§ Mr. BUTCHERI beg to move, after the word "Bill" ["other than a Money Bill"], to insert the words "or a Bill affecting the continued existence or the prerogative rights, and powers of the Crown."
8.0 P.M.
The necessity for this Amendment is that unless it is adopted it will be possible, under the provisions of this Bill, to abolish the Monarchy altogether, or, if that is thought a somewhat strong suggestion in 1438 the present state of education in the Liberal party, fundamentally to modify the prerogatives of the Crown. What is more, this could be done not only against the wishes and in spite of the opposition of the Second Chamber, but entirely behind the backs and against the wishes of the people. The point of my Amendment is this: that if there is to be a change in the rights or the powers of the Crown, it ought not to be carried into law under a mangled Constitution 1439 such as would be set up by this Bill. It ought to be done, if at all, in the ordinary usage and practice of our Constitution, with the consent of both Houses, and passed with the assent of the people themselves. There should be a power, as I conceive it, between the House of Commons itself and the Crown if a Bill is brought in for the purpose of affecting the rights and privileges of the Crown. If you abolish, as you do by this Parliament Bill the Veto of the House of Lords, at any rate the least you can do is to set up a Veto of the people, a Veto which will intervene I between the House of Commons and the Crown. In the case of this Bill, not only do you abolish the Veto of the Second Chamber, but you give no chance whatever to the people themselves to oppose a Bill they object to. Let me say two or three words about the abolition of the Monarchy, which is the first ground for my Amendment. I admit that in the present state of public opinion it is exceedingly improbable that such a proposal should be made to the House of Commons. The Sovereigns of this country are, and have been, for many years, deeply seated in the affections, loyalty, and reverence of their people. There is probably no immediate prospect of any proposal for the abolition of the Monarchy finding favour even with a Ministry depending upon the support of what I may call a log-rolling coalition House of Commons. But the mere fact that it is improbable that such a proposal should be made is to my mind no adequate argument against guarding against such a proposal if it should be made. Would it not have been said not long ago that a Bill such as this Parliament Bill was improbable? Three or four years ago the idea of a responsible Minister of the House of Commons bringing forward a Bill such as this Parliament Bill would have been scouted as impossible. Even a very few years ago the prospect of a Bill of this sort being brought forward would have been regarded as exceedingly remote. Therefore, I say, that the mere fact that this proposal is improbable is no reason why we should not guard against it. At any rate it is consistent with the scheme of the Bill that such a proposal might be made. I think, therefore, it is necessary that we should guard against it going through under the provisions of this Bill. Proposals af this sort, if brough forward at all, should pass through the Second Chomber, and should be subject to the assent of the people.
1440 This argument is made all the stronger when we reflect that it was only three or four nights ago that the Government told us that this Bill was not a mere temporary expedient, which we had been led to expect it would be, but that it is, so far as we were able to gather from the right hon. Gentleman's speech, to be a Bill of a permanent character. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] That is cheered by hon. Members below the Gangway opposite. I suppose they will do their very utmost to take care that the scheme of the Bill shall be made permanent so long as this Government is in power. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Is not that the very reason why we should take care that such a scheme as I have referred to should not be passed through under the provisions of this Bill? Although I admit that it is improbable that a Bill for the abolition of the Monarchy should pass the House of Commons as the matter stands at present, do not let us forget that there is a considerable section, or at any rate a section, of political force in this country which has put in the forefront of their programme the abolition of the Monarchy. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no," and "Which one?"] The Social Democratic Federation. Hon. Members are permitted to groan at that; but there is such a body, and I am not at all sure that if the hon. Gentleman the Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Keir Hardie) were in his place he would not cheer at the idea of abolishing the Monarchy. So that you have a body in this country who have inscribed on their programme a definite proposal to abolish the Monarchy. We, therefore, at any rate ought to take care that that shall not pass through under the provisions of this Bill. We see how already there are dangers of small sections controlling the Government. Already we see that a body of Irish Members can dictate to the Government, and to this country, exactly as to how this Bill is to be carried, and, whether it is to pass or not. What I suggest is not entirely an imaginary danger. What is at present no doubt a small section may be able to control some future Government, and force them into bringing forward a proposal of this character.
I pass to the next part of my Amendment, that which deals with the alteration or limitation of the prerogatives of the Crown. The prerogatives of the Crown are very large, and deal with an enormous variety of subjects. They deal, for instance, with such matters as peace 1441 and war, treaties, the acquisition of territory, the appointment of many dignitaries and authorities in the State, such as bishops, judges and magistrates, and many others. The prerogatives of the Crown deal also with such matters as the Dissolution of Parliament and the dismissal of Ministers. It is perfectly true that in all or nearly all of these matters the exercise of these prerogatives of the Crown is exercised upon the advice of Ministers, but there are also some powers remaining to the Crown which are within the personal competence of the Crown to exercise. Let me take, in the first instance, those powers of the Crown which are exercised on the advice of Ministers. I can well imagine that a case might arise where a demand might be made for depriving the Crown of these powers so as to invest them in other hands.
Let me give the Committee an illustration of what I mean. In regard to the prerogative of appointing judges or magistrates, it is quite true that it is exercised by and on the advice of Ministers, but, having regard to events which have recently happened, and which may happen in the immediate future, it is at least possible that an ignorant outcry may arise. Indeed, I am not sure it has not already arisen. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear," and "Ignorant?"] I prefer my own adjective. An ignorant outcry, I say, might arise against the present system of appointing judges or magistrates. The appointment, it is perfectly true, is made on the advice of Ministers, and it is made in the exercise of the prerogative of the Crown. But I can well understand that the demand might arise that the prerogative or right of the Crown should be abolished, and that the judges and magistrates should be appointed, let us say, by popular election, subject it may be to the approval of the House of Commons. It might very well be that the demand might be strongly urged by some party in this House that the present system of appointment should be done away with, and we in that way should interfere with one of the prerogatives of the Crown. Hon. Members would justify the demand upon very much the same reasons as the Parliament Bill is justified, namely, that it would be in the interests of the Liberal party, or some of their allies either below the Gangway on the opposite side of the House, or below the Gangway on this side of the House. That is the reason why, as I understand it, the Parliament Bill is justified—and so far as I know the only 1442 reason. It is not justified in the interests of the country, but because the Liberal party want to carry certain measures into law which they cannot carry under the present Constitution.
Exactly in the same way I can conceive this demand for altering the mode of appointing magistrates and judges may be justified, namely, that the interests of the Liberal party demand it—that there are not enough Liberal magistrates on the Bench. I seem to have heard that complaint recently, and I am not sure that hon. Members below the Gangway do not share that complaint. I seem also to have heard complaints made as to the appointment of judges. It might be necessary in the interests of unsuccessful Liberal candidates at elections, v/ho have lost their seats in consequence of breaking election laws, that the present mode of appointing judges should be altered. I do put it to this Committee that if demands of that sort are made it ought not to be possible for such demands to be carried through in the face of a paralysed Second Chamber and against the wishes of the people. If these demands are to be considered at all, they should be considered according to the old methods of our Constitution, in two Chambers, and with a power of appeal to the people. I give that as one instance, and one only, of how it might be dangerous to interfere with one of the present prerogatives of the Crown in the interests of the Liberal party and under the provisions of this present Parliament Bill. I might give many such instances.
But let me go from these prerogatives which are exercised solely and wholly on the advice of Ministers to those prerogatives which, at any rate in theory, although rarely in practice, are within the competence of the Sovereign himself. I refer to such prerogatives as the dismissal of Ministers and the Dissolution of Parliament. I can quite see that under the provisions of this Parliament Bill, Bills might be brought into this House of most extreme danger to the public good, and under conditions where no Second Chamber is there to stop them and no popular vote is permitted under the provisions of this Bill to control them. Under these circumstances, I can well imagine that a demand should be made on the Sovereign that he should intervene to prevent the passage of such Bills into law—intervene, I agree, in an unusual way, either by the dismissal of Ministers, or by the dissolution of Parliament. Suppose he 1443 refused to accede to that demand, he might feel, and I think feel with some justice that the interests of the public, the interest of the country, were being betrayed, and that he was in a sense responsible for that betrayal. At any rate, it would put the Sovereign in an extremely obnoxious position, and a position in which he ought never to be placed. If on the one hand he should refuse to intervene he would feel as I have suggested. If, on the other hand he should intervene he would be violently denounced beyond any question by large sections of the population. But which ever happens you would have the Sovereign of this country brought into the vortex of party politics, from which he has happily escaped in the past, and in which I hope he never will be involved in the future. To bring the Sovereign into party politics would be disastrous, not only to the Crown itself, but most injurious to the interest of the country. Therefore, from my point of view also, as regards these prerogatives which are in no sense personal to the Crown, these prerogatives exercised only on the advice of Ministers, there is the strongest reason why you should interpose some power between the House of Commons and the Sovereign, and it is for that reason and in these interests that I move my Amendment and ask the Committee to say that as regards Bills of that character, which impair and interfere with the existing prerogative of the Crown, that no such Bill should be capable of being carried into law under the provisions of this Parliament Bill which have not the approval of the Second Chamber, or which deprives them of the power of referring these questions to the will of the people.
§ The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir Rufus Isaacs)After listening to the speech of the hon. and learned Member, which shows that he devoted a considerable amount of thought and study to the question, I cannot but think if there was no other reason why the Government should draw no distinction between this and any other of the twenty-three classes of Amendments proposed his speech would have supplied it. The result of listening to the hon. and learned Member's speech was to convince me if there had been the slightest doubt before that it would be inadvisable to insert any such safeguards as he wants us to insert. I do not make these observations in any spirit other than that of desiring fairly to answer the point raised by 1444 the hon. and learned Member. The difference between the hon. and learned Member and us who sit on this side of the House is a fundamental difference. It is because we trust entirely to the loyalty of His Majesty's subjects, because we think that the security of the Crown rests upon the loyalty of His Majesty's subjects that we are convinced it would be an evil day for the Crown when its continued existence had to depend upon the preservation of the Veto of the House of Lords. The loyalty of His Majesty's subjects is expressed by the people who send Members to this House, and in this House I do not think it can be gainsaid that you have the reflection of the will of the people.
Let me deal a little more in detail with the three divisions made by the hon. and learned Member. First of all he rested his Amendment upon the desirability, indeed, upon the necessity, according to him, of safeguarding the existence of the Crown itself. He said it was necessary to have some protection against the abolition of the Monarchy, as if, forsooth, anyone would imagine that the House of Commons, governed as this country is at the present moment, represening as we do in the House of Commons either in this or future Parliaments, the view of the majority of the people, would venture to propose anything equivalent or approaching in any way to the abolition of the Monarchy. In truth the hon. and learned Member must recognise, as I am sure he will, that there is no such danger even if he is right in the assertion as to what is part of the programme of the Social Federation. If what he said is true I do not think we have anything to fear from any federation which starts with that in the forefront of its programme.
The hon. and learned Gentleman then went on to deal with the exercise of the prerogatives of the Crown, which he desires also to safeguard by preserving the right of Veto to the House of Lords for Acts done upon the advice of the Ministers. That is to say, the hon. and learned Member says there are acts which are done by the Sovereign in the exercise of this prerogative upon the advice of responsible Ministers, and he says "you ought to introduce into this Bill a special safeguard to protect the Sovereigns exercise of that prerogative by giving a special security preserving the Veto of the House of Lords as well as the necessity for a majority of votes in the House of Commons." I would 1445 point out to the hon. and learned Gentleman that it is peculiarly to the House of Commons that this matter appertains, because the prerogatives of the Crown are, as he quite rightly stated, in the main almost in all instances exercised according to the constitutional practice of this country, not upon the will of the Sovereign, or according to his own judgment, but upon the advice of responsible Ministers, and when these Ministers have given their advice to the Sovereign, if there is any criticism to be directed to it that criticism is directed here.
I think the hon. and learned Member forgets for a moment that it is here in this House that any vote of censure or equivalent to a vote of want of confidence on any Minister because of some action taken or because of some advice given to the Sovereign, would bring about the immediate fall of the Government. It is in the House of Commons that the resignation of the Government takes place. You may have a vote of censure or want of confidence passed upon the Government in the House of Lords, but the Government would not resign and would take no notice of it. It is for that very reason that I said the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument would convince me, if I ever had any doubt, that we ought not to accept this Amendment. Ministers who have to give this advice have to justify their action here in this House, and it is this House that decides whether a majority of its Members approve of that action or otherwise. There is one other point which the hon. and learned Member raised which seemed to me to be against his Amendment.
§ Mr. BUTCHERMight I explain that my point was that there might be a strong party opposite who might want a change made in the system of appointing judges.
§ Sir RUFUS ISAACSI think the hon. and learned Member has not appreciated that I have followed the order he himself selected in moving his Amendment. The Government is responsible for the advice given and one of the Ministers of the Crown has to give advice recommending the appointment of a particular judge. With reference to the action of the Government, I fail to appreciate the point made by the hon. and learned Member because, after all, the judges are appointed independently of this House. They are 1446 selected from barristers practising at the Bar in this country by the head of the judiciary, and they are recommended by him from his knowledge of them, and from the position they hold at the Bar. I think this country has every reason to be satisfied with our method of appointing judges, and I think other countries are more likely to follow our example in this matter. If the hon. and learned Member failed to convince the Committee on his first and second points, at any rate, he must have failed to convince them on the third point. He said if his Amendment is rejected you will have the Sovereign thrown into the vortex of party politics, with the result of dragging the Sovereign into our party conflicts. The protection which this country and the Sovereign has against that is by following the constitutional practice of the Sovereign doing that which responsible Ministers advise him to do. That has been the constitutional practice in this country for a long time and so long as there is a majority here supporting the particular Government, and that Government is able to carry on that administrative and legislative programme in the House of Commons there will be no fear of the Sovereign attempting to dismiss his Ministers, or being called upon to dismiss them.
The whole argument of the hon. and learned Member rests on the fallacy that the Sovereign can be brought into these matters. There might be a Dissolution of Parliament upon which there might be a question of a different character raised, but in that case if the Sovereign dissolved Parliament, what necessarily happens is an appeal to the constituencies, and the people are well entitled to determine what kind of Government they require, and the Sovereign chooses his Ministers from the supporters of the majority. It is difficult to see why we should introduce this Amendment, and I cannot help saying that in dealing with this matter, and in considering the position of the Crown and the Royal prerogatives compared with other countries, we have in this country the great safeguard that the maintenance of the Monarchy rests upon the patriotic loyalty of His Majesty's subjects. It must rest upon them, because those subjects elect the Members of this House. From that majority the Ministers are chosen, and those Ministers are responsible for the actions of the Sovereign which he takes upon their advice.
§ Sir ROBERT FINLAYI think the Committee and the country are indebted to my hon. and learned Friend for bringing forward this Amendment. The discussion shows that the proposal of the Government is simply that there is no institution, however dear to the people, however fundamental and deep its roots may lie, that it is not proposed by this Bill to put at the mercy of the Vote of a Single Chamber. I think the Attorney-General has very inadequately appreciated the arguments put forward by my hon. and learned Friend. He says that to adopt this Amendment would be disastrous to the Crown, and the reason he gave for that proposition was that it was better that the Crown should rest upon the loyalty of the subjects of this country than upon the Veto of the House of Lords. No observation could show a more profound misconception of what the function of the Veto of the House of Lords has been in our history. The House of Lords has never resisted the will of the people. You may trace the history of the House of Lords as far back as you like, and you will find they have never offered any resistance to the will of the people when that will has been adequately ascertained and made clear. The House of Lords has never opposed the will of the people when it has been shown that it is no passing whim but the settled desire of the people of this country that a certain measure should be passed into law. That principle was laid down by the great Duke of Wellington, and that is a principle which has steadily guided the conduct of the House of Lords. The truth is that the Attorney-General confounds the House of Commons with the people of the country and the whole attitude he assumes is that we are the people of this country. The truth is you may have a House of Commons which does not represent upon some subjects the will of the people. That was loudly said by the Attorney-General and his friends with reference to at least one measure which was passed by the last Unionist Administration. [An HON. MEMBER: "More than one."] The Attorney-General said we had no mandate for passing the Education Act, that it did not represent the wishes of the people of the country, and that the Unionist Government had no business to pass it.
§ Sir RUFUS ISAACSAnd it never would have passed if it had taken two years.
§ Sir R. FINLAYI can readily show how fallacious that interruption is when I point 1448 out that as long as the same House of Commons lasts over the two years and the three Sessions you have no security for the people being consulted at all. The point is that the Crown and the great prerogatives of the Crown ought to rest upon the will of the people of this country, and you ought to have an adequate security against rash legislation interfering with these fundamental institutions. That safeguard the Government absolutely refuse to give, even in the case of the Crown. The Crown itself is to be at the mercy of the vote of this Chamber. There was one point brought out with great force by my hon. and learned Friend with which the Attorney-General did not deal at all, and that is that we now know that it is intended that this Bill shall be permanent in its operation. It is all very well to say that you do not want exceptional legislation, and to say that there is no danger of any such encroachment. I am not so sure about that. We might have an encroachment of the nature which my hon. and learned Friend has so fully and ably described within a comparatively short period. Take some of the great prerogatives of the Crown. Take, for example, the power of concluding the treaties with foreign countries. In America no treaty can be concluded without the consent of the Senate. I wonder whether any hon. Member will be able to give us any guarantee that this House, when it is a Single Chamber in full control of legislation, will not find its appetite growing by what it feeds on and claiming that it should have control over the Veto of the Crown in reference to foreign treaties.
§ Mr. JOHN WARDMay I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he and his party have not claimed that already with regard to the Declaration of London?
§ Sir R. FINLAYNo such claim has ever been made by the party on this side of the House. It is perfectly clear that the prerogative of concluding treaties rests with the Crown; and what has been desired by some Members of this House was that, before the Declaration of London was ratified, a Debate should take place in this House, so that the Crown might have before it full material for determining what decision should be arrived at on that important subject. That, however, is a different matter altogether. At no distant date a claim might be put forward that this House should enjoy the same right as the Senate of the United States enjoys 1449 —the right to say that no treaty should be concluded without its authority. Take the great question—peace or war. Can any subject be imagined which might be presented in a more fascinating light to a popular audience than that the House of Commons, the one effective Chamber, should be consulted on every occasion before war was declared or peace made? It would be said, "The burden falls upon you, and it is for you to say whether war should be declared. The burden has fallen upon you, and it is for you to say whether peace shall now be concluded in order that the burdens of war may cease." I can imagine arguments being presented in a fascinating light to a popular audience. Can anyone who has studied our Constitution pretend that such an alteration of that kind, however attractive it might appear to some hon. Members, and however attractive they might make it appear to their constituents, would be for the benefit of this country or for the efficiency of the Executive of this country.
My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Butcher) has dealt with the question of the appointment of judges. He would be a bold man indeed who, after what has taken place within the last few weeks, would say this House might not claim to have a voice in that prerogative of the Crown. There is another matter which I think was just touched upon by my hon. and learned Friend, and which involves possibly as great a danger as may exist in any of the events to which he has referred, and that is the question of the Dissolution of Parliament. This Bill proposes that the duration of Parliament should be shortened to five years. Is it at all improbable that a House of Commons in the uncontrolled power which this Bill would confer upon it, anxious that some measure should be passed into law over the heads of the House of Lords, and anxious that the tenure of the seats of Members of this House of Commons should be prolonged until that great measure on which their hearts were set, had gone through the stages required by this Bill in order that it might be sent up for the assent of the Crown without the assent of the House of Lords, might desire to pass an Act providing that the Dissolution of Parliament should not take place without the consent of the House of Commons? There is, to my mind, nothing improbable about it at all.
It is of no use appealing to the past. The House has acted under the restraints 1450 of the Constitution which have so long existed. You now propose to abolish those restraints and to make the House of Commons absolute masters of the situation. No person or body of men is fit to be entrusted with absolute power, and the history of this country is no guide to what you may see in the doings of the House of Commons under the system which you propose to establish. My hon. and learned Friend referred in guarded language to the possibility of an attack on the very existence of the Crown itself. The Attorney-General has said that is a danger which is simply fantastic. I agree at present the state of feeling in this House is such that we need not apprehend that any such law would in the next few years be brought forward, but events have moved very fast within the last ten years, and we do not know what direction events may take in the future until we see the House of Commons invested with the absolute control of our Constitution. We have all heard of the man who said:—
Is thy servant a dog that he should do these things?We may see strange developments, and, however remote the danger may be, surely, when you are dealing with an institution so fundamental as that of the Crown in this country, you ought to put into your Bill an exception guarding it against any ill-advised measure. It can do no possible harm, and why is it you refuse to put in such an exception securing the Monarchy itself against an unfortunate assault upon it? You are entrusting the House of Commons with absolute power. Surely there ought to be something sacred from an attack under the casual influences of the hour, which might lead to a coalition banded together in a common attack on that which the country holds dearest. The Crown is safe with the people of this country, but, if you remove the safeguard of the Veto of the House of Lords, which after all only secures that the people should be consulted before any great change is made, you may see strange developments. I shall certainly vote for the Amendment proposed by my hon. and learned Friend.
