent him. I have read his programme a good many times. In any case, from the statement made in this House on the 29th March, 1909, he knew that the Germans were not going to accelerate their programme.

Lord C. BERESFORD

There was the Austrian commencement as well.

Dr. MACNAMARA

I do not know any more about the Austrian "Dreadnoughts" building than we knew and the Noble Lord knew on 30th June, 1909. But he did know the statement made on these benches on 29th March, three months earlier, as to the German acceleration. Further, in 1914 the Noble Lord wanted twenty-six to the German twenty-one. He said that, with our pre - "Dreadnoughts," with a margin, was enough for us. That is a margin of five. We have got a margin of nine. That is thirty to twenty-one. That is not enough for the Noble Lord. According to the Noble Lord's arithmetic, nine is less than five. The Noble Lord went on to say that if we laid down four contingent "Dreadnoughts "he wanted six by March, 1914. We laid them down. We have got five more in this 1910–11 programme. Therefore, so far as I can see, all he requires in the 1911–12 programme is one more.

Lord C. BERESFORD

Oh, no.

Dr. MACNAMARA

All right. I have the greatest possible admiration for the Noble Lord. He is a very kind, considerate, and sympathetic gentleman, and is always very solicitous for the lower deck. But I am bound to say that as a careful, accurate computator—not to put too fine a point upon it—I would not appoint him Director-General of the decimal point. But in regard to the Debate gene-Tally, I cannot help thinking there has been some misapprehension.

Lord C. BERESFORD

On your part.

Dr. MACNAMARA

There is clearly a miscalculation on the part of the Noble Lord. Further, in my opinion, some misapprehension generally has emerged in this Debate as to the extent of the increase in our expenditure on Navy Services in recent years. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Rochdale spoke of it as going up "by leaps and bounds, mountains high." My hon. Friend the Member for East Mayo spoke of the many millions which have been spent in recent years. The fact is that down to three years ago the actual gross expenditure upon the Naval Services of this country were masked by contributions from the Loan Fund. Take 1904–5 and compare it with last year, 1910–11. Parliament granted out of Revenue in 1904–5 for Navy purposes £36,859,681. That was the Parliamentary Grant in the Estimates. Last year Parliament granted £40,603,710. I will undertake to say that my hon. Friend will be surprised to learn that the gross expenditure in 1904–5 was actually within £27,569 of the actual gross expenditure of last year.

Mr. DILLON

I am not a bit surprised. I fought these loans.

Dr. MACNAMARA

In that particular year, 1904–5, there was a contribution by way of loan of £3,402,575. Let the House go further and observe this. In the six Estimates for which we have been responsible, the Parliamentary Grant has been augmented by loans, in all of £4,463,126. In the six Estimates prior to these the Parliamentary Grants were augmented by loan contributions by no smaller a sum than £18,052,988. Therefore, with great respect, hon. Gentlemen must please bear these facts in mind when dealing with the increase of the Navy Estimates. Notwithstanding that it is quite true that the gross expenditure now before us for 1911–12 shows an advance upon last year of £3,782,892. That is a most regretful circumstance. But it is unavoidable. Turn to the expenditures of other countries. As far as I can I will compare like with like, though I admit it is very difficult in examining these Estimates so to do. Our net expenditure ten years ago—I am dealing only with net expenditure, because I have only got the net expenditures of other countries' estimates—was £31,075,000. For 1911–12, in the Estimates before the House, the amount is £44,392,500. I admit at once that is a very considerable increase. [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear."] Yes, but why? The answer is to be found in the increased expenditures of other countries. In ten years Germany has gone from £9,530,000 to £22,042,000; the United States from £16,012,000 to £26,367,000; France—in which there has been the least advance—£13,107,000 to £16,705,000. Take these four great countries, Germany, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Put their expenditure on naval services together. Ten years ago they spent altogether £69,750,000. They are estimating to spend between them this year £109,500,000. Ten years ago our proportion of the total expenditure, which I am now dealing with, was slightly greater than the proportion which is to be found in the Estimates now before the House. I think that answers to some extent the contention that we have gone ahead with reckless profligacy. My hon. Friend, I gather, has suggested that, Radicals as we are, with "Peace, retrenchment and reform" upon our banner—[An HON. MEMBER: "Take it down."]—It does not become hon. Members opposite to gibe at us for spending money on national defence. My hon. Friend suggests that, Radicals as we are, we have been responsible for leading the van. That is his proposition.

