FOREIGN OFFICE.

HC Deb 27 July 1911 vol 28 cc1827-80

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £37,225, be granted to His Majesty to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1912, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Department of His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."

NOTE.—Thirty thousand pounds has been voted on account.

The PRIME MINISTER

I think I said two days ago, in answer to an inquiry by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Balfour), that I thought it would be more convenient, instead of answering a question across the floor of the House, that we should take the occasion of this Vote to make a statement as to a question which very largely and generally, if it does not absorb, at any rate excites public attention. I mean the question which has arisen in the international sphere in regard to Morocco, and I think it will be of general interest, as well as for the convenience of the House, that I should make that statement at once before any debate or discussion has arisen. It is obvious that this Moroccan question has reached a point at which it will become increasingly difficult, embarrassing, and anxious unless a solution is found. Too close an analysis at the present moment of causes and antecedents might provoke in more than one quarter recrimination and retorts, which it is on every ground desirable to avoid. I propose, therefore, simply to state to the House what is the actual situation today. Conversations are proceeding between France and Germany. We are not a party to those conversations. The subject matter of them may not affect British interests. On that point, until we know the ultimate result, we cannot express a final opinion. But it is our desire that these conversations should issue in a settlement honourable and satisfactory to both the parties, and of which His Majesty's Government can cordially say that it in no way prejudices British interests. We believe that to be quite possible; we earnestly and sincerely desire to see it accomplished. The question of Morocco itself bristles with difficulties, but outside Morocco, in other parts of West Africa, we should not think of attempting to interfere with territorial arrangements considered reasonable by those who are more directly interested. Any statements that we have so interfered to prejudice negotiations between France and Germany are mischievous inventions, without the faintest foundation in fact. But we have thought it right from the beginning to make it quite clear that, failing a settlement such as I have indicated, we must become an active party to discussion of the situation. That would be our right as a signatory to the Treaty of Algeciras; it might be our obligation under the terms of our Agreement of 1904 with France; it might be our duty in defence of British interests directly affected by further developments. There have been times, when we were not sure how far this was fully understood. I am glad to say we are now quite satisfied that that is not the case. The statement which I made here at this Table more than three weeks ago, and the speech since made elsewhere by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer have, I hope and believe, made it perfectly clear that we claim not any predominant or pre-eminent position, but that of one party interested in possible developments and in seeing a solution of the present difficulties. Sir, in our judgment, it would have been a grave mistake to let such a situation drift till an assertion of our interest in it might, owing to previous silence, cause surprise and resentment at the moment when this assertion became most necessary. That, I trust, we have sufficiently guarded against by the statements already made. I repeat that we earnestly desire a successful issue of the conversations now in progress, and I would venture, in the general interest, to make a strong appeal to the House, not on the present occasion to enter into further details or open up controversial ground.

Mr. BALFOUR

The careful and guarded statement made by the Prime Minister requires little or nothing from me in the way of comment, and nothing whatever in the way of criticism. He has, with a full knowledge of the difficulties of the case, and of the responsibilities attaching to the conduct of foreign affairs in a crisis like this, made an appeal to the House not to drag in irritating matter, not to raise unnecessary controversies, and not to go back over the past with criticism which, as they are directed towards the past, can do no good now, whilst it is possible that, unless couched in the most cautious terms, they may act as an irritating cause rather than as a pacific cause, in the present critical situation in which Europe, not only this country, but Europe finds itself. So far as my friends and myself are concerned, that request of the Prime Minister will, I feel quite certain, be regarded in the spirit as well as in the letter; and, perhaps, I need only add this one further remark; we have often said on both sides of the House that we do not allow our party differences, however acute, to interfere with our common agreement where the interests of the country as a whole, are at stake. I suppose there never was a moment at which that doctrine, if a genuine one, as it is, is more difficult to carry into effect than at this moment when, I suppose, party differences are more profound and more acute with regard to domestic issues, than they have been in the memory of any man now present. Sir, so far as we are concerned those statements in the past were no mere fair weather enunciations of an easy morality; they were not merely doctrines stated at a time when the temperature of the party differences was low, and when the political horizon abroad was free from cloud. They were genuinely meant, and they will be faithfully carried out; and, if there be any observers or critics outside these walls, who have counted upon our differences and our absorption in the bitter home disputes of the moment, in the hope that they will make easy a policy which they under other circumstances thought this country might object to, if there are any who suppose that we are wiped out from the map of Europe because we have our own differences at home, it may be worth while saying, for the benefit of those whom it may concern, that they have utterly mistaken the temper of the British people and the patriotism of the Opposition, whether the Opposition be drawn from one side of the House or from the other side of the House.

4.0 P.M.

Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD

I am sure whoever addresses the House, following the statements made by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, must do so with an overwhelming sense of responsibility. The gravity of the Prime Minister's statement will not delude anyone in spite of the very careful phrasing in which it has been couched. This House, on all sides, knows, perfectly well what the opinions of my hon. Friends are; the House also knows perfectly well the forces, the organisations, the movements in Europe with which we are associated. The House knows perfectly well that so long as there is a Labour party in Germany, in France, or in England, those parties will co-operate together to the very last moment to seek peace, and pursue it earnestly. My hon. Friend the Member for Glamorgan has just told me that this morning, in an International conference of miners, in which every European country has been represented as well as our own, a very earnestly worded resolution, supported by the earnest speeches of representatives—of the miners at any rate— from all those countries, has been unanimously passed. I am not going to say anything further than I have said. If the path of peace is going to be wrecked at the present moment, we shall stand by it even when it has been wrecked. I hope the House will believe me that in stating that I am in no way going against the spirit either of the statement that has been made by the Prime Minister or that made by the Leader of the Opposition. We know the gravity of the situation. We know that those who work with us upon the Continent cannot control continental national policies. But we also know this that it may be very useful for rulers of all the countries to know that there is a strong organisation that will stand for peace through fair weather and through foul weather. May I say this further word, and I say it with profound regret: I am exceedingly sorry that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made the statement he did in another place. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no."] I will tell you why. It is far better that we should discuss these things quite candidly and in a calm frame of mind.

If the statement had to be made, it was precisely the statement that ought to have been made through the ordinary private channels. I do not know that I agree—I do not agree—with those private negotiations which settle the lines of national policy, the results of which are only made known to the public when the public are absolutely powerless to influence the direction in which the Nation is going. But so long as that is the policy, so long as that is the method of carrying on international diplomacy, it was surely a statement which ought to have been made in that way; and I will tell you why again. That statement has been the basis of a Press campaign which everybody must regret. I am sorry that the Prime Minister confined his good advice to this House. This House has never hampered him. This House has not hampered the Foreign Secretary. Whatever has happened which is unfortunate, has happened because the Press has not risen to the responsibility of its position as a peacemaker and a war maker between nations. I offer that protest, and I will say no more now. I have spoken with a great deal of feeling, with much reluctance, and with a grave sense of responsibility; but I do hope and I do pray that the negotiations which are going on will result in peace. I do hope and I do pray that no European nation will assume for a single moment that party divisions in this country will weaken the national spirit or national union. But that does not mean that there will not be sections in the country who will strive, ceaselessly strive night and day, in season and out of season, whether it is popular or unpopular, to make it impossible first of all and to make it difficult after that, for two civilised countries, two professedly Christian countries, to resort to the arbitrament of the sword in order to settle a difficulty that could easily be settled by The Hague Court.

Mr. GEORGE LLOYD

I would be the last to enter upon any discussion on what is gone by, but we have so few opportunities of discussing foreign questions that I desire on this occasion to call attention to affairs in Persia. I would first of all ask the attention of the House to some of the developments that have taken place in Persia within the last few weeks. I do not propose in this respect to offer any criticism as regards the Government's policy: I merely ask for an explanation. We all know that quite recently the ex-Shah of Persia landed on Persian territory from Russian soil. We also know that in 1909 the Government was one of the signatories with Russia to certain agreements by which Russia, in the second part, pledged herself in very clear terms to take effective measures against any political agitation on the part of the ex-Shah in his former dominion. I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman, the Foreign Secretary, whether it is a fact, or it is not a fact, that we were aware by any channels whatever, either through Russia or any other channel, that it was very probable that the ex-Shah would attempt the unfortunate step he has just taken, and, if so, does the right hon. Gentleman really think that the attitude of Russia is in conformity with the taking of effective measures which, we understand, from the protocol of 1909, she had undertaken with regard to any further political agitation in Persia. We think really that it is time we were informed exactly what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to Persia at the present time. I think the right hon. Gentleman himself will not deny that, following upon the Russian Convention we did extend to the Parliamentary party in Persia a considerable measure of sympathy. At the present time we seem to have reversed our attitude; or, at any rate, we cannot take an absolutely neutral attitude. Not to make any statement of any kind whatever, in order to preserve Persia from renewed political agitation on the part of the ex-Shah, might cause the greatest doubt in the Nationalist party of Persia, as to whether we might not be acting with Russia in this matter. I for one scout any such suggestion. But I do think it is a very timely moment for the Government to make some statement as to their attitude and feeling in reference to the landing of the ex-Shah in Persia.

The Persian trade routes are another matter about which I should be glad of further information. There have recently been some specially interesting articles appearing in the columns of "The Times," by one who has had very long experience in the Persian Gulf. Everybody I have met recently who knows the situation of Southern Persia, and the condition of the trade routes there, knows that all the facilities and channels by which our trade may go up to the centre of Persia are in such a hopeless state of anarchy and confusion that our trade is being seriously jeopardised. There were many, and I was amongst them, who were critics of the Anglo-Russian Convention—at any rate from the local point of view, because of the great concessions we made from the trade point of view with Central Persia. I remember reading a speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, on the occasion when he was justifying his policy in reference to the Convention, and in that speech he laid stress on the fact that our trade in South Persia was so small—I do not think that I misrepresent him—that the attitude he had taken was largely from the strategical point of view in connection with the Anglo-Russian Convention. I think it is a very dangerous line of argument to allow our trade to shrink and become smaller, and then later on say it is so small that there is no need for further safeguards. Five years ago, on the Bushire-Shiraz route, there were 7,000 muleteers employed almost exclusively in carrying British goods. Last year the number sank to something less than 3,000. I had occasion only a few months ago to call the attention of the right hon. Gentleman opposite to the fact of the negotiations with regard to the northern trade route which, at any rate at one time, was a very good and valuable route. That northern route was allowed completely to lapse, and nothing would persuade Turkey to put it in proper order or do anything that would be effective.

It seems to me that the Government are pursuing the same policy with regard to our southern Persian trade as they did with regard to the northern trade route. What was the result in the north of Persia? Eventually Russia got more and more hold of the northern trade routes into Persia, and all we could say was, "Very well, our trade must have a different inlet to Persia." I would like to ask the right hon. Gentleman what he now proposes to do with regard to the southern Persian trade routes. I for one would be the last to disagree with him in not wishing to press further the terms of the British Note which the Government sent last October in reference to this matter. We were told later on that the condition of affairs had so far improved that it was unnecessary to take the steps which were hinted at in that Note. What is the Government going to do to protect our trade? Something has got to be done, and done rapidly, in connection with the trade of southern Persia. I would like to have some assurances from the right hon. Gentleman that he is not going to leave the matter where it is at the present time, and that he will do all in his power by some methods to assist the trade in the Persian Gulf, which has suffered so great a decrease in the last forty years. I wish to say a few words with regard to the situation in Albania. First of all I would like to say how very glad I am, as probably are most of my hon. Friends on this side of the House who take an interest' in the affairs of Persia, that the suggestions which have been made in some quarters with regard to intervention in Albania have remained unnoticed, so far as I am aware, by His Majesty's Government.

