§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum not exceeding £3,541,500, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expenses of the Personnel for Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, etc., including the cost of Establishments of Dockyards and Naval Yards at Home and Abroad, which 981 will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1912."
§ Mr. LEEI understand that the First Lord of the Admiralty desires to defer the speech which he will doubtless make upon this Vote, and therefore it devolves upon me to draw his attention to certain points which I hope he will reply to later on. It is peculiarly appropriate and opportune that debate upon this Vote should follow immediately on the discussion which we have had on the Declaration of London. In the course of that Debate we were dealing mainly with theory, and our position at sea, particularly in regard to the defence of our trade routes. To-day on this Vote we have to consider what are the actual facts of the position in regard to our supremacy at sea; what, in fact, whatever may be the results of the Declaration of London, are the material resources at the present time at the disposal of the Admiralty, or under their programmes, to deal with the situation which has been created. The vital lesson which was contained in the Memorandum issued earlier in the year under the authority of the First Sea Lord has been greatly reinforced by the Debates which have taken place on the Declaration of London. I refer to the statement of the First Sea Lord at the commencement of his Memorandum, that the really serious danger this country has to guard against in war is not invasion, but the interruption of our trade and the destruction of our merchant shipping. I do not think that anyone will dispute that truth, however much they may regret the particular form in which it was enunciated to the country. We are not here to-day to engage in this abstruse question as to what would be the position or possible means of redress to neutrals under the Declaration of London. What I want the Committee to consider is this: What provision is the Admiralty capable of making with the material resources at its disposal to enable it to protect our trade against interruption and destruction when we are belligerents, which is a condition to which the Declaration of London does not apply? I hope to be able to show before I sit down that the strength of the cruisers that the Admiralty has at present at its disposal, or will have under the programme laid before the House, is totally insufficient.
Everybody would agree, particularly after what has been stated in the last few days, that it is the first few weeks of a war 982 in which we might be engaged as belligerents that will be vital as far as our food supplies are concerned, and it is not merely a question as to whether the food supply is so unsafe that starvation, as a matter of course, would follow from its temporary interruption, but a question as to whether a state of uncertainty, amounting to panic, would be created, and as the result of that state of panic, whether reasonable or unreasonable, the price of food in this country would go up to a point where the poorest of the poor of our population would find it impossible to provide themselves with the necessary food to sustain life. That is the real problem that has to be considered, and what I want to ascertain, if I can, is how is the Admiralty going to deal with it? There are only two possible ways of dealing with it, so far as I can see; there was the way which, I am afraid, now is no longer possible: that was the theoretical possibility of our having succeeded by diplomatic negotiations in getting all food consigned to this country declared non-contraband when this difficulty would not arise. Now we know that that is impossible; if it was impossible before it has been made doubly impossible by the Declaration of London. In the view of many of us, the position has been made worse because the question as to whether food should or should not, under certain conditions, be declared conditional contraband, will now be left to the individual temperament of hostile naval commanders, who are practically incited in the best "Don't-nail-his-ears-to-the-pump" style to so construe this instrument which the Government propose to act upon. For that reason, whilst I have no doubt that the Declaration of London will save a great deal of trouble to the Foreign Office, which is probably its only advantage, it certainly will not save trouble to the Admiralty, and the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord must have recognised that fact himself. It places responsibility upon the Admiralty, which I do not say for a moment they wish to shirk, but which is the greatest responsibility that can possibly be placed upon a Department of State, and whilst it has been alleged that ii has the possible advantage from the point of view of national defence that it is now impossible, according to the Declaration of London, to have all food declared contraband of war, strictly speaking from the national defence point of view, I do not think it has such advantage, and I will tell the Committee why.
983 If it had been possible to declare all food contraband of war there would have been such an outcry and state of panic as would inevitably determine the right hon. Gentleman to enormously strengthen our fleet. We should at any rate know where we were. Now we are in entirely a fallacious position, as I believe, of partial security with regard to our food supplies, whilst, as a matter of fact that position of security does not exist, but the agitation with which the right hon. Gentleman would be faced to strengthen his fleet and the number of his cruisers, if all food had been declared contraband, is no longer to be created because it will be stilled by belief in this instrument, and there will be no panic and no demand because there will be general misunderstanding of the situation, which will extend to the man in the street and make him inclined to acquiesce in the present state of affairs. I pass from that feature of the situation to come to what is really the only practical remedy when we are belligerents to ensure that cur food supply should not be interfered with, and that is the adequate policing of our trade routes. I contend that is an absolute impossibility with the present strength of the cruisers the Admiralty possess, and therefore I am justified in urging upon the Admiralty that their programme in regard to cruisers is totally insufficient.
4.0 P.M.
The First Lord of the Admiralty, in the speech which he made the other day, gave, no doubt unintentionally, quite a false impression to the House of the real situation with regard to this matter, because he did not make clear to the House the peril which we have got to guard against in this matter. It is not merely the particular peril from recognised hostile cruisers, but it is the peril arising from attacks upon our trade routes by converted merchantmen, and the fact that he dismissed that rather airily by saying we did not recognise the legality of this conversion, and hinting, in fact, that these ships may, if so converted, be treated practically as pirates, does not take us very far. The Admiralty, in order to minimise the danger of the situation, by the vague threats indulged in, that they would know how to deal with a situation of this kind when it arises, does not mean very much. They cannot do more than sink the offending ship, unless they go to the extreme length of hanging a few of the foreign officers as pirates. Even that would not have a material effect, because a nation 984 engaged in a life-and-death struggle with us, and knowing the only way to bring us to our knees would be to create a state of panic and starvation in the country, which would paralyse the hands of our Government, would not be likely to stick at difficulties of that kind, with regard to the sinking of their ships, or even the possible death of officers engaged in this hazardous service. Before passing from that point there are a few other small technical difficulties which the right hon. Gentleman raised which, I think, are really nonexistent with regard to the arming of merchantmen. He raised, first of all, the question of merchantmen having to be specially constructed in order to carry guns. He knows perfectly well that is not the case. It is not the least necessary that merchantmen should be specially constructed in order to carry a sufficient force of Artillery to be able to destroy unarmed merchantmen on the high seas. It is like the case of a man with a revolver against the unarmed crowd. If a merchantman has a gun—and it need not be a very heavy one—and ammunition on board that gun can be rigged up without any very elaborate arrangement beforehand in such a way as to enable that ship to do immense damage upon our trade routes.
In regard to coaling we have been told that vessels would be unable to coal without going into port. We all know that that is not the case, because coaling at sea is a most familiar operation, and a Power engaged in this practice would not neglect the provision of colliers to enable these ships to be coaled at sea without any material difficulty. Then there is the policy adopted by foreign Governments of arranging for a proportion of their fastest merchantmen to have guns and ammunition on board in times of peace in order that if the necessity arose they may be converted into warships in time of war without going into port. The Civil Lord, in a previous Debate on Vote A of the Navy Estimates, said there was not a tittle of evidence to show that any foreign Power was adopting this policy. I do not know what information was at his disposal when he spoke, but I doubt whether the First Lord of the Admiralty would say that there is not a tittle of evidence to-day to show that that policy has been adopted. Information has reached me from a source which is usually very reliable—the right hon. Gentleman can correct me if I am mistaken in this, but I have done my best to verify it—that in the case of three great 985 Powers on the Continent of Europe, Germany, Austria and Italy, provision has been made by their respective Admiralties that certain fast ships of various lines are to be equipped by carrying actually in their holds at all times guns and ammunition in addition to carrying a certain proportion of officers and men belonging to the Navy reserve.
I believe in the case of Italy it has been publicly announced by the Minister of Marine that all vessels reserved for the naval service are as a matter of fact to carry at all times these guns and ammunition on board in case they should be needed in the event of a sudden outbreak of war to take their place as auxiliary cruisers. That is the information which has reached me, and therefore there is a good deal more than a tittle of evidence to support this statement. If this is not the case, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will tell us so, and perhaps he will tell us whether he has any accurate source of information on this question. The defence which was put forward in the Debate yesterday was that these particular ships are all known to the Admiralty, and therefore constitute very little danger, but I do not think that defence will really hold water. Whether they are known or not if they are actually at sea as they might be on one of our principal trade routes, and if, moreover, they are free to act as they will now be free to act, not being forbidden to act under the Declaration of London, and, indeed, will act with a tacit international consent—
§ Mr. McKENNANo.
§ Mr. LEEI do not want to go into that question. It was debated at length yesterday, and I shall not be in order in going into it at greater length. I think I am quite justified in saying that these vessels will act with a tacit international consent. How is the present strength of our Navy going to adequately deal with such a peril in the first few weeks of a war? The First Lord of the Admiralty told us earlier in the Session that we had an ample supply of cruisers to deal with all these emergencies. I venture to deny that statement, or at any rate he has not convinced me on that point. In any case the arguments the right hon. Gentleman used in support of his contention are somewhat misleading. He read out an amazing list of cruisers without distinction as to class possessed at the present time by this country, and he said the number was far in excess of that pos- 986 sessed by any other Power, and asserted that that was all we require. Whilst we may be prepared to admit, for the sake of argument, that our strength in armoured cruisers fit to operate in the battle Fleet is sufficient for the purpose of dealing with any situation which is likely to arise in home waters, and that with the help of those cruisers and our battleships we might be able to establish and maintain that supremacy in home waters which is essential to safeguard us against invasion—always supposing we are able to coax the enemy out into the open—that really does not touch the point to which I wish to draw the attention of the right hon. Gentleman which is the condition of the trade routes on which our food supply is coming to this country during the first few weeks of a war. The superiority in armoured cruisers in Home waters will not help us at all there.
We are considering this danger to our trade routes and to our food supply from vessels which may be cruisers at a moment's notice and which may eventually be run down, but they may be able to deal us a deadly blow which may bring us to our knees at the very commencement before the cruisers we can send after them can possibly approach them. It is against that danger that I say nothing but the adequate policeing of the trade routes will suffice, and policing by swift, well-armed modern cruisers—not necessarily armoured cruisers of the second or third class protected types, but cruisers of a class of which we possess, in my view, a very insufficient number at the present time. In saying that it is perhaps necessary that I should make a point of calling attention to certain figures, and here again I can only rely upon official sources of information like the Navy List and other information which is open to me. From those sources I gather that, taking the North and South Atlantic as the broad area which covers the main routes along which our food supplies come to this country, seven years ago in the year 1903 we had twenty-two cruisers operating in that area and guarding those trade routes, whilst to-day we have only six.
We all know that the original reason for this was the new policy of concentration which became necessary on account of the growing power of other nations in European waters, and this made it essential to further safeguard this country against the danger of invasion. Whilst that policy was no doubt necessary at that time in order to safeguard this country, it does not meet 987 the point we are concerned with—namely, the safety of our trade routes, and it has nothing to do with the general question of the command at sea in European waters. It is quite possible we may have an absolutely overwhelming strength there, and yet the trade routes may not only be not secure, but not even as secure as they were seven years ago with a less force at our disposal. I wish to emphasise that the danger we have to guard against is not so much a military and naval danger but the effect upon the population of this country, and particularly upon our poorest classes, during the first few weeks of a war in case there should be any cause, justifiable or otherwise, for a panic and for uncertainty amongst those who undertake the carrying of our food supplies to this country.
I do not think the First Lord of the Admiralty will deny that during the last few years there has been a great relative decline in the cruisers we have got available for the protection of our trade routes as compared with other countries. The figures which have reached me, which I believe are accurate, or at any rate approximately accurate, are that seven years ago, as compared with Germany, we had 102 effective protected or unarmoured cruisers to Germany's twenty-two, or a, superiority roughly of five to one. Now I understand the figures are, in regard to protected and unarmoured cruisers, seventy possessed by this country and thirty-five by Germany, being roughly a proportion of two to one. Therefore there is relatively a great decline, and whatever may be the views of hon. Gentlemen opposite with regard to the two-Power standard, I do not think they can claim with regard to this question of the provision of cruisers for the protection of our trade routes that a proportion of two to one as against one Power is in any sense adequate. Therefore I would urge that a larger programme of protected and unarmoured cruisers is absolutely essential if the Admiralty is to be able to carry out the responsibility which devolves upon it of safeguarding this country at the outbreak of war.
I am glad that the Foreign Secretary in his speech yesterday did not hold out any suggestion that the passing of the Declaration of London would relieve us from the necessity of maintaining our cruiser strength. I am very glad he said that, because it has been frequently hinted in other quarters, where a reduction of arma- 988 ments is specially favoured, that one of the results of the passage of the Declaration of London would be that we might reduce our naval armaments; and, therefore, it is comforting to know that that view is not taken by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I go perhaps rather a little further than the right hon. Gentleman, and I suggest that not only is a reduction not possible, but that an increase is absolutely necessary. I have given several facts, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will reply to my points. Before I pass away from the question of cruisers, which is a main burden of my remarks this afternoon, I should like to ask a question upon a technical point with regard to the extremely light armament which is being given to the new cruisers which are now being built by the Admiralty. I am referring to the protected and unarmoured cruisers alone for the purposes of this Debate, and an extremely light armament has been given to them as compared with the cruisers of foreign Powers they might have to meet in case of war, and indeed a light armament as compared with the armament which we understand is allotted to certain merchant vessels of foreign Powers in the event of war. This is so marked in some cases that it is possible to conceive a situation where, in the event of war, one of our fast protected or unarmoured cruisers might indeed by its speed—
§ Mr. McKENNATo which class is the hon. Gentleman referring?
§ Mr. LEEI am referring to unarmoured cruisers, for example, of the "Blonde" class and to protected cruisers of the "Bristol" class. I am aware there is a slight improvement in this respect in later types, but I venture to say the Admiralty in the past, not only during the administration of the right hon. Gentleman, but I will be perfectly frank, and say during the last Unionist Administration, have shown a tendency to under arm the smaller class of cruiser. I think it has been almost universally admitted that the armament of the "County" class was insufficient.
§ Mr. McKENNADo I understand the hon. Gentleman to say the armament of the new class is too light?
§ Mr. LEEI am not prepared to express a dogmatic opinion on that point, but I think possibly the six-inch gun is not sufficient in view of the class of ship these vessels may have to meet, but I admit the 989 Admiralty is making an improvement in this respect. I think the tendency of the Admiralty in late years has been to under arm their cruisers, and I do not think it is a sufficient answer for the right hon. Gentleman to say merely the experts are satisfied, because, certainly in the case of the "County" class, the experts have been proved to be wrong, and occasionally they are wrong. Before finally leaving this question of cruisers, I wish to make one more point, and that is with regard to the new naval policy of the Dominions in establishing what are in effect separate navies under the British flag. I perhaps was brought up in the older Admiralty school, which frowned at the establishment of separate navies, and I still cling to that theory, but at the same time we have got to recognise the facts, and we have got to recognise that public sentiment in the Dominions is in favour of these separate navies and that they would not undertake to co-operate on any other terms. We have, therefore, got to make the best of it, and I think a great deal of good work will result from the Dominion navies if they can be persuaded that their primary duty in a general scheme of the defence of the Empire is to undertake, as far as their resources and as far as their location permits, the defence of the particular trade routes which lie in their vicinity. By undertaking that duty they can greatly relieve some of the burdens which at present rests upon the Mother-country, but until they have shown themselves capable of doing that and until they are in a position to do it I maintain the present supply of our cruisers is inadequate, and that a largo programme must be proceeded with by the Homo Government.
