DECLARATION OF LONDON.

HC Deb 28 June 1911 vol 27 cc434-548

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made and Question proposed, "That this Bill be now read a second time."

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. McKinnon Wood)

In rising to move the Second Reading of this Bill I may point out to the House that part of the Bill is a consolidation of prize practice and is similar to the draft which was prepared about seven years ago. That part of the Bill is non-controversial, and I do not suppose that any point will arise upon. it except possibly in the Committee stage. The important part of the Bill is that which deals with the necessary alteration of prize practice in view of the establishment of an international Prize Court of Appeal. The House is. aware that the Government consider that the questions of the establishment of an. international Prize Court and the provision of rules under the Declaration of London are closely connected questions, and therefore some months ago the Govern- ment promised that on the Second Reading of the Bill full opportunity should be given to the House for the discussion of these two important international agreements. I do not think that the severest critic of the Government will raise the question that sufficient time has not been given for the discussion of this matter. There has been the fullest and most vigorous discussion. I suppose no international instrument has ever been discussed in the same way. We have had discussion which has been both legitimate and illegitimate. I am not an admirer of the exhibition of picture posters as a method of controversy in many cases, but I think the House will agree that it never was resorted to with more ludicrous inappropriateness than in dealing with a question of international law. The delay that has taken place has been, of course, increased by the desire which was expressed that this matter should be considered by the Imperial Conference before a decision was taken by the House. When the Commonwealth of Australia expressed a desire that this matter should be discussed at the Imperial Conference, together with the larger question of the desirability of consulting the Dominions in matters of international agreement which affect any of them, the Government immediately acceded to the request. On the broad general question, as the House is aware the statement of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs entirely satisfied the representatives of the Dominions. On the special question of these agreements the discussion was extremely interesting and valuable, not merely because it resulted in a resolution in favour of ratification but because it showed that the question had been critically weighed by the Dominion statesmen, and that they had come to this country prepared to deliver well considered opinions upon it. The representatives of Now Zealand regarded these agreements as a great advance in international law. Sir Joseph Ward said:— There has been on the part of those opposed to the Declaration a strong and persistent effort made to influence the opinions and judgment of the representatives of the overseas Dominions attending this Conference, and after weighing the opinions of those whose opinion is considered worthy of respect, and examining the matter carefully for myself, I have arrived at the conclusion that the Declaration of London now before us is better in the general interests of the British Empire, either as a neutral or as a belligerent, than the conditions existing at present. And the other representative of New Zealand, a man extremely well qualified to speak on this subject, a trained international lawyer, Sir John Findlay, who had considered the matter in New Zealand, and delivered a very weighty and important speech in favour of the Declaration in New Zealand before he came to this country, after dealing with the details of the Declaration, came to the conclusion that in every respect the Declaration of London was one of the best things that had been done for British commerce for very many years. The Prime Ministers of Canada approved of these agreements themselves, and welcomed them as a step forward in international agreement, in which Canada has a great and special interest. The Prime Minister of Newfoundland was also strongly in favour of the agreements. The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa looked at the matter especially from the point of view of that Dominion, and pointed out how these agreements would improve the position of that Dominion in the event of war by allowing the free importation of food and, indeed, everything but conditional contraband, in neutral vessels through neutral ports, and he pointed out that this great benefit to South Africa was due to the abandonment of the doctrine of continuous voyage as applied to conditional contraband. The Prime Minister of Australia, while abstaining from voting, expressed a clear and decided opinion on general grounds that the Convention establishing the International Convention and the Declaration of London ought to be ratified. So there was no dissentient at the Imperial Conference from the opinion that these agreements ought to be ratified.

I think the House is well aware that the opponents of the Declaration have no ground for reproaching themselves for having omitted any opportunity, public or private, of pressing their views before the Dominion representatives. Therefore, we find that after the fullest consideration not only the British Government, but the Governments of the self-governing Dominions, are of opinion that it is desirable that this agreement should be ratified. It is not very long since we were urged to take the opinion of the Dominions. That was the great cry of the opponents of the Declaration. Now, after reading recent manifestoes and speeches on the question and after reading the speech delivered yesterday, what do we find? We find a censensus of silence on the subject of the Dominions. Were we only urged to listen to them when it was hoped that their views would be adverse? Are their opinions to be ignored when they are found to be favourable? That is not very respectful to our great Dominions. The worst thing I think that could happen to this country and this empire would be if we got into the habit of treating our Dominions as pawns in a party game. I gather from the Amendments of which notice has been given and the speeches which were delivered yesterday that the idea is that this matter should be referred to a Royal Commission. One hon. Member has suggested that there should be a Committee of admirals and business men, with a few international lawyers as assessors. An admirable idea!

I should be the last man in the Government to throw a slight upon business men. [An HON. MEMBER: "Not on admirals, I hope."] Well, I never knew a subject upon which admirals were agreed. I should be the last man to throw a slight upon business men, but I think that they must feel that it is the grossest flattery to regard them as experts in international law. I think they will hardly regard that as a compliment even when it comes from the hon. and learned Member for York (Mr. Butcher). No. I think that the proposal of a Royal Commission or a Committee is the very worst possible way that could be conceived of dealing with international questions like this. How would such action appear in the eyes of other nations? It is legitimate in domestic affairs in the case of a measure you want to get rid of to refer it to the lethal chamber of a Royal Commission. It might not do any particular harm in that case. But in international agreements I want to know if it is a policy that will commend itself to the serious judgment of right hon. Gentlemen opposite? It is an entirely novel precedent. Is it one which they will take the responsibility of approving? It is a very serious thing to bring discredit on the British Government in regard to international agreements. The effects remain after the particular administration has passed away. The injury is not to a Liberal administration: it is to the British Government. What is the Commission to consider? (1) the decisions of an international conference summoned by the British Government to meet in London, and (2) the desirability of establishing an international Prize Court proposed by the British Government and never dissented from until lately by the Opposition?

At the Naval Conference we chose our experts, who very ably represented us. Lord Desart, a very eminent British jurist, was the chairman. Questions were asked in this House as if the Admiralty had never been consulted. Whom did we appoint as representatives of the Admiralty? The Secretary of the Defence Committee who had been director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Sir C. Ottley, and the director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Sir E. Slade, represented the Admiralty. If the Secretary of the Defence Committee and the director of Naval Intelligence are not acquainted with the views of the Admiralty, I wonder who is acquainted with them. The representatives of the Foreign Office were Mr. Hurst and Sir Eyre Crowe. At our invitation the foreign Powers sent their representatives. After prolonged discussion, in which were displayed reasonableness and goodwill, agreement was arrived on many points on which there had been great divergence of view. Now we are invited to throw the whole thing over and appoint a Royal Commission. What sort of a reply is a future British Government, whether Conservative or Liberal, to expect to receive when next it wishes to call a conference or when next it wishes to submit any important proposal to the conference at The Hague? Do not you think that the other nations would say, "We prefer not to waste our time. You did not know your own minds when you called the last conference. Have you had your Royal Commission? Do you not think you had better have it first?" [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I thought I should get these cheers, but I will ask right hon. Gentlemen who have been responsible for the Government whether before an international conference is summoned they will find it a convenient thing to have a Royal Commission sitting in public, tieing our hands in every detail? Is that the way right hon. Gentlemen, who have had anything to do with the conduct of foreign affairs, will proceed when it is desired to have an international agreement? I do not think so. I think other nations would say something still harsher if such a proposal were carried. They would say that Britain's idea of an international agreement was a code which she herself drew up without consulting anybody else.

In these agreements we took the initiative. We are doubly interested as the greatest naval Power, and as the greatest maritime Power carrying half the oversea commerce of the world. I wish to remind the House of the immediate historical causes which led to these proposals, because they are very relevant, they are extremely important and they are often overlooked. The experience of recent wars has impressed upon the British Government the fact that in naval matters international law is in a state of complete uncertainty and chaos. There was no international law, there was no agreement, and there was endless divergence of opinion, and from that state of affairs we were the principal sufferers. The events of the Russo-Japanese War revealed the fact that there was great danger and inconvenience to British commerce arising from the uncertainty of international law, and it also revealed the inadequacy of the means of obtaining redress, short of force. The Unionist Government was in power at that time; I do not mention the fact with a view to any criticism. They did not resort to force, or threaten force, and they probably were perfectly right and were considering the larger interests of the country. I think there were five British ships, two German ships and one Danish ship destroyed by the Russian fleet. I believe there are Members in the House now who were interested in those ships. They were the "Knight Commander" "Ikhona," "Oldhamia," "St. Kilda," and "Hipsang." With regard to Japan we had not such serious ground of complaint, but in regard to food the decisions of the Japanese courts were not in accordance with our view. In the case of the "Pehping," carrying rice to Newchang, the Prize Courts condemned her cargo on the ground that there were Russian troops there who could oat rice, although there was no presumption that the rice was going to any but the peaceful natives of the place. The case of the "Hsiping" was very similar. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition remembers, as do others, that there was an enormous outcry at the sinking of British ships by the Russians. Both he and Lord Lansdowne, who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, were beset by people seeking interviews, and deputations of the most important chambers of commerce and shipping and underwriting associations were received. The underwriters had an enormous interest in this question, seeing that they insured foreign as well as British goods and ships. They pointed out that while they were not concerned in the war they were having to run undefined war risks. What was to happen to them was a thing they could not find out. They had to depend on the views of a foreign belligerent State. They pointed out that trade with Japan was paralysed, and that it was necessary to get a further definition of what was contraband. Lord Lansdowne listened to them with sympathy, and he said that it was essential that we should have a clearer definition of what is contraband. He used the word "essential." But he added that he could not go into this question while the war was actually in progress. That was cold comfort for them. The British Government protested, but what remedy was that for the British shipowner, the underwriter, or the exporter? He could plead his case in a Russian Prize Court. The Prize Courts of Russia gave decisions, not according to British doctrines, but according to the regulations of the Russian Admiralty. If dissatisfied with the decision, the parties could appeal to another Prize Court in Russia, also administered according to the regulations of the Russian Admiralty. It seems to be forgotten that whenever we are neutral and other nations are at war, our cases are judged by the Prize Courts of the belligerents. Some of these cases are not settled yet.

There came an opportunity of dealing with this matter in a time of peace, which Lord Lansdowne suggested was the proper time, when the second Peace Conference met in 1907. The Government then proposed to give neutrals the power of appealing from the Prize Courts of the belligerents to an International Prize Court, and the nations represented agreed to that proposal. It arose, not out of theory, but out of a grave practical difficulty, as a remedy for serious evils which now seem to be forgotten, or at least ignored by most of our critics. But when we came to discuss the matter at The Hague, the discussion showed more clearly than ever the extraordinary vagueness and uncertainty of international law. There was grave divergence of views between the great Powers—it was evident that doctrines were held which would probably in the future, as in the past, be extremely damaging to us. That showed that it was mere foolishness to argue as critics do-now—it is the basis of argument of most of the chambers of commerce—that our commerce is now protected by some excellent doctrines of British jurists which are repudiated by other Powers.

The Government were not prepared to submit the interests of Great Britain or its commerce to the uncertain interpretation of international law. They felt that the establishment of a court of appeal would not meet with general acceptance so long as vagueness and uncertainty existed as to the principle which the court would apply. Therefore, the Naval Conference of London was called. What was the avowed object of the Naval Conference? It was to arrive at an agreement as to what are the general and recognised principles of international law; to get an agreed statement of existing international law. That was the object of the conference, and was well worth doing. I think we did more, and that we got an improvement of the existing practice. The leading naval Powers, before the meeting of this conference, sent in memoranda explaining their views. Some stated what they considered to be the existing international law, and some what they proposed should be the international law decided by the conference. You cannot read these memoranda without again recognising the immense divergency of opinion which existed. There was hardly a point on which every nation was agreed; and on some points there were nearly as many opinions as there were nations.

4.0 P.M.

I should like to say a few words as to the difficulties which have arisen in discussing this question. The first difficulty that has arisen is the persistent ignoring of the essential factors of the problem. There is the practice of foreign countries in the first place. This is a matter of the greatest importance, because until we have an International Court of Appeal and agreed rules, we have to fight our cases in the Prize Courts of the belligerent who has done the injury; and, again, when belligerents, we may be hampered by the view of some other Power. The second difficulty arises from the very nature of the subject. It would arise if we had a Royal Commission, whose report on the Declaration would have to be weighed and considered from different points of view. It is very easy now to say that this provision could be very much improved to safeguard British trade. You have got to ask yourselves another question, how would that improvement affect our position as belligerents? We have interests of a neutral character, enormous interests, because we carry goods all over the world, foreign as well as British goods, and because we insure foreign as well as British property. We are interested as belligerents in the right of captors to stop the carriage of contraband to the enemy. On the other hand, we have a great interest in the free access of neutrals to our shores. Our interests are so many sided that we cannot afford to take a one-sided view.

I would venture to impress this consideration upon the House. If you had your Royal Commission or your Committee of admirals and business men, or any other tribunal, and if you were considering this question from the point of view of Great Britain alone, and if you were paying no attention to the doctrines and wishes of other countries, but, of course, bearing in mind that every licence you assumed you must give to other nations and every restriction you put on other nations you must observe yourself, if you were trying to draw a code without regard to anybody else you would have so to weigh and balance each article that I think you would find that your code would be open to most of the criticisms that are directed against the Declaration of London, and to all the criticisms that come from critics who look at this matter from a single point of view. Of course, the House will recognise that the tasks of our delegates and the British Government who instructed them and are responsible was a much more difficult one. They had to obtain agreement amid divergent views. You cannot judge this matter fairly without taking a broad and balanced view of the Declaration of London as a whole. The real question is—are these agreements an improvement upon the present position? Do we gain or lose by them. Yet I constantly find critics who attack us in the same document (1) because we have not secured absolute immunity for our own commerce, and (2), because we have not secured an absolutely free hand to deal with other people's commerce. Really, I think that describes some of the speeches we have heard. Many critics have just wakened up to the fact that a war would entail consequences highly inconvenient to other people besides sailors and soldiers, and that the ordinary routine of oversea commerce would not proceed without some special risks. They say "such and such a highly inconvenient thing would happen under the Declaration of London—do not ratify it." But they ignore the fact that the same highly inconvenient thing, or perhaps a much more inconvenient thing, might happen without the Declaration.

I will give the House an example. Business men have come to us and said, "In our business, as you know, the goods are conditional contraband, and you are aware that the practice is to bring cargoes of grain and a great many other things to ports of call, and the ship carries no papers that would show her ultimate destination." They say: "Is that safe under the Declaration of London?" The answer is "No," and it would not be safe without the Declaration of London. You cannot carry on commerce in time of war with the same comfort and safety as in time of peace. I do not claim that the Declaration of London will make a time of war like a time of peace, but I think that it will remove many uncertainties and great difficulties which now hamper commerce.

One of the most familiar arguments, and one which every Member of the House must have heard, is that under the Declaration of London Continental Powers can bring in food by land, at greater cost but safely, and that we can only do so by sea. Monstrous that we should be at such a disadvantage! As if the Declaration of London had created the geographical facts. You cannot by any Naval agreement, or by any Naval force if you refuse all agreements, prevent a Continental Power from bringing in food and everything else over her land frontier. I venture respectfully to agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in what he said about the advantages of being an island and the disadvantages of being an island and especially with his observation that you cannot alter that fact for good or evil by any agreement.

One of the favourite arguments used by more ingenious people in this controversy is one which I confess I have the very greatest difficulty in following. It is that by establishing an International Court and agreeing to fixed rules we have given up any advantage which might have arisen in some not very clearly explained way from the protests of neutrals against the action of belligerents. As the Marquess of Salisbury said in another place:— As a matter of fact a belligerent would be effecttively controlled by the public opinion of the neutral Powers. I do not admit that. I do not think that experience shows anything of the kind. I cannot understand why, if this were so, we should be pleased, we of all nations in the world. I must insist we have to consider our position as belligerents. We all expect, with the utmost confidence, if we are engaged in war, that we shall be the Power which will carry on the most extensive naval operations, and effect probably by far the largest number of captures. Why in the world we should desire effective control by neutral Powers, as the Marquess of Salisbury appeared to desire, I altogether fail to see. It is one of the advantages which I claim for the Declaration of London that when we are at war we shall not after the Declaration of London be constantly hampered by protests of neutral Powers which take a different view from ourselves as to the rights of a belligerent—it may be in regard to blockade, that is a very likely case to arise under present circumstances; it may be in regard to the doctrine of continuous voyage, which is a subject on which trouble has already arisen. I think that it should be rather a matter of congratulation that in future our naval commanders will be able to do their duty, knowing clearly what their rights are, and what they can do without interfering with the recognised rights of neutrals. I say that is to the good in saving us from friction with neutrals which might hamper us in time of war.

The importance of this point of view has-been put with much cogency in an article in "Brassey's Annual," by Sir Cyprian Bridge, who is a man who has held important commands as an admiral, and who was Director of Naval Intelligence. He points out clearly that there is great advantage in this to naval officers.

But I notice this argument is relied on by the Noble Marquess, by Lord Selborne and others as a security to us in regard to our food supply. They think that the protests of neutrals would prevent the enemy from acting harshly, but the fact is that in the pre-Declaration view of some of the most powerful nations it is not improper to treat foodstuffs as contraband. Those nations are not likely to protest. What are those nations? They are Germany, France, Russia, and Austria. There are other nations who are considerable carriers which have not sufficient naval strength to protest efficiently, and experience shows that even a strong naval Power is not at all likely to go to war on account of the damage done to two or three of her ships because the risk and cost of war would be altogether out of proportion to any damage that would have-been caused. To trust to the intervention of neutrals for the safety of our food supply is to trust to the feeblest of all con- ceivable securities. On the other hand it seems to me that the intervention by neutrals to prevent harsh and arbitrary action by belligerents would be more effective and much more likely to be exercised under the Declaration of London. Without it the Neutral Powers can only base their protests on the vagueness of international law, but it will in future be a much more serious thing for belligerents to break the solemn engagements of an agreement into which they have entered with neutrals. In the event of any flagrant breach I think we may reasonably expect a protest from a combination of neutrals which would be most effective. Altogether I think that that argument is one of the weakest which has been brought against the Declaration of London.

This agreement is attacked from two very opposite points of view, and there are two strongly opposed schools. There are those who think that the rules will not sufficiently protect neutrals. There are influential Members on both sides who wish to see all private property at sea immune from capture. To them I say that was impossible of attainment. There is no international agreement on the subject. We are not even agreed ourselves, but the establishment of an international court and these rules are a step forward. They give greater certainty and security to neutrals, whereas before there was the greatest uncertainty. If we accept these agreements there is nothing to prevent our trying to obtain improvements in future conferences. If we reject them we shall not only give up what we have secured but have struck a deadly blow at the whole principle of agreement. Undoubtedly our sternest opponents are those who object not to these agreements but to all agreements, the people who regard the Declaration of Paris as one of the gravest blunders this country ever made. I was talking to a naval officer the other day and he said, "It is not your Declaration of London I so much object to, I do not object to that, I do not think it will do any harm, but it is the Declaration of Paris which I dislike." Their ideal is that we should be free to act as we did a century ago in the French war. They forget what our interference with neutral trade then cost us—world-wide hostility and an extension of the field of war. Even then we could not maintain the licence we assumed. They do not recognise how impossible it would be to assume that licence now with the general development of naval power and the vast extension of sea-borne commerce. I need not argue that point, but I pass on rapidly with I think sufficient reason, as the matter has been discussed in this House and in another place for three days and in the Imperal Conference, and not a single responsible statesman has given any countenance to the idea that we ought to free ourselves from the Declaration of Paris. I am, however, entitled to point out how much of the opposition is based upon the dislike of any international agreement in this matter.

A much more moderate and reasonable-view is that in gaining an advantage for neutrals and for our own commerce when we are neutrals, however great that may be in itself, it ought not to be purchased by giving up rights which are necessary to us as belligerents. That is the view put forcibly by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Austen Chamberlain) in the previous Debate. I think that is a fair criterion. I submit that the Declaration of London is not open to that objection. It in no way weakens us in the exercise of our naval power as belligerents, but on the contrary it removes some difficulties which might have hampered the exercise of that power. I notice our critics are not agreed on this matter. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said yesterday that blockade has not lost its power, though it was less powerful than in days gone by, and that we had given up something, though he did not explain what, in regard to it. I see that the. hon. and gallant Member for Evesham (Mr. Eyres-Monsell) has written a pamphlet, in which he says that our views on the subject of blockade were accepted practically en bloc by the Conference, but on the other hand he says that blockade is no use now. I think both those two critics of ours are partly right and partly wrong. Our views on blockade were practically accepted en bloc as the hon. Member for Evesham says, but blockade is still of value, as the right hon. Gentleman says, and that view is supported by the Admiralty. Let us see what the position is in regard' to blockade. The right hon. Gentleman has introduced a new note into the controversy by suggesting that we have weakened our power of blockade. We had supposed before that we had increased our efficiency in blockade, as the hon. Member for Evesham apparently thought. What happened? There were two Continental doctrines that might have been very hampering in time of war. One of the doctrines, of which France was the principal exponent, was that you must give individual notification to each ship. In other words, although you had given a general notification of the blockade, each ship had a chance to try and run the blockade, just like the case of giving a dog a first bite. If you caught the ship then you notified that there was a blockade, and the captain said, "Oh, thank you" and went away. Obviously that is a very serious diminution of the efficiency of blockade. Now we have our view established on that. Then there was the other Continental doctrine that a ship must actually have passed some imaginary line between two blockading ships. We pointed out that that was impossible and impracticable, and we have got rid of that. What in our practice has been altered? Have we made any concessions? Yes. Theoretically a blockade runner could be stopped before she had actually tried to slip the blockading squadron. Lord Desart and Mr. Arthur Cohen have examined all the prize cases, and they say that there is no instance that they can find of a vessel being seized before she had reached the area of blockade. Therefore we have not given up anything of practical value. A ship must have entered the area of blockade, and we must catch the blockade runner by the continuous pursuit of a vessel of the blockading force. As Mr. Arthur Cohen has pointed out very fairly, if we cannot catch the vessel the blockade is not efficient, as it is required to be by the Declaration of Paris. Therefore on the question of blockade there is not the slightest doubt that we have established the British rule for all practical and important objects. I am fairly familiar with this controversy, but I must say that, apart from a good deal of declamation from those who object equally to the Declaration of Paris and the Declaration of London, there has been no serious argued attempt to show that we have given up anything which would weaken our naval efficiency.

We are told that we have introduced a new danger by having made our food supply less secure. We have all seen the sensational headings "Starvation in War," the foolish posters about a ship being sunk, as if that could not be done now, and the lurid word pictures which are drawn to waken public alarm. Some speeches are made up of nothing but statements about the danger to our food supply that would arise in time of war. Yes; but why do not the speakers tell their ignorant audiences that this danger exists at the present moment? The whole argument rests on the simple device of absolutely ignoring present conditions, and concealing from the public the fact that every one of the dangers they mention is a danger that we are facing now. Let us look at the question as practical people. Let us start with the bulk of the food supply. I cannot tell from official figures exactly what proportions of our food supply is brought in neutral and in British bottoms, but the representatives of the corn trade of the country informed us that they believed that in the case of grain the proportion brought in in neutral vessels was something like 10 per cent. I think the phrase they used was that they thought that not less than 10 per cent. was brought in neutral vessels. There are many other kinds of food which come to this country. I suppose that practically all the chilled meat would come in in British ships. At any rate, I do not suppose that one is under-estimating it if one takes the figure of 10 per cent. But I will not base any argument on the figure. My point is that it is the smaller part, and much the smaller part, of the supply. The representatives of the grain trade told us that they thought that proportion would be largely increased in time of war, but that still it would remain much the smaller proportion of our supply. On the other hand, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge gives reasons for thinking that we should have to depend more on British ships and less on neutrals in time of war. But I will not go into that argument; my whole point is that we should have to depend for the bulk of our supply in time of war on British ships. We cannot depend upon neutrals. I am not here on behalf of the Government to ask you to depend upon agreements, however much they might safeguard neutrals. We must depend upon the protection of our strong Navy. We are not, as some people would have you believe, offering the Declaration of London as a substitute for the Navy. I think this consideration, that the bulk of our food supply comes in British ships, and that the position of British ships will be exactly the same after the Declaration of London as it was before, neither better nor worse, places the matter in a fairer perspective. It disposes of much wild talk. What becomes of all the perorations and declamation when it turns out that you are forgetting 80 per cent. or 90 per cent. of the supply?