I should like to say at once that I am sure that any attempt at intervention in Albania at the present time would be a very serious step, and a very regrettable one, for us to take. That does not mean that many of us do not think that the Albanian campaign, or rather some aspects of it, and the methods of the last few weeks have not been regrettable and do not demand a considerable amount of fair criticism from this country; but I think, sooner than add to the difficulties of Turkey at the present time in criticising the details of their methods, that we should do much better to try and, in our criticisms, to point out that it is only another example of the futility of the Ottomanising policy which the Committee of Union and Progress adopted some two or three years ago. There were a good many sympathisers with it in this House, and rather florid kind of talk which went on at that time with regard to liberty, equality, and fraternity, and the outer trappings and promises of the Committee of Union and Progress. We sympathised with the demands of the Committee party in Turkey because we honestly believe that they meant a greater period of tranquillity and liberty for Turkey. But I have no doubt that, however that might prove to be, the policy of trying to Ottomanise absolutely different races and creeds all throughout the country was doomed to failure, and in this case this policy with regard to Albania is proving a signal failure. Until the Committee party chose to change their attitude in this matter, and deal with it rather more on national autonomous lines I am perfectly convinced that their efforts will be doomed to failure. At the same time I would like to repeat that any attempt at intervention on our part would be very regrettable and one which I hope we may have an assurance from His Majesty's Government that they do not contemplate.

There is only one other matter I am going to ask for information about and with regard to which I wish to offer no remark. This, I think, is rather a fortunate opportunity when the Foreign Secretary might tell us a little more about what passed, or the results of the conversation that went on during the Imperial Conference with regard to the Dominions in foreign affairs. We were told, and we were very glad to see that the Dominion Premiers were highly pleased with the speech of the right hon. Gentleman and with the confidence into which he took them with regard to the foreign affairs of the Empire. We also understood that in future the Dominions were going to be kept fully informed of all the more important steps we were likely to take in our foreign affairs. I would like to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on that fact, but I think it is time we knew a little about how the Foreign Office proposed to deal with this matter. I should like to ask, if it is not an unwise question at this momen, and if so the right hon. Gentleman will know it, whether in a case of this kind when we have grave international troubles it is possible, or if he thinks it possible, to keep the Dominions thoroughly informed with regard to all that is going on. That is a matter as to which we are naturally anxious to know a good deal more, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will deal with it as fully as he can and tell us how he means, and how far he means, to keep the Dominions informed, and by what methods, and that should a very great crisis arise, whoever may be the parties in power in Canada or Australia, however much disposed they are to resent any wars that may arise, how they may be kept fully informed of every detail, not only when the event has occurred, but some time before, of what the negotiations may mean. There were several other matters with regard to the Japanese Treaty which I had intended to raise this afternoon, but in view of what has been said by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, with regard to the Moroccan situation I would merely ask him to give me such information as he can on the points I have raised, and I leave the remainder for discussion on a future occasion.

Mr. JAMES HOPE

I desire, in my remarks, to follow very much on the lines of my hon. Friend (Mr. G. Lloyd). I heartily agree with what he said with regard to the policy in Turkey. I quite agree with him that any unconsidered single-handed intervention on our part in the present state of things in Albania would be deplorable, but the danger is that if the situation is not carefully watched it may drift of itself to a point in which the intervention of somebody may become absolutely imperative, and we may then be compelled to take a hand in a very dangerous game which timely action might have averted. I am the very last to wish to put pressure, especially on the Foreign Secretary, but I do think that a word of warning is necessary on the posi- tion which now exists in Montenegro and Albania. I have no special interest in the matter, except that from travelling in those parts I have acquired some local knowledge and certain sympathies, and I have information which has come straight from the spot, and it is to this effect. There are now some ten to twelve thousand Albanian refugees in Montenegro, who are being supported by the people there; the people have met them very generously, but the resources of the Government and of the country, from a Western standpoint, are ludicrously inadequate. Efforts are about to be made in this country to do what is possible for those poor people, and I understand that the right hon. Gentleman has generously promised that everything in the way of those efforts that is possible shall be done. But it is doubtful whether the real problem can be sufficiently tackled by any private means. The refugees keep coming in, and the situation is becoming increasingly embittered; they are being fed at present by maize which is brought from Bulgaria and Southern Russia, and transported with infinite difficulty to the refugee camps.

The situation cannot go on indefinitely; it is quite impossible for Montenegro indefinitely to support week after week these many thousands of refugees, but it is equally impossible that they can be dismissed and sent to their homes. It would be impossible for the King of Montenegro, and for his reputation with his neigbhours in the Balkans, that he should suffer that to be done, unless there were some assurances of the safety of those people. In consequence of this economic pressure and the impossibility of those people, who are increasing in numbers in Montenegro, going home without guarantees, the position in Montenegro may become so intolerable that war may be the least bad of two alternatives before their country. I need not dwell on the complications which would ensue there, because all Balkan policy is more or less interdependent. What happens in Montenegro cannot be indifferent to Servia; what happens in Turkey cannot be indifferent to Bulgaria. Any special action in Bulgaria must, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, be subject for discussion, and perhaps for action, in Roumania, and so the whole of the Balkans may be involved, and, if the whole of them are involved, the great Powers cannot at any rate stand aside. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend as to the risk of any isolated or hasty interven- tion, but I do ask that this matter should not be allowed to drift, because it might become a dangerous question. Some timely action now might toe the means of avoiding much greater complications in the very near future, and the dangerous period, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, in those parts is at the end of the harvest. I am talking of the Balkans generally. I have information as to very much graver difficulties in those parts, but I trust that those difficulties may perhaps be averted by wise steps taken in time.

Mr. NOEL BUXTON

In the fewest possible words I wish to associate myself with the desire of hon. Members opposite to call attention to the Turkish question, and to a great extent I wish to associate myself with the views they have expressed. The Turkish question is likely to be with us for a long time to come. At the moment it is largely obscured by other topics which appear more weighty, but I think in regard to those the Turkish proverb may prove to be true which says, "The dogs bark, but the caravan passes on." The caravan of the general welfare of Europe will long be bound up and inter-penetrated by the problem of what is to become of the Near East, and I think I agree with hon. Members opposite that, so far as events have developed themselves, the best hope, inadequate though it may be for the future, still appears to lie in the prospect which remains of the regeneration of Turkey. Turkey has been the scene of a struggle between two political parties. There is in this country a, disposition to revert to the attitude which a few years ago was general here, and to feel that the new Turk is, as it is crudely put, the old Turk in other clothes. I desire to urge that when we speak of Turks, as when we speak of any other people, we must discriminate between one party and the other. There was at the first period of the Turkish parliamentary epoch a natural inclination for all parties in. Turkey to stand together, but there is in every country two main types of mind, and there are developing already in Turkey divisions and cleavages between the two types which exist in every country, the conciliatory and the aggressive type, to put it roughly. Recent changes in Turkish government have shown to the satisfaction of advanced reformers in Turkey that there is a better chance than appeared a few months ago for the more reforming section to get the upper hand. Those two parties are repre- sented by two very prominent men in whom many people in this country take a great interest. One is now in London, the leader of the older reform section of the Committee of Union and Progress, Dr. Riza Tewfik, a well-known writer of political history and philosophy. It is significant indeed that be, who a few months ago was violently hostile to the so-called Committee of Progress and seceded from it, is now satisfied with the changes that have taken place and is a convinced supporter of the Government as at present composed.

There is another section, which, I think, we may fairly call the Chauvinist section, the avowedly Chauvinist section, which is represented by a type well known to some of us in this House, and conspicuously by a man who has been one of the most self-sacrificing leaders of the original committee', Dr. Nazim Bey, who still presides over the fortunes of the Committee at Salonika. He is an avowed Jingo, who believes in the steam-roller policy. He thinks that the only chance of Turkey lies in centralisation of the most extreme kind. He believes that local interests, local privileges, and local autonomy of any kind would be absolutely fatal to the future of Turkey. These two men just serve to personify the two elements which are struggling for mastery. As there are two elements in Turkey, there are also two policies which may be pursued by this country, or by any great Power which has relations with Turkey. During the reign of Abdul Hamid we more or less set aside for several years the old policy, and we threw our weight upon the side of intervention. What line we should take during the new regime has obviously been a question of very great difficulty, and I desire to urge upon the Government that the need of using our influence with Turkey is very great, and that our policy should be actively friendly, so long as it is not hostile. We must choose between a policy of hostility and a policy which believes that the best chance of success lies in a strong and progressive Turkey, and, therefore, we should show great activity on the side of lending a hand to the elements which we think are progressive and hopeful. As to other practical sides of the matter, as affected by the question of what policy we should pursue, may I ask the Foreign Secretary to give his close attention to the condition of things in Macedonia. There is no doubt a very great improvement in the crude figures of mortality, and of violent death, of what used to be called in the common parlance of the Chancelleries of the Near East, "The butcher's bill of Macedonia." There was, four years ago, a number of murders almost incredible, month by month; an average of about 200 per month for several years. In recent times by the best statistics I have been able to see, those supplied to the Turks by the Exarch, the head of the Bulgarian Church, there were fifty murders in four and a-half months committed by Turkish bands, and to some extent it is assumed under the patronage of the Union Committees. That is very regrettable, but we must admit there is some improvement.

I would like to urge that, if possible, the Consuls should keep the Foreign Secretary supplied with fuller information on this point by more systematic travel in the Turkish provinces. When the revolution took place it became a question what should be done with the European officers who had been acting to some extent as inspectors and to some extent as controllers of the gendarmerie, after a time some were allowed to be withdrawn, and others have gone to the Asiatic parts of the Turkish Empire. I think it would have been wiser for the Turkish Government to have kept these officers in Europe. The most dangerous thing for the new Turkish Government was that criticism should fall upon them with regard to the Macedonian question and the Albanian questions, and it would have been a great security to them in reply to that criticism if they had been able to say to the Powers of Europe: "We have voluntarily retained your European officers at their posts and you have full information from them. "That would be a reply to such criticism. At the present day the villagers who were formerly able to resort to these officers or to resort to the Consuls of the Powers, are now ordered by the Turkish authorities to keep clear of foreigners, and it is doubtful how far our present information can be relied upon as absolutely accurate. So far as we can we should make it more complete, and I hope our Consuls will be instructed to complete the information by fuller inquiry. Then there is the Albanian question. That is the most urgent matter before us. I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary to give all the help he can to the schemes for sending relief, to which hon. Members have referred already, to those unfortunate refugees who have gone across the Montenegrin frontier and are now in Montenegro. Some very good authorities, and notably the chief Balkan correspondent of "The Times," take a very gloomy view of the near future with regard to Albania. They are convinced that within the next eight weeks or so, if the Montenegrin Government is not relieved of the intolerable burden of these 15,000 or more refugees it will be an urgent question for King Nicholas whether it is not a good deal cheaper for him, and less disastrous for his country, to declare war. That is undoubtedly a possibility, and no one knows what motives, as yet hidden from the public eye, may contribute to bring about that result. We do not want to bring that result about, and I wish only to submit this point, that if relief work is successful and the distribution is assisted, as it can be, by the British Legation, and perhaps also by the consular system on the Turkish side, the strain upon the resources of Montenegro will, to that extent, be relieved and the danger of war will be diminished.