I should like to make an observation with regard to what is known as the policy of scrapping. Here again I am prepared to take up a strictly non-party attitude, and to admit, if the right hon. Gentleman wishes, that possibly in the past the policy of scrapping may have been carried too far, but at the time the great scrapping of cruisers took place—I think in the year 1904–5—there were very urgent and imperative considerations. If all these vessels were maintained, we had insufficient dock space for them, we had insufficient personnel to man them, and all the new vessels which were coming on, and the cost of repairs was very great. Balancing those disadvantages against the advantages of retaining them, I think we came to a right conclusion, and scrapping 990 was the better policy. The Dominion naval policy had not then been formulated, and I venture to say now it would be as well if the Admiralty would go very slow in this matter of scrapping, and would consider whether, in the present state of development of these Dominion navies, it would not be of great advantage to them, as well as a great advantage to us, to transfer those obsolescent cruisers, which are, perhaps, not efficient for Fleet action in home waters, to them, if necessary as a gift, in order that they might be utlised in the first place for training purposes, and secondly, for the defence of the trade routes in the immediate vicinity of those Dominions. I think that is a reasonable policy, and one which would be advantageous both to the Mother-country and' to the Dominions concerned.
We admit the Admiralty has awakened to the condition in which we are placed by the rapid obsolescence of the whole of our first batches of destroyers, and that they have done a good deal during the last two years to remedy the situation which was bound to arise when those vessels had been withdrawn, but even there I do not consider they are doing enough. I think the right hon. Gentleman is still clinging to the belief that the destroyers which are more than twelve years old— practically all those which are known as the 30-knotters—are still really efficient for war purposes in European waters. No expert I have been able to approach on the subject is of that opinion. The right hon. Gentleman clings to it in this House, but I am not so sure he really entertains it in his heart. He has to put a brave face on these matters until he can get the number of destroyers he needs, and we are anxious to support him in getting them. The situation, according to the figures at my disposal, is this: We have at present destroyers not exceeding ten years old, 81, to Germany's 79, and according to the right hon. Gentleman's own figures, which he gave in this House a few months ago, in the spring of 1913 we shall have 129 destroyers under twelve years of age to Germany's 108. That is an exceedingly small margin, one which I believe is totally inadequate, and one which has been defended largely as the result of the habit in which the Admiralty and the Government have fallen now in these matters of comparing our strength in naval power with one other Power only, which is surely insufficient. Even in this matter of destroyers, it is necessary the Admiralty should make a much greater effort.
991 I do not apologise for having confined the whole of my remarks this afternoon to the question of cruisers and the protection of our trade routes, because that subject has come up in a peculiarly acute form as the result of the Debate within the last few days, but I must say one word with regard to battleships. It has been a common complaint among experts that during the last few years in these Debates we have thought of nothing but battleships, and that the other component parts of the Fleet have been altogether ignored. I do not think that complaint can be properly directed against me this afternoon, but I think it was natural, and indeed necessary, that during the last few years we should have concentrated upon our battle fleet, because, after all, if that is not sufficiently strong all the cruisers in the world will not maintain our position. With regard to the battleship position, I can only repeat what I said a few months ago on the Provision Vote. In my opinion, the position is still extremely unsatisfactory. There are no new facts as far as I know except that the Austrian programme is steadily materialising and is no longer the phantom which some hon. Gentlemen seem to represent it. I can only repeat what I said in the Provision Debate, that as far as the published programmes and intentions go some time in the year 1914 we in this country shall be faced with a position where we shall have only twenty-nine or thirty vessels of the "Dreadnought" type available for the purpose of defence in European waters as compared with an approximately equal number possessed by the Triple Alliance. That is not a satisfactory position, and I would remind the Committee that neither the First Lord of the Admiralty nor the Government have ever answered our point with regard to the necessary detachment of a certain proportion of our force of "Dreadnoughts" to the Mediterranean to meet the new situation which has arisen from the creation of "Dreadnought" squadrons by both the Austrian and Italian navies.
I am not talking of the present moment, I am directing my argument to the time when the present published programmes of these Powers, including our own, will mature, and I say when that moment arises, it is necessary we shall detach a considerable squadron of our "Dreadnoughts" to the Mediterranean, and that will leave us with a force in the North Sea which I think will be inadequate to pro- 992 tect the position of this country in the event of war with our chief naval rival. Therefore, without asking the right hon. Gentleman at this moment to do what I suppose would be impossible for him to do —to increase his programme for this year —I do renew the plea that he should not postpone until the last days of the financial year the commencement of the ships which will, I presume, be finally sanctioned by the House of Commons this afternoon. I would remind the Committee, with regard to the battleships of these programmes that the first instalment for each of the German vessels is £480,000, whereas the first instalment for our vessels in the ease of the dockyard ships is from £170,000 to £180,000, and in the case of contract ships only £75,000. I say the Admiralty is throwing away the great initial advantage which it claims in its power to construct ships more rapidly. It is no good being able to construct ships more rapidly as compared with your rivals, if you postpone the commencement of them until eight months or so after they have commenced. It really confers no advantage upon us whatsoever. I think it is a mistake to announce what your programme is going to be until you are in a position to commence it. I think that is the cause of most of the difficulties in which we find ourselves. First, there is the abandonment by the Government of the two-Power standard, and the refusal to set up anything in its place. I think the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty —and this is the first time I have had the pleasure of addressing him as right hon.— must be tired of hearing my expression of opinion on this point. But I stick to it. I still more regret the habit which the Government has got into of expressing their naval strength in the terms of a one-Power standard only. I think it was very alarming in the course of the Debate last night to note the way in which the Foreign Secretary seemed to admit that it was impossible for us to maintain any longer our relative naval strength in regard to other Powers. He seemed to take it as a matter which ought to be recognised that it was not possible for us to maintain the position in these matters we had hitherto occupied. That was the sense of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. May I quote a few words:—
But the conditions have changed, and are changing. I put this point. Your two-Power standard, your three-Power standard, if you have it, is no longer going to be a world-Power standard, and it is not going to be possible for any Power to have a world-Power standard. That has been the increasing tendency of 993 the growth of fleets generally, and that has increased the risk that in time of war neutrals might interfere with our belligerent action."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd July, 1911, col. 869.]I need not quote further. The right hon. Baronet recognised, or seemed to accept, the impossibility of our being able to maintain in the future the relative naval supremacy we have possessed in the past. We on this side, at any rate, have not yet come to recognise that there is any inability on our part to maintain the two-Power standard, and I claim we have to maintain that position whatever it may cost. I hear a great deal just now about the advantages of national insurance in a domestic sense. We all agree that that is a highly desirable reform, but I submit we have no right to spend money upon national insurance in a domestic sense until we have adequately provided for our national insurance in a national sense. That must be the first claim on the finances of this country, because, without it, unless we have absolute national insurance in a national sense it is useless for us to proceed with any certainty with any scheme of domestic or social reform.
Captain MURRAYWith reference to the remarks which fell just now from the last speaker, as to what the Foreign Secretary stated last night regarding the impossibility nowadays for this country to maintain its relative position with the naval strength of other countries, I will not labour the point, but I think I am right in saying that it is impossible to maintain a world-Power standard, which is something different from the two-Power standard. I rose, however, to refer very briefly to the matter of secondary armaments in our battleships. I have on previous occasions, both in the year before last and last year, during the Debates on the Naval Estimates, pointed out that, in my humble opinion, we, in this country, were making a great mistake in putting, if I may use the term, all our eggs into one basket in this particular respect—the adoption in all our latest battleships, the ''Dreadnoughts," etc., of the all big-gun principle. The idea seems to be prevalent in many quarters that in these days only a "Dreadnought" can engage a "Dreadnought"—that only a ship of the "Dreadnought" type, or post-"Dreadnought" type, can engage a ship of that particular type, and that a pre-"Dreadnought," such as the "King Edward," pitted against a "Dreadnought," would speedily be put out of action. I believe that idea to be erroneous. It is disputed by many distinguished naval officers. I 994 do not propose to pit one set of opinions against another in this naval matter. It is always invidious to do so. But I think I may say without fear of contradiction that naval opinion is by no means unanimous in respect of the alleged superiority of the all big-gun type of vessel over vessels of an earlier date with a heavier secondary armament. It is a matter of common knowledge that there are certain naval officers—and I am not quite certain whether the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord Charles Beresford) is not one of them—he will correct me if I am wrong—in saying that he has advanced an opinion in respect of the advisability of having heavier secondary armaments. At any rate, it is a matter of common knowledge that there are certain distinguished naval officers who are perfectly willing at any time to take a "Lord Nelson" into action against a "Dreadnought."
§ Lord CHARLES BERESFORDAgainst a first "Dreadnought."
Captain MURRAYLet us for one moment consider what are the chief advantages of the all big-gun type of ship. I understand that one of them is that an all big-gun type of battleship is able to fire a relatively large number of armour-piercing projectiles as compared with the earlier type of ship. En passant I would remark that these projectiles are generally described as armour-piercing, but I do not know whether they are actually so, for I believe it to be the case that there is a continuous race between projectiles and armour. At one time the projectile is ahead, and at another time the armour is ahead. I do not know whether the First Lord of the Admiralty can tell me which is leading at the present moment. However, apart from that particular point, I think it is possible to assume that at any rate from the point of view of those who are in favour of the all big-gun type of ship that this type has the advantage of being able to fire a relatively large number of armour-piercing projectiles. What I wish to submit to the Committee to-day is this— that the all big-gun type of ship labours under a disadvantage in that she has no heavy secondary armaments. We have past experience of this, although I admit there are two sides to the question, and experts differ as to the value of past experience. But let us take the all big-gun type of battleship. What do we find? We find it laid down by many experts and certainly by a very large section of naval opinion that in the battle of Tsu Shima the 995 chief damage done by the Japanese to the Russian battleships was by the secondary armaments of the Japanese vessels. The Russian ships owed their disablement mainly to the high explosive shells from the Japanese secondary armaments which struck rapidly and effectively against the unprotected parts of the vessels.
I think we should take some notice of what is being done and of the policy being carried out by other countries in respect of secondary armaments. I have here what is known as the Dickinson return. I am not going to describe the armaments of the British vessels, but turning for instance to France, we find that the latest French battleships have a heavy secondary armament. Those of the "Jean Bart" type have twelve 12-inch guns and twenty-two 5.5-inch guns, which have approximately the same power as our 6-inch guns, firing an 80-lb. shell at the rate of eight rounds a minute. Then I come to Germany and I take the latest type—the "Ostfriesland" type — the "Helgoland" has twelve 12-inch guns and fourteen 5.9-inch guns. That is according to a statement in "The Times," from its Berlin correspondent. Then we come to the United States, and there again a similar state of affairs prevails. In the "Florida" type of vessel they have ten 12-inch guns, and sixteen 5-inch guns. In the "Arkansas" type of vessel of a later date they have twelve 12-inch guns and twenty-one 5-inch guns. Next we come to Japan, and we find that in the latest type building there, the "Kawachi" type, the "Settsu,'' launched in 1911, has twelve 12-inch guns, ten 6-inch guns, and ten 4.7-inch guns. We must not forget that Japan has just come victorious out of a naval war, and that being so the fact that Japan has retained heavy secondary armaments and especially 6-inch guns, should give us food for thought. The policy of Japan in this particular respect is one to which we should pay attention.
There is only one other point to which I wish to allude this afternoon, and that is in regard to the question of the range. Let us assume that a fleet be engaged in the North Sea. What is the range of visibility there? I am not pressing the First Lord of the Admiralty on that point. It would probably be useless to do so. He would properly and rightly reply that it was not in the public interest to divulge exactly what he knows in this particular respect.
§ Mr. McKENNAAnybody knows it.
Captain MURRAYThen I will hazard a guess. I should say, if I were asked— it is not exactly my own opinion, but it is an opinion which I have formed after consultation with naval officers—I would hazard a guess that not more than one hundred and twenty-five days in the year in the North Sea are days upon which it would be possible to come into action at a range of over 6,000 yards.
§ Lord CHARLES BERESFORDOh, no.
Captain MURRAYThe Noble Lord opposite dissents. I do not quite know what his dissent indicates, but I do know that speaking on a similar Vote earlier in this Session what he said was that there was not more than one day in three months in which it would be possible to come into action at a range of five or six miles.
§ Lord CHARLES BERESFORDI said 10,000 yards.
Captain MURRAYIf that be so, it is only a difference of 2,000 yards. What the Noble Lord said was that "the idea of the 'Dreadnoughts' fighting actions at five or six miles distance is perfectly chimerical," and that "there is not one day in every three months in which they could fight at such a distance." These were his own words taken from his speech on the 20th March last. (OFFICIAL DEBATES, 20th March, 1911, vol. xxiii., col. 60.) At any rate, whether I am right or wrong, I do submit that there are probably a number of officers in the Navy who hold this view that there are about sixty-five days out of every hundred in which an action could not be fought at a range of over 6,000 yards in the North Sea, and I submit if that be so it does constitute a very serious factor in the consideration of this question of secondary armaments.
§ Lord CHARLES BERESFORDThe hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has pointed out a very interesting question on which there has been a great deal of difference of opinion as to the necessity for auxiliary armament, whether the all big-gun ship is the best or whether these ships should have an auxiliary armament. I think he did a very wise thing in pointing to what other nations have done, and particularly Japan, and they were certainly of opinion that they won some of their battles with the auxiliary armament. Personally, I should like to see an auxiliary armament on board our vessels. I have 997 always supported the doctrine of the biggest small gun and the smallest big gun, and not to have too great a range. I have had experience of command in the North Sea, and I say it is very rare that you will get a day on which you can fight an action on the supposititious range for which the "Dreadnought" was originally laid down. She was to fight an action a very long way off indeed. Now for two reasons that is a mistake. One is that at that range hitting is problematical, no matter how accurate the gun is or how well trained your men are. There enters into it, therefore, the element of doubt and of luck, and your enemy may have the luck.
I think you will find that you will fight actions a little over the old range, about 3,000 yards up to 5,000 or 6,000 yards, and that you will get alongside the enemy's ship as soon as you can and hit him as often as you can, and that you are not going to conduct a fight away out on the horizon where it is problematical whether or not your shots will take effect. I think with regard to naval affairs this is more or less an annual farce that we go through here of criticising the Naval Estimates and of pretending that we have control over expenditure. The real point is that we cannot touch the question of naval defence unless we can at the same time review naval policy as a whole, but what happens is this, that we get one vote one day and another vote on another day, and we find we have been building ships without sufficient men to man them. We were told that we could not possibly find all the men, the supposititious 3,000 men, whom the First Lord said he was going to join. The figure 12,900 for last year was given to me last week in reply to a question which I asked. The wastage is only 6,000. I do not see how he proposes to keep up with the shipbuilding. It is no use building ships without men. He spoke of 3,000, but I think I could give him 5,500 for the financial year, because he joins most of them at the end of the financial year. As a matter of fact, there were 7,000 this year over and above the ordinary waste. How can you re-view naval questions as a whole unless you also review naval policy as a whole. It is most absurd in my opinion to have these different questions in different Debates, and then we apparently have not got a Board at all. The First Lord has never explained his statement that any document that any Member of the Board 998 submits to him, if he approves of that document, is approved by the Board of Admiralty.
§ The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Emmott)That does not arise on this Vote.
§ Lord CHARLES BERESFORDI will pass away from that. This is the Shipbuilding Vote, and the shipbuilding is supposed by the country to be considered by the Board of Admiralty. What is the Board of Admiralty? Is it the First Lord and the distinguished agriculturist who sits beside him? It is really a very important point. The country believes that, all these questions on the Shipbuilding Vote have been carefully considered by the Board, and yet some of the Board may have had nothing to do with it or may have dissented from it. The First Lord might wish to lay down more battleships, but that is my point, who is responsible?
