§ Mr. SWIFT MacNEILLI wish to take this opportunity of directing the attention of the House to a very different matter. After nearly twenty-five years' experience in this House, I think it is a question which should receive attention. I challenge contradiction when I say it is the strangest thing possible when one hears, as I have done, vehement debates with a view to making the legislation of this House perfect and with a view to making the House the master of its own conditions, to making it the predominant partner—that, from generation to generation, you have allowed treaties involving the highest international obligations—involving questions of peace and war—to be taken absolutely out of the hands of the House. It is no exaggeration to say, so far as international policy is concerned, you have rendered the House as little effectively powerful as any man walking over Westminster Bridge. Over and over again treaties involving matters of life and death, involving questions of first-class importance, have been ratified behind the back of Parliament. It is very well to say, and it is true that the Ministers who do it are responsible to the House of Commons and through the House of Commons to the people at large. That is 532 true, but then before the House of Commons in the ordinary course gets to know the mischief has been done, and then, of course, party feeling, party pledges, and party lawyers will come in aid of Ministers, and whatever their fault or merit may be, by that time the mischief is done. What I say, and what I say especially, is that we are at long last having what I have wished to have, a real working representation by men who have felt themselves what the pinch is and who are touched with the infirmities of the people, and now that we have them I hope they will see that war is not the chance work of half a dozen individuals on one side or the other, but of the mass of the community. I ask them to see that we are well informed and instructed in reference to the foreign policy of this country, and to say that no treaty can be ratified unless the consent of this House has been given.
This is not a new subject. In former days this matter used to be very well ventilated indeed, and I think it is of peculiar interest now that Mr. Bryce, the Ambassador at Washington, is in that high position for us to remember the very remarkable observations of that gentleman in his work on the American Commonwealth, which Mr. Speaker Peel, in one of his delightful out-of-door non-political speeches said was the most interesting book that he had ever read in his whole life. Mr. Bryce described—and this is very interesting having regard to this proposed Arbitration Treaty—how the founders and leaders of the American Colonies did their very best to improve their constitution on what they conceived to be the defects of our English Constitution, and that they made provision whereby treaties could not be the work of the mere President alone but had to receive the assent of two-thirds of the Senate who were present at the time that it was proposed to ratify a treaty. Then Mr. Bryce observed—and this is very interesting coming from an Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in this House—that in England there is an utter absence of control of all foreign policy—that there is all but an actual want of control over it. Then he proceeds to point out that the time may come when it may foe of great interest to English students and politicians to revise their system possibly even on the American model, so that the representatives of the people should at least have a voice in foreign affairs, which so much concern them. That is very interesting coming from him, and then he proceeds 533 to say that in 1886, and I find it was on the 19th of March in that year a Motion was moved to the effect that before treaties were ratified this House should be able to give assent or dissent. I think it was the House of Commons which was to assent or dissent. There was a great Debate upon that, and it was rejected only by four votes. And what I would point out is that we see the importance of that with reference to the great scheme of Imperial federation. We know the extreme sensitiveness of our Colonies in reference to the treaty-making Power, and we know that, as the law stands to-day, Great Britain can make any treaty with any Power, and by that every Dominion is bound.
That cannot last long, and the people themselves must be allowed to know all about this diplomacy and what it is. And there should be no secrecy in regard to high diplomatic statecraft about it. The House of Commons is ample judge of what is discreet and what is indiscreet, and it is a complete absurdity for others to treat us as children or for us to allow ourselves to be so treated in matters of such high international importance as those involving questions of peace and war. We have heard again and again during the last few days that great expression, "The prerogatives of the Crown have become the rights of the people." The prerogative of the Crown in peace and war is not great, and it cannot become the right or prerogative of the people. It is at present the right or prerogative of the Cabinet. It may be, as it was in Lord Palmerston's time, the right or prerogative of an exceptionally able Foreign Secretary, a man of very strong character, who did not interfere or bother himself with the affairs of the Cabinet, but determined to have foreign control and foreign policy in his own hands. It was not the right of the people in his time. It was still less the right of the people in Lord Salisbury's time. I hope the time will never come again, as it can if this system of secrecy is observed, when a Gentleman can get up as Foreign Secretary and deny on Monday the existence of a treaty, every word of which he had to admit was in existence on Thursday. I hope that the secrecy of this foreign policy will never go to such an extent as this again, that when two Cabinet Ministers on the Conservative side, Lord Carnarvon and Lord Derby, resigned because they could not agree to a secret treaty in reference to Cyprus, they were not permitted at the 534 time to make full explanation, and when, three months later, they were permitted to do so, Lord Salisbury eompared their revelations which they were entitled to make in the interests of the people to the piecemeal revelations of Titus Oates.
