FIELD ARTILLERY (TRAINED HORSES).

HC Deb 02 March 1899 vol 67 cc1080-158

Amendment proposed— To leave out from the word 'That,' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'the numbers of trained horses for the Horse and Field Artillery require the immediate attention of Her Majesty's Government,'—instead thereof."—(Sir Charles Dilke.)

*SIR C. DILKE (Gloucester, Forest of Dean)

The admirable form and perfect clearness of the speech of my honourable Friend, upon which, I am sure, the House will congratulate the honourable Gentleman, may perhaps a little have concealed the fact that his speech was mainly a speech of detail and did not present to the House what might be called a general view of the results of our Military system as at present organised. At the commencement of his speech the honourable Gentleman said it was a continuation speech, as the Estimates showed a continuing policy, continuing that which was laid down last year. But I think we might have expected now from the honourable Member, and we shall certainly ask for it a little later, some statement of the main principles upon which our Army is now beginning to be based. Last year, for example—and a small example is as good as a large one, and therefore I take this small one—the Government came down here defending short service, of course, as cardinal part of the system in this scheme of modification; but proposing for the first time a three years' enlistment for the Line. Now, in the face of this new departure of the three years' enlistment, the honourable Member has never made a single statement with regard to it, that we may see how far it is gaining confidence or otherwise in the War Office. The system was to be commenced on a very limited scale, 50 men to a battalion, and it is only being tried in a small number of battalions. The words which accompany the report show, I tear, that that system is a failure, beta use the words suggest a desire to make the men re-engage. The reason why I mention this fact is that it is a main tact. The reconstitution of the Army as time goes on is such as to make the system really a long service system again, instead of a short service system, and I believe that the service is actually as long as it was in the days when we called it a long service Army. The way in which Reserve men are being brought back to the colours is making it a long service Army. Now, the honourable Gentleman shows it is extravagantly dear at the present time. What is the cost of the land forces of which the honourable Gentleman speaks? The cost, as the House will see, is a rapidly increasing cost, with no increase in the strength. Taking the rupee at the average rate—at the market price which it is worth today, and not as being worth 2s., because it can be spent for that amount in India—taking the rupee at its market value, we are now spending in India and at home £;38,600,000. The right honourable Gentleman has mentioned that there are 21,000 men in the military service of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, and the House must not forget that there are all these 21.000 men and all additional officers which have to be met cut of a mill ion additional to this £38,600,000. So that the expenditure upon the land forces, with the Colonies, at the present moment is over £40,000,000, and in the next year we cannot hope to get out of it under £42,000,000, which, together with £28,000,000 which will be expended upon the Navy, brings out a total of £70,000,000 for Imperial Defence. Now, when you come to consider that we lay out £42,000,000 on land forces and fixed defences, I doubt whether we get that return which we ought to get, and which we are entitled to expect, considering the enormous sum of money we expend. Now, the amount of our Military expenditure, upon which I will say only this one more word, has become something amazing. This next year our expenditure will be about £70,000,000. The next country in extravagance is France. That country spends £40,000,000 on its Army and Navy. And there is no doubt, on these very large figures, the War Office will feel that they must make their figures very clear if they are to be supported by this House; unless they can show that with the increase of the millions of expenditure there is an increase in Military strength. The honourable Gentleman has stated the circumstances in a particular way; we all know it, and we all know that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made this remarkable statement, that while conscription does enter into the account it is not the main factor of the account of the War Office. The Leader of the Opposition made a statement upon this subject also. He said that the cost was appalling, but that we were "tied by traditions, prejudices, and habits, which it was hopeless to overcome." I ventured to comment upon those words of the right honourable Gentleman, and to somewhat reproach him for using the word hopeless, and not being willing to face the problem in such a manner that we may be able to overcome this fearful increase. But I am becoming as hopeless as my right honourable Friend. Here is the speech of a new and capable man, a man of great ability, and he never touches this problem; and I confess, as one