Mr. BYLES

They are catching on.

Dr. MACNAMARA

I rather thought I understood him to say that we were setting the pace among the nations in naval armaments. No charge could be further from the truth. It could only be made by persons of short memory. Let the House not forget that in the early days of the present Administration we gave the very best evidence of our genuine desire to arrest this crushing expenditure, and I think every friend of humanity and civilisation will agree that the attempt was genuinely and bravely made, quixotically made if you like. We might be told we ought never to have made that attempt, but do not tell us when we failed that we were responsible for leading the van in this rivalry. I do not suppose that any hon. Member in this House really thinks that we are smitten with what I may call a megalomaniac endeavour to build big ships. I rather think I see something like that advanced in the Press. We have been told we have responded too confidingly to the pressure of the naval experts—that, I think, is a suggestion I have heard during these Debates—and that the naval experts probably think there is nothing like ships and guns and armaments. That, again, is hardly a just criticism. We have attached, and I myself attach, the greatest possible weight to the opinion of the naval experts; but after all it is we the Civil Members who are responsible to the Cabinet and to this House and to the country and I can assure hon. Members in all parts of the House that we enter upon our work of preparing these provisions and preparing this programme for Parliament with the greatest possible sense of our responsibilities and further, we do not propose, in any circumstances, to hide behind any expert or any number of experts.

I confess I am often rather amused at the fanciful pictures which it is becoming fashionable to draw of the Board of Admiralty. In these pictures you are to imagine the four Sea Lords assembled in the boardroom truculent and terrifying, and you are to imagine entering to them the three Civilian Members quaking and perspiring with trepidation. You are to imagine, as they enter, the First Sea Lord pointing to the programme of the year, which the Sea Lords had made entirely for themselves, and flourishing a lighted torch near a barrel of gunpowder, demanding the instant signature of the three Civilian Members, on pain of threat to blow the whole thing sky-high We might easily draw that picture from some of the comments about our position. I desire to say it bears no resemblance whatever to the truth. The Sea Lords are experts; their views carry great weight, but if any hon. Gentleman thinks the three Civilian Members—and in this connection I shall call the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lee) as a witness; he has been engaged in the same discussions—do not play their part fully and patiently and thoroughly in settling the programme of the year, I say he is woefully mistaken. I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich (Mr. George Roberts) and my hon. Friend the Member for West Fife (Mr. Adamson), whose maiden speech I was very glad to have heard, will accept the assurance from me that when I put my name to these Estimates I did not believe I was doing something which would be a menace to peace or to national security. As a matter of fact, I believed, and still believe, the absolute opposite to be the truth. I concur in the opinion of the late Sir Henry Camp-bell-Bannerman, who said in March, 1907:— If our fleets be invulnerable, they carry with them no menace across the waters of the world but a message of the most cordial goodwill. I have already said that I deplore these growing burdens, and I hail with delight the very remarkable speech of the Foreign Secretary on Monday night, a delight not confined to this House or this country. I was very sorry to hear my hon. Friend the Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon) suggest that the declaration of the Foreign Secretary was a red herring drawn across the trail. I think that was a rather unworthy suggestion. I do not know how the Foreign Secretary's speech affected other hon. Members, but to me it seemed as though a ray of hope, a ray of promise, and a ray of sunshine had flashed across the dark waters of a troubled sea, and I am not ashamed to say that for the moment it took me right out of my necessary part of comparing battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, muzzle-velocities, armour plates, battle practices, and range-finders, and all the rest of it.