With regard to the subject of intervention, I think that is not a subject which we private persons, who are outside the knowledge which diplomatists have, can pronounce an opinion upon. But I think everyone will want the Foreign Secretary to associate himself with these remonstrances which are undoubtedly being made to the Turkish Government as to the methods by which their warlike policy towards the Albanians has been carried out. There are two other suggestions in regard to the carrying out of this friendly critical policy which we should like to see adopted at Constantinople, two ways of showing to the Turks that we are not unconditional enemies of the new regime but that we are conditionally most active friends. One is in regard to education. We must show that we want to encourage association in that field of Turks and English, and an obvious way to do that would be to subscribe rather more than appears to have been subscribed to the British. School in Constantinople. I hope the Foreign Secretary may soon gain the information which he undertook lately to obtain from the Ambassador with regard to the prospects of a larger subsidy to the British school at Constantinople. There is another point on which those who would like to see a self-respecting Turkey would like to express an opinion. Turkey is raising the question of the reorganisation of taxation, and particularly in Constantinople they are now unable to make their system just and fair because of the excessive immunity which foreigners enjoy under the privileges of the Capitulations. I think none of us want to insist upon any conditions which diminish the self-respect which an independent nation is entitled to. Indeed, we should desire to support them in a real and radical reform of the taxation system, so far as we have power to interfere under the rights arising from the Capitulations. Upon these points I would like to associate myself with hon. Gentlemen who have spoken in asking for further information, and I would urge, with any force I can, that our policy should be more active than it is in Constantinople, and it should be friendly because it should also be critical. If we could sincerely show the Turks our desire to help them on in the path of reform we should be able to exercise much greater influence than in the past towards the liberal and conciliatory side of their politics, and increase to a great extent the chance of their success.

Mr. MORRELL

I desire to take this opportunity to call attention to the case which has been already raised in this House not many weeks ago of Miss Kate Malecka, who for the past sixteen weeks has been imprisoned without trial and without any particulars of the charge against her in a Russian fortress at Warsaw. If this case primarily affects only a single individual I am certain my right hon. Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will recognise that it raises a most important question as to the treatment of those whom we, at any rate, claim to be British subjects in foreign countries, and that he will recognise also that this case has roused a very deep and wide-spread feeling among all classes in all parts of this country. Three weeks ago we raised this question on the adjournment of the House. Unfortunately the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was unable to be in his place at that time. It would have been possible for the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs to have shown a sympathy which certainly he did not show on that occasion, and to have done something to allay the anxiety which is felt by the lady's friends and by all who care for the good name of this country among foreign Governments. He did not succeed in doing so. No doubt he was tinder a disadvantage in the short time which was left to him to speak, and I do not desire to make any accusation against him as to the in- tention of his speech, but I think I am speaking what all of those who were present felt when I say that his speech on that occasion satisfied no one as to the attitude of the Foreign Office. What he told us was that the Foreign Office had no reason whatever to complain of the action of the Russian Government towards this lady, and that the Russian Government had not acted harshly in any way. As to our own Government it had asked that the trial should come on in a reasonable time. What more could we do? Even if she were a British subject we could not ask for her release. That was the effect of his words, but if I thought that really was the last word of the Foreign Office on this subject I should think the Foreign Office was open to a considerable amount of criticism. I am glad to say that since then the answers which have been given by the Foreign Secretary have done a good deal to allay the anxiety which was felt. I hope that this afternoon the right hon. Gentleman will be able to give us some better assurance than we have yet had as to the attitude of the Foreign Office on this question.

We all know that there are difficulties. There are great complications in connection with the question of nationality, but even those I believe have been greatly exaggerated. It would be very difficult, indeed, for the Russian Government to substantiate by clear evidence their claim that this lady is not a British subject. Their case rests on evidence which is necessarily obscure and remote. It rests, as I understand, on a doctrine which has never yet been applied to the Polish subjects of Russia—the doctrine that a Russian subject cannot naturalise himself abroad without the consent of the Russian Government. I understand from inquiries I have made that hitherto that doctrine has never been pressed against Polish subjects. This lady's father was a Polish subject. He came to this country, naturalised himself as an Englishman, and married an English wife. His daughter was born at Folkestone, and lived all her life in this country. As regards her claim to British nationality, that, at any rate, is perfectly definite, and, so far as our law is concerned, is absolutely indisputable. If Mr. Malecka, when he tried to give up his Polish nationality and become naturalised in England, had taken the precaution to alter his name to an English name I do not believe for a moment that any claim would ever have been raised by the Russian Government with regard to his daughter's nationality. I am sure my right hon. Friend will agree that it would be extremely difficult at this length of time—fifty years after the late Mr. Malecka naturalised himself in England— for the Russian Government to bring any proof in support of their claim. Therefore, I submit that we are entitled, at any rate until we have proof to the contrary, to assume that this lady, who was born and brought up in England and lived here until two years ago, when she went to Russia to earn her living by teaching English and music, is a British subject, and the Foreign Office should do all that they would do for any other British subject to protect her against injustice and wrong in a foreign country.

Even if the question of nationality were more doubtful than it is, the action of the Russian Government could not be justified. I think the Foreign Office is open to criticism for not having taken action sooner than they did in support of this lady's claim for fair treatment. What are the facts? She was arrested without warning on 5th April—that is sixteen weeks ago yesterday; her rooms were ransacked, her papers were seized, and she was carried off to Warsaw gaol, where she has since been kept in strict solitary confinement without the right of anyone, except the British Consul to visit her. Even as regards the visit of the British Consul, I would call attention to the unsatisfactory attitude of the Russian Government. Here was a lady who came into Russia under a British passport. She was known to consider herself a British subject. She often said, in conversation amongst her friends, "At any rate, I can speak freely of political matters, because I am a British subject." She was arrested on 5th April, and the British Consul at Warsaw at once claimed the right to visit her. On 26th April the claim of the British Consul was reinforced by a request of the British Ambassador. At first the request was granted by the Russian Government, but immediately afterwards the permission was withdrawn. It was not until the lady had been in prison eighty days that the British Consul was at last allowed to pay her a visit. Even then it was only to be an unofficial visit, and the conversation had to be carried on in German. That is not a very satisfactory attitude for the Russian Government to have taken up.

We have asked again and again for particulars of the charge against this lady. How is she said to have conspired? Anybody may be said to have conspired against the Russian Government. The charge will cover almost any political activity. Conspired with whom? And on what date? We have asked these questions again and again. On 11th July a request for particulars was made by the British Ambassador. To this day, sixteen weeks after the arrest, the lady is still absolutely ignorant of the particulars of the charge against her. It is impossible to apply for bail, because the application cannot be recognised until the acte d'accusation has been framed; until then it is impossible for her lawyer to see her or consult with her. For sixteen weeks she has been kept in prison without knowing the details of the offence with which she is charged. That again is an unsatisfactory attitude on the part of the Russian Government, who the Under-Secretary told us had behaved so admirably in this matter. I have heard to-day from private sources that the British Consul has written to say that the trial is not likely to take place for some little time—October is the month stated. Until the acte d'accusation is served on the prisoner no lawyer has any locus standi, and he is not permitted by law to visit his client. Even now we have no assurance from the Russian Government that there will be a trial or when the trial will take place. The lady is kept in prison without bail; her health, at any rate a short time ago—I am told the conditions of the prison have lately been improved—was unsatisfactory. She was subject to all this anxiety, and except for permission to write a letter once a week she was kept absolutely without communication with other human beings.

We were asked the other day, "What more could the Foreign Office do than they have already done in this matter?" I suggested then that, considering the failure to furnish particulars of the charge, it is now reasonable to assume that there is no definite charge at all. We know that political charges in Russia often rest entirely on the evidence of the secret police, those agents provocateurs who are paid by the police. If no charge is forthcoming after sixteen weeks, it is not too much for the Foreign Office to say firmly, "Unless particulars are supplied we ask for this lady's release and for her deportation to this country." As long ago as 26th April, the Foreign Secretary stated that according to the Consul's information. Miss Malecka would be conducted across the frontier when the matter had been Investigated and forbidden to re-enter the country. That seems to me a reasonable attitude on the part of the authorities. Why is it that that has not been followed up? Why has not a precise request been made to the Russian Government that, failing the production of particulars of the charge against this lady, she should be released, conducted across the frontier, and forbidden to re-enter the country. I do not want to import any heat into this matter, but I say deliberately that if this lady had been a distinguished person, bearing a famous name in this country, I do not believe the Russian Government would have dared to arrest her as they did. They never arrested their own distinguished subject Leo Tolstoi, who did a great deal more than Miss Malecka has ever done. I am confident that if Miss Malecka had been a more distinguished person instead of merely a teacher of music the Foreign Office and public opinion in this country would never have allowed this matter to drag on as it has done. I do not mean to suggest that my right hon. Friend would have been less active in the one case than in the other; but we claim the rights of British Nationality to have exactly the same weight in the case of the humblest as in the case of the most distinguished people.

5.0 P.M.

It is sometimes suggested that, after all, British subjects must take their luck in the country to which they go; that they are entitled only to the law of the country, and no more; that Miss Malecka is not suffering worse than other Russian subjects. I do not believe that my right hon. Friend would consent to a doctrine of that kind. It has been claimed over and over again— it was claimed by Lord Palmerston in the famous case of Don Pacifico in 1850— that we endeavoured to obtain for British subjects something more than the bare justice of the laws of the country to which they go, and that they should be secure in whatever land they might be against injustice and wrong. One of the first claims of a British subject is that he shall not be imprisoned or kept in prison in a foreign country without proper particulars of the charge against him being produced, or without having a right to a trial within a reasonable time. That is what we are entitled to ask in this case. It seems to me, considering the time that has elapsed, the Foreign Office might now reasonably ask for this lady's unconditional release. If my right hon. Friend does not see his way to do that, the least he can do is, first of all, to demand the immediate production of particulars of the charge against her; secondly, to demand that she shall be released upon bail pending the trial that cannot now take place, as I understand, before October; thirdly, that the trial should take place at a date to be communicated to the British Government, and that the date of the trial should be made known to Miss Malecka and her friends; fourthly —and to this I should attach very great importance—the Government themselves should be represented by English counsel at the trial, so as to see it is conducted in a fair and proper manner. We know, unfortunately, that in political trials in Russia this fairness is not always evident; all sorts of evidence is taken, and sometimes these trials are conducted in a way which would not for a moment be suffered in this country. At any rate, I think it is fair to ask that the Government should themselves be represented, should be able to give counsel a watching brief, so that we may have full particulars of the trial when it takes place.

I remember the speech which was made by the right hon. Gentleman some years ago when the Czar of Russia was about to visit this country. I remember the appeal which the right hon. Gentleman made then to these Benches to consider the progress which was being made by the Russian Government towards more liberal ideas, and to give a good welcome to the Czar; to do what we could to increase the friendship between the two peoples. I am only too delighted to help on the friendship of this and any other civilised country, but the only grounds upon which the friendship between Russia and this country will remain stable is that in their dealings with British subjects the Russian Government should respect the rights of individuals. I do sincerely trust that my right hon. Friend will use his great influence with the Russian Government—and I am certain, he has great influence—to try to obtain for this lady some fairer treatment than she has hitherto had; to try and obtain, if possible, her immediate release: at any rate to let it be known that the condition of friendship between Russia and England is that when an English woman goes abroad she should be entitled to fair and just treatment from the Russian or any other foreign Government.

Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON

It would seem not improper on the occasion of this Vote, "when we are in the habit of bringing criticisms to bear upon foreign Governments in matters for which they are responsible, that a word or two should be said in a matter where the responsibility lies with us; where we may take the analogy from the case discussed in the House yesterday, that it is the business of all good citizens in this country to realise the responsibility that exists. Indeed, apart from any other consideration, I think it would not be unfitting to-day that those of us who take an interest in Egyptian matters should say something by way of sympathetic tribute to the work of the late Sir Eldon Gorst. More than a year ago when Egyptian matters were being discussed in the House, when he was being made the subject of a very hostile campaign in the Press and outside, there was a disposition in some quarters to assume that his management of affairs in Egypt had been open to censure, that his policy had been misdirected, and that its course should be changed. I believe that before his death, and certainly since his death, there has been a recognition in many quarters of the essential injustice of the campaign that was then conducted against him and a recognition that his policy was substantially good, wise and cautious; that, in the words of a leading journal in an article written after his death, Sir Eldon Gorst's policy Had in the main been a success. I should like to say that with a good deal of emphasis, and perhaps the more emphasis because on certain points of detail I would have been among his critics.

The fact is that Sir Eldon Gorst was the instrument of carrying into effect almost the only display of really progressive policy that we have made in Egypt for a number of years. I do not mean to say that under the distinguished regime of Lord Cromer progressive steps were not taken. I should put it that on the whole under Lord Cromer's management there was no very clear disposition shown to carry out the reiterated promises of series of statesmen belonging to both parties that our policy in Egypt should be directed to the preparing of the people for ultimate self-government. That was always the declaration under Lord Cromer, whose able and skilful management was more directed to the development of English interests in Egypt than to any progressive preparing of the people for any species; for even the simplest form, or the beginnings of self- government. It is in the regime of Sir Eldon Gorst that we see the recognition that such a policy is really entertained, and that we see the first beginnings in the carrying of it out. Perhaps even the phrase "first beginnings" is apt to give too large a notion of what has been achieved. The burden of complaint last year—and it received a most unfortunate endorsement from a distinguished American politician—was that we had been doing too much in Egypt. No evidence had ever been given that we were doing anything at all beyond the simple establishment of provincial councils. I think it is to-day recognised that provincial councils stand alone, and are no great innovation in Egyptian life. Their powers are extremely limited. Such as they are, they are being exercised in quite a satisfactory way. The councils are, above all things, bent, so far as the evidence goes, on furthering education in Egypt.

One again connects the name of Sir Eldon Gorst with that step, as with the various measures for amelioration. Though they make a very little figure, even in his own reports, when they are studied they are seen to be something substantial. It should be recognised, I think, with gratitude, that under his control there has been for the first time for many years an actual diminution of crime in Egypt, a thing that never could be claimed even under the powerful government of Lord Cromer. In other respects, Sir Eldon's name should be associated with educational reforms, with real reform of the Moslem University and with certain measures of progress in the work of the new University, which, however, has not gone very far; and the extension of Government effort in both primary and secondary schools. In paying that tribute I think we are doing no less than justice to a distinguished and industrious public servant. The occasion, however, is one for the expression of hopes and aspirations with regard to future policy on the part of those of us who take a permanent interest in Egyptian matters. On the appointment of Lord Kitchener as Sir Eldon Gorst's successor I will say nothing whatever beyond expressing the very warm hope that Lord Kitchener's instructions will allow him to prosecute the policy which had been entrusted to Sir Eldon Gorst. There has been a tendency in some quarters to make the assumption that Lord Kitchener will carry through a policy of force, oppression, and coercion. In some quarters the chance of such a policy is almost welcomed. I need not say that, from my own point of view, such an assumption would be utterly unwarrantable. I should rather take it for granted that the Foreign Secretary will tell us that Lord Kitchener's instructions are to continue the policy of gradual, cautious progress that Sir Eldon Gorst was carrying out.

In that very connection I may be permitted to lay more stress on the greatness of the need for further measures of real reform in Egypt. Sir Eldon Gorst, in his last report, made a reference to which I suppose everybody will assent: "That a country in which only some 6 per cent." —600,000 out of 11,000,000 are, I think, the figures—"are 'literates' is obviously quite unfitted for self-government." Everyone, I suppose, will assent to that proposition; but the next comment, of course, would be that when such a country is under the effectual control of the British Government; when the agent of the British Government has in his hands the educational and other facilities; when he had in his power to forward or retard the educational machinery of the country, it is the plainest duty of the British Government to see to it that that very small number of "literates" shall not long continue to be the figure of the educated population. Yet, in the very face of that declaration of Sir Eldon Gorst, that the smallness of the number of literates in Egypt is a decisive argument against giving them self-government—which I say nobody disputes—you have a declaration from a journal like the "Egyptian Gazette," "that education is not for the Egyptian peasant," and that in fact it ought to be the policy of this country to keep the Egyptian peasantry ignorant. I think any foreign observer who puts the two doctrines together, who took Sir Eldon Gorst's report, and this sort of corollary that you get in the "Egyptian Gazette," that such a foreign observer might come to the conclusion that it is the plainest policy of the British Government to keep the Egyptian ignorant in the knowledge that ignorant people will never be able to claim anything like self-government. I repeat, I do not for a moment impute any such act, or intention of policy to the Government, but I think the Government will admit that if you have a very small number of literates in Egypt, if you have a wealthy nation, that the provision that is there being made for primary education is still disgracefully small.

When we began to look into these matters about the year 1906 we found that the total provision made for a people of 11,000,000 was about £200,000 a year. This was promptly increased when an outcry was made, but it is still a lamentably small figure, in view, that is, of the constant protestations of Members of both parties in this country that the education of the masses of the people is one of the most vital interests of the nation. That cannot be one of the things of which it may be said that "That which is true for the West is not true for the East. "The principle is universal. I do not think I am going beyond the obvious and proper course of an adherent of the Government when I press upon them the great necessity for increasing the provision for, as well as raising the quality of, education in Egypt. The whole of our experience of the world shows that in these days every progressive country is increasingly conscious of the need for a continual increase in measures of reform of all kinds. Healthy, non-stagnant, and continuous life means a constant attention to the needs of the people in all directions, and cautious provision for these needs by means of further legislative measures. The very fact that Egypt is in certain regards a backward country makes it more necessary that the people should be provided for in the way of reforms more even than the peoples of more advanced countries. The ordinary condition of Egyptian people in the matter of sanitation is still so bad that there is the greatest need for improvement. The infant death rate is simply frightful. The advance that has been made in the material condition of the people since the British control began does not in the least work out in that real mixture of moral and physical improvement that is taken as evidence of progress in a civilised country. The position of the fellaheen in many parts is the same as fifty years ago.

Mr. BAIRD

As it was four thousand years ago.

Mr. ROBERTSON

I daresay that would not be wrong either. The position of the fellaheen was stagnant for a thousand years. Let him know that under British control, primarily established for the purpose of securing the interest on money lent to the Egyptians by European creditors, that that is all the more reason why our Government, while it exercised something like absolutely autocracy, should play a paternal part in promoting the betterment of the people. Despite the truth that under our occupation there has been some vague and general progress—I am not disputing the progress of matters as regards security and the general administration of justice, and there is room for criticism in detail in the promotion of the general resources of the country—from the moral side we are happy to be able to chronicle some progress; but there is no advancement commensurate with that made upon the other side. Now at a time when the new Consul-General is appointed, a man of the distinction of Lord Kitchener, and in view of the declaration made by the Foreign Secretary in. a Debate in this House last year, I think it would not be unfitting that the right hon. Gentleman should give us some assurance of the direction in which our policy is consciously to take in the future.

Last year, speaking some time after the lamentable murder of Boutros Pasha, and taking account of the very unrestful state of the Egyptian politics, and the language used by a number of Extremists who themselves frequently cried out that our occupations should cease at once, the Foreign Secretary declared that in future no political progress could be made until the state of unrest had passed away and there was practical quiet in the situation. Since the right hon. Gentleman made that declaration the state of unrest has passed away, and so far as I can gather the moral and political situation in Egypt is peaceful to-day; the Extremists have been silenced or have of their own accord given up their propaganda. If the Foreign Office declared that it could not make any progress so long as these disturbances existed, they are morally committed now, when the disturbances have ceased and a prolonged state of quiet exists in the country, to resume something in the nature of political progress. I do not for a moment, in a Debate such as this, ask to have outlined the lines upon which progress should take place. I am merely drawing the attention of the right hon. Gentleman to his references last year, and expressing the hope that he will once more give us and the world to know that under British control Egypt is not to be supervised or ruled with a view to fulfilling the hopes of those Britons who occasionally express the desire that she should merely become but part of the British Empire, but that Egypt is to be governed for the good of her people, and that as we realise the good of any people is not attained until that people has something like contentment, the policy of the new Consul General will aim as before, with due caution and careful consideration in all the steps taken, to fitting that people for the control of their own affairs.

The outcry against Sir Eldon Gorst was largely inspired by a small faction that aimed at having an Egyptian bureaucracy and desired to see the Civil Service more and more filled with Englishmen, and who resented the introduction of Egyptians into that Civil Service. Sir Eldon Gorst, following the plain duty of a British Consul-General, wherever he found a competent Egyptian sought to give him any appointment suitable for a competent native, and it was resentment of that policy that inspired much of the campaign against Sir Eldon Gorst. Some pretended that there was no general resentment to his policy, but took objection to the appointment of some one or two incompetent men. The appointment of incompetent men may take place in any country, but should not be made the basis of an organised Press campaign, such as was got up last year, and before that against Sir Eldon Gorst. The resentment was very much against giving Egyptian positions to competent Egyptians; that is one of the test questions of the situation, and we should welcome the declaration of the Foreign Secretary as much as the conditions he laid down, that if peace and quiet once more reigned in Egypt there would be no departure, under Lord Kitchener, from the course that in large measure was followed by Sir Eldon Gorst. The right hon. Gentleman has already assured us that Lord Kitchener's position was civil, and that there is to be no vital alteration in the relationship we hold towards Egypt. I think it would contribute to the tranquilisation of public opinion in Egypt and other countries, if it was made known that to Lord Kitchener Egypt might look with confidence for a sympathetic policy towards the natives, and that he will really carry out the aspirations we have been accustomed to associate with the liberal conception of our occupation of Egypt in a better policy towards a subject race under our control.

Mr. BAIRD

I had the privilege of serving as a colleague with the late Sir Eldon Gorst, and it may not be considered out of place that I should be allowed to pay a tribute to his great merits. Indeed, I think nothing shows more the courage and loyalty with which Sir Eldon Gorst carried out the orders of his superiors than the opposition which was stirred up against him in Egypt. Nothing would be easier for anybody than to have refused to carry out a policy which was manifestly unpopular. He stuck to his orders, and no Civil servant ever served his superior with greater loyalty or single-mindedness than Sir Eldon Gorst. The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, who referred to the criticism of the policy of Sir Eldon Gorst was not quite hitting the right nail on the head; the policy of Sir Eldon Gorst was the policy of the Foreign Office in this country. The Foreign Office must accept the whole responsibility for it, and I am quite certain the Foreign Secretary has accepted full responsibility, and any criticism levelled against Sir Eldon Gorst was not personally against him, but was levelled against the policy propounded by the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary.

Last year we had a declaration from the Foreign Secretary with regard to Egypt, and I think the Opposition in this House are entitled to congratulate themselves upon that declaration. I happened to be in Egypt at Christmas time, and I noticed there was a very great difference between the general condition of the country then and what it was six or seven years ago when I was serving there. But I was told on all sides that matters were very much better than they had been six months before. I asked my late colleagues in the Government, both native and British, to what they attributed the improvement, and they all stated they attributed it entirely to the declaration of the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons. There is not the slightest doubt that that declaration was badly wanted. What I do think is surprising is that the Foreign Secretary should have stated as he did, when he made that declaration that had the Debate taken place as was originally intended some weeks before, he would have made that same declaration. The Egyptians realised that they would have to alter their proceedings; that lawlessness and disorder must cease, and that they must become law-abiding citizens once more; and I maintain that if that declaration had been made six months earlier, as it might have been made if the right hon. Gentleman realised the importance of it, there would have been far less trouble in Egypt. However, there is no use going back, but this was an instance of the justification of the Opposition in- tervening in a very delicate matter, such as the government of Egypt always must be, with a view to obtaining a strong declaration from the Foreign Secretary.