§ Mr. McKENNAThe Board is responsible. It is signed by the members of the Board.
§ Lord CHARLES BERESFORDI know all that about signing. I signed them for some years and then I refused to sign them because I did not agree with them. They may have taken a different view. I would not sign because I did not agree, but they may have done so. I would like to go on to the question with regard to what the Foreign Secretary said last night that conditions have changed and were changing. I want to point out that these conditions are changing with regard to the armament and the shipbuilding of other nations, and it is entirely our fault that that has occurred. If we had kept to our own programme with regard to the Shipbuilding Vote and merely laid down what we thought necessary for ourselves, without considering other nations, we should not be in the position we are now in of seeing the various changes that are being made with regard to the size of the ships and construction, and other dangers. After bringing forward all these remarks with regard to the "Dreadnoughts" pulverising the ships of other nations, we reduced our Shipbuilding Vote, and that is the reason why at this moment we are in a position of some danger. The First Lord last year had laid down a certain number of more battleships, and it is enough to prove my point to say that in one year we laid down two and in the next year eight. That is a process which is not businesslike, and cannot be conducive to the safety of the 999 country. I hope the Secretary to the Admiralty will take the opportunity to correct a mistake which he made last year with regard to my programme.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAI propose to refer to that.
§ Lord CHARLES BERESFORDI think he will find I was entirely right, and that he was not correct. I should like to return to this point about the cruisers. I have raised it very often, and particularly in a little programme which I laid before the chambers of commerce. I said I wanted thirty-six cruisers. That was before the new state of affairs had been brought about by the Declaration of London. I wanted thirty-six, but the Government only provided for nine. As the hon. Gentlemen below me has pointed out, in the year 1904 we had sixty cruisers on the trade routes, and we have only twenty now. The trade routes were always a weak point, but this new Declaration makes it very much weaker than it ever was before. The hon. Member below me has referred to the Admiralty Memorandum, in which they point out that the really serious danger to this country is connected with the trade routes. Why has not something been done, if this is really a serious danger, to meet it? The number of cruisers on the trade routes has been reduced, and under this new Declaration the trade routes are more liable to attack than they were before by armoured merchantmen.
In answer to a question the other day by the hon. Member for the Blackpool Division of Lancashire (Mr. Ashley), the right hon. Gentleman said that of cruisers twelve years old on 31st March, 1904, Great Britain had forty-eight and Germany eighteen, and on 31st March, 1911, Great Britain had only twenty-four and Germany twenty-four. These are cruisers of modern date and modern equipment and modern armament, and not more than twelve years old. But in the twenty-four the right hon. Gentleman included three of the "Boadicea" type. The question related to protected cruisers, but he included "Boadiceas" and he also included eight "Scouts." The "Scouts" are not cruisers at all. They are the mother ships for the torpedo boat destroyers, and you cannot include them among the cruisers. Their coal capacity is not large enough, and in other ways they are not suitable. They will do very well for torpedo boats. You cannot include them, and the real total number of modern 1000 cruisers which we have got compared with Germany under twelve years old is only thirteen. There was a great deal of discussion during the last three days on the Declaration of London and about the lack of cruisers, and what I want to point out is that if we do not have the cruisers we are handicapped with regard to the Court of Appeal.
5.0 P.M.
We say the danger which will occur to us will occur before you go to the Court of Appeal at all. Something must have happened, or else we have no reason to appeal, and the danger to our trade routes from lack of cruisers will be that ships will be certainly put down by armed merchant ships, which I think the right hon. Gentleman says we have not agreed to, but we have not objected to it. If we have objected there will be no result like that. If these armed ships get out on the trade routes secretly, before war, the right hon. Gentleman gays he will take steps afterwards. What steps can he take? It will be too late. He has got no ships on the trade routes to meet the armed cruisers. The Foreign Secretary yesterday spoke about the Admiralty or the Government knowing all about these ships. They do not know all about them at all. They need not be very fast; they may be six-knot ships. If they get to such places as Pernambuco or the Neck of the Bottle, they can put down these vessels, though, of course, they will be caught afterwards. But the risk of starvation has occurred to this country simply because you have not got cruisers on the trade routes, as I have often said, like policemen on the beat, to prevent these armed ships interfering with our food supply. You appeal to a court of law. What are you going to appeal about? Something which has happened, and we say that thing, having happened, might bring the country to the verge of starvation, and who would be the people affected? Without doubt the poorer classes first. I pointed out the other day that thirty-two battleships, twenty-five armed cruisers, and nine unprotected cruisers is not a fleet at all equipped or ready to fight an action. The heavy ships, armoured ships, could not carry out their duties unless you have the cruisers to render them effective, and you are dangerously short of cruisers, not only for the Fleet, but to protect the trade routes.
The public have been misled again and again on this question of naval defence. If you look at the June Navy List, page 270, "ships arranged in various classes," 1001 you will find that there are sixty-eight battleships built and building; of these the "Trafalgar" was actually sold two months ago, the "Nile" is included in the sale list, and the "Royal Sovereign," the "Empress of India," the "Hood." the "Ramillies," the "Repulse," the "Resolution," and the "Royal Oak" should not be included in the list of ships because they have been withdrawn. The "Repulse" is on the sale list, and the "Hood" has no guns as she is flagship at Queenstown. Therefore we have nine battleships which ought not to be included in the Navy List at all. I remember the same thing happening some years ago. The First Lord of the Admiralty of that day pointed out that we had more ships in commission than the rest of Europe, and he included the old "Victory," the "Asia," and other depot ships of that sort which were in commission and hoisted the pennant; and I maintain that took in the public, and that sort of argument ought not to be allowed. Then, with regard to the new problems which are coming forward very soon which will affect the Shipbuilding Vote, the First Lord has not taken into account at all what the Mediterranean Powers are doing. He said a few months ago that their programmes were nothing but paper, whereas they are now a palpable fact, and he has not, so far as I gather, taken into consideration at all the fact of the entire alteration of the strategical plans of this country when the Panama Canal is opened. That will make an entire difference to our strategic plans all over the world, and there does not appear to be any reason at present to suspect that the First, Lord of the Admiralty has taken that into his consideration.
Then I had to find fault with him for counting in the depot ships for destroyers as cruisers. They are not equipped as cruisers, and they have to remain where they are in war. There are three ships also which come off the list, the "St. George," the "Blake," and the "Blenheim," which are all depot ships, and are counted as cruisers in his list. He told the country this year that he had 101 cruisers. He has nothing of the sort. He has really got 52 in commission, and of these 19 are T.B.D. ships or depot ships. He should not count them as cruisers, because he cannot use them as cruisers in war. He has 17 with nucleus crews that he can use, and 15 with skeleton crews. As a matter of fact, he has about 40 cruisers altogether that he can show at this moment, and it is far too little. It 1002 is no use saying you have 101 if you have not got them. They are not there, for the reasons I have given. To be effective a battle fleet ought to have five unprotected or small cruisers to every two battleships—that is really to carry out the duty necessary for a battle fleet, but this is not counting what is necessary for the trade routes at all. The trade routes were never properly defended, and now you have added enormously to the danger by the possibility of attack by armed merchantmen by the Declaration of London, and you are taking no steps whatever to meet it. I believe, as you are going to pass this Declaration, the very least you should lay down is sixty cruisers if you want to have your trade routes protected. I see the First Lord of the Admiralty smiles. He always smiles when I make these suggestions for increasing the Fleet. Let me show him how un necessary it is for him to smile, because he always has to do it sooner or later. I said to the London Chamber of Commerce that we wanted sixteen battleships. It was laughed at, and I think the First Lord of the Admiralty crucified it as far as he was able to in the House, but he has built fourteen of these since. This was called a most terrible scare, and I was told I was altogether incorrect and so were the fifteen admirals who supported me. I wanted thirty-six second class cruisers. He has only built nine, but he will have to build more. He may say he will not now, but he will have to, both for the Fleet and for the trade routes if this Declaration passes. I wanted fifty-two torpedo-boat destroyers. That was a gross exaggeration I was told, but he has built forty-six since. In other words he has spent, out of the £68,000,000 that I wanted, £37,000,000, and he will have to spend the rest sooner or later, and I sincerely hope he will not be too late. People who bring the facts before their country are generally called scaremongers and people who exaggerate, but I maintain now, as I have said before, that there is no single agitation for an increase of the Service which has not been justified afterwards. There is no Member in this House who can ever say that money was thrown into the sea or wasted with regard to that agitation.
There is another case with regard to putting ships on the Navy List which really are not there. Eight second class cruisers are put in as being effective cruisers. The "Bonaventure" is a depot ship for submarines, and the other seven are mine 1003 layers. That is one of the most important services we have, but it is no use to say they are cruisers. They are not cruisers. They are occupied with other and more important work, and they will have to be employed in mine laying or mine sweeping when we go to war, therefore they are not cruisers, and they ought not to be put down upon the list to tell the country that they can execute certain duties when they have to execute other duties. A cruiser cannot be in two places at once. I claim that the First Lord has put fifteen ships in the Navy List which ought not to be there at all. There is another point the Foreign Secretary tried to make with regard to armed merchantmen on trade routes. He said they were all known. They are not known at all. How can they be known? A few in places are known, and the fast ones are known, but the idea that it is only fast merchant ships which can undertake the duty of armed cruisers is altogether wrong. Small ships can get there, they can be sent out without the knowledge of anybody, they can have their guns in the holds; they may be on the trade routes at such places as Pernambuco or the Neck of the Bottle as merchant ships, and not convert themselves into men-of-war until they fire their guns. Then they may put down six or eight ships, so it does not want very many of them. What does it matter what happens after the merchant ships are put down? They will have achieved their object, whether they are sunk or hanged or whatever becomes of them, and they will be in a position to bring this country to its knees through the food supply being interrupted. I was in Hull the other day on political work, and I made inquiries on a very important question. I found a great number of the poorer families were in very hard straits, and there was only about twenty-four hours' supply of flour owing to a stoppage through some strike on twenty-five steamers. That is very serious, but what would occur in time of war? If this had such an effect on the poorer classes of one town merely through a strike, imagine what would happen in time of war when the trade routes were interrupted. It is a very good object-lesson, and it will not do for the First Lord and the Government to tell us that under certain paper regulations such things are not allowed as armed merchant ships. We ought to be in a position to see that that cannot happen, and that position can only be brought about if we have a proper number of cruisers, not only 1004 for the battle Fleet, but for the trade routes, so that it does not matter if they put a few armed merchantmen on these trade routes with the idea of sinking our merchant ships.
I must refer to what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lee) said about scrapping. I do not agree with his definition of his Government's scrapping. It is perfectly right to scrap. Always scrap anything that is obsolete but never get rid of it until you put something in its place, as is done in industrial affairs. The principle of scrapping was really brought in for no other reason but economy, and to get rid of comparisons. The other Government, when in office, and even this Government, when necessary, have scrapped these ships. While it was necessary to scrap them, they should not have been scrapped until something was put in their place, because the danger was begun. The trade routes have always been in danger. The danger was begun by taking the cruisers off the trade routes. The policy with regard to a battle fleet is absolutely different from that as to protecting trade routes as regards scrapping and tactics. You cannot mix the two together as the Admiralty Memorandum has done. You have to look at the two matters from totally different points of view. The greatest danger is in connection with the trade routes. If they are interrupted that is like cutting your arm off. Battleships do not win wars and campaigns. Supposing that the other battle fleet does not come out, is your battle fleet to cruise about the North Sea until it does come out? The armoured cruisers can have nothing to do with the protecting of your trade routes. There is only one way that can be done, and that is to have armed vessels on the trade routes—not gunned and armoured cruisers. The ordinary tramps can go out, and if the other Power arranges, as Germany would arrange, to have them at certain places at a certain moment to cut our trade routes, I maintain that is a possibility, and it is a greater possibility than ever under the Declaration of London. You have to build proper cruisers—small cruisers, protected or unprotected—to meet that difficulty with regard to the trade routes, else you are not safe.
There is another point as to which I wish to have information. There have been complaints made very often about the ventilation of the flats, and of the compartments especially. There was a serious accident the other day on board 1005 one of the ships. So far as I understand the circumstances, the men should not have been in that space. I cannot help calling attention to the superb gallantry of the men who went down to rescue their comrades. I am sure the Admiralty will say that the conduct of Commander Bune was splendid, as was also that of an able seaman who went down and lost his life in trying to rescue these men. I think there should be a full inquiry into the accident. I will ask the right hon. Gentleman a question later on with reference to this matter, because these things ought never to occur. You may lose men in war, and you cannot help it, but you should lose as few in peace as possible. I have to tell the right hon. Gentleman that I think a great deal of the confusion about the state of the Fleet and the Shipbuilding Vote is owing to the way he answers our questions, and I must ask him to be a little less evasive. We know perfectly well that there are a great many questions which it is not in the public interest to answer, and I quite agree that hon. Members should be careful not to ask such questions. But there are a great many questions which are asked, and some of us know the answers as well as possible. I believe it is within the right of one hon. Member to ask another hon. Member questions. I wish somebody would ask mo if I could answer these questions. I should never answer any question where the giving of the answer would be against the public interest. Nobody would do that who has any sense of loyalty to the Service or to the State. There are a great many answers given by the right hon. Gentleman which cause a great deal of friction and irritation on account of the way the answers are given. It is not what a man says in answering a question that causes irritation but the way he says it. If the right hon. Gentleman will take my advice, he will reform, and in answering questions which are perfectly legitimate and which are put from both sides of the House he should let us know the facts. Do not let us have inferences which are almost invariably incorrect.
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will answer my questions as to what he intends to do with regard to the new problems in the Mediterranean. We shall have to have a battle fleet there. We cannot afford to have our lines of communication threatened in any way by other countries who build ships superior to those we have out there. I would like to know if the Board of Admiralty are of opinion that the 1006 cruisers are ample, and that the Declaration of London does not add to our responsibilities in relation to the defence of our trade routes. I think that is a most important matter. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) that we are not building enough torpedo-boat destroyers, having regard to the advance made in that direction by Germany. We should never be satisfied with being simply equal. We have to get over to their coast, and we have to come back. The boats have to be relieved. Our men are at sea, while the other men are in harbour at bright fires, ready to come out when they are required. Life on a torpedo-boat destroyer at sea is a very severe life. You cannot sit down comfortably, you cannot lie down, or eat, or do anything comfortably, and no officer or man should be asked to remain for more than two nights in rough weather on board a destroyer. We ought to have as regards these boats three to one. So far as the North Sea is concerned our 27 to 29-knot boats are not suitable. We want boats of the "River" class, and more of them in proportion. Will the right hon. Gentleman let me know if the Board of Admiralty are going to build more of these destroyers? They cannot do it this year, but perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will take into consideration that our list of obsolete boats is far greater than that of Germany. The proportion of German boats suitable for the North Sea is greater than the number we have, taking into consideration the work our boats will have to do and the work theirs will have to do. Another question I wish to ask is whether the right hon. Gentleman is going to stay his hand in regard to docks. Is he going to build more, or are the two which are being built to be final? If they are to be final, I do not think they will be sufficient.
§ The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. McKenna)There will be four.
§ Lord C. BERESFORDI trust that the right hon. Gentleman will answer the questions I have asked when he is making his reply.