Now, let me deal with the smaller portion of our supply, which comes in neutral ships. My contention is that the Declaration of London does not injure us, but improves our position. I am talking of the time when we are a belligerent. I have dealt with the bulk of our supply, which must come in in British ships, and is not affected by the Declaration of London. Now I will deal with the smaller portion of our supply, which will come in neutral ships. I say that the Declaration of London does not injure us, but improves our position. We constantly find people arguing under the strange delusion that under existing conditions food would come unhindered to our shores, and that in a fit of lunacy the British Government under the Declaration of London have allowed it for the first time to be made contraband. We have had many protests from chambers of commerce based on this statement, that under the law of nations food can only be declared contraband if destined for the armed forces of the enemy, and that all nations have hitherto been agreed upon this point. Take the Chamber of Commerce of London. They base their argument upon this extraordinary statement that the effect of the Declaration is to alter the law of nations as hitherto maintained in a manner entirely unprecedented, and to expose to capture or deliberate destruction food supplies borne to any port of Great Britain in neutral vessels. In other words, that the Declaration of London has created the risk of having food seized. Can there be a more outrageous proposition? Can you conceive a statement more absolutely misleading? The Declaration of London creates no new risk; it lessens existing risks.

My general proposition, which I intend to prove, is that if we refuse to ratify the Declaration of London, we run the risk of having food supplies declared absolute contraband. If we went to war with either of several great Powers, the probability is that they would declare food contraband of war. There is nothing in their expressed views on international law that would stand in their way. If the Declaration of London falls through, Russia, France, and Germany are all left free by their declared view of international law to notify food as contraband. The hon. and learned Member for York (Mr. Butcher), in one of the many pamphlets that we have received, has described my statement that we are better off as "a piece of official recklessness." I do not object at all to the phrase. The House will judge when I have concluded my argument. But I would like to point out a case of historical recklessness on the part of the hon. and learned Member himself. In his pamphlet he says, that food supplies when carried on neutral vessels have not in modern times been treated as liable to capture unless proved to be destined for the armed forces of the enemy. Could there be a more reckless statement? The curious thing is that the hon. and learned Member makes that statement on the very page on which he quotes a case which shows how erroneous it is. In 1885 France declared rice contraband to all ports north of Canton. A White Paper recently republished gives the correspondence, and hon. Members have had an opportunity of informing themselves on the point. How does the hon. and learned Member deal with the case? With much ingenuity. He says:— Great Britain strongly protested. The war was shortly afterwards terminated, and in no single case did France exercise her alleged rights. No; the notification was quite effective. Shipments of rice were stopped, and no doubt the notification contributed to bring the war to a sudden conclusion. We have records in the Foreign Office of a case where a British ship actually loaded up several thousand bags of rice, but took them out in consequence of this notification of France. France maintained her policy to the end of the war, in spite of most energetic protests from Lord Granville. More than that, she maintained her view as to her right to declare food contraband up to the meeting of the Conference in 1908. What position did France take up? That she was entitled to declare rice contraband, whether it was going to the peaceful population or to the army of China, on the broad ground that it was the best way to put pressure upon China and finish the war. M. Wadding-ton wrote to Lord Granville these words: The importance of rice in the feeding of the Chinese population and army does not allow my Government to authorise its transport in the north of China without the risk of depriving themselves of one of the most powerful means of coercion they have at their disposal. It was on that very ground that the opinion of Prince Bismarck was based. I have here an extract from the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," of 8th April, 1885, which I will read to the House:—

"The Kiel Chamber of Commerce have received the following answer from the Imperial Chancellor with reference to their communication regarding the treatment of rice as contraband of war on the Chinese coast:—

"In answer to their representations of the 1st inst., I reply to the Chamber of Commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war, does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every war is a calamity, which entails evil consequences not only on the combatants hut also on neutrals. These evils may easily be increased by the interference of a neutral Power with the way in which a third carries on the war, to the disadvantage of the subjects of the interfering Power, and by this means German commerce might be weighted with far heavier losses than a transitory prohibition of the rice trade in Chinese waters. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy, and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships.

"'The Imperial Chancellor,

"'V. BISMARCK.'"

These two historical facts, which do not stand alone, have rather disconcerted the critics of the Declaration. They feel that these facts really dispose of their case on this point, which is their main attack on the Declaration. They have, therefore, tried to minimise them in two ways. They have shown a considerable amount of ingenuity in trying to explain away the inconvenient facts. They ask—I have been asked in this House—whether M. Waddington did not argue with Lord Granville that the justification for stopping this rice was that tribute was paid in rice, and that rice was the pay of the soldiery? Yes, M. Waddington, in the course of the controversy, used many arguments, one of which was that they were only doing what we had done ourselves when we were at war with France. Another argument was that about tribute and the pay of the soldiery—a very inconclusive argument. M. Waddington could not pretend that all the rice they stopped could be characterised in that way. But after all let us look at something much more important than the mere arguments between two Foreign Secretaries engaged in controversy.

Let us look at the instructions given by M. Waddington to the Ambassadors and Ministers of France at all the Courts. His justification of the notification that rice was contraband was on the broad ground that is was the best way of putting pressure upon China to bring the war to a close. What is more important is that France maintained that view up to 1908. At the proceedings of the Naval Conference France handed in a statement which is there on record which shows actually that she did maintain that view. What was her proposal about food? We run no risk of having food declared contraband! What did Franco say? "Foodstuffs and raw materials intended for non-combatants are not in principle considered as contraband of war." That was the pious opinion. What was the practical conclusion: "But may be declared such according to circumstances of which the Government is to judge, and in virtue of an order issued by it." Am I not, therefore, fully justified in saying that the view of France up to the time of the Naval Conference was that she was entitled to declare food contraband and to have it seized if it was to her interest to do so, and that she was to be the judge of the propriety of doing so? And—replying to my hon. Friend below the Gangway who interrupted me—am I not justified in saying that Germany admitted the propriety of the action of France? I have read the words of Bismarck. Lord Desborough, chairman of the London Chamber of Commerce, who takes a keen and critical interest in this matter, wrote a letter to "The Times" in which he stated that Prince Bulow afterwards repudiated Prince Bismarck's view. The Noble Lord very fairly gave the reference to the report on which he relied. I read it with much care. There is not a word in it which confirms what he says. Prince Bulow did not repudiate Prince Bismarck. No, Sir. Germany never gave up that view until the meeting of the Naval Conference. Let me put a point that confirms that. Germany put forward a statement as to what she thought international law might become under the Convention. Did she, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition would have had the City believe yesterday, treat food as something that could never be declared contraband? No, she put certain classes of food in the list of absolute contraband. Preserved provisions which could be used for the troops; they were to be absolute contraband.

I have shown that neither France nor Germany were estopped from declaring food contraband until the Declaration of London was ratified. What about Russia? Russia claimed the same right in the war with Japan, and though in reply to our protests she agreed not to act upon it, she has not given up, and never did give up that principle until she signed the Declaration of London. In fact, like Germany, she put certain classes of food supply useful for the Army into the list of absolute contraband. I say that the Declaration of London does this good thing for our food supply; it frees us from the danger, no imaginative danger, of having our food supplies declared absolute contraband. We tried at the Peace Conference to have food placed on the free list. We could not secure an approach to international agreement. The Declaration of London places it on the list of conditional contraband in accordance with the old-established British doctrine—at any rate our doctrine for a long time now. The Articles dealing with that subject have been much discussed, and perhaps I am bound to say a little more about them in detail—I hope the House will bear with me. Article 33 is the definition of conditional contraband. Nothing can be condemned as conditional contraband that does not come under that definition. That definition expresses the British view. We have never maintained that food was in no circumstances contraband. We have always admitted that food destined for the enemy's army could be so treated. Had we been able to place food on a free list we should have gained an advance not only on the doctrine of foreign nations, but upon our own doctrine. It is absurd to condemn the Declaration of London because we have not been able to secure so much as that.

I should like to point out to those who take the view of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, that if you do place food on a free list you would only be dealing with a small proportion of the supply. You would not be dealing with such a proportion as to secure ourselves in time of war. Starvation or non-starvation would not depend upon that proportion. That must depend upon our power to bring food hero in British ships.

What is the definition of conditional contraband? It is:—

"Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government Department of the enemy's state unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress.

Article 34 deals with the circumstances of suspicion when the presumption is that the destination is that described in Article 33, namely, that of the armed forces of the enemy, a presumption which may be rebutted. The point I want to make is this: I do not want to argue with hon. Members as to how a naval captain would interpret Article 34. What I say is, however he interpreted it—if you take the gross exaggerations of meanings and possibilities of that article which have been put forward—and they are gross enough—it would not expose us to a single new risk to which we are not now exposed. There is the interesting manifesto of the Imperial Maritime League, signed by a number of Admirals, drawn up to influence the Imperial Conference. The statement that I find there is that, as all our ports are in railway communication with armed forces, all our ports are bases for armed forces, and all ships carrying supplies to these ports would become capturable. I suppose, if the Navy was at Rosyth and the men were fed with fish from Fraserburgh or Grimsby, then Fraserburgh and Grimsby would become bases? According to this wild statement every port in the world is therefore a base. There is no port that escapes. We are seriously asked to believe that that is what is meant in the Declaration of London, and that that is how an. international Prize Court would interpret it. The Clause in the Declaration of London dealing with conditional contraband is solemn humbug! I must say that I think it is much fairer to rely upon the opinion of the Lord Chancellor. I think it is much nearer the probability of what the decision of a Prize Court would be. He says you could not count any ports except ports which are actually magazines for war, or actually places of equipment for war, as being within the term "base for the armed forces of the enemy." In the commentary it says they may be "bases of supply." That does not say that every place connected with a railway would be a base of supply. That is a very different point.

I come now to the doctrine of continuous voyage upon which we have been attacked. What we maintain in relation to the doctrine of continuous voyage is that we have made a very satisfactory gain indeed. There is no general agreement upon this. The doctrine of continuous voyage is in some quarters hardly understood; at any rate there is no agreement upon it. It is a doctrine therefore that has given us, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, trouble, and very likely will give us trouble in the future with neutrals. The result of the agreement is very satisfactory. The doctrine is established where it is important, and given up where it is of no practical value. It is agreed in the case of absolute contraband; that is very important to us. In the case of absolute contraband, in the case of war materials, arms and so on, the probability is you can trace the ultimate destination, but in the case of articles like food and clothing, to trace the ultimate destination is perfectly impossible. It is said that we give an advantage to foreign nations who can bring things in by land. Never was there a more ridiculous argument. It is an advantage you cannot deprive them of.

The Lord Chancellor has pointed out that we gain a great deal more by giving up this doctrine than any other nation. I will not dwell upon that point—that we shall be able to bring food without risk of the capture of the ships to neutral ports within a few miles of our shores. What does the Imperial Maritime League say about that? That it would be a "transparent evasion." What tender consciences these admirals have! Their consciences would not be quite so tender in time of war. It is what the Declaration of London contemplates. It is no more evasion for us to bring food from a neighbouring harbour into a British port than it is for Germany to bring food by rail from a Dutch port. I think our critics are hard up for arguments. Criticism has been raised upon the word "enemy" in this Article. I will not dwell upon that because my right hon. Friend has promised to get that matter settled by agreement. Another question has been raised by a number of distinguished lawyers touching the question of the Report of the Conference. In deference to their views I should like to put to the House exactly how the matter presents itself to the Government. The Report of the International Naval Conference was drawn up by M. Renault. It was then revised by a committee of all the Powers represented at the Conference, and it then became, not M. Renault's report, but the report of a Committee of the Conference. Then the Conference gave a whole sitting to consider the Report and they amended it. It was then accepted by the Conference. The President's declaration was, "This Report is accepted by this Conference." What does the Report itself say?— We now reach the explanation of the Declaration itself, on which we shall try, by summarising the reports already approved by the Conference, to give an exact and uncontroversial commentary; this, when it has become an official commentary by receiving the approval of the Conference—

which it did— may serve as a guide to the different authorities—administrative, military, and judicial—who may be called upon to apply it.

The view of the Government, therefore, is that this is the official, authentic commentary, and if there is any ambiguity in the Articles naval authorities and Prize Courts will look to that commentary and see what the intention is. But as we do not think that this is a matter on which there will be any difference of opinion among the nations, I do not apprehend any difficulty in dealing with that point.

I now come to a most important point, never mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman yesterday in his speech to the commercial classes, that of the free list. Not only is it a very substantial gain to us when neutrals, but it is even a more important gain when we are belligerents. Hitherto there has been no certainty whatever as to what articles a belligerent would declare contraband. It has been dependent upon caprice. Now, for the first time, the nations have agreed to place upon a free list articles which cannot be declared contraband. These include many of the most important materials of our industries. There is cotton —declared contraband in the past—which as a raw material furnishes employment for an enormous proportion of our industrial population. There is wool, so necessary to Yorkshire, and other raw materials of the textile industries, "and the yarns of the same"—metallic ores— a very important item—rubber, hides, and articles of that sort—articles required for agriculture, machinery for textile and agricultural operations, and all kinds of machinery not used in war, and many manufactured articles not used in war. The list is much too long to be read, but I would suggest to hon. Gentlemen that it is well worth considering. It is a list so important that it amounts to nearly a third of our whole foreign trade. In 1909 it was three hundred millions. It is something between three hundred and four hundred millions now. Nothing shows the irreconcilable manner in which certain critics approach this subject than the scoffing language employed in minimising the value of this list. The hon. and gallant Member for Evesham (Mr. Eyres-Monsell), in a pamphlet called "A Simple Explanation," says:— We thus safeguarded the importation of goods we could do without.

What do Lancashire and Yorkshire Members think of that? We could do very ill without the staple materials upon which millions of our workpeople have to depend. Take, for instance, cotton. The hon. and learned Member says we have on an average six months' supplies of cotton. I do not know what hon. Members representing cotton manufacturers' constituencies have to say to that. It is a very astounding statement. The hon. and learned Member has mixed up the exceptional maximum with the normal state of affairs. I attach the very greatest importance to being able to maintain our commerce and to keep our workmen in employment. Those who remember the cotton famine in Lancashire in the time of peace can imagine what a cotton famine would be in a time of war. Here we have secured, as far as it can be secured in neutral vessels, the staple articles of our manufacture.

HON. MEMBERS: How much comes in neutrals?

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

I cannot tell. I have no official figures. I do not want to overstate my case. To maintain our commerce in time of war and to keep our industrial classes in work is a very high belligerent interest.

Lord HUGH CECIL

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether he distinguishes in his argument between neutrals and belligerent bottoms?

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

That is why I put in the remark. I think nothing could be more unfortunate than that the case I am arguing should be put too high. I admit that the free list only deals with goods coming in neutral vessels. I put that in on purpose. I claim, before I leave this cart of the subject, that for shippers and underwriters and shipowners and commerce generally this agreement brings unmixed advantage, and that not one shipowner, underwriter, manufacturer, or merchant is injured; they gain by this free list and by the definition of contraband, and by the power of appeal from the belligerent Prize Court to the International Prize Court.

I now come to other subjects, and first let me deal with the sinking of neutral prizes. The Declaration of London is condemned because we could not induce other people to prevent the sinking of neutral prizes. We have had a great deal of talk as if the Declaration of London created this situation, but that is only another example of the loose argument by which it is assailed. Have those critics forgotten what happened only seven years ago? Have foreigners never sunk neutrals? Russia sank eight or more. What was the position at the Conference? I ask the particular attention of the House to this. The position at the Conference was that our view was upheld by two Powers, Japan and the Netherlands. The right to sink neutral prizes was upheld by Germany, the United States of America, Austria, Spain, France, Italy, Russia—seven Powers. Yet the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition stated in the City yesterday that:— The general view of the civilised world, the view of the prize courts of the great maritime nations, the view of America, the view of England has always been violently opposed to this sinking of neutrals and this treatment of corn and foodstuffs destined for a civil population as contraband of war. We have dealt with food and we have dealt with the sinking of neutrals and with the existing state of international opinion. What possible justification is there for the statement that the Declaration of London has made matters worse? Hon. Gentlemen opposite argue that we have made it worse. They in their time had a chance of dealing with this matter. They had provocation, but they did not go to war. They were quite right. But they cannot argue now that they would have gone to war. They cannot argue that the thing would have been stopped by a protest of the great Powers. Here we find seven of the great Powers approving of the doctrine. We have succeeded in obtaining so many deterrent conditions in connection with the sinking of the neutral prizes that the representatives of the other Powers in their reports think there will be very few cases in the future. I should like to quote what our representatives say in their report to the Secretary of State. In their report of what happened at the Conference they say:—

Mr. BALFOUR

Is that published?

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

Yes. The delegates representing the Powers most determined in vindicating the right to destroy neutral prizes, declared that the combination of the rules now adopted respecting destruction and liability of ships, practically amounted in itself to a renunciation of the right in all but a few cases. We did not conceal the fact that this was the object at which we aimed.

Mr. BUTCHER

Is there any record of the view of these delegates in the proceedings which are reported?

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

Yes, I have taken that statement from the Blue Book.

Mr. BUTCHER

I want to make it clear. This is a statement of the report by our delegates. I want to know is there anything in the record of the proceedings which records the view of these delegates themselves?

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

There is, of course, the statement of the views they put forward about the sinking of prizes.

Sir ROBERT FINLAY

Is there anything to that effect in the statements of the foreign delegates themselves?

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

I cannot say that. But I do not suppose the right hon. Gentleman suggests that we are misinformed. I am prepared to take the report of our own delegates. I must say something now about the limitation of the right and the deterrents. First of all I ask the House to remember it is only a ship which in a Prize Court would be condemned as liable to capture, a ship of which more than half her cargo was contraband, which could be sunk under the special conditions of necessity. Carrying contraband which amounted to less than half the cargo would not render the ship liable to condemnation. Therefore, it is only a vessel that is the legal prize of the captor which can be destroyed and it must be remembered that the captor would be sinking his own property. He would only have to take her into port and reap his reward. And, as this is so, from the neutral owners' point of view the ship is lost whether she is taken into port or destroyed. Next, the captor must establish the fact that he is only acting in the face of exceptional necessity, or he must pay full compensation, and no examination will be made of the question whether the capture was valid. In the third place, the captor will always have to pay compensation for neutral goods which are not contraband. In the fourth place, the captor must place the crew and passengers in a place of safety, which will generally not be an easy condition. Therefore the Declaration, while not preventing altogether the destruction of ships carrying more than half a cargo of contraband, sets up very strong deterrents and makes destruction a very costly business indeed.

I should like to say a word about the British practice. It was certainly the view of our Prize Courts that a plea of necessity, however strong, was not an answer to the neutral claim for compensation. But our judges admitted there were cases where sinking was a military necessity. Suppose a neutral carrying a cargo of arms or ammunition or a cargo of coal for the use of the enemy's fleet, which was close at hand. I think there is no captain. British or foreign, who would not think it his duty to sink that neutral. It is no use putting war rules higher than can be car- ried out. That was very well stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcester. In such a case in the past we should have paid compensation. Others Powers would not. In his judgment, in the case of the "Actæon," Lord Stowell said:— Lastly, it has been said that Captain Capel could not spare men from his own ship to carry the captured vessel to a British port, and that he could not suffer her to go into Boston, where she would have furnished important information to the Americans. These are circumstances which may have afforded very good reasons for destroying the vessel, and may have made it a very meritorious act in Captain Capel so far as his own Government is concerned, but they furnish no reason why the American owner should be a sufferer. … I think, therefore, he is entitled to receive the fullest compensation. And he therefore gave compensation. Dr. Lushington also recognised that there was some cases where it might be of very grave importance to the public service of the captor's own State. The position of our judges was that even when destruction was justified by necessity, compensation should be paid to the neutral. Other nations do not admit that obligation. We gave, but did not receive. We were losers by our superior practice. Now we have equality. We are not in a worse, but we are in a stronger position to urge our views in future. As belligerents under these new rules as compared with our own doctrine we gain, but I do not wish to attach too much importance to that. As neutrals under the rules when compared with the doctrine and practice of most other nations, we gain. It is curious to have this provision attacked by people who attach importance only or chiefly to belligerent rights. I venture to say upon the question of the sinking of neutral prizes that, in view of the strong line taken by so many great Powers, and taking into account our interests as belligerents as well as neutrals, this is not an unreasonable compromise, and it makes greatly for the limitation of the practice.

5.0 P.M.

Now, as regards the subject of the conversion of merchant men on the high seas. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition spoke as if this was an enormous new peril. It is neither enormous nor new. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for York asked me a question on this subject the other day, and I said it was a matter involving such complex argument that it would be impossible to deal with it by a mere question and answer, but I promised to deal with it in this Debate. The right of conversion is not one that has ever been questioned. I met an admiral this week who was in command of a British merchantman con- verted into a warship. As the House knows, the British Government has made provision for exercising that right in the case of certain ships. The only difference between us is that we say it ought to be done in port or in territorial waters and other nations say it may be clone upon the high seas. Other nations claim the right because we have many ports and they have few. There is no international law upon the subject, and right hon. Gentlemen opposite cannot point to any decision of a British Prize Court on the matter. They cannot say it is a new thing. What we were asking for was a new rule. We thought it was in our interest and we pressed for it at the second Peace Conference and the Naval Conference. We could not persuade some of the great countries to agree to it; neither Germany, Austria, France, nor Russia would agree to it. We had to report that the attempt at agreement had failed and the matter remained open, and all the Powers maintained their old opinions.

There was some agreement at the second Peace Conference on the subject. These converted vessels must be warships and bear the outward sign of warships. They must be immediately placed on the Navy List, and they must be commanded by commissioned officers, and must be under naval discipline. The question of conversion on the high seas remains open. It is quite incorrect to say that the Declaration of London legalises conversion on the high seas. It does not deal with it at all. With or without the declaration the Powers claiming the right may exercise it. What justification is there to rave about this as a new risk? We have not succeeded in establishing what we admit is a new rule for which we can point to no international sanction, no decision of our own Prize Courts. The Declaration of London has nothing to do with this question. But a different point has been raised. Does the creation of an International Prize Court alter the position? That was the real point of the hon. and learned Member for York's question. Might it not decide against our view? It might and it might not, but surely the most important question after all is our position as belligerents. We shall seize these converted merchantmen whether they are converted in port or upon the high seas just the same, and the Prize Court will have nothing to say to it. I may be told there will be a larger number of them converted on the high seas. It is quite true there might be, but not a larger number than can be converted at present by the Powers that claim the right-to convert them. Converting merchantmen is a game we can all play at, and we far better than any other nation. What might happen? A neutral might be seized and the question might be taken to the International Prize Court. That is the hon. and learned Member's point. But a neutral might be seized now and what could we do? Protest—go to war. Go to war for what we cannot pretend is an international law at all. This applies to other nations. Other Powers who claim the right could not even protest.

Supposing the matter is taken to the International Prize Court. It has been suggested that the declared understanding that it was an open question might induce the court to decline to adjudicate, and they would not deal with it. I do not rely upon that. I assume that they would adjudicate. Well, they might take our view. That is not at all improbable. At the Naval Conference the United States, Spain, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands were on our side, and it might be that some of the other neutrals would take that view. We might establish our doctrine, but at the worst the court might take the opposite view. Is that sufficient ground for giving up the other advantages of the Declaration? Let me deal with this question a little in proportion. People have an idea that all the merchant ships of an enemy will be suddenly mounting guns and seizing our commerce on. the high seas. I cannot help thinking that it is only a very limited number of ships in any mercantile marine that will be fast enough to make it possible to convert them into warships. If they were slow ships they could not escape the first cruiser. They would have no defensive power, a broadside would sink any one of them, and they must trust to their heels. Therefore, it is only fast ships that will be converted, and the number of ships fast enough which it would pay to convert in. the mercantile marine of any of our opponents could be counted on the fingers of our hands. Surely we can watch them, or what is the use of the British Fleet? It would be our business to do that. I do not think it will be quite so easy as it looks in theory to convert merchantmen into warships on the high seas or to conceal the fact that when a ship is still in a neutral port she is not preparing for a commercial voyage but for something very different. Our consuls would watch her, and if that became apparent we should take action and the neutral could not allow her to proceed. We have had trouble enough on that point ourselves. Unless she was fairly near a national port her career could soon be brought to a close by a British cruiser. This is not a new risk, and it is one that is enormously, grossly and senselessly exaggerated. Above all, if it is a risk to us it is ten times as much risk to anybody else.