§ Mr. TOBINI shall certainly support this Amendment for the very weighty reasons given by the hon. and learned Gentleman who moved it (Mr. Butcher) and by the right hon. Gentleman who preceded me in this Debate (Sir R. Finlay). I cannot see for a moment that one of the reasons given by the learned Attorney- 1451 General for refusing to accept the Amendment is a valid one, namely, that there is very little likelihood of a Bill affecting the continued existence of the prerogative of the Crown being introduced into this House. I think we have a right to protest, and we shall continue to protest, in spite of all the votes that take place on all these Amendments, against the non possumus attitude the Government have chosen to adopt on this as well as on other Amendments. They seem to take up this attitude, "The Bill we have drafted we have drafted. It is stereotyped in ink, and we will not allow a single comma to be altered. We will not budge from it." They refuse to consider any alteration of any kind. We have a right to protest against that attitude on the part of the Government, and we have a right to protest and shall continue to protest against the silence reigning on the benches on the other side. We do not know what their views are. I look in vain for the 270 Radical Members who have been returned to this Parliament, and some of whom, at any rate, ought to be here backing up their Front Bench. I see but one here, and I hope that his Constituency will have his name in gold letters before it to-morrow morning. Whatever arguments we produce in this House will not have any weight whatever upon it, because the Prime Minister said so in effect on Thursday last, even before he had heard what we had to say on behalf of Amendments such as this. But in spite of that we shall continue our arguments. We believe that the country outside is taking notice of them. We believe it is at last beginning to realise the dangers that are concealed in this Bill and the powers that it proposes to confer upon the Single Chamber which is thus being set up. The country likes us to produce our arguments It likes men to hit out by fair argument. It does not like men who go in for the stonewall process of blocking all the balls that are delivered against them. An important Bill, such as that indicated by the Mover of this Amendment, affecting the existing prerogatives of the Crown, might be carried by this Single Chamber which is being set up by a majority of one vote in spite of the wishes of the majority of the electors of this country, and that is being done without the provision of a single safeguard in the Bill to ensure that the people shall have been consulted first, or with a safeguard, such as is insisted upon by other constitutional countries in provid- 1452 ing that a Bill of this kind shall, at all events, only pass into law, not if carried by a bare majority in a Single Chamber, but if carried by a majority far exceeding one-half of both legislative bodies. For these reasons I cordially support this Amendment, seeking to exclude from the operation of this Bill measures which affect the existence of the prerogatives of the Crown.
§ Mr. MILLSI wish to point to the very serious danger which may arise if this Clause is passed into law in its present form. The objects of this Bill are, as far as we can understand, to give the two parties in the House an equal chance of their Bills passing into law, and also of insuring that the will of the elected representatives of the people in the House of Commons shall finally and ultimately prevail. This Bill, however, really goes a great deal further than that. It does not mean that the will of the House of Commons shall finally prevail, but that the will of this House, and therefore of the Cabinet which controls this House, shall be absolutely and entirely supreme in all matters of legislation. The Veto of the Crown having lapsed through desuetude, this Bill is going to take away the Veto of the Second Chamber. When you are giving this power to one House and one body it is only prudent you should impose some safeguard more than the common sense and loyalty of the Members, in order to prevent it carrying out wicked and foolish legislative proposals which not only this House but the whole country might afterwards be sorry for. There are certain legislative actions which this House should not be allowed to undertake without some exterior check. The most important of these functions is the one dealt with in this Amendment. The House should not be allowed to alter the prerogative or position of the Crown unless it is absolutely assured that it is expressing the will of the people who send it here. We all admit that the will of the people, through this House of Commons, must have unlimited power, but there should be power strong enough to refer back a measure so that it may not be passed until it has had the most mature and careful consideration. If you are going in this way to stifle all power of expression by the people, you are taking away from them the power which they eventually use and exercise by their vote, and you are driving them to force of arms and to civil war if they wish to impress their will on the Government of the day.
1453 Few hon. Members opposite know the real objects of this Bill as well as we do. When you talk about abolishing the Veto of the House of Lords you are doing nothing of the kind. You are abolishing the power of Veto of this country and setting up in its place an autocratic Cabinet. The Attorney-General said that we on this side of the House propose to protect the prerogative of the Crown by the Veto of the House of Lords. We do not intend to do that, but we do maintain that there should be some body outside the House of Commons which has power to see that the people are consulted before the House of Commons, which may have outrun its mandate, has the power of attacking the prerogative of the Monarchy. It may be urged that such an Amendment as this in the present state of feeling in the House of Commons is unnecessary. It seems to me, with all respect, that that is not a very forcible argument. If you are going to write a new Constitution you must frame it to be not only strong enough to withstand ordinary circumstances, but you must make it so strong that it will be able to withstand even the most unforeseen and extraordinary eventualities.
I do not think we are justified in saying that this Amendment is entirely unnecessary. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for York (Mr. Butcher) mentioned some of the remarks uttered by various members of the Social Democratic party. I do not intend to quote them now, although I see present the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil, who no doubt would like to hear quoted his remarks about Republicanism, in which he said that the existence of a King was a proof of lunacy among the people. That hon. Gentleman is a Member of this House of Commons. He presumably represents some amount of thought. I know it is considered almost bad form to mention these things, but if there were a few more Gentlemen opposite doing their duty in this House, I do not think it would be wrong to mention them. I do not suppose the hon. Member who made them is ashamed of them, and I have never heard them repudiated by any of the hon. Members who sit around him. Therefore I suppose we may take it that they agree in great part with him. It must be remembered that these remarks are made not by mere party hacks speaking at street corners, but that they are made by leaders of the party who claim almost divine wisdom in the interpretation of political 1454 knowledge, and are never tired of telling us that we represent none but brewers and peers, while they represent the great intelligence of the working classes of this country. I do not agree with them in any of their professions; still less do I agree with them when they arrogate to themselves these attributes. But it is only right, without desiring to give them an advertisement, that their statements should be taken some notice of. I do not see, when these sort of opinions are held by hon. Gentlemen in this House, that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General has any right to say it is absolutely unnecessary to move an Amendment of this sort. I am not for one instant accusing right hon. Gentlemen who sit on that Front Bench of sharing these opinions. I believe they are as firm supporters of the Monarchy as anybody in this House or among the people of the country generally, but I do say the Government opposite are supported by a coalition majority. I do not wish to analyse that majority, that has been done before, and I am not saying it in any disrespectful way, but hon. Gentlemen themselves will be the first to confess that if they are dependent for their majority upon the support of a coalition, it is obvious that there must be some give and take in their policy. If these statements which we have all heard of by those hon. Gentlemen on the subject of the Monarchy are no more than mere talk—if they really are not opinions which they have come to—I do not think there is any criticism too strong for their action in this matter. If they are their opinions, and if they are trying to impress them upon the Government, the acceptance of this Amendment would strongly strengthen the hands of the Government in refusing their advances. I would remind the hon. and learned Gentleman that in negotiations which have gone on they have made it apparent that a little strengthening of the Government would not be inconvenient in certain circumstances. The acceptance of this Amendment would reassure the country as a whole, because I think the country are beginning to suspect that this great Veto Bill which is going to liberate the masses is not a great national reform, but a mere piece of party quibble to keep the right hon. Gentlemen in power and enable them to try to evade the performance of their promises.
§ The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN (Mr. Whitley)The hon. Member is, I am 1455 afraid, going back to the discussion of last Thursday, instead of confining himself to the Amendment on a specific subject which is before the Committee.
§ Mr. MILLSI entirely abide by your ruling, Sir, and apologise for transgressing. I was only saying that if this Amendment were accepted by the Government, the people of the country would realise their intentions, and that they are not passing this Bill in order to seat themselves comfortably in power for an indefinite term, but that they are seeking as they contend a real reform of the Constitution and not as we suspect a mere disturbance of that Constitution.
§ 9.0 P.M.
§ Mr. JAMES HOPEThe Amendment and the reply of the Attorney-General to it give a very good illustration of one of the difficulties in which the Government are landing Parliament under their new proposals. The Attorney-General has spoken of the great respect which the country feels for the Sovereign and of the great feeling of loyalty towards the Sovereign and the position which he occupies, but he forgets that that is due to the peculiar position that the Sovereign has hitherto enjoyed in this country by being detached and aloof from party politics. Under the proposals of the Government, we are convinced that he could not remain in that position. Hitherto when a Bill came before the Crown, it had the sanction of the whole of Parliament and of both Houses behind it. It is true, you may say that the Second Chamber of Parliament is defective and ought to be reformed, but hitherto a Bill when it went before the Sovereign for his assent, did so with the full assent of the whole Parliament of the country. In the future, under this Clause, a Bill will go before the Sovereign, which will only have the consent of one Chamber, and the result of that will be to confront the Crown with an entirely new set of problems which the Crown has not had to face for many a long year past. There has been hitherto a double check against any violent breaking of the Constitution such as is involved in a Home Rule Bill for any part of the United Kingdom. I do not apply that especially to Ireland. That check has operated twice, in 1886 there was the check of the House of Commons, and in 1893 there was the check of the House of Lords. Let me ask what would have happened in 1893 if there had 1456 been no House of Lords, or if the Veto of the House of Lords had been paralysed so that they could not have rejected the Home Rule Bill of the Government of the day. In 1893 the Bill was passed by the House of Commons, but it was rejected by the House of Lords. Assume that that Bill had become an Act of Parliament because the Constitution was working under the terms of this Bill.
There is not the least doubt that in 1894 that Bill would have been passed again, and if there had been a slightly larger majority in the House of Commons it could have been passed in 1895. In fact I think it could have been passed under the conditions which then existed. In 1895 it would have gone to the Sovereign for his assent. In the meanwhile the whole trend of opinion after discussion would have been altered, but the House of Commons would then have affirmed the Bill, and in what position would the Sovereign have been? He would have known from all sources open to an intelligent man that the opinion of the country was against the Bill, but the House of Commons would have three times affirmed it. Then the task would have been put upon him of deciding whether he should give his assent to the Bill or not, and whatever decision he came to he must have offended an enormous body of his subjects. If he had passed the Bill he would, as the result of the election which was then held, have been proved to have offended the majority of his subjects. If he had refused his assent to the Bill he would have gone in the teeth of the House of Commons and have offended very nearly half his subjects. That is what his position would have been in the year 1895 if we had been working under the provisions of this Bill. Can anybody say that that situation may not recur, and that that situation will not recur in the course of the next few years? If it does recur you are putting a burden upon the Throne in hands however capable and strong which the Throne ought not to bear. You may say the Crown must act in a constitutional way, and the Bill being proposed for the assent of the Crown, the Crown must give its assent. Are you so sure of that? In the past the Crown had the sanction of the whole of Parliament behind the Bill when it came up for Royal Assent, but you are assuming a constitutional state of affairs which this Bill will destroy and, after all, although it may be two centuries since the power was exercised, the power does remain. The other day the question was asked as 1457 to Parliament prolonging its own duration, and the hon. Member (Mr. Snowden), the most extreme in his views of all Members of the House, said, "But you have always the Veto of the Crown, and that will be a case with which the Crown might exercise it." He acknowledged, and I quote him as a witness, that although you may say constitutionally the power of Veto has passed into desuetude, you may resurrect it, and you will if you pass this Bill. After all, the thing is very simple. A Bill is sent up, and the Sovereign has only to send a Commissioner, and the Commissioner will say a few words in French to the effect that the King will consider further of the matter, and the Bill is dead, and nothing you can do can bring it to life again.
§ The DEPUTY - CHAIRMANI have been very patient with the hon. Member, but he is using an argument directed against the whole Bill rather than to this particular Amendment.
§ Mr. JAMES HOPEMay I not put myself in order in this way? Here is the power of the Crown. This Amendment states that it shall not be taken away under the procedure of this Clause. Therefore, I think I am entitled to argue that where the power of the Crown exists and may be brought into force it is desirable that that power shall still remain to bring it into force, and shall not be taken away under the provisions of the Bill. I submit that part is in order, but that particular portion of my argument has now come to an end. I am not only talking of the Veto of the Crown in the ordinary sense. I quote again what the right hon. Gentleman (Sir R. Finlay) said, that that can be exercised in other ways. There is the power of dissolution, and there is the power of dismissal. I ask the Attorney-General first, has the power of dismissal passed into desuetude. It was exercised in 1851 and in 1834 against the whole of the triumphant Whig Ministry. I think he admitted that the Crown of its own right and power can dismiss a Parliament. Therefore, if the Crown were placed in such a position as I indicate, there are these two remedies open to it. I have spoken hitherto of ordinary legislation.
I come to a legislation itself affecting and limiting the powers of the Crown. If the case is strong as regards ordinary legislation, it is far stronger with regard to these cases. Assume the position I have suggested that the Crown might estrange the feelings of large bodies of its 1458 own subjects, is it not possible, is it not probable, is it not under that assumption almost certain, that there would be a movement to restrain the powers of the Crown, and a Bill would be brought forward to provide that the powers of the Crown shall be limited in future just as the powers of the House of Lords are proposed to be limited by this Bill. Now you put the Crown into a position of extraordinary difficulty. Here is the prerogative of the Crown itself, whether as to dismissal, as to Veto, as to Treaties, or as to appointments. You have a Bill brought forward to limit the powers of the Crown in that regard. I do not follow the argument of the Attorney-General as against my learned Friend. He seemed to speak as though my learned Friend wanted to limit the rights of this House to criticise action of the Crown taken on the advice of Ministers. That is not the point. The case my learned Friend has in view was a Bill brought forward in this House to limit the powers of the Crown itself.
I will give the case of Treaties. Sup pose a Bill brought forward providing that no Treaty should be ratified without the formal assent of the House of Commons. That passes this House and goes straight to the Crown. What is the position of the Crown? Is it to consent to a limitation of its own prerogative? After all, the Sovereign is not merely to consider himself and his own rights. He is a trustee of the Constitution, and all the branches of Parliament ought to be trustees of the Constitution. Ministers ought to be at this moment, but they are not. You must assume that the Sovereign of the day would regard himself as a trustee of the powers of the Crown itself. Is he to abandon his trust? If he is not, is he to defy this House with no check and no intermediary and perhaps with the knowledge in his own mind that the people were with him and against them? That is the position. Hitherto under the Constitution it has worked well enough. I will go back to the case of the Constitutional crisis of 1784. Then you had a House of Commons overwhelmingly set on the passage of the India Bill. The Crown was strongly against them, and the Crown nominated a Ministry which did not have the confidence of the House of Commons of the day and Mr. Pitt, on first taking office, knowing that the Crown was behind him and believing that the people were behind him, submitted to defeat day after day and week 1459 after week, carrying on the Executive Government. In the end he succeeded and the election that followed swept the former Ministry away. But if the House of Commons had prevailed and had been omnipotent, it would have triumphed and the people's cause would have been betrayed. I quote that as an instance where the Crown understands the wishes of the people better than this House. But whatever the question of the minute may be you will have this position, of the House of Commons demanding that the Crown shall surrender some one of its rights and the Crown will refuse—must refuse, if it believes the people is on its side, and remembers the position of trust which it must hold towards the Constitution. Then you will have the naked issue joined between the Crown and this House, and of all dangers to this country none could be greater than that. Surely you want some buffer between this House and the Crown. I will not go back to the hackneyed quotation in Cromwell's time. He created a Chamber on his arbitrary power to serve as a buffer. What you had before you will have again. Then whichever power of the Crown is used to the annoyance of the House of Commons will produce a demand that that power shall be reversed.
I do not know whether the House remembers the Debate on this very subject about a year ago. It was the night on which the Prime Minister made his famous statement practically sealing the bargain with hon. Members below the Gangway and that is what stamps it on my mind. We were considering that night the third resolution, that Parliament shall sit for five years, and an hon. Member (Mr. Clough) argued that Parliament should sit for five years and no less, and that there should be no elections within the five years. That is a direct proposal to entrench upon the rights of the Crown. Do you think that if the prerogative of dissolution is used against the wishes and against the sentiments of the majority of this House there will not be a demand that the power shall be taken away? That was one of the incidents which led to the great Civil War, the demand that the prerogative of dissolution should be taken from the Crown. It might be for one reason, and it might be for another. But the proposal has already actually been made, and will be made again. What is the Crown to do on a question like that? 1460 It has sometimes been argued that we need not look to past times, which are over and gone, that we have to look not merely to matters as they present themselves to us in this House and at this moment. But I think a great writer very well and wisely said that they cannot look far forward to their descendants who do not look back to their ancestry. The constitutional questions were thrashed out, even to this very proposal that is now before the House, in the seventeenth century. Human nature remains the same. The attack then was first made on the Crown, and, when the Crown was at that time beaten down, then the other branch of the Constitution very swiftly followed. Now the attack is made first on the Second Chamber, but, if that succeeds, as surely as night follows day, and day follows night, the position of the Crown will be attacked. What happened in 1649? It was only a month after the power was taken from the Crown that the power was taken from the Second Chamber. Things may move more slowly now, but if you take away the power standing between this House and the Crown, you will bring this House and the Crown into direct and, perhaps, immediate antagonism, and destroy the whole balance of the Constitution. What the result of that will be we do not know in detail, but we have the testimony of the history of the seventeenth century, and know that the struggle will be an exceedingly bitter one. The end of it we cannot foresee, but whatever its ultimate end may be it must be bad for this realm which we all desire to maintain in its glory and renown.
§ Mr. LAURENCE HARDYThere is one aspect of the question which has not been brought forward prominently to-night, but which does very much confirm the opinion expressed by my learned Friend in desiring to exclude matters dealing with the prerogatives of the Crown from the Bill. In future such measures would not have full authority as it has been understood up to the present time. My hon. Friend has quoted precedents of 250 years ago, but at that time there was not in existence at all the element which appeals most to me. Now the prerogatives of the Crown are not limited to the opinions we hold with reference to them in this House. They are matters of vital importance to millions living outside of this country altogether. The existence of the Crown is the link which binds us to the great Dominions 1461 across the seas. It is that link that enables this country to rule the great Indian Empire, and, therefore, we may justly say that measures dealing with the existence of the prerogatives of the Crown are far too important to be dealt with in this way, and that they should be reserved specially when you are rewriting the Constitution. We know that the present arrangement is to take the counsel of the Dominions every four years. It would be possible under this Bill in half that time to do away with the position of the Crown, which is the very bond that binds together all those Dominions, and therefore it seems to me that we have a special case in appealing to the Government on the ground that we have no right to settle this for ourselves, and that we are bound in dealing with a matter of this sort to, at all events, be sure that any measure which affects the Crown at all should have the authority of Parliament as understood in the past and still understood throughout the Empire at large. I think that is a salient question and that the Government should give consideration to it before rejecting the Amendment.
§ Mr. SANDERSONI should like to confirm what my hon. Friend has pointed out. It seems to me that this is as an important Amendment as could possibly be presented on the Parliament Bill. My hon. Friend behind me has pointed out the present importance of the Crown in our Empire, and how it is the link between the centre of the Empire and the outlying parts. I ask hon. Members to think for a moment how, if this Parliament Bill becomes law, the importance of the Crown will be increased. Important as is the position of the Crown at present, it would be immensely increased in future because the responsibility would be greater. At the present moment there is a buffer in the existence of the Second Chamber, but in future if you have that buffer taken away for all practical purposes, then you will have nothing of any practical use between this Chamber and the Crown. The responsibility which will be laid upon his shoulders under those circumstances will be immeasurably greater than at the present moment. I do not suppose that the right hon. Gentlemen on the Government Bench intend to take power under this Bill to pass an Act limiting the prerogatives of the Crown without referring to the people. I would ask them this plain question: Do you contemplate such an occasion? Supposing this Parliament Bill 1462 becomes law and the powers of the House of Lords are cut down as contemplated by the Bill, and supposing a controversy did arise between this House and the King, and the King were to say to himself, "Although this has passed through the House of Commons, I am of opinion it is not in accordance with the wishes of the people"—take such a position as that when the Home Rule Bill was introduced in the House of Commons. Although it passed through this House, it was well known that it did not represent the will of the people. Supposing the King were to say "This has passed through the House of Commons, but I do not think it represents the will of the people," and there arose a conflict between this House and the Crown, do the Government wish to take power to pass a Bill to limit the prerogatives of the Crown? If they do not intend to pass such a Bill without its being referred to the people, what is the objection to accepting this Amendment?
Here we have for the first time something like a written Constitution. If we are to have a written Constitution, and it is the opinion of every Member of this House, as I believe it is, that it would be most unwise to take power for us in this House to pass any Bill interfering in any shape whatever with the prerogatives of the Crown without that particular Bill being referred to the people so that they could give an opinion on it, I ask the representatives of the Government to say what is the objection to accepting the Amendment? I should not have interfered in this discussion but for the fact that I feel that this is about the most important Amendment on the whole Bill. I am exceedingly sorry that we have not the Prime Minister here. I should certainly have hoped that he would have listened to the arguments presented in support of the Amendment.