§ The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of ADMIRALTY (Dr. Macnamara)Before I come to the questions that have been raised by the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee) and the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford), I think it is my duty to say a few words on this Vote. It is a very important Vote. It is for this year an Estimate of the sum required to meet 1007 the cost of shipbuilding, repairs, and maintenance, and the cost of the establishments of the dockyards at home and abroad. The Vote is in three sections. The first section meets the cost of the personnel in the dockyards; the second meets the cost of the supply of naval stores to the yards and fuel and oils for the Fleet; and the third meets the cost of contract work, machinery for ships, contract-built hulls, armour, gun-mountings, and so on. The grand total of the Vote is £22,862,200. That is slightly over half the entire Navy Estimates for the year. It is the highest figure at which this Vote has ever stood. Of that sum, £8,496,900 goes to the yards to meet the cost of labour and material, and £14,365,300 goes for contracts. The Committee might very well note that of the grand total no less amount than £15,063,877 is for new construction, not including armaments. This, again, is the largest sum on record. Of the £15,063,877 we propose to spend £1,738,645 within the financial year. I call the attention of the hon. Member for Fareham to the fact that within the financial year we are thus spending on the new programme of the year 13.2 per cent. of the total cost of the ships in the year's programme. That is above the average of our practice, as the hon. Gentleman must know. That leaves for new construction £13,325,232 of the 1911–12 new construction Vote, which will be applied to the carrying forward and completion of previous programmes. It is due to the Committee to say how the programmes stand. Of the 1908–9 programme the only outstanding item is the torpedo-boat destroyer "Nautilus." We expected to have her during August. There have been difficulties in realising the speed and she has had two accidents. The 1909 10 programme included the famous eight "Dreadnoughts." We laid down two in July, 1909, two in November. 1909, and four in April, 1910.
Of those one, the "Hercules" is already completed, and I think it is very creditable to the contractor that the vessel should now be completed. The "Collossus" is due this month, and probably she will be delivered in August. The "Orion" and the "Lion" are due in November, and the "Conqueror," "Monarch," "Thunderer" and "Princess Royal" are due on the 31st March next. Of the other parts of the 1909–10 programme the two unarmoured cruisers are 1008 already completed, and four "Bristols" are due in September and October. Of the twenty destroyers in the 1909–10 programme, there is only one outstanding: that is the "Fury." She was given to a firm which had no previous experience of this class of ship, but we expect her in September. The six submarines of the "D" class will be ready in the next few months, and one or two in the next few weeks. The floating dock for the Medway should be at its mooring before the end of the year, and the floating dock for Portsmouth will be ready early in the new year. Last year's programme includes five armoured ships, three protected cruisers, two unarmoured cruisers, and twenty destroyers, together with three more being built by the New Zealand Government; six submarines, a submarine depot ship, a floating dock for destroyers, and a floating dock for submarines, a surveying ship and a Coastguard tender. All the programme is fairly well in hand.
The programme for 1911–12, which is now before the House, includes five large armoured ships—four battleships and an armoured cruiser, all to be completed before the end of 1913; three protected cruisers, an unarmoured cruiser, twenty destroyers, six submarines, two river gunboats, a depot ship for destroyers, and a hospital ship. When this programme is completed, which we are now asked to vote, the entire cost will be £13,205,360, and of that, as I say, we are meeting 13.2 per cent. in this financial year. That carries our provision for naval defence well to the end of 1913 or the beginning of 1914. While I am on shipbuilding, I am sure the Committee will be interested to hear, that apart from that and quite over and above that, there are under construction in this country at this moment, at the cost of the Dominion Government, the following ships:—The "New Zealand," for New Zealand, the "Dreadnought" cruiser launched last Saturday; and for Australia, the "Dreadnought" cruiser the "Australia." Both the "New Zealand" and the "Australia" are due in September, 1912. The two "Bristols" for Australia are both due in August, 1912, and there are the two submarines for Australia and the three destroyers already mentioned. That is a short statement which I thought it necessary to give of this Vote and the purposes for which it is required. I now come to the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee), and I wish him to realise that our provi- 1009 sion is sufficient and ample to make national safety fully secure. He says that we have fallen into a very unsatisfactory position. I am bound to say as far as I am concerned that I have not a shadow of doubt that the provision we have made, which is now under discussion, is amply sufficient, not only to protect our interests but, as I shall endeavour to show in a moment, to keep open our trade routes, to which so much attention has been paid in the last two or three days. I have not a shadow of doubt of that. I am quite sure that many Members who saw the splendid flotilla at Spithead last Saturday week must agree with me in that view. Indeed, the attendance at this Committee is the very best evidence I could adduce of the fact that the public and the House of Commons feel perfectly satisfied at the character of the provision which we have made.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAThat is not the case. It is much below the average in 1909–10. However, let me call a critic, an expert and an able and constant critic, to give evidence on this point. I call on the hon. Member for North Kensington (Mr. Burgoyne), and I want the hon. Member for Fareham particularly to note what he says, because the hon. Member for Fareham says that we have given over the two-Power standard and we are measuring ourselves against a one-Power standard. The hon. Member for North Kensington is the able editor, if I may say so, of the "Navy League Annual." In the volume for 1910–11, on page 108, this is what he says:—
We are pre-eminent to-day. That cannot be gainsaid.He goes further. Here is a comment which is rather apropos having regard to the speech to which we have just listened. In the course of an interview in the "Pall Mall Gazette," on 16th February this year, this is what my hon. Friend says:—Yet the fact does remain that in all these first essentials we are not only up to the two-Power standard, but in the case of 'Dreadnoughts,' pro-'Dreadnoughts, armoured cruisers, protected cruisers, and destroyers and submarines, we have at least a 'two-keels-to-one' standard in completed vessels as against the next strongest power,I think I am entitled to bring that evidence to rebut the statement of the hon. Gentleman that we have abandoned the two-Power standard. But I should like to give 1010 one more quotation from the hon. Gentleman. In the "Observer" of the 5th March, 1911, he says:—In the first place in all general essentials we are not only up to the two-Power standard but it can safely be asserted that we possess the two keels to one.He goes on:—Even the dock question, a great factor of dispute three years ago, is rapidly righting itself in our favour. And as we stand to-day it is only in matters of detail that it would be possible for anyone seriously to criticise our naval position.That is the deliberate statement of my hon. Friend and he adds in the same interview:—We are secure as to our superiority in capital ships in 1913 already.I think after that statement that even the alarmists of the Imperial Maritime League might very well adopt a little less frenzied tone. I come now to the question of cruisers which has formed part of the speeches of the hon. Gentleman and of the Noble Lord, and which was discussed in this House earlier this year. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lee) and the Noble Lord (Lord Charles Beresford) both feel that we have not provided sufficiently for cruisers, and particularly the class of cruisers which would protect trade routes and maintain without interruption that supply of food stuffs which form four-fifths of the food of the people of this country. I think from a remark which fell from both the hon. Gentleman and the Noble Lord that I can leave out of this discussion the question of the armoured cruisers. If I leave out the "Dreadnought" cruisers we have a magnificent flotilla of thirty-four pre-"Dreadnought" armoured cruisers. They are all under twenty years of age to-day; and they will all be under twenty years of age on 31st of March, 1914. Their combined displacement is over 400,000 tons. They carry between them sixty-eight 9.2, seventy 7.5, and 318 6-inch guns. No combination of any two Powers in the world has a flotilla of that character. Therefore we are agreed that so far as the purpose of associating themselves with the main fleet in action is concerned our armoured cruisers satisfy the hon. Gentleman and the Noble Lord.I may leave that now and come to the question of protected cruisers and unprotected cruisers, and particularly their function of keeping open the trade routes for the food supplies of this island. The Noble Lord is a very violent opponent of what I may call the Cawdor policy, so enthusiastically endorsed by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, 1011 of withdrawing and scrapping a great many small vessels at the close of 1904 and the beginning of 1905. One quotation from his views I may give from the famous London Chamber of Commerce speech of 30th June, 1909. The Noble Lord said in that speech:—
I think it was criminal to scrap these small ships without putting something in their place.As to that I am bound to say this, with the greatest respect, that although he knows a great deal more about this matter than I do, that I cannot altogether concur that his leaders—for after all it was his leaders who adopted this policy— really deserved the wrath which he poured upon them. I venture to suggest this to him. If you are going to have cruisers in distant seas, it is vital that they should be thoroughly effective, well found, and of considerable speed. If they are not what happens? My opinion is that your commerce protecting flotilla will really become death traps for gallant lives. You have only to read what happened to the "Varyak" and "Koreetz" at Chemulpo to know that.
§ Lord C. BERESFORDThat is not my point at all. They can only become death traps by a superior cruiser being sent out by the enemy. That would be known at once, and these would be shadowed by two of our cruisers. They would never be death-traps against armed merchant ships in the slightest way, as long as they had guns they could put them to the bottom of the sea. That is our policy.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAI think the Leader of the opposite party and Lord Cawdor Were perfectly justified in withdrawing from the charge against the Estimates that type of vessel. They locked up personnel. As the Noble Lord knows, they cost money for maintenance and repair, and expenditure upon them was not justified in my opinion, for what it is worth, by their capacity as fighting machines. Therefore, I am very much more a supporter of the policy of the late Government than their very faithful follower, the Noble Lord who represents Portsmouth. After all, that is all ancient history, although I must say I think that the hon. Member for Fareham might have remembered that it was that very policy which led to what he called the relative decline, to which he called our attention in his speech, between the proportion of our cruisers and the cruisers of other great Powers. I do not want to press that. The 1012 question is what have we done since and where do we stand to-day? There were no protected cruisers laid down in 1905–6, nor in 1906–7. The programme for 1907–8 initiated the "Boadicea," a vessel of 3,300 tons, 18,000 horse-power, and twenty-five knots speed, and carrying six 4-inch guns.
In the 1908–9 programme we get an improved "Boadicea," the "Bellona," and five "Bristols," each of 4,800 tons, of 22,000 horse-power, and twenty-five-knot speed. They are armed with two six-inch guns and ten four-inch guns. In 1909–10 there were two more "Boadiceas" and four more improved "Bristols." They are each of 5,250 tons displacement, 22,000 horse-power, and twenty-four and three-quarter-knot speed, mounting each eight six-inch guns. The 1910–11 programme will give two further improved "Boadiceas," and three more improved "Bristols"—the "Dublin," the "Southampton," and the "Chatham." The present programme will give one more improved "Boadicea'' and three more "Bristols." That is a flotilla of twenty-two vessels of great speed. We have nine ships completed now, and thirteen will be completed during this year, and eighteen will be completed during next year, all of great speed. All twenty-two will be completed during 1913. But that is not all. You have also to take into consideration, apart from the monetary contributions, the cruisers proposed to be constructed by the Dominion Governments under the scheme put forward at the Imperial Conference of 1909. There are "Bristols" and "Boadicea's" in that scheme. I think it is also necessary to mention the monetary contributions. Members will see on pages eight and nine of the Estimates that the amount which is at our disposal this year is £607,400, of that £119,400 is in return for services rendered, and we allocate to Vote 8 out of this contribution £278,700 as appropriations-in-aid. Now I come to the development of the over-sea Dominion fleet resolved upon by the Imperial Conference of 1909, at which the over-sea, Dominions were represented. I include these in the tale of Imperial protection for the commerce of the Empire. When the schemes arranged are complete we shall have provision for over-sea and at home—I am not alluding now to the larger proposal of the Commonwealth of Australia but to the scheme of 1909—of twenty-two "Bristols" and eight "Boadiceas," all fast ships and effective cruisers. The Noble Lord agrees that our armoured cruisers are thirty-four.
§ Lord C. BERESFORDBut you must also have small cruisers. You cannot detach the armoured cruisers for protection of trade routes.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAWhen the programme is completed we shall have thirty effective cruisers. Let me take the new British provision, plus the existing British provision together. I take the protected cruisers of the first, second and third classes, all under twenty years of age, and all with a speed of eighteen knots or over. On 1st April this year there were completed sixty, there were building nine, and projected three. On 1st April, 1912, there will be completed fifty-seven. One or two will have dropped out owing to the age limit, but there will be building eight, and there will be projected the 1912–13 programme, whatever that may be. It will be considered by the Admiralty with the greatest care, having regard to the interests involved, and to securing our food supplies uninterrupted.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAI should not like to answer that off-hand. At any rate, these vessels will be kept free for the purposes we are discussing. On 1st April, 1913, there will be completed fifty-eight, there will be building three, plus the 1912–13 programme, and there will be projected the 1913–14 programme. Let the hon. Gentleman look at that. You can take any combination of two Powers you like, and you do not reach that provision, the details of which I have explained. I take the unprotected cruisers, each under twenty years of age from the date of being launched, and running to a speed up to twenty-five knots. The Noble Lord pooh-poohed the idea of considering the scouts. The scouts are only six years old, some of them five years old, and of 2,600 to 2,900 tons. They carry ten 12-pounders, and two torpedo tubes. Two carry fourteen 12-pounders. The Noble Lord drew a vivid picture of a merchant ship with one 12-pounder, but we have two ships with fourteen 10-pounders and the rest with ten 12-pounders. When I called his attention to these ships he said they could not be considered for the purposes required.
§ Lord C. BERESFORDThe scouts have a certain duty to perform, and they can- 1014 not perform two duties at once. You cannot send the scouts away from the torpedodestroyers. They could not be sent out to our trade routes, many of them three or four thousand miles distant.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAI rather gather from the Noble Lord that he thinks they cannot be spared for the work. There were eight scouts and three "Boadiceas" on 1st March of this year; there will DO eight scouts and five "Boadiceas" in March, 1912, and eight scouts and six "Boadiceas" in March, 1913. That particular type is far ahead of any two-Power standard you can name; indeed, you can combine all that type of ships belonging to all the great maritime nations. I think we are all agreed in regard to armoured cruisers that we have all we need. I recognise, and must recognise, that the question of the food supply of this country is vital, but I declare that the protection afforded under this programme is quite ample. If the hon. Member will turn to the Estimates he will find that we pay a subvention of £150,000 a year for the right of pre-emption, as armed cruisers or transports, of the two great Cunarders, the "Mauretania" and the "Lusitania." If they look at page 101 of the Estimates hon. Members will see a note to the effect that the Cunard Company hold all their vessels at the disposal of the Government—apari from the "Mauretania" and the "Lusitania" subvention, and each vessel has 68,000 horse-power—and all are to be at the disposal of His Majesty's Government for hire or purchase. With regard to workmen in the dockyard, I desire to make a short, comment. The replies to last year's petition will I hope be immediately promulgated, although we have not quite completed the necessary selections to enable me to make a statement about it to-day. I may say I do not think the matter will be found very exciting. It must be remembered that since 1906 we have made some considerable concessions to the workmen in the yards. As a matter of fact, on the numbers which are now engaged in the Royal Dockyards the concessions we have made amount in wages to an annual value of over £67,000. We have made a concession on the working hours, making them uniformly forty-eight hours a week throughout the year, and we have done a very considerable amount to encourage yard boys to go to the evening schools.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAIt has given individual advances certainly. If we take the existing number of workmen engaged the increase which we have given since 1906 comes to over £67,000 a year. We shall this year make a concession which I know will be appreciated. In May, 1907, the establishment was closed, and it was reopened again in June, 1910. The maximum age for establishment was then forty-five years, and a number of men in the interval between 1907 and June, 1910, reached the forty-five years' maximum, and therefore lost their chance for establishment. We recognised at once that that was a great hardship. We went to the Treasury and called attention to the fact, recommending that the age for establishment should be raised from forty-five to fifty years. We thought it expedient that fifty and not forty-five should be the maximum in future for establishment. Sanction has now been obtained from the Treasury, and men are enabled to become eligible for establishment up to fifty years. I am quite sure the extension will be appreciated.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAThe maximum age was forty-five, and now the Treasury have sanctioned that up to fifty years they will be eligible for establishment.
§ Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEBut they would have to meet competition?