But whilst cherishing these ideals to which I think the Foreign Secretary's speech gave some hope of realisation, my immediate duty is to take the world as I find it, and my humble view is, so far from endangering peace and national security an invulnerable British Navy is the sheet-anchor of both. Taking the world as it is, and not yielding in the slightest degree to my hon. Friends in my desire as to what it ought to be, the conclusion is regretfully forced on me—and I say it with great deliberation—that if I want peace, if I want national security, if I want to try and develop the great ideal of President Taft, which was endorsed by the Foreign Secretary, if I want a quiet time in which to prosecute social reform, which I agree is very urgent, I am more likely to get all these things and that quiet time if our defences are strong than I should be if they were weak. Here we are, 44,000,000 of us on two small islands. Our tables and our cupboards vitally depend upon sea-borne food supplies, our daily occupation is vitally dependent upon seaborne raw material, and our prosperity as the greatest commercial country in the world is dependent upon keeping the seaway clear. The hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. A. G. Harvey) is an advocate of Free Trade, and I endorse what he said on that point, but what is the good of Free Trade if the sea-way is not kept clear? Last year £1,212,000,000 worth of food and raw material and manufactured goods came to these shores and left these shores. Take the last two months, January and February of this year. There came into the ports of these two small islands: of grain and flour 9¾ millions worth; of meat, animals, food, and poultry 8¼ million worth; of butter, cheese, eggs, fish, fruit vegetables, and so on, 11¾ millions worth of tea, sugar, coffee, cocoa, dried fruits and so on, seven millions worth—36¾ millions worth of food and drink, leaving our wines, spirits, and tobacco, in two months Dislocate that vital supply and who would be the first people to suffer? The very working classes whom my hon. Friends with such ability and patience so worthily represent in this House. I repeat that I deplore these crushing burdens. I deplore this mad rivalry which civilisd people are pursuing; and I rejoice we have a man big enough and brave enough to make the speech which the Foreign Secretary made last Monday. But, as we stand, and situated as we are, there is no question, there can be no question, as to the vital obligations resting upon us to make our Navy supreme for the defence of our commerce on the high seas, our honour abroad, and our free institutions here and in our oversea Dominions. That being the case, we cannot allow our supremacy upon the high seas to be challenged for one moment. That, as I see it, and I have no doubt hon. Members will agree, is our reading of the law of self-preservation. I am in entire agreement with my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this matter. In a character sketch in the "Review of Reviews" in September last my right hon. Friend said:— Our naval supremacy, living as we do from day to day on food brought from over-sea, and with no conscript army of millions to defend our country, is a matter of life and death. We do not argue about it. We maintain it and must go on maintaining is against all challengers, even if it comes to the spending of our last penny. He added later on:— we are open for a deal. We are anxious for a deal; but no matter how heavily we may be pressed, we shall never be driven to surrender a position which—our rivals being themselves judges—is essential for our continued existence as an independent State; the basis of any such deal must of necessity be the maintenance of that immunity that we cannot risk by any arrangement. That is the case for these Estimates in a nutshell.

Mr. DILLON

He said nothing about the number of "Dreadnoughts."

Dr. MACNAMARA

I can summarise my convictions very shortly. I have said I deplore this vast expenditure. I will hail with pleasure and gladly consider any means by which, consistent with the security of this Empire, this burden can be reduced. I quote with great pleasure a statement made by the Leader of the Opposition on 5th March, 1907. This is what he said:— I think the right hon. Gentleman (the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman) was loudly and properly cheered when he expressed his aversion to the growing burden of armaments in this country and all other countries. I do not suppose there is a single man in this House who dissents from the aspirations he expressed. I am ready and I am sure my hon. Friend (Mr. Lee) is ready to go further and to say that, if the right hon. Gentlemen through the Hague Conference or by any other machinery, can really find a method by which, consistently with the security of the Empire, this burden can be diminished, he will receive the unanimous and grateful thanks of every section of the community, whatever may be their political creed. I say I agree. We all agree. I desire to see international friendships cemented. I desire to see international difficulties settled by peaceful arbitration, but while I cherish that idea, and will do all I can to promote it, as Secretary to the Admiralty I am bound to look facts square in the face. I have done so, and these Estimates are the result. They do not satisfy extreme views on either side. There are those who think the provision too small; there are some who deem it to be too Ample. My own view is that the great mass of public opinion in this country disagrees with both those views, and thinks the Estimates sufficient. I think public opinion is right. Let me express a hope that we may now be allowed to get Mr. Speaker out of the Chair and to set up Committee. It will still be possible then to continue the discussion. These are not Estimates of provocation or aggression; they carry with them no menace; if they did, we would not be a party to them. They are Estimates of self-defence and self-preservation, and it is with that conviction I helped to frame them; and in that spirit I commend them to this House of Commons.