§ Mr. ALFRED LYTTELTONThe matter now before the House is one which in the opinion of our fellow-subjects beyond the seas is of the utmost gravity and importance. The Committee may be familiar with the fact that Canadians, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier especially, always speak of the relations between Canada and this country in the sense that Canada is an independent country owing allegiance to the King. All the Crown Colonies look really to the Crown. Almost all the coloured subjects of the King look entirely to the Crown as absolutely the centre and core of the authority of this Kingdom. 1463 Many millions of the King's subjects abroad do not know anything about this House and have never heard of it. They regard the King as the centre and symbol of authority in this country. I cannot but think it would be a shock both to the Dominions and the Crown Colonies if they feel that it is within the absolute power of this House hereafter substantially to limit the authority of the Crown without there being, as hon. Friends below the Gangway have put it, a buffer between this House and the Crown. That may be illustrated by the consideration of a matter which was before the House two or three years ago, and has often been made the subject of boasting of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on that bench. I mean the prerogative of letters patent. The constitution of the Transvaal and of the Orange Free Colony we settled by letters patent, with which I would not say the House had nothing to do, because it was brought as a matter of courtesy before this House, but as a matter of fact those letters patent could have settled the question of the constitution both of the Transvaal and of the Orange Colony, as well as of United South Africa, without the interference either of this House or of the House of Lords. The rights of making treaties, of dissolving Parliament, and of appointing judges are matters which the events of the last two or three days have proved are in substantial risk at the hands of hon. Gentlemen opposite. It was only by the exercise of the authority of Mr. Speaker that a Division was prevented the other day as to the legal right of a Member, declared to be a Member of this 'House by the judges, to become a Member of this House. What was the supposed reason against his being allowed to take his seat? It was the reason of every loser—that is was unfair.
§ The DEPUTY-CHAIRMANThe hon. Member would not be in order in going into that matter, but I see no reason to interfere as far as he has gone.
§ Mr. A. LYTTELTONThe hon. Member's experience in this House is not very great or he would appreciate the difference between an illustration and a subsequent argument. I was giving an illustration of the liability, a natural liability, because we are all human beings—of an 1464 assembly of this kind to be dominated by a majority who feel themselves aggrieved by decisions of judges, and are obviously desirous of interfering with their appointment and status. It is very undesirable that the appointments of the Crown, safeguarded in the way in which they have been all these years, should be put back under the authority of this House without any intermediary between this House and the Crown. In my opinion it would be disastrous for the future if, as my hon. Friend said so well and pointedly, in a matter between the Crown and this-House, this House perhaps possessed some very strong opinion at a moment when there was substantial doubt as to whether the issue between the Crown and this House was one in which the people were not with this House, but with the Crown.
§ Sir F. BANBURYI would like to know what is the real objection of the Government to this Amendment?
§ Sir RUFUS ISAACSI gave my reasons when the hon. Baronet was not in the House.
§ Sir F. BANBURYI cannot conceive that any one like the hon. and learned Gentleman could have given any satisfactory reason for rejecting this Amendment, and that is why I venture to appeal to him to reconsider the matter. The Amendment merely comes to this, that it states in emphatic language that both sides of the House of Commons are desirous that the Crown should continue in existence. Is the hon. and learned Gentleman desirous that the Crown should continue in existence, and if he is why do they not accept the Amendment? Or does he contemplate that something might arise which would compel the Radical party—
§ The DEPUTY - CHAIRMANThese questions have been answered already.
§ Sir RUFUS ISAACSI think that the hon. Baronet was not in the House when I gave my answer.
§ Mr. JAMES HOPEMay I point out that three specific questions were put by myself which were not answered.
§ Sir F. BANBURYI would be glad to sit down if the hon. and learned Gentleman would answer the questions which have been put. I rose because I thought that in a serious question of this sort sufficient time had not been given by the Government, and as we are accustomed—I do not say it is the case with 1465 the hon. and learned Gentleman, because he is the exception which proves the rule to be treated a little haut en bas by Members on that side of the House. I rose not with the idea of embarrassing the hon. and learned Gentleman because I have always endeavoured to conduct controversy in this House in as fair a manner as possible, but because I thought my hon. Friend was entitled to some answer to the questions which he had put to the hon. and learned Gentleman.
§ Lord HUGH CECILI think the questions put by my hon. Friend are deserving of some answer from the Government. The question of whether the Royal Assent has fallen into desuetude is a very important one. I do not know whether the prerogative to refuse the Royal Assent is revived by this Bill or whether it is not.
§ Sir RUFUS ISAACSThe reply to this particular Amendment has been made, but
§ I do not wish to appear discourteous. The answer is that the Royal power with regard to Veto has already been dealt with when the Prime Minister said that it has fallen into desuetude. [Lord HUGH CECIL: "Dead as Queen Anne."] With regard to the other question I do not think this is the moment to discuss the merits of the subject.
§ Mr. JAMES HOPEThe learned Attorney-General said something about the power of Dissolution, but it was very vague. Is it the opinion of the Government that the Royal power of dissolving Parliament against the advice of Ministers of the Grown has fallen into disuse or not, and has the Royal power of dismissing Ministers fallen into disuse or not?
§ Question put, "That those words be there inserted."
§ The Committee divided: Ayes, 169; Noes, 273.
1469| Division No. 170.] | AYES. | [9.40 p.m. |
| Anson, Sir William Reynell | Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. S. | Larmor, Sir J. |
| Archer-Shee, Major Martin | Dixon, Charles Harvey | Lawson, Hon. H. (T. H'mts., Mile End) |
| Ashley, Wilfrid W. | Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- | Lee, Arthur Hamilton |
| Astor, Waldorf | Du Cros, Arthur Philip | Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Col. A. R. |
| Bagot, Lieut.-Colonel J. | Duke, Henry Edward | Lonsdale, John Brownlee |
| Baird, J. L. | Fell, Arthur | Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. A. (S. Geo., Hon. S) |
| Baker, Sir Randolf L. (Dorset, N.) | Finlay, Sir R. | MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh |
| Baldwin, Stanley | Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A. | Mackinder, H J. |
| Banbury, Sir Frederick George | Fleming, Valentine | Macmaster, Donald |
| Banner, John S. Harmood- | Fletcher, John Samuel (Hampstead) | Magnus, Sir Philip |
| Baring, Capt. Hon. G. V. | Foster, Philip Staveley | Malcolm, Ian |
| Barlow, Montague (Salford, South) | Gardner, Ernest | Mason, James F. (Windsor) |
| Barnston, Harry | Gibbs, George Abraham | Meysey-Thompson, E. C. |
| Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.) | Gilmour, Captain J. | Middlemore, John Throgmorton |
| Bathurst, Hon A. B. (Glouc, E.) | Goldman, C. S. | Mildmay, Francis Bingham |
| Bathurst, Charles (Wilts, Wilton) | Goldsmith, Frank | Mills, Hon Charles Thomas |
| Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks | Gordon, J. | Mount, William Arthur |
| Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth) | Greene, Walter Raymond | Neville, Reginald J. N. |
| Benn, Ion H (Greenwich) | Gretton, John | Newdegate, F. A. |
| Bennett-Goldney, Francis | Guinness, Hon. W. E. | Newton, Harry Kottingham |
| Bentinck, Lord H. Cavendish | Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne) | Nield, Herbert |
| Bigland, Alfred | Hambro, Angus Valdemar | O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim. Mid) |
| Bird, A. | Hamerslsy, Alfred St. George | Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A. |
| Boscawen, Col. Sackville T. Griffith- | Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington, S.) | Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William |
| Bottomley, Horatio | Hardy, Laurence (Kent, Ashford) | Paget, Almeric Hugh |
| Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid) | Harris, Henry Percy | Parker, Sir Gilbert (Gravesend) |
| Boyton, J. | Helmsley, Viscount | Parkes, Ebenezer |
| Bridgeman, William Clive | Henderson, Major H. (Berks, Abingdon) | Pease, Herbert Pike (Darlington) |
| Burn, Colonel C. R. | Hickman, Colonel T. E. | Peel, Captain R. F. (Woodbridge) |
| Butcher, J. G. | Hill, Sir Clement L. (Shrewsbury) | Perkins, Walter Frank |
| Campion, W. R. | Hillier, Dr. A. P. | Pole-Carew, Sir R. |
| Carlile, Edward Hildred | Hills, John Waller (Durham) | Pollock, Ernest Murray |
| Cassel, Felix | Hill-Wood, Samuel | Ratcliff, R. F. |
| Cautley, Henry Strother | Hohler, G. F. | Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel |
| Cave, George | Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield) | Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall) |
| Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) | Horne, W. E. (Surrey, Guildford) | Ronaldshay, Earl of |
| Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford University) | Horner, Andrew Long | Royds, Edmund |
| Chaloner, Col. R. G. W. | Houston, Robert Paterson | Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby) |
| Clay, Captain H. H. Spender | Hume-Williams, William Ellis | Salter, Arthur Clavell |
| Clive, Captain Percy Archer | Hunter, Sir C. R. (Bath) | Sanders, Robert A. |
| Cooper, Richard Ashmole | Ingleby, Holcombe | Sanderson, Lancelot |
| Courthope, George Loyd | Jardine, E. (Somerset, E.) | Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells) |
| Craig, Charles Curtis (Antrim, S.) | Joynson-Hicks, William | Scott, Leslie (Liverpool, Exchange) |
| Craig, Captain James (Down, E.) | Kebty-Fletcher, J. R. | Spear, John Ward |
| Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet) | Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr | Stanier, Beville |
| Craik, Sir Henry | Kerry, Earl of | Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston) |
| Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian | Kimber, Sir Henry | Starkey, John Ralph |
| Croft, H. P. | Kirkwood, John H. M. | Staveley-Hill, Henry |
| Dalrymple, Viscount | Lane-Fox, G. R. | Steel-Maitland, A. D. |
| Stewart, Gershom | Tobin, Alfred Aspinal | Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart- |
| Strauss, Arthur (Paddington, North) | Tryon, Capt. George Clement | Yate, Col. C. E. |
| Swift, Rigby | Walker, Colonel William Hall | Yerburgh, Robert |
| Sykes, Alan John | Ward, Arnold (Herts, Watford) | Younger, George |
| Talbot, Lord E. | Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid) | |
| Terrell, George (Wilts, N W.) | Williams, Col. R. (Dorset, W.) | |
| Terrell, Henry (Gloucester) | Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud | TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Viscount |
| Thompson, Robert (Belfast, North) | Winterton, Earl | Valentia and Mr. H. W. Forster. |
| Thynne, Lord Alexander | Wolmer, Viscount | |
| NOES. | ||
| Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour) | Fenwick, Charles | M'Micking, Major Gilbert |
| Abraham, Rt. Hon. William (Rhondda) | Ferens, Thomas Robinson | Markham, Arthur Basil |
| Acland, Francis Dyke | Ffrench, Peter | Marks, George Croydon |
| Adamson, William | Field, William | Marshall, Arthur Harold |
| Agnew, Sir George William | Fiennes, Hon. Eustace Edward | Martin, Joseph |
| Ainsworth, John Stirling | Fitzgibbon, John | Mason, David M. (Coventry) |
| Alden, Percy | Flavin, Michael Joseph | Masterman, C. F. G. |
| Allen, Artnur Acland (Dumbartonshire) | France, Gerald Ashburner | Meagher, Michael |
| Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud) | Gelder, Sir W. A. | Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.) |
| Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry | Gill, Alfred Henry | Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's County) |
| Atherley-Jones, Llewellyn A. | Glanville, H. J. | Menzies, Sir Walter |
| Baker, H. T. (Accrington) | Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford | Millar, James Duncan |
| Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.) | Goldstone, Frank | Molloy, M. |
| Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark) | Griffith, Ellis J. | Molteno, Percy Alport |
| Barnes, George N. | Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway) | Money, L. G. Chiozza |
| Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick, B.) | Hackett, J. | Mooney, John L. |
| Barry, Redmond John (Tyrone, N.) | Hall, F. (Yorks, Normanton) | Morgan, George Hay |
| Barton, William | Hancock, John George | Muldoon, John |
| Beauchamp, Edward | Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) | Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C. |
| Beck, Arthur Cecil | Harmsworth, R. Leicester | Needham, Christopher T. |
| Benn, W. (T. H'mts., St. George) | Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale) | Neilson, Francis |
| Bentham, G. J. | Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West) | Nicholson, Charles N. (Doncaster) |
| Bethell, Sir John Henry | Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.) | Nolan, Joseph |
| Black, Arthur W. | Haslam, James (Derbyshire) | Norman, Sir Henry |
| Boland, John Pius | Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry | Norton, Captain Cecil William |
| Booth, Frederick Handel | Haworth, Arthur A. | Nugent, Sir Walter Richard |
| Bowerman, Charles W. | Hayden, John Patrick | O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) |
| Boyle, D. (Mayo, N.) | Helme, Norval Watson | O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) |
| Brace, William | Henderson, Arthur (Durham) | O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) |
| Brady, P. J. | Henderson, J. M'D. (Aberdeen, W.) | O'Doherty, Philip |
| Brigg, Sir John | Henry, Sir Charles S. | O'Dowd, John |
| Brocklehurst, W. B. | Higham, John Sharp | Ogden, Fred |
| Brunner, John F. L. | Hinds, John | O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.) |
| Burke, E. Haviland- | Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H. | O'Kelly, James (Roscommon, N.) |
| Burns, Rt. Hon. John | Hodge, John | O'Malley, William |
| Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas | Holt, Richard Burning | O'Neill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.) |
| Buxton, Rt. Hon. S. C. (Poplar) | Horne, Charles Silvester (Ipswich) | O'Shaughnessy, P. J. |
| Byles, William Pollard | Howard, Hon. Geoffrey | O'Shee, James John |
| Carr-Gomm, H. W. | Hughes, S. L. | O'Sullivan, Timothy |
| Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich) | Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan) | Parker, James (Halifax) |
| Cawley, Harold T. (Heywood) | Isaacs, Sir Rufus Daniel | Pearce, Robert (Staffs., Leek) |
| Clancy, John Joseph | Jardine, Sir John (Roxburghshire) | Pearce, William (Limehouse) |
| Clough, William | Johnson, William | Pearson, Weetman H. M. |
| Clynes, John R. | Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil) | Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham) |
| Condon, Thomas Joseph | Jones, William (Carnarvonshire) | Phillips, John (Longlord, S.) |
| Corbett, A. Cameron | Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts., Stepney) | Pickersgill, Edward Hare |
| Cornwall, Sir Edwin A. | Jowett, Frederick William | Pirie, Duncan V. |
| Cotton, William Francis | Joyce, Michael | Pointer, Joseph |
| Crawshay-Williams, Eliot | Keating, Matthew | Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. |
| Crean, Eugene | Kelly, Edward | Power, Patrick Joseph |
| Crooks, William | Kennedy, Vincent Paul | Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central) |
| Crumley, Patrick | Kilbride, Denis | Priestley, Sir Arthur (Grantham) |
| Cullinan, John | King, J. (Somerset, N.) | Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.) |
| Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy) | Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton) | Pringle, William M. R. |
| Davies, E. William (Eifion) | Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade) | Raffan, Peter Wilson |
| Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth) | Lansbury, George | Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough) |
| Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.) | Law, Hugh A. (Donegal, West) | Reddy, Michael |
| Davies, M. Vaughan- (Cardiganshire) | Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rrnd, Cockerm'th) | Redmond, John E. (Waterford) |
| Dawes, James Arthur | Levy, Sir Maurice | Redmond, William (Clare, E.) |
| Delany, William | Logan, John William | Richards, Thomas |
| Dewar, Sir J. A. | Low, Sir F. (Norwich) | Richardson, Albion (Peckham) |
| Dillon, John | Lundon, Thomas | Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven) |
| Doris, William | Lyell, Charles Henry | Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln) |
| Duffy, William J. | Lynch, Arthur Alfred | Roberts, George H. (Norwich) |
| Duncan, J. Hastings (York, Otley) | Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester) | Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs) |
| Edwards, Enoch (Hanley) | Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs) | Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford) |
| Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid) | Maclean, Donald | Robertson, John M. (Tyneside) |
| Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master of | Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J. | Robinson, Sydney |
| Esmonde, Dr. John (Tipperary, N.) | MacNeill, John Gordon Swift | Roche, Augustine (Louth) |
| Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.) | MacVeagh, Jeremiah | Roe, Sir Thomas |
| Essex, Richard Walter | M'Callum, John M. | Rose, Sir Charles Day |
| Esslemont, George Birnie | M'Laren, F. W. S. (Lincs., Spalding) | Rowlands, James |
| Falconer, James | M'Laren, Walter S. B. (Ches., Crewe) | Rowntree, Arnold |
| Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland) | Thomas, J. H. (Derby) | Whittaker, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas P. |
| Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees) | Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton) | Whyte, A. F. |
| Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel) | Thorne, William (West Ham) | Wilkie, Alexander |
| Scanlan, Thomas | Toulmin, George | Williams, J. (Glamorgan) |
| Schwann, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles E. | Lire, Rt. Hon. Alexander | Williams, Llewelyn (Carmarthen) |
| Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B. | Verney, Sir Harry | Williamson, Sir Archibald |
| Sheehy, David | Walsh, J. (Cork, South) | Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull, W.) |
| Sherwell, Arthur James | Walsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince) | Wilson, Henry J. (York, W. R.) |
| Shortt, Edward | Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent) | Wilson, John (Durham, Mid) |
| Simon, Sir John Allsebrook | Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton) | Wilson, J. W. (Worcestershire, N. J. |
| Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe) | Wardle, George J. | Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton) |
| Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.) | Waring, Walter | Winfrey, Richard |
| Spicer, Sir Albert | Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay | Wood, T. M'Kinnon (Glasgow) |
| Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.) | Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan) | Young, Samuel (Cavan, East) |
| Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West) | Watt, Henry A. | Young, W. (Perthshire, E.) |
| Summers, James Woolley | Wedgwood, Josiah C. | Yoxall, Sir James Henry |
| Sutton, John E. | White, Sir Luke (Yorks, E. R.) | |
| Taylor, John w. (Durham) | White, Patrick (Meath, North) | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland. |
| Tennant, Harold John | Whitehouse, John Howard |
§ Sir PHILIP MAGNUSI beg to propose in Sub-section (1), after the second word "Bill" ["other than a Money Bill"] to insert the words, "or Bill for modifying this Act."
I am sorry to say I was not able to be present on last Thursday to hear the speech of the Prime Minister, but I understand that in that speech he distinctly stated that the Government would not be prepared to accept any of the exempting Amendments which appeared on the Paper. The attitude of the Government on the Amendments that have been moved shows that the Members are prepared to carry out the instructions of the Prime Minister. Personally I very much regret that those exempting Amendments have not received that amount of careful attention which it seems to me their very grave importance in dealing with a Bill of this kind deserves. I cannot, however, help feeling that the Prime Minister had not considered this particular Amendment when he came to the general conclusion which he asserted on Thursday last. This Amendment differs essentially from every one of the other important Amendments which provide for certain exemptions from the machinery created by this Bill. It belongs to another category altogether and none of the other Amendments are in any way similar. The bulk of the other Amendments propose to exempt some particular measure, having regard to its importance, from the operations of the Bill, and to leave to the Second Chamber, with respect to those particular measures, the powers which it possesses at present, and would possess but for the machinery set up by this Bill. My Amendment excludes the Amendment of the Bill itself from the machinery provided by this Bill.
I take it that it will be generally admitted that this Parliament Bill alters essentially, and in a way in which it has never been altered for the last two or 1470 three hundred years, the Constitution of the country. I think it will be admitted, after the speeches which have been made to-day, notwithstnding what some of the Ministers have said, that this Bill practically creates one-Chamber Government. I am quite aware that the Prime Minister has on more than one occasion stated that he is in favour, and remains in favour, of two-Chamber Government. I cannot help thinking when he makes that assertion that he uses the word "Chamber" in two different senses. He uses it ire speaking to the public in the sense ire which two-Chamber Government is understood in every civilised country in the world, and he uses it in speaking in this Parliament in the meaning provided by this Bill. Those two senses are quite different from one another. I take it that the only safeguard to one - Chamber Government which this Bill sets up is that a certain amount of time may elapse between the passing of a Bill in this House and that Bill becoming law without the consent of the Second Chamber. I think it will be generally admitted that is the effect of the Bill as it stands the important point of my Amendment follows from the fact that the Government realise that this Bill cannot be carried into law without the consent of the House of Lords. Whether they would desire that it should be carried into effect without their consent is another matter. They definitely realise that this fundamental alteration in the Constitution of this country cannot become law unless it has the assent of both Houses of Parliament. How that assent is to be obtained is of course not for me now even to consider. The House of Lords may agree to the Bill, in which case it may obtain the assent of both Houses, or they may not agree to the Bill, and the Prime Minister may put into force a threat which has been used 1471 to create a sufficient number of Peers in order that the Bill may become law with the assent of both Houses.