No one can study this controversy with an open mind without seeing that behind a vast mass of the opposition to these two agreements there is really a feeling of distrust and dislike of all international agreements on this subject. It is evident in the attacks upon the International Prize Court, in the appeal not to allow British Prize Court decisions to be reviewed by a court of foreigners, in the renewed attack on the Declaration of Paris, in the unreasoning tone of many of the arguments, often mutually destructive, which have been directed against these agreements. I think I have shown in instance after instance that the criticism of the Declaration has been based upon a complete ignoring of existing facts. It is condemned by comparison with a standard which never had any real existence. When we remember that this was the first attempt at an agreement upon many points upon which there were widely divergent views amongst the nations, that the delegates of the Powers had to reduce chaos into order; when we consider that each provision had to be weighed carefully from the conflicting points of view of belligerent rights, the rights of neutrals and the interests of each nation, then I think we may claim that the two Conventions represent a remarkable measure of agreement, a genuine and honest endeavour to create a code of naval law, and a real step in advance. In international agreements we must proceed step by step. To refuse an agreement which is a real advance because we do not regard it as perfect is to put an end to international conference. I believe these agreements, which chiefly deal with the rights of neutrals, will be of general benefit to the peaceful commerce of the world, and that as the greatest maritime nation we shall be the largest gainers.

The British Government has, and accepts, the responsibility of having proposed the International Prize Court, and of having called the Naval Conference of London. We did so in pursuit of a policy which we think right and wise, the policy of promoting international agreement, which we hope to carry to a higher and wider development. In these agreements our views on many important matters have been accepted. We, with the other great naval Powers, without one exception, have signed these agreements. The world is naturally looking to us to be the first to ratify them, because we are the Power which took the original initiative. If we, for no adequate reason, and there is no adequate reason, were to draw back now from those agreements so much of our own making, agreements so valuable to our peaceful commerce, how would the world interpret our action? Would they not say, "If Great Britain will have no agreement and will submit to no restriction in the interests of neutrals, then force is the only possible protection for our commerce. We must at all costs build more 'Dreadnoughts.'" The Navy Leagues of all nations would have an argument made to their hands. We need no longer talk about limiting armaments. The race for armaments which is already exhausting the nations must proceed. The burden which is weighing heavily upon industry must grow. If we were to draw back now we should arrest—no man can tell for how long—the progress of international agreement, from which in a wider sphere, not we only, but our kinsfolk in our own Dominions and in the great Republic across the Atlantic are now hoping great things for the progress and welfare of mankind.

Sir ROBERT FINLAY

Any one who was in the House at the commencement of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman to which we have just listened who did not happen to be aware of what was the subject of the debate would have supposed that this was a mere party question which was under discussion. I really do not know why the right hon. Gentleman through many parts of his speech, and particularly in the opening part, thought it necessary to assume so aggressive a tone. I think I might venture to tell him that if the people of this country are to be satisfied that this Declaration ought to be ratified, they will not be satisfied by strong language, and what they want is something in the nature of reason. The right hon. Gentleman has devoted himself, as I shall show very largely, to answering arguments that never have been used by any responsible opponents of this Convention. [AN HON. MEMBER: "Yes, by the Leader of the Opposition."] The right hon. Gentleman has used one most extraordinary argument which I hope on reflection he will think fit to withdraw. He said that the hostility to this Bill and to the Convention to which it is intended to give effect is based upon a dislike of all international agreements. I venture to say that a more unfounded charge was never made, and the right hon. Gentleman must be very poorly off for arguments when he has to back up his case by a statement of that kind. Can the right hon. Gentleman point to a single speech by a single responsible Member of the Opposition taking up that line or justifying in the remotest degree the observation which he thought fit to make.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

I am aware that no responsible Member of the Opposition has made a speech upon this question until yesterday. The right hon. Gentleman has not correctly represented what I said. I said that behind the great mass of opposition to these agreements there is a feeling of distrust of all international agreements, and that is a statement well within the facts.

Sir R. FINLAY

I entirely dispute that statement. The right hon. Gentleman confesses his inability to point to a single speech bearing out the statement he has made.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

No, Sir; I do not. The real leader of the opposition to the Declaration, who has written whole volumes on this subject, is the late Member for King's Lynn. What I said was that behind the vast mass of the opposition—I did not say the official Opposition here—to the Declaration there was this feeling of distrust of international agreements.

Sir R. FINLAY

The only support for that charge is that the right hon. Gentleman says there is evidence of it in a book published by a supporter of the present Government.

Mr. McKENNA

He never said that.

Sir R. FINLAY

Towards the conclusion of his speech the right hon. Gentleman made an even more remarkable statement. He appealed to the House to pass the Second Reading of this Bill on the ground that if they did not do so the race of armaments would go on. Does the right hon. Gentleman believe the passage of this Convention will stop that race in armaments which we all deplore? It will not stop the race in armaments. It will deprive us of some of our most effective weapons, and it will deprive us of advantages which as things at present stand we enjoyed. I think the right hon. Gentleman made hardly a fair attack upon the Opposition in his reference to the Dominions and to the opinions which the representatives of the Dominions have expressed on this matter. He said: "We were called upon to consult the representatives of the Dominions." So you were, because it would have been a most extraordinary thing if a matter of this kind affecting all the parts of the British Empire had been carried through without taking the opinion of the representatives of the Dominions beyond the seas. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to attempt to use the fact that the representatives of the Dominions have acquiesced in the passage of this Convention as an argument why the House of Commons should consent. It would have been monstrous not to consult the Dominions, but it is monstrous to suggest that in a matter which affects us vitally and which affects us far more than it can affect any one of our Dominions, we should have our judgment biassed by the fact that the consent of the representatives of the Dominions has been given. The right hon. Gentleman was, to use his own phrase, trying to use the Dominions as pawns in the party game.

I agree with one observation made by the right hon. Gentleman. This Declaration must be taken as a whole. Do we gain or do we lose under it, taken as a whole? I say we lose. Our gains are on comparatively small points, and are in, themselves slight. Our losses are on vital points, and may be of capital importance to this country. This ought not to be a party question at all. Surely, if ever there was a case when the House of Commons ought to have been invited to express its opinion free from the pressure of the party Whips, it is such a case as this. The Government have announced they do not intend to relax the pressure of the party Whips, but I think I may say the country will not be much influenced in its opinion by a vote in favour of the Convention obtained in such a way and from the composite alliance which supports the present Government. I hope it is not too late to ask the Government to depart from this attitude which they have so far assumed and to allow Members on their own side of the House to give effect to the opinions which many of them entertain upon this point.

The first matter to which I wish to direct attention is the question of the establishment of an international Prize Court. I cordially welcome the attempt to establish an international Prize Court. I have seen a good deal of the work of the Hague Tribunal. It has done most valuable work, but why is it the Hague Tribunal has done such service to the cause of peace? It is because the court has been well constituted. It has been composed of a comparatively few members—commonly five—and the members of that court have been jurists of the first repute, whose opinions commanded the confidence of Europe and of the world. Why is it the precedent afforded by the composition of the Hague Tribunal has been so widely departed from in the present case? We are creating a tribunal which is to determine the most important questions conceivable for this country, questions which arise as affecting neutrals, and questions which affect even an enemy's subjects if they are said to be acting in contravention of a treaty or of an Act of Parliament of their own country. We have in our country Prize Courts of unrivalled prestige and authority with a history behind them of which no other country can boast for its courts. We are proposing to subject those tribunals to an appeal to a court sitting abroad, and surely the very least thing that could be desired of a court that was to lay down the law which was to be binding upon the Privy Council and our other Prize Courts would be that it should be one of such composition as to command the confidence of this country and of all the countries who might have anything to do with it.

I say the constitution of the International Prize Courts is thoroughly defective. Do hon. Members who have been asked to vote for this Declaration and for this Bill realise what that court is to be. It is to consist of fifteen members. Great Britain will have one member upon that court. There will be fourteen others. Seven of those others will be named by the United States, by Japan, and by four of the great Powers of Europe. That makes eight in all. Where are the other seven to come from, the other seven upon whose votes a question of vital importance to this country may turn? You have got some three dozen States. I will not read the names of all of them. There are the smaller European Powers, of whom all that is to be said is that their interests are not comparable for one moment with those of Great Britain. Then you have a series of States—South American Republics. You have Bolivia, Chili, Columbia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and so on. I need not read the names. Hon. Members will find them in the schedule which contains the agreement for setting up this international Prize Court. The names are more eloquent than any observations can be. We are to have Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, Persia, Turkey, Roumania, Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. I venture to say that to set up a court of this size, in which Great Britain is to have only one voice out of fifteen, and a court constituted in that way is a proposal so outrageous that it is almost incredible a responsible Government could make it. The interests of Great Britain far outweigh the interests of any other country. They are nearly as great in these matters as the interests of all the rest of the world put together, and we are to have one voice in fifteen—the fifteen made up in the way I have indicated.

The truth is the promoters of this Convention seem to have fluctuated between the idea of a court and a sort of little Parliament to consist of delegates from all the States, big or little, that were parties to the Convention who were to represent the interests, real or supposed, of their country. Of course, these small States are to sit according to rota and in turn, but the vote of the State which is sitting for the time will have as much weight as the vote of Great Britain will have on questions which may vitally affect Great Britain, and one can see whether it is likely a tribunal so composed would command the confidence either of this country or of the world generally. A court of fifteen is far too large. It would not be effective as a court of justice. The experiment has been tried in the northern part of Great Britain itself, and no reform was ever more welcome than that which broke up so unwieldy a court. A court of that kind is pre-eminently unfitted to deal with what will be very largely questions of policy. Let us by all means have an international Prize Tribunal, but not this tribunal. Take the Hague Tribunal as your model, and, if you get an effective tribunal of that kind, I quite agree it is a great step in advance. When the court was first suggested it was proposed it should be left to make the law as it went on, "very much in the rough," in the language of M. Renault, reporting on the subject; but, of course, it was very soon realised, and the voice of the country made itself heard upon it, that it would be a monstrous thing to leave any tribunal without guidance from a clear code as to the interests of this country. Our position is peculiar. The fleet is our only means of offence or defence. Our food comes by sea. We have only six weeks' supply in this country at any one time, and we have an enormous carrying trade. It was recognised that if the proposal for the International Prize Tribunal was to go on a code must be provided, and the Declaration of London was in consequence entered into. The first question is, how far does this so-called code cover the ground. So far as it does not deal with any matter, the Court is left to decide without any guidance whatever, according to its own ideas of equity and good conduct. It is left without any guidance whatever, and on any points on which the Declaration of London is silent we are committing our vital interests to the decision of a tribunal unfettered by any direction and at liberty to make the law as it pleases.

There are three points, all of them important, on which it was found impossible to come to any agreement. The first related to the Rule of 1756 as affecting certain branches of trade carried on in time of war. The second related to the question of whether property in goods should be determined by nationality or by the domicile of the owner for the purposes of capture. I pass by these points, not because they are unimportant, but because their importance is dwarfed by the overwhelming importance of the third point on which no agreement was arrived at, and that is the right, to convert merchant vessels into men-of-war on the open sea. On this point there was an irreconcilable difference of opinion. A convention was drawn up dealing with the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war. That convention consists almost entirely of mere platitudes. It was hardly worth while putting into a convention. The only important part of it is the preamble, and that recites that no agreement could be arrived at on what is the one and all important question. The preamble states that on the question of the conversion in time of war of merchant vessels into fighting ships the Powers have been unable to agree whether such conversion may take place on the high seas. That question is vital to us as belligerents. To what pur- pose is it that we seal up the enemy's fleet in port? We know where the enemy's war vessels are, but if a merchantman may go to sea, and, on reaching a convenient point for preying upon our commerce, be declared by the captain to be a war vessel duly commissioned by the other belligerent and authorised to capture our merchant vessel, just imagine what havoc might be inflicted upon our trade under such circimstances. This vessel goes out under the disguise of a peaceful trading vessel, and then, at sea, proclaims herself to be a man-of-war. I suppose the same process may be gone through again, and, having done her business of destruction, she will be able to reconvert herself into a peaceful merchantman and seek her home again. I say that the first principle in these matters is that a vessel must abide by the character in which she leaves her own territory. That is obviously fair. The right hon. Gentleman says, "Hear, hear."

The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. McKenna)

That has always been the British view.

Sir R. FINLAY

And the right hon. Gentleman admits its importance.

Mr. McKENNA

Certainly.

Sir R. FINLAY

It is overwhelmingly important. The right hon. Gentleman who spoke before me said, "Why, if it is a serious matter, two can play at that game, and we can convert our merchantment in the same way." But whose lines of trade is it that would stand to lose by such a practice?

Mr. McKENNA

Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me a minute? I thought he was going to show how the Declaration of London affects this point.

Sir R. FINLAY

Yes, I am going to show how the Declaration and this Bill and convention would affect it. I say that, as a matter of ordinary fairness, no vessel ought to be allowed, having quitted her own territory as a merchantman, to be converted on the high seas into a man-of-war, and no such vessel ought to be recognised as entitled to the privileges of a belligerent vessel. The Declaration affects this point by its absolute silence upon it—its absolute silence. The Foreign Office has told chambers of commerce and any members of the public who have chosen to inquire, that our position is not affected by what has been done. I say that that is a complete mistake; our position is affected, and vitally affected, the instant such a conversion may take place on the high seas, because, if this Bill passes, and the convention scheduled to it becomes binding upon us, the question whether such a conversion may take place on the high seas will come to be determined by an international Prize Tribunal.

Mr. McKENNA

Not as against us, if we are fighting. If we are belligerent, that question would not come to be decided by the tribunal as against us.

Sir R. FINLAY

Not as belligerents, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, and this is an excellent specimen of the way in which the Foreign Office have dealt with this case in putting it before chambers of commerce and the public generally. Not as belligerents. In that the right hon. Gentleman is perfectly right. But when the question comes before the international Prize Tribunal at the instance of a neutral, it may be that in that case in which a neutral is concerned and to which perhaps Great Britain is not a party at all, the decision of the international Prize Tribunal, according to their ideas of equity and good conscience, may be that such conversion may take place, and does the right hon. Gentleman in that case say that that decision would not prejudice our position?

Mr. McKENNA

Will the right hon. Gentleman forgive me? He stated the case of a foreign merchant ship being converted at sea and, on the conversion, attacking our commerce. I ask him, how that is affected under the Declaration of London, and I would remind him that it would not be affected under any decision of an international Prize Court.

Sir R. FINLAY

The right hon. Gentleman will no doubt have an opportunity of arguing this point when he speaks, but I may suggest this to him, that he entirely misses the point. If you have a series of decisions, or even only one decision, in which the international Prize Court, according to their ideas of equity and good conscience, hold that such conversion is lawful, shall we be in the same position for saying that it is intolerable and that the vessel is not entitled to the privilege? I hope I have made my point intelligible to the right hon. Gentleman, and I invite him to deal with it when he comes to speak. It may not affect us as belligerents, but what will be our position should the question be decided adversely to us when the matter arises at the instance of neutrals. I venture to say the Foreign Office assumed a very serious responsibility indeed when it assured chambers of commerce, and notably the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, that on this point no change is made in the existing position. A change is made, and a change of the most vital character. This Declaration is silent on a point of capital importance, and we are left to the unguided views of this body of fifteen members, representing all the States, great and small, who were parties to the convention. I assert that the attitude which the Foreign Office took up and the attitude which the right hon. Gentleman assumed just now is a very good specimen of the facile optimism with which vital interests have been played with. The Foreign Office told the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, in another letter, that they were keenly alive to the importance of this question of the conversion of merchant vessels into ships of war on the high sea. They are keenly alive to it, but they show their keenness by leaving it to the unguided decision of this court of fifteen.

I turn now from the consideration of what the Declaration of London itself does not contain and its consequences and disastrous effects, owing to the creation of the international Prize Court without any guide for dealing with so important a matter, and I turn to the question of what the Declaration does contain. I think I shall be able to satisfy the House, at any rate I hope to be able to do so, that the sins of commission by the Declaration are quite as serious as its sins of omission. There are two preliminary observations I shall ask leave to make. The first is that the preliminary provision of this Declaration of London is extraordinary in its terms. It runs:—

"The signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognised principles of international law."

That statement is a very audacious one. To suggest that it has the consent of all is totally untrue. The changes on which the right hon. Gentleman has dilated may be good or they may be bad, but they are undoubtedly changes and changes of a very important character. The Convention begins by stating that the Powers are agreed that what is contained in it represents the generally recognised rules of international law. I do not refer to this merely for the purpose of criticising the words, but I would point out it is a most unfounded statement, and I refer to it because of the vital bearing it has on the statement made the other day by the Prime Minister when he told the representatives of the Dominions that there was nothing in this Declaration which would prevent Great Britain from subsequently advocating modifications or changes. I say that this Declaration does throw a complete obstacle in the way of that. Suppose Great Britain comes forward, as the Prime Minister suggested, with a proposal for a change in the Declaration; or suppose that the twelve years of the Declaration have run out, and we desire to have another Declaration embodying vital changes. Might we not be told, and told with very great effect, "You have solemnly admitted by the Declaration of London that the rules which are embodied in it are in accordance with generally recognised principles." How could we then be prepared to argue that the rules were not in accordance with the principles of international law. I say that that initial statement is a most unfortunate and disastrous one, and it cuts the ground from under the Prime Minister when he states that we could at any time propose a modification or alteration of this Declaration.

Another very important thing in this matter is in connection with Renault's report. We are told that that report is to be regarded as part of the agreement in accordance with the practice of foreign courts. I venture to say that there is a great deal of confusion, and that what has been said upon this subject is very ambiguous. The courts in some countries, unlike our own court, look at statements of this kind, made by the parties by whom the agreement has been entered into. But our own courts would only look at the agreement itself in order to see what the parties have agreed upon, and so far as I am aware, the court of no country would look at a report of this kind for the purpose of varying or contradicting the agreement into which the parties had entered. But that is what this report to some extent does. The report is, in at least one instance, in favour of a contradiction of the text. One article says a ship's papers are "to be conclusive evidence of the destination of the ship, unless the ship is out of her course." But the report, on this article, says that the ship's papers are not conclusive if it is shown in other ways that the statements contained in them are untrue. There can be no contradiction more complete. The text says that the papers are conclusive, except in one case, and the commentary says that the papers are not conclusive at all, but can be shown to be untrue in other ways, and goes on to say actually that this is so obvious that it was unnecessary to mention it. All I can say is that if an article agreeing that the ship's papers are conclusive except in one case lets in proof that they are untrue in other cases, then words neither in the English nor the French language have any meaning whatever. I protest against such a slovenly proposal as that of incorporating this report with the agreement. If the parties are agreed to it let them put it into the agreement itself, but do not let them add to the agreement a general reference to a report and say that that is to be taken as containing other matters to which they are agreed. What is it that we have agreed to, and this leads me to turn to the substance of the Declaration.

I desire to point out to this House that there are two points of capital importance on which we have made a complete and even abject surrender to the views of foreign Powers of those principles which have always been entertained in this country. The first relates to the question of contraband. The second to the destruction of neutral vessels. With regard to contraband a great deal was made by the right hon. Gentleman of the free list. I venture to say that the importance of that free list is vastly exaggerated. Are there any articles in that free list which it can be very reasonably anticipated could be declared by any Power to be contraband of war and apart from that there is the question of the proportion of the vessels neutral or British in which such articles that are mentioned in the free list are brought to this country. I say it is a very good thing to have a free list. I do not undervalue it but I say that for controversial purposes the Government have most undoubtedly magnified the importance of the introduction of that free list. The real importance of the question of contraband to us is in its bearing upon food supply. I need not enlarge upon the importance of that to this country. Our food supply in regard to the enormously greater part of it is sea-borne, and we have a very slender stock in store in this country. The Foreign Office says the question of contraband only affects provisions if they come in neutral vessels, and 90 per cent. of the corn comes in British vessels, and only 10 per cent. in neutral vessels. I take that for the purposes of my observations from the Foreign Office. The proportion of provisions of other kinds coming in neutral vessels is very much greater, I believe some 30 per cent. But what I desire to point out is this, that the proportion of British and neutral vessels bringing food into this country in time of peace is no criterion whatever of the proportion in time of war, and I must say that I think that the Foreign Office has assumed a very serious responsibility when they take upon themselves to assure chambers of commerce, and through them the people of this country, that the matter was of little importance in view of the fact that 90 per cent. of our corn comes in British ships.

What percentage would come in neutral vessels if we were at war, particularly if we were hard pressed. Everyone knows it would be enormously increased, and I most respectfully submit to this House that it is not right that the people of this country should be told that after all the matter was a very small one, because 90 per cent. of our corn comes in British vessels. The law of conditional contraband is perfectly clear. It has always been held in this country, it has always been held in the United States, and it has been laid down authoritatively that food is contraband only if it is for the army or the fleet, and is in consequence of that part of naval or military equipment. A very able writer on international law, Mr. Hall, says the opposite view is not arguable, and a right hon. Gentleman of considerable authority in these matters to whom hon. Gentlemen on the other side might be disposed to listen, Mr. Bryce, our ambassador at Washington, expressed himself on this subject on the 11th of August, 1904, in a Debate in the House in these terms:— Food, by the genera] consent of nations, was not contraband of war unless it is clearly proved to be for military or naval purposes. In 1885 an attempt was made by France to treat rice as contraband of war. Lord Granville protested in the most energetic manner, and in point of fact rice never was treated as contraband of war. That authority is one which I think is amply borne out by a more extended view of the law on this point, into which on this occasion I do not intend of course to enter. But this I may say without fear of contradiction, that for more than 100 years there has never been an attempt to treat food as absolute contraband of war except on two occasions. The first was that of France in 1885, and in that no seizures took place, and the question therefore never came up for adjudication. The right hon. Gentleman referred to a letter from Prince Bismarck to the Chamber of Commerce at Kiel on this point, but after all that letter does not profess to be a statement of law, and it is a statement in such terms as would justify any act in time of war. All that it comes to is this, that Prince Bismarck did not intend to interfere. He said that interference might do more mischief than it would do good, and I venture to say that it is perfectly impossible to treat that as a statement by Prince Bismarck that in the opinion of German lawyers food was properly treated as absolute contraband of war. The other case is the case of Russia in 1904 in the war with Japan, but that incident really tells against the Government advocates, because protests were made, and Russia withdrew from the position which she had assumed. She assented that provisions should be contraband only according to the use to which they were to be applied, and that was the doctrine for which Lord Lansdowne contended. The incident of Russia therefore is merely a case in which when an attempt was made by a great power to treat food as absolute contraband it found itself constrained to withdraw from that position, and it tells very much the other way.

I said I would not go into the authorities at length, but may I be allowed to enter one word of protest against the manner in which the Foreign Office has dealt with this great question. They have laid down that we are exposed to the imminent danger of having food treated as absolute contraband. They have expressed themselves in terms which would lead the public to suppose that in the view of a great many Powers food was absolute contraband of war. I venture to say that in putting that forward the Foreign Office was very oblivious of its responsibilities. Have they ever recollected what use may subsequently be made of such a statement? They make that statement for the purpose as they think of securing a controversial triumph at the moment. But a statement of that kind ought not to be made except under a sense of the greatest responsibility and realising the prejudicial effect that it may afterwards have upon the position of this country. That ought not to be put forward as a move in the game of party which is being played on this particular part of the subject. With regard to the statement of Prince Bismarck, which is relied upon by the right hon. Gentleman, it is perhaps a sufficient answer to say that Germany, in the views it submitted as a basis for arriving at an agreement, did not contend that food was absolute contraband. They said distinctly that food was conditional contraband.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

The right hon. Gentleman must not make that statement. Germany in her statement did put some kind of foods as absolute contraband.