§ 6.0 P.M.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAI assume they will, but at any rate, they will have the chance of establishment up to the age of fifty. I desire to refer to another matter which has reference to the conflict which arose between the Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth and myself in the early Debates on the Navy Estimates this year. I feel that I must make some short reference to it. In a speech in the Chamber of Commerce the Noble Lord asked for ten battleships up to 31st March, 1914—six if we laid down a contingent four. We did lay down the contingent four, and we laid down five in 1910–11, so that if in 1911–12 we laid down one battleship he ought to be satisfied. That is what I took from his statement. The Noble Lord stoutly denied it, and insisted that the ten up to 31st March, 1914, was conditional, and that under certain circumstances you would want not ten, but sixteen, and that would give you thirty-two by 31st March, 1914, instead of thirty. What I insisted 1016 upon was that he had not asked for sixteen; the Noble Lord will remember that that was my point. He did not ask for sixteen so far as "The Times" report was concerned. That was the best report open to me, and there is no reference to sixteen in it. What does occur in it is this, that the Noble Lord speaking said:—
I must tell you that the proposal I am making does not allow for German acceleration—although we had learned by that date that there was no German acceleration—because again I do not want my countrymen to pay for something which is not visible, and it does not allow in any way for the Austrian announcement of the commencement of four battleships.The Noble Lord is entitled to claim that I did not give sufficient attention to that proviso, but my contention that he did not ask for sixteen in the speech as reported in "The Times" is a perfectly correct one. The reference to the sixteen is in the appendix which the Noble Lord afterwards was so good as to show to me and give to me. I have it here, and the Noble Lord will easily see that that could not be printed in a newspaper. It states:—This is the detailed account of my proposals as indicated by me in my speech of 30th June, 1969.At the top is shows ten ships, including the contingent four, and later onIncrease of above programme if Austria lays down four battleships…by six ships, and that makes up his sixteen. I ought to have given greater attention to the proviso, but the sixteen was not in the report. Nevertheless, the Noble Lord knows I would not intentionally misrepresent him; I only refer to the controversy to give, as I now do, a more complete and more accurate statement of what the Noble Lord's intentions were than I did on 16th March.
Mr. BALFOURThe right hon. Gentleman has made a very interesting speech, but it would have been more interesting to me, and, indeed, in some respects more worthy of the occasion if he had occupied more of it in dealing with the arguments which had been advanced by previous speakers upon certain very grave questions of naval policy. I do not think that he dealt with those, at any rate at any great length. He gave us his interpretation of a speech delivered many months ago, and gave us a long extract from a newspaper report of a speech which was delivered by an hon. and gallant Friend of mine, all matters of great interest, but none of them, if he will permit me to say so, touch- 1017 ing the issues raised either by the hon. Gentleman on the other side of the House with regard to the arming of "Dreadnoughts," or with regard to the even more vital question raised in the speech of my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Lee), and in the speech of my Noble Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford). I hope those questions will be dealt with by the First Lord of the Admiralty. The hon. Member for Kincardineshire (Captain Murray) has dealt with a point which, I am sure, has caused great anxiety both in the Admiralty and out of it for many years past. When the "Dreadnought" policy was started it was at that time a subject of great anxiety as to whether the secondary armament of those ships was really adequate and was really the best that could be introduced in view of the work they would have to do in the North Sea and other theatres of operation, where the range of vision on many days of the year is necessarily limited. At that time all the experts of the Admiralty were quite clear that our system was the best. I do not think any Government can take a view other than that which is pressed on them by those who are really responsible in a matter which is clearly highly technical matter.
Nevertheless, I think that the anxiety which on this point has existed from the beginning must have been augmented by the fact that while every naval nation of the world has imitated us in policy with regard to ships of the "Dreadnought" type, no nation in the world has accepted our policy with regard to the secondary armaments of those ships. I admit that the arguments in favour of practically concentrating all your force in your biggest type of gun, with the exception of the relatively small guns which only are to be used in case of torpedo attack, I admit there was, and is, much to be said for it. I remember when I used to inquire into the question, the argument which I think most weighed with the technical advisers of the Government was that is was far easier to get a range if you had only one type of great gun, than if you had mixed types and had more than one kind of gun. I have no doubt that that argument is of great weight. On the other hand, it is impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that many men of perfectly sound and unbiassed judgment in this country are in doubt as to whether we are adopting the right policy. If you ask the naval constructors of our great yards under private Control, I believe you will find that they 1018 think our policy is open to question. What moves me more than anything else is that the Germans, the Americans, and the Japanese, to mention only those three great naval Powers, apparently have taken a different view from that which is adopted by the Admiralty.
§ Mr. McKENNA made an observation which was inaudible.
Mr. BALFOURThey may differ among themselves, but none of them agree with us. I think every one of those nations, who have devoted an immense amount of care, thought, and expense to determining the exact methods in which they would adopt our "Dreadnought" policy, have come to the conclusion that, rightly or wrongly, we are not armed in the second batteries of those great ships. I do not ask the Government naturally, or the First Lord to go against the advice of his experts; it would be folly to do so, he must be guided by those who are most eminently distinguished men; but I do ask him and them to consider with most anxious care the opposite conclusion, or the different conclusion, which has been arrived at by nations so diverse in training and so ready to follow us where they can, and who have all agreed at any rate to vary the practice that we have established, and to vary it in a manner which may make a very vital difference if the ships are ever tested by the supreme arbitrament of a naval engagement. That was the first point, or one of the first points, raised in this Debate, and it was not followed in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman.
Then I come to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham. My hon. Friend did not dwell at length upon the questions so often debated in this House whether our programme of battleships, meaning by battleships "Dreadnoughts" in the strictest sense of the word, and "Invincibles," whether that was or was not adequate to the necessities of this country. He did not go over in details the disputes which we have had on previous occasions, but he did mention one specific point which does deserve the attention of the Government and the House. He pointed out that if you take the accepted programme of the central Continental States which are in alliance, and compare that programme in the matter of battleships with our programme you will find that in the year 1914 there is no substantial superiority on the part of this country. Heaven forbid we should be 1019 engaged with the central Powers of Europe. It is, I hope, a contingency so remote as to be one which, except when we are dealing with the real necessities of self-preservation, we may put on one side. But they are great States, and in alliance, and if we should be in the unhappy contingency suggested by my hon. Friend we should have to divide our forces so as to protect our interests in the Mediterranean in such a way as would leave us in the North Sea in a very much weaker position than this country is in the habit of supposing, in face of any real and serious dispute with the next greatest naval Power to ours in the world.
Mr. BALFOURIt is because I cannot tell what the slate of affairs may be in 1914 I ask the Government to be prepared for any contingency. I pass from that point, which I ventured again to emphasise, to what was the main substance of my hon. Friend's contention, and which I admit was dealt with by the right hon. Gentleman, though not, I think, in a satisfactory fashion, if he will forgive me for saying so. My criticism of his mode of dealing with it is this. He read us a long list of statistics, and if he will allow me to say so, too long a list, because it included a great many ships quite incapable of protecting our commerce, and not intended to protect our commerce. [An HON. MEMBER: "Scouts."] I think he included scouts, and I thought he included some for laying mines.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAI am not sure. I do not think so.
Mr. BALFOURMy criticism is just, but it is not as just as I thought. He did include scouts but he did not include some other ships which, if he had included, he would be prepared to admit ought to form any part of any such detailed list. Having gone through this list, he says: "Can any other nation in the world, or any other two nations, show us a list of cruisers comparable to the one which will be possessed by this country and the Dominions of this country in a very short time?" I do not think that that is the proper way to deal with this particular strategic problem. It is the proper way to deal with the comparative strength of fighting fleets. Then you may set them side by side, ship by ship, and say that one fleet is stronger 1020 or not stronger than, equal or unequal to, some other, and that if it is equal so far as that other fleet is concerned you are safe. But that is not the way to treat the great lines of communication. It is not even a mere question of which nation has the largest fleet of modern or relatively modern cruisers. The question is whether such a Fleet as we have got is adequate to protect our great lines of commerce in the critical weeks which would exist at the opening of a war. That is not a question which can be settled merely by reading out a list, however formidable, of cruisers and saying that no other country can show anything to compare with it.
Our anxiety has been, and is, with regard to the safety of our trade routes, especially in the earlier stages of a war. We know from an Admiralty document published on the authority of the Secretary of State for War, that the method by which the Government expect to be able to deal with cruisers attacking our commerce is that of more or less effectively scaling up the ports from which, as their base, those cruisers could prey on our commerce. Apparently some northern Continental Powers were in question. The view of the Admiralty seems to be that if you have a superior Fleet in the North Sea you can protect all those converging lines of commerce which come across the Atlantic from west to east, or from south to north from the Mediterranean and elsewhere. I suppose that that is and does remain a fundamental and important part of the strategy of this country for dealing not only with the enemy's fleets, but with the enemy's cruisers. But one cannot help feeling after what has occurred, not merely in the Debate of last night, but also in regard to the apparently steady movement that Continental opinion has shown in all the Debates on the Declaration of London, and taking into account the views that Continental Governments have expressed in those Debates that there will or may be a very considerable creation of, as we think, illegitimate cruisers on the high seas out of merchantmen. Hence it seems to me that the importance of policing the trade routes is and must be immensely increased. It is really no use saying that these ships will be very imperfectly adapted to the work. They will be most imperfectly adapted to the permanent work, but will they from their situation at the moment of the declaration of war be imperfectly adapted to carry out that function, which is the one we most 1021 fear, namely, the destruction of ships belonging to neutrals or ships belonging to ourselves carrying the foodstuffs which in the early stages of a war will bo so absolutely necessary to us?
It is no use comparing the actual numerical strength of our cruisers with the numerical strength of the cruisers possessed by this or that other country. These cruisers do not meet in battle; they do not meet as organised forces. If the whole question was to be settled by a fight between our cruisers and the organised cruisers of another nation, the numerical estimate would be amply sufficient. But that is not what is going to happen. We must provide policemen for all these routes, and the policemen have to deal with a new kind of criminal since the Declaration of London, or, more strictly, since the Continental Powers, by their resistance to our views on this subject in the debates on the Declaration of London, have so freely shown that they regard it as one of their really important weapons of offence against this country that they should be able to commission merchantmen on the high seas—merchantmen which, however ineffective for permanent work during a war, may deal us a blow at the very moment when that blow is most serious. I hope that when the First Lord comes to reply he will give us as much satisfaction on this point as the public interest will permit. I say as much as the public interest will permit because it would not be proper to insist that this Government, or any Government, should describe to the House of Commons, and through the House of Commons to the world at large, precisely what their strategical plans were, and how they proposed in every case to deal with this or that difficulty which might confront the country. Nevertheless, though I quite admit that, if the First Lord thinks it his duty to say that it is inexpedient in the public interest to make a full explanation on the point, I for one shall deem it my duty to accept that statement, and I hope he will realise that nothing has yet been said from that Bench, either in the Debate to-day or in previous Debates, of a kind which will really satisfy us.
I do not wish to take part in the discussion in any controversial spirit. If the right hon. Gentleman chooses to say, as he is justified in saying for what it is worth, that this policy of diminishing the number of cruisers of no great fighting capacity is a policy which we began—we did begin it, 1022 and I think we were right. But I would point out that certain circumstances must have been pressed on the attention of the Government during the last two years which were not, and could not, have been present to our minds. I certainly never realised or thought it possible that it would be the declared policy of great nations—a policy which they would refuse to deprive themselves of the power of pursuing—to turn their ships on a great scale into commerce destroyers on the high seas. It is true, of course, that the beginnings of the policy could even then have been discerned. In my view—I do not know whether the Government would agree— the spirit of the Treaty of Paris was broken as soon as merchant vessels were turned into war vessels without having crews, organised, drilled, and trained in the method which we recognise as characteristic of a man of war. What was intended by the Treaty of Paris when we abolished privateering was not so much to prevent the destruction of commerce as to prevent the destruction of our commerce by ships that were not warships. I believe it is only correct to say that these converted merchantmen would be warships. I imagine that they would be. We should not use the old crews and merely turn the merchant ships into commerce destroyers. We should make them really Government ships, with the same drill and discipline, and in every respect indistinguishable from cruisers. But I do not believe that that is what is intended by the Continental nations which claim this power. They do not mean to have these ships really warships; they want to have them technically warships, colourably warships; but they mean deliberately and in a most dangerous fashion to get round the original Treaty of Paris of 1856, and to cover the high seas as far as they can with what are in effect substantially privateers, with the additional danger that they only become privateers in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.
That danger may have begun to show itself three or four years ago, but I do not believe that anybody could then have foreseen the magnitude which it has now reached under the stress of the discussions on the Declaration of London. That danger is now facing us, and even if the Government do not think it proper to declare all the plans which they have for dealing with this new menace to our food supplies and our trade routes, I earnestly hope that in their building programme they will make special provision for this 1023 fresh, and as I think very grave danger to which our food supplies and the raw materials of this country are now subject, and from which certainly we all believe they were in practice safe when the "scrapping" policy was introduced. I do not wish to raise the issue of the Declaration of London again. I deeply regret the decision to which the House of Commons came, but they did come to it, and that matter may be said for the moment to be settled. The appeal I make to the Government is that they should face the situation which they, as I think, are in part responsible, and which, whether they are responsible for it or not, is now upon us, and adapt their building programme to the new dangers and the new circumstances which have arisen.
§ Mr. WILKIEI make no apology for intervening in this discussion. I think that when a Member who is specially interested in the subject rises to address the Committee he should have an opportunity to put forward his views. I hope, therefore, the Committee will bear with me if in my rough and rugged way I attempt to place my views before them. In listening to these Debates I have all along felt that they were largely hypothetical. Even to-day, the Leader of the Opposition was challenged as to whether he knew what will be the situation in 1914, and he admitted he did not. How is it possible for the human intellect to provide for what you do not know? That, I think, proves my statement that many of these discussions have been purely hypothetical. I understood that the Vote under discussion was Vote 8 (Construction), but the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Arthur Lee) at the very beginning of the Debate boxed the compass. I do not intend to deal with general policy except that I would remind the Committee that the "Dreadnoughts" have never been tested in actual war, whilst the pre-"Dreadnoughts' have been. It is possible that the "Dreadnoughts" may turn out to be not as effective as their designers anticipated. As more or less of a layman, my opinion would be, for, at least, a great portion of our home waters, to provide smaller ships and with greater speed, with equal armament to anything afloat. I listened very carefully to the Noble Lord, the Member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford), with his experience of the salt sea he always brings a breeze into the House when he refers to these questions. 1024 I hope he will excuse me if I remind him— as I have been reminded since last election—that he was elected, not merely to look after the policy of the Admiralty, but likewise to say one little word—I have not heard one to-day—on behalf of the men who construct the vessels of the Navy, which he knows the work of so well. I think at the last election the dockyards town was swept by his side on their promises of what was to be done for the workers. So far not much has been done.