The point that I desire to emphasise is that the Bill cannot become law unless it has the assent of both House of Parliament. What I claim for my Amendment is that any change in this Bill shall also not become law without the consent of both Houses, and that having once passed this Bill it shall not be again altered unless the House of Lords give its consent. That is the essential feature of this Amendment—that the same condition shall hold good as regards the alteration or amendment or modification of this Bill as the Government recognise must hold good in order that the Bill may pass into law. In other words, the proposal is that the Constitution of this country cannot be again changed any more than it is being changed now without either the assent of both Houses of Parliament, or without an appeal to the country, so that the will of the people with regard to any alteration in this Bill may be made known. The Prime Minister and the Government claim that they have a mandate for the passing of this Bill. I ask them by this Amendment to be sure that they have a mandate from the people for any modification of this Bill, or for any future alteration in the Constitution of the country. This seems to me an eminently reasonable proposition, which ought to commend itself to the consideration of the Government. It is equally fair to both sides. When the Unionist party come into power they might be glad to be able to alter the Parliament Bill without reference to the Upper House, but they would find it necessary to submit themselves to exactly the same procedure as I am now suggesting to the Government. Consider for a moment what may happen if the Amendment be not accepted. Suppose that after the passing of this Bill a Government even more Radical than the present Government were in power and that they desired without the sanction of the House of Lords so to modify this Bill that the duration of Parliament might be continued for seven, nine, or any other number of years, or that a shorter period might elapse between the passing of a Bill for the first time in the House of Commons and its receiving the Royal Assent. What is there to prevent them so doing? They would be able to do it by modifying this Bill, and they would be able so to alter the Constitution as practically to 1472 secure that Bills might pass with the assent of this House alone in the course of one Session only. It cannot be denied that this Bill has been brought forward very much in order to satisfy the wishes of the Irish party, so that Home Rule may follow without the assent of the Second Chamber.
§ Mr. DILLONAnd many other things.
§ 10.0 P.M.
§ Sir P. MAGNUSSuppose this Bill has been passed and Home Rule granted, the Government will then have to consider the wishes of hon. Members below the Gangway on the other side. What is it that, they demand as strongly as Nationalists demand Home Rule? They demand the abolition of the Upper Chamber altogether. May it not be that under circumstances which may arise the Government will be compelled to defer to the Labour Members in the same way as they have to do to the Nationalist Members, and that they will be prepared to alter this Bill so as to give effect as speedily as possible to the wishes of the Labour Members? I cannot help thinking that that is not the original intention of the Government, and for that reason I think they ought to be desirous of accepting this Amendment. The acceptance of this Amendment must be regarded as a test of the Prime Minister's sincerity when he says that he desires to preserve some shadow of authority to the Upper Chamber. The arguments adduced in favour of adopting some of the exempting Amendments would have a great deal more force if the Bill were altered in the way I suggest. Further, the Bill contains a Preamble which has not yet been discussed. We have not heard when the reconstitution of the House of Lords is to take, place. Unless this Amendment be accepted I fear that in some future Parliament, under a Radical Government, subservient to a large extent to the Labour party, the whole of the portion of the Bill dealing with the reconstitution of the House of Lords might be entirely repealed. These seem to me valid and strong reasons why the Amendment should be accepted. Unless the Amendment be accepted we shall be entering upon a downward course which will ultimately lead to the total abolition of the powers of the Second Chamber and land us with a Government consisting of one Chamber only and all the arbitrary despotism with which a Government so constituted will be endowed. I beg to move.
§ The PRIME MINISTERI listened with great respect to the speech of the hon. Gentleman, but I regret that I cannot hold out any hope that the Government will accept the Amendment, either in the form in which he has proposed it or in any other forms in which the same proposition appears on the paper. The reason is very simple. We have already determined on more than one Amendment to accept the principle that, apart from Money Bills, there is to be one uniform rule applied to all kinds of legislation, namely, the rule laid down in this Clause. Only to-night we have refused to except from the operation of that rule Bills for the creation of Home Rule in any of its various forms, and, by the Amendment rejected a few moments ago, Bills affecting the prerogatives of the Crown. We have further, in debating a previous Amendment, refused to limit the power of the House of Commons to deal with the duration of Parliaments in the future. That being so, I cannot think that it would be either logical or convenient that we should make a special exception in favour of the provisions of this particular Bill. The Government may have a parental pride in the Bill. As a Bill, I believe it is a very good Bill—but I should be very sorry to see the liberty of a future House of Commons in any way impaired or restricted by the means of an exception proscribing any Amendments which experience may show to be necessary. I think that would really be sufficient to dispose of the Amendment; but let me add one further point—a very Serious point. If the hon. Gentleman's Amendment were carried it would establish, or rather it would stereotype, with regard to this particular matter, an equality, and a very serious inequality, as between the two parties in the State. Suppose this Amendment to be carried. Suppose you do elect to-morrow, or next year, a House of Commons in which the party opposite were in power. They could alter any one of the provisions of this Bill with the assent of the other Chamber. I am assuming for the sake of argument that that Second Chamber was still a Chamber in which there was the normal Conservative majority—
§ Sir PHILIP MAGNUSWhy assume it if that House is to be reconstituted?
§ The PRIME MINISTERWe are obliged to take contingencies into account. I should have very great confidence in the kind of Second Chamber which is contemplated by the Preamble of this Bill. But 1474 I am sorry to say I do not see the possibility of an immediate creation of such a Chamber. In the meantime we have to consider what will be the state of things without such a Chamber; what would it be if this Amendment were carried. It would be establishing, as I have said, for the time being an absolute inequality between the two parties in the State. We could not amend the procedure in Clause 2 of the Bill, however much experience might show it to be necessary, without resorting to the old forms of the Constitution, enabling the House of Lords to block our proposals. On the other hand, a casual, temporary, and precarious—and in point of numbers an insignificant—majority of the party opposite could with the greatest possible ease extend our three Sessions to five, and our two years to three, and render practically the operative part of this Bill futile and nugatory. I am bound to point out to the hon. Gentleman, and I am sure he will agree with me after what I have said—that the carrying of this Amendment will establish an inequality as between the two parties in the State. For the reason I have given—namely, that we want to have one uniform rule for legislation—to apply to all things, great or small, important or unimportant, organic, or inorganic, the Government cannot possibly accept the Amendment.
Mr. BALFOURThe right hon. Gentleman contemplates with dismay the possibility of a Unionist majority, "temporary, precarious, and insignificant" ever altering this Bill by the help of a friendly House of Lords. Are there no "temporary, precarious, and insignificant" majorities on the other side? Is it only one party in the State whose predominance in this Chamber is "temporary, precarious, and insignificant," and if these are disqualifications attaching in turn to a majority from either party in the State, or from any party in the State, and if the right hon. Gentleman thinks that to such a "temporary, precarious, and insignificant" majority you ought not to entrust dealing with the fundamental Constitution of the country, I wish to know how he justifies this Bill at all? He has got on this Amendment as he has on many others this bugbear of what he calls the inequality between the two sides of the House. This makes him tremble to think that there may be a majority in this House coincident in opinion with the opinion of the other House, and the idea of any such unfair advantage in what he evidently regards 1475 as the game of politics, fills him with the same kind of dismay as unfair rules in the carrying on of any particular contest on the football field. [An HON. MEMBER "Or golf."]—yes, or golf—fills a competitor with dismay. The remedy for that is to reform the House of Lords. Let him get his own countrymen in favour of a reconstitution of a Second Chamber. Do not let him adopt what he is inconsistently adopting now.
What does he say? "Since the House of Lords as at present constituted does not agree with me in my opinion we will so frame the Constitution that a 'temporary, precarious, and insignificant' majority in this House shall always be able to modify that part of the Constitution from top to bottom." I think that is a grotesque policy with regard to any of the fundamental laws of the kingdom. It is a doubly grotesque policy when you come to the machinery by which the Constitution itself is altered. Every State in the world has got greater safeguards in its Constitution than we have under the old traditional policy of this country of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. First and Second Chambers are required to agree before any law becomes law. Even under that system we are less protected against fundamental changes by "temporary, precarious, and insignificant" majority than in any other country which has a deliberately framed Constitution. You are not content with that relatively unstable position. You are going to make the position still more unstable by saying that all changes, however tremendous—not merely in the Constitution of the country, but in the machinery by which that Constitution is hereafter to be moulded—are to be henceforth at the mercy of a "temporary, precarious, and insignificant" majority. I think that is lunacy. I cannot understand any serious body of politicians trying to carry it into effect. You ask us not merely to assent to revolution, but to assent to revolution which in turn makes future revolution a matter of a "temporary, precarious, and insignificant" majority. I never heard of such a policy. Is there any political theorist in any part of the world, speaking any language, dealing with any Constitution, however old or however new, who has decided, not merely that the Constitution itself in ordinary legislation shall be a one-Chamber system, but that the whole of the 1476 future moulding of that policy shall be in the hands of one Chamber, and one Chamber alone?
I do not see how on what principle His Majesty's Government on their own argument and on their own showing can justify this. The right hon. Gentleman has told us all through these Debates that after all the power left to the House of Lords is a considerable power, because that they have the power to hang up a Bill for two years. I regard that as a most inadequate safeguard, but at all events let us grant the importance and the value which the right hon. Gentleman gives it. By what tenure is that safeguard preserved? Is that a fundamental part of the Constitution? When you are handing over all the powers to this Chamber over ordinary legislation we see the greatest objection to it, but we at all events know that no further invasion upon our Constitution can be made except under the provisions you are putting before us. Now it seems that that may be the fruitful parent of any number of further revolutions, each one of which fritters away what you call the safeguards In these circumstances you are asking us to substitute the ancient foundations of the Constitution, foundations of moving sand which any breath may sweep away. The right hon. Gentleman himself has dilated for momentary rhetorical purposes upon the transitory character of the representation which a majority of this House may have. He himself in a moment of forgetfulness has explained in a happy phrase how little the majority of this House may represent the permanent opinions of the country. Are we now, from henceforth going to hand over to a majority of the House, constituted as he tells us as a majority of this House so often is, not merely the ordinary legislation of the country, but the very shaping of the machinery by which legislation is to be carried into effect. It is not merely the craze for revolution which has animated the Government from the beginning of this whole policy; they are going a step further now and they are making it perfectly clear to every Member of this House and to every member of the general public who still takes the trouble to consider the tenor of legislation that henceforth everything we hold sacred and dear is to be for ever in the keeping and the keeping only of a majority which, in the right hon. Gentleman's own words, is "temporary, precarious, and insignificant."
§ Mr. HICKS BEACHThe Prime Minister has given some reasons for refusing this Amendment. The first is that he already refused an Amendment to exempt the granting of Home Rule to Ireland, and an Amendment to exempt prerogatives of the Crown, and another reason I think was that this Amendment is outside the scope of this Bill. He said in these circumstances it would be illogical to exempt from the provisions of this Bill any subsequent Bill that might seek to amend its terms. Besides these, another argument was that it would act very unfairly between the two parties, and that when the present Opposition came into power he contended it could do exactly what it liked with the House of Lords. May I respectfully point out that this Amendment is moved quite as much in the interests of the party oppositt as it is in our own party. It is quite true this Amendment is moved directly with the purpose of preventing the Liberal party from further extending what we believe to be the iniquitous provisions of this Parliament Bill. For example, we do not desire to see any Radical Government prolonging the duration of Parliament from five years to seven, nine, or eleven years. We do not desire to see a Radical Government coming in and saying, under the first Clause of this Bill, that the person who is to decide what is or is not a Money Bill is in future not to be the Speaker of the House of Commons, but the Prime Minister or the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We do not desire to see a Radical Government come in, and under Clause 2 alter the three successive Sessions into one Session. We do not desire them to enact that any Bill shall become law which has been passed three times, not only within two years, but within a period of even six months, because that could easily be done by the Prime Minister proroguing Parliament, meeting the next day, and then passing the Bill again. That could easily be done by any Government that has its tail wagged by the party below the Gangway. That is why we press this Amendment. Supposing this Bill is passed into law? I am presuming that the Liberal party will have created their 500 puppet peers establishing their majority in the other House. In the ordinary course of things, I presume, the Unionist party will come into power again, and I imagine that one of their first acts would be to repeal the provisions of the Parliament Bill. You would then find the House of Lords with a Radical majority, and we should have 1478 no say at all in the passage of a Bill brought forward by the Unionist party to repeal this Bill. Do the Liberal party desire that? What about the Preamble of the Bill? We have been told by the Prime Minister that the prospect of carrying out the Preamble of the Bill is getting more and more remote.
§ The PRIME MINISTERI never said that.
§ Mr. HICKS BEACHI think that only in his last speech the Prime Minister told us that the carrying out of the Preamble of the Bill is very remote. We are led to that conclusion every day by speeches from hon. Members below the Gangway. Does the right hon. Gentleman think it is not desirable, after the Preamble has been carried into fruition, after the Second Chamber has been constituted upon a popular basis, that that Chamber should have some say in matters with which this Parliament Bill deals? Surely they should be allowed to have some say in any alteration which may be suggested in this measure. I cannot help thinking that hon. Members opposite are arguing against themselves when they decline to allow any Amendment of this Bill to have the sanction of the Second Chamber before it passes into law. I am strongly of opinion that in the interests, not only of the good and continuous Government of this country, but also in the interests of the Liberal party itself, it is most desirable that any Amendment of this Parliament Bill should receive the final approval not only of this House but of the Second Chamber as well.
§ Mr. CAVEI find it very difficult to reconcile the speech of the Prime Minister with the speeches he has made on previous occasions. The right hon. Gentleman told us in his speech on the First Reading, and again in his remarkable speech last Thursday, that he saw dangers in the provisions of this Bill unless safeguards were inserted in it. He said in terms—I noted his words—that any House might outstay its mandate and pass imperfect measures. He said: "These are dangers to guard against, and we have guarded against them," and he pointed very clearly to two provisions in this Bill, one the five years' limit of the duration of a House of Commons, and secondly, the provision which prevents this House from passing a Bill over the head of the other House except after two years' delay. That seemed to me 1479 to indicate something like a Parliamentary bargain between the two Houses. In other words the Prime Minister said this: "We propose to you this measure, but we insert these safeguards, and we shall not be able to pass a Bill over your heads and the heads of the other House except after," to take only one instance, "two years' delay." Surely a Parliamentary bargain is worth nothing unless it can be enforced, and the effect of this bargain now proposed is that each of these safeguards may be swept away two years from now. You cannot enforce the safeguards. What then are your safeguards worth? I want to quote to the Prime Minister a sentence from a speech of Cromwell, whom he seems to have taken as his prototype in certain respects. Cromwell in 1654 made a speech to the House of Commons. He was impressing upon the House that there were certain matters which were fundamental, and he informed them that when they went outside they would find there those who would prevent them from coming in again unless they had taken an oath to observe these fundamental matters, and among the fundamental matters he included the duration of Parliament. May I quote one sentence from his speech, because I think it bears upon the matter we are discussing now. He said this:—
That Parliaments should not make themselves perpetual is fundamental. Of what assurance is a law to prevent so great an evil if it lie in the same legislature to un-law it again? Is such a law like to be lasting? It will be a rope of sand; it will give no security, for the same men may unbuild what they hare built.Every word of that applies to this occasion, and every word, I think, supports this Amendment. Your safeguards are worthless if this House could undo them to-morrow; and it is contradictory on one day to tell us "there are evils against which we have guarded," and in another to provide that these safeguards may be abolished to-morrow. I think that sentence alone of Cromwell, who, after all, had gone through the experience which the Prime Minister is only beginning today, is enough to recommend this Amendment to the House.
§ Captain SPENDER CLAYIn supporting this Amendment, I should first of all like to say how very much I appreciate the speech which has just been delivered by the hon. Member for Kingston (Mr. Cave), and I think it is very unfortunate the Prime Minister has not an opportunity of answering that speech. I am quite certain the arguments 1480 the hon. Member for Kingston put forward were absolutely unanswerable, and that no argument which the Prime Minister adduced adequately met them. This Amendment would bring about exactly what the Government profess to desire. We understand that their anxiety is solely to ensure that Liberal legislation shall have the same opportunity of passing into law as Conservative legislation. It is also admitted by them that no Government, however big its majority, is necessarily representative of the people after it has been in power for a period of three years. I suppose for that reason the period of two years has been selected by the Government. If they are really in earnest there can be no possible objection on their part to this Amendment. The Prime Minister in his speech last Thursday said that Amendments of this kind were unnecessary; but surely a moment's reflection will show the right hon. Gentleman that such is not the case.
Does this period of two years commend itself to every part of the House? Do the Members of the Labour party agree that it is a suitable time for delay? Suppose the Radical Government brought in one of their cherished schemes for the benefit of mankind—and mankind does not always deem those schemes to be so very beneficent—judging by the protests that arise from every part of the country—but suppose that Government, having been in power for a period of three years, would not that strong sense of philanthropy which distinguishes hon. Members opposite and of which they think they have a monopoly compel them to say, "Why throw this measure into the melting pot of a General Election and give the wicked Tories a chance to throw it out? We will cut the period short and send the Bill up to the House of Lords at once "—I cannot help thinking, though it may be dangerous to prophecy, that a little Bill would emanate from the Treasury Bench substituting a period of one calendar month for the two years. I gather from the cheers of hon. Members opposite that such a curtailment of time would appeal to them. Evidently they are Single Chamber men, naked and unashamed. They are not ashamed of the fact and they regard this period of two years as a farce. They have some considerable weight with the Government at the present time.
Then there are the Members for Ireland—the Nationalist party. When they have 1481 been paid their blood money for their support of the Budget of 1909 they will probably, if they still honour this Assembly with their presence, also desire some curtailment of this period, and they, too, are not without weight with the Government. In fact, I think it comes to this, that the moderate constitutional-minded and I am afraid old-fashioned Liberal would find himself in a hopeless minority. It is to prevent this very distressing state of affairs that I support the Amendment.
§ Sir H. CRAIKI happen to have an Amendment on the Paper with the same object, and I think we require some safeguard of this sort. The considerations on that point have been so fully urged that I will not repeat them but will deal with the arguments which the Prime Minister used to-night. They were simply two. One is that he says, in effect, We have adopted a monotonous course of refusing to accept Amendments and we intend to pursue it to the end. The other answer is, That they cannot admit a proposal of this kind because there might be a difference between the majority in this House and the majority in another House. But if there is to be no difference between this House and the Second Chamber under any conceivable circumstances, for what purpose do we have a Second Chamber at all? Is it possible that you can always secure a Second Chamber which will be always in agreement with this House? If the right hon. Gentleman himself had to frame a Second Chamber at this moment, would it agree with hon. Members below the Gangway who now support him but who in future may be opposed to him? A Second Chamber must constitutionally be in a position distinctive from that of another Chamber. If it is not its existence is useless and need not be continued, but it does not follow that the Second Chamber, because it has certain differences, is not at any time to be tolerated. The right hon. Gentleman has himself frequently opened out arguments which have proved that the delay caused by the Second Chamber is a useful and necessary element of the Constitution, but I am not going to dwell upon the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman's own statements. I wish to appeal to the arguments which arise from historical experience, one of which has been used by my hon. and learned Friend below me. I wish to adduce a more recent instance. In 1791, during the French Revolution, the Constituent Assembly drew up a Constitution—a Single-Chamber Constitution—and 1482 I want to call the attention of the Committee for one moment to the words used with regard to that by one who was at one time an honoured Member of this House. Mr. Lecky, remarking upon the action of the Constituent Assembly which presented that Single-Chamber system of Government in 1791, says:—
One part, of the Constitution is curious, because it shows that the National Assembly was not absolutely blind to the lesson which experience of its own proceedings had abundantly supplied in the facility with which a Single Chamber can change all the institutions of the country and the extraordinary danger of such a process of organic change.Here is a curious point to which Mr. Lecky calls attention:—It was provided that no change could be made in the Constitution until three successive Legislatures, lasting two years, had asked for it, and until it had been especially chosen and enlarged in number for the very purpose. It was a strange thing that an Assembly which had shown itself so contemptuous of all the limitations of its own power, and which had so effectually destroyed every possible counterpoise to its power, should" have imagined it could in this way effectually bind its successors. You can only bind your successors if you bring in another power, and that other power is supplied by the Second Chamber, and by the Second Chamber alone.These restrictions and safeguards to which the right hon. Gentleman appeals, are mere bands of sand if they depend only on the will of the one Chamber which has created them and which to-morrow may sweep them away. You can only make these real safeguards, as Mr. Lecky has shown, by having a Second Chamber and by reconstituting that Second Chamber, not in the remote futurity, but in the immediate present.
§ Mr. BOTTOMLEYI gather it is rather the opinion of the Committee that someone should speak for this side of the House, and, rising in that capacity, I am bound to say I am amazed that His Majesty's Government should not have accepted this Amendment. Any business Government would not have hesitated to do so. If I may emulate the excellent example of the Solicitor-General, I would ask the Committee to ask itself the important question: Where are we? I understand this Amendment, stripped of all technicalities, means this, that assuming this Bill becomes law no other Bill amending the Act shall pass without the consent of the House of Lords. This Bill cannot become law without the consent of the House of Lords, and the consent of the House of Lords to this Bill cannot be obtained until its composition has been very materially altered. In other words, a very largo addition to its membership has to be made and when it has been made, and until that 1483 result has been counteracted, it will be a Liberal House of Lords. Therefore, as I understand the Amendment, the position will be that with a House of Lords with a Liberal majority this Bill, when once it becomes law, cannot be altered without the consent of that Liberal Second Chamber. That is the proposal which the Prime Minister brushed aside. As a loyal Member of the Liberal party desirous of seeing this Government kept in office until some Government on more sane principles than the party system provides is called into being, I cannot understand why the Prime Minister does not accept the Amendment. Surely the Prime Minister will not say, whatever else was before the electorate at the last election, that we have a mandate, not only to pass the Parliament Bill, but to pass any conceivable Amendment to that Bill without reference to a Second Chamber. I shall vote for every Amendment to Clause 2 because I am satisfied, as every impartial Member of the House must be satisfied, that in this Parliament, at least, we are going to hear no more of the reform of the Second Chamber. If this Clause 2 were a temporary expedient pending the reform of the other House I would loyally support the Government in any machinery it cares to set up, but in the absence of a declaration by the Prime Minister, which we shall never get, that, within the life of this Parliament, the Preamble of this Bill is to become a reality, then I look upon Clause 2 as the most idiotic, stupid reductio ad absurdum of the party system of government, and recognising that this Amendment is one which cannot be answered by any argument in language, I shall vote for it very heartily, only suggesting that the hon. Member should substitute for the word "modification" the word "amendment."