Mr. LOUGH

May I—

Mr. McKENNA

May I make an appeal to my right hon. Friend to allow us to get Mr. Speaker out of the Chair. We can continue the discussion afterwards much better, if only my right hon. Friend will now allow the Division to be taken.

Mr. LOUGH

Before I acquiesce in that I should like to make one statement. This is the day of private Members, but we have had very little of it owing to the maintenance of a custom which I protested against—in a good-humoured way, I hope. But the fact is Ministers have largely taken possession of the day. I am not going to press the matter or to put my right hon. Friend to the slightest inconvenience, but I wish to place it on record that this occasion has been usurped, like so many others, by the Front Benches, and it would have been more convenient for the general business of the House and of the country if we who are entitled to the day had got it. All we ask is an opportunity of stating our opinion. That is what we are sent to Parliament for, and if we are only given the opportunities to which we are entitled we "hall not damage the prospects of Liberalism.

Mr. DICKINSON

I wish respectfully to make my protest against the action of the Front Bench. Some of us have always voted in the minority on this question. But during the last five or six years we have had no opportunity of giving full expression to the feelings of this House, as whenever the opportunity should have arisen there has been a division in which the real feeling of this party has had no chance of being expressed. As one who is going to vote against the Government on this occasion, who did so on a former occasion, and who expects to do so on a future occasion, I object to not having an opportunity of stating my reasons for doing so.

Mr. MORTON

I do not want to stop the Vote being taken, because I want to get home myself, but I know a lot of my hon. Friends want to protest against the way in which we are treated by the Government. Every effort is made by them, and every power is used to prevent us getting up a discussion. I do not mean a mere party discussion, but one from a business point of view. It is very probable that after this appeal by the Minister to-night to take this Vote, when we want an answer from him later on he will then be away. It is no good for the right hon. Gentleman to shake his head, although I cannot say what is in it, I just want to mention that twelve months "go something similar occurred and I wanted to bring a matter before the Minister. It was with regard to the destruction of fishermen's nets. I gave the right hon. Gentleman notice, and also his secretary and the Whips, but when I got a chance later on the following day of mentioning the matter the right hon. Gentleman was away. He had left the House and never answered me at all. I do not think this is fair treatment, and that is not the only occasion. I should like to warn the Government. We are no doubt quiet because we want to do away with the Lords' Veto, hut when the occasion comes we shall not allow ourselves as honest Liberals to be trifled with.

Mr. PETO

I do not want to detain the House more than a very few minutes, but I do want to say one word in support of the hon. Member for Sutherland (Mr. Morton), who said that we were entitled to a little business discussion on this question. I also want to refer to one thing that the Secretary to the Admiralty said. He was extremely anxious to prove the Admiralty's case in relation to this Resolution before the House, and he pointed out that during the last ten years, comparing our proportion of the naval expenditure of Europe with the proportion of other European nations we positively spent slightly less to-day than we were spending ten years ago. I venture to think that, in his anxiety to prove his case in relation to this Resolution to his hon. Friends opposite, he has entirely proved our case that we are spending an inadequate amount. I ask the House to couple what the Secretary to the Admiralty said with what fell from the First Lord a little earlier. He referred to the fact that we had a gigantic Fleet of ships to scrap, and said that none of the other European nations were in the same position. If, therefore, we are spending less in proportion to other nations than we were spending ten years ago, when we were not in the postion of having an entire Navy to scrap, it absolutely proves our contention that the Estimates before the House are wholly inadequate.