I desire to enter into the question from an industrial point of view. I fully expected the Secretary to the Admiralty, when he was up, to say something on the point. I hope the First Lord, when he rises, will tell us he has done something for the workers. Is it not possible that we can have our policy in this matter thought out instead of for one or two years, for five, six, or ten years? I believe other countries are doing it, and have done it; and why cannot we? I know perfectly well that there are very great difficulties in the way; but it is to get over difficulties that politicians are for, especially Ministers! They should be sagacious in contriving and dexterous in using means to get over their difficulties. The Members of the Government might show some of that skill and dexterity that some, at least, of the Opposition credit them with. I desire, therefore, that they should use it in the direction I have indicated, which would help to steady the trade of the country. One of the reports of the Poor Law Commission—I think it was the Minority Report—dealing with the industry of the country suggested that when the trade of the country was slack there should be some increase of the national work; and that when the trade of the country was busy the national work should slacken down. I certainly strongly contend that the national resources and the national services, wherever possible, should be used to regulate the general ebb and flow of labour and of trade.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in one of his speeches on the National Insurance Bill, admitted that the workers are the greatest sufferers by these great fluctuations of trade; likewise that they are the least responsible. A real effort should, therefore, be made to mitigate this. We should by this means give more stability to the trade of the country and greater continuity of employment to a larger number of workers. Surely it would be better to employ men on national work than what we have been doing, that is giving grants 1025 in relief to unemployed workmen—sometimes not to the most deserving. During the last few years in the depression of the shipbuilding trade we have had as many as 30 per cent. unemployed. With the present flow of improved trade and the extra work required to be done by our own and other Governments, in some cases the supply for certain classes of workers is not equal to the demand, the workers asserting that they are either starved to death or, as at present, worked to death. We contend that a real effort ought to be made to change that state of affairs, because if it goes on what will be the result? A large number of extra men will be introduced into the industry, and then when the recurrent depression comes, unless some bettor method has been introduced in the meantime, we will not only have 30 per cent. of our men idle, but 50 or 60 per cent, "making bad worse and confusion worse confounded." Therefore, with all humility, I respectfully suggest that until the temporary rush is over the contract work of the Government should be slowed down. We have the complaint of a great many Government contractors who find it difficult to meet their date of delivery: to meet their obligations they have to work a large amount of overtime. That overtime is bad; it has to be paid for at time and a half; it is virtually more or less loss: whereas if the contractors could slow clown there would be a better return to the country in extending the period of the employment of the workers.
The First Lord admitted, I think, in his opening speech this Session, that there was some delay Last year from the industrial trouble. Notwithstanding—I suppose it was an Election catching cry from the opposite side, who "wanted eight and wouldn't wait"—the delay has done no harm to anyone. The hypothetical position of 1914 is no longer taken as an actual fact, or in proof of the assertion of hon. Gentlemen opposite. If that delay had been caused by the workers we would likely have heard of great indignation raised against the workers, who would have been accused of lack of patriotism in dealing with the work. But as it was not their action hardly a word was said in reference to the delay, proving after all that all the cries raised were not real, but only made for party purposes, which, however, failed at the last election. I do not want to enter into the question of the burden of armaments. I have always been one who favoured an efficient navy. But the cost of our national defences must be con- 1026 sidered with our national income. What we contend is that it apparently is easier to get money from this House to destroy life than to preserve and to develop it. We contend that the assertion that we cannot provide adequate defensive forces for our country and at the same time provide for social reform is shown not to be the case by the fact that our greatest naval competitor at present is beating us in social reform, is spending more upon social reform. If that country can do it, so can we. We can, therefore, obtain better conditions than we have.
To come from the mere question of the dead material to the living labour, I want to bring the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the inequality of treatment that is meted out to the different class of workers in His Majesty's dockyards. In doing so I do not desire to appear to be invidious in comparing one class of workman with another. I desire simply to state facts as they are, not that the one class who may be at the top is receiving more than its share. Far from it. But I do say that the others are receiving less than they ought to receive. An example the First Lord has had, I think, put to him before, and he has not made the response which we think he should have made. Take the case of boys sitting for examination with a view to starting dockyard employment. Those who obtain the highest number of marks get the choice of trade. The two principal trades are engineering and ship construction. The two boys who pass at the top of the list take these trades. They enter the yard equal. They both attend the dockyard school for four years and are trained in the same subjects. At the end of four years they are both equal in scholastic and mechanical training. At the end of six years their apprenticeship period comes to an end. Both are still equally good. Now comes the difference. The maximum pay of the shipwright is £l 15s. 6d. The minimum pay of the engineer is £l 16s. How there is that difference in the two departments we cannot understand. Both work the same hours and under similar conditions. We certainly contend that these inequalities even amongst the Government's own employés ought to be redressed.
In view of the advance of wages given by the shipbuilders of this country we expected the Admiralty would have given a more generous response to the petition of the workmen, and if they had not given an advance, at least would have brought up 1027 their men to an equivalent rate. How this should be denied the workmen we cannot understand. It is not in the interests of the public that it should be denied. When we go further and compare the rates of pay of the Admiralty in a considerable number of their principal trades, we have complaints made by the contractors who build vessels outside that the difference is much greater. The Government recently brought in an amended Fair-Wages Clause, and the present President of the Board of Trade told us that it was "not only watertight but seaworthy." If so, I contend the Admiralty are not carrying out their own ideal. The Admiralty compel their contractors to observe this Fair-Wages Clause, yet they are not observing it themselves. Take the trade in which I am most conversant. The rates of pay of the shipwrights in the Dockyard is 35s. 6d. per week for the hired men, and 34s. for the established men. The rate paid in the other shipbuilding yards for doing precisely the same class of work is from 3s. 6d. to 10s. per week higher. And if you take the joiners' and other trades that figure is even greater. Will the Government give us a committee of inquiry, where we can go into the matter and have the whole thing investigated and dealt with once and for all, so as to prevent this squabbling and continued complaints that come to some of us and involve us in a great amount of correspondence?
I now come to the next question of what is called skilled labour; that is merely a name for a. class to which boys work up to. The First Lord of the Admiralty is thoroughly conversant with this matter, but the real point at issue has been missed. This class of workers are employed upon drilling, riveting and caulking, and we are told that, if they were classed as mechanics they would have to be discharged. As a rule you do not discharge many of your skilled artisans. It is not denied—indeed, it is admitted—that the skilled labourers doing this class of work are only a little less skilled than artisans, and that they are doing good work. Therefore, if they are doing good work equal to contract work in regard to which the Admiralty compel contractors to pay the standard rate, then I say that the Admiralty ought to pay these men a proper scale of wages. If they put them on less skilled work, let them pay a less skilled rate. We have had classification but classification does not meet the difficulty, because under classification you may have four men 1028 equally skilled upon one job, doing the same amount of work, but each of the four getting a different rate of pay. What I contend is that the Admiralty should classify the work and pay the men the rate they are entitled to. If they did that they would get rid of the whole difficulty. There is no reason why these men doing this work with recognised skill should not receive the same rate as similar men received from the contractors. I urge upon the Admiralty their favourable consideration for this matter, and I have to publicly thank the First Lord of the Admiralty for giving me an opportunity of pulling the case before him. I referred the other day to the respectful request for improved conditions for carpenter warrant officers, shipwrights, and carpenters crew, who have not received any improvement for the last thirty years. They are now becoming disappointed and disheartened, which as everybody knows takes the energy and life out of men. If we are to maintain an efficient navy and efficient ships we must have efficient warrant officers, shipwrights, carpenters and crew afloat.
§ Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEOn a point of Order, Mr. Whitley, does this Vote include carpenters and crews?
§ Mr. WILKIEI am only following the example of the hon. Member for Fareham, who boxed the compass, and I hope the hon. Member will excuse me for I have on two or three occasions tried to get in with this discussion when it would have been strictly in order, and I can now only ask the indulgence of the Committee to enable me to put my point. You may have the best commanders and engineers and everything else in your ship, but these men who know the ship from stem to stern are the men you must depend upon in times of emergency. Let us have an inquiry right down into all these things and let us go into the question of the complaints of the workmen and the complaints from the engine room and from the dockyards. I say it will be far better to the interests of the Navy that you should have these matters inquired into and investigated. I ask the Admiralty, will it not be possible to expedite the method of dealing with these questions. There is considerable friction over the long delay that take place and owing to the length of time before answers are given. I hope the Committee will agree to accept an inquiry into these matters, and if they do, they will be acting in the best interest, not only of the Navy, but of the Nation as a whole.
§ Mr. ALAN BURGOYNEI am sure the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down will forgive me if I do not follow him in his argument, but if I rather return to the subject which I think is entirely in order, and which has been dealt with by some Members upon this side of the House; that is the question of secondary armament. Before I come to that I should like to make some reference to the remarks made by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty. I am not ashamed of anything I have written, nor am I frightened by criticism upon it, but I repudiate the suggestion, which I dislike intensely, that I am to be considered as an expert. I never claim to be such. In the course of the Debate upon the Naval Estimates of the year, earlier in the Session, references were made by a number of hon. Members on this side of the House, and also by some Members on the other side, to the fact that in armament of the latest type of ships of the line now under construction both at home and abroad we of all the naval Powers had abandoned secondary armaments, as hitherto understood. I do not think it can be contended by the Admiralty that the answers that came from the Treasury Bench were, at all convincing or satisfactory, and it is for that reason I wish to deal with this important matter at some length. During the course of the same Debate an hon. Member below the Gangway complained that in naval and military matters we were entirely in the hands and under the control of (he experts, and, if I remember rightly, he suggested that we should have a little more to say as to the design, displacement and cost of ships. He instanced the United States, where the very design of ships is largely settled by the decision of the Senate. I think a large majority of the Members of this House would agree that it would be folly for us to adjudicate upon the technicalities of ship construction. But, nevertheless, I submit that the question I have to put is one that should receive the earnest attention of those interested in our naval defences. It is not my wish to weary the Committee with the dull minutiæ of naval development, but I may remind the Committee in support of my case that until the advent of "Dreadnoughts" all capital ships, whatever might be their difference in detail—in displacement, in the thickness of armour or in outward appearance—possessed this in common in all countries in the world, that their armaments were divided into three distinct sections, each destined for an equally distinct 1030 theoretical function. First came the primary armament, representing the smashing power of the ship, and being in effect the great factor which distinguishes the capital ships from the smaller and lesser craft. Next came the secondary armament of medium guns, which was there for several purposes. In the first place it was there as a supplement to the main armament for the effective attack upon the lighter structures. They were intended further for the rapid discharge of morale shaking explosives, with the view to upsetting the equilibrium of the crews of rival ships, and finally for defence or offence against such protected craft as might come within range and not be of that importance to warrant the use of the larger weapons. Lastly there was the anti-torpedo craft or tertiary armament destined for the rapid discharge of projectiles against swift vessels attacking with the torpedo as their arm.
During the last ten years there has been a conviction growing in the minds of those interested in naval matters that the multiplication of war functions in a single hull is a mistake. In the old days a battleship, by reason of the fact that she carried a secondary armament could undertake the functions of cruiser as well as battleships. She carried mines—she was therefore also a minelayer. Now there are mine-layers fitted solely for the laying of these explosives; to-day certain types of ships perform certain types of functions. Indeed, simplicity is the basis of naval development. I mention this point merely because it has an important bearing on what I desire to prove. The essence of successful gunnery, once precision has been attained, is "fire control, and it is impossible adequately to perform this all-important function without careful "spotting," that is to say the instantaneous yet precise observation of the effect of the projectile discharged upon the mark aimed at. Obviously if a broadside fired into an enemy is composed of shot and shell of many and varying sizes the effect of the discharge cannot properly be gauged. The result of this gunnery axiom is to be found in the "Dreadnought" where the primary and secondary armaments were merged into one. The acceptance of this axiom too dispels for all time from the minds of the vast majority of naval officers and others interesting themselves in the question any regard for a secondary battery as a supporting factor to the primary weapon. We are thus left with the big guns and the 1031 little guns with no medium weapons, intended either to aid the former or supplement the number of the latter. The Noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth said he believed that the best mixture of armaments in battleships was a combination of the smallest effective big gun with the largest effective small gun. In that he was but following the axiom laid down by Lord Fisher, than whom no greater authority could be mentioned. With the big guns now being mounted I have nothing to do. It may be stated, however, that they are probably the finest in the world. I would direct the attention of the Committee, therefore, to the small guns, the tertiary or anti-torpedo armament. These weapons are mounted on modern ships for but a single purpose—to protect the vast structures from destroyer, torpedo boat or submarine attack. The value of a gun, I take it, may be judged by its suitability for the work it will be called upon to perform.
In 1877 the first serviceable torpedo boat, the "Lightning," displaced seventeen tons and steamed eighteen knots, and even by 1890 we had not generally reached one hundred tons displacement, whilst the speed was no more than twenty-two knots. To meet these torpedo carrying crafts, battleships of that period carried a number of guns firing shells weighing one, three, or six pounds. But in those days certain facts entered into consideration. The speed of the attacking craft was comparatively small, thus providing a large period during which they would be under fire. Their torpedoes were erratic and of short range, so that an attack, to be successful, had to be pushed right home, and the size of the boat was such that a few six-pound projectiles bursting inside them would disable and stop them.
7.0 P.M.
By 1892 the menace of the torpedo-boat had become so great that the Admiralty introduced an antidote—they had already tried one, the torpedo-catcher or torpedo gunboat, but it failed miserably on the score of speed. In 1893 we came first to the torpedo-boat destroyer of the Havock type, of 210 tons. Having introduced this destroyer, it was promptly taken up by every other Power, with the result that it slowly displaced the small craft it had been introduced to destroy and became, in its turn, the bane of the battleship. To meet the bigger craft it was necessary to introduce a new anti-torpedo weapon, and the battleships were promptly fitted with a 1032 twelve or fifteen-pounder gun, and we did not change this up to the days of the "Dreadnought," when we went as far as the 4-inch gun, firing, according to its type, a shell weighing twenty-five or thirty-one pounds. The point I wish to make is that whilst destroyers have gone up to 1,000 tons displacement or more, we have not increased the calibre of the anti-torpedo guns. This was not a very important matter at the time since, in addition to these twelve-pounder guns, we had the secondary battery of 6-inch guns.
But what is the ease when these 6-inch guns have been removed? How are our ships placed? History teaches us that victory can only be gained by a preponderance in battleships fitted to lie in the line. This has always been so in the past, and it will be so in the future. I wish to emphasise what the Secretary to the Admiralty has already said, namely, that in regard to battleships we have probably reached the zenith of our naval preponderance. I think I am right in saying that we shall, after the commissioning of the "Colossus" and "Hercules," have fourteen "Dreadnoughts." as against fourteen "Dreadnoughts" possessed by the rest of the world combined. Whilst that is true, it is equally true that from this day onward we shall descend in our ratio of naval strength as compared with other Powers, and the time will come when we shall find ourselves with a superiority of not more than nine ships. Now I ask the Committee to consider when we have a superiority of no more than nine ships, what will the feelings of the country be—
§ Mr. McKENNAThe hon. Member means nine ships of the "Dreadnought" type.
§ Mr. BURGOYNEYes. I want to recall to the right hon. Gentleman's mind that he once made the statement that the time will come when "Dreadnoughts" alone will count.
§ Mr. McKENNANot yet.
§ Mr. BURGOYNEI am coming to that particular time.
§ Mr. McKENNABut then we shall have more than a margin of nine ships.
§ Mr. BURGOYNEI am speaking up to the year 1914, and I do not think the right hon. Gentleman can look further. I ask what will be the feelings of the country if, as the result of a destroyer attack, which they are unfitted to meet, we learned that six or eight of our super-"Dreadnoughts " 1033 had been torpedoed and sunk, leaving us with a battle fleet inferior to that of the enemy? It may be contended that this is a fancy picture, but what are the facts? What happened in the last naval battle in the Far East? Japan lost one-third of her fighting line, two out of six battleships in a very short time. The "Dreadnought" carries only twenty-four 12-pounder guns. Is the First Lord going to tell me that she could beat off an attack by, say, four destroyers of 800 tons, steaming at thirty knots, and using torpedoes with 7,000 yards range and 45 knots speed? Obviously he is not going to say anything of the sort. You could not keep them off, and the "Dreadnought" would have to go down. The, weakness of the case is recognised by the introduction of the 4-inch guns firing a 25-lb. to 31-lb. shell. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman will suggest that even a 4-inch gun firing those shells will keep off destroyers. Does he imagine that even a dozen of these in each of the attacking craft will prevent at least one of them getting home with a torpedo? I have only to refer to the entire Navy for an answer, and almost with a united voice they will tell him these weapons are far too small and quite inadequate. A man might as well try to shoot leopards with a rook-rifle.