§ Mr. INGLEBYI think it must be admitted by every fair-minded man that some safeguard is necessary for the Constitution of any country which is constituted in such a way as ours. I was referring to the constitution of Poland of 1791, which was framed in the flush of the French Revolution, and which was a democratic constitution I might say in the best sense of the word. It started with the decree that the will of the people must prevail. I cannot help thinking that, consciously or unconsciously, Clause 2 of this Bill is founded on this very constitution I am quoting, for it is almost exactly similar. It goes on to 1484 say that any general law must be introduced in what corresponds to the House of Commons, and if not then carried by the House of Lords—the Senate—it shall remain in a state of suspended animation until the next Houses are elected—they are elected every two years—and then if introduced into the House of Deputies and is not accepted by the Senate or House of Lords, it shall ipso facto become the law of the land. I wish to call attention to that particular matter, because that Clause in the Constitution of Poland is reproduced in this Parliament Bill. But though that is a most democratic Constitution yet it provides its safeguard, because it decrees that the Constitution of Poland itself cannot be amended unless an extraordinary constitutional diet is summoned for that very purpose. I think if a second-rate Principality, such as Poland, required a safeguard before the Constitution could be amended this country, the head of the British Empire, certainly should demand no less. I think most earnestly that some safeguard is needed. I cannot help thinking that the Government will agree to this most reasonable Proposition.
Mr. NEIL PRIMROSEI have been induced to rise by the speech of the hon. Member for South Hackney (Mr. Bottomley). He supported the Amendment on the ground that no change in this Bill should be carried without the consent of the House of Lords except by means which he indicated. My main reason in supporting this Bill is that, whatever my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir H. Dalziel), who sits beside me, may think, the time must come, and come soon, when the Second Chamber must be reconstituted, and it can only be reconstituted on lines which will make Liberal legislation possible by means of this Bill. That is why I oppose this Amendment. With regard to the quotation from Cromwell which the hon. Member for Kingston (Mr. Cave) made, I would like to point out that that quotation makes particularly foolish every Amendment which is moved by that side of the House, because that quotation says you cannot put restrictions on a House which that House itself cannot negative. That is exactly what hon. Members on the other side of the House are trying to do, for every day that we have sat in Committee on this Bill they have been trying to insert Amendments which were confining the functions of this House, as this Amendment proposes to do, which would 1485 exclude certain legislative enactments from the functions of this House. According to the quotation which he himself has used from the words of Cromwell, that is a useless proceeding, because you cannot curb the legislative proceeding of this House when this House itself can abolish that control. Hon. Members opposite are very fond of adducing the example of the United States. I maintain that there is no£ the faintest analogy between the constitutional position of the United States and the proposals of this Bill. The reason is obvious. Congress, the House of Representatives, and the Senate, were created by the Constitution which the Convention in Philadelphia set up. This House, by this Bill, in modifying the present Constitution, is in the position of the Convention which set up the United States Constitution. There is no possible analogy between the two positions. I think that all these Amendments which are trying to curb the power of the House of Commons in dealing with legislation, so far from being of use are interfering with the liberty of discussion which we on this side of the House believe to be necessary in a representative Chamber.
§ Mr. WYNDHAMThe hon. Member for Wisbech (Mr. Primrose) bases his support of the Government on the broad ground that Clause 2 is a convenient means for an end, but I think it will not be uncharitable to say that there is a wide divergence between the end he contemplates and the ends which the Government and their supporters have in contemplation. He laid particular stress upon the Preamble of the Bill. So much stress has not been laid by the Prime Minister. There is one aspect of the Bill on which we can all agree. If Clause 2 does go through unamended, it will be a very convenient means for any end which any person may cherish. The hon. Member has lifted the Debate out of the groove into which I think it had fallen. It has become very difficult for any Member of this House to address the Committee, because of two disabilities under which we are all labouring. It was understood that, whatever we might say, and whatever votes we might give, we were this evening to submit Amendments which were designed to enable certain topics to be excluded from the scope of Clause 2, but it was also understood from the Prime Minister's speech, and from the speech of the Solicitor-General, that the Government were adamantine against any 1486 Amendment, because in their view there was a general reason for rejecting all Amendments. That reason, adumbrated by the Prime Minister this afternoon, and by the Solicitor-General this evening, was this, that whatever else was discussed at the General Election, nobody discussed the possibility of exceptions from the provisions of Clause 2, and therefore no exceptions from the provisions of Clause 2 are to be made. In spite of these two disabilities under which we are all labouring, and in spite of the fact that the Government are not going into the merits of any one of these Amendments, yet I do think that something may be said on the merits of this Amendment. The hon. Member for Wisbech (Mr. Primrose) at any rate addressed himself to this Amendment, which is more closely allied, and more nearly in touch with the character of the Bill than any of the other Amendments of similar character. I do not think it is more important; it is not so important as the Amendment for excluding the preservation of the Union, which we have discussed. It may be that it is not so important as other Amendments of the same character which we are to discuss later, but I do say that it is more closely allied to the character and essence of the Bill which the Government is bringing forward. Why? What is the character and essence of the Bill for which the Government are responsible? It is no less than this—I do not think right hon. Gentlemen opposite will quarrel with my description—to substitute a written Constitution for the traditional Constitution of this country.
11.0 P.M.
This Amendment is ad rem to that characteristic of the Government proposal. The others are more important, it may be, but this one is very nearly in touch with the very core of what you are asking this Committee and this country to do. I think we might even now invite them to look for a moment impartially to the merits of this Amendment, by asking them to compare its merits with the merits of their proposal. What is the prime merit of a written Constitution? It is that it cannot easily be changed. What we have claimed for our traditional Constitution is that it can be changed, and we have sometimes—perhaps from insular arrogance—deplored the fact that the United States of America has a written Constitution which has not the same elasticity as our unwritten Constitution. With a written Constitution you get something unchangeable, and we ask that this 1487 should be shown by this Amendment, which the Government refuse, and in refusing it they discard and throw overboard the only merit which they can claim for their Constitution. In spite of the disabilities which I have touched upon, I ventured to invite the Government now to consider whether this Amendment is not in harmony with their proposal. Of course, if the Government merely get up and re-peat that at the last General Election, whatever else be said, nobody ever suggested that there should be exceptions from Clause 2, I have nothing more to say, and they really reduce our proceedings to an absurdity. If that be true, if that be the presentation of the truth upon which the Prime Minister and the Solicitor-General are prepared to found this, why did they come before the country as one who asks for a concession of some African potentate covering everything. Then when he is asked to enumerate what is covered by it he refuses to discuss the merits of the particular proposition. There have been such cases, and even in benighted Africa the dusky potentate has said, "It is true I have signed away a great deal, but I did not know I had signed away that." It is the right of this Committee to say "You may ask us to sign away all our liberties, but are we when' we take a written Constitution to sign away the only virtue which anybody has claimed for a written Constitution?"
§ The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. Churchill)The right hon. Gentleman has joined others on the opposite side in paying a tribute to the virtues of the Parliament Bill. They wish to make it permanent; they ask to make these safeguards unchangeable; they regard them now as so valuable. [An HON. MEMBER: "Unchangeable."] That is the request of the Amendment.
§ Sir P. MAGNUSmade a remark which was inaudible.
§ Mr. CHURCHILLTo make the provisions of this Bill unalterable. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no."] Surely they cannot at this time of day ask us to make that unchangeable only in one direction. Is it to be suggested that we for our part should agree that these safeguards, which the party opposite now regard as so valuable and which the right hon. Gentleman the 1488 Leader of the Opposition thinks are everything we hold sacred and dear—
Mr. BALFOURI am not aware that I used such flamboyant language. I would not use it of things of which I approve, and certainly not of the things of which I do not approve.
§ Mr. CHURCHILLThen where is the logic and sincerity of asking us to make them permanent for all time?
§ Sir P. MAGNUSRead the Amendment.
§ Mr. CHURCHILLI am very glad to be able to put these points because they show that what the right hon. Gentleman is asking is not an even-handed arrangement. By what he is asking his party would be free to alter this instrument or to abolish it altogether. Is it not their own declaration that they intend to alter it when they have a majority? The right hon. Gentleman's contention is that his party should be free to alter the system to a very different one any time they liked. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, no."] Whereas in our position we should never be in a position to alter it no matter how vexatious or irrelevant. I am utterly at a loss to understand what the position of the right hon. Gentleman is.
Mr. BALFOURThe right hon. Gentleman assumes that the other Chamber is always going to be opposed to him in politics. I assume that it need not necessarily be so if right hon. Gentlemen opposite make it representative. I assume that it need not necessarily be so if they create 500 peers. On what possible grounds therefore does the right hon. Gentleman consider that a permanent arrangement which he complains of, rightly or wrongly, as being characteristic of the present situation?
§ Mr. CHURCHILLThat would be a good argument if we had at the present time a reconstituted and impartial Second Chamber. Members opposite have always failed to appreciate, although we have tried to explain to them, the position which we occupy and which this Bill seeks to assert. This Bill is very effective as an instrument for securing the predominance of the House of Commons, but nobody has ever pretended that it secures complete political equality between parties. It does not. It exposes us to the possibility of vexatious and malevolent interference in our future legislation, and at the same time it gives us no security that the party 1489 opposite, if they obtain a majority, will not reverse or tear up this constitutional settlement. In that pregnant fact, quite apart from the declarations of the Government, resides the assurance that it will be necessary to follow up this first step with a second step, securing some body which will fairly work the Constitution provided by this instrument. The right hon. Gentleman opposite, in supporting this Amendment, is only asking us to agree that in no circumstances will be depart from the safeguard which this instrument sets up, while at the same time he would remain perfectly free, if he had a majority next year, to tear the whole thing up and make any new settlement he chose. Where is the purity of that? If the right hon. Gentleman came forward and said that he would agree to make this a permanent instrument which could not be altered by either party in the State, that would indicate at any rate a desire on the part of the Opposition to appreciate to some extent the position which those who are opposed to them take up. But no such proposal is put forward. The unanswerable arguments to which the hon. Members below the Gangway referred are arguments designed only to perpetuate in another form the gross inequality which in an infinite variety of forms we are engaged in discussing on this Bill from day to day
§ Lord HUGH CECILThe defence put forward by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary for resisting this Amendment amounts to this. In the first place they do not contemplate passing the reform of the Second Chamber during the present Parliament. The argument implies that. If they passed that reform during the present Parliament, my right hon. Friend would never have the opportunity of meddling with the matter at all. Therefore the argument as to unfairness between parties breaks down altogether. If during the present Parliament the Second Chamber were made, as Members opposite would say, an impartial Second Chamber, evidently the whole argument that my right hon. Friend might alter the Parliament Bill to his taste and that right hon. Gentlemen opposite would be placed in an unequal position, breaks down. My first observation, then, is that the reform of the Second Chamber is now recognised as not coming during the present Parliament. My second observation is that right hon. Gentlemen opposite anticipate defeat at the next election. That is some- 1490 what strange, because they have repeatedly assured us that they are only carrying out the mandate of the people. The Solicitor-General said earlier in the evening that we thought the electors stupid; right hon. Gentlemen opposite must think them tyrannical and ungrateful, because the Government claim to be doing only what they have been told to do, and yet they are certain of instant dismissal. The proposition that this Amendment puts forward is simply that the ancient Constitution should be treated as the "constituent assembly"—that the "constituent assembly" should be consulted again before the arrangement set up has been modified. When my hon. Friend the Member for Wisbech shows that this House cannot be limited he forgets that the other House must assent to this Bill. All we say is that the powers that the other House will exercise, and must exercise in pursuance of the law, ought to be exercised in resisting any Bill amending this Bill. That seems to be a very reasonable proposition.
§ Mr. POLLOCKIn supporting this Amendment let me say I have listened to the most remarkable speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary in opposing it. He seems to forget that we are dealing in this Bill with a fragment only of the alteration by which it is endeavoured to alter the Constitution. This particular fragment is a fragment on which the veto of the House of Lords is to be curtailed. Hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House as well as hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway support this Bill as being a fragment, an instalment of the intention that the Preamble shall at some time be carried into effect. I was interested in listening to the speech of the hon. Gentlemen the Member for Wisbech. He obviously supported this Bill in the belief that at some time the partial, fragmentary nature of this legislation will be completed by Amendment and alteration of the constitution of the House of Lords. The Home Secretary does not seem to see that we are asking that the opportunity should be given that this Bill should at least stand so long as may be necessary for the rest of the intentions of the Government to be carried out.
What guarantee have we if we pass this Bill, only that there will ever be an opportunity for the intentions of the Preamble and of the rest of the legislation intended by Members on the other side to be carried into effect? The Prime Minister might remember the words of Cromwell 1491 quoted a few moments ago by my hon. and learned Friend. The right hon. Gentleman himself has pointed out what may be the uncertainties of political fortune. It may well be that he himself will never have the opportunity of carrying into effect the whole of the legislation that he no doubt sincerely desires to carry out. In making his speech on the First Reading, he told us that no country can safely rest its fortunes on the hazard of the perpetual recurrence of special providences. Yet at the same time he is trusting to some special providence to give him a considerable period of time during which he may have the opportunity of fulfilling his pledge, given in the Preamble, that we should have a reconstitution of the Second Chamber on a proper democratic basis. We ask him, by virtue of this Amendment, to give some security that this Bill will stand for such time, remote or early, which would give him the opportunity of fulfilling the pledges which are contained in the terms of the very Bill itself.
The Prime Minister answers that he has already declared that he will make no difference in Bills whether they are organic or inorganic, or whether they are concerned with one view or another. Who, he says, shall decide that point? What we are asking is that he should treat this Bill, which is neither organic nor inorganic, but which is absolutely primary, and the first Bill that lays down a written Constitution at all, as at least entitled to stability which shall last until the Preamble is carried into effect, and we get the further instalment that he has promised us. This is not a question whether a Bill is organic or otherwise. It is an answer to the right hon. Gentleman to say that this Bill is primary, and deserves proper treatment at his hands, inasmuch as it is inadequate for rebuilding the Constitution. [An HON. MEMBER: "Destroying the Constitution."] My hon. Friend says "destroying the Constitution," but let me accept for the purposes of my argument that it is for rebuilding the Constitution. If the right hon. Gentleman intends this Bill as rebuilding the Constitution and laying anew the foundations, I presume he means to go through to the end and to rebuild the Constitution and not merely to lay the foundations. The hon. Member for Wisbech Division of Cambridge seemed to entirely misunderstand the quotation given by my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston. He did not appreciate what Oliver Cromwell said, 1492 that this House no doubt could alter any of the legislation passed through it. It is for that very reason we seek now, as they sought 250 years ago, for some outside assembly to give some sort of stability to our system and to prevent this House acting in an entirely intemperate and uncontrolled manner.
§ Mr. STUART-WORTLEYI support this Amendment because it rests upon the claim and principle where you have the power conferred by a written Constitution, revision of that Constitution should not proceed for a less important or higher source than that which created the Constitutional arrangement. The position of Ministers to this Amendment—and there could be no more important Amendment than that we are now discussing—is only one more piece of cumulative evidence that Single Chamber Government is the intention as well as the effect of this Bill, and that Single Chamber Government is in future to be the sole supreme and final judge of the limits of its own powers. And, further, their attitude is evidence of the absolute want of value of all the pledges and promises made in the face of this House as to what they intended to do with regard to what the Preamble says about the powers of the other House.
The Prime Minister says that the House already resolved that there should be only one principle applicable to all Bills under this Bill if it becomes an Act. The House decided nothing of the kind, either in substance of in form. If the House had so decided we not only would not, but could not, be discussing the Amendment now before us. If the House had arrived at any such decision in substance the decision would have been a very unwise one, because it would be totally without precedent to be found in civilised Constitution in the habitable world. We need not go beyond the British Empire to challenge Ministers to show any evidence whereby it is possible for one and the members of a legislative partnership to alter the conditions of that partnership without the concurrence of the other party to the arrangement. That is the fault in this Bill which this Amendment seeks to correct. The right hon. Gentleman opposite fell back in the end of his speech to the argument which always seems to serve right hon. Gentlemen opposite in all their intentions. He says this Amendment, should it be carried, would be to the advantage for one party only in the State. That argument shows a suspicious amount of foreknowledge on the part of right hon. 1493 Gentlemen opposite of the Constitution of the Second Chamber we are to have. It does more: it shows the point of view from which this whole scheme has been made out. It has been merely a regulation of the game between parties, and parties have been from the first the sole inspiration for bringing in this Bill, while the one chief and overriding consideration left out has been the interests of the people at large from whom any real strength is alone to be obtained. It is from that degrading point of view that hon. Members opposite have never been able to rise and that is the inherent weakness of their proposal. That is why we can promise, so far as we can help it, that this measure shall never have permanence.
§ The PRIME MINISTERI hope the Committee may now feel disposed to come to a decision upon this Amendment, the importance of which I have never disputed. The Debate has on the whole been conducted on perfectly fair lines, although a certain amount of exuberance characterised the speech of the right hon. Gentleman opposite who has just spoken. The Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord Hugh Cecil) said in resisting this Amendment we are making two assumptions. The first is that you are not going to bring into existence during the life of the present Parliament that reconstituted and representative Second Chamber to which reference is made in the Preamble. In the second place, the Noble Lord said that the Government see no chance of obtaining, if the electors were again consulted by a general election, a renewal of the mandate given to them at the last, two elections. I do not wish to dogmatise in the matter, but I must point out to the Noble Lord that I do not admit either of those assumptions. On the contrary, I hope and believe that before the lifetime of this Parliament is ended, we shall be able to put into a concrete and workable form our proposals in the Preamble.
I also hope that when this Parliament comes to render its account to the country the electors will renew a little more emphatically than they did at the last two elections—even more emphatically—their expression of confidence in the present advisers of the Crown. While those are my hopes and intentions, and indeed my expectations, yet we have to guard against contingencies, and, human nature being what it is and human affairs being what they are, and as the unfore- 1494 seen and incalculable always ought to enter into the schemes and designs of Statesmen, we think it right that we should not submit ourselves to what we should have to submit ourselves to if the Amendment were accepted, namely, the the possibility of our not being able, whatever experience we may show, to amend in any particular this measure. I do not think that is an unreasonable position to take up. On those grounds, and no other, except the general considerations adverted to in the course of this Debate, we must resist this Amendment. I hope hon. Members will now consider themselves in a position to come to a decision upon this Amendment.
§ Mr. JOYNSON-HICKSI have not yet spoken on this Bill, and I have made several efforts to catch the Chairman's eye, so much so that I at last came to the conclusion it was a somewhat hopeless task.
§ The CHAIRMANI do not believe the hon. Gentleman meant that as any reflection, but I do not think he should make use of a phrase like that, because it does cast a reflection.
§ Mr. JOYNSON-HICKSI had not the slightest intention of casting any reflection upon you, Sir. All I meant to say was that I had been unable, doubtless through my own fault, to bring myself within the range of your eye. There is one point I have wanted to put before the Committee, and I hope they will allow me to do so. This Parliament Bill represents the accumulated wisdom of the Liberal party with regard to the difficulties in which they are placed from the time of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to the present. It represents the views and propositions which they have placed before the electorate certainly on two occasions and very definitely at the last general election. The Prime Minister has told us that if ever there was an election fought upon a particular question it was the last election, which was fought upon the Veto Bill, containing, I presume, the provisions in this Bill, I venture to suggest that, if other proposals had been contained in this Bill, such as have been foreshadowed tonight by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Churchill), they might not have got that large majority. They got their majority upon the definite understanding that they were proposing certain proposals and none others with regard to the House of Lords. The 1495 Prime Minister has told us over and over again and nearly every Liberal Member in their speeches in the constituencies said there were certain safeguards in this Bill, and that those safeguards provided a scheme fair towards the House of Lords and the Conservative party.