who desires, and earnestly and sincerely desires, to maintain the strength and efficiency of the defence of the Empire, that I doubt whether it is possible for the War Office to justify to the country this constantly increasing expenditure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has not succeeded in overcoming the old views of the War Office, and forcing upon them a new departure last year. In spite of the temptation held out to us by the three years' system of enlistment, we did, some of us, say that, though under the new proposals of the Government the expenditure was certain to increase, the increase of strength was very doubtful. Now, what are the facts my honourable Friend has stated—that the Army now is larger than it ever was before, that the recruiting was very good, and that it was constantly being increased. Now, what are the forces upon which we should draw in time of war? What are the forces upon which we should draw for our three Army Corps, and at the same time be able to keep the Indian force at full numbers in time of war? The forces upon which we should draw are the Regular Army, the Army Reserve, and the Militia. Now, so far from there having been any increase of strength to correspond with the increase of cost, these three forces have remained stationary. The question I put to the honourable Gentleman at four o'clock brought out these facts—my own calculations appear to differ from the official calculations by three. On the 1st January, 1895, the Regular Army, Militia, and First Class Army Reserve taken together amounted to 408,903 men. The answer given to me this afternoon, given to me to-day at four o'clock, knocked off the three and gave me 408,900. And the number on the 1st January this year is almost exactly the same, the number being 408,921 men, so that the nett result is that in four years, with all your enormous expenditure, you have an increase of 24 men in the forces upon which you would have to draw in time of war. That is the number by which it has been increased in four years. Now as regards the number of those from whom you would have drawn for expeditionary forces, they have diminished. You have a much greater number in South Africa than you had before, and there 12,000 fewer men at home than there were four years ago. The number that you pay for here or in South Africa is stationary. The number of men is the same as four years ago, but you are paying a very much greater sum. Now these are facts which we have gone into before, and they are perfectly well known to the War Office, and should be equally well known to my honourable Friend; and we have this to say, that we desire a sweeping reform. We have to say the alternative is this appalling cost. There is no other alternative. You have to adopt the increasing expenditure of one million and a half sterling in each succeeding year, and you have to face the fact that constituencies are very doubtful about the return they get for the money which they give. Surely my honourable Friend, in making this first statement, must feel that the muddle on one side of Army matters, for which he is not responsible, is increasing. He stated to the House to-night very frankly that there were 21,000 men now under the control of the Foreign and Colonial Offices, and out of the control of the War Office altogether, and that the number was rapidly increasing. He knows of the enormous efforts that were made in India to get rid of divided command and the great and prolonged struggle that took place, and the resistance that was offered by the old-fashioned men to getting rid of the Presidency Armies. At last that resistance was overcome, and all the men were brought under one command. Here divided command is increasing by means of the Colonial Office and Foreign Office, over which you have no control at all. There is a great lack in the defence of the country, and you now show that we have nothing like a comprehensive scheme for its defence. With regard to the manœuvres last year, only half battalions were present. Lord Methuen has made a statement with regard to India—that it was only possible to have half battalions ever there. Lord Wolseley, in his report on manœuvres, states that the battalions were as strong as possible, owing to the necessity of leaving behind men under six months' service. They averaged 16 officers and 480 men out of an establishment of 881 men, but there were many battalions down to 400 men, whilst the return showed one which only had 361 men; that is a statement which ought to interest this House. It confirms the statement of my honourable Friend the honourable Member for Belfast which was first controverted, but yet had to be admitted in the end, and which led to the return which was laid before the House. The real question is, whether the country gets a return for the money which it has paid. My honourable Friend, in reference to the Army, dwelt upon the possibility which must be held in view—he referred six or seven times to the Army which had to be maintained at home against the possibility of invasion. I think the country will accept the naval view with regard to that; if we are to spend what we do spend on our Navy, then the prospect of an invasion is a subject of such remoteness that