6.0 P.M.

Sir R. FINLAY

We are now upon corn. What is the use of leading us off the scent by saying that Germany said that tinned provisions were obviously of such a nature that they were intended for the use of troops. What we are dealing with is the supply of corn to this country in time of war and the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me when I say that no single Power with the qualified exception of France, treated food as otherwise than conditional contraband, and the question of whether it was contraband depended upon whether it was intended for the military or naval forces of the Empire. It is quite true that France, and France alone, did put in a clause which the right hon. Gentleman has read which did put forward the claim which was put forward in 1885, but the document, I think, was an old one, prepared not for the purpose of the Convention, and it contained the statement that food might, under certain circumstances, be declared to be absolute contraband of war. But France stood alone in the matter, and I put it to the House that entirely gets rid of the effect of the letter of Prince Bismarck, of which so much has been made here and in the country, and that we are face to face with this that with the general consent of the great majority of countries food is only conditional contraband. Then it is said that may be the law, but what security have you that it will not be contraband? In the case of corn I think we have a sanction, and a sanction of the most effective kind. Suppose that we were pressed in war and that we had partially or temporarily lost command of the seas, would there not be a great transfer of the carriage of corn to this country from British ships to American ships? It would be most profitable to the United States ships to bring corn over which would be selling at a very good price in this country and there would be a great transfer of that kind. Will any hon. Gentleman say that any Power at war with us would be likely to provoke the displeasure of the United States by declaring that corn carried in a United States vessel to this country should be absolute contraband of war? Not only is the law on the matter clear, but it has behind it, so far as we are concerned, a sanction of the most effective kind, for happily I think we may dismiss the very idea of the possibility of war between this country and the United States as not within the range of practical politics, and as long as we are not at war with the United States we may depend upon it that no country however powerful would incur the displeasure and the possible hostility of such a Power as the United States by putting forward an unfounded claim to treat food brought to this country as contraband of war. If this Declaration were adopted the hands of the United States in this matter would be tied. If we ratify and the United States ratify, the United States would be bound, like ourselves, to the conditions which are contained in this Declaration, and when those conditions are looked at it will be found that we should not be very much better off, if at all, than if corn were declared to be absolute contraband of war. The Declaration on this point is a very good specimen of how it affects us on other points as well. It opens in a very promising way by conceding a general principle. Then comes an exception and we find that while we have been presented with a general principle the principle is eaten up by the exception which those taking a different view want. The 24th Article said food was conditional contraband. The 33rd Article said it might be seized if it was destined for the use of the armed forces or Government Departments of the enemy State. But Article 34, an innocent looking Clause, which seems to have passed with very little notice, under the guise of defining what are the circumstances which will raise the presumption of this fact, really gives away the whole position of this country. May I refer the House to its terms?

"The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities or to a contractor."

That is, of course, a mistranslation. It ought to have been a dealer or trader.

"Established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy."

If it is consigned to the enemy authorities, a cargo of wheat on its way to the Board of Trade, which in time of famine in this country owing to the war, was importing wheat for the relief of the civil population, might be seized. If it is consigned to a dealer who notoriously supplies the Government, there is not a corn dealer in a large way in this country who would not notoriously in time of war sometimes have contracts for the supply of the Government. If it is consigned to a fortified place, how many of our ports should we be content in time of war to leave unfortified? We should find it necessary to set them up, and if we set them up we should incur the penalty that the corn coming to that port was consigned to a fortified place or a place serving as a base for the armed forces, that is a base either of actual operations or a base of supply as is stated in the Report and as the words of the text clearly mean. The right hon. Gentleman offers us his own assurance that that was not so, and he referred us to the Lord Chancellor; but one part of the Lord Chancellor's observations he did not quote. The Lord Chancellor said he gave this as his opinion on which he did not entertain any real doubt. What the precise state of mind indicated by the phrase, "no real doubt," may be I do not quite know, but I should rather gather that some doubt had at times entered into the mind of anyone who used a phrase of that sort. When a man says, "I have no real doubt" it is really a sort of admission that he sometimes had twinges but has got rid of his doubt at the time that he speaks. The true rule is the English rule that the presumption only arose if the goods were consigned to a port of military or naval equipment, and under that it was decided in our courts, and it shows what the principle was, that Bordeaux was not such a port, although military or naval equipment went on there, but on the other hand Brest was, because the predominating character of the port is the test. But with the rules which are introduced by Article 34 a complete revolution is effected, a revolution almost as serious, I am not sure it is not quite as serious, as if food were declared to be absolute contraband.

The Foreign Office argued in their correspondence with the chambers of commerce that the presumption after all was rebuttable, and gave the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce a sort of legal lecture upon presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. I am sure the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce were grateful to the Foreign Office for their law, but it did not touch the point on which the chambers of commerce were insisting. For all practical purposes, and there was not in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the faintest recognition of this fact, the real question is how will Article 34 be construed by the captains of the enemy's cruisers whose duty it is to intercept food supplies to this country, and how they would act under it. They would say "this is going to a port which beyond all question is fortified." It is true the right hon. Gentleman said the Convention did not mean that, but if it did not mean that why on earth did it say it? The captain of the cruiser would seize the cargo and would leave the lawyers to wrangle over it some years afterwards, by the time that this country had perhaps been starved into surrender. That is really the practical question with which we have to deal, and it is no use telling us that in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman the words do not mean what they say. The terms of this Article 34 are so very wide that we have no security whatever.

Then you must add to Article 34 two other considerations which make it really of overwhelming importance. The first is that we should have foreign Powers converting merchantmen into men-of-war on the high seas. We could not check that. We might endeavour to pursue them, but we could not seal them up as we could seal up the enemy's fleets consisting of men-of-war. We should be exposed at any moment to the danger of a converted cruiser of this kind, which had sailed as a merchantman appearing as a man-of-war, and putting in force the rigorous rules laid down by Article 34, which really would enable seizure in every case. More than that, by the rule with regard to the destruction of neutral vessels, that converted man-of-war would be able to sink the neutral vessel at its own discretion according to the Articles. Our position in this country if we were hard pressed, if we temporarily lost the command of the seas, would be most serious under the combined effect of these three provisions, and more than that, we should not be safe at all even if we retained the general command of the sea, because we never could, however complete our command was, be secure against a merchantman appearing at a critical point, converting herself into a man-of-war and proceeding to seize and sink neutral vessels bringing corn into this country.

On looking at the papers I found with very great surprise that Article 34 is not mentioned at all in the report to the Foreign Office of the British delegates. It seems to have escaped attention altogether. It is an innocent-looking Article about Rules of Evidence and Presumption, and it is not referred to, and, as far as I can find out, never formed the subject of discussion except upon two perfectly inferior points. One was the proposal to add the words "or of supply," which was admitted to be unnecessary, and the other was a subsidiary point with regard to the trader or dealer being resident in the enemy country. I should be much obliged if the right hon. Gentleman will correct me if I have overlooked anything, but I cannot find that at the Conference there was any discussion. That is a very serious matter. Article 34 is the most important Article in the Convention from the point of view of this country, and it seems to have slipped through. The truth is that Article 34 is simply an adoption of the draft put forward by Germany. It will be found that the differences between the German draft and Article 34 are absolutely immaterial, and what we have done on this vital point of the most capital importance is simply to accept what was prescribed by Germany, and, as far as appears on the printed document, without having adequate discussion.

The advocates of the Declaration had laid great stress on the fact that the doctrine of continuous voyage in the case of conditional contraband is put an end to. I think we gain very little by that abolition, and that some Continental countries gain a vast deal more. One advocate of the Declaration is reported to have said in another place that all that has to be done is to turn the vessel bringing corn to Havre round and take her over to England, where she might deliver the corn with perfect safety. That is a complete delusion. The real destination of the corn in that case would be England, and under Article 35 the vessel might be seized at any time. The statement is made very rashly, and I do not think any responsible Gentleman on the Front Bench opposite will defend it. All the corn taken to that port, or to any other French port, would have to be transhipped. There are many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who know the capacity of merchant vessels trading on the Atlantic better than I do, but I am told that these ports are unsuitable for the transhipping of the very large vessels in which corn is habitually brought to this country. It would be a very troublesome and a very expensive operation, and it would give us very slight advantage indeed. But what an enormous advantage does the abolition of conditional contraband give to Germany! The right hon. Gentleman has said that Germany may get her supplies by land. Of course she may, but sea carriage is a great deal cheaper, and under this abolition of conditional contraband on a continuous voyage, on which the right hon. Gentleman plumes himself as really having obtained a concession, Germany gains a great deal, because she can in a far cheaper way get corn brought in any amount to the Dutch and Belgian ports for the purpose of supplying her army than she can possibly do by rail.

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman will controvert that proposition, and I say that this concession which he claims to have gained for this country is in point of gain to us absolutely nothing as compared with the gain to Germany. I need not dilate on the importance of this Article in the case of our being neutral. I am sorry to detain the House, but this is a matter which cannot be dealt with briefly. I pass on to the question of the destruction of neutral bottoms. I venture to say that on that question the Foreign Secretary was absolutely right in the way he stated the law in the instructions given to our delegates. The Foreign Secretary stated the law in a way which would have led one to hope that on this point we should stand firm. Russia had asked in 1907 for the right of destruction of neutral vessels and enemy vessels on the ground that she had very few ports except those at a great distance from the probable scene of operations, and that therefore it would put her, or any country similarly situated, at a disadvantage as compared with a country with any number of ports. Is that any reason for altering the law in a manner which is in itself unfair and improper according to the statement of the Foreign Secretary himself? I say it is no reason whatever. It is a sort of idea that there is to be an equal chance for both belligerents, and that the belligerent with a great many ports is to be brought into the

same position as the belligerent which has very few ports, and that it may destroy a neutral prize. Surely the idea is somewhat preposterous. On this point on which we started with such fair prospects, judging by the declaration of the Foreign Secretary we have made, as I shall point out to the House, a complete surrender. The Foreign Office has adopted in terms the Russian proposal on this point—a proposal which we well knew was put forward on the ground that owing to the inconvenience of their ports being distant they wished to make it the practice to destroy a neutral prize.

The completeness of the surrender we have made is apparent from the story. It begins with the statement of the law by the Foreign Secretary. Then you have the Russian proposal. What they wanted was that a neutral vessel should not be destroyed "except in a case where its preservation might compromise the safety of the vessel capturing, or the success of its operations." Then came the British instructions of 1st December, 1908, in which the Foreign Office begins to give way. These instructions say:—

"an effort should be made to secure the adoption by the Conference of the view that inability to spare a prize crew, or the mere remoteness of a convenient national port, does not constitute a military necessity which would justify the sinking of a neutral prize."

It shows a certain amount of simplicity to put forward that proposal. The whole reason of the Russian proposal was that she had few ports and that therefore she must have this extreme right to destroy neutral prizes because her ports are not within convenient reach. We put our proposal forward, and it was rejected. We submitted, and adopted in terms the Russian proposal without qualification. Words are added at the end about "the success of the operation in which it is engaged at the time," but these words make not the slightest difference, and the result is that we have abandoned the sound position which this country has always taken up, and we have adopted the ground which was put forward by Russia, who had explained what the reason was why she took the particular view which she advocated. It is said, "In vain is the net spread in sight of any bird." The Russian net was spread in sight of the Foreign Office, and all the same it came in.

The Government say that they could not get any other agreement. I say better a thousand times no agreement at all than

this. It gives up everything. Our proposal was rejected by the Conference, and the net result is that destruction may be effected where the safety of the captor of the vessel would be jeopardised by not destroying, or the success of the operations in which it is engaged at the time would be imperilled. I say that would entitle Russia in every case to destroy. The safety of a cruiser would be compromised if she had to take a prize to a distant port, or the success of the operations in which it is engaged would of course be imperilled. These operations are cutting up the commerce by which food is being brought to this country, and in every case, according to the rule proposed by Russia, and which we accepted, Russia and other Powers in a similar position would be entitled to say that the destruction of a neutral vessel is justified. My complaint is that this most unhappy Article legalises and makes usual and habitual that which has never been done except under circumstances of stringent necessity, as an act of military necessity, and subject to making compensation in every ease where done to the person injured. I do not deny that it might be done as an act of military necessity. I will not say that it would be always-wrong, for there are circumstances in which the belligerent feels it a moral duty to permit a wrong, subject to compensation being made afterwards. But these are strictly exceptional cases. What this Article does is to make the practice that which has never been recognised by us, but which has been advocated by Russia for the reasons I have given.

I venture to say that there is no more vicious mode of reasoning than that adopted by the right hon. Gentleman who opened the Debate. He put the extreme case of a neutral vessel coming with a supply of arms or ammunition, when a battle was actually impending at sea between the forces of two belligerents. He said there would be no opportunity for carrying the vessel to port, and he asked: Would you not destroy that vessel as the neutral vessel would be then taking part in belligerent operations? But I protest against taking extreme cases of that or any other kind, and from them arguing, because destruction took place under circumstances therefore you are to make a rule of what has always been highly exceptional. The Government say that the Articles treat it as exceptional. Article 49 says it is exceptional. But the exception to the rule that neutral vessels may not be destroyed is that it may be done in every case where the safety of the captor or the success of his operations would be imperilled if he abstained. The exception is absolutely eaten up by the rule, so far as desired by those who put this forward. Article 51, which refers to the exceptional necessity referred to in Article 49, does not carry it one bit further. We had an extraordinary argument from the right hon. Gentleman when he read an extract from the report of our delegate saying that the representatives of some foreign Power had assured him that cases of destruction under the Article as it stood would be extremely rare. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for York (Mr. Butcher) asked whether there was any record in the Blue Book of that statement having been made by the representatives of foreign Powers.

Mr. McKENNA

There is.

Sir R. FINLAY

Will the right hon. Gentleman give me the reference?

Mr. McKENNA

It is on page 98. The words are:— The delegates representing those Powers which have been most determined in vindicating the right to destroy neutral prizes, declared that the combination of the rules now adopted respecting' destruction and liability of the ship, practically amounted in itself to a renunciation of the right in all but a few cases.

Sir R. FINLAY

Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will do me the honour of following what I am going to say.

Mr. McKENNA

I assume the right hon. Gentleman did not wish to say that the report of our delegates misrepresents what was said by any foreign delegates.

Sir R. FINLAY

I did not mean to say anything of the kind. But what I did say was that apparently there was no statement in that Blue Book of what was said by the representatives of these foreign Powers. We are offered this flimsy security in reference to the terms of the article which was drawn by Russia for the purpose which Russia admits in her claims to destroy under it. Then we are told that the representatives of foreign Powers say that it would be very rare indeed. There are no restrictions there to make it rare. It legalises in every case. If any attempt were made to put forward such an argument as that the representatives of foreign Powers would say: "We do not impugn your good faith for one moment in making that statement through your own Foreign Office, but you must have misunderstood us. Look at the article. It is as simple as can be. We explained why we wanted it, and it is absurd on the strength or a misunderstanding by you of what was proposed in conversation to seek to qualify the terms of an article which is as plain as any article can be." There is one passage from an eminent Russian jurist on this very subject to which I would like to call the attention of the House. Monsieur de Martens, writing in 1887, after laying down rules as to the circumstances under which neutral vessels may be destroyed, in terms wider than we shall consent to as representing true international law goes on, that the distance of Russia's ports from scenes of naval operation often obliges Russia to sink her prizes, and he says:— This measure of a general character will excite without doubt against our country a universal dissatisfaction, (mécontente générale); and ho goes on:— What the maritime law of all states considers as a means to which recourse must not be had except in the last extremity will necessarily transform itself for us into the normal rule. That is precisely what this article does. I had occasion when I was Law Officer to go very carefully into the views of jurists in different countries upon this point, and the result was that the English and the American authorities are unanimously against the right to sink a neutral vessel, and that there is no agreement amongst jurists of the Continent to the effect that they are generally in favour of it. Exceptions are found here and there, the views do not always accord, but it cannot be said that the jurists of the Continent are generally in favour of the destruction of neutral vessels. In fact, a very well known and very authoritative German, treating of this matter in his handbook of international law, uses an expression to which I call the attention of the House, because it has a great connection with some of the statements made by the right hon. Gentleman in opening this Debate. What Dr. Goeffkin said in his book, which was published in 1889, was:— the destruction of neutral ships can be allowed only in cases of extreme necessity, since this case is plainly distinguishable from the case of an enemy's ship where condemnation is certain, which necessity is to be admitted if the ship is no longer seaworthy or the captor is being pursued by a superior enemy In face of that how can we be asked to assume that our position is so unfavourable as the Foreign Office for controversial purposes tried to make out? A French writer, M. Dispagnet, in his "International Law," published in 1889, speaking of the destruction of vessels, said:— This distraction is allowed only for enemies' ships and not for neutral vessels in case they are sinking. And surely it is perfectly reasonable in the case of neutral vessels that all they should be liable to is to be taken into port and condemned if the circumstances warrant. Destruction, as applied to neutral vessels, is for reasons which these authorities give an unjustifiable course. It is true that Russia destroyed our vessels at the time of the war with Japan, and we Hid not get compensation. Well, we did not think it worth our while in the case of these vessels to bring that extreme pressure on Russia which we might have brought to bear on her, but it would be a grave mistake to suppose that the pressure that we might bring to bear on any Power pursuing this practice habitually, if our hands were not tied down by the Declaration, would not have a most important effect. The truth is if we had got anything even in the nature of a compromise there would be something to be said for the Government, but we have got no compromise. We have got an unconditional surrender to the Russian view legalising this practice of the destruction of neutral vessels.

The Foreign Office stated—and it is one of the complaints which I have to make against the correspondence conducted by them with chambers of commerce—in a letter of 13th October, 1910, with reference to the destruction of neutral vessels:— the modifications introduced by the Declaration place this country in future in a more favourable position than it has hitherto been. There is not the slightest foundation, there is not even a colourable foundation for that statement. This country has given up everything, and has gained nothing whatever by way of compensation. I have concluded what I desire to say on these two points. There are many other points that I might deal with if I had not trespassed at inordinate length upon the time of the House. With regard to blockade I only say one word. The rule as to blockade is one which leaves an enormous deal to the discretion of the international Prize Court. It is provided that capture may take place only within the zone of operations of the blockading vessels. Then there is a subsequent Article with reference to continual pursuit. What is the zone of operations? On that point there is a long note which I have read with attention more than once, and which throws no light whatever on the question. It is a great deal longer than the Article, but it is not a bit more clear. It leaves the question as to what is the zone of operation of a blockading vessel absolutely in the dark, and that point goes without any assistance whatever to the international Prize Court which is to decide a matter which may most vitally hamper the efficiency of our ships.

Mr. McKENNA

How?

Sir R. FINLAY

Because if the international Prize Court take a narrow view of the meaning of the term zone of operations our captures beyond that zone would be illegal. The right hon. Gentleman is making the same mistake that characterised his interruption about an hour ago. The decision with regard to the zone of operation may be given in any case which has arisen between neutrals. Once two countries are at war as belligerents they do not litigate before the international Prize Court. They litigate in another manner on their own account. But if the international Prize Court put a very limited meaning in cases coming before them at the instance of neutrals or of enemies, subjects in the cases provided for, then the hands of our cruisers would be tied, and we should be bound by the law as laid down by the international Prize Court. I hope that I have succeeded in making my point clear. It seems to me very clear. I hope that I am not unduly sanguine when I think that I may possibly have converted the right hon. Gentleman. Then what is to be done? It is said that we have gone so far that we ought to complete this matter. I think we have made a very grave blunder in going so far with this Declaration as we have, but I say that we have not gone so far that the matter cannot be set right, and I say that before this Convention is ratified it certainly ought to be inquired into much more than it has ever been yet.

My own view is that the Convention is one that should not be ratified. But, of course, the test of examination is one which, if the Convention is a good one, it would survive in spite of my belief; but I say that to ratify this Convention without further examination would be an act involving the gravest responsibility on the part of the Foreign Office., a responsibility the full extent of which may not become manifest for many years, but which this House as trustee for the country, not only for the present generation, but for future generations, is bound to take into account before it gives its assent. Much better have no agreement at all. Our position is a pretty strong one at present. We have got the United States in agreement with us on, I think, almost every point, and Japan, to a very large extent, is substantially in agreement. The idea seems to be that we should insist on having an agreement, a good agreement if possible, but better a bad agreement than none at all. Unless we can improve our position, let us remain as we are, relying upon our own strength and on the consent of those countries which take the same view as we do. We will never purchase safety by surrender. I am sorry to say that in my view the ratification of this Convention would be a national calamity of a grave character.

Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES

In the first place I wish to express my very deep regret that His Majesty's Government have not afforded a free hand to the House of Commons. No question of Liberal principle is involved in this discussion. Liberal interests are no more affected than the interests of the Conservatives in this particular question. The National Council of the nation have finally to decide whether or not this agreement should be ratified. The right hon. Gentleman the Undersecretary of State in his speech, the ability of which I am glad to recognise, ridiculed the idea of referring this matter to a Royal Commission. The particular machinery which should be used for the investigation of the intricate matters involved might possibly not be most happily found in a Royal Commission. In the settlement of this treaty great points have been ignored. Certainly every other country was represented by some of the most distinguished men in science and in international law. We were represented—I do not speak, how could I? in terms of the slightest disparagement—by the very able Foreign Office officials, who represented and zealously represented, the interests of Great Britain in this matter. Four or five gentlemen in the Foreign Office, under the guidance and direction of the Foreign Secretary, settled a treaty which may have the most profound results, not only upon the commercial prosperity of this country, but even upon its national safety. Therefore I very respectfully venture to take exception to the vein of light irony with which the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs dismissed the question. I claim to speak on this question, though, with all due humility, because for very many years past I have made a study of international law, especially in relation to commerce, the matter being of the greatest interest to me. It is in that capacity, and in that capacity alone, that I shall venture to lay before the House my objections to this proposal. Before dealing with the main grounds for my objections, I want, with due respect, to correct some very glaring inaccuracies into which the right hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs fell. He represented to this House that food supplies, and indeed all things ancipitis usus, has been in the facile discretion of foreign Powers. He said it was in the power, I hope I am not misquoting him, of foreign countries, a power which they had apparently freely exercised, to declare foodstuffs contraband of war. He vouched for that on authority which I believe never existed. He vouched for that on the authority of a no less distinguished publicist, as well as statesman, than the late Prince Bismarck.

Throughout the whole history of international law, for at least more than two centuries, I think I may say since the time of Grotius, the right to seize articles of food, except under limited conditions, has been denied by every civilised country. Except with two or three glaringly historical exceptions it has never been exercised. In the Napoleonic wars, in the early part of last century, it was with the wildest extravagance asserted by France, and that assertion was met by an equally extravagant assertion by Great Britain. But neither country attempted to act upon it, and both shortly afterwards withdrew it. The right hon. Gentleman referred to what was done by France in 1884 during their war with China. It is true that France asserted the right to stop vessels proceeding to Hong Kong, and they seized them with the rice which was on board. But that was not on the ground that rice was a food supply, but on the ground that rice was currency. Lord Granville, who was at that time the Foreign Minister, violently repudiated the right which was asserted. The matter never came before a Prize Court for consideration and judgment. The war came to an abrupt end during the course of negotiations, and with the exception of that isolated case of 1884, we have no juridical authority on the subject, and it may be stated it is the only modern instance, apart from the instance of the Russo-Japanese War, in which any country has ever asserted the right to seize neutral ships carrying foodstuffs, unless they were going to a place of military or naval equipment. That is incontestible. My right hon. Friend said Prince Bismarck justified that. It is true that Prince Bismarck was very glad to see this war proceeding at that time on the part of France against China, because it distracted that Power as well as the attention of France from other affairs.

It is perfectly true that Prince Bismarck, in an answer imputed to him, said it was not a matter in which he would interfere, and that each nation must be the judge of its own requirements, needs and aims. But within a few months of making that statement, in a letter—and this is what the right hon. Gentleman never told us—Prince Bismarck unconditionally withdrew every word he had written, and stated that the seizure of Saltpetre in ships was a breach of international law. Saltpetre, I suppose, is still a main component in the manufacture of military ammunition, and Prince Bismarck was of opinion that saltpetre should not be subject to seizure. I have corrected the right hon. Gentleman in a very grave error into which he apparently unwittingly fell, when laying this matter before the House. Von Bulow, the successor to Prince Bismarck, held precisely the same view as Prince Bismarck in his Hamburg letter, and affirmed that articles ancipitis usus should not be regarded as contraband unless the vessel were on its way to a place of naval or military equipment. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs referred to the sinking of ships, and he stated with great emphasis that the sinking of ships was asserted as a right by the great Continental Powers of Europe, and he gave us instances to show that the sinking of neutral ships had been a not uncommon practice in past days. I challenge my right hon. Friend, before the Russo-Japanese War, to produce a single case of a neutral ship having been sunk by a belligerent. He adverted to the American cases, and again my right hon. Friend was not accurate in what ho said. He quoted Lord Stowell in regard to the ships which were sunk, but those vessels were not neutral ships, they were hostile ships, and Lord Stowell went as far as any jurist in emphatically laying down, in awarding compensation for damages in those cases against the captors, that nothing justified the sinking of neutral, ships by belligerents. I will now deal very briefly with this proposal, absolutely, of course, from a non-party point of view, as the result of my reading and study of the historical part of this question.