I hope the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down will not think it impertinent of me if I remind him that I believe his personal acquaintance with Egypt is small. I trust he will allow me also to say that in dealing with Orientals a long and close acquaintance is a sine qua non for understanding them. The longer one lives in the East the more difficult one realises it is to understand the Orientals, and the broad assertion which the hon. Gentleman made with regard to the advantages of education are largely misconceptions. He said that the condition of the fellaheen did not materially improve during the period in which we were in Egypt. I ventured to interrupt him, and say it was the same as it had been 4,000 years ago. There are certain things in the East which do not change, and will not change, and which, I believe, the people do not want to change. Once, when I was being pulled out of a tomb by some natives near Cairo, as they were hauling the rope up they called on the god Immon, and it is perfectly certain they were singing the very same song that was sung 4,000 years ago. That is characteristic. It is impossible that you can from one day to the next introduce into the Oriental mind notions of living and of government such as we have in this country. I venture to think that the criticism of the hon. Gentleman opposite as regards the material interest of the country since we came into occupation of it are by no means well founded, and cannot be justified by examination on the spot. If the hon. Gentleman had been in a position to compare the state of the villages in Egypt to-day with ten or fifteen years ago, it would be impossible for him to make the remarks which he has made. There has been an incredible advance which has no parallel in this country at all. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman is familiar with Egypt. I do not know how long ago it is since he first went to Egypt, but if he was familiar with Egypt for twenty years he will remember if he ever went beyond Cairo that the conditions were appalling. There were pools of water outside the villages which were nothing but festering sources of infection. They have been dried up in many cases. The improvements such as whitewashing in the villages is something extraordinary, and, as to the material prosperity of the country, I wish we could see in our own country districts the amount of prosperity we see among the peasants in Egypt. There never was a country where such an improvement has taken place in so short a time, and the general well-being is progressing and advancing very rapidly at the present time.

Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON

Would the hon. Member mind telling me since what date there has been a general drying up of those insanitary pools, because when I was there less than five years ago I know they were there then?

Mr. BAIRD

My association with Egypt began in 1896 and ended in 1904, and what I speak of was going on during the whole of that time, the amount of good which was done being something phenomenal. Of course, if people will insist upon feeding babies with water melons babies will die, but to talk about Egypt being in a desperate state in this connection is entirely exaggerating the position of affairs. The hon. Member seemed to indicate that no progress had been made, and he said that in the main he failed to see that there had been any progress with regard to giving the people a greater hand in their own government.

Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON

I specified the progress which has been made in the provincial councils, and I said that whatever progress or advance has been made was of a very cautious and moderate character, whereas the allegation was that a very rapid and dangerous advance had been made in giving the people of Egypt self-government.

Mr. BAIRD

It is evident from the last report of the Consul-General that he considered the progress was too rapid to be successful. On page 3 of Sir Eldon Gorst's report he refers to the Legislative Council and the General Assembly, and after stating that there has been an improvement in the capacity of the people to govern themselves, he says:— Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the recent experiment so far as the Legislative Council and the General Assembly are concerned proved a failure, and that the results derived from it has not been in accordance with our intentions or our hopes.

Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON

What does the hon. Member suggest that stands for?

Mr. BAIRD

When existing institutions connected with self-government do not work that is hardly the time to set up new one. When such rudimentary means of expressing their views as they possess are not satisfactory it seems to me unwise to inflict further means of self-government upon them. The hon. Member opposite was very anxious as regards the policy which is to be pursued in the future, and hoped that there would be no return to any sort of arbitrary rule. May I refer to a significant incident which occurred when I was out in Egypt last winter. I happened to be there when Lord Kitchener came to that country. His visit was entirely a private one and there was no ulterior object whatever about it. Nevertheless the Egyptians would not believe it, and scurrilous articles ceased in the press. It was feared that Lord Kitchener might be sent to Egypt, and as hon. Members know in the East a strong man is always what the natives fear. That is what we have got in Lord Kitchener. After the death of Sir Eldon Gorst no man could have succeeded him with greater satisfaction to Egypt and to this country than Lord Kitchener.

What is the view of the hon. Member opposite on this point? I think it would be a great advantage if we could have a clear statement as to what the hon. Member's real aspirations fire. There is no more sensitive spot in the world for the Government of which we are responsible than Egypt. This makes it all the more difficult for us to discuss the matter in this House. The first thing we have to do there is to maintain order. I gather from what the hon. Member opposite said in referring to the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last year he seemed to think that although there had been an interruption in the development of self-government in Egypt in consequence of that statement, as peace and order had now been restored he thought it was time to resume activity in that direction. I sincerely hope nothing of the sort will occur. We must not forget that the activity shown in that direction led to the death of the Prime Minister and general disorder and discomfort, and when we are asked to return to that state of affairs, I think it is a most unfortunate thing, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not act upon that suggestion.

Anyone who has had any connection with Egypt knows what our object is. It is not primarily as the hon. Gentleman opposite said, to advance the interests of financiers who have invested their money there. We are there for the purpose of ruling the country better than the people can rule it themselves. We have shown that we are able to do this. If you compare the condition of Egypt now with the condition of any other country in a similar position such as Morocco or Abyssinia under a native governor, you are bound to admit that the amount of prosperity and peace enjoyed by the natives of Egypt cannot be equalled in any of those countries. If the work is carried on gradually and wisely, as it has been in the past, there is not the slightest doubt that the great object we all have in view of eventually fitting the Egyptians to take a greater part in the government of their country will be achieved. It is no use trying to run before you can walk in Oriental affairs any more than in other affairs, and that is the tendency of people in this country who do not possess any real knowledge of the affairs of Oriental countries. They are generally impatient at the slow progress which is made in those countries, but really the progress is miraculously fast if you realise the type of individual you have to deal with, and the thousands of centuries of ignorance and slavery you have to contend with.

I think the state of prosperity and the degree of education the Egyptians have now reached is a very great tribute indeed to the success of the Government of this country during the time we have been on the shores of the Nile. The credit for that prosperity is shared by all the people who have had a hand in the government of the country. I desire to protest against the unfair aspersions contained in the speeches of those hon. Members who have criticised the Egyptian Civil Service. There never was a body of men in a more difficult position than the Egyptian Civil servants. Those officials are there under the Khedive, and they draw their salaries from Mm. Their position is undefined, and it is simply by force of character and prestige that they are able to persuade their native colleagues to carry out what they consider to be the wisest policy. There never was a more difficult position to occupy, and for hon. Members to come here and criticise the work of those men who are now employed all over the country doing their level best for the prosperity of Egypt and the honour of their own country, and who have taken on a. heavy portion of the white man's burden, shows a complete lack of appreciation of the problems with which we are faced. That is a line of argument which is very frequently taken up, not only in the Press, but in public speeches of those who take an interest in Egypt, and it is based upon inexperience and lack of knowledge. I think the people who make such statements ought to take advantage of the cheap fares to Egypt in order to study what is going on there, because I believe that if they come into touch more with the natives and the British officials out there they will realise that there is no part of the world where we have assumed the duties of government with the object of spreading happiness, prosperity and justice where that task has been discharged more successfully than it has in Egypt.

Mr. DILLON

; The hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. Baird) has made a very interesting speech, and he claims to know a great deal more of Egyptian affairs than most hon. Members of this House. Really his claim is well justified, but I would remind the House that he speaks altogether from the official point of view. Those of us who have been here for many years are accustomed to listen to officials who have served a long term of years in foreign lands coming to this House and claiming to know all about those countries in which they have served, and we have generally found them impatient of criticism from those who know less. I think, however, that that impatience is an unwise one. We cannot take as final the judgment of any official no matter how energetic he may be, or what his experience may be as to the policy to be pursued in the government of those countries for which we are responsible. Two remarkable statements were made by the hon. Member. In the first place, he said that the present state of peace and prosperity was due entirely to the statement made by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in this House last Session as to the future policy of this country.

I think that was a most unfortunate statement. What I wish to direct the hon. Member's attention is that that statement was a definite declaration on the part of the English Government that they were going to drop the policy which Sir Eldon Gorst had been asked to carry out, and that they were going to abandon that policy until some distant and doubtful time, until they had received from the leaders of the National party in Egypt a declaration that they acquiesced in the unlimited occupation of their country by Great Britain, before they were granted self-government. I think that was a most unfortunate statement, all the more unfortunate, because it followed upon a remarkable statement by ex-President Roosevelt, in which he undertook to lecture this country as to the way Egypt should be governed. Ex-President Roosevelt is a man whose acquaintance I have the honour to enjoy, and for whom I entertain a great respect, but I consider that he went entirely outside his proper sphere when he undertook to lecture this country as to how subject nations should be ruled. American statesmen are the least fitted in the civilised world to pose as authorities on the government of subject peoples; because, to their great credit be, it said, they have hardly any experience in that class of work. The statement of ex-President Roosevelt in my opinion was most ill-judged and unfair. Why should Englishmen demand from the people of Egypt that they should acquiesce in the unlimited occupation of their country by Great Britain as a condition to a policy of self-government being granted to them? I think it is an intolerable condition to lay down. These are questions of policy which ought not to be considered solely from the official point of view. I wish to join in the expression of regret at the untimely death of Sir Eldon Gorst, a man undoubtedly of exceeding ability and of a kindly nature, who, I know, entered into this policy of conciliation in Egypt with all his heart. That policy was cut short by the statement which the right hon. Gentleman made to the House last year, and I confess I was amazed when an hon. Member stood up the other cay on the occasion of the appointment of Lord Kitchener and expressed the hope that the policy of conciliation and extension of self-government in Egypt would be continued by Lord Kitchener as it had been carried out by Sir Eldon Gorst in the last few years. It was carried on in a most insufficient and halting manner up to twelve months ago. There was then a rude break, and since then no policy of conciliation has been carried on. That policy has been absolutely abandoned for the present and a totally different policy instituted. One of the chief grounds of justification given for this change of policy is the extraordinary ground that the representative body in Egypt had discussed the Suez Canal Convention in a spirit of unreasonable hostility to the terms of that Convention. Anybody who reads carefully the Report of the Committee appointed to consider that Convention will admit the Egyptian Assembly considered it most carefully and prepared an admirable report. I do not think anyone who reads the Report of the Committee will deny that the reasons given for rejecting the Convention were exceedingly strong, whether they were conclusive or not.

There was another extraordinary proposition which the hon. Member laid down. It was one of those general propositions frequently laid down in the course of these Debates, particularly by officials who have returned after long experience in the East, and by them they think they will completely close the mouths of all those in this House who have not had their long experience of Eastern people. I am sorry to say I have been in this House for nearly thirty years, and I have heard it repeatedly said by officials, as conclusive and as calculated to put an end to the whole of the discussion, that the East never changes. "You cannot," said the hon. Member, "expect the East to take up Western methods or to change." The same language is used, and there are the same incantations to the gods as were used thousands of years ago. He based on that the argument that the East did not change. That is a strange assertion to make nowadays.

Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON

He also said it was changing miraculously.