We have to take all these things into consideration. Admiral Paris once said that the farther we go in naval warfare, the more wars will be fought with money. If a "Dreadnought" sinks we lose a matter of £2,000,000, but if four 800-tons destroyers sink the loss is barely £600,000. Surely that would be a profitable transaction to a hostile Navy. I am not contending that you ought to have nothing but torpedo craft. Perhaps the First Lord will tell us that in the case of the large modern destroyer the guns of the main armaments will be used. Would this not savour of shooting rabbits with an elephant rifle? Also, if you are going to use your big guns for repelling torpedo craft, what become of their inner linings should a fleet action take place on the day following an attack by night? Another idea which has been put forward is that possibly a screen of our own destroyers will be maintained around our battle Fleet. That is a type of dependence which is quite new to naval tactics. If other nations were following our lead I would not have pressed this matter to such inordinate length, but what do we find abroad? Whilst in general principle they follow the "Dreadnought," they mount, in 1034 addition to a heavy battery of ten or a dozen large guns, a number of weapons firing projectiles infinitely heavier than that discharged by our 4-inch guns.
I only need to mention the recent naval review. I will take the great American and German vessels at that review. The "Delaware" mounts fourteen 5-inch guns firing a 60-lb. shell; the "Von de Tam" has a number of weapons firing an 88-lb. shell in addition to sixteen 20-pounders. The same applies to the ships now building for Japan, France, Russia, Austria, Italy, Brazil, Argentine, Chili, and Turkey. Spain alone follows our example, and has nothing larger than the 4-inch gun in her ships now building. I do not intend to detain the Committee any further. I have stated my case at great length because I wish to make it clear that I have not raised this question for purely party or obstructive purposes, but because it is one not only of urgency but of gravity. Although there may be and are points of criticism in other directions, I venture to state that to send our huge expensive capital ships to sea inadequately provided against attack with the most potent of modern naval weapons, the torpedo, is a folly almost amounting to a crime. I hope I may appeal to the First Lord not to pass this subject off with a mere reference, because he knows that I voice a large section of the naval service. I ask him to give to the Committee and the country a comprehensive explanation of the policy he and his Hoard have adopted in the past and some definite expressions of opinion as to the lines they propose to pursue in the future.
§ Mr. CHARLES DUNCANI desire to draw attention to an important matter affecting a class of men employed by the Admiralty—I refer to the Admiralty writers. There has been an inquiry into the case of these men. I may say that their wages have remained unaltered since the year 1879. They have petitioned the Admiralty since 1904. but they have never yet received any answer to any of the petitions they have sent in. They petitioned the Admiralty in 1908, and a Staffing Committee was appointed under the chairmanship of the hon. Member for North Camberwell (Dr. Macnamara), and that Committee reported on 3rd September, 1909. Since then these men have been patiently waiting for the adoption of this report by the Treasury. We have now got to the year 1911, so that practically these men have been waiting from 1908 to 1911 for some improvement in their conditions, and 1035 so far as I can see they scorn as far off as ever. These men have a very real grievance. I suppose we may compare them with men who are employed in ordinary industrial circumstances who may have some reason to ask for an improvement in their condition. I never heard of a case in all my experience where a number of workpeople have petitioned their employer where that petition has been listened to and a report made, where the men have been kept for two or three years waiting for the result of an inquiry.
I think these men have very reasonable cause for complaint. They complain that some parts of this report have been put into operation, but not those parts that represent any benefit to them. The parts averse to them have been put into operation, and the parts which they consider mean improvements in their conditions have been withheld, and seem likely to be withheld until the crack of doom. There is another point in regard to the London allowance. These men when brought from the provinces to work in any of the London provinces were given to understand that the difference between the cost of living and other expenses was supposed to amount to £40, and for a period of years this £40 was paid. Since this report has been drawn up this £40 has been reduced to £25 in 1910. The men naturally complain that this reduction has been brought into operation almost immediately and sent to the Treasury, whilst those recommendations which suggested improvements in their conditions have not yet been acted upon.
A further point of complaint is that there are a very considerable number of these men employed in the London district, and the £25 difference only applies to some of them, and not to all. They would like to know if there is this difference between the cost of living and other expenses in the provinces and London, why the whole of the men engaged in the London area do not receive the £25, and why the £25 is not common to all? Another point they have asked me to draw attention to is that there has been one small improvement effected in their condition—almost a microscopical one—and it is that three men who have been working in a higher position have been advanced by £25 per annum. I do think some attention ought to be given to this matter. I have persistently asked questions for a very considerable period now in this House as to when this Report 1036 was likely to be put into effect, and if so, will it be within my own lifetime? Is there any hope at all that this Report is going to be put into operation? These men are getting tired of waiting for this Report, and I think a very great injustice has been caused by asking them to wait such an unconscionable long time. Of course, we all know that Members on the Treasury Bench do not have to wait for their advance of wages two or three years. The matter has only got to be suggested and we, like loyal Members of the House of Commons, immediately grant them their advances between £2,000 and £3,000 a year, and nobody complains. I think the whole of the Members of this House are in agreement that when a man does earn his salary, whatever that sum, he is entitled to have it, and nobody grudges him it. Therefore, I think these men, having waited this enormous long time, are really entitled to come consideration in this matter. They have drawn my attention to many sections of men of a similar class in the employ of the Admiralty whose wages since 1874 have been advanced 20 per cent. to 60 per cent., and it is obvious the cost of living has advanced. I therefore do ask that some promise shall be given on this question which will give the men some degree of satisfaction, and that this report shall not be held up for ever and ever amen, but that these men shall see something is being done and that somebody is not only knocking at the Treasury door but, if necessary, is kicking. If the ordinary boot will not do, I hope they will use the clog. The men have been exceedingly patient in this business, and they do ask that some attention should be given to their petition and that some hope should be offered them of some improvement in their condition during their lifetime. After all, these men are in the service of the Crown, and they have a right to a share in the improvement which is going on all round. The fact that they have remained stationary is a great cause of dissatisfaction among them. I therefore hope that in response to the modest appeal I have made this evening we may have some word of consolation from the First Lord and that some attention will be given to this question, so that, the men will have something to hope for in the immediate future with regard to an improvement in their condition.
§ Mr. McKENNABefore replying on the question of general policy, I had perhaps better dispose of the case referred to by 1037 the hon. Member who has just sat down. A Committee was appointed, and it sal and has reported, but my hon. Friend knows the report of the Committee has to be considered by the two Departments, and it is impossible for me to say anything more than that the question is still being prominently kept open. It would be impossible for me, as it affects other Departments beside my own, to make any more definite statement as to the conclusions to which they came. I cannot say more than that the Committee presided over by my right hon. Friend went into the case with the greatest care and his report on the matter is one which obviously deserves most careful attention.
§ Mr. CHARLES DUNCANWill the right hon. Gentleman do his best to press upon the Treasury that these men have waited all these years.
§ Mr. McKENNAI can assure my hon. Friend I will do my best to sec the Departments concerned coincide in their views upon the subject, but I would ask my hon. Friend not to press me further than that. I think I might summarise what has been said in the earlier parts of the Debate upon the question of general policy under two heads. One was the question of secondary armament, and the other the question of the protection of our trade routes. I do not think I can do better on the question of secondary armament than adopt most, if not all, the statements made by the hon. Member for Kensington (Mr. Burgoyne) as to the history of it. It is perfectly true, as he staled, that the position of the secondary armament as we now understand it has really risen out of a condition in which there was a triple armament, primary, secondary and tertiary, and in most modern ships, and certainly in our ships, the secondary armament has been absorbed in. the primary armament. I do not think we are at issue about anything except the tertiary armament. The secondary armament-which some hon. Gentlemen would wish to see is usually described now as an anti-destroyer armament, and the real question between us is not whether there should or should not be a secondary armament of the old type, but whether the anti-destroyer armament should be stronger than it is in our present ships, namely, a 4-inch gun. I see the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Balfour) shakes his head, but I think I can explain that is really the difference between us. It is not a question of a secondary arma- 1038 ment as the secondary armament was understood when the "King Edward" was built. That question was settled long ago; it was settled by the right hon. Gentleman himself. The outstanding question now is whether the anti-destroyer armament should be more formidable than the 4-inch gun.
The problem we have to consider is what is the work which the anti-destroyer gun has to perform, and that work must depend upon the type of the destroyer and the range of the torpedo. It is an unfortunate fact that the development of the torpedo in the last few years has been remarkable. It is quite true that at one lime the 12-pounder was fully sufficient as an anti-destroyer armament, and it is equally true that at a later stage the 4-in. gun was amply sufficient as an anti-destroyer armament, but the Board of Admiralty fully recognise it may very possibly be the case now—and the question will certainly be considered with a perfectly open mind by the Board—that the 4-in. gun is not a sufficient answer to a torpedo-boat destroyer carrying torpedoes with a range, not of 1,000 or 2,000 yards, but of many thousand yards. We require a gun with a considerable range, as you have to destroy your destroyer before it can get within range with its torpedo. The 4-inch gun, of course, has a range of 6,000 or 7,000 yards, but its hitting power at that distance is not so certain as a gun of a larger type. The problem, therefore, is at what range you can hit your destroyer with tolerable certainty.
Mr. BALFOURIt is not, of course, the whole question either raised by the hon. Member opposite or by myself. It is alleged by some tacticians that a fight between two "Dreadnoughts" might be liable to be decided by a tremendous rain of missiles which would be really of very little use at 7,000 or 8,000 yards, but which would be most effective at 2,000 or 3,000 yards.
§ Mr. McKENNAI am not going to pretend for one moment, if you lake two ships each with the same primary armament, and you add to one a secondary armament, 9.2 or 6-in. guns, that the second ship will not be the stronger of the two, but it is always a question of what you choose to have. I will take two ships. We have now got the "Orion," and before that we had the "St. Vincent." The right hon. Gentleman could have taken the "St. Vincent," with ten 12-inch guns, and he could have added perhaps sixteen 6-inch guns 1039 and used them as a secondary armament on the broadside in battle, and he would have got a ship—I am speaking from memory only—which would cost him precisely the same amount as the "Orion." The "Orion" gives him ten 13.5-in. guns, and the problem he has to solve is which is the better: the "St. Vincent" with ten 12-in. guns and sixteen 6-in. guns or the "Orion" with ten 13.5 guns. He must not take the "Orion" with ten 13.5 guns as against another ship with ten 13.5 guns plus sixteen 6-in. guns. He must compare what he would get for the same money. If he says, "I would spend another £200,000 and add twenty 6-in. guns to the 'Orion,'" I would tell him if I spend another £200,000 on a ship I can get the "Orion," not with ten 13.5 guns on the broadside, but with thirteen or fourteen 13.5 guns on the broadside. Is that not so?
§ Mr. McKENNAIt always comes to a question, if you have a certain amount of money, of how you would spend it. Do we get a better ship in the "Orion" with ten 13.5 guns on the broadside or in the "St. Vincent" with ten 12-in. guns, eight on the broadside, and sixteen 6-in. guns, of which ten would be on the broadside? I would not ask anybody to give a hasty answer to that question, but that is the nature of the problem to be considered, and it is upon the answer to that question that the Admiralty have given their decision in favour of the type of construction recommended to the House. The Admiralty recommended that decision, I think infinitely to their credit, when the right Hon. Gentleman was Prime Minister. The question of the secondary armament, as I have said, has been answered by successive Boards in favour of absorbing the secondary armament in the primary armament. It must be understood that the question whether the 4-in. gun is big enough is left open, and that may be enlarged without altering my argument. What have other nations done? The latest information we have got with regard to Germany shows a secondary or tertiary armament of fourteen 5.9 guns and eighteen 21-pounders. The United States have twenty-one 5-in. gun? and nothing less except 3-pounders, which do not count. They are for an entirely different purpose. In France the latest type of vessel has twenty-two 5.5 guns; Russia has sixteen 1040 4.7; Italy has twenty 4.7, and in the case of a later ship twenty-two 4.7, and sixteen 12-pounders; Austria has twelve 5.9, and Japan is the only country which has really got a secondary armament in the sense suggested by the right hon. Gentleman, namely, ten 6-inch and ten 4.7. The Japanese case has really been answered already in the Debate, for it has been pointed out that where you have a fleet of a sufficient size to provide separate vessels to do the different kinds of work, the ships which have to perform the various classes of duty may be provided with the single type of armament suitable for that duty. But Japan has not got a fleet of sufficient size to keep ships for separate purposes, and hence she has found it necessary to provide her vessels with secondary armaments. Proceeding with my list I see that Brazil has only twenty-two 4.7, and Argentina has twelve 6-inch and twelve 4-inch guns. I repeat that it is apparent that Japan is the only one which has a secondary armament in the sense in which the word was used by the right hon. Gentleman. She has only ten 6-inch and ton 4.7. With regard to the rest they have none of them, except. Germany, anything bigger than 24-pounders, and if our own 4-inch guns are taken into consideration, it may be seen that we are in no way behind any of the other Powers in our destroyer armaments.
Lord C. BERE3FORDIs it the policy of the Board of Admiralty to endeavour to repel torpedo destroyer attacks by destroyers or by armaments?
§ Mr. McKENNAThe policy of the Board is to protect themselves against destroyer attack by counter-destroyer attack or by guns. We adopt the double policy. I do not understand the Noble Lord to suggest we should not adopt the plan of the destroyer attack. I think I can claim to have satisfied the House that with our 4-inch guns we have an adequate anti-destroyer armament.
§ Mr. LEEThere is one point I would like to raise. Take two types of ships of equal tonnage. We will take the "Colossus" and compare it with one of the Japanese vessels. Each has a tonnage of about 22,000. Our vessel has ten 12-inch guns and sixteen 4.7; the Japanese has twelve 12-inch guns, ten 6-inch and ten 4.7. Why is it we cannot get these advantages in ships of equal tonnage and of approximately the same date?
§ Mr. McKENNAIf the hon. Gentleman will allow me I will remind him that the "Colossus" and "Hercules" shipbuilding plan broke down two years ago, and what I am saying now relates to the programme of the present year. The hon. Gentleman will hardly expect me to go into a detailed justification of the programme of two years ago. The next question that was raised was that of the defence of our trade routes, and the particular aspect which was emphasised was that which would arise from the use of armed merchantmen which it was supposed would be suddenly commissioned at sea without any warning. The Leader of the Opposition was good enough to help me in one respect by reminding the House that it was quite possible this would be a matter on which one could only speak with very great difficulty. The House will not expect me to disclose the strategy of the Admiralty, our exact state of knowledge, or the ground for that knowledge of what has been done. I think, however, I can safely say this, that the arming of merchantmen does not really constitute any new factor. If we should be engaged in war one of the first functions which the Navy has to perform, after the protection of our commerce and keeping the sea open for themselves, is to close the sea to the enemy and to endeavour to destroy his trade. His merchant ships, whether they were armed or not, would be located, marked down, and, I hope, captured. Of course everything must depend on the position of the ships at the particular moment, and I can only say this that the Admiralty do their best to keep themselves thoroughly well informed of the position at any moment of any ship likely to be dangerous and of the courses open to her. If such danger exists I think, I may say, we are provided with adequate means of defence. The House will understand it is perfectly impossible for me to disclose here what steps have been taken and the state of information at which we have arrived, whether against this or that Power.