it need not be considered in the way in which the honourable Member has considered it in his speech. But the country will admit that the country needs an Army, not only for India, but for any great wars in which we may hereafter be engaged. Because if we had been brought into a war, as seemed likely a few months ago, it could not have been brought to an end without a territorial force. I think, as against the six or seven allusions the honourable Gentleman made to the subject of invasion should be set his single allusion to what I may venture to call a counter stroke. There is this problem: Is our Army, with all the gigantic expense which is incurred upon it, one that is available for these two ends; is it available for reinforcement of India in time of war, and for the counter stroke alluded to by the honourable Member? We still, it appears to me, starve our Army for reasons of economy on many points. That is so, for although we spend so much, we have to do some things much cheaper than other countries do. If I might give a small example, I would point to an economical country, which has an economical army, and which has had to substitute aluminium fittings for all the metal parts the army carries. That we do not do so is because of the expense; yet Switzerland, a little country, a third of whose army is ready for mobilisation at any time, can do these things that we cannot. My honourable Friend has not said a word about the manoeuvres—he spoke of the manœuvres of last year—but he has not said a word about there being any manœuvres this year. Apparently we are going to have no great manœuvres this year upon the ground of expense. We are starving the Army there, in my opinion, upon a point which is vital to its existence. Now the Question I put upon the Paper is one of the main examples of starving the Army on the ground of expense. My honourable Friend the Member for Essex, I have no doubt, will support me, because he put the same proposal on the Paper without having had any communication with me whatever upon the subject, and as we have taken this matter up, so it has been present to the eyes of many others. In spite of the able defence of the right honourable Gentleman the Under Secretary in his speech, I still remain under the impression that horses are a point on which the British Army is starved. I still believe that the supply of trained artillery horses is less than efficiency would demand, and I am sorry to believe so after so able a defence. I would ask him if he really believes the whole of the arguments urged upon him by those highly competent to judge upon this point; that there are sufficient trained artillery horses. Why is it that every officer in India believes that it is impossible to drill his men without as many waggons as there are guns? The four-gun batteries to which the Government appear to be wedded are, as I understand, only supplied by a single waggon. I have never found a Continental officer or an Indian officer content to drill under such conditions. And I do not believe it is possible to do so. The Government of this country admit that they have no guns for the Militia, although they contend that they have some sort of guns for the Volunteers; but there is a vast body of Infantry in this country for which they have no artillery of any kind; there are a vast number of troops in this country so situated, and if it is worth keeping them up—the Volunteers cost a million a year—then it is worth giving them artillery. The Secretary for War last year admitted that the artillery was insufficient, and said that the Government would increase it, and yet there are 1,500 fewer trained artillery horses now than there were 20 years ago. Twenty years ago there were 5,714, and now there are 4,174. It is admitted that in 1879 Lord Beaconsfield reduced the number of horses by 700, and, of course, we know that Mr. Stanhope reduced the Horse Artillery very largely, and made no corresponding increase. Those two diminutions were followed by a pretended increase, and the Secretary for War came down and said he was going to increase the proportion of his guns. Now, what is the present situation? As I understand the honourable Member, he, in answer to a Question the other day—he has used the same argument to-night—said the country may be quiet on this head, because we have now a greater reserve of horses than before the reduction took place. If that statement means anything at all, it means, to put it in plain language, that the guns are to be taken into action by omnibus horses.

*MR. WYNDHAM

The waggons.

*SIR. C. DILKE

But these are not waggons going along the road; most of these waggons will be in action; they will have to retire very hurriedly over bad country, over any obstacle which happens to be in their way. Omnibus horses may be very excellent creatures, but I do not think any foreign Power would take their batteries into action with omnibus horses. They do not use them for that purpose; they use them for transport, I know, but not for actual service for the waggons in the field, and I confess that, in my belief, you must have trained horses for the waggons which are serving with the guns, as for the guns themselves. Now, Sir, of course we somewhat stretch our figures