7.0 P.M.

I do not deny what the right hon. Gentleman emphasised in his peroration, that it is a great and noble idea to have an international Prize Court. It has been the dream of Continental jurists, and if you read, as I have, the pages of French, German writers, and Russian writers, you will find that all of them vividly express their great aspiration for an international Court of Appeal, by which they believe all international differences might be ultimately solved. Great Britain has all throughout the history of this question resolutely opposed the establishment of an international court; but now, for the first time in her history, as the result of the noble aspirations of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sanction is given to the establishment of an international court. As a humble lawyer who has given his attention to this subject, I take no exception to the establishment of an international court, if we had a good code of international law which represented the general usages and the general interests of maritime nations. The science of international law is still in a inchoate state. In the first place, it is the practice of particular nations; in the second place it becomes the usage of two or three nations, only after vicissitudes and the lapse of a considerable period of time does it ripen into the custom of the states concerned. You are endeavouring, by this Convention, to precipitate the end to which international lawyers look, and it is precipitated when you instruct your agents, recognising that a code is necessary, to enter upon the matter in a spirit of compromise. An international court of appeal is impossible, unless you have a code established which you can administer. Therefore you instructed Lord Desart and his very able colleagues to approach the solution of the sinking of neutral ships in a large spirit of compromise in acting on our behalf with respect to these matters. My objection to a court of international appeal is twofold. In the first place it arrests the hand of diplomacy. It may be that a belligerent country may be guilty of an act against neutrals which is not in consonance with the traditions and principles of maritime law, and at once, under present conditions, you have resort to diplomatic intervention. Diplomatic intervention may be useless, but I could quote various instances where representations made by the Government of the right hon. Gentleman opposite were most effective. Now the aggrieved party will appeal in vain, because the Government will tell him this is a matter which has to be settled by the international court, and we should be violating our treaty and our convention if we diplomatically interfered. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman will deny that that must follow. There is another objection which I entertain to this international Court of Appeal. I will not refer to the fact that a gentleman from Guatemala is to be one of the judges who will compose this body, but what I do refer to is this, that the aggrieved ship owner or merchant in this country has, in the first place, to submit the matter to the decision of a municipal court of the belligerent country. If it decides against him he then has to carry his appeal to a foreign country before a tribunal which cannot speak his language and acting on rules of evidence totally dissimilar to those which we have. He has to employ foreign lawyers, he has to carry his witnesses over to that foreign port, he has to fight against a powerful Government, the Government against which he is appealing, and he has also this still greater and permanent disadvantage, that he is fighting for something which the genius of the law in his own country told him he was always right in asserting, but which the municipal law of foreign States of Europe would tell him he was wrong in asserting. Therefore, for those reasons I think that this is precipitate action, and although we lawyers do look forward some day to the establishment of an international court, you must have your international law in a more settled and fixed condition than it is at present, and it shall not be law manufactured by a spirit of compromise.

The next exception that I have to take, and I do not think the right hon. Gentleman has answered this, is that in time of war, and I am now speaking of when we are belligerents, our position with regard to food supplies coming to this country is very much worse than it is under present custom law. I shall establish that point, I hope, to the satisfaction of my hon. Friends. What is the law, and let the right hon. Gentleman the Undersecretary correct me if I am not stating the law aright. When I speak of law it has no sanction except that of usage. It is a mere custom of law, but it has very powerful sanction. It has this powerful sanction that the common sense of Europe has justified the law, and justified it so far that it has never, except in one or two extravagant cases, been violated. The law is that food stuffs, unless carried to a port of naval or military equipment, cannot be seized, I mean food stuffs in neutral vessels. That is absolutely unequivocal, and I think unanimously recognised to be the law of Europe.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

I do not think so.

Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES

The right hon. Gentleman has the misfortune to disagree not only with me but every jurist. I may refer him to Hall, and to any of the well-known American works, and ho will find in the pages of each of those works, categorically stated, that it has been the generally recognised law of, Europe and of America that food stuffs in neutral vessels are protected unless on their way to a port of naval or military equipment, or to the armed forces of the enemy. I challenge the right hon. Gentleman, or any of his colleagues who may reply, to quote any passage which conflicts with the proposition which I lay down. What is the difference that the Convention makes? The difference the Convention makes, and I think anybody who is not a lawyer will appreciate the distinction in a moment, is this among others, but this great difference, it says, that if the food stuffs are going to a base, that is the word, in a neutral ship, they may be seized. We turn to find out what "base" means. There is a glossary or commentary attached to the Declaration by M. Renault, that is to be effective as the terms of the Declaration, according to the statements of the delegates and, I think, according to the statement of the Foreign Office. The commentary says "base" does not only mean base of nations, but means base of supplies. I really ask any hon. Gentleman, or right hon. Gentleman in this House, does he suppose that a naval commander representing a country at war with ourselves seeing a ship laden with provisions making its way to Hull or Bristol or Liverpool would not, in the interests of his country, at once feel it his duty to his country, in the interest of bringing the war to a successful conclusion, to lay hands upon that vessel, upon perhaps the unfounded ground that Hull or Bristol or Liverpool were bases of supplies for the armed forces of the enemy. I say that any naval commander who would fail to do that would be unworthy of being in the service of his country. Neutral States who may regard that as unjust would be silenced by being told that that is a difficult question of international law which has to be decided, it may be some months hence, by the international tribunal. That, to my mind, appeals most strongly.

I ask hon. Gentlemen who sit behind me to consider whether that Article does not involve a serious menace to, I will not say the absolute safety of our country, but at any rate to the security of our country to some extent, and to the security of our people in time of war. No doubt any interference with our food supplies would be even if they did not go so far as to involve famine, a very serious matter for this country. How was the matter met in the House of Lords? It was met in the House of Lords by this answer. Assume that you are right and that a naval commander would regard Hull or Liverpool or Bristol as a base of supply, What would be easier than to convey your goods to Havre and tranship them from there under the doctrine of continuous voyage to your own country? I have endeavoured to ascertain the opinion not only of people who are competent to speak of this question in my own country, but of those competent to speak in other countries. They referred me to M. Renault's explanatory clause which says the destination is not to be decided by the ship's papers, which is the good old customary rule, but that if there is fraud, and if the ship's papers are illusory, and if Havre is not the true destination, then the ship is liable to be seized. I can conceive that that is the view or many Continental jurists with whom I have communicated, and that any transferring of the goods first of all to a neutral ship at Havre and thence under convoy to Great Britain would be a wholly impossible proceeding. The last subject that I desire to refer to is the question of the destruction of neutral ships. I have already stated neutral ships have never hitherto been sunk until the Russo-Japanese War. The American cases were those of hostile ships, not neutral ships. In the Russo-Japanese War undoubtedly merchant ships were sunk. Lord Lansdowne made very energetic representations to the Russian Government on that. What did the Russian Government do? Did they assert the right? On the contrary, Count Larnsdorff wrote an apologetic letter saying it shall not occur again. For two years there was no recrudescence of that outrage, and then, I think it was towards the end of the war, in the year 1903, there was a further case, and again representations were made by the Foreign Office, and again Count Lamsdorff wrote to say that again a mistake had been committed, and offered an apology.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

Did they pay compensation?

Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES

It is not a question of compensation. The question is that we, the greatest civilised country in the world, are admitting and sanctioning the right to destroy neutral ships.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

I thought the hon. Member said that Russia acknowledged that they had made a mistake.

Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES

Certainly.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

And yet the hon. Member says they did not pay any compensation.

Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES

I know many people who have acknowledged mistakes and not paid compensation. What does this sinking of neutral ships mean? There are certain illusory words in the Convention to the effect that persons on board are to be conveyed to a place of safety. These are the conditions under which a naval commander may destroy a neutral ship. He may do so if he thinks his own ship would be in danger, or that the success of his operations would be imperilled if he did not do so. Assume that a commander met a passenger vessel on the high seas, and that that vessel afforded him some justification for overhauling and perhaps seizing it. Would not that naval commander say, "This vessel may convey communications to the enemy, or may even be seized by the enemy; to prevent that contingency I will at once put it out of existence." Would any international court hold that to be an invalid excuse if the commander, on his honour as a naval officer, stated that he believed that the interests of this country in the prosecution of their naval campaign would have been prejudiced if he had not caused the ship to be destroyed? My knowledge of the legal judgments of the Admiralty Courts of most countries, including our own, leads me to the conclusion that the judgment would be in favour of the naval commander. What about the people on board? They are to be conveyed to a place of safety. What is a place of safety? The people are to be placed in the narrow confines of a man-of-war! Their effects may be destroyed, and they are to be conveyed in that ship to a place of safety. But while being conveyed to a place of safety the vessel conveying: them may be sunk. Yet we have committed ourselves to a principle which throughout our whole naval history we have persistently, continuously, and emphatically repudiated. Does the right hon. Gentleman deny that? Does he assert that we have ever given countenance to the destruction of neutral ships? One of our greatest living international lawyers asserted that it was a practice unknown to civilised nations until Russia adopted it, and he declared that it was contrary to the elementary principles of civilised States.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir Rufus Isaacs)

Does the hon. Member suggest that it has ever been done by the British Navy?

Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES

I suggest that the only cases were those during the French war which have been cited, and they were cases of American ships which were not neutral but hostile ships, trading under a licence. And be it observed, Lord Stowell, before whom those cases came for adjudication, absolutely condemned in costs and damages the man-of-war for not having taken those ships to a port.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD

How does the hon. Member account for the fact that seven out of the ten powers at the Naval Conference claimed the right to sink such ships?

Mr. ATHERLEY-JONES

I account for it very easily. This country has ports all over the world. We have facilities for conveying our prizes to ports in almost every sea. It would be a gratuitous act on our part to sink a ship. But military powers like Germany or Russia have very few ports in the seas in which no doubt they would endeavour to assert the principle. I thoroughly agree with the proposal made by Germany some years ago that private property at sea should be exempt. That apparently cannot be obtained, and it is not obtainable only through the action, right or wrong, of the British Foreign Office. The Under Secretary of State suggested that the other side of the House were opposed to all conventions, and he supported that assertion by citing the case of Mr. Thomas Bowles, who was a Member of this side. Do not let the hon. Member run away with the idea that we are opposed to conventions or treaties. I at least should be one with him in every effort to secure our ends by conventions upon proper lines. I have endeavoured with absolute fairness and with the greatest respect to submit my objections to this Declaration. It is a very difficult position for a Liberal Member to be in, because we feel that pressure is being brought to bear, and properly so, as to which Lobby we should go into. But I would earnestly entreat the Foreign Secretary, I will not say to make this an open question, but that these articles, which have received criticism from far abler men than I, should be reviewed and another opportunity given to the House to express its opinion upon them.

Mr. BUTCHER

I beg to move, as an Amendment, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add instead thereof the words, in view of the strong expression of independent expert opinion on the part of many important business and commercial bodies and of high naval authorities against the ratification of the Declaration of London, and in view of the fact that the Declaration, if ratified, will be binding on this country for at least twelve years, this House declines to proceed further with the Naval Prize Bill until the whole question has been submitted to and reported on by a commission of experts to be appointed for that purpose. It is seldom that there comes before this House a question of graver national importance, of greater complexity, and of a more entirely non-party character than that which we are considering to-night. The Government themselves have recognised the exceptional gravity of this measure. It is customary to ratify a convention such as the Declaration of London without consulting Parliament, but in this case the Government have recognised that so far-reaching an innovation as is contained in this code should not be foisted upon the country without the sanction of Parliament, and they have given a pledge to the House that they will not ratify the convention until Parliament has given its approval. Having given that pledge, the Government have adopted a most unfortunate course in refusing to allow an unbiassed expression of opinion on the part of the Members of this House. If ever there was a question before the House that required the free, instructed, and unbiassed opinion of Members it is the question we are asked to vote upon here. What are we asked to do? We are asked to pledge ourselves to two momentous decisions. We are asked, in the first place, to sanction a code of international maritime law, which code will be irrevocably binding upon us for at least twelve years, which in many important respects is admittedly imperfect and incomplete, which is expressed in language almost studiously vague and ambiguous, and which in some vital points widely departs from those rules and regulations for which we have uniformly contended, both in our Prize Courts and in our diplomacy. We are asked, in the second place, to set up an international Prize Court to administer the code embodied in the Declaration, a court on which this country will have one member out of fifteen, on which our Dominions will not be represented at all, and of which the rest of the judges will be foreign jurists largely out of touch with the juridical conceptions both of this country and of the United States.

When a proposal of that sort is made one would naturally expect that the Government making it would be supported by a vast and preponderating consensus of expert opinion. But how do they stand? On the one side you have the Government and their advisers of the Foreign Office. No one disputes their absolute sincerity, hut there is such a thing as pride of parentage, and I venture to think in this case that we have seen to-night the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs exhibiting a somewhat unduly favourable view of his progeny. What about other departments of the Government? Let me ask, and I should like to know before this Debate closes, were the Naval Lords of the Admiralty consulted in any way before this solemn Declaration was signed by our representatives in London? I suppose we shall hear later on whether they were. We have certainly not heard what their opinion is.

It is said—I believe it was said in another place—that the Board of Admiralty was consulted at some stage or other—I do not know what. But in a matter of this sort, essentially a naval question, essentially a question for experts both naval and others, would it not be right and proper that we should have the advantage of knowing what the views of the naval experts of the Government were, views which up till now have been sedulously withheld? There is no difficulty about any of the opinions of the experts of the Foreign Office—not at all! Though I wish to treat this as a non-controversial and non-party matter, I do say that as we have heard the opinions of the Foreign Office, would it not be right, when this House is asked to take a step of such a momentous importance, that we should also know the views of the expert advisers of the Admiralty. I wish to admit to the fullest extent what support the Government have in this matter. They have some—not very much—external support; some jurists of acknowledged eminence; and, of course, they have had the advantage of getting the acquiescence of the majority of the Colonial Premiers. I do not wish to say one word as to the position of the Colonial Premiers. We have not got a full report before us of the proceedings of that Conference. We do not know by what arguments they were guided, or what arguments the Foreign Office used, and it would be premature, and I also think discourteous, on our part to venture to criticise those arguments until we are in full possession of them. We do know this, that two representatives of Australia were instructed to come to that Conference for the express purpose of showing the grave danger to this country of some of the provisions of this Declaration. The Premier and another delegate from Australia did attend the Imperial Conference and give solid grounds for their objections, which I venture to think were never adequately answered, and which they never withdrew.

Those are the opposing forces on the one side. What are on the other? I do not think I use the language of exaggeration when I say that on the other side there is an almost unexampled consensus of independent expert opinion deeply, strongly opposed to this Declaration—the opinion not of this or that class, but of almost of every class concerned. We have naval, business, commercial, shipping opinion manifested in an almost and unusual manner against it. We have the opinion of jurists of the highest eminence, including such a man as I know my right hon. Friend would be glad to recognise as one of the most prominent in his class, Professor Holland. I am not going to enumerate the forces which are drawn up against the Government, but it is well to remind this House and the public that you have against this Declaration the chambers of commerce of almost every maritime and business centre in this country; the Chambers of Commerce of London, Birmingham, Leeds, Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow, Ply-mouth, Portsmouth, Sunderland, Swansea, and Belfast. Can any other occasion be brought up by the right hon. Gentleman or any one who follows—where there was such an absolute consensus, not of party men—for this is a matter of the business life of the country. Those concerned have given their opinion, not as party men, but as men of practical business experience and common sense. Can any other occasion be brought up in the history of modern times, when Government proposals were opposed by this enormously strong opposition on the part of the business community, and where the Government yet persisted in going on in the face of that Opposition? But I have not enumerated all or anything like all against it.

I spoke of chambers of commerce. This Declaration is also opposed by the United Kingdom Chamber of Shipping, the shipowners of the great ports of Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leith, Liverpool, and also the shipowners of Manchester and the North of England. There is one class I have not yet mentioned; that is the class to whose opinion above all we ought to pay respect to. I refer to naval opinion. No less than 157 admirals have put their signature to a strong protest and condemnation. Let us remember that these men represent that Service that when others are sitting in their armchairs will have to fight for the protection of the ships on which our fate will depend. In that state of things I venture to put down my Motion, and to ask the House not to give a definite opinion on the present occasion either in condemnation of the Government or in affirmation of the views of those who oppose the Government. I ask the House to suspend its judgment until we have clearer and fuller information. This I venture to think, can only be obtained by a commission of experts drawn from all classes whose opinion is valuable, including the opinion of our own self-governing Colonies. I do not suggest that this Commission is to deprive this House of the exercise of the opinion of its Members. I think that would a shameless abnegation of our responsibility. That Commission will be asked to advise. It rests with us to decide.

We have not, at any rate at the present moment, the means of forming an opinion upon this matter of great difficulty and complexity. Will any hon. Gentleman on the opposite side of the House tell me that ho is so entirely and absolutely acquainted with every detail of this controversy that no facts, no argument, can be brought forward that would affect his judgment? After all, in a question of this sort, the assertion of infallibility is nothing but a confession of incompetence. Therefore I think we are entitled as Members possess- ing responsibility in this matter to this House and to the country, to ask that the final decision shall be deferred until we have that fresh light and that fresh knowledge which we can get from such a Commission. What can be said against it? One argument has been suggested. I think it is a bad one. It is that there has been a considerable delay already, and that a further delay would be useless. In answer to that is it not fair to say that delay could not be possibly harmful? If you delay this decision for six months you do not destroy the Declaration of London. You do not abandon your right to ratify it if you like. On the other hand delay might be exceedingly valuable in saving us from disaster. In a case of this sort better, I think, six months of delay, with the certainty of a reasoned verdict, than an immediate judgment with the possibility of national disaster. It would hardly be right for me to urge this view upon the House, and to point out the undeniable existence of this vast body of opinion opposed to the Government without pointing out also that that opinion, that these objections, are founded upon solid grounds.

In view of the speeches which have been already delivered I think I shall be able to shorten my observations, but I shall endeavour to point out some unanswerable objections, as I think, to the ratification of this Declaration. I will not touch upon the question of the composition of the Prize Court. It has been touched upon by my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh and St. Andrews Universities, but it is obvious that grave objections can be taken to it. I propose to confine my observations to the code contained in the Declaration of London. The first observation I make about that code is that it is almost studiously vague in its terms; so vague is it that the Government themselves tell us that it cannot be understood without calling in the aid of the general report of the Drafting Committee, M. Renault's report. I am bound to say that the attitude of the Government towards M. Renault's report has been one of a somewhat singular character. We were told in the first place earlier in the Session that this report without any further international Convention must necessarily be read into, and be regarded as an authoritive exposition of, the Declaration of London. That is what I was told by the Under-Secretary. Eminent jurists controverted that view. At the Imperial Conference the other day the Foreign Secretary said he would not ratify the Declaration except with the stipulation that this Report of M. Renault must be treated as an authoritative exposition of the Declaration. I want the House to consider whether it is right that that Report should be regarded as an authoritative exposition of the Declaration. Upon that authorities of the highest character fundamently differ. Let me tell the House what Mr. Arthur Cohen says in a lecture delivered at University College:— The Declaration, unless supplemented by M. Renault's report, is vague, defective and incomplete. Then he goes on:— It would be unsafe to ratify the Declaration until the report is in some way embodied in the Declaration and made binding on the international Prize Court. What is the view of another great legal authority, Professor Holland? In an address to the British Academy he says:— It would be calamitous should a practice be introduced of attempting to cure the imperfect expression of a treaty by tacking on to it an equally authoritative reasoned commentary…. It would be obscurum per obscurius, a remedy worse than the disease. Is not this a matter upon which we should have further light? Which of these two eminent Gentlemen is right and which is wrong? It is in that state of things that this House is asked to say that the ratification will be entirely satisfactory, and that we must express immediate approval.

The vital question for us is this: How are our foodstuffs, in time of war, brought in neutral ships likely to be affected by this Declaration? The right hon. Gentleman, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, spoke of the effect of the Declaration when we were neutral. I think a good many defects of this Declaration are to be found in the fact that the Government approached this question far too much from the point of view of our position when we were neutrals and far too little from the point of view of the position we should be in when we were belligerents. Many of the defects of this Declaration are due to that fact. The right hon. Gentleman claimed many advantages from it when we were neutrals. I do not admit them. I think it would probably be found, as many persons of capacity believe, that even when we are neutral we should be worse off. But supposing the right hon. Gentleman was able to prove conclusively, as he attempted to do, that there were other advantages in this Declaration, I say if it had but this one fatal defect of seriously injuring our food supplies in time of war, then this House should refuse its ratification.

There are three points of view of great importance as to the effect upon our foodstuffs. First, there are the express provisions of the Declaration as to contraband, second, the express provisions as to the sinking of neutral ships; and, third, the silence of the Declaration as to the converting of merchantmen into war ships on the high seas. As to the matter of contraband, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman, it is most important for us to ascertain clearly what our position at present is, as to the supply of foodstuffs carried in neutral vessels. I think my hon. Friend who has spoken has laid down the law with absolute clearness, when he said that the general modern practice of nations for a hundred years has been to treat food, not as contraband, liable to seizure in any circumstance, but as conditional contraband liable to seizure only when it is proved to be intended for the armed force of the enemy. We have the opinion of one Under-Secretary to-night; let me read the opinion of another Liberal Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a man whose authority as a jurist and a statesman none of us would dispute. I refer to the right hon. James Bryce. He said from his place in this House on 11th August, 1904: Food by the general consent of the nations was not contraband unless it was clearly proved to be intended for military or naval purposes. Does the right hon. Gentleman dispute the accuracy of the statement of Mr. Bryce. It has gone unchallenged in the House of Commons until to-day, and not a single jurist or any one else has challenged it until it was challenged by the Undersecretary this afternoon.

The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs called me to task for some passages in a pamphlet which I wrote upon this subject. Since the right hon. Gentleman made his speech I had the opportunity of refreshing my memory. I looked at what I had written, and I adhere to every syllable I uttered. I called attention in the clearest terms I could command to the fact that two attempts only were made in modern times in which other nations had claimed the right to treat food as absolute contraband. I pointed out that the claims had broken down, and that food had not been treated in modern times as absolute contraband. What is the fact? The right hon. Gentleman, in answer to a question in this House some time ago, said that there had not been one single case in the last thirty or forty years in which food was condemned as absolute contraband. As regards the case of France in 1885, that was dealt with by my hon. Friend who preceded me; and as regards the case of Russia in 1904, that precedent shows that although Russia did claim the right to treat food as an absolute contraband, the United States and ourselves protested, and that claim was not proceeded with. That being the state of the case without the Declaration, how do we stand with the Declaration? As already pointed out, you find in the Declaration, not merely an invitation to a hostile commander, but a justification for a commander to capture every cargo of foodstuffs coming in neutral ships to this country. All he has to say is, "This ship is destined for Bristol, Liverpool, Newcastle, or elsewhere, which must be a base of supply for the Army, and I would fail in my duty to my country if I failed to capture it."

The Lord Chancellor said the word base of supply meant a port which was actually a magazine for war or actually a place of equipment for war. What an unfortunate thing that the Lord Chancellor was not consulted before this Declaration was signed, so that we might have some clear and distinct words which might have prevented this deplorable result. The words of the Declaration are as wide as they could be. Perhaps it might be interesting to know what view a German distinguished officer takes as to the meaning of "base of supply." Let me quote the opinion of General Baron von Gotz in a book ho wrote on the conduct of war. He says:— In Western Europe, the dense network of railways allows of reinforcements and supplies being brought up in a few days from the most remote parts of the country. It even obviates the necessity of restricting the base to one district, the whole area of the country becoming the base. That is the German view, and it is also the view taken by General von Kammerer. He says that owing to railways the meaning of the word "base" has been altered. To Germany and the Continental Powers the provisions of the Declaration in this respect matter not. These countries are largely self-supporting. To us this matter of sea-borne food is a matter of life and death. We produce only about one-fifth of the food supply we want ourselves; the rest is brought to us by the sea. Food supplies are borne into this country at the appalling rate of £484 per minute. Anything which would materially stop this food supply in time of war would be ruin. Let us not be told that neutral ships will not be valuable in bringing in food supply. Let us grant that the proportion of food brought in neutral ships is only 10 to 15 per cent. of the total amount now. Is it not certain that when war broke out and our own ships carrying our own goods were liable to capture, Declaration or no Declaration, we should necessarily have to rely to a far larger degree upon neutral ships, perhaps to the extent of 30 or 40 per cent., and it is this source of supply which under the terms of the Declaration you are going to destroy.