Mr. DILLON

Yes, I know, but that progress of course was due to the English officials. Could there be a more untrue or a more dangerous proposition than that he laid down that the East never changes? I say that the East is changing more than the West. A mighty wave of change has passed over the East, not only the Near East but the Far East. These nations, which we were told so confidently would never change are changing much more rapidly than the Western nations. Does the hon. Member include the Japanese? The Japanese never changed for 3,000 or 4,000 years, but they then changed more rapidly than any other nation on record. The Chinese are changing with extraordinary rapidity, and, when they have effected their change in the course of another ten or twelve years, the eyes of the world will be considerably opened. The Persians and Turks are changing. Islam is changing, and the Egyptians are changing too. The statesmen who wraps himself up in the well-worn maxim that "the East never changes," is pursuing a policy which will land him very quickly in disaster. The fact is the East is changing and changing rapidly. What I appeal for in my comparative ignorance of the East, which I admit, is that England in this great change should be careful she is ranged with the course of progress and liberty and is not found, owing to this old idea of the East being changeless, on the side of tyranny and reaction.

Let me say a few words on the appointment of Lord Kitchener. It is a remarkable appointment. When it was first spoken of in this House last year it was repudiated by the Liberal Press of this country as impossible. That is the word I recollect which was used in article after article in the leading Liberal newspapers of this country. We have seen impossible things done without any great protest. I myself have never taken so extreme a view about the appointment of Lord Kitchener. I have not the slightest idea what policy Lord Kitchener proposes to carry out, and we have not had the slightest hint or glimmer of light from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I think it would be a very interesting thing, and a very right thing, that he should tell us tonight what is the policy Lord Kitchener is to carry out. I do not in the least know what Lord Kitchener will do in Egypt. I always remember on the one hand his operations in the Sudan, and on the other hand his operations in South Africa, and I am bound to say that, according to the leaders of the Boer people, Lord Kitchener contrasted very favourably with both Lord Roberts and Lord Milner. Therefore it is quite unknown what policy he will carry out.

He is the servant of the Foreign Office of this country, and I have no doubt he will do his duty, and do it firmly. What we want to know is what is the policy of the Foreign Office? Are they going to carry on a policy such as has been carried on during the last year, and as was carried on four or five years ago, or are they going to carry on the policy for which Sir Eldon Gorst was so cruelly and basely assailed by the Press of this country? I was very pleased to hear the hon. Member get up and defend Sir Eldon Gorst. I have never in my experience known an official engaged in a great and responsible duty such as that of the Consul-General of Egypt more cruelly and basely assailed than Sir Eldon Gorst was assailed last year in a section of the Press of this country, showing how little reality there is in the cry we so often hear on these benches of "Support the man on the spot." Yes, "Support the man on the spot" so long as he carries out your policy, but, if they have any fault to find with him, there is no part of the Press which is more unscrupulous, more cruel, and more shocking as to the weapons to which they have recourse than the Conservative Press.

Let me say a few words on the situation in Persia. It is very serious. I asked the Under-Secretary to-day how it came about that the ex-Shah of Persia was permitted, in. spite of repeated protests from the Persian Government, in spite of questions in this House, and in spite of the fact that the Russian Government and the English Government, when they rescued him from his insurgent subjects on the occasion of the Insurrection two years ago, gave an undertaking they would prevent him entering into any intrigues against the Government of Persia, to travel about Europe freely, visiting Vienna, Paris, and other cities, including, I think, Berlin. How could they pretend to carry out the undertaking when this gentleman was allowed to travel freely over Europe and leave Odessa, where he was supposed to be a kind of honourable prisoner. We get no satisfaction in answer to questions in. this House, nor do the Persian Government get any satisfaction in response to their remonstrances. This gentleman, whose appearance is very well known in Vienna, announces he is going to Carlsbad to take the cure, and he travels across Russia and takes a Russian steamer across the Caspian Sea and lands on the shores of Persia. It is not so easy to cross Russia even if you are unknown if the Russian Government is on your track. Here is a man who ought to be closely watched by the Russian police, and who, to judge from his photographs—I do not want to say anything disrespectful to him—has a very marked appearance, and he travels across Russian territory without being recognised, and across the Caspian Sea without arousing any suspicion, and lands in Persia.

6.0 P.M.

I am assured on the highest authority that four weeks before he landed in Persia the Persian Government repeatedly appealed both to the representatives of the English Government and to the representatives of the Russian Government, saying his agents had already come into Persia and were stirring up sedition and importing arms for the purpose of rebellion, and they had reason to suppose the ex-Shah was continually breaking the undertakings given by the Russian Government. Now be is in Persia, this unhappy country, which has been hampered and obstructed systematically and unrelentlessly by the Russian Government ever since the revolution succeeded, and he is stirring up civil war. I asked to-day why the Russian Government could not be asked to use the troops which they persist in maintaining in northern Persia for no reason, because there has been no intense disorder or any danger there for more than two years, to take the Shah and request him to retire to Odessa again, and thereby save this wretched country from civil war and all the horrors which are sure to ensue. The answer given was that the Russian troops were there for the purpose of maintaining order and protecting the rights of foreigners, and would not interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. Observe the extraordinary principle involved in that statement. Whereas, the two Governments are pledged by a written instrument to protect the Persian Government from the intrigues of the Shah, they are, because the Shah has evaded the Russian police, or, as I believe, because the Russian police have shut their eyes to his crossing Russia, to be absolved from their undertaking the moment he crosses the frontier. It then becomes an internal affair of Persia and the Russian troops say they have no right to interfere. I wish the Russian troops would depart. I have never been able to extract from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs any real reason for the Russian troops remaining there. But I would point out that they ought to carry out their undertaking in regard to this man. He is really their prisoner. He was taken from his own Government by the Russian Government, and I wish they would take him to Odessa, treating him with all due respect, but still keeping him there. I think it deplorable, too, that the British Government has not done its duty to the Persian people in this matter. It is all the more deplorable that this should have been allowed to occur, in view of the possible danger of the stirring up of civil war in Persia, especially at a time when everyone interested in the fate of that country had good ground for hoping that a better day was dawning for it. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs might be a little more forbearing of his criticism of scenes in the Persian Parliament after what we have witnessed in this Assembly. I very much doubt if those scenes have exceeded in bad taste those which have occurred in this House of Commons.

While making allowance for the inexperience of the members of the Turkish Parliament one cannot but realise that they are making a serious attempt to govern their country on the lines of progress. Substantial hopes have been aroused in the minds of friends of Persia by certain recent occurrences. For instance, the Persians called in a gentleman —an American—a man of great experience in the field of finance, and handed over to him the whole control of their finances. That in itself caused great hopes for the future. Furthermore, I am informed, and I read a telegram to that effect in the newspapers, that they applied to the British Government for permission to put the British Attaché in the Persian Embassy at Teheran in control of the gendarmerie. Could any act show a greater desire to avoid in an even more than rational way any trouble, and to meet the complaints made by the British Government with regard to the treatment of Persian subjects. Yet, just at this very crisis, when they have placed a leading American at the head of their finances and have invited the British Attaché to take charge of their gendarmerie, this ex-Shah is let loose on the country to stir up civil war. All I can say is I really do not understand how the Government of this country, if civil war should break out, can wash its hands of responsibility for that misfortune.

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. Grey)

I will deal, first of all, with the question raised by the hon. Member for West Staffordshire—that of Albania. It is quite natural that the hon. Member should have raised the question and that other hon. Members should have spoken on it. It is quite true to say, of course, that the insurrection in Albania is an internal Turkish affair, but it would be going too far to say that, because it was, from a strictly international point of view, an internal Turkish affair, therefore it is one which had no political interest for other nations, and especially for those nations whose territories border on the Turkish Empire. The insurrection in Albania has given rise to great disturbances. There has been a natural fear that it might spread, and that the consequences would be felt, not only along the borders of Turkey itself, but by neighbouring countries. As long as that danger remains, the state of affairs in Albania must give cause for political anxiety, and the Turkish Government must not be surprised if other Powers, and especially those Powers whose territories are nearest to the scene of the disturbance, should show considerable sensitiveness about it from a political point of view. Any steps which could be taken to limit the area of disturbance and prevent it from spreading cannot be initiated by us, but can only have our support if they are adopted by other Powers. I am talking of steps not taken inside Albania itself, but steps taken supposing the consequences should spread beyond the borders of the Turkish dominions in the area of disturbance.

There have been, as the public knows from what has appeared in the Press and from the statements of independent eyewitnesses of what occurred, some grievous excesses in the course of the struggle in Albania. Of course, we deplore these on the ground of humanity. But I deplore them also because we are sincere friends of the new regime in Turkey, and we know very well how much the credit, reputation, and stability of that new regime is due to the favourable support it received from public opinion when it first established itself. We want to see that support continued. We know perfectly well, and the authorities at Constantinople know perfectly well, that that support must depend on their power to produce order in their own country and to realise those hopes with which the establishment of a new regime was originally attended. Therefore it has been our earnest desire, not merely on the ground of humanity, but because we believe the hopes of Turkey are centred in the success and progress of the new regime and because we wish to see its stability and reputation strengthened and increased—to see these troubles in Albania settled on liberal and generous terms.

As to intervention, we cannot contemplate that sort of intervention which took place under the old regime in Macedonia. There there was a regular international organisation, composed of officers selected among the Powers, in the service of the Turkish Government, extending the system of European influence in the hope of creating a better Government in Macedonia. That was what occurred under the old regime. It was at best a cumbrous arrangement. I do not wish to say that it did not achieve some good results, as that would be very unfair to the many officers who have worked so hard under it. But you can never expect really satisfactory results from any organisation working in another country which has not the good will of the central Government and of the authorities of the country itself. Whatever may happen in the future I do not suppose that the great Powers of Europe will be anxious to undergo all the labour and trouble of trying to get Turkey to accept something of the same kind again, knowing perfectly well that the results never realised the hopes, and were not in proportion to the labour entailed in urging it upon the Turkish Government. I am quite sure that the great Powers of Europe at the present moment have no desire to be drawn into intervention in Turkey. I do not say that the united forces of the great Powers, if the emergency were serious enough, could not intervene to effect whatever object they might have in view. But such intervention would mean the destruction of the new regime and of all the hopes founded on it, and it would also mean that Europe had made up its mind that Turkey was going to relapse into the state it had been under the old regime, and that there would be a recurrence of the same unsatisfactory relations between Turkey and the other Powers. It would further mean that the hopes for the future of Turkey had been destroyed. That is not the point of view from which we, or, I believe, the other great Powers are approaching this problem.

I do not find fault with the views put forward by the hon. Member who said we ought to be frank and candid in expressing our regret at the excesses which have occurred, and at the unsatisfactory state of things either in Albania or Macedonia and that we should do that from the point of view of those who wish to see the Government of Turkey improved, and who desire also to see it reform itself from inside. That is the point of view from which we approach the Albanian question. I do not for a moment wish to conceal the facts or palliate or excuse them, but I do say, on the other hand, that intervention would mean a complete change of policy; it would mean that we had given up the hopes founded on the new regime. I desire to express my anxiety as to the development of the situation in the future, and my regret at many of the things that have occurred, in a way which, I trust, will make the Turkish Government feel that it comes from those who have no political object, and have no desire other than to see the success of the Turkish Government, because they feel that the chances of Turkey's future depend upon their being able to repress and put an end for ever to the sort of abuses which happened under the old regime, and to realise the hopes which were founded on the creation of the new regime.