The idea is to keep foreign policy outside Parliamentary influences to have a caste of foreign secretaries who are to be very wise people indeed, but who are not to be interfered with by the House of Commons at all. I have determined as well as I can to break down that system, although it is a very strong task. Let us see how the system works as we have seen it in history. I congratulate the present Foreign Secretary on having a longer tenure of office in the House of Commons than any other Foreign Minister. He was appointed in 1905, and can it be believed that between that date and 1853 only for four years was our Foreign Secretary in this House, when, from 1859 to 1861, Earl Russell was Foreign Secretary until he was moved to the House of Lords where, he continued in office. Then there was as Foreign Secretary for a short time Lord Derby, the son of the Prime Minister, who was also called to the House of Lords, and these are the only two. I hope he has very much revised his judgment since. I heard the right hon. Gentleman say in 1907 with regret that it was only possible to be a Foreign Secretary in this House if there was a generous allowance of all parties to him and an absence of criticism. Lord Salisbury developed that spirit to a high degree. He united in himself a thing that Mr. Gladstone spoke of with the severest strictures, the position of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and there was no one whatever to control him. The Prime Minister has some control over the Foreign Secretary. The Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister has sometimes no control over himself. What did he do in this House? Those who are acquainted with the blazing indiscretions of Lord Salisbury will remember Lord Salisbury took precious good care, so far as he could, to avoid interrogations in this House in reference to foreign policy. He put in this House as Under-Secretaries Mr. Brodrick, now Lord Midleton, a gentleman who we all know could never have occupied that position merely on his merits, and then after Mr. Brodrick he put in his own son, the present Lord Salisbury, and they were both given directions not to answer supplementary questions. A Motion for the Adjournment was 535 moved to direct the attention to the House and the public to that. I only mention these instances to show how thoroughly foreign policy can be kept out of the purview of this House.
Take another instance. It is quite possible in a Cabinet to have a Prime Minister like Lord Beaconsfield who had a foreign policy of his own, and who always, to do him justice, long before he was in any political office, exalted the Prerogative of the Crown. He said so far back as in, 1854, and he reiterated it in 1864, and he was in Opposition on both occasions, that he would be the last person in the world to say that peace and war could depend upon the assent or consent of this House, and that that was a matter for the Crown alone. He and his Cabinet from 1874 to 1878, at the close of this transaction called the Berlin Conference, had a complete dominating power over foreign policy, and again and again matters were kept from the cognisance of the House of Commons and he overawed his Cabinet. There is another delicate matter which does not arise now. Hon Gentlemen who take the trouble to read a most instructive book, "The Life of the Prince Consort," by Sir Theodore Martin, will find out problems which they could never understand in the Crimean War. A Minister would make a statement one day and the next day he would make a completely contradictory statement. These things arose from matters which could not have had any existence if the House of Common were put in full possession of all the secrets. They arose largely from the personal predilections of Ministers of the Crown or people behind the Crown. All these things are essential to be considered now in this matter of Imperial Federation, and in reference to arbitration. A pretty position in reference to this Treaty of Arbitration with America—and it could have been done—if this country had ratified that Treaty without knowing anything about it, or having any voice in it, while no treaty of that kind can pass in the United States without the consent of two-thirds of the Senate! Why should we suffer ourselves to be blindfolded? It is said that an irresponsible man in this House of Commons can get up and complicate matters, and that there are international confidences between Powers in international transactions which should not be divulged, and that it is of the greatest benefit for the peace and amity of people entering into these negotiations that inner negotiations should be 536 confined to as small a company of statesmen as possible. [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear."] My hon. Friend has been ten years in this House. If he goes back three weeks he will find that from his own benches more questions were asked in reference to Germany—irritating, hateful questions, calculated to throw discord between two people than anything which could come out of any international transaction whatever.
These things are not mere matters of theory, they are matters of fact. Let me give an example. Parliament in 1905 was prorogued on 12th August never to meet again. The Japanese Treaty, the supreme work of Lord Lansdowne's genius, was signed on 22nd August. As I am impartial I do not want that any Government should have any advantage or disadvantage over another. The Foreign Secretary knows that that is an old practice of mine. Take that treaty between this country and Russia in reference to Persia. It was ratified three days after Parliament rose, so that there could be no effective discussion on it. The treaty may have been good or bad, but we are old enough to take our own responsibilities into our own hands and to see what is right and what is good for the people at large. I say, with some slight earnestness, that it is not right and not respectful to ourselves that we should delegate to any hands, however capable, the management of foreign matters, especially in cases of peace and war and high international politics. The whole thing cannot be better summarised than in two or three pages in the introduction to a little book frequently quoted in Debates here, "Bagehot's English Constitution." Bagehot was not talking of present matters, because he died so far back as 1877. I thank the House for allowing me to speak on a matter on which I am afraid I am in a minority of one. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO, no."] I am delighted to hear that. I feel very strongly on the matter, and I feel that it intimately affects great questions of peace and war. My idea is this, that English working men, who can, if they choose, return Members for every constituency in this kingdom, except the universities and the City of London, are not foes, but friends, of peace, and the working classes abroad have the same feeling. I believe we shall do better if, instead of spending enormous sums for "Dreadnoughts," we spent the same sums in making our homes more cheerful and cultivated and more happy and bright. It is because I think 537 this that I have spoken on a matter which is dear to my heart, and which I hope may be taken up some day or other by others.