8.0 P.M.

One word about the sinking of neutral ships. Capture is not the only risk which neutral vessels carrying foodstuffs would be subject to under this Declaration. It is equally and absolutely certain that almost every foreign commander would be invited and justified under this Declaration, not only in capturing, but in sinking every neutral ship carrying a cargo of food to this country. What has been our practice in the past? We have the words of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the instructions he wrote to Sir Edward Fry at The Hague, and he lays down very clearly what our practice is. He said:— Concerning the right to destroy captured neutral vessels, the view hitherto taken by the greater naval Powers has been that in the event of its being impossible to bring in any vessel for adjudication, she must be released…The British Prize Courts have held that to be the law for at least one hundred years. That is the view which we say is the view of the greater nations. How do we propose to deal with that by the Declaration of London? Whenever a foreign hostile commander comes across a neutral vessel carrying food to this country, he may be afraid that putting on a prize crew would interfere with the success of his operations and under Article 49, and he would say, "I can sink you if the success of my operation is likely to be interfered with by putting on a prize crew." And sink that ship undoubtedly he would. I would like to know whether Admiral Slade, our distinguished representative at the Naval Conference, has altered his view. He spoke in strong terms against sanctioning any words in this Declaration which would allow a hostile commander to urge such excuses for sinking a neutral prize, as that he could not spare a prize crew. He said it would be disastrous. Does ho hold that opinion still? Is it not obvious that under the terms of this Declaration the mere inability to spare a prize crew would be held to be ample justification for sinking neutral ships? Let the House remember that, though in the interest of our possible foreign enemy Article 49 of this Declaration would be of no use to ourselves, because whereas our foreign enemies could say "we have not a port handy to take ships to for adjudication, and in consequence it would interfere with the success of our operations to take the ship there and therefore we would sink that ship," in our case, with our many ports all over the sea, we would not have that excuse, and we would be bound to take the ship for adjudication to a port. There is only one other question in connection with this Declaration that I wish to refer to and that is the conversion of merchantmen to warships on the high seas. It is true that there is no recognised international law on the subject, and the Government have told us over and over again that although the Declaration is silent upon this point we are no worse off than we were before. I have heard that argument several times. I ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether that is the view of the Government.

Mr. McKENNA

As belligerents.

Mr. BUTCHER

That is an entire misapprehension, because if the Prize Court is set up this is one of the very questions it will have to deal with, namely, the question of the legality of the conversion of merchantmen to warships on the high seas. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs said that under the terms of the Bill we should be no worse off in this respect than we were before. This is a question which the international Prize Court will have to deal with, and how? It will have to deal with it according to the principles of justice. In this matter, instead of having our hands free and being able to protest and bring every pressure in our power against any Power that asserts this right to convert merchantmen on the high seas into warships, we shall have our hands tied, and we shall be able to utter no protest or take any retaliatory steps when at war because this question has to be left to the decision of the new court. No wonder that the German newspapers have been expressing their unconcealed delight at the prospects of the speedy ratification of this Declaration.

The "Cologne Gazette" said the other day that there appeared to be no doubt that this Declaration would shortly be ratified, owing to the great party majority commanded by the Government. I think I have now given some reasons for thinking that there are grave objections to the immediate ratification of this Declaration, which will involve us when we are belligerents in serious peril in regard to our food supply, both in regard to what the Declaration contains as well as what it does not contain. I think I have made out a case for asking for further information before the House comes to a final and irrevocable decision. The Prime Minister said the other day that he would feel it his duty to carry the Second Reading of this Bill by the aid of a purely party vote. It is unfortunate, strange, and I would almost say unworthy that the Prime Minister does not find it possible to trust his followers on a matter of such great and vital national importance. I hope that even before this Debate comes to a close there will be an alteration in that decision. Be that as it may, I hope and desire that the House, in coming to a decision upon a question of such great and vital moment to us, may act not as an assembly composed of sects or of parties, but as the representatives of a united people, animated by one common desire to act in the best interests of their country as a whole.

Mr. SHIRLEY BENN

I rise to second the Motion which has been moved by my hon. Friend the Member for York. I do so thoroughly alive to the danger involved in regard to the establishment of an international Prize Court if this Motion should be passed. I am a believer in the international Prize Court, but not in the Declaration. No one who has had to deal with shipping during the wars of the past twenty-five years can deny that in certain cases there are benefits obtained for our shipping by this Declaration, but the evils which it recognises and legalises are far greater than the benefits. If our representatives at the Conference had been able to carry out the instructions of the Foreign Secretary there would have been comparatively few objections to the Declaration, but the concessions which they found themselves obliged to agree to in order to get unanimity have made the Declaration of London extremely dangerous to those of us who look at this question from a mercantile point of view. After the speech of the learned Gentleman in the House to-day I feel it may perhaps seem rather strange that I, who am not a lawyer, should address the House on this question, but I do so as a merchant who has dealt with shipping, who has to deal with it, and who knows the dangers we have to contend against.

My first objection to the Declaration of London is in regard to vessels carrying foodstuffs, which I regard as a vital matter. If I were shipping grain from America and I found that the English market was requiring grain, and that the price was good, I should naturally endeavour to ship it over to England. The first thing I should do if England was at war would be to take legal advice as to whether there were blockades in force, and ascertain whether the grain I was going to ship was contraband or not. I expect I should be told that under the Declaration of London foodstuffs going to any fortified port or to any place that might be the base for the supply of the armed forces of England would be contraband, and that would make grain contraband. If I asked what was a base, very likely I should be told that we had no real authority as to what a base is, but if we take a foreign authority who has carried weight in Europe, if we consider what Jomini said in his "Précis 1'Art dc la Guerre," in 1838, we shall find that he describes the base of operations as a place from which a force, naval or military, draws its resources and reinforcements, that from which it sots forth an offensive expedition and in which it finds refuge at need. We know that here in England, with the vast railway system we have got, there is no port in England that would not be used to supply our armed forces. Therefore grain would be contraband, and I think I may say that this is the first time that grain has been recognised as contraband unless going to a port either beseiged or blockaded, or intended for the service of the enemy. One case in which a country tried to starve another country into submission was our own case in 1795, when that celebrated Order in Council was issued instructing British cruisers to capture all vessels going into any French port that had food supplies on board. Our captains captured some, but what was the result? The United States complained that it was not legal, and the matter was left to a mixed commission, and that commission decided that it was not legal, and England had to pay not only for the value of the goods, but also for the loss of market and detention. The second case was the one referred to in the House this afternoon, when France, in her war with China, declared that any rice going to any port north of Canton should be considered as contraband. What was the result? Lord Granville, the Liberal Foreign Minister, promptly issued a proclamation to the effect that no decision of a Prize Court carrying out such a doctrine would be recognised by England, and the result was that it was not carried out.

We are told that we need not worry as to whether grain is going to be contraband or not, because we shall always have the command of the sea, and we shall be able to bring it in. But there is a great difference between bringing in contraband stuff and bringing in stuff that is not contraband. If I were shipping grain from America I should have great difficulty in the first place in getting a ship that would take contraband, and in the second place I should want to get a fast ship, which, of course, means an expensive ship. I should have to pay a war premium, and if one judges from what was paid during the Russo-Japanese war the amount would be from 25 to 30 guineas per cent., or about one-fourth the value of the steamer. In addition, you would have to pay war risk on your cargo. If, on the other hand, grain was not made contraband of war coming into England, the war issues would be very trifling, and something like 2s. 6d. per cent, would cover the risk of vessels carrying stuff not contraband. This was the case after the British protest had been made against the Russian Government seizing and sinking neutral vessels.

The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs this afternoon suggested that if we were perhaps losing something in connection with our foodstuffs we were gaining a great deal by having a free list and by knowing that we could bring in raw material for our factories, and so find work for our people. I cannot sec that there is anything very great in having this free list if we are belligerents, because if our Navy is strong enough to bring in our foodstuffs it will be strong enough to bring in our raw materials. Cotton has been referred to in this respect, but. I think the only case of cotton being considered contraband was in 1861, during the Civil War in America, when the Confederate Government applied this rule to all the cotton grown in the Southern States, and assumed the cotton in the South as Government property, and used it as the means of obtaining money by which to carry on the war. As Government property it was, of course, liable to capture. I feel this is the most dangerous point of the whole of this Declaration, because, whether we retain the command of the seas or not, the Declaration must hit us. If we retain it, we bring in contraband at an enormously high price which would make the cost of food to the working men of England so high that few would be able to buy it. If, on the other hand, we do not retain the command of the seas—and, unfortunately, as we all know, in many great wars in the past we have failed at the commencement to hold our own, and it might be we might lose control of the seas for the moment—no contraband could come into England, and, if it did not, we should be face to face with a famine and starvation, and England might be brought to her knees and have to agree to terms that an enemy might impose upon her.

The second point on which I wish to say a few words is the question of the sinking of ships. It is difficult to understand how we can ever agree to that article. It has always been recognised that property in the ship never passes to the captor until he has brought it into port and it has been adjudicated upon and a decree of condemnation passed by a competent court. We were told America was in favour of the sinking of ships. She may be in favour of it, but it is not what she did during the Spanish war. The ships captured were brought into port, but they were not allowed to stay in the hands of the men who brought them in. They had to be handed over pending the decision of the court, as to whose property they were. Under the present arrangements a ship can be sunk at sea before it is known whose property it is. I suppose, because we have allowed things to happen in the past, it is thought we will agree to anything. If we go back to 1872, we find a German general undertook to sink six British merchant ships in the Seine. He told the captains of them, after they had discharged their cargoes, that he would pay the value of the ships. The captains said: "No." The general then said it is a breach of neutrality, and undertook to fire upon those ships, some people say, while there were British sailors on board, and to sink them in order to prevent French gun-running up the river. The matter was tested, and Prince Bismarck, in defending the proceedings at Duclair, said:— I maintain the measure in question, however exceptional in its nature, did not overstep the bounds of international war-like usage, because the report shows that a pressing danger was at hand, and every other means of meeting it was wanting. The case was, therefore, one of necessity, which, even in time of peace, may render the employment or destruction of foreign property admissible under the reservation of indemnification. It seems, therefore, they could take what they like and pay for it. If I was sending a British ship out to the East laden with cotton goods and agricultural machinery and we were a neutral Power, a belligerent would seize that ship, and, if he thought it was likely it would give information to his enemy, he could sink it. All we could do would be to go into the Prize Court, and, if we were not satisfied with its decision go on to the international court. Then all the captain has to do is to prove he illegally sank the ship, and no question can be raised as to whether it was legal or not to seize it. No punishment is to be meted out to a captain of a foreign man-of-war who seizes and sinks an innocent neutral except that he is to pay the cost of the neutral.

Mr. McKENNA

How does that differ from the present practice?

Mr. SHIRLEY BENN

It is not usual for civilised countries to sink innocent neutral ships which are not carrying contraband.

Mr. McKENNA

The hon. Gentleman has just given a case in which innocent ships were sunk.

Mr. SHIRLEY BENN

I gave the case of 1872, when England failed to take the opportunity which she ought to have taken. That is the only case on record. Generally speaking, no country will sink an innocent vessel she captures at sea unless there is contraband on board, and not even then, without compensation. The third and last point on which I wish to say something is the conversion of these steamers when at sea into men-of-war. In olden days, it was supposed you could always tell the difference between a merchant ship and a man-of-war. You could tell them what could be used for warlike purposes, but to-day many liners are so adaptable that they can be turned at very short notice into men-of-war. The American Government during the war with Spain acquired the "St. Louis," "St. Paul," "New York," and other vessels and turned them into cruisers. Therefore, when you get these big liners out thousands of miles from their native country, it will be very hard for people when they call at outlying ports for coal and supplies to say whether they are merely supplying an ordinary mail steamer or a wolf in sheep's clothing. It seems a great pity we could not hold out persistently that no vessel should be converted into a man-of-war unless it is converted at a home port and sails from that home port as a man-of-war with the necessary flag. I am not looking at this matter at all from a. political or party point of view. I merely look upon it as one who has had to deal with shipping and who believes this Declaration of London will be extremely bad not only for the trade of England, but also for the food of our people. I have been told that we, having 50 per cent, of the carrying trade of the world, America could not supply us in their own ships in case of war. But anyone who says that can hardly realise what America can do, because if America wants to send grain over here she will get the ships, and if England should be at war and should be getting worsted I rather think one of the very first things America would do would be to purchase the necessary vessels so as to secure the trade of England. She will do it very quickly indeed. I saw how it was done during the Spanish War. An Act of Congress was passed enabling foreign ships to be bought, and an Act of Congress might be passed to-morrow to enable America to buy more foreign ships in order to carry goods. If I am right in my contention that this is bad for our country, I cannot believe that this House will be willing to agree to any arrangement which might not only diminish our power but might paralyse our energies at the very moment when it might be most necessary for the independence of our country and the security of our Empire that those powers should be exercised to their utmost extent.

Sir G. SCOTT ROBERTSON

This House, I am sure, has been very interested in the speech of the hon. Member who has just spoken, not from the point of view of a lawyer. Practically, except for the opening speech, lawyers have monopolised this debate, and we wanted very much to hear the opinion of the ship owners and the shippers. I am very grateful to the hon. Member for having cited the instance of the sinking of English ships by the Germans in 1871 without the payment of any compensation.

Mr. SHIRLEY BENN

Compensation was paid.

Sir G. SCOTT ROBERTSON

At any rate the example quoted is an extremely interesting one and has an important bearing on this discussion. This Amendment is intended to postpone not only this discussion but the ratification of the Declaration of London. I hope the House will not, for an instant, entertain such a suggestion. As the hon. Member who last spoke truly observed, the question has already been thoroughly thrashed out this afternoon, and I predict that during the rest of to-day's sitting as well as to-morrow the speakers will simply be obliged to repeat in other words what the ingenuity of lawyers and others may suggest the facts and counteracts which have been brought forward this afternoon. It has come to this pass. There is the lunge, the guard, and the ripost. The fact is neither side is going to acknowledge a hit, and they are simply going to repeat during the next few days what has already been said this afternoon. I should like first to congratulate, very sincerely, the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, who opened this Debate, and who put the case so fully, so clearly, and so convincingly that, from our point of view, he has left very little for us to say.

I will only answer something which fell from the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh and St. Andrews Universities, who deprecated very strongly the introduction of party politics into this question. Is he not a little late in the day with that protest? Do not we all know what happened last December. Do we not know the little articles asserting that the Declaration of London was a sword for Unionists to wield? Do we not remember how our constituencies were flooded with pamphlets suggesting that if the Declaration were ratified it would condemn the people of this country to be fed like monkeys on nuts? It surely is a little late to declare that this is not a party question after such a weapon has been used. The fact is that weapon has been proved to be blunt and useless. It is to be thrown away and another plan to be adopted. I do not think we are very likely to be readily convinced of the sincerity of such a manœuvre. I should like to say one or two words in reply to what fell from the hon. and learned Member for North-West Durham (Mr. Atherley-Jones) in the very dignified, but, if I may say so, very didactic manner wherein he laid down certain dicta, and proved the point no doubt to his own satisfaction by serious misquotation. First of all he told us that food had never been admitted to be contraband by any jurists at all. I think he said that that line had been fixed for 200 years. He was interrupted by the Under-Secretary, and he replied that the point had not been disputed by jurists. I should like to say that Sir Edward Fry, who, I suppose, will be admitted to have some claim to be a jurist, declared at the Hague Con- ference, "that the international law of today is hardly anything but a chaos of opinion often contradictory of the decisions of National Courts based on national law." That I think, is the true state of the case. It is absolutely certain that there is no finality, no general agreement as to what is international law. One can easily see that, if one wanted to, simply by analysing the controversies which have been going on in the newspapers and by the extraordinary pamphleteering energy which has been displayed. Even at the present moment in this House of Commons there is not anything like a common agreement as to whether food is contraband absolute or conditional or not, and another point upon which there is no real decision is whether ships can be sunk at sea or not legally. Of course on this last point there is no decision in any British Court which has ever gone to confirm the idea that ships cannot be sunk at sea. You may even go further and say it is exactly the reverse of that, and that it has always been laid down that ships may in case of necessity be sunk at sea, but in every single case compensation must be paid. On those two questions alone the House will see what a difference of opinion there is as to what is international law. Leaving the lawyers, I should like to come to the shippers, who are the actual people interested in this question, and I should like to quote the resolution passed by the Liverpool Steamship Owners Association in 1904. It runs as follows:— That, in consequence of the uncertainty existing among British merchants, shipowners, and underwriters as to what is contraband, the position is most detrimental to the interests of the country and the Empire. Therefore, this association begs to impress upon his Majesty's Government the vital necessity of an immediate and satisfactory settlement of the question of what is and what is not contraband. That is in 1904. And yet we are told here that the law has been fixed and has been perfectly well known for a couple of centuries that food cannot be considered contraband of war. The hon. Member for York and the hon. Member for Durham tried to confute the well known instance of 1885. There we know that France declared rice contraband of war. Lord Granville protested against it, and Prince Bismarck when asked pointedly, officially by the Kiel Chamber of Commerce his opinion on this subject, gave an answer which is very well known that he upheld—it came to that in effect—that he upheld the position of France on the ground, of course, that if you increase the difficulties of the enemy you naturally shorten the duration of the war. The hon. Member for Durham has tried to get out of that by saying that this statement was withdrawn by Prince Bismarck. Prince Bismarck never withdrew this statement at all. What Prince Bismarck said was simply this, that in a specially given case—saltpetre—to that extent it was not to be considered contraband of war. But this is the important point of misquotation, quite unconscious, I am sure, by the hon. Member for Durham. He said that Count von. Bulow supported the position that this opinion of Prince Bismarck had been withdrawn. I want to give exactly the very words used by Prince von Bulow in the Reichstag. They are these:— Contraband of war is a matter of dispute, and with the single exception of arms and ammunition is determined as a rule with reference to the special circumstances of each case. That is the exact quotation, which was not intentionally garbled, of course, but it did give a wrong impression to this House. I happened to have a controversy with Lord Desborough at the time about this very matter, so I remember it. The point was this, did the prince say what he was alleged to say in so many words or not? As a matter of fact, Lord Desborough rather reversed the ordinary order of things. He argued first of all that what Prince Bismarck said was never the view of the German Government, and after that he argued that it was withdrawn. I was quite easily able to show by chapter and verse that he was wrong on both points. This, of course, is a comparatively small matter, but its special bearing is this, that Lord Desborough, by his personal influence, did actually quite sincerely make a misstatement, and so helped or induced the Associated Chambers of Commerce to pass a vote against the Declaration. That is especially the point I wanted to make on that matter.

I agree with every word of Sir Edward Fry. I agree that the Declaration clears up what is a perfect chaos at present of international law, and I believe it does give us a way out of that chaos, and it does that without diminishing in scope or weakening in application any single belligerent right. I believe it does give the shippers and shipowners what is the utmost which can be come to as an international agreement on maritime law by all the Powers, and, therefore, it lets them know what they may do in time of war, and in regard to neutral vessels tells them what rights have generally been agreed upon that they may exercise; and if these rights are infringed it gives them a right to compensation. I contend that this is a very important matter indeed. It has been mentioned to-day that there are certain matters which have not been provided for in the Declaration. That is quite true, and one of these is the transformation of merchant ships at sea into warships. It has a theoretical and practical aspect. Theoretically, of course, we are all in favour of merchant ships only being converted into warships in the territorial waters of the Power whose flag they fly. That is very natural for us, because we have territorial waters and ports and coaling stations all over the world. Naturally and theoretically also, we can reasonably understand that Germany would take exactly the opposite point of view. She has very little territorial water in Europe, and out of Europe little or no territorial water, no ports, and also no coaling stations. Obviously, therefore, there was a conflict of opinion there. We very properly sought to maintain a position of enormous advantage. Of course, we should have taken up the same attitude as Germany if we had been in her position.

There is another aspect of the case. Practically we do not know, for instance, what the international court will decide. I myself am of opinion—I think the First Lord of the Admiralty does not agree with this point—that this is a question which will have to be left to the international Prize Court to decide, whether a merchant ship can legally be turned into a warship on the high seas or not. The world is against us on this point, and we know that if we are at war to-morrow any Power could exercise this right. While we are bound by our own declarations and assertions we are debarred from exercising it, therefore we are in a position of inequality. Obviously if the court were to decide in our favour—I suppose theoretically we should say that suited us—but if it decides against us we are in no worse a position than we are at present. In fact we stand to win, and we cannot lose. That is not altogether an unsatisfactory position. Then we possess in merchant ships fit to be converted into war vessels twenty times as many as any other nation in the world, and, secondly the number of ships belonging to a foreign Power which are capable of being converted in this way into war ships is necessarily very limited. I am not going to ask the First Lord to divulge any secrets, but I am quite certain that every single one of these ships must be known to the Admiralty if the Admiralty is worth its salt. In the case of war breaking out, would you attach a cruiser to each ship? You might, but much better not. Why not equip your own commerce destroyers, your own swift liners, and set them to follow and shadow and hunt these special vessels? At present, of course, supposing these vessels came in contact with several of our own liners in mid-ocean under our rule, we should say "No; we cannot capture these liners because they are more than three miles from home." So I contend that if the court were to decide against us, or if we felt it was going to decide against us, the proper plan would be for us to accept our opponents' position. I am sure in that way the great number of vessels that we should have—three or four to one if you like—would easily be able to surround a vessel coming out in the hope some day of converting herself and then, at a given moment, I suppose our commerce destroyers in perspective would throw aside their merchantman manners and, after a time, no doubt, thank God for their meeting. That seems to show either way that we have an advantage. Were the position theoretically in our favour in the international Prize Court, that is an advantage too, but if it were otherwise we should still easily hold our own and play that game very successfully indeed. The other questions of nationality and domicile need not be discussed. They are very interesting, but as a test of inequality perhaps one need not go into them very fully. The Conference appointed a committee to deal with this matter, and they were equally divided, and obviously the question may be very well left to the international Prize Court.

I should like now to revert to the question of contraband of war and food supply and the doctrine of continuous voyage. Is it or is it not a matter of great moment to us that this doctrine of continuous voyage should not be applied to conditional contraband? I do not think it is at all. Of course, everything connected with the food supply of this country depends entirely and solely upon ourselves—whether we are to be starved or put to great inconvenience in war time. Everything depends upon whether we have a sufficiently powerful fleet. It is no use at all to tell us that if we temporarily lost the command of the sea this doctrine would be detrimental to us. If we temporarily lose the command of the sea we are doomed. There is no question of that at all. Our life, our commerce, which is the vitality of our blood, and the integrity of our shores, which means freedom for every one of us, are absolutely dependent upon the strength of our Navy, and that is a point which hon. Gentlemen opposite have to remember. We must have a sufficiently powerful Navy to be able to permit all British ships to enter our ports without molestation. Comparatively speaking, neutral vessels do not count. It has been explained that 10 per cent. of the food and raw materials brought into this country is brought in by foreign ships, but that seems to be rather an exaggeration. Probably 95 per cent. of the whole imports of food and raw material are brought into this country by British ships. It is sometimes attempted to be proved in a curious way that we may ourselves retain command of the sea and yet, at the same time, cruisers may be able to cut off neutral ships coming to our ports without interfering to any great extent with British ships similarly engaged, which, if they were interfered with to any great extent, would force us at once to surrender because we should be starved out. That is so illogical that one cannot attempt to deal with it. It is perfectly hopeless.

How does this doctrine of continuous voyage affect us adversely? What is the present position? Supposing we were at war with Germany to-morrow, and we blockaded her North Sea ports, she would get supplies through the neutral ports of France, Belgium, and Holland, without any difficulty. How does that affect us? She gets her supplies all right, and we might perhaps refer to the instance of Rotterdam particularly where she could certainly get them with much more ease and less expense than anywhere else What is the result there? They are transhipped. All the frontier railways are blocked. We know what the state of war is on a frontier with trains full of men, supplies and armaments, and all the traffic congested. You know really what a very poor chance Germany would have of potting supplies from there. What supplies she did get would be enormously increased in price. There would be the breaking of bulk, the handling, the rehandling, and the sending off. All that would cause such an enormous cost in the total that her industries would be quite starved, and, of course, the getting of food would be quite out of the question because the cost would be so great. What would be the difference to us? At the present moment all our food could be stopped by any Power with which we might be at war if that Power were strong enough to drive our fleet off the sea. The amount of the imports to this country in these neutral ships in the way of food or war material is quite trivial. They would go into French, Belgian, or Dutch ports, and the goods could be very easily brought over here at very much cheaper rates than similar imports could be taken into Germany. I think there is no doubt at all on that subject.