The second point I want to touch on is the question the Secretary to the Admiralty took up in relation to the Noble Lord (Lord Charles Beresford). There was a little difference of opinion. The Noble Lord made it perfectly clear that in that pronouncement before the Chamber of Commerce he said he had not taken into consideration the Austrian and the Italian programmes. Taking them into consideration his figures were entirely different. The Secretary to the Admiralty skated round that point with extreme dexterity, and managed entirely to evade it. It seems to me to be a very simple proposition. It is whether twenty-nine to twenty-nine is exactly the same thing as twenty-nine to twenty-one. If there are to be eight "Dreadnoughts" or their equivalent in the Mediterranean, we have to decide whether we are to leave the Mediterranean absolutely unguarded and leave the great channels of the food supplies and raw materials of the Empire absolutely open and uncontested. If we are to do that then only we may be said to have twenty-nine to twenty-one. If we are to see that British interests in the Mediterranean are defended equally with British interests in others parts of the world, and in other seas the proposition is whether twenty-nine to twenty-nine is the same thing as twenty-nine to twenty - one. I should like to remind the House how in March last year the Secretary to the Admiralty dealt with this question of the scrapping policy. The only thing that interested the hon. Gentleman was who began it. The Noble Lord said: "It was the Unionists who scrapped them." The Secretary to the Admiralty replied: "Now we have it definitely from the Noble Lord, and it will be a great advantage to us to know it was the Unionists." That is the attitude of the Front Bench on a great many of these great naval and Imperial questions. If only they can put the blame on the other side all is well, and they hope to make a splendid platform point. I thought at the time, and I think now, that this question of the protection of our trade routes is one which transcends practically every other naval question, and it has this enormous merit, that it is a question with regard to which we need not make any invidious comparison with any foreign country whatsoever. Our interests in the trade of the world oversea and our interests in maintaining our food supply are on an entirely different basis from that of any other country in the world. Therefore, if they take this petty party point on such a question as to whether our trade routes are adequately protected or not, I do not think we on this side of the House who differ from these Estimates need go any further for a reason for voting against the Government.

What is the position with regard to this cruiser question? I do not pretend to speak with any naval knowledge whatever. I leave the question of our battleship programme and what our "Dreadnoughts" and super-"Dreadnoughts" are capable of doing in the able hands of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Arthur Lee), and the Noble Lord (Lord Charles Beresford). I appeal to the House to listen to me on the point of view stated by the hon. Member for Sutherland (Mr. Morton), namely, the business point of view. I have been connected with one or two businesses, and I have been an ardent advocate of the scrapping policy where machinery is worn out and has ceased to serve its purpose. I have never recommended scrapping to a board of directors without being able to answer the obvious question, What are you going to replace it with? The Unionist party began the scrapping policy, and the First Lord gave a tribute this afternoon to the prescience of those who were in power when it began. He pointed out that the Navy Estimates could not have been kept down as they have been without this scrapping policy. I ask the House to consider whether the policy which lays down four cruisers where we laid down five last year, with an expenditure of £111,000 less for the construction of these cruisers, is a policy of adequate replacement of the large number scrapped in the past. The right hon. Gentleman referred to them as small cruisers of 4,000 tons. I agree with him that a vessel of that size cannot be in the ordinary sense of the word called a small one, but compared with the duties they have to perform they are small.

There is only one other point I want to make, and that is with respect to the question of standard. We have had the question of the two-Power standard, and the question of constructing on the basis of two keels to one. The ordinary elector and the plain business man are not naval experts, and it is on behalf of people who do not pretend to understand these details of the decimal point in the size of a gun, the tonnage of ships, and the number of men, that we appeal. They can understand the two-Power standard

and two keels to one, and I ask the House to consider what possible security and freedom the ordinary citizen will feel in, the standard described by the right hon. Gentleman. The First Lord said we cannot secure that freedom unless our Navy is supreme as against any foreign Navy, and as against any reasonably probable combination which we might have to meet singlehanded. What is a reasonably probable combination? Has not any Government the right to form an opinion upon that, and has not any Member of the House the right to form his opinion upon it? In the course of this Debate we have heard of the Triple Alliance, and it has been asked whether it is a reasonably probable combination. My last words on the question of this newfangled naval standard which we presumably have to accept for the present, are these: We have heard, at Monte Carlo and other places, of systems which are capable of withstanding any possible conceivable run of figures or of combinations which may come against them. The almost universal experience is that although they think it is all right, and that they can meet with any conceivable probable combination and win, it generally breaks down on account of the forces that come up against it which they did not expect. If it is a bad thing for this country to model its constitution on the basis of Costa Rica, it is a worse thing still to adopt as a standard of naval policy a system that will not work at Monte Carlo.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

The House divided: Ayes, 216; Noes, 54.