§ The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir Edward Grey)I have not heard that any other Foreign Office subject is to be raised except that which the hon. Member (Mr. Swift MacNeill) has raised, and perhaps it would be better to take the opportunity of replying at this stage of the Debate, and then the House can go on to other subjects. The hon. Member has spoken very courteously as regards myself. I would like to refer, first of all, to the reference which he made to a speech of mine in 1907. I do not think I have ever read that speech since I made it, but I have a recollection of making it. The hon. Member says that in that speech I said it would be impossible to combine the office of Foreign Secretary with a seat in this House if foreign policy was much criticised, or made a party question, or if too many questions were asked. My recollection of the speech is that I was not making any complaint at all at the time. "When I made that speech I was recalling the fact that when I was first appointed Foreign Secretary, with a seat in this House, it was generally regarded as an experiment, because it was so long since any Foreign Secretary had combined the work of the Foreign Office with a seat in this House, and I said I was conscious that in making that experiment it could only be carried out if the House was indulgent, and so far from complaining of anything which had happened I was taking the opportunity of thanking the House for having always shown to me that forbearance and indulgence which made the experiment possible and which enabled me to continue to hold the office. I should not like it to be supposed that I was making any complaint when I made that speech. I do not think I went so far as the hon. Gentleman said in deprecating questions and criticism.
I remember what happened originally when I first became Foreign Secretary was, that it was stated to the House, quite openly, that some indulgence would have to be shown in some way to me as Foreign Secretary, for I could not undertake to be present here four days a week to answer questions, and that some latitude must be allowed. There was no suggestion made that any limit should be put to the number of questions asked, but the suggestion was that there should be a limit to the number of days I should be here to answer 538 questions, and with the general consent of the House in 1906 it was agreed that I should be here on two days a week—Tuesday and Thursday—to answer questions. The House accepted that. There was only one condition made. It was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham (Mr. J. Chamberlain), whose continued absence we all regret so much. He stated with what I thought great force that if questions were only to be answered by me on two days a week they should be placed on the Paper in a position which would secure that they would be reached, and since that time they have always been placed first on the Paper. I have always endeavoured to be in my place so that any questions put down on these days should be answered personally. On the other days the questions are answered as fully as I could do by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary. I still think that if the House was to be very exacting in the amount of personal attendance required of the Foreign Secretary at the Debates in the House and so forth, it would be impossible to combine a position in the House of Commons with the duties of the Foreign Office. I would like to say again what I said in 1907, that I am very conscious that the House has shown forbearance, and has always indicated that it is conscious that the work of the Foreign Secretary is particularly incompatible, at any rate on some days of the week, with attendance in the House of Commons. So far from making any complaint, I would express my sense that the House has always been ready to make the work of the Foreign Secretary as easy and practicable as is compatible with fair criticism and the proper discussion of foreign questions which I have never deprecated, and which I know must take place.
4.0 P.M.
The hon. Member for South Donegal says that the House has not sufficient opportunity for discussion of foreign affairs. He says that it rests with the Government to make peace or war. The question of peace or war always has been in the control of the House of Commons. The House of Commons controls that in the same way as it controls other things. Having the power of the purse, the Government cannot go to war without a vote of money by the House of Commons. It is in the power of the House of Commons, especially as regards question of peace or war, to exercise control. Before a war takes place the 539 Government asked a vote of money. I take a case which happened in the days when Mr. Gladstone's Government was in power. When war was supposed to be imminent Mr. Gladstone had to come to the House of Commons and ask a Vote of Credit before war took place, and happily no war ever took place at that time. It is absolutely impossible for any Government to contemplate war unless it feels certain that when the moment comes the House of Commons would be prepared to endorse the policy of the Government by voting the supplies which were necessary and without which it would be absolutely out of the power of the Government to go to war at all.
§ Mr. SWIFT MacNEILLAs I understand that what occurs is this. It is quite possible that a Government might launch into war without the consent of this House. If the Government did launch into war, the right hon. Gentleman knows very well that it is not likely that the House of Commons would refuse supplies for the war. There was a case in which a war occurred, and the Minister at the time said "I cannot refuse supplies much as I deprecate the war." That also occurred, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, in regard to certain British Members during the Boer war.