The only other question which was raised in the Debate was that in relation to the sinking of ships at sea. It is always assumed that the law is that we must not sink a neutral ship at sea. But there is no decision by any English court in the least bearing upon that. In all the cases which have been quoted to-day—the judgments of Lord Stowell and Dr. Lushington—the only thing they say is that if a ship is sunk at sea, then compensation must be paid. That is the only point with which they deal. Well, how do we stand at present? Supposing the Declaration of London is not ratified, we are precisely in that position with other nations. As we know by the memorandum sent in, we are at liberty to sink neutral ships, but because of our statements, and the assertions made by our Press, and so forth, we have not that authority. We have cast it aside, and deprived ourselves of it, and therefore we are in the awkward position that others may sink neutral ships, but we must not do it. I agree with a great deal of what was said by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh University (Sir R. Finlay). He said that extreme cases must not be taken as precedents in law. In the case of a ship with food for an enemy being seized, of course we could sink that ship, but although, according to the Declaration of London—and it is almost a paradox—there is permission given to sink the ship, I do not know how it is to be done. That ship must be trying to break the blockade, or be resisting the legitimate right of search, or have more than half of its cargo contraband.

9.0 P.M.

But then there is the other provision that the crew is to be placed in a place of safety. As the hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned, a warship going into action would hardly be considered a place of safety, and consequently the commander of that ship must charter a ship to take the captive crew on board. Otherwise he could never sink the ship at all. I warmly support the ratification of the Declaration of London. I am quite certain that, although it may not load at present or in the immediate future to any diminution of armaments or any diminution of the terrible outlay on ships of war which now has to be borne by the people of the world; still it cannot have the opposite effect, and in time we may hope that it will lead to some general perception, which will be admitted by people generally of the value of arbitration. That is a very great and important step in advance, and I believe the ratification of the Declaration of London is a very important step in the history of the evolution of international law.

Mr. CAWLEY

I agree with the view advocated by many exponents of the Declaration of London that this should not be a party question. I could have wished that it was a question from which the Government Whips could have been kept apart. I do not think anybody in the House can quote a single instance where a Bill of this magnitude brought in by the Government of the day, and for which the Government of the day was responsible, has not had the Government Whips telling. I believe that under the present system anything else is inconceivable, but I cannot see why because the party Whips are telling it should be made a party question. Hon. Members opposite are perfectly free to vote for the Bill in spite of the fact that the Government Whips are telling. I presume that the Opposition Whips will not be put on. In the case of a Bill of this magnitude if any Member on either side of the House holds the views which have been expressed by the hon. Member for North-West Durham (Mr. Atherley-Jones) that this Declaration is fraught with danger to the country as a whole, I am sure he will not vote for the Government tomorrow night against the convictions which he holds. I am perfectly certain that the Government need have no fear of the result if every hon. Member in this House will give expression by his vote tomorrow night to his reasoned convictions.

I admit freely that a large amount of opposition has been worked up against this Bill and against its corollary the Declaration of London. I know the way in which that opposition has been worked up. I know it in my own Division. The late hon. Member for King's Lynn went down to a dinner of the chamber of commerce and harangued them upon the subject. There was nobody to take the opposite point of view with anything like the knowledge or ability of Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles. That I believe happened all over the country. It was the opponents of the Declaration of London who agitated, and by their agitation creating a false impression, managed to get a certain amount of support from chambers of commerce in this country. A short time ago one of the main reasons given for opposition to the Declaration of London was that the Colonies had not been consulted. That has now been dropped. To-day we have heard from the right hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh University (Sir R. Finlay) a most extraordinary argument upon this point. He said it was perfectly right that they should be consulted, but having been consulted, no notice should be taken of their opinion. I believe that the actual words used were that this House should not be biased in any degree by what they said. What is the use of consulting the Colonies if you are not going to be biased in any degree by what they say? Now we are asked to consult a Royal Commission. I wonder would the same thing be said after the Royal Commission has been consulted?

Surely if we are not going to be biased in any degree by the opinion of our Colonies we ought not to be biased by the opinion of a Royal Commission. If that report is against the view of the right hon. and learned Gentleman we shall be asked to consult some further body, and if we consult that body we are not to be biased by their view. What is the basis of this demand for a Royal Commission? I have not heard to-day the suggestion of any kind of information which is lacking at present which has not been brought forward and which a Royal Commission might bring forward for the consideration of this House. It is about two years since the Declaration of London was first signed. During these two years a strong agitation against it has been going forward. Very clever men who felt strongly on the question have been putting their views before the country. I should like to know what are the kind of views, and what is the kind of information which it is suggested that a Royal Commission might furnish to this House? We have heard none. I admit that a large amount of opposition has been worked up against this measure. I believe that it has been mainly worked up by showing people the kind of thing that might happen under the Declaration of London. It has been shown, over and over again, by opponents of the proposal that if the Declaration of London were in force war would be horrible. But war would be horrible if the Declaration of London were not in force. That argument was brought forward in that form yesterday by the Leader of the Opposition. He presented to his audience a lengthy argument, occupying about a column of the "Morning Post," in which I read it, in which he pointed out the awful horrors that would result if this country were involved in war, and if the Declaration of London were in force. There is not a single item in the catalogue of horrors which could not happen as easily and would not happen as certainly if the Declaration were not ratified.

It might be said, and has been said by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite that considerable changes are made by the Declaration of London. It is said that food as conditional contraband will more easily and more certainly be stopped by belligerents who are at war with us. I would point out that at the present time conditional contraband is liable to capture which is shown to be destined for the use of armed forces or a Government Department. That is the rule as stated in the declaration of London. There is another rule in the Declaration of London, but that is a mere rule of evidence, and does not operate until the question comes before the Courts. The rule, and the the only rule, under the Declaration of London is that only those things can be condemned as conditional contraband, and liable to capture which are shown to be destined for the use of armed forces or a Government Department. That is the rule at present, and I would point out that no fewer than three hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have been speaking to-day in contrasting the present rule with the rule under the Declaration have stated this as the existing rule, and have stated as the rule under the Declaration, this, plus the rules of evidence which decide when things are to be presumed to be conditional contraband. But such rules exist at the present time, and it is not fair to state in one case the rule plus the further rules of evidence and in the other case to omit the further rules of evidence. The rules of evidence in the present case were stated to-day by the right hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh University, to be that consignment to a port of naval or military equipment creates a presumption of contraband, and if in the one case you are to take that presumption you must take it in the other. It was stated by the Leader of the Opposition yesterday that a naval captain who captures a prize might well say "this is a warlike base."

Surely the same thing applies at the present day. The naval captain might say that the particular port was a port of naval or military equipment. Take for instance the town of Manchester, which is the market for provisions for the towns in South Lancashire and probably about the most important market for provisions in the world. In time of war Manchester provides a brigade for the Territorial Forces. Would it not be possible for a naval captain to say that Manchester was busy mobilising a brigade of infantry and was a port of military equipment? It seems to me quite as simple and quite as right for a naval captain under those circumstances to say that Manchester is a port of military equipment as to say that Manchester, Liverpool or Bristol is a base of naval supply under the Declaration of London. I can see no difference. If you are to leave it to the discretion of the naval captain he is as much justified in one case as in the other, and would be as likely in one case as in the other to say that food is contraband of war. But the matter does not end there. Because there is no doubt that at the present time a hostile power might and probably would say that all food is contraband of war. The right hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh University read us a lecture on the iniquity of that suggestion. He said in fact that it was playing in the hands of our adversaries.

I think if a foreign nation takes that argument, it applies with equal force to the elaborate argument of the Leader of the Opposition in trying to extend the meaning of the word "base," or to the argument of the hon. and learned Member for Durham (Mr. Atherley-Jones) in trying to show that the Declaration gives greater powers to others. But is it so absurd for a hostile Power to say that food shall be contraband coming to this country? The instance in regard to Prince Bismarck has been quoted. The actual words of Prince Bismarck do not exclude food, for he expressly approved of the declaration of food as contraband. He said the measure had for its object the shortening of war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy, and it was justifiable as a step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships. That was the opinion of Germany then, and that was the attitude taken up by Germany during the Russo-Japanese War. They took up that attitude when Japan and Russia declared food to be contraband, and that belligerent Powers had the right to declare food to be contraband. I and a great many others believe that is what Germany would do if Germany were at war with this country. It is not only believed on this side of the House, but Lord Selborne, speaking in another place, expressly said he was of opinion that a hostile country at war with this country would declare all food to be contraband of war. He was putting an illustration. That is the opinion of a nobleman who held office in a Conservative Government as First Lord of the Admiralty. He believed, as many of us believe, that in the case of war we should have food declared to be absolutely contraband.

I object to those people who think it is an absurdity to say that food would be declared contraband, when we have a nobleman, who was First Lord of the Admiralty in a Unionist Government, giving an opinion which I submit is not one to be lightly regarded. There would be differences between the present practice and what would occur under the Declaration of London. Those differences would be, firstly, that in the case of the condemnation of a neutral ship, and the sinking of a neutral ship, the circumstances would go, not before a belligerent Prize Court, but before an impartial court. There would be this advantage, that privateers would be almost certainly condemned. The right hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when he opened this discussion this afternoon, said that the international Prize Court might say that they could not take cognisance of this matter of privateering, and that different Powers had taken different views of it. But if they did take cognisance of it, there are only three Powers who had declared in favour of merchant ships being converted into men-of-war on the high seas, and the great probability, if a majority in Parliament is against this, the majority in the international court would be against it. If the court does consider it at all, the great probability is they would take the view held by this country. If they did not, then, as has already been pointed out, we should be exactly in the same position as at the present time. We should be in the position that conversions on the high seas will be made, and we should get no redress. That is exactly the position to-day. Conversions on the high seas would take place; they would go before the Prize Court of the wrong-doer, and we would get no redress. If, on the other hand, as I believe they would, the international court decided that such a thing is not legal, and could not be done, then we stand to gain everything and stand to lose nothing. Another difference would occur. The court under the Declaration would enforce that food could not be declared absolutely contraband as it can be at the present time.

I think one really strong argument can be brought forward against the Declaration, and it was put with great force and moderation by Lord Selborne in another place, and it was put with equal force, but not with equal moderation, by the Leader of the Opposition yesterday, and that is this, that when neutral Powers have a court to look to eventually, they are less likely to intervene in a war. There is a possibility at the end of the war of obtaining redress in the international court, and they are less likely, therefore, during the war to press their objection. I believe there is something in that argument in so far as food supply is concerned. It must be remembered that what brings neutrals into war is not so much the view held by the few merchants who have suffered, and not so much the view held by the neutral Government, as the gradually rising irritation of the people of the country, but I believe there would be, certainly to a limited extent, a smaller likelihood of a neutral Power intervening in time of war owing to the acts of the belligerents, when there is a chance of compensation at the end of the war. Which is the Power most likely to irritate neutral countries? Which is the Power most likely to cause the animosity of neutrals owing to its action during a war? It is the strongest sea Power which is the one most likely to irritate, neutrals by action against neutral ships. The strongest sea Power at the present time is Great Britain, so that on the whole we stand to gain rather than to lose by lessening the likelihood of neutral intervention. These are some of the main reasons for thinking that we gain rather than lose as belligerents under the Declaration of London, if it is ratified.

But besides the effect upon our food supply, there are many other things to be considered. There is the point that any effect which is produced is only produced upon a small fraction of the amount of food brought to this country. It has been suggested that the greater portion of that supply would come in neutral vessels if war broke out. I would point out that when we talk of neutral vessels you are reckoning German ships. They would not be heard of in time of war with Germany, because her naval marine would be cut off, and to that extent the number would be lessened. Again, it may be said, would not America send a larger number of her grain ships? At the present time the burden of the carrying is done by this country, not only to this country but between foreign countries, and that supply between foreign countries would have to go on during the war. Where are you going to set free the ships? America cannot send them, and if she did, they would just be as liable to attack, so that the ships cannot be set free to take part in trade between Great Britain and America. I do not for my part think that the proportion of neutral ships would be increased; and it is quite certain that the proportion of neutral ships in time of war would be relatively an unimportant part of the carrying forces coming into this country. That is admitted by Lord Selborne. He said that the neutral ships were of great importance though relatively of small importance compared with that which is brought by our own ships. There can be no doubt about it that whatever happens it is only a small proportion of what is coming to this country which can be interfered with by any circumstances created by the Declaration of London. There is another point and that is, that the power of any of our adversaries to cut off any large proportion of our food supplies is very limited indeed. The Royal Commission which sat upon food supplies reported to that effect. The result of their report is summarised by the vigorous opponent of the Declaration of London, Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles, in these words:— We come then at last to this that, as regards supplies, no apprehension need be felt; that they will suffer no material diminution in quantity, and therefore can hardly suffer in material appreciation of their price; that the addition to price will be 'relatively small'; and that finally it is a question not of price but only of panic, not of scarcity but only of a scare. Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles himself says as his considered opinion, that unless the command of the sea were lost we can protect the passage of any such supplies, and even if we were not so predominant, that even then so wide and open are avenues of access to the British islands that the supplies cannot be intercepted to any appreciable extent were all the navies of the world to be set to the task. That is the answer of the leading opponent of the Declaration of London to the leading argument against the Declaration of London. I think for that reason this argument about food supplies is not a strong one. It affects part only, and that part, according to the statement of the strongest opponent of the Declaration of London, cannot be seriously affected. As a matter of fact, the terms of the Declaration of London tend not to less, but to greater safety. There are one or two points in which we give up our offensive powers. I am prepared to admit that. There is, for instance, the doctrine of continuous voyage, and there is the point about the blockade beyond the area of the operation of the ships which are blockaded. Those are both points on which we do sacrifice something. I do submit those are entirely negligible points. I think, as belligerents, we do not gain much, but that we do gain on the question of neutrals and on the question of blockading, which are very vexed questions, and on which at present France takes a very different view. Those questions are cleared up. In the case of the Bundesrath we gave up our claim, or rather we allowed the Bundesrath to go through. Under the Declaration of London a question of that kind is cleared up once and for all, and numbers of points upon which we might come into conflict with neutrals are reduced almost to nothing. That is a real advantage. Secondly, we have the advantage that food under any circumstances cannot be declared to be contraband. As belligerents I am prepared to admit the advantages gained are not considerable. I think we gain something. I do not think we gain very much. As neutrals I think we gain enormously. I think we gain particularly by establishing certainty to a great extent as to what is and what is not contraband. We gain by the establishment of universal laws which are to be observed, and we gain particularly by having a court in which we can recover in case the international law is broken. In the past we have had to go to the courts of the wrongdoers themselves.

A good deal has been said about the sinking of neutral ships. Never in the history of this country have we recovered one halfpenny because our ships, when neutrals, have been sunk by belligerents. We have had to go into the courts of the belligerents. The hon. and learned Member for Durham (Mr. Atherley-Jones) suggested that Russia withdrew its claim to sink neutral ships. Russia has done nothing of the kind. Russia sunk neutral ships before protest and after protest. She sunk them before she apologised and after she apologised, and when it came before her courts her courts upheld her, and refused to pay one halfpenny compensation for the ships which were sunk by the Russian Fleet. That is what has happened in the past. Our merchants have had to go into the courts of the wrongdoer, and they have refused to pay in the past. Now we will have to go to a neutral court administering definite laws, and will be able to recover compensation. That seems to me a real and very important gain from the Declaration of London. But I am prepared to admit that I support the Declaration for another reason, which I believe obtains very little support on the benches opposite or among the opponents of the Declaration. I think that when, and only when, no question of national security is at stake, that it is a very important gain to have secured an international court administering international law. I believe that that is a real step forward in international history. I think it is a step forward in the direction of widening the amount of international agreement and widening the number of things which are brought before an international court. I support this Declaration in the first place because I cannot see any way in which it affects our national security, and because I think that it does give a real and definite advantage as neutrals, and lastly because it does give us this great experiment and great step forward, and an experiment which I believe is pregnant with great advantage to the future of the world.

Mr. CHAPLIN

I cannot say that I agree with the statement which fell from the hon. Member who has just sat down that we have much to gain and very little indeed to lose by the ratification of the Declaration of London. I hold, on the contrary, exactly the opposite view. I am convinced that the real position is this—that we have much to lose and very little to gain. Neither am I much perturbed by the estimate which he gave us—I think, upon the authority of my hon. Friend, Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles—that, as regards the importation of food into this country, we should suffer very little injury and need have very little apprehension; because I am of opinion—and that is why I cannot say for a moment that I regret the introduction of this question—that the real and vital question which we have to consider in discussing the Second Reading of this Bill is the effect of the Declaration of London, and also our present position in this country as regards food supply in time of war. The hon. Member has referred to the Report of the Royal Commission on Food Supplies. As I am one of the few Members of this House who served upon that Commission, as I was indeed myself mainly or largely instrumental in procuring its appointment, and as the subject is one with which I am thoroughly familiar, I hope the House will permit me to intervene for a very short time in this Debate. If I had not learnt by long experience—and I have served on. many commissions—how very little attention their reports in nine cases out of ten command even upon the most important questions, I own that I should have been surprised when I remember to how small an extent the Report of that Commission was successful in arousing the attention of the country as to the fool's paradise in which we have been living for so long and are living at this moment in regard to the security of our food supply in time of war. But there it is, and grave indeed were the facts elicited by that Commission. So serious indeed were they that with all those facts before them, how did the Commissioners commence their report? It will be found in one single sentence which occurs immediately after the quoting of the reference to the Commission:— It seems to us impossible to over-estimate the importance of the subject that was entrusted to our care. To that statement the signatures of all the Members of the Commission wore appended, beginning with that of his present Majesty—because so important was this subject regarded as being by the Government who appointed the Commission that the then Prince of Wales was asked to serve, and graciously consented to do so. That was the first name, and the last was that of a Member of the Labour party in this House. That may give some idea of the importance and gravity which the members of that Commission themselves attached to the subject. What are the facts? The chief and most important of them I will give to the House as briefly as I can. Take the question of our food supplies and where they come from. In regard to meat, dairy produce, cheese and butter in particular, meat—which is held to include beef and veal, mutton and lamb, pork and bacon—and eggs, the quantities for which we have to depend on countries across the seas may be given in the following proportions:—45 per cent. of the meat that we consume, 64 per cent. of the cheese, 53 per cent. of the butter, and 55 per cent. of the eggs. These are comparatively unimportant, because we produce considerable quantities of these articles at home. But when we come to our supplies of wheat and flour—in other words, of bread, which is the great staple food of the people of this country—the House ought to remember that the consumption of bread is immensely greater than that of any other kind or article of food, especially by the poorer classes—the facts are as follows. The Royal Commission reported unanimously in 1905, and I do not think I can put it more shortly than it is put in their own words to this effect:— We are of opinion that the consumption per head per year will not normally exceed 350 lbs., which would give a present annual consumption of 31,000,000 quarters, equivalent approximately to 600,000 quarters as the average weekly requirement. Out of this enormous total it was estimated that rather less than 6,000,000 quarters consisted of home grown corn, or only 20 per cent. of the whole consumption. In other words, that for 80 per cent. of the great staple food which we require for the people of this country we are entirely dependent on supplies which are and must be brought to our shores across the ocean. As a matter of fact, the position of our country at this moment, quite independently of the Declaration of London, is very like to an army in the field cut off from its commissariat, unless you are certain of being able to keep your communications all over the world.

In regard to the present supplies which are actually in existence in the country at any given time, I am bound to say that there was some small difference of opinion in the Royal Commission. The majority put the minimum supply at any given time in the country at six weeks and a-half. The minority, of which I was one, thought it would not be safe to put that estimate at more than five weeks and a-half. The difference between us arose as to the amount which shortly before harvest is left in the hands of the farmers of this country. Perhaps my experience of that particular branch of the subject was gained in the greatest wheat-growing county in the kingdom—Lincoln—a county which at one time grew as much or more wheat than was grown in the rest of the whole of the United Kingdom. I adhere absolutely to my opinion. If I had the time, and if it was worth while, to give the House the grounds for my opinion, I am very confident that I should get the majority of the House to agree with me that my estimate was right, and that the other estimate was more likely to be wrong. As a matter of fact it is not a very serious question, and I do not therefore stop to dwell upon it. The exact amount makes very little difference, but I imagine that all parties in this House will agree that it is a position in which a country like our own—the heart and centre of an empire like ours, with all its great interests and responsibilities—ought never for a single moment to be placed.

I think the House will be interested to know whence comes this immense proportion of our staple food. Eighty per cent. of the bread upon which we absolutely depend is brought from different parts of the globe in the following proportions:—In 1904—and again I take the figures of the Royal Commission, for I have only come back this afternoon from foreign climes, and I have not had the means or the opportunity of getting the latest figures—there came from the British Colonies and Possessions 39 per cent.; from Europe (including Turkey) there came 25 per cent.; from the United States of America 19 per cent.; and from other countries 0.4 per cent. One remarkable feature of these figures—to which I call attention because the question of the supplies coming from America has been referred to already this evening—a most remarkable feature, is the enormous falling off in the supplies from the United States. No doubt they will in the course of years become less and less, although there has been on one or two occasions a considerable rise since the time I quote. Then there is another consideration, one of vital importance. These vast supplies of our staple food are brought to us from all parts of the world, over, in many cases, enormous distances. There is another point, and one of the most extreme importance, and that is that a large amount of these supplies are still brought to us in sailing ships. Several witnesses called our attention to this point. One of them maintained, and I have never heard the accuracy of that statement questioned, that in what is called the cereal year 1891–2, 26 per cent. of the whole of our foreign imports of wheat were brought to us in the sailing ships of that time, mostly from the Pacific coast. That was due, I understand, to the paucity of coaling stations—the difficulty of getting coal. No doubt that has diminished to some extent, but surely many of them still bring corn in that way. On that point in the memorandum which was sent to us by the Admiralty very early in our proceedings—and I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude and appreciation for the great courtesy that was shown to us by that Department and the readiness to give us information from the beginning to the end of that inquiry—there occurs a sentence which is certainly deserving of the attention of the House, and above all of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. What was said was this:— It is to be noted that all or nearly all of the grain brought in sailing ships comes from the Pacific ports, the most of which is carried in full cargo, and that on the outbreak of war a large number of them would he already afloat for a long voyage and would afford an easy prey to any enemy on the alert. I think we must be quite certain of one thing, that if such a misfortune fell upon this country as that we were engaged in war with one or more of the great Powers of the world, the enemy would be quite certain to be sufficiently on the alert, and would know as much and very likely more, as to the progress of these vessels and the localities in which they were to be found as we ourselves should be likely to know. These are essential facts put as briefly as I can put them before the House. That is the position which was disclosed by the Report in 1905. We were informed at that time that the practice of buying less and less corn on the part of the merchants to keep in stock, and of buying more and more from hand to mouth, from week to week, just as it is wanted, was steadily increasing. I am sure the House may take it as practically certain that the amount of the stocks existing in the country at the present time is even less than according to the estimate I have given. That is the position. That being so, the question that we have to consider to-night, in my humble opinion, is how is our position, so exceptional and so dangerous as it would be in the unhappy contingency of war, to be met? Will our position be made better or will it be made worse by the ratification of the Declaration of London which we are asked to signify our approval of by the Second Reading of this Bill?

On this question, I am referring now to the effect of the Declaration, there is one thing we ought never to forget, although it seems to me that upon the other side of the House it has rather escaped the atten- tion it deserves from hon. and right hon. Gentlemen, namely, that the situation in regard to our food supplies places us in a totally different position from that occupied by every other single country in the world. I think, therefore, that in arrangements of this kind, which may very well be adapted and perfectly satisfactory to countries like Germany and Russia and France, may be wholly unsuited to the United Kingdom, and not only that, but there may be dangers in them which are not always foreseen by those who have not the opportunity of giving very careful attention and study to this question of food supply upon which we depend for our existence and which quite conceivably in certain conditions might well become dangerous and fatal to the future of this country. It seems to me—and I say this with great respect, and with every desire in the world to avoid anything offensive in its character, because no one in this House feels as strongly as I do that, above all and before all, if that be possible, this question should be kept entirely outside party consideration—that either the Government or their representatives on the Declaration and previous conferences either ignored in their calculations or were not sufficiently well acquainted with or did not pay sufficient regard to, the different conditions affecting our food supply, especially in time of war.