This Amendment says, in effect, "Crystallise the Bill with those safeguards and provisions which have been before the country," and the Prime Minister says, "No. We desire to put in the Bill the right to make any constitutional Amendment. We desire to retain to ourselves, without the consent of the Second Chamber, the right to remodel the conditions upon which we have gone to the country and got a mandate for this Bill." If they have got any such proposals, we are entitled to ask them to produce them before they pass this Bill. Are they going to amend the Bill by reducing the two Sessions to one Session? We have been told it is fair the House of Lords should have power to defer, and we have had to-night the first anticipation of the kind of speech we shall have when the House of Lords use their powers under this Bill. They will still, after the passing of this Bill, be subject to vexatious and malevolent interference. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Hon. Members below the Gangway seem to think that that is my expression. It was the expression of the Home Secretary to-night, and if he uses it now I wonder what kind of speech he will make in a year or two when the House of Lords exercise the power you are going to give them. If the Government really mean to be content with the powers they put in their Bill there can be no harm in accepting this Amendment. If, on the other hand, they have proposals up their sleeve for dealing with any action the House of Lords may feel justified in adopting then let them bring them forward. Let them be put into the Bill. Let them have the sanction of the people of this country. But do not try to alter the Constitution with the aid of one Chamber and one Chamber alone.
§ Mr. NEVILLEI think the Committee and the country at large ought to recognise the spirit in which the Government is dealing with important Amendments, which are designed not from a party point of view, but for the purpose of making the Constitution which the Government are proposing for the country, a suitable Con- 1496 stitution, and one which will work on business lines. The attitude which they adopt is very like the attitude of the Mahomedan Conqueror of Egypt who, when he came to Alexandria and found the finest-library the world then contained, asked, "What are these books? What do they contain? Is it in the Koran? If it is we don't want them. If it is not send them to the baths and let them be burned in order to make the water hot." So it is with the Government and the way in which they deal with our Amendments. If an Amendment is included in the Bill it is sacrosanct; it has been before the constituencies, and we, who have come back flushed and intoxicated with our victories—with that sparkling wine, are quite content to take that as a sufficient endorsement of the policy which we are suggesting to the country. But not one word has-been said on the other side. I have listened in vain for a word as to where the country comes in. The questions have been, "Where do our party come in?" "How are our interests to be safeguarded?" They are making the promise to the ear, but they are taking care it shall be broken to the heart. That has been the attitude adopted on this occasion on every Amendment that has been brought forward.
If I may, I would ask, what is-the object of the safeguards? The object of the safeguards is to prevent certain contingencies maturing into eventualities. I suppose there is nobody who is a trustee who would not, if he were a fraudulent man, be glad that there should be no such doctrine as fraud upon power; but that is exactly what the safeguards we suggest to-night are introduced for the purpose of preventing. Right hon. Gentlemen opposite come back here they say with a mandate from the constituencies, but they are forbidden to use it for any purpose which the Liberal Party thinks fit, and the only way in which that can be stopped is by seeing that the people of this country have an opportunity of saying a word upon the question by putting adequate safeguards in the Bill. It is for that reason that these Amendments have been put forward by the Party to which I have the honour to belong. The Prime Minister said that he was proud of this Bill—he said he took a parental pride in it. Ali I can say is that there are a great many unfertile parents in this country who would rejoice at the birth of a monstrosity, and, so far as I can 1497 see, this Bill, in which the Prime Minister and other Members of the Government take so much pride, will be treated hereafter in the history of this country as nothing short of a monstrosity.
§ The CHAIRMANThe hon. Member seems to think we are, discussing the Bill, but we are engaged in debating a particular Amendment.
§ Mr. NEVILLEI am exceedingly sorry that I transgressed in the slightest degree the proper order of this House, but I was only quoting what the Prime Minister said, that he took extraordinary pride in it. I am sorry that I should have followed him upon that subject, but I should like to emphasise one point further, and that is this, that if the Committee and the Government are sincere in their
§ desire to produce a workable measure and one which will be for the benefit of this country, not merely for the benefit of their party, but for the good of every party which may come into office, they should as far as ever they can prevent the House of Commons from having the power of altering the Constitution at the will of any body of people. Their duty is to follow the advice which has been given by the hon. Member for Hackney, and see that the Constitution of the House of Lords has been remodelled before they further mutilate and destroy the Constitution which exists at the present time.
§ Question put, "That those words be there inserted."
§ The Committee divided: Ayes, 190; Noes, 288.
1501| Division No. 171.] | AYES. | [11.40 p.m. |
| Aitken, William M. | Croft, Henry Page | Larmor, Sir Joseph |
| Anson, Sir William Reynell | Dalrymple, Viscount | Law, Andrew Bonar (Bootie) |
| Archer-Shee, Major M. | Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. S. | Lawson, Hon. Harry (Mile End) |
| Ashley, Wilfrid W. | Dixon, Charles Harvey | Lee, Arthur Hamilton |
| Astor, Waldorf | Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- | Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury) |
| Bagot, Lt.-Col. Josceline | Du Cros, Arthur P. | Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey) |
| Baird, John Lawrence | Duke, Henry Edward | Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Col. A. R. |
| Baker, Sir Randolf L. (Dorset, N.) | Faber, Capt. W. V. (Hants, W.) | Long, Rt. Hon. Walter |
| Baldwin, Stanley | Falle, Bertram Godfray | Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. A. (S. Geo., Hon. S.) |
| Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (City Lond.) | Fell, Arthur | Lyttelton, Hon. J. C. (Droitwich) |
| Banbury, Sir Frederick George | Finlay, Sir Robert | MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh |
| Banner, John S. Harmood- | Fisher, William Hayes | Mackinder, Halford J. |
| Baring, Captain Hon. Guy Victor | FitzRoy, Hon. Edward A. | Macmaster, Donald |
| Barlow Montague (Salford, S.) | Fleming, Valentine | Magnus, Sir Philip |
| Barnston, Harry | Fletcher, John S. (Hampstead) | Malcolm, Ian |
| Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.) | Foster, Philip Staveley | Mason, James F. (Windsor) |
| Bathurst, Hon. Allen B. (Glouc. E.) | Gastrell, Major W. Houghton | Meysey-Thompson, E. C. |
| Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks | Gibbs, George Abraham | Mildmay, Francis Bingham |
| Benn, Arthur S. (Plymouth) | Gilmour, Captain John | Mills, Hon. Charles Thomas |
| Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich) | Goldman, Charles Sydney | Morrison-Bell, Major A. (Honiton) |
| Bennett-Goldney, Francis | Goldsmith, Frank | Mount, William Arthur |
| Bentinck, Lord H. Cavendish- | Gordon, John | Neville, Reginald J. N. |
| Bigland, Alfred | Goulding, Edward Alfred | Newdegate, F. A. N. |
| Boscawen, Col. A. S. T. Griffith- | Greene, Walter Raymond | Newman, John R. P. |
| Bottomley, Horatio | Gretton, John | Newton, Harry Kottingham |
| Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid) | Guinness, Hon. Walter Edward | Nicholson, Wm. G. (Petersfield) |
| Boyton, James | Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne) | Nield, Herbert |
| Brassey, H. L. C. | Haddock, George Bahr | O'Donnell, Thomas |
| Bridgeman, William Clive | Hambro, Angus Valdemar | O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid) |
| Bull, Sir William James | Hamersley, Alfred St. George | Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A. |
| Burdett-Coutts, William | Hamilton, Lord C. J. (Kensington) | Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William |
| Burn, Col. C. R. (Torquay) | Hardy, Laurence (Kent, Ashford) | Paget, Almeric Hugh |
| Butcher, J. G. | Harris, H. P. | Parkes, Ebenezer |
| Campion, W. R. | Helmsley, Viscount | Pease, Herbert P. (Darlington) |
| Carlile, Edward Hildred | Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire) | Peel, Capt. R. F. (Woodbridge) |
| Cassel, Felix | Hickman, Colonel Thomas E. | Pole-Carew, Sir Reginald |
| Castlereagh, Viscount | Hill, Sir Clement L. (Shrewsbury) | Pollock, Ernest Murray |
| Cator, John | Hillier, Dr Alfred Peter | Pretyman, Ernest George |
| Cautley, Henry Strother | Hills, John Waller (Durham) | Pryce-Jones, Col. E. |
| Cave, George | Hill-Wood, S. (High Peak) | Ratcliff, Major R. F. |
| Cecil, Evelyn (Aston Manor) | Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy | Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel |
| Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford University) | Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield) | Rolleston, Sir John |
| Chaloner, Col. R. G. W. | Home, Edgar (Surrey, Guildford) | Ronaldshay, Earl of |
| Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry | Horner, Andrew Long | Rothschild, Lionel de |
| Clay, Captain H. H. Spender | Houston, Robert Paterson | Royds, Edmund |
| Clive, Captain Percy Archer | Hunt, Rowland | Rutherford, William (West Derby) |
| Cooper, Richard Ashmole | Ingleby, Holcombe | Samuel, Sir Harry (Norwood) |
| Courthope, George Loyd | Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, E.) | Sanders, Robert Arthur |
| Craig, Charles Curtis (Antrim, S.) | Joynson-Hicks, William | Sanderson, Lancelot |
| Craig, Captain James (Down, E.) | Kebty-Fletcher, J. R. | Sandys, G. J (Somerset, Wells) |
| Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet) | Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr | Scott, Leslie (Liverpool, Exchange) |
| Craik, Sir Henry | Kerry, Earl of | Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) |
| Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian | Kirkwood, John H. M. | Smith, F. E. (Liverpool, Walton) |
| Cripps, Sir Charles Alfred | Lane-Fox, G. R. | Spear, John Ward |
| Stanier, Beville | Thomson, Wm. Mitchell- (Down, N.) | Winterton, Earl |
| Stanley, Major Hon. G. F. (Preston) | Thynne, Lord Alexander | Wolmer, Viscount |
| Starkey, John Ralph | Tobin, Allied Aspinall | Wood, John (Stalybridge) |
| Staveley-Hill, Henry | Touche, George A. | Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart- |
| Steel-Maitland, A. O. | Tullibardine, Marquess of | Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George |
| Stewart, Gershom | Walker, Col. W. H. | Younger, George |
| Swift, Rigby | Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid.) | |
| Sykes, Alan John | White, Major G. D. (Lanc, Southport) | |
| Terrell, George (Wilts, N. W.) | Williams, Col. R. (Dorset, W.) | TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Viscount Valentia and Mr. H. W. Forster. |
| Terrell, Henry (Gloucester) | Willoughby, Major Hon. Claude | |
| Thompson, Robert (Ballast, N.) | Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.) | |
| NOES. | ||
| Abraham, William (Dublin) | Edwards, J. H (Glam., Mid.) | Lawson, Sir Wilfrid (Cockerm'th) |
| Abraham, Rt. Hon. William (Rhondda) | Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master of | Levy, Sir Maurice |
| Acland, Francis D. (Camborne) | Esmonds, Dr J. (Tipperary, N.) | Lewis, John Herbert |
| Adamson, William | Esmonde, Sir T. (Wexford, N.) | Logan, John William |
| Addison, Dr. Christopher | Essex, Richard Walter | Lundon, Thomas |
| Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R. | Esslemont, George Birnie | Lyell, C. H. |
| Ainsworth, John Stirling | Falconer, James | Lynch, Arthur Alfred |
| Alden, Percy | Ferens, Thomas Robinson | Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester) |
| Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbartonshire) | Ffrench, Peter | Macdonald, J. M. (Falkirk Burghs) |
| Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud) | Field, William | Maclean, Donald |
| Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry | Fiennes, Hon. E. E. | Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J. |
| Baker, Harold T. (Accrington) | Fitzgibbon, John | MacNeill, John Gordon Swift |
| Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.) | Flavin, Michael Joseph | MacVeagh, Jeremiah |
| Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark) | France, Gerald Ashburner | M'Callum, John M. |
| Barnes, George N. | Gelder, Sir William Alfred | M'Kenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald |
| Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick B.) | Gill, Alfred Henry | M'Laren, H. (Leicester, Bosworth) |
| Barry, Redmond J. (Tyrone, N.) | Glanville, Harold James | M'Laren, F. W. S. (Linc, Spalding) |
| Barton, William | Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford | M'Laren, W. S. B. (Crewe) |
| Beale, William Phipson | Goldstone, Frank | Manfield, Harry |
| Beck, Arthur Cecil | Greenwood, Granville G. (Peterborough) | Markham, Arthur Basil |
| Benn, W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.) | Griffith, Ellis Jones | Marks, George Croydon |
| Bentham, George Jackson | Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway) | Marshall, Arthur Harold |
| Bethell, Sir John H. | Hackett, John | Mason, David M. (Coventry) |
| Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine | Hall, F. (Yorks, Normanton) | Masterman, C. F. G. |
| Black, Arthur W. | Hancock, John George | Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.) |
| Boland, John Pius | Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. (Rossendale) | Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's Co.) |
| Booth, Frederick Handel | Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) | Millar, Duncan |
| Bowerman, Charles W. | Hardie, J. Keir (Merthyr Tydvil) | Molloy, Michael |
| Boyle, Daniel (Mayo, North) | Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale) | Money, L. G. Chiozza |
| Brace, William | Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West) | Mooney, John J. |
| Brocklehurst, William B. | Harvey, W E. (Derbyshire, N. E.) | Morgan, George Hay |
| Brunner, John F. L. | Harwood, George | Morrell, Philip |
| Burke, E. Haviland- | Haslam, James (Derbyshire) | Muldoon, John |
| Burns, Rt. Hon. John (Battersea) | Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry | Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C. |
| Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas | Haworth, Arthur A. | Needham, Christopher Thomas |
| Buxton, Rt. Hon. S. C. (Poplar) | Hayden, John Patrick | Neilson, Francis |
| Byles, William Pollard | Hayward, Evan | Nicholson, Charles N. (Doncaster) |
| Carr-Gomm, H W. | Helme, Norval Watson | Nolan, Joseph |
| Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich) | Henderson, Arthur (Durham) | Norman, Sir Henry |
| Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood) | Henderson, J. M. (Aberdeen, W.) | Norton Capt. C. W. (Newington, W.) |
| Chancellor, Henry George | Henry, Sir Charles | Nugent, Sir Walter Richard |
| Chapple, Dr. William Allen | Herbert, Col. Sir Ivor | O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) |
| Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S. | Higham, John Sharp | O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) |
| Clancy, John Joseph | Hinds, John | O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool, Scotland) |
| Clough, William | Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H. | O'Doherty, Philip |
| Clynes, John R. | Hodge, John | O'Dowd, John |
| Collins, Stephen (Lambeth) | Holt, Richard Durning | Ogden, Fred |
| Condon, Thomas Joseph | Hope, J. D. (Haddington) | O'Grady, James |
| Corbett, A. Cameron | Home, Charles Silvester (Ipswich) | O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.) |
| Cornwall, Sir Edwin A. | Howard, Hon. Geoffrey | O'Malley, William |
| Cotton, William Francis | Hughes, Spencer Leigh | O'Neill Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.) |
| Crawshay-Williams, E. | Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan) | O'Shaughnessy, P. J. |
| Crooks, William | Isaacs, Sir Rufus Daniel | O'Shee, James John |
| Crumley, Patrick | Jardine, Sir John (Roxburghshire) | O'Sullivan, Timothy |
| Cullinan, John | Johnson, William | Palmer, Godfrey Mark |
| Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kirkcaldy) | Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea) | Parker, James (Halifax) |
| Davies, Ellis William (Eifion) | Jones, Edgar R. (Merthyr Tydvil) | Pearce, Robert (Leek) |
| Davies, Timothy (Louth) | Jones, Wm. (Carnarvonshire) | Pearce, William (Limehouse) |
| Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.) | Jones, Wm. S. Glyn- (Stepney) | Pearson, Hon. Weetman H. M. |
| Davies, M. Vaughan- (Cardigan) | Jowett, Frederick William | Pease, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Rotherham) |
| Dawes, James Arthur | Joyce, Michael | Phillips, John (Longford, S.) |
| Delany, William | Keating, Matthew | Pickersgill, Edward Hare |
| Denman, Hon. Richard Douglas | Kelly, Edward | Pirie, Duncan V. |
| Dewar, Sir J. A. | Kennedy, Vincent Paul | Pointer, Joseph |
| Dillon, John | Kilbride, Denis | Pollard, Sir George H. |
| Doris, William | King, Joseph (Somerset, North) | Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. |
| Duffy, William J. | Lambert, George (South Molton) | Power, Patrick Joseph |
| Duncan, J. Hastings (York, Otley) | Lambert, Richard (Cricklade) | Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central) |
| Edwards, A. C. (Glam., E.) | Lansbury, George | Priestley, Sir Arthur (Grantham) |
| Edwards, Enoch (Hanley) | Law, Hugh Alexander (Donegal, W.) | Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.) |
| Primrose, Hon. Nell James | Scott, A. M'Callum (Bridgeton) | Waring, Walter |
| Pringle, William M. R. | Seely, Rt. Hon. Colonl | Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay T. |
| Raffan, Peter Wilson | Sheehy, David | Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan). |
| Raphael, Sir Herbert Henry | Shortt, Edward | Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney) |
| Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough) | Simon, Sir John Allsebrook | Wedgwood, Josiah C. |
| Reddy, Michael | Smith, Albert (Clitheroe) | White, Sir Luke (York, E. R.) |
| Redmond, William (Clare, E.) | Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.) | White, Patrick (Meath, North) |
| Richards, Thomas | Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.) | Whitehouse, John Howard |
| Richardson, Albion (Peckham) | Strachey, Sir Edward | Whyte Alexander F. (Perth) |
| Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven) | Strauss, E. A. (Southwark, W.) | Wiles, Thomas |
| Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln) | Summers, James Woolley | Wilkie, Alexander |
| Roberts, George H. (Norwich) | Sutton, John E. | Williams, John (Glamorgan) |
| Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs.) | Taylor, John W. (Durham) | Williams, Llewelyn (Carmarthen) |
| Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford) | Tennant, Harold John | Williamson, Sir Archibald |
| Robertson, John M. (Tyneside) | Thomas, Abel (Carmarthen, E.) | Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull, W.) |
| Robinson, Sidney | Thomas, James Henry (Derby) | Wilson, Henry J. (York, W. R) |
| Roche, Augustine (Louth) | Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton) | Wilson, John (Durham, Mid) |
| Roe, Sir Thomas | Thorne, William (West Ham) | Wilson, J. W. (Worcestershire, N.) |
| Rose, Sir Charles Day | Toulmin, George | Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton) |
| Rowlands, James | Trevelyan, Charles Philips | Winfrey, Richard |
| Rowntree, Arnold | Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander | Wood, T. M'Kinnon (Glasgow) |
| Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter | Verney, Sir H. | Young, Samuel (Cavan, East) |
| Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland) | Walsh, Stephen (Lancashire, Ince) | Young, William (Perth, East) |
| Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees) | Walters, John Tudor | Yoxall, Sir James Henry |
| Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel) | Ward, John (Stoke-upon-Trent) | |
| Scanlan, Thomas | Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton) | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland. |
| Schwann, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles E. | Wardle, George J. |
Mr. HAMILTON BENNI beg to move, after the second word "Bill" ["If any Bill other than a Money Bill"] to insert the words, "or a Bill which contains any provision affecting the qualification for the exercise of the parliamentary franchise or affecting the right to vote at any parliamentary election."
As Clause 2 stands at present, a Bill containing provisions dealing with either or both of these subjects, would become law if passed in three successive Sessions in two years. This Amendment would prevent any hasty or ill-considered alteration of the qualification to vote, which may be passed by any Government, backed by a transient majority and seeking to prolong its own existence. A stable electorate is the whole basis of our representative system. In giving the power to a transient majority to alter the electorate as best suits its own interests, you are effecting an electoral revolution each time there is a new Parliament. It might be convenient to this Government to grant female suffrage or to another Government to grant adult suffrage, but in any case there is a disturbance of that stability of suffrage which is essential to representative government. The same argument applies to the other side of the question. It would be possible for a Government, avoiding the mature consideration and the judgment of the people, to deprive of the right to vote at Parliamentary elections certain classes who now enjoy that right. These rights should not be jeopardised or placed in the power of any temporary majority.
If democratic government is to be successful, nothing is more essential than that 1502 the suffrage should be put beyond the power of a temporary, precarious or insignificant majority. It was exactly this power which led to the pro-consular powers of ancient Rome, and eventually to the subversion of the republic. That the present Amendment is necessary may be inferred from the only other precedent which we have in English history of a House of Commons which became omnipotent. The Long Parliament established itself in 1649 as omnipotent, and, having passed on the 6th of February a resolution abolishing the House of Lords, and on the following day a resolution abolishing the Monarchy, it then proceeded to consider an Elections Bill, the aims of which are described by Mr. Gardiner in his "History of the Commonwealth," who explains that "there are some reasons for believing it was intended that this system of recruiting was to be applied to each successive Parliament so that there would never be another General Election." On the Third Beading of the Elections Bill on the 19th of April Cromwell attended the Debate and protested against the proposal, finally calling in the soldiers and ordered the Mace to be removed, and dispersed the Parliament with the characteristic remark, "You are no Parliament." Of course it will be said that no Government of this country will ever repeat or attempt to repeat what the Long Parliament attempted to do. But, as the Prime Minister said just now, "You have to provide against contingencies." Ten years ago no one in this country would have believed that any Government would have brought in the present Parliament Bill. If you refuse the Amendment you are 1503 putting unfettered into the hands of the Government of the day the power to prolong its own existence indefinitely, and to exclude from the franchise any sections of the electors who happen to be opposed to them. If I may say so, you are striking at the roots of democratic Government in this country.