Now I come to Persia. I am not surprised, of course, at the regret which has been expressed, or indeed at the criticisms which have been made on the return of the ex-Shah to Persia. I regard his re-entry into that country as a most untoward event. I was asked by the hon. Member (Mr. Lloyd) whether we were aware that it was probable, and the hon. Member (Mr. Dillon), I think, said we have had repeated warnings from the Persian Government. I have inquired how many warnings we have actually had, and I am told we have only had two.

Mr. DILLON

What I said was that the Russian Government had been repeatedly warned.

Sir E. GREY

We have had only two, one in the autumn of 1910 and one quite recently, and when we received that last warning we suggested to the Russian Government that a joint warning should be addressed to the late Shah against intriguing in Europe against the Persian Government. He was supposed then to be in Austria, but before that suggestion of ours was acted upon news came that he was not in Austria at all, and he had as a matter of fact re-entered Persia. The hon. Member says that could only have been done by the connivance of the Russian officials, because it is so easy to recognise the late Shah. I do not know him by sight, and I do not know by what means he got back into Persia. The accounts which have appeared are that he had so little confidence of the help of Russia that he took considerable pains to disguise himself, but the Russian Government have, I believe, repeatedly warned the late Shah against intriguing for a return to Persia, warning him that his pension would be forfeited if he did intrigue, and they promised earlier in the year, when there was an idea that he might be intriguing, to redouble the vigilance of their authorities when he returned to Russia. The plain fact of the matter, I believe, is simply that the late Shah, having taken considerable pains to do so, has succeeded in evading the vigilance of the authorities and has got back into Persia. The hon. Member has given his views as to what our attitude was. We certainly cannot intervene in the North of Persia ourselves. We would rather intervene as little as we possibly can in Persian internal affairs, even in the South where we have special trade interests. Nor does it lie with us to press intervention upon the Russian Government. You cannot press intervention upon the Russian Government at one moment and deprecate it at another. If they choose to adopt a policy of non-intervention you cannot say that is an unreasonable policy, nor does it lie with us to press intervention upon them. We did, if I remember right, at the time of the revolution against this Shah, when he was still Shah, express our own view very strongly that the policy should be one of non-intervention, and that at Teheran, though there were Persian Cossacks in the service of the Shah, as he still was, commanded by Russian officers, though these Russian officers by lifting a finger could have stopped the revolution against the Shah and prevented his deposition, we urged strongly upon Russia that in our view the policy we intended to pursue, and what we thought the proper policy, was one of non-intervention, that was strictly observed by the Russian Government. If there had been the lest intervention on the part of Russian troops or Russian officers in the service of the Shah intervening politically, the deposition of the Shah would never have taken place.

Russian intervention in Persia on the occasion of the original dispatch of troops to Tabriz took place at a time when there was great disorder and when it might reasonably have been supposed that life and property were in danger, but it was not intended to have political consequences, though it did have political consequences. At that time the centre and sole hope of the Nationalist movement, Tabriz, was surrounded by Royalists and reactionaries, and was then at its last gasp. The Russians came in and relieved Tabriz, and the leaders of the Nationalist movement, instead of being overwhelmed, went from Tabriz to Teheran. The Russian troops took no part in the political movements. The fact of their having come in was merely incidental, but it is perfectly arguable that unless Russian troops had been sent to Tabriz at that particular moment, the Nationalist party would have received such a blow from the reactionary party that it would never have recovered head and the Shah would have never been deposed. You cannot press non-intervention at one time and intervention at another, and if the Russian Government take up, as I believe they do, the attitude that, having repeatedly warned the Shah when he was outside Persian territory that he would lose his pension if he intrigued, now that he has succeeded in making a secret entry without their good-will into Persia, they must Adhere to a policy of non-intervention in Persia itself, it is not a policy which we can deprecate. I think, of course, that the present Persian Government are absolutely within their right in declaring that the late Shah's pension has been forfeited. There can be no question of our putting in any plea again on his behalf. If they succeed in capturing him or turning him out of the country there can be no question of our joining in any representation in his favour, but the policy of non-intervention is one which it will not be in our power to depart from, and one which I do not think it would be desirable or wise or reasonable that we should urge the Russian Government to depart from.

As to the southern trade routes in Persia, of course, this state of things which exists may have a considerable setback upon any improvement which there has been before. It is quite true, as the hon. Member (Mr. Lloyd) said, though he said it uncritically, that we did not follow up the policy which appeared to be indicated by our Note last winter of intervening in southern Persia. We never wished to intervene if we could possibly help it, and not long after that it seemed to me that the hopes of the Persian Government were improved by the statesmanlike attitude assumed and the statesmanlike advice which was publicly given by the Regent. We hoped, under his wise government and advice, that matters would improve, and we desired to do nothing whatever which would impair the chance of the Persian Government themselves strengthening their position and their hold on the southern trade routes. When they stated that they would prefer instead of British officers to employ Swedish officers, drawing them from a nation which could not give rise to political suspicion in any quarter of Persia, we acquiesced. All we desired was that whatever they did should be effective, and provided the European officers employed were officers who could not give rise to any political prejudice to either the British or Russian position in Persia we were quite willing that they should be drawn from any nationality. Of course, I can say nothing on the matter now. This struggle which has begun in Persia makes it impossible for us to do more for the moment than watch the course of events. If the consequences of the struggle should spread and become more alarming as the days go on we might have to take measures for the protection of life and property in such places as are within our reach; but at present we have not heard of danger to foreigners. The trade routes, of course, must be impeded by the state of things which exists, and we can but hope that the troubles that have now broken out in Persia will not be too prolonged, because, after all, when people dwell upon the importance of trade in southern Persia, the power of trade to grow must depend on the amount of order in the country. We may intervene temporarily where there is actual danger to life and property, but unless you are prepared to commit yourself to political responsibilities which we are not prepared to commit ourselves to in this case, and which we desire to avoid, you can only really further the interests of trade by seeing the government of the country itself become stronger. Any measures short of that will be temporary expedients, and their effect will be temporary.

Then I would pass to the personal point raised by the hon. Member (Mr. Morrell) respecting Miss Malecka. The hon. Member said this was a question of principle. I do not dispute it being a question of principle, but it is not quite the same case as if it were that of a British subject of British origin, undoubtedly a British subject, over whom no other country can have any claim or can ever have had any claim, who had gone from here to reside in a foreign country, and who has no connection whatever with the politics of that country. Miss Malecka is undoubtedly from the point of view of British law a British subject. She was born in England, and her father was naturalised in England, he having been a Russian subject, and in any part of the world where she went she was entitled to a British passport and to British protection. But considering her origin, going back to the country of her father's origin, if that country can show that by its laws her father has never forfeited his Russian nationality when in Russia, according to international law that would be the nationality which would prevail in the country of original origin. We give, as everyone knows, open asylum to people who come from other countries, and we make naturalisation here very easy. On that we have always taken pride, because it is the outcome of our free institutions. But you cannot extend that principle to cover people who come from another country to this, who come naturalised here and then return to the country from which they originally came and mix themselves up in the politics of that country. I do not say that Miss Malecka's is a case of that kind, but it is not really a simple case of a British subject of British origin having no connection with the politics of the foreign country to which she goes. Miss Malecka went to Russia, and I find that before I ever heard of her presence in Russia the Consul had had occasion to warn her more than once that she was talking very indiscreetly about Russian politics. I have nothing to do with those warnings. I had not heard of Miss Malecka at the time. That had all taken place before the case came before me at all. Subsequently she was arrested by the Russian Government. Then, of course, the case did come before me on the ground that she was a British subject. When I came to look into that I found that there was no doubt whatever that under British law she was a British subject, that in this country we were bound by law to afford her the rights of a British subject, and that we were entitled, wherever she went in the world, to give her the protection of a British subject, to which she was entitled unless she in Russia could be shown to be a Russian subject; because it is said that her father's nationality had never been forfeited, and that she, according to the law of that country, would be a Russian subject. Most complicated points were involved in that, and it took a long time to examine these points. It required expert legal opinion—expert Russian legal opinion. Those points have been considered, and we have put forward before the Russian Government our claim that she had lost her Russian nationality. The Russian Government have not admitted that our claim is good under Russian law, and there the case remains as regards nationality at the present moment.

I have put forward our case for claiming that in law she is not a Russian subject, and I have urged upon the Russian Government that, even if they are not prepared to admit at once our case for claiming that she is not of Russian nationality in Russia, yet as we have put forward a primâ facie case that that is so, they should let us know why there is so much delay in furnishing particulars of the charges brought against her, they should agree that she will be defended by counsel when she is brought to trial, and they should allow the British Consul, at any rate unofficially, to visit her. That is how the case stands at the present moment. I have got no answer from the Russian Government as to why particulars have not been furnished, but I understand from indirect sources that a large number of documents were seized at her house. These documents have to be examined, and until that is done particulars of the charges cannot be forthcoming.

Mr. MORRELL

Will the right hon Gentleman press for bail?

Sir E. GREY

I cannot press for bail until the question of nationality is actually settled and particulars actually furnished. But what I have asked is why there has been so much delay in furnishing particulars. I have said that those particulars should be forthcoming, that she should be defended by counsel, that the Consul should be allowed to visit her, and that, if a British subject, this country should be represented at the trial. That is how the case stands. Now I come to another question, and here let me say how deeply I sympathise, and how entirely I endorse the tribute which has been paid to Sir Eldon Gorst. I shall never forget the great courage with which he went to Egypt to take up Lord Cromer's work—a courage which never faltered—while we of all people knew how difficult the task must be of taking the position in Egypt when Lord Cromer retired. Sir Eldon Gorst has not only left a reputation for courage, but also for ability, for energy, and for devotion in his work. He was a real friend of Egypt, really interested in the country, interested in its people, and interested in its development. That was work which he himself specially loved, and it was a work which until a few months ago we hoped: that he would have continued. We shrank from even the thought, when we heard of his serious illness, that he might be unable to return to Egypt, because we knew how difficult that work was and how unfortunate it would be if it had to be interrupted: and if any change had to be made. It is not only Egypt that has lost, but our public service has lost. His ability and capacity for public work was such that, whether in Egypt or elsewhere, he would have remained to the end of his life one of our most valuable public servants, and it is a real loss to our public service that his life should have been so cut short. I agree with the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. John Dillon) in resenting the attacks made upon him at one time of his administration. I said, I think, last year that those attacks ought never to have been made upon him. They ought to have been made upon the Government on whose instructions he acted, if they were to be made at all. But I am sure that, whoever went to Egypt after Lord Cromer, it was certain that there would be a difficult time for him. It was certain that storms would break. Storms did break, and Sir Eldon Grorat weathered these storms, and had he been able to return to Egypt he would have done so with credit and with the increased reputation of one who had shown courage and who had not flinched when times were difficult, and to him the credit would have been due of having gone through those difficult times and brought about peace and order in that country.

As to policy in Egypt, of course, the hon. Member for Tyneside (Mr. J. M. Robert-son) is perfectly right in saying that a deliberate policy to keep the Egyptians back would be entirely wrong. I regard it as an unthinkable policy. An hon. Member opposite found fault with my hon. Friend the Member for Tyneside for the policy he advocated in Egypt. My hon. Friend advocated no doubt a progressive policy, but so far as he went into details it was a policy to which no one could take exception, not even the man who founds small hopes on the progressive policy. What did my hon. Friend advocate? He advocated the spending of more money on education. There can be no objection to a progressive policy of that kind. The difficulty, of course, is the question of money, because there are so many competing claims for the expenditure of the public money which is available. The first policy of Lord Cromer was to restore the material development of the country, and after that to secure that an increasing amount of money should be spent on education, which might be called the political problem. I quite recognise, too, that Egypt is quiet at the present moment, and that this is a good time for considering what can be done in the direction of progress generally, whether material progress or political progress. But as regards any suggestions made they must be tested by the opinion of men on the spot. I do not for a moment say that the opinion of men on the spot is necessarily infallible, but it is folly to go on with projects of reform without having heard what those on the spot have to say.