This matter is really far too serious for anything of that kind, and I say this because I have had occasion to give to this question a great deal of study and careful attention now for a very considerable period of time. Personally, I cannot help regretting that such element should be imported into this most important question, far more important than any other questions which are before the country at the present time in regard to the future security, both of the nation and of the Empire to which we all of us belong. That being my opinion as to the gravity of this question standing in my place in Parliament I do not hesitate to say, with a full sense of the responsibility that rests upon me, that the dangers which await our food supplies in times of war in the United Kingdom are bad enough and great enough already in the conditions under which we live even to-day, but that they will become infinitely worse under the provisions of this new-fangled Declaration, which, at all events, has all the appearance, whatever the intention may have been, of being carefully planned and constructed by some of those who were responsible for it with a view to limiting and hampering as far as possible the undoubtedly great powers which are possessed by the British Navy.

10.0 P.M.

I am prepared not only to make that statement, but to rest my justification for making it upon what I believe must be, and can only be, the answer to two questions which I am going to put in the Government through the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty. One of them is this. Arc the provisions for policing and safeguarding our trade routes, which have been very justly called the arteries of this Empire, adequate and sufficient to-day? I am inclined to think I can give an answer to that question myself, and to give it out of the mouth of a very distinguished admiral who gave evidence before the Royal Commission. He was a witness not called by myself, and as a matter of fact, if I may use the expression, belonging to a camp the very opposite to my own. I was always most apprehensive on the question of whether our food supplies in this country were safe or not. I was always myself for doing something in addition to the maintenance of a strong Fleet, which we were required to consider by the terms of the Royal Commission. The gallant admiral had no fears whatever upon the subject of food. He was quite easy upon that point, subject to one condition, namely, that we had our cruisers properly distributed, and that we had plenty of them, as he described it, to hunt other people away. Upon being pressed upon the rather crucial question as to how many cruisers he thought ought to be available for hunting other people away, he frankly confessed, and he was a great supporter and adherent of the Admiralty, "I should certainly like to see more. "What happened? He gave his evidence on 20th June, 1904. On 5th March, 1905, we had before us a return presented to the House of Commons, in which fifty-nine cruisers and ninety-four other ships, 153 in all, had just been struck off the list of effective warships in that year. Taken in connection with the statement of the admiral and the facts I have just related there is only one possible inference that can be drawn—I understand that those ships have never been replaced, and it is that our trade routes are not sufficiently guarded at the present time, and if that be so, they will be infinitely worse guarded under the Declaration of London. What is likely to be the position? If the claims of Germany, France, and Russia, so definitely put forward for the re-establishment of privateering in its worst and most dangerous form is ever put into practice again there is only one answer to the question. How are you to know when, where, or for how many of those ships transformed on the high seas from merchantmen into war vessels you are to be prepared, and if you are not prepared for them, what is to become of your food supply? As you have practically agreed to sign this Declaration have you not to a large extent condoned the practice?

Mr. McKENNA

It is not dealt with in the Declaration. It is left an open question.

Mr. CHAPLIN

My complaint against the Government is that they have left this an open question, and I thank the right hon. Gentleman for putting into my mouth the words I was going to say. That is the whole position, and that is the great difficulty we are in. Having studied and considered this question for years, that, is what I am more afraid of than anything else, and that is why I am content to base my opposition to this Declaration upon that point if upon no other. There are many other points, but I am not going to dwell upon them now, because they will be thoroughly dealt with by those who are experts on the question, which I do not-pretend to be. Nevertheless, if I had remained silent having acquired the information on this subject which I have done from thoroughly legitimate sources—if I had not taken the earliest opportunity on. the very eve of my return from abroad this afternoon I should have felt I had failed altogether in my duty.

Mr. McKENNA

The right hon. Gentleman has reminded the House with very great truth of the value to us and the importance of our overseas trade in food. He seems to argue from the importance of that trade that we shall suffer severely if we sign the Declaration of London. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman as to the vital importance of keeping our ports open to food supplies during war. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the existence or the absence of any agreements will of themselves be of very small importance in keeping our ports open. What we shall have to rely upon in order to secure our trade in time of war is our Navy.

Mr. CHAPLIN

Quite so. But have you got the ships?

Mr. McKENNA

That is another question; but if we have not got the ships the whole discussion about the Declaration is quite irrelevant. If we are in danger in time of war and we have not got the ships we may as well at once put up our shutters.

Mr. CHAPLIN

I understand that you are able to police and guard our trade routes now and in time of war?

Mr. McKENNA

Yes, Sir. Our Navy is adequate to guard our trade routes and to secure sufficient full supplies of food for our people during war, and we shall rely on our Navy to secure that food, and not upon the existence or the absence of the Declaration of London How does the Declaration of London affect our food supplies? I would observe, in the first place, that in the whole course of the Debate right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Gentlemen opposite have only considered the Declaration of London from the point of view of Great Britain as a belligerent, and it is only from that point of view that I propose to speak on behalf of the Admiralty in reply to the criticisms which have been raised. As to neutrals the Declaration has not been attacked. I have attended the whole of the Debate, and I think it has been admitted that as a neutral we gain rather than lose by the Declaration. The important argument raised has been the effect upon this country as a belligerent.

The argument on this point has been confined to three heads. First of all the conversion of merchantmen at sea to ships of war; secondly, the effect upon our supplies of food; and, thirdly, the sinking of neutral vessels. Upon all those three points those who have addressed the House have endeavoured to convince hon. Members that we should lose seriously as a belligerent. I propose to answer those three points. First of all, on the question of the conversion of merchantmen into warships upon the high seas. I pressed the right hon. Gentleman opposite to tell me how we should be affected as belligerents by the Declaration in that respect. The Declaration of London does not mention the conversion of merchant ships to men-of-war on the high seas. I pressed the right hon. Gentleman on this point, because I was anxious to know the full extent of the argument upon that point, and what is it? I reproduce it from the mouth of the most authoritative exponent of the views of hon. Gentlemen opposite, the late Attorney-General. He told us that although the subject was not mentioned in the Declaration of London, nevertheless, as an international Prize Court may hereafter determine a question between a belligerent and a neutral other than Great Britain in which the belligerent has converted a merchant ship into a man-of-war and has captured a neutral vessel and the international Prize Court might then determine that compensation was payable to the neutral, that the doctrine of conversion would thereby receive a moral sanction. Am I right? Am I correct in stating the right hon. Gentleman's view that a decision of the Prize Court not affecting us might give a moral sanction to the doctrine of conversion which would bind us?

Sir R. FINLAY

A legal sanction.

Mr. McKENNA

I am really astonished at the use of that word by the right hon. Gentleman. What can the international Prize Court decide and only decide? It can only decide a question as between a belligerent and a neutral in this matter, and it can only decide whether a neutral is entitled to damages or not. That is all. It can decide only upon the facts of the specific case. It cannot determine any question as between two belligerents, and it is not within its jurisdiction to lay down any rule of law as to how one belligerent should treat another. I am surprised the right hon. Gentleman who has held high legal office should give the weight of his authority to those persons who would wish to cramp the authority of the British Government in this respect. If this Declaration were signed to-morrow, it would not bind the British Government in the slightest degree to allow belligerent rights to any merchant ship that was converted on the high seas, and no decision of the international Prize Court under any sanction or authority could hereafter bind the British Government and compel the British Government to allow belligerent rights to a merchant ship converted on the high seas.

Sir R. FINLAY

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman has followed the point. The decision, although between other parties, if it proceeded on the legal precept that conversion might take place on the high seas, would most seriously prejudice our position.

Mr. McKENNA

That is what I put before the right hon. Gentleman as his statement of the case, and I can assure him that in his view he is mistaken.

Mr. DUKE

Would not the court follow its own precedents?

Mr. McKENNA

The court has no jurisdiction as between belligerents. There is nothing in the Declaration of London which affects the rights of belligerents inter se. It only affects the rights of belligerents as against neutrals. Consequently, every belligerent, as against his enemy, is not bound by any decision of the international Prize Court, and the international Prize Court has no jurisdiction to give a decision binding upon a belligerent as against his co-belligerent. I am quite aware of the fact that nineteen-twentieths of the opposition to the Declaration of London is founded on a misapprehension of its contents. I say, after being fully advised on the subject and after a tolerably complete study of the matter—if we are engaged in war with a Foreign Power and after that Foreign Power converts its merchantmen into ships of war at sea, we are as completely at liberty to deal with the merchantmen so converted after the signing of the Declaration as we were before it. I think that disposes of the first point. [Hon. MEMBER: "No, no."] Then we disagree on a question of fact. But if I am right in my construction I take it the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me there is no objection to the Declaration of London on this point.

Mr. WYNDHAM

Of course the Declaration does not affect belligerents inter se. The argument of my right hon. Friend was this. That belligerents, if our contention be true, will find greater sanction in thinking it is right to destroy neutrals and that will in our opinion have a most injurious effect on the food supplies of this country carried by neutrals.

Mr. McKENNA

I am only dealing now with the question of conversion, and, speaking on behalf of the Admiralty, which has to carry out the instructions, I say that under the Declaration, if we are belligerents, we should not hold ourselves bound as against the enemy to treat any merchant ships which he may convert on the high seas into men-of-war as entitled to belligerent rights. I cannot say anything more clear or precise on that point. So much for conversion at sea. We claim that no Power has a right to convert merchant ships into men-of-war at sea, and we should hold ourselves absolutely at liberty to take what course we thought right in such a case. We are not bound in any way by the Declaration of London in that respect. So much for the first point.

The next point was as regards the supply of foodstuffs to this island should we be engaged in war. The right hon. Gentleman declared with some emphasis that the danger to this country under the Declaration of London was very great. He really attributed to the Declaration a grave importance in the possibility of its limiting our food supply. Again, what are the facts in this very simple matter? As I have said, we rely upon the Navy to keep the sea open. According to the right hon. Gentleman the Declaration of London is going to put in jeopardy foodstuffs carried in neutral ships which would not be in jeopardy at the present time. How much greater must be the jeopardy of the foodstuffs carried in our own ships? And when we remember that nine out of ten ships in lime of peace carrying food are British ships—there would be more in war—even under his own construction how can he pretend that there is a serious danger to our supply owing to the Declaration of London? The Declaration only affects one ship in ten. It does not touch our own British ships if we are engaged in war. There is nothing affecting belligerent ships. Still the right hon. Gentleman thinks that this one-tenth of our foodstuffs—that is the maximum figure—that this one-tenth of our foodstuffs, which, according to him would be placed in jeopardy is of this most vital importance. But would the foodstuffs be placed in jeopardy under the Declaration of London in a degree greater than they would be in jeopardy now? The answer to that point is very simple. The Declaration of London so far from jeopardising the foodstuffs in neutral ships safeguards them. I not only think that the right hon. Gentleman's point had not any great value owing to the comparatively small amount of foodstuffs carried in neutral ships, but I think his point was wrong. The Declaration of London absolutely safeguards foodstuffs in neutral ships as compared with the present practice.

Taking his own illustration of grain carried in an American ship, I would observe, first, that the United States Government are in favour of this Declaration. What does that mean? The right hon. Gentleman took the case of contraband food in an American ship, and he argued that we should suffer under the Declaration because if we were engaged in war and our enemy captured an American ship carrying foodstuffs, the United States Government would go to war about the neutral and would fight, whereas if we signed the Declaration of London, he says the United States would not go to war about it. I should think that the acute mind of the right hon. Gentleman would have seized the question that the vital point there would be whether the United States Government signed the Declaration. It would be quite immaterial whether we signed, because it must be supposed that it is our enemy who has captured the United States vessel, and it does not matter a snap of the fingers whether we have signed the Declaration. What does matter is whether the enemy and the United States have signed the Declaration. I want to make it perfectly clear that when we are belligerents, the ratification by us of this Declaration will not have the slightest effect upon the relations between the two other Governments, one our enemy, and the other a neutral. The right hon. Gentleman says that the United States Government would go to war with our one my if their ship was captured carrying food, whereas it would not go to war if their ship was captured by the enemy carrying food if this Declaration is signed by us and by them. Let us see whether that is so or not. The United States Government have approved of this Declaration, and they believe that the principles declared by it are just and proper. The right hon. Gentleman, therefore, supposes that the United States Government are going to war because another Power docs what they think right and just. He has entirely mistaken the effect and meaning of the Declaration. He admits, and I admit with him, that in general practice food has only been conditional contraband, the condition depending upon whether it was intended for the armed forces of the enemy. That has been the general practice, although there has been very considerable exceptions, and no Power has ever admitted that it is bound by the general practice. I want to get to all points of agreement. The Declaration of London declares that food may become contraband under precisely these conditions—

Mr. CHAPLIN

No.

Mr. McKENNA

In that it is intended for the supply of the forces of the enemy. It always must become a question of evidence whether food is so intended or not, and the Declaration of London lays down that certain facts shall constitute evidence that it is so intended. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] Yes, that is so. But without the Declaration of London food would have been treated as contraband precisely in the same way by the enemy.

Mr. WYNDHAM

How often in the last fifty years?

Mr. McKENNA

How often have there been wars? It has been so treated in every war that has taken place in the last fifty years. There is not a single exception. That food has been treated as conditional contraband of war evidences can be found in every war that has taken place in the last fifty years. It is common ground between us that in the general practice food would have been treated as conditional contraband, and that the condition which the enemy would have to prove, not when he stopped and captured the vessel, but in the Prize Court, is that the food was intended for the forces of the enemy. But both before and after the Declaration the belligerents would have the duty of exercising precisely the same function of stopping ships carrying contraband neither more nor less, and the Declaration of London determines the conditions under which the belligerents shall pay compensation to neutrals—nothing else. It does not affect the operations of war, but it determines that if a belligerent wrongly stops a neutral ship and wrongly confiscates property it shall thereafter pay damages to the neutral who has been injured. What objection is there in that, and how does it affect food supplies coming to this country? The fact of the matter is that if we were at war, with or without the Declaration of London, and were unable to keep the seas open with our Fleet, the enemy would stop all ships carrying food to our ports. We know that the Declaration of London, unless there is something in the way of reprisal by a neutral Power, will not affect that in the slightest. [An HON. MEMBER: "It will indeed."] It will not affect it in the slightest degree. It will be his duty to stop all ships in precisely the same way in order to determine the destination of their cargo. If he is not satisfied that the destination of the cargo is harmless, he will capture the ship. But the difference between what has been the law up to the present time and the law under the Declaration of London will be that a belligerent having captured the ship will have to pay compensation if he was wrong in his judgment, and it is quite right that he should pay it. The hon. Gentleman argued that owing to the existence of the Declaration neutral ships would be stopped by an enemy of ours in a way in which they are not stopped at the present time. He gave absolutely no reason for that belief—none whatever.

Mr. BUTCHER

Article 34.

Mr. McKENNA

Article 34 does not affect the stopping of the ship.

Mr. BUTCHER

Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that Article 34 is not only an invitation, but a justification to a hostile commander?

Mr. McKENNA

The hon. Gentleman has not devoted, perhaps, as great attention to the consideration of what actually takes place in war as to the consideration of the words on paper. In the first place, how is the captain of the enemy ship or any cruiser to know what is on board until he has stopped the neutral ship? He will stop the neutral ship carrying cargo to our shores whether there is the Declaration of London or not. He will stop it and examine the papers of the ship and the cargo, and so this notion that there is any invitation in Article 34 is the purest invention. I cannot find language in which to express my view of the statement if I confine myself within reasonable limits. I take it that the commander of a cruiser who is endeavouring to stop the trade of the enemy, or put an end to the trade of the enemy, would slop every suspicious ship he saw, and he would examine the papers, whether under the Declaration or not under it, if he had any ground for believing that the ship carried contraband, or that the foodstuffs or conditional contraband were really intended for the armed forces of the enemy. Ho would not merely stop the ship, either under the Declaration or not under it. He would capture it.

The Declaration of London does not affect that at all. That would happen in either case. There is no change in the law under the Declaration in that respect; nor would there be in practice. Does the right hon. Gentleman suppose that if this were adopted we should issue instructions to our captains of cruisers that they should in no circumstances stop a neutral, or that in all circumstances they were to stop a neutral? Of course not. No such instructions would be issued. We should rely whether under the Declaration of London or not under it for the protection of our commerce upon the ability of our Navy to keep the sea clear of foreign commerce destroyers. If there are foreign commerce destroyers, foreign enemy cruisers, afloat our commerce would be in danger whether carried in our ships or in neutral ships, and the danger would be so serious that the Admiralty have felt justified year after year in asking the House of Commons to make adequate provision for the Navy. So long as they do make adequate provision for the Navy you have nothing to fear as regards the destruction of our food supplies, whether carried in our own ships or in neutral ships.

The last point that the right hon. Gentleman referred to was the sinking of neutrals. Here again he alleged that in the event of war we should suffer serious damage by agreeing to the Declaration of London. I ventured to interrupt him in order to get from him more closely what is the precise point in this respect in which he believed that we should suffer as belligerents. How do we suffer as belligerents if the enemy sinks neutrals? The right hon. Gentleman seemed to speak as if he were under the impression that it was not merely a case of sinking neutrals, but of sinking British ships. I know he did not think so, but it is a view very generally held as to the construction of this Article, and it is a view which ought to be emphatically cleared up. This Article does not authorise or disallow the sinking of enemy's ships. If we are at war our ships may be sunk or not sunk exactly as our enemy pleases, and nothing in the Declaration of London affects his rights or powers to sink or not sink our ships. The only thing that is determined is the conditions under which a neutral ship may be sunk. How are we affected as belligerents by that? The sinking of a neutral ship is no doubt of very great importance to the neutral Government. It is important to us if we are belligerents. The probability would be that if it were often repeated the neutral Government who suffered would probably not submit to it. The right hon. Gentleman's point is, if I understand him correctly, that if we signed this Declaration we should be assenting to a plan which, if we did not sign it, would be so abnormal and so generally recognised as improper that any neutral would be roused to war if its ships suffered. Here again I ask the same question, how does our signing the Declaration affect the object one way or the other? Suppose we were engaged in war with a European Power, and a neutral ship of the United States has been sunk by our enemy. How does our signing or refusing to sign the Declaration of London affect the feelings of the United States. The United States Government accept this Declaration. They believe that its provisions are right, and they are willing to accept the terms that our enemy may sink their ships under the conditions stated.

Sir R. FINLAY

Are the United States willing to ratify the Declaration?

Mr. McKENNA

The United States will ratify it.

Sir R. FINLAY

How do you know?

Mr. McKENNA

I am informed so. I am informed that the United States approve of the terms of the Declaration.

Sir R. FINLAY

Are the United States willing to ratify whether this country ratifies or not?

Mr. McKENNA

No, Sir, I am not informed of that, nor do I think it is very material to my argument. My right hon. Friend reminds me that the United States Government have pressed us to act, and by pressing us to act they have indicated to us in the plainest terms possible that they approve of the conditions laid down in the Declaration of London.

Sir R. FINLAY

The right hon. Gentleman has stated a fact. Will the right hon. Gentleman produce the papers? Are you willing to produce the papers that have been quoted?

Mr. McKENNA

Papers have not been quoted.

Sir R. FINLAY

The right hon. Gentleman will pardon me. He has stated a fact. Will he produce the paper to the House?

Mr. McKENNA

I have not stated the fact on certain papers at all. I have made a communication to the House on the authority of my right hon. Friend. It may or may not be in the papers; it may have been communicated by word of mouth, and the ordinary rule as to quoting would not apply, as the right hon. Gentleman very well knows. I have not quoted from any document. Provided the United States approves of the terms of this Declaration of London, why are they likely to go to war because one of their ships is treated in a manner which they declare they think is the proper manner for neutral ships to be treated under these conditions? It is really an outrage upon, common sense to suppose that we alone of all the Powers are affected, not by the actual terms of the Declaration, but by a sort of moral influence which the existence of the terms is going to have upon other Powers in preventing them from joining in a war in our defence. That is the sole argument that is used. If we ratify this Declaration, neutral Powers, who would otherwise be aggrieved, who would otherwise not get the benefits which neutral Powers obtain under this Declaration, would be induced to go to war with our enemy because they would not get the advantages which neutrals receive.

It is a view which, I think, is extraordinarily far-fetched, and which is believed by the action of all the foreign Powers who are signatories to the Convention. I think that disposes of the main points dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman. The hon. and learned Member for York (Mr. Butcher) asked me as to the opinions of the expert advisers of the Admiralty. He has for a long time expressed considerable anxiety on the matter, and has asked many questions across the floor of the House. I am perfectly willing to give him the information for which he asks. In this matter of international law, under the practice of the Admiralty and the division of business with the Admiralty, the expert adviser is the officer whom we call the Director of Naval Intelligence. He is always an admiral of distinction, considerable distinction, and his office, which is outside the Board, is one of the most important offices which we have at the Admiralty. I know the opinion for certain of four Directors of Naval Intelligence on this point, and I believe I know the opinion, though I am not quite certain of it, of a fifth. I do not know the opinions of any others, but those four, whose opinions I know, and the fifth, whose opinion I believe I know, are unanimously in favour of the Declaration of London.

Mr. BIGLAND

Members of the Board?

Mr. McKENNA

Those are not members of the Board. The Directors of Naval Intelligence are expert officers who advise the Board on this particular branch of Admiralty work.

Mr. WYNDHAM

The right hon. Gentleman misunderstands the question of the hon. and learned Member for York. He asked for the opinion of the experts on the Admiralty Board. You have given the opinion of the Directors of Naval Intelligence, and are not on the Admiralty Board.

Mr. McKENNA

I have nothing to conceal. The right hon. Gentleman is anxious about the point, and I will come to it fully in due course. The question I have been asked is the opinions of the expert advisers of the Admiralty. I gave him, therefore, in the first instance, the opinions of the expert advisers of the Admiralty on this particular branch of work, the Directors of Naval Intelligence, whose opinions are of more weight because they are experts, and of more weight than those of many distinguished admirals who write to the newspapers, and who have not made a deep study of matters of this kind. Of all the Directors of Naval Intelligence that I have been able to discuss the question with, certainly four, and a fifth whose opinions I believe I know, are in favour of this Declaration. I do not know the opinions of any more, but so far as I am aware—

Sir F. BANBURY

How many are there?

Mr. McKENNA

There is only one Director of Naval Intelligence, the officer who advises the Board of Admiralty upon these matters and questions of this kind. I have discussed the question with four different gentlemen who at one time or another have been Directors of Naval Intelligence, and I have had the advantage of hearing the opinion of a fifth. Naturally they cover a period of a great many years, and they are unanimously in favour of the Declaration of London. So much for expert opinion first of all.

Mr. BUTCHER

Is Admiral Slade in favour of the Declaration?

Mr. McKENNA

I have the opinion of Admiral Slade strongly in favour of the Declaration of London. If the hon. Member doubts my word I will show the opinion to him.

Mr. BUTCHER

I do not doubt the right hon. Gentleman's statement, but I am astonished after what I have read.

Mr. McKENNA

Then we come to members of the Board. I have stated, and I repeat, that the Board of Admiralty support the Declaration of London. The hon. and learned Gentleman is not satisfied with that. He wants now, according to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Wyndham) the opinion of the expert members of the Board. Questions like this Declaration of London come within the special Department of the First Sea Lord. There have been two First Sea Lords who have been concerned with the Declaration of London—first Lord Fisher and then Sir Arthur Wilson. Both are in favour of it. I only mention these facts because a great many questions have been addressed to me from the other side of the House always upon the supposition that I have something to conceal, and that because I refuse to disclose the opinions of Members of the Board they must be against me. I mention it now only after a long delay, and with the express warning, if I may be allowed to give it to the House, that it would be found in practice most unfortunate if there were quoted the opinion of particular Members who are not Members either of this House or of the other House, and able to speak for themselves. I have never varied my opinion upon that point; but I have been pressed by the hon. and learned Member, who has pressed me up to the point of saying that the whole of the Navy are opposed to the Declaration. No distinguished officer, whose opinion upon a technical subject of this kind is worth any more than the opinion of the man in the street, is against the Declaration of London. Naval officers vary in their views, but upon the construction of a treaty of this kind naval opinion in general is not likely to be well informed. The experts in the Navy are very well informed, extremely well informed, and they are in favour of the Declaration. I never saw a more wanton suggestion made in this House or out of it, that the Navy—or, as I have seen it in print—that the whole Navy is opposed to the Declaration—

And it being Eleven of the clock, the Debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed to-morrow (Thursday).