§ Mr. CHURCHILLWe ask the Committee to resist the Amendment which seeks to exclude matters relating to the Parliamentary franchise;. We are certainly not able to accept an Amendment which would prevent the Government for example from dealing with plural voting. The other night I ventured to point out to another hon. Member the Noble Lord
§ below the Gangway opposite that he ran a risk by his Amendment, not nearly so direct a risk as the hon. Member on the present occasion, of taking away the power to deal with votes for women, and I think the hon. Gentleman ought to have that clearly in mind. The Government are unable to agree that matters affecting the franchise, which ought to be exclusively matters for this House, should be excluded from this provision which we regard as proper and convenient for regulating the passage of legislative proposals.
§ Question put, "That those words be there added."
§ The Committee divided: Ayes, 161; Noes, 253.
1505| Division No. 172.] | AYES. | [11.58 p.m. |
| Aitken, William M. | Fleming, Valentine | O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid) |
| Archer-Shee, Major Martin | Forster, Henry William | Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A. |
| Ashley, Wilfrid W. | Foster, Philip Staveley | Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William |
| Bagot, Lt.-Col. Josceline | Gibbs, George Abraham | Paget, Almeric Hugh |
| Baird, John Lawrence | Gilmour, Captain John | Parkes, Ebenezer |
| Baker, Sir Randolf L. (Dorset, N.) | Goldman, Charles Sydney | Pease, Herbrt P. (Darlington) |
| Baldwin, Stanley | Goldsmith, Frank | Peel, Capt. R. F. (Woodbridge) |
| Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. (City, Lond.) | Gordon, John | Pole-Carew, Sir Reginald |
| Banner, John S. Harmood- | Goulding, Edward Alfred | Pollock, Ernest Murray |
| Baring, Captain Hon. Guy Victor | Greene, Walter Raymond | Pretyman, Ernest George |
| Barlow, Montagu (Salford S.) | Gretton, John | Pryce-Jones, Col. E. |
| Barnston, Harry | Guinness, Hon. Walter Edward | Ratcliff, Major R. F. |
| Barrie, H. T. (Londonderry, N.) | Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne) | Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall) |
| Bathurst, Hon. Allen B. (Glouc, E.) | Haddock, George Bahr | Rolleston, Sir John |
| Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks | Hardy, Laurence (Kent, Ashford) | Ronaldshay, Earl of |
| Benn, Arthur S. (Plymouth) | Helmsley, Viscount | Rothschild, Lionel de |
| Bennett-Goldney, Francis | Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire) | Rutherford, William (W. Derby) |
| Bigland, Alfred | Hickman, Colonel Thomas E. | Sanders, Robert Arthur |
| Boscawen, Col. A. S. T. Griffith- | Hill, Sir Clement L. (Shrewsbury) | Sanderson, Lancelot |
| Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid) | Hillier, Dr. Alfred Peter | Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells) |
| Boyton, James | Hills, John Waller (Durham) | Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) |
| Brassey, H. L. C | Hill-Wood, S. (High Peak) | Smith, F. E. (Walton) |
| Bridgeman, William Clive | Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy | Stanier, Beville |
| Bull, Sir William James | Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield) | Stanley, Major Hon. G. F. (Preston) |
| Burdett-Coutts, William | Home, Edgar (Surrey, Guildford) | Starkey, John Ralph |
| Burn, Col. C. R. (Torquay) | Horner, A. L. | Staveley-Hill, Henry |
| Butcher, J. G. | Hunt, Rowland | Steel-Maitland, A. D. |
| Campion, W. R. | Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, East) | Stewart, Gershom |
| Carlile, Edward Hildred | Joynson-Hicks, William | Swift, Rigby |
| Cassel, Felix | Kebty-Fletcher, J. R. | Sykes, Alan John |
| Castlereagh, Viscount | Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr | Terrell, George (Wilts, N. W.) |
| Cator, John | Kerry, Earl of | Terrell, Henry (Gloucester) |
| Cautley, Henry Strother | Kirkwood, John H. M. | Thompson, Robert (Belfast, N.) |
| Cave, George | Lane-Fox, G. R. | Thomson, Wm. Mitchell- (Down, N.) |
| Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford Univ.) | Law, Andrew Bonar (Bootie, Lanes.) | Thynne, Lord Alexander |
| Chaloner, Colonel R. G. W. | Lawson, Hon. Harry (Mile End) | Tobin, Alfred Aspinall |
| Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry | Locker-Lampson, G. (Salisbury) | Touche, G. A. |
| Clay, Captain H. H. Spender | Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey) | Tullibardine, Marquess of |
| Clive, Captain Percy Archer | Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Col. A. R. | Valentia, Viscount |
| Cooper, Richard Ashmole | Long, Rt. Hon. Walter | Walker, Colonel W. H. |
| Courthope, George Lloyd | Lyttleton, Hon. J. C. (Droitwich) | Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid.) |
| Craig, Captain James (Down, E.) | MacCaw, Wm. J. MacGeagh | White, Major G. D. (Lanc. Southport) |
| Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet) | Macmaster, Donald | Williams, Col. R. (Dorset, W.) |
| Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian | Magnus, Sir Philip | Willoughby, Major Hon. Claud |
| Croft, Henry Page | Mason, James F. (Windsor) | Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.) |
| Dalrymple, Viscount | Meysey-Thompson, E. C. | Winterton, Earl |
| Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. S. | Mildmay, Francis Bingham | Wolmer, Viscount |
| Dixon, Charles Harvey | Mills, Hon. Charles Thomas | Wood, John (Stalybridge) |
| Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- | Morrison-Bell, Major A. (Honiton) | Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart- |
| Du Cros, Arthur P. | Mount, William Arthur | Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George |
| Duke, Henry Edward | Neville, Reginald J. N. | Younger, George |
| Fell, Arthur | Newdegate, F. A | |
| Finlay, Sir Robert | Newman, John R. P. | TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Mr. Malcolm and Mr. Hamilton Benn. |
| Fisher, William Hayes | Newton, Harry Kottingham | |
| FitzRoy, Hon. Edward A. | Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield) | |
| NOES. | ||
| Abraham, William (Dublin) | Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) | Palmer, Godfrey Mark |
| Abraham, Rt. Hon. Wm. (Rhondda) | Hardie, Keir (Merthyr Tydvil) | Parker, James (Halifax) |
| Acland, Francis D. (Camborne) | Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale) | Pearce, Robert (Leek) |
| Adamson, William | Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West) | Pearson, Hon. Weetman H. M. |
| Addison, Dr. Christopher | Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.) | Pease, Rt. Hon. J. A. (Rotherham) |
| Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R. | Harwood, George | Phillips, John (Longford, S.) |
| Ainsworth, John Stirling | Haslam, James (Debyshire) | Pickersgill, Edward Hare |
| Alden, Percy | Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry | Pirie, Duncan V. |
| Allen, Arthur A. (Dumbartonshire) | Haworth, Arthur A. | Pointer, Joseph |
| Allen, Chales Peter (Stroud) | Hayden, John Patrick | Pollard, Sir George H. |
| Baker, Harold T. (Accrington) | Hayward, Evan | Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. |
| Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.) | Helme, Norval Watson | Power, Patrick Joseph |
| Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark) | Henderson, Arthur (Durham) | Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central) |
| Barnes, George N. | Henry, Sir Charles | Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.) |
| Barran, Sir John N. (Hawick, B.) | Higham, John Sharp | Pringle, William M. R. |
| Barry, Redmond J. (Tyrone, N.) | Hinds, John | Raffan, Peter Wilson |
| Barton, William | Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. Charles E. H. | Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough) |
| Beck, Arahur Cecil | Hodge, John | Reddy, Michael |
| Benn, W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.) | Hope, J. D. (Haddington) | Redmond, William (Clare, E.) |
| Bentham, George Jackson | Home, Charles Silvester (Ipswich) | Richards, Thomas |
| Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine | Howard, Hon. Geoffrey | Richardson, Albion (Peckham) |
| Black, Arthur W. | Hughes, Spencer Leigh | Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven) |
| Booth, Frederick Handel | Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan) | Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln) |
| Bowerman, Charles W. | Isaacs, Sir Ruins Daniel | Roberts, George H. (Norwich) |
| Boyle, Daniel (Mayo, North) | Johnson, William | Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs) |
| Brace, William | Jones, Sir D. Brynmor (Swansea) | Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford) |
| Brocklehurst, William B. | Jones, Edgar R. (Merthyr Tydvil) | Robertson, John M. (Tyneside) |
| Brunner, John F. L. | Jones, Wm. (Carnarvonshire) | Robinson, Sidney |
| Burke, E. Haviland- | Jones, Wm. S. Glyn- (Stepney) | Roche, Augustine (Louth, N.) |
| Burns, Rt. Hon. John (Battersea) | Jowett, Frederick William | Rose, Sir Charles Day |
| Carr-Gomm, H. W. | Joyce, Michael | Rowlands, James |
| Cawley, Sir Frederick (Prestwich) | Keating, Matthew | Rowntree, Arnold |
| Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood) | Kelly, Edward | Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter |
| Chancellor, Henry George | Kennedy, Vincent Paul | Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland) |
| Chapple, Dr. William Allen | Kilbride, Denis | Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees) |
| Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S. | King, Joseph (Somerset, North) | Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel) |
| Clancy, John Joseph | Lambert, George (South Molton) | Scanlan, Thomas |
| Clough, William | Lambert, Richard (Cricklade) | Scott, A. M'Callum (Bridgeton) |
| Clynes, John R. | Lansbury, George | Seely, Rt. Hon. Col. |
| Collins, Stephen (Lambeth) | Lawson, Sir Wilfrid (Cockerm'th) | Sheehy, David |
| Condon, Thomas Joseph | Levy, Sir Maurice | Shortt, Edward |
| Cornwall, Sir Edwin A. | Lewis, John Herbert | Simon, Sir John Allsebrook |
| Cotton, William Francis | Logan, John William | Smith, Albert, (Clitheroe) |
| Crawshay-Williams, E. | Lundon, Thomas | Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.) |
| Crooks, William | Lyell, C. H. | Stanley, Albert (Staffs N. W.) |
| Crumley, Patrick | Lynch, Arthur Alfred | Strachey, Sir Edward |
| Cullman John | Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester) | Strauss, E. A. (Southwark, W.) |
| Dalziel, Sir James H. (Kircaldy) | Maclean, Donald | Summers, James Woolley |
| Davies, Ellis William (Eifion) | Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J. | Sutton, John E. |
| Davies, Timothy (Louth) | MacNeill, John Gordon Swift | Taylor, John W. (Durham) |
| Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.) | MacVeagh, Jeremiah | Tennant, Harold John |
| Dawes, James Arthur | M'Callum, John M. | Thomas, Abel (Carmarthen, E.) |
| Delany, William | M'Laren, H. (Leicester, Bosworth) | Thomas, James Henry (Derby) |
| Denman, Hon. Richard Douglas | M'Laren, F. W. S. (Linc, Spalding) | Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton) |
| Dillon, John | M'Laren, W. S. B. (Crewe) | Toulmin, George |
| Doris, William | Markham, Arthur Basil | Trevelyan, Charles Philips |
| Duffy, William J. | Marks, George Croydon | Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander |
| Duncan, J. Hastings (York, Otley) | Marshall, Arthur Harold | Verney, Sir H. |
| Edwards, A. C. (Glam., E.) | Mason, David M. (Coventry) | Walsh, Stephen (Lancashire, Ince) |
| Edwards, Enoch (Hanley) | Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.) | Walters, John Tudor |
| Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master of | Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's County) | Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton) |
| Esmonde, Dr. J. (Tipperary) | Millar, Duncan | Wardle, George J. |
| Esmonde, Sir T. (Wextord, N.) | Molley, Michael | Waring, Walter |
| Essex, Richard Walter | Money, L. G. Chiozza | Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay T. |
| Esslemont, George Birnie | Mooney, John J. | Wason, Rt. Hon. E. (Clackmannan) |
| Falconer, James | Morgan, George Hay | Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney) |
| Ferens, Thomas R. | Muldoon, John | Wedgwood, Josiah C. |
| Ffrench, Peter | Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C. | White, Sir Luke (York, E. R.) |
| Field, William | Needham, Christopher T. | White, Patrick (Meath, North) |
| Fiennes, Hon. Eustace Edward | Nolan, Joseph | Whitehouse, John Howard |
| Fitzgibbon, John | Norman, Sir Henry | Whyte, Alexander F. (Perth) |
| Flavin, Michael J. | Norton, Captain C. W. (Newington, W.) | Wiles, Thomas |
| France, Gerald A. | Nugent, Sir W. R. | Wilkie, Alexander |
| Gelder, Sir William Alfred | O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) | Williams, John (Glarmorgan) |
| Gill, Alfred Henry | O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) | Williams, Llewelyn (Carmarthen) |
| Glanville, Harold James | O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool, Scotl'd) | Williamson, Sir Archibald |
| Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford | O'Doherty, Phillip | Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull-, W.) |
| Goldstone, Frank | O'Dowd, John | Wilson, John (Durham Mid.) |
| Greenwood, Granville G. (P'terb'h) | Ogden, Fred | Wilson J. W. (Worcestershire N.) |
| Griffith, Ellis Jones | O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.) | Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton) |
| Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway) | O'Malley, William | Winfrey, R. |
| Hackett, John | O'Neill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.) | Wood, T. M'Kinnon (Glasgow) |
| Hall, F. (Yorks, Normanton) | O'Shaughnessy, P. J. | Young, William (Perth, East) |
| Hancock, John George | O'Shee, James John | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland. |
| Harcourt, Rt. Hon. L. (Rossendale) | O'Sullivan, Timothy |
§ The CHAIRMANThe only way in which the Amendment standing in the hon. Member for Hitchin (Dr. Hillier) can be moved is in a curtailed form—to insert the words, "or a Bill which contains any provision which affects the Constitution of the House of Lords." The other subjects have been covered by our previous discussion.
§ Dr. HILLIERI beg to move after the second word "Bill" ["other than a Money Bill"] to insert the words "or a Bill which contains any provision which affects the Constitution of the House of Lords."
I recognise that the previous debate has covered many of the points which we might have hoped to deal with, and, under the circumstances, I will merely ask the Committee to consider the following fact. I will not refer at length to the constitutions of other civilised countries; they have been dealt with by previous speakers. But it is deemed necessary both in the American Constitution and in the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, the greatest and most modern of Anglo-Saxon democracies, to insert in their Constitutions certain safeguards with regard to any alteration of the Constitution of the country, or of either Chamber of Parliament. I will briefly refer to the Preamble of the American Constitution. It has this merit: it is brief, clear, and concise, and the spirit of it is given full effect to in the Constitution which follows. It reads:—
In order to provide for the defence …," etc.:And to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity we do ordain…," etc.:Article 5 is very brief, and perhaps I may venture to read it to the Committee:—The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either case shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress.No Amendment can be made in the Constitution of the United States of America 1508 unless such Amendment is passed by two-thirds of both Houses, and has subsequently been ratified by a majority of the electors of that country. I am aware that it has been argued that the American Constitution is somewhat too rigid, and presents certain objections on that ground. But the right hon. James Bryce, in his classic work on the American Commonwealth, says:—Ought the process of change to be made easier? … American statesmen think not. The habit of amending would turn into the habit of tinkering: there would be too little distinction between changes in the ordinary statute law, which require the agreement of majorities in the two Houses and the President, and changes in the more solemnly enacted fundamental law.
§ The CHAIRMANThe only point that the hon. Gentleman can deal with is the composition of the House of Lords, and he is now reading the Constitution of the States. The point that he is now making is one that might have been brought in on the previous Amendment, but which we have already discussed and settled, and it is not in order now.
§ Dr. HILLIERWith great respect I venture to ask for your consideration whether the alteration of the Constitution, or constitution of either Houses of Parliament, whether it be the lower or the upper House, is not a fundamental Constitutional change, and therefore anything bearing on fundamental Constitutional changes in other States is relevant to the argument?
§ The CHAIRMANIf the hon. Member means that on an Amendment dealing with the composition of the House of Lords any other great Constitutional change can be raised, I should say certainly not.
§ Dr. HILLIERI venture to suggest that the alteration and the composition of the House of Lords or the Senate of the United States of America would be one of those great Constitutional changes referred to in the Articles quoted.
§ The CHAIRMANI do not understand that what the hon. Member was reading was relevant to this Amendment.
§ Dr. HILLIERThe Amendment you read from the Chair was "after the second word 'Bill' to insert the words 'a Bill which contains any provision which affects the Constitution of either Houses of Parliament.' "
§ The CHAIRMANWe dealt with an Amendment which affects the constitution of the House of Commons. This 1509 Amendment affects the constitution of the House of Lords, and I do not see how on that Amendment any other question arises.
Dr. H ILLIERI shall endeavour entirely to confine my observations to that Amendment, and in doing so I shall endeavour to show that the alteration of the constitution of the House of Lords would be one of those fundamental Constitutional changes which is provided against in the article of the American States Constitution, and also in a similar article inserted in the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, which says, Section 128, that:—
The Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner: 'The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six months after its passage through both Houses the proposed law shall be submitted in each State to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives.'There you have two instances of Anglo-Saxon democracies laying down what they regard as the quintessence of democratic legislation and Constitution making. You have in both those Constitutions provisions carefully laid down against the alteration of the Constitution of either of these countries without, not only the sanction of both Houses of Parliament, but also the sanction of the electors and the country.
§ The CHAIRMANThat is really out of order. The hon. Member is now arguing what came under the Amendment already disposed of. The only question that can be raised now is the composition or form of the House of Lords. That point would be in order because it is not already settled. The other point on which he is now speaking is not in order.
§ Dr. HILLIERMay I ask the Committee to consider whether the alteration of the composition of the House of Lords may not be fairly regarded as one of the fundamental changes in the Constitution against which it is desirable to provide. I would further submit this, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman opposite will be good enough to offer some reply. What reason have we, as a nation, to suppose we can dispense with safeguards which all other civilised nations 1510 have insisted upon, and with regard to which both the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia have made provision. Why are we so specially circumstanced that we can afford to dispense with safeguards which all the countries of the whole civilised world have thought it necessary to insert in their constitutions? Is it that our experience of Single Chamber Government in the time of Cromwell was such a success that no such safeguards are now required? Our experience in Cromwell's time of Single Chamber Government was the most arbitrary that ever existed. Is there anything in the composition of this House or of the present Government which leads the right hon. Gentleman opposite to suppose that safeguards of this kind can be dispensed with? [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear.] An hon. Member below the gangway says "hear, hear," but I would point out that, narrow as the gangway opposite is, it represents a deep and yawning gulf between—
§ The CHAIRMANThe hon. Member must confine his remarks to the Amendment.
§ Dr. HILLIERI think our experience shows that there is more necessity for such safeguards in the case of this House, than in the instances I have quoted. The hon. Members opposite are divided on the question as to whether there ought to be a Second Chamber of any sort or kind. I hope we shall be told by the Home Secretary on what grounds we can afford to dispense with those safeguards which have been considered absolutely necessary in every other civilised country.
§ Mr. CHURCHILLThat part of the hon. Members Amendment which was in order, and those parts of his speech which were relevant to the Amendment, are confined solely to the question of whether Bills affecting the composition of the House of Lords should be exempted from the provisions of the Parliament Bill. The Committee is asked to say that the present hereditary and unreformed House of Lords shall exercise a final and absolute veto upon all proposals for the reconstitution of the Second Chamber which may emanate from either party in this House. I cannot think that that is in accordance with the general view taken by many of those who support this proposal. Certainly the Government could not accept it. It is perfectly clear that there is no likelihood of any change of that kind. I 1511 should entertain a similar objection to the interposition of such a novel and insuperable barrier as that which is contained in this Amendment.
Sir HENRY DALZIELThe Debate on this Amendment has caused great doubt in my mind whether these Amendments are brought forward in earnest or in an honest way. I think Ministers have had a good share of the discussion in Committee on this Bill; in fact, I think some of them have talked a great deal more than is necessary on some of these Amendments. If I think it right to take part in a discussion, I shall certainly do so. It is very difficult to understand the position of the Opposition. We have had complaints throughout the whole of these Debates that the Government are not serious in their intentions with regard to the alteration in the compositon of the House of Lords. That has been almost the note of every speaker on the otherside of the House—that we were going to have a Single Chamber, and that we had no serious intention of altering the composition of the House of Lords. What is the meaning of the Amendment they are now seriously bringing forward; an Amendment selected by them as one we should discuss before the termination of this Debate on this series of Amendment? It would exclude the possibility of the composition of the House of Lords being considered. The Leader of the Opposition is demanding that the Government should bring in their Bill, and his supporters say, "We deny you have the power under this Bill to do it." The hon. Member's Amendment is one which I feel very much disposed to support. Some of us here are not anxious, after we have taken away the power of the Second Chamber, that greater powers should be given it because it may have some claim to a representative capacity. I think this is the most Radical Amendment moved in the course of the Committee.
§ Dr. HILLIERThe hon. Gentleman has entirely misrepresented my Amendment. It would prevent this House making any change in the composition of the Second Chamber to which the Second Chamber did not itself assent. Are they to have no voice in their own composition? The hon. Member entirely misrepresents the Amendment when he says it would preclude this House from proposing an Amendment. All that would be necessary 1512 would be that the Amendment proposed in this House should be also acceptable to the House it proposed to reform.