Division No. 71.]	AYES.	[10.55 p.m.
Acland, Francis Dyke	Beresford, Lo'd Charles	Craig, Herbert J. (Tynemouth)
Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R.	Bigland, Alfred	Craig, Captain James (Down, E.)
Agnew, George William	Bird, Alfred	Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet)
Allen, A. A. (Dumbartonshire)	Booth, Frederick Handel	Crawshay-Williams, Eliot
Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud)	Bridgman, William Clive	Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninlan
Anstruther-Gray, Major William	Brocklehurst, William B.	Croft, Henry Page
Astor, Waldorf	Burn, Colonel C. R.	Dalrymple, Viscount
Baird, John Lawrence	Burns, Rt. Hon. John	Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth)
Baker, Sir Randolf L. (Dorset, N.)	Buxton, Noel (Norfolk, North)	Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.)
Balcarres, Lord	Carlile, Edward Hildred	Dawes, J. A.
Baldwin, Stanley	Carr-Gomm, H. W.	Denman, Hon. R. D.
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (City Lond.)	Cautley, Henry Strother	Dixon, Charles Harvey
Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark)	Cave, George	Duncan, C. (Barrow-in-Furness)
Banbury, Sir Frederick George	Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich)	Duncan, J. Hastings (York, Otley)
Barnston, H.	Cawley, H. T. (Lanes. Hey wood)	Edwards, Sir Francis (Radnor)
Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick)	Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford Univ.)	Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid)
Barran, Rowland Hirst (Leeds, N.)	Chaloner, Col. R. G. W.	Eyres-Monsell, Bolton M.
Barry, Redmond John (Tyrone, N.)	Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry	Falle, Bertram Godfray
Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton)	Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S.	Fell, Arthur
Beauchamp, Edward	Cooper, Richard Ashmole	Ferens, Thomas Robinson
Beck, Arthur Cecil	Corbett, A. Cameron	Fleming, Valentine
Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich)	Cornwall, Sir Edwin A	Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead)
Benn, W. (T. H'mts., St. George)	Courthope, George Loyd	France, Gerald Ashburner
Bennett-Goldney, Francis	Cowan, W. H	Furness, Stephen
Bentham, George Jackson	Craig, Charles Curtis (Antrim, S.)	Gastrell, Major W. Houghton
Gibbs, George Abraham	Mills, Hon. Charles Thomas	Scott, Leslie (Liverpool, Exchange)
Gibson, Sir James Puckering	Molteno, Percy Alport	Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B.
Goldsmith, Frank	Money, L. G. Chiozza	Shortt, Edward
Goulding, Edward Alfred	Morgan, Gorge Hay	Simon, Sir John Allsebrook
Greig, Colonel James William	Morpeth, Viscount	Smith, F. E. (Liverpool, Walton)
Gretton, John	Morrison-Bell, Capt. E. F. (Ashburton)	Smith, Harold (Warrington)
Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward	Morton, Alpheus Cleophas	Soares, Ernest
Hall, Fred (Dulwich)	Mount, William Arthur	Stanier, Beville
Hamersley, Alfred St. George	Murray, Capt. Hon. Arthur C.	Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston)
Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington)	Neilson, Francis	Starkey, John Ralph
Harmsworth, R. Leicester	Neville, Reginald J. N.	Stewart, Gershom
Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry	Nield, Herbert	Strauss, Arthur (Paddington, North)
Haworth, Arthur A.	Norman, Sir Henry	Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West)
Hayward, Evan	Norton, Captain Cecil W.	Swift, Rigby
Helmsley, Viscount	O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid)	Talbot, Lord Edmund
Henry, Sir Charles S	Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A.	Tennant, Harold John
Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy	Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William	Terrell, George (Wilts, N. W.)
Hughes, Spencer Leigh	Paget, Almeric Hugh	Terrell, Henry (Gloucester)
Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan)	Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington)	Thynne, Lord Alexander
Isaacs, Sir Rufus Daniel	Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham)	Tobin, Alfred Aspinall
Jones, William (Carnarvonshire)	Perkins, Walter Frank	Toulmin, George
Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney)	Peto, Basil Edward	Trevelyan, Charles philips
Kebty-Fletcher, J. R.	Pole-Carew, Sir R.	Valentia, Viscount
King, Joseph (Somerset, North)	Pollock, Ernest Murray	Walton, Sir Joseph
Kinloch-Cooke Sir Clement	Priestley, Sir Arthur (Grantham)	Ward, A. S. (Herts, Watford)
Lambert, George (Devon, S. Moiton)	Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.)	Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent)
Lee, Arthur Hamilton	Radford, George Heynes	Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton)
Levy, Sir Maurice	Raffan, Peter Wilson	Waring, Walter
Lewis, John Herbert	Rainy, Adam Rolland	Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay
Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbruy)	Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel	Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan)
Logan, John William	Rawson, Col. Richard H.	Webb, H.
Long, Rt. Hon. Walter	Rea, Rt. Hon. Russell (South Shields)	Wheler, Granville C. H.
Lyell, Charles Henry	Rendall, Athelstan	White, Sir Luke (York E. R.)
Lyttelton, Hon. J. C. (Droitwich)	Rice, Hon. Walter Fitz-Uryan	Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P.
Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J.	Richardson, Albion (Peckham)	Whyte, A. F. (Perth)
M'Curdy, Charles Albert	Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln)	Wiles, Thomas
McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald	Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs.)	Williams, Penry (Middlesbrough)
M'Laren, H. D. (Leices.)	Roe, Sir Thomas	Williamson, Sir A.
M'Laren, Walter S. B. (Ches., Crewe)	Ronaldshay, Earl of	Willoughby, Major Hon. Claude
M'Micking, Major Gilbert	Rose, Sir Charles Day	Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull, W.)
Magnus, Sir Philip	Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter	Wood, Hon. E. F. L. (Yorks, Ripon)
Markham, Arthur Basil	Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby)	Wood, T. M'Kinnon (Glasgow)
Masterman, C. F. G.	St. Maur, Harold	Yate, Colonel C. E.
Mathias, Richard	Salter, Arthur Clavell	Yerburgh, Robert
Menzies, Sir Walter	Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland)	Young, William (Perth, East)
Meysey-Thompson, E. C.	Sanders, Robert Arthur
Middlemore, John Throgmorten	Sanderson, Lancelot	TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Master of Elibank and Mr. Gulland.
Millar, James Duncan	Schwann, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles E.
NOES.
Adamson, William	Hardie, J. Keir (Merthyr Tydvil)	Pirie, Duncan Vernon
Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.)	Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale)	Pointer, Joseph
Barnes, George N.	Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.)	Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.
Barton, William	Haslam, James (Derbyshire)	Richards, Thomas
Bowerman, C. W.	Henderson, Arthur (Durham)	Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven)
Brace, William	Higham, John Sharp	Rowntree, Arnold
Brunner, John F. L.	Hudson, Walter	Sherwell, Arthur James
Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas	John, Edward Thomas	Smith, Albert (Lanes., Clitheroe)
Byles, William Pollard	Jones, Leif Straften (Notts, Rushcliffe)	Snowden, Philip
Clynes, John R.	Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade)	Thomas, James Henry (Derby)
Collins, Stephen (Lambeth)	Lansbury, George	Thorne, William (West Ham)
Dickinson, W. H.	Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rld., Cockerm'th)	Wadsworth, J.
Edwards, Enoch (Hanley)	Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas	Wardle, G. J.
Esslemont, George Birnie	Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester)	White, Sir George (Norfolk)
Fenwick, Charles	Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs)	Wilkie, Alexander
Gill, Alfred Henry	M'Callum, John M.	Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton)
Glanville, Harold James	Martin, Joseph
Goldstone, Frank	Mason, David M. (Coventry)	TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. G. Roberts and Mr. Parker.
Hancock, John George	O'Grady, James

Main Question put, and agreed to.