It would be absurd to suppose that the technical advisers of the Admiralty are misinformed on these points, or that they have not taken full account of all the steps necessary to protect our commerce. I agree with most of what the hon. Gentleman said when he spoke of the necessity of safeguarding our trade on the outbreak of war. This is a consideration which the Board of Admiralty has ever before it, and the whole of its policy and strategy is bound up with the idea that at the outbreak of war we shall safeguard our own 1042 trade and destroy the trade of the enemy. The Noble Lord smiles. I think I might reply to him in the words he used when he took note of the fact that I smiled at an observation he had made. I may tell him I am speaking not my own views on the subject, but I am stating the steps which will be taken by the technical advisers of the Board, who are as fully apprised of the dangers and of the possibilities of danger as the Noble Lord himself. The Noble Lord has frequently used an expression which he will forgive me for saying is somewhat misleading, and that is that our trade routes are not protected, because he does not see cruisers steaming up and down them and acting like policemen on a beat. That is not the use to which we put our cruisers. We put our policemen where the danger is and where the possible robber is to be found. It is no good having policemen marching up and down the middle of the street; you want them constantly aware of the suspicious houses and suspicious quarters which need to be watched, and you want them placed in the neighbourhood of the districts where there is danger.
§ Lord C. BERESFORDI smiled because exactly the same remark has been made in past years. We were told, in fact, that the cruisers were not wanted any more, and that no more would be built. As a matter of fact, no more were built for two or three years. I said that was a mistake at the time, and, although we were told that that was the recommendation of the technical advisers of the Board of Admiralty my opinion was that they were wrong, and I submit that they are still in the wrong, as you will have to build more cruisers.
§ Mr. McKENNAThe Noble Lord is rather going into the controversies of an antediluvian period. I beg him to come down to the year 1911 and to see what we are doing. It is all very well to talk about what occurred six or eight years ago. The question is whether we have enough cruisers to meet our necessities. We do not need to see them every few miles; we could never get enough cruisers built to satisfy such a demand as that. The question is have we got enough cruisers to watch every possible source of danger. I say that we have. After the most careful examination of the facts I say there is no justification for anxiety on that point, and you may be assured that the Board of Admiralty has never lost sight of the importance of that point, and would not 1043 hesitate for one moment to ask the House for anything that was necessary to secure our trade. I say that we are satisfied, the Board are satisfied, that we have made adequate provision, not for all time. The Noble Lord (Lord C. Beresford) must not say next year when there is another programme with more cruisers, "Oh, you said last year you had enough, and now you are asking for more."
§ Lord C. BERESFORDWe shall not complain.
§ Mr. McKENNANo, you will not complain. I have little doubt that next year's programme will include more cruisers, and the year after that more cruisers. We shall have to build cruisers, not to have them on the line of march like policemen, but in order to meet the cruisers which are being laid down by other Powers. As they built cruisers so we shall, because the element of danger would be increased against us if we were not prepared with cruisers to meet that danger. I hope I have given a sufficient answer on these points. I have endeavoured to deal with them in a fair spirit. My only anxiety was to allay what I recognise is a thoroughly respectable anxiety upon these points, and to assure the House that the Board of Admiralty will not neglect their duty in regard to the questions of the trade routes of this country. My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. Wilkie) asked one or two questions with regard to carpenters and the difference between the pay of shipwrights and engineers. That is a matter which has been considered. I must remind him that it is a matter of choice by the men themselves, or rather by the lads themselves, which trade they will take, and whether they are engineers or shipwrights they know what the conditions of pay are at the time. There is no unfairness in that respect, but I will bear in mind what the hon. Member has said.
§ Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEI quite agree with the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Wilkie) that it is very difficult to get in a reference to matters affecting the dockyards in a Debate in this House. Whilst I sympathise with him in what he said about the carpenters and other artisan ratings in the Royal Navy, I am sure he will excuse me when I rose and asked if he was in order. I think this is the first time for many years we have had 1044 an opportunity of discussing in this House Vote so far as it relates to personnel of the Naval Estimates.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAEvery year.
§ Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKELast year a day was given, but the whole time was taken up with construction. Three years before that the Debate was closured.
§ Dr. MACNAMARANo, no. It was always debated.
§ Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKEI will not dispute the matter. But, at any rate, we have very few opportunities of discussing matters connected with the dockyards. I do not know why that is done, why the dockyard Members should not have an opportunity of discussing matters which are of vital importance to this country. One can well understand the anxiety of the Government to avoid discussion, both of the questions of construction and personnel, seeing that until quite recently the naval policy of the Government was to limit construction to a degree which we now know was incompatible with the safety of the Empire, and to limit the status of the personnel by suspending establishment in the Royal dockyards. Thanks to the Imperial Press Conference, which I do not think attracted sufficient attention in this House at the time, and the lesson learnt by the Government at the last General Election, they have awakened from the slumber into which they were lulled and into which the Labour party would desire to lull them again.
Now that they have endeavoured to make up leeway, naturally their supporters below the Gangway rebel against the Estimates. Four years ago they were told that a very much smaller amount would suffice to meet all requirements. But what we have to consider is not so much the size of the Estimates as whether the amount asked for will meet all possible contingencies, whether the shipbuilding programme is sufficient to meet any reasonably possible combination that might be brought against us on the high seas. The Estimates provide for a certain number of ships which are to be laid down during the ensuing winter months, and to be completed in the spring of 1914. By that time Austria, Germany and Italy will have a combined fleet of "Dreadnoughts" numbering twenty-nine. We shall have a fleet of "Dreadnoughts" numbering thirty. A mere margin of one. 1045 I venture to think, looking into the future— for the first Lord has told us that in the future only "Dreadnoughts" will count— that this margin is not sufficient. Certainly in the spring of 1914 the position "will be very different from what was known, and is still known, as the two-Power standard. It will be very different from the two keels to one standard. It will not even be a standard which will meet any reasonably possible combination, that may be brought against us, and in these circumstances I think we have some reason for asking the Government, before this Vote is passed, to make some further statement with regard to the standard in "Dreadnoughts" which they consider necessary for the safety of the Empire, and to preserve the security of our trade routes. Looking at the figures, both with regard to expenditure and the number of cruisers, I think not only is there a reduction made in the amount that we have to expend on cruisers, and on construction, but also a serious reduction in the amount to be voted for building new cruisers, which number four instead of five. I do not propose to refer at length to the Declaration of London. I feel I should not be in order in doing so. But no one can disregard the declared intention during the Naval Conference in London of the foreign Powers to convert their merchant vessels into men-o'-war during war time. I know that the Government do not allow that the Declaration of London would sanction this proceeding, but all the same, it cannot be said that the Declaration renders impossible the carrying out of the views expressed on this point by the foreign Powers at the Naval Conference. I regard the present situation, so far as the protection of our commerce is concerned, as very serious. Certainly the programme laid down by the Government is quite inadequate to protect the trade routes. If you will look at the number of cruisers in 1903 and compare it with the programme for 1911 you will find that the total number in the North and South Atlantic was in 1903 fourteen cruisers, five sloops and three gunboats: to-day we are satisfied with seven cruisers and one gunboat; and the position is all the more serious when we remember that the Government have told us that the greater part of our foodstuffs is carried in British bottoms.
Turning from shipbuilding to personnel two facts stare us in the face. On the one side we have a large increase in the number of men employed in the Royal dock- 1046 yards, and, on the other hand, a decrease in the number of men on the establishment. When the establishment was suspended the number of established men in round numbers was 7,000. Now it is only 6,600, and even that figure is to be cut down still further by the Treasury, who have definitely fixed the establishment at 6,500. I need not remind the House that it is of the greatest importance in time of war to have a sufficient number of skilled men, skilled in all the technicalities of shipbuilding, to repair ships that are disabled. I am told that the Government purpose to depend on men who would be released from construction employment to make up for the deficiency. I do not think that is a sound policy. There is nothing to prevent wages going up, and a good deal of that would fall very heavily upon the taxpayer. Those who would have to select the men must select the best men, but they would have no opportunity in time of war to inquire into their qualifications, and it would be far better to have in time of peace a larger establishment of tried and skilled workmen who may be depended upon equally in time of war as in time of peace. Moreover, we have to-day a larger Navy than we had in 1905, and with the larger Navy the establishment should be larger, yet the Government have seen fit to adopt the exactly opposite policy. Why have they done so? With regard to the question of suspension, soon after I came into the House of Commons I asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what he intended to do with regard to those men who become eligible for establishment during the period when the establishment was suspended, whether it was his intention to see that their privileges with regard to eligibility were not prejudiced by the Government action. His answer to me was that that, was his intention, and now I am glad to hear from the Financial Secretary (Dr. Macnamara) to-day that the matter has been very seriously considered, and that the Government are going to extend the age of establishment eligibility from forty-five to fifty. Presumably, I suppose, it was done the sake of giving to those men who passed the age during the time of suspension an opportunity of qualifying for establishment after it had been reintroduced.
8.0. P. M.
There is one point which I would like the Financial Secretary to note. He is very kind, and I know why he desires to raise the age from forty-five to fifty. What will be the effect of raising the age from forty- 1047 five to fifty? Surely it cuts both ways. It will be open to the Government to delay establishing men until they are nearly fifty years of age. Will not that affect the pensions of these men? Will it not also reduce the establishment still further, or, rather, would it not give a ground to the Treasury for saying that while we have an establishment of 6,500 to-day, to-morrow we shall only require 6,000? I hope that will not be the effect, but the concession is open to that construction, and from what one hears and what one has seen I do not think it is the policy of the Government to foster establishment. On the other hand, their policy is to cut down the establishment. I think the report of the writers, which has been drawn up by the Financial Secretary, will have something to say upon the question of the establishment.
§ Dr. MACNAMARAHow do you know?
Sir C. KI NLOCH-COOKEI only think; I do not know. I should not say I know anything before such an authority as the I Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, but I think it will be found that the question of establishment will be referred to in that Report, and the writers will be asked to give up any claim to be put on the establishment in return for some other concession. It would be an advantage to the country if establishment could be given to the men in the Works Department as it is given to men in the other departments of the dockyards. With regard to dockyard petitions we are told we must not expect anything exciting. I think the time has gone by for expecting anything exciting with regard to dockyard petitions from the Admiralty. I do not say that the petitions of last year were not answered very fairly in some respects, although I cannot altogether agree with the, Financial Secretary that raising the maximum rate of wages for a skilled labourer to 30s. has been altogether a success. I am quite ready that any skilled labourer should receive a. maximum wage of 30s., but I should be better pleased if it was possible for more than a very small number to obtain that maximum. So far very few men in the dockyards have been able to reach the maximum. Then, again, the classification of skilled labourers interferes very much with other classifications. No one knows exactly what he is in the dockyard. He is called a skilled labourer by some people 1048 and something else by others. That is a mailer which the Financial Secretary might well turn his attention to.
With regard to unskilled labourers in the dockyard they only get a guinea a week. I suggest that that is not a sufficient wage for a man to maintain his wife and children and to live decently. I think the Admiralty ought certainly to raise the wages of the unskilled labourers. I am afraid little attention has been given to this subject. I have been told over and over again by the First Lord that the cost of living in one dockyard town differs very much from the cost of living in another, and I am particularly told, with regard to the borough that I represent, that the cost of living there is very different from that at Woolwich. I think that is a matter which the Financial Secretary might well inquire into. It may be that a few years ago, when the Report to which I refer was drawn up, the cost of living was different. The cost of living now, at any rate in the borough that I represent, is very little less than the cost of living at Woolwich. With regard to particular petitions to which I would call attention, I should like to mention that of the chargemen. You have some chargemen getting 1s. 6d. while others only get 1s. for identical work in every respect. I suggest, that the Admiralty would do well to give all chargemen the higher rate of 1s. 6d. Then other wages that require revision are plumbers, who should receive extra payment for work done in confined spaces, leather hose makers, sawyers, joiners, sailmakers, storehousemen, and I could mention several others. I should like to see some arrangements made to accelerate promotion in shipwrights' wages. Shipwrights are a very important rating, and no body of men have done more to fit themselves to the requirements of the day than dockyard shipwrights, and yet their wages are very different from those paid by outside firms. Whatever the reason may be for paying lower wages in the dockyard to the wages paid outside, the Government cannot get over the fact that it was they themselves who insisted upon the eight hours' day in the dockyard, and because the Government have insisted upon it that is no reason why they should curtail the men's wages. There is a great discrepancy between the wages paid in the dockyard and outside. There is a great grievance among the men themselves, and I should very much like to hear the opinion of the First Lord of the Admiralty on that 1049 subject. I should like to know why it is that the wages of the men in the dockyard are so much lower than the wages in similar trades in private yards. I do not want to be told that in one case they work eight hours and in another case they work longer for the simple reason that it is the Government who have insisted that they should work eight hours. No doubt if they were asked to work a little longer time to obtain a higher wage they would be very pleased to do it. But do, please, let us have some explanation of the discrepancy in the wages paid in the dockyard and those paid for similar work outside. Then as to discharges. Why do not the Government so arrange their work as to prevent wholesale discharges? Such a policy is very detrimental to efficiency and very detrimental to the men themselves.
Major GUESTI should like to draw attention to one or two points connected with labour in the dockyards. I should like to touch, first, on the question of skilled labour. In reply to a petition which the men presented to the Admiralty in 1900 the Admiralty promised that twenty men in the dockyard that I represent should be placed on the maximum rate of wage, and that twenty established men should also reach the higher rate. Up to the present time only nineteen hired men have been placed on the higher rate, and only four men of the establishment have been promoted. I would ask the Admiralty authorities to do their utmost to fulfil their promises and to place the complete number upon that maximum rate, because men are leaving on retirement every day, and the bonuses that they draw are calculated on the amount of wages they are paid at the time they leave the service. This is a matter which very much affects the condition of the men, and they consider that the promises which were made to them should be fulfilled. Then I should like to ask the Admiralty to consider the question of how the men are selected to come on this maximum wage. At present they are selected without the men themselves knowing what conditions they must fulfil to justify that selection. I would ask the Admiralty in making these selections to take into consideration the standard of the piecework these men have before them, provided always that their character is as good as other men, and not let the matter be dependent on selection pure and simple, which invariably has led to heart-burning and disappointment. If that could be 1050 brought into consideration it would be a great advantage and satisfaction to the men who are working for the Government. I should like to touch for a moment on the position of the chargemen and shipwrights. There we find similar men carrying out similar work on different sides possibly of the same ship which they are constructing, receiving different rates of pay. This has caused very great and very real discontent among the, men themselves, and they have made it clear that they would infinitely prefer equality of wage between men who are doing the same work to the introduction which was made in 1906, of a proportion of the men being on a higher rate than others. If it is impossible to equalise matters possibly some classification might be. introduced whereby men would get on the higher rate of wage either by excellent service or by length of service, and not purely and simply by selection.
Another point which the men have made representations about is the question of apprentices. It occurs that two lads may sit at the same competitive examination of enter a dockyard. One boy may succeed and the other may fail. The lad who succeeds joins the dockyard as an apprentice, and his service towards a pension docs not commence to count until the conclusion of his apprentice service. On the other hand the lad who fails in his examination and who enters the yard as a rivet boy at the same age as his rival finds that his service towards a pension counts from the date on which he entered the yard. Therefore the boy who has not succeeded in beating his rival in open competition has the advantage over him in that respect.
And it being a quarter past Eight of the clock, and there being Private Business set down by direction of the Chairman of Ways and Means, and under Standing Order No. 8, further proceeding was postponed without Question put.