At the present moment there is a new Consul-General appointed for Egypt. Of course, there will be discussions with him as to what he thinks reasonable to be done, and it is for him when ho gets to Egypt to survey the situation before definite proposals and projects are pressed upon us. I do not mean to say that they should not be discussed, but that he should have definite instructions to do this, that, and the other, before he has had time to survey the situation on the spot would, I think, not be reasonable. I have stated already in the House that Lord Kitchener's appointment is a Civil appointment. It does not mean a change of policy from a, policy of Civil administration and reform to a military policy. It does not mean a reactionary policy. He goes there to continue our work in Egypt, and to promote progress as far as it is reasonable and practicable to do it. I think people will bear in mind about Lord Kitchener that he goes with exceptional knowledge of Egypt, and not only so, but I believe it is' an appointment which commands confidence not only in this country, but among the Egyptians themselves, who knew him. He goes with a reputation for impartiality, and he goes with the reputation of a man who does not stir up difficulties or strife, but smooths them over. He does not make difficulties, but he overcomes them, and he overcomes them whenever it is possible to do it, and by his manner in smoothing them over he has shown considerable diplomatic power. I think the time he goes to Egypt is probably a more favourable one than there has been for some little time. After Lord Cromer retired, having been there so long, and considering the great personality which he had, there was bound to be unrest in Egypt, whoever went there. We had what was called a progressive policy, though it was a very moderate progressive policy, and not the sort of revolutionary policy which might be supposed from some of the criticisms that were made upon it.

Steps were taken which we thought perfectly reasonable to take. They were exceedingly moderate, and I do not think they were dangerous. If they did not succeed better, I think it was because our attitude was misunderstood, and I think it was misunderstood because there was probably a feeling in Egyptian circles that when Lord Cromer retired, and after the withdrawal of his personality which had been there so long, there would be unrest, and a belief that there was not to be a continuation of Lord Cromer's policy but some complete change; and therefore some of those progressive steps which we took were misinterpreted as if they were intended to be not a continuation of the policy of the occupation, but a weakening of the policy of the occupation. I trust that all that has passed, and with it the danger of any moderate steps which may be taken in the future being so misunderstood again. It is quite futile to propose measures of reform, or progressive measures, if even the most moderate attempts in that direction are to give rise, not to a desire and enthusiasm on the part of the people in Egypt itself to take advantage of those measures and make the best of them, but to an agitation against the occupation, which is a danger to political peace and material prosperity. The fact that progressive measures do not mean any change in the policy of the occupation must be fairly understood if those measures are to advance. The present time is one when we have a man with a brilliant record in Egypt, whose appointment, I believe, is as welcome in Egypt as it is here. I believe that with him as Consul-General in Egypt the material progress of the country will continue, and we shall do our best in consultation with him to ensure that in the future of the British Government in Egypt we shall regard ourselves as trustees, not merely for the material prosperity, but for the moral and political life of the people.

Colonel WILLIAMS

I wish to address one word to the Foreign Secretary in reference to a matter which arose when Lord Cromer was in Egypt. It is concerned with the administration of Mahomedan countries, where, although we are administering for the Mahomedan people, we must remember that, not only is there a considerable number of English people in Egypt, but that there is also that ancient Christian Church of the Copts, which has suffered, and is suffering, from what its members feel to be a grievance. In view of the appointment of Lord Kitchener, I trust that this will no longer be so. Lord Cromer started with the idea that Friday was the Mahomedan Sunday, and that Egypt, being a Mahomedan country, Friday was to be observed by Christian people as the weekly rest day, and not the Christian Sunday. Of course, anybody who knows anything about Mahomedans know that Friday is the day on which Mahomedans go to the mosque. But he also knows that it is not a day on which the Mahomedan leaves any bit of business he has in hand or makes any alteration in his secular life such as the Sunday imposes upon Christian people. The result has been, that Christian officers and Englishmen, who are Christian, of course, who are employed in Egypt, are obliged to work the whole of the Sunday. The same is the case with the Copts who wish to observe the Sunday for themselves, but are often deprived of the opportunity of attending their own places of worship, because Sunday is not a dies non in the Egyptian offices, as it would be in England among our own people, and they are positively unable to observe the holiday as a day of rest and religious obligation, while they are obliged to observe Friday, whether they like it or not. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will take this matter into consideration and will discuss with Lord Kitchener if it is possible to make some change which would meet the position of a very large section of the people who belong to the very ancient Christian church, the Copts, and also of the many other Christian people who live in Egypt. There is no reason that we should forget the obligations of our own religion.

Mr. KING

I really think that it is in some way to be deprecated that this Debate should not be continued at any rate until a respectable hour in the evening. We do not often get an opportunity of discussing the whole field of foreign affairs. Though I recognise that the present moment is very peculiar, yet I do think that we ought to continue this subject a little longer. The tendency that there is on all sides of the House to place implicit confidence in the Foreign Secretary is, of course, a very delightful feature of this Debate. I am sure that if any Minister deserves the complete confidence of the House the Foreign Secretary does, and certainly he has nothing but confidence from me. And, by the way, I should just like to say a word or two of those Gentlemen who on the platform are so fond of telling us that the very safety of the country is being imperilled by the Liberal party. I would like them to observe that in the House of Commons at any rate there is absolute and complete confidence in the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government. One question that has not been touched on in this Debate is our treatment of native races. At the present time there is a feeling all over the world of the great and vital importance of the treatment of native races by the higher civilised and white races. At the present moment there is a great conference of representatives from all parts of the world assembled in this city discussing this great question. I believe that our Ministers fully realise the importance of it, and are entirely right-minded in the attitude which they take up with reference to it. If any words of mine have weight I want to say that they should be firm and courageous and instant in pressing on every possible occasion for the proper treatment of all races all over the world.

That is perhaps a large order, but it is not a larger order than that which Cromwell set himself when he was Foreign Secretary of this land, or than Lord Palmerston set himself when he constituted this country the supporter of liberty and freedom and constitutional government in two continents. Nothing will give to the democracy of this country and other countries a greater feeling of loyalty and admiration for our Government than the steadfast pursuit of this policy. As an instance of what I mean, I may refer to the horrible treatment that has been meted out to the natives of the Putamia district. The Government sent out Sir Roger Casement, a most admirable and able investigator, who has sent in a report which we are told largely justifies the accusations that have been made against the employers of labour there, but they have have not felt justified in publishing that report. I believe that a strong open policy on matters like this only gains more force and more confidence from the people at large. I do not refer to the matter of the Congo because that I know, especially at the present moment, is a very complicated and difficult matter. In general terms, I say, that if our Government can be more insistent and more instant in their pressing everywhere all over the world the rights of native races, they will attain an even higher level of confidence and admiration than they have yet reached.

7.0 P.M.

I am sorry that I was called elsewhere partly by duty and partly, I must admit, by pleasure, and that I did not hear the whole of this very interesting Debate, but I am informed by those who have been here that nothing has been said about Portugal and the recognition by this country of the Portuguese Government. There is no reason whatever why the Portuguese Government should not be recognised at once. The Foreign Secretary was asked the other day why we did not recognise the Republic of Portugal, and his answer was that a constitution must be firmly established before it can be recognised. I have been out in Portugal since the revolution, and have had the pleasure of going about the country and of calling upon different classes of the inhabitants, and, as far as I could make out, they were living under quite as firm a constitution as we do, and I dare say some people would say that their constitution is a great deal more fixed than ours is. A sudden but not unexpected revolution occurred about nine months ago. A provisional Government was established, and one of the very first acts it undertook was to disestablish the Church. The Government that can disestablish an old-established Church which is not the church of one-half, but is nominally the church of the whole population, I think you may say is a firmly established Government. I do not know whether the Foreign Secretary is laughing at what I say or not, but he ought to be listening. It is really a very serious matter. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the view of the average Englishman—and such I claim to be—who closely follows foreign affairs in this country—and such I certainly am—is that there is no reason whatever at the present moment why he should not go across to the Foreign Office and give orders for the Portuguese Government to be recognised. I daresay the Foreign Secretary has been. so engaged with other matters that he has not been able to do justice to the Portuguese in this matter; but I would inform him that after the general election the Government majority in the Portuguese House of Parliament at this moment is far greater than the majority which supports hon. and right hon. Members on the Treasury Bench. They have an absolutely overwhelming majority in favour of the Republic. Why not recognise the Constitution of that country in view of the facts I have stated, and which I am perfectly certain would be confirmed by His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon. Why not recognise the Portuguese Government? There is really very important ground for doing so as soon as possible. First of all, we are the traditional allies of Portugal, and the sentiment in that country of trust in the British people is very great. Moreover, our trade relations with Portugal are far greater than with any other country; our trade relations with her colonies are also very great. Further, there is the question of the treatment of the native races in the Portuguese colonies, in regard to which we have been endeavouring as far as we can to strengthen the hands of those who are seeking just treatment and fair conditions of labour for those natives. If you recognise the Portuguese Republic you will afford a far greater motive for this country being listened to, and you will be all the more able to alleviate the lot of thousands and thousands of struggling labourers at the present time. I do want to make a very earnest appeal to the Foreign Secretary to recognise as soon as possible the Government of Portugal.

I should like to refer to one other question. In spite of what has been said in regard to Morocco, which I in the main endorse, I would point out that at this critical time neither our Ministers, nor our publicists, nor the Press, nor the people, I hope, will be led away from the real grounds for friendship between us and Germany, by any extravagance of language or extravagance of claims that may be put forward. I trust that the right hon. Gentleman will not overlook the fact that at the present time they are on the eve of the general election in Germany.

As to that general election, the political prophets foretell that Conservatives and Protectionist party are going to suffer a huge defeat, a defeat which probably will be as great as that of the Conservative and Protectionist party in this country in 1906. The only hope that the Conservative and Protectionist party have in regard to the general election in Germany is to raise a huge red herring, and that is what they are trying to do. Conservatives and Protectionists in this country have tried to do that time after time, but, of course, the English people are too sensible to be drawn from the path of wisdom by any red herring. The German people may not be gifted with such political wisdom and sagacity as are the English people. It may be that in some quarters the raising of the Jingo scare, the beating of the military drum, the sound of appeals to imperialistic sentiment, may lead the German people to vote for the Conservatives and Protectionist party at the coming general election. I firmly believe, as one who has studied closely German affairs, that the fact of this general election has a great deal to do with what we see in the German newspapers in regard to German policy at the present time. I should like to continue my remarks on various other subjects relating to the field of foreign policy, which is a very great one, but I understand that it is desired not to continue this Debate to an undue length. I am glad to say that the right hon. Gentleman is in many respects a model Foreign Secretary, and deservedly has an immense amount of confidence on both sides of this House, and not only in this country but in other countries of the world. Yet there are some things he may learn from the people. It is not only what is said in the Chancelleries that is important; it is not only what is written in despatches, in notes, in memoranda, and in protocols, but it is what the people say, it is what the Press of different countries say, and it is, above all, what is the opinion of the great mass of the people. It is really with the idea that the people's wishes, feelings, and aims should be more and more studied in foreign politics that I have ventured to address the Committee this afternoon.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution reported; Committee report Progress; to sit again upon Monday next, 31st July.

Resolved, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Master of Elibank.]

Adjourned accordingly at Eleven minutes after Seven o'clock.