§ Sir E. GREYIt is always in the power of the House to discuss the foreign policy of the Government. War may arise on some occasions quite suddenly and require supplies from the House of Commons, and it is unthinkable that the Government should lead up to a war which it thinks contrary to the policy which the House of Commons is prepared to endorse. Then the question of the ratification of treaties would not really affect the question of peace or war. War is not made by treaties. War arises out of circumstances. It may arise quite suddenly. The question of the ratification of treaties is an entirely different point, and it opens a very grave constitutional question—much too serious and grave a question to be dealt with this afternoon on an occasion of this kind—much too serious a question to be dealt with by anybody but the head of the Government. It means a great change in our Constitution to lay down definitely that no treaties were to be ratified until they have first been submitted to and sanctioned by the House of Commons. I do not propose to discuss the merits of that this after- 540 noon. I only say it is a great constitutional change. I would make two observations on it. In the first place, being a great constitutional change, I should think we have enough of constitutional change already before the House of Commons to deal with in the present Session of Parliament. In the next place I would make the observation which I am rather surprised did not come from the hon. Member for Donegal. He complains of the lack of control of the House of Commons over foreign policy, and says that hon. Members on both sides have complained of the paucity of occasions on which foreign policy is discussed in the House.
That is not the fault of the Government. The Foreign Affairs Vote can be asked for in the usual way whenever it is the general sense of the House to have discussion on Foreign Affairs. The real reason for lack of control, whether with regard to foreign policy or general policy or any great Imperial matter, is the congestion of business in the House of Commons; and if changes are to be discussed by which the House of Commons is to get more control of Imperial affairs generally, I think the more practicable, the most effective, and the most suitable time to discuss changes of that sort would be when the House of Commons has, by constitutional reform, relieved itself of an enormous mass of the local business, both for the United Kingdom and Ireland which at present is in its hands. It would then find for itself much more time to devote to Imperial questions. It is probable that debates on foreign affairs, as well as other Imperial affairs, would be much more frequent, and I believe that the greatest difficulty with regard to controlling foreign policy is not in the Constitution of the country, as it exists at the time, but in the fact that as long as the House of Commons remain without-some great measure of devolution, its business will be so congested that, with the best will in the world, they would never be able to acquire that control of Imperial policy which it can only acquire by frequent debates on important subjects.
With regard to secrecy, I can only say as the hon. Member for Donegal no doubt knows, that there is a great deal in foreign affairs which cannot be disclosed. Secrecy there must be up to a certain point, because in foreign affairs we are dealing with the relations with other countries, with secrets which do not belong to us specially, but which we are sharing with some one or more foreign Powers. Therefore we cannot, especially at the early stages of 541 negotiations, take the House of Commons publicly into our confidence, because we should be disclosing to the world matters which concern not only ourselves, but the other Powers with whom we are in negotiation; and very often at an early stage of negotiations to make a premature disclosure would result in the other Power desiring to break off the negotiations altogether. If you ask anybody who has had experience of business, or has had anything to do with negotiations between employers and trade unions, to consider how if from the very beginning all the suggestions put forward by one side or the other, and concerning which one side or the other might be willing to make concessions if they received certain concession from the other were conducted in public, they will tell you that it would prejudice the chance of any successful result being arrived at. So it is with nations. But I quite agree that when an important change or anything of very great importance is going to be done, or there is anything that is likely to be a matter of great controversy it is desirable as far as possible to take the House of Commons into confidence. It was for that reason the other day, while speaking on the subject of an Arbitration Treaty, it being a new departure, I suggested that that was something which the House of Commons should have before them before it was finally ratified and concluded. So with these other matters. Negotiations are now proceeding about the Baghdad Railway. They are in a stage which is entirely tentative at the present time, and they are exactly in that stage where to make premature disclosures—say, for instance, when proposals were made which were unacceptable would prejudice the success of the negotiations, and would not promote a favourable result. Always at the beginning of negotiations of this kind one side or the other makes proposals which are not acceptable, but these are not intended to be final proposals, but if they were immediately disclosed and discussed, and seemed to be unacceptable, then the result would be exceedingly discouraging, and they would begin to be afraid on one side or the other that the concessions which had been made on one side or the other were unreasonable, and at once a harsher atmosphere would be brought into the whole of the negotiations which is unfavourable to a successful result. I do not in the least complain of the hon. Member for Donegal having raised this question, which I know is a favourite one with him, but I think he must realise 542 that in his speech there are certain difficulties which I was bound to point out to the House. Without deprecating the question he has raised I would say that the question of the ratification of treaties is one of far too great importance to be discussed on an occasion of this kind, and I would ask the House to bear in mind that it is when the House of Commons is really free to devote itself to the discussion of Imperial affairs that then and then only will it get control.