§ Viscount HELMSLEYThe intervention of the hon. Member for the Kirkcaldy Burghs (Sir Henry Dalziel) is at least more welcome, even although it is irrelevant than the studied and silent insolence of hon. Members opposite, who made no attempt whatever to listen to any arguments that are made.
§ The CHAIRMANDid the Noble Lord use the word "insolence?" [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes, studied and silent insolence."] The word "insolence" is entirely unparliamentary, and the Noble Lord must certainly withdraw it.
§ Viscount HELMSLEYI will most certainly bow to your ruling, and, if the word is unparliamentary, I will withdraw it and substitute for "insolence" "discourteous contempt for the arguments of their opponents." Hon. Members opposite assume the attitude that, because they are there in sufficient forces to resist these Amendments, therefore all arguments advanced on this side of the House are not worth attention. That is an argument which may have force in this House, but it has very little force elsewhere. The Amendment which my hon. Friend suggests is quite consistent with every other Amendment moved on this side of the House. It says that this House should not set itself up to be a constituent assembly, and that all matters dealing with an alteration of the fundamentals of the Constitution among ourselves should be excluded from the operation of this Bill. That is not so unreasonable a proposition as some hon. Members seem to think. It is going a good deal further than even what the Government profess that they are doing under the Parliament Bill. What they profess they are doing is to equalise the position of both parties. It can be shown on a more favourable opportunity that the Bill does not do that.
But to say that this House is to be a constituent assembly, and to alone have the sole power of deciding under what Constitution we shall be governed, is to go a great deal further than that and to set up an autocracy which has only once been tried in our history, and then proved a great failure. Surely it is not unreasonable to say when a proposal for reconstituting or reforming the Constitution comes before this House that this House alone 1513 should not carry it, but that it should under the Constitution of this country have to be passed by both Houses which make the constituent power of Parliament. That argument deserves some consideration. It does not deserve the ignominious treatment which the hon. Members seem to give it—treatment which arises as much from the assurance of their majority as from ignorance—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order," and "Withdraw."]
§ The CHAIRMANI must ask the Noble Lord to address me.
§ Viscount HELMSLEYAnd I ask you to get for the Members of this House a hearing.
§ The CHAIRMANI will endeavour to get a quiet hearing for Members of this House. That is what I am trying to do. I must ask hon. Members below the Gangway not to make these constant interruptions in the debate.
§ Mr. LANSBURYIs it in order for one hon. Member to accuse other hon. Members of ignorance. If so, I only want to say I accuse the Noble Lord of bumptiousness—ignorant bumptiousness.
§ The CHAIRMANIf the hon. Member desires me to distinguish between words, I say I do not think an accusation of ignorance is unparliamentary, hut an accusation of "bumptiousness" is not a proper accusation.
§ Viscount HELMSLEYThe hon. Member for Bow and Bromley did not allow me to conclude my sentence, I was not making an accusation of general ignorance against the Labour party, but of ignorance of the letter and the spirit of the history of their country. I think the present attitude they are adopting only confirms what I venture to say now. Is there any argument or reason why any alteration of the constitution of the House of Lords which I think everybody will agree is a fundamental alteration of our Constitution should not be submitted to the ancient rule of this country that both Houses should have their say upon it. Moreover, is there any reason for supposing in the face of the attitude of the House of Lords at the present time that a reform of that House would not pass that assembly? We know very well that the House of Lords would agree to reform.
§ The CHAIRMANThat does not seem to be relevant to the Amendment. The question is whether a Bill for the reform 1514 of the House of Lords should be passed over the heads of the House of Lords under certain contingencies. I must ask hon. Members not to interrupt. It is not fair when the House is kept up by the votes of the majority beyond the ordinary hours—it is not right that hon. Members who are opposing this Bill should be subject to a constant fire of interruptions. I must appeal to hon. Members to support me, to remain silent, and not to make these constant provocative interruptions.
§ Viscount HELMSLEYI am sorry if I have transgressed the rules of order in saying that the House of Lords were willing, as they have shown, to make reforms at this time. I can only say that I was answering arguments which had been advanced and which appeared to me to be relevant to the Amendment. I will not, however, pursue that matter further, but will say, that this being one branch of an important subject which involves a most fundamental change, and it certainly should be submitted to both Houses and not to one.
§ Mr. HARRY LAWSONI always desire serious Debate on serious subjects, although it is somewhat difficult after twelve o'clock at night to secure it. I certainly shall not complain that the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir Henry Dalziel) has broken what I may call the brazen silence which prevails on the Benches opposite. The truth is that this is a very important point which has been raised, and the declaration of the Government through the Home Secretary does make it very difficult to expect that any reasonable Amendment will be accepted after Debate. If you lay down a general formula beforehand and say there is to be no exception, you can argue that it is useless to bring forward arguments in favour of making these exceptions. Here the Committee is asked to interfere with the time-honoured custom of Parliament that every Bill affecting the composition or privileges of either House has been brought forward in that House which the Bill affected. A Bill affecting the House of Lords therefore ought to be brought forward in the House of Lords. Unless the right hon. Gentleman can say that is not true here we are doing away with a Second Chamber when the Bill should be brought forward in that House. That is, I believe, the ruling of the Chair, and it is the accepted doctrine of Parliament, and it introduces a new complication because a Bill 1515 for the reform of the House of Lords will have to be introduced into the House of Lords if usage and tradition are to be followed.
I cannot understand how in these circumstances this Clause, unless it is amended, can apply. That has been the case in the past, and you, Sir, are aware that Bills, as well as Resolutions, which have been brought forward with a desire of reforming and altering the composition of the House of Lords, have been there introduced, and Lord Rosebery's proposal is a notable case. That introduces a new complication which the House is asked to deal with, and we are asked now to disturb an ancient custom of Parliament by refusing an Amendment brought forward at this time of night. It illustrates the difficulty which has been pointed out by Professor Dicey in legislating on this kind of subject. The Prime Minister quoted Professor Dicey, but what the latter said was that the great danger which the Constitution ran was making a Resolution of the House of Commons equal to an Act of Parliament. We are now making a Resolution of the House of Commons in this and other fundamental matters equal to an Act of Parliament. I know that it is not in order to raise the whole question of what is fundamental in the British Constitution and what is not. There is a very old point, and Cromwell has been quoted upon it. He distinguished between circumstantials and fundamentals and said that they must deal with circumstantials here, but they must deal with fundamentals by virtue of a two-Chamber Government. Here we are going to upset the whole traditions and practice of this House without the House being aware of what is the real practice of Parliament.
I think a good many Members who have listened to the Debate have treated this
§ as a trivial Amendment and have not seen the seriousness of the question involved. Surely in regard to their own position the House of Lords ought to be consulted. They have shown no indisposition to bring forward schemes of reform, and they must have their scheme of reform brought forward in the House now. Hon. Members apposite profess to wish to have a fair revising Chamber which shall be equal as between the two great parties, and shall also maintain the traditions of the State. If that is so, I do not see how they can refuse to let the House of Lords have a full say in regard to its own reform. If it were obscurantist and obdurate there might be some argument for not making this exception on the merits. The House of Lords has gone very far in admitting the necessity of reform. In fact, it wants to make itself what Lord Russell said it was, a Council for weighing with greater caution and deliberation the resolutions of the House of Commons. I admit the difficulty of arguing to these exceptional cases. It all comes of the astuteness of the Prime Minister in laying down beforehand that he would consider no exception to the general rule. He certainly has not swallowed formulas, but in the long run it will be found that you cannot frame a Constitution in this way. You must have some regard to the wisdom and example of the Constitution-mongers who have gone before you in other lands. The whole history of the drawing up of the Constitution is to make proper exceptions to general rules. You are making no exceptions. You are dealing with everything in the same way, and the attempt is doomed to failure and will bring discredit on this House and on British institutions all over the world.
§ Question put, "That those words be there inserted."
§ The Committee divided: Ayes, 140; Noes, 232.
1519| Division No. 173.] | AYES. | [12.45 a.m. |
| Aitken, William Max | Bennett-Goldney, Francis | Cautley, Henry Strother |
| Archer-Shee, Major M. | Bigland, Alfred | Cave, George |
| Ashley, Wilfrid W. | Boscawen, Col. A. S. T. Griffith- | Cecil, Lord Hugh (Oxford Univ.) |
| Bagot, Lieut.-Colonel J. | Boyle, W. Lewis (Norfolk, Mid,) | Chaloner, Colonel R. G. W. |
| Baird, John Lawrence | Boyton, James | Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry |
| Baker, Sir Randolf L. (Dorset, N.) | Brassey, H. Leonard Campbell | Clay, Captain H. H. Spender |
| Baldwin, Stanley | Bridgeman, W. Clive | Clive, Percy Archer |
| Banner, John S. Harmood- | Bull, Sir William James | Cooper, Richard Ashmole |
| Baring, Captain Hon. Guy Victor | Burdett-Coutts, William | Courthope, George Loyd |
| Barlow, Montagu (Salford, South) | Burn, Colonel C. R. | Craig, Capain James (Down, E.) |
| Barnston, H. | Butcher, John George | Craig, Norman (Kent, Thanet) |
| Barrie, H. I (Londonderry, N.) | Campion, W. R. | Crichton-Stuart, Lord Ninian |
| Bathurst, Hon. Allen B. (Glouc, E.) | Carlile, Edward Hildred | Croft, Henry Page |
| Beach, Hon. Michael Hugh Hicks | Cassel, Felix | Dalrymple, Viscount |
| Benn, Arthur Shirley (Plymouth) | Castlereagh, Viscount | Dickson, Rt. Hon. C. Scott |
| Benn, Ion Hamilton (Greenwich) | Cator, John | Dixon, Charles Harvey |
| Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- | Lane-Fox, G. R | Rolleston, Sir John |
| Duke, Henry Edward | Law, Andrew Bonar (Bootie, Lanes.) | Ronaldshay, Earl of |
| Fisher, William Hayes | Lawson, Hon. H. (T. H'mts., Mile End) | Rutherford, Watson (L'pool, W. Derby) |
| Fitzroy, Hon. Edward A. | Locker-Lampson, G, (Salisbury) | Sanders, Robert Arthur |
| Fleming, Valentine | Locker-Lampson, O. (Ramsey) | Sanderson, Lancelot |
| Forster, Henry William | Lockwood, Rt. Hon. Lt.-Col. A. R. | Sandys, G. J. (Somerset, Wells) |
| Foster, Philip Staveley | Long, Rt. Hon. Walter | Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) |
| Gibbs, George Abraham | Lyttelton, Hon. J. C. (Droitwich) | Stanley, Hon. G. F. (Preston) |
| Gilmour, Captain John | Macmaster, Donald | Starkey, John Ralph |
| Goldman, Charles Sydney | Malcolm, Ian | Steel-Maitland, A. D. |
| Gordon, John | Meysey-Thompson, E. C. | Stewart, Gershom |
| Greene, Walter Raymond | Mildmay, Francis Bingham | Sykes, Alan John |
| Gretton, John | Mills, Hon. Chas. Thomas | Thompson, Robert (Belfast, North) |
| Guinness, Hon. Walter Edward | Mount, William Arthur | Thomson, W. Mitchell- (Down, N.) |
| Gwynne, R. S. (Sussex, Eastbourne) | Neville, Reginald J. N. | Thynne, Lord Alexander |
| Hardy, Laurence | Newdegate, F. A. | Tobin, Alfred Aspinall |
| Helmsley, Viscount | Newman, John R. P. | Touche, George Alexander |
| Henderson, Major H. (Berkshire) | Newton, Harry Kottingham | Walker Col. William Hall |
| Hickman, Col. Thomas E. | Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield) | Warde, Col. C. E. (Kent, Mid) |
| Hill, Sir Clement L. | O'Neill, Hon. A. E. B. (Antrim, Mid) | White, Major, G. D. (Lancs., Southport) |
| Hills, John Waller | Orde-Powlett, Hon. W. G. A. | Williams, Col. R. (Dorset, W.) |
| Hill-Wood, Samuel | Ormsby-Gore, Hon. William | Willoughby, Major Hon. Claude |
| Hohler, Gerald Fitzroy | Paget, Almeric Hugh | Wilson, A. Stanley (York, E. R.) |
| Hope, James Fitzalan (Sheffield) | Parkes, Ebenezer | Winterton, Earl |
| Home, Wm. E. (Surrey, Guildford) | Pease, Herbert pike (Darlington) | Wolmer, Viscount |
| Horner, Andrew Long | Peel, Captain R. F. (Woodbridge) | Wood, John (Stalybridge) |
| Hunt, Rowland | Pole-Carew, Sir R. | Wortley, Rt. Hon. C. B. Stuart- |
| Jardine, Ernest (Somerset, E.) | Pollock, Ernest Murray | Younger, George |
| Kebty-Fletcher, J. R. | Pretyman, Ernest George | |
| Kerr-Smiley, Peter Kerr | Pryce-Jones, Col. E. | TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—Dr. Hillier and Major Morrison-Bell. |
| Kerry, Earl of | Ratcliff, R. F. | |
| Kirkwood, John H. M. | Roberts, S. (Sheffield, Eccleshall) | |
| NOES. | ||
| Abraham, William (Dublin Harbour) | Edwards, Enoch (Hanley) | Jones, Edgar (Merthyr Tydvil) |
| Abraham, Rt. Hon. William (Rhondda) | Edwards, John Hugh (Glamorgan, Mid) | Jones, William (Carnarvonshire) |
| Acland, Francis Dyke | Elibank, Rt. Hon. Master of | Jones, W. S. Glyn- (T. H'mts, Stepney) |
| Adamson, William | Esmonde, Dr. John (Tipperary, N.) | Jowett, Frederick William |
| Addison, Dr. C. | Esmonde, Sir Thomas (Wexford, N.) | Joyce, Michael |
| Agar-Robartes, Hon. T. C. R. | Essex Richard Walter | Keating, Matthew |
| Alden Percy | Esslemont, George Birnie | Kelly, Edward |
| Allen, A. A. (Dumbartonshire) | Falconer, James | Kennedy, Vincent Paul |
| Allen, Charles Peter (Stroud) | Ferens, Thomas Robinson | Kilbride, Denis |
| Baker, H. T. (Accrington) | Ffrench, Peter | King, Joseph (Somerset, North) |
| Baker Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.) | Field, William | Lambert, George (Devon, S. Molton) |
| Balfour, Sir Robert (Lanark) | Fiennes, Hon. Eustace Edward | Lambert, Richard (Wilts, Cricklade) |
| Barran, Sir J. N. (Hawick) | Fitzgibbon, John | Lansbury, George |
| Barry, Redmond John (Tyrone, N.) | Flavin, Michael Joseph | Lawson, Sir W. (Cumb'rld., Cockerm'th) |
| Barton, William | France, Gerald Ashburner | Levy, Sir Maurice |
| Beck, Arthur Cecil | Gelder, Sir W. A. | Lewis, John Herbert |
| Benn, W. (Tower Hamlets, St. Geo.) | Gill, A. H. | Logan, John William |
| Bentham, G. J. | Glanville, Harold James | Lundon, Thomas |
| Black, Arthur W. | Goddard, Sir Daniel Ford | Lyell Charles Henry |
| Booth, Frederick Handel | Goldstone, Frank | Lynch, Arthur Alfred |
| Bowerman, C. W. | Greenwood, Granville G. (Peterborough) | Macdonald, J. R. (Leicester) |
| Boyle, Daniel (Mayo, North) | Griffith, Ellis Jones | Maclean, Donald |
| Brace, William | Gwynn, Stephen Lucius (Galway) | Macnamara, Dr. Thomas J. |
| Brocklehurst, William B. | Hackett, John | MacNeill, John Gordon Swift |
| Brunner, John F. L. | Hall, Frederick (Normanton) | MacVeagh, Jeremiah |
| Burke, E. Haviland- | Hancock, I G. | M'Callum, John M. |
| Burns, Rt. Hon. John | Harcourt, Robert V. (Montrose) | M'Laren, H. D. (Leicester) |
| Carr-Gomm, H. W. | Hardie, J. Keir (Merthyr Tydvil) | M'Laren, F. W. S. (Lincs., Spalding) |
| Cawley, H. T. (Lancs., Heywood) | Harvey, A. G. C. (Rochdale) | M'Laren, Walter S. B. (Ches., Crewe) |
| Chancellor, Henry George | Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, W.) | Markham, Arthur Basil |
| Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S. | Harvey, W. E. (Derbyshire, N. E.) | Marks, George Croydon |
| Clancy, John Joseph | Harwood, George | Marshall, Arthur Harold |
| Clough, William | Haslam, James (Derbyshire) | Mason, David M. (Coventry) |
| Clynes, John R. | Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry | Meehan, Francis E. (Leitrim, N.) |
| Collins, Stephen (Lambeth) | Hawoth, Arthur A. | Meehan, Patrick A. (Queen's Co.) |
| Condon, Thomas Joseph | Hayden, John Patrick | Millar, James Duncan |
| Cornwall, Sir Edwin A. | Hayward, Evan | Molloy, Michael |
| Cotton, William Francis | Helme, Norval Watson | Money, L. G. Chiozza |
| Crumley, Patrick | Henderson, Arthur (Durham) | Mooney, John J. |
| Cullinan, John | Henry, Sir Charles S. | Morgan, George Hay |
| Davies, Timothy (Lincs., Louth) | Higham, John Sharp | Muldoon, John |
| Davies, Sir W. Howell (Bristol, S.) | Hinds, John | Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. R. C. |
| Dawes, J. A. | Hodge, John | Needham, Christopher T. |
| Delany, William | Hope, John Deans (Haddington) | Nolan, Joseph |
| Denman Hon R. D. | Horne, C. Silvester (Ipswich) | Norman, Sir Henry |
| Dillon, John | Howard, Hon. Geoffrey | Nugent, Sir Walter Richard |
| Doris, William | Hughes, Spencer Leigh | O'Brien, Patrick (Kilkenny) |
| Duffy, William J. | Hunter, William (Lanark, Govan) | O'Connor, John (Kildare, N.) |
| Duncan, J. Hastings (York, Otley) | Issacs, Sir Rufus Daniel | O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) |
| Edwards, Allen C. (Glamorgan, E.) | Johnson, W. | O'Doherty, Philip |
| O'Dowd, John | Roberts, Charles H. (Lincoln) | Ure, Rt. Hon. Alexander |
| Ogden, Fred | Roberts, George H. (Norwich) | Verney, Sir Harry |
| O'Kelly, Edward P. (Wicklow, W.) | Roberts, Sir J. H. (Denbighs) | Walsh, Stephen (Lancs., Ince) |
| O'Malley, William | Robertson, Sir G. Scott (Bradford) | Walters, John Tudor |
| O'Neill, Dr. Charles (Armagh, S.) | Robertson, John M. (Tyneside) | Ward, W. Dudley (Southampton) |
| O'Shaughnessy, P. J. | Robinson, Sidney | Wardle, George, J. |
| O'Shee, James John | Rowlands, James | Waring, Walter |
| O'Sullivan, Timothy | Rowntree, Arnold | Warner, Sir Thomas Courtenay |
| Palmer, Godfrey Mark | Samuel, Rt. Hon. H. L. (Cleveland) | Wason, John Cathcart (Orkney) |
| Parker, James Halifax | Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees) | Wedgwood, Josiah C. |
| Pearce, Robert (Staffs, Leek) | Samuel, S. M. (Whitechapel) | White, Sir Luke (York, E. R.) |
| Pearson, Hon. Weetman H. M. | Scanlan, Thomas | White, Patrick (Meath, North) |
| Pease, Rt. Hon. Joseph A. (Rotherham) | Scott, A. MacCallum (Glasgow, Bridgeton) | Whitehouse, John Howard |
| Phillips, John (Longford, S.) | Seely, Colonel, Rt Hon. J. E. B. | Whyte, A. F. |
| Pickersgill, Edward Hare | Sheehy, David | Wiles, Thomas |
| Pirie, Duncan Vernon | Shortt, Edward | Wilkie, Alexander |
| Pointer, Joseph | Simon, Sir John Allsebrook | Williams, J. (Glamoragan) |
| Pollard, Sir George H. | Smith, Albert (Lancs., Clitheroe) | Williams, Llewelyn (Carmarthen) |
| Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. | Smyth, Thomas F. (Leitrim, S.) | Wilson, Hon. G. G. (Hull, W.) |
| Power, Patrick Joseph | Stanley, Albert (Staffs, N. W.) | Wilson, John (Durham, Mid.) |
| Price, C. E. (Edinburgh, Central) | Strauss, Edward A. (Southwark, West) | Wilson, W. T. (Westhoughton) |
| Priestley, Sir W. E. B. (Bradford, E.) | Summers, James Wooley | Winfrey, Richard |
| Pringle, William M. R. | Sutton, John E. | Wood, T. M'Kinnon (Glasgow) |
| Raffan, Peter Wilson | Taylor, John W. (Durham) | Young, William (Perth, East) |
| Rea, Walter Russell (Scarborough) | Tennant, Harold John | |
| Reddy, Michael | Thomas, Abel (Carmarthen, E.) | |
| Redmond, William (Clare, E.) | Thomas, J. H. (Derby) | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Gulland. |
| Richards, Thomas | Toulmin, George | |
| Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven) | Trevelyan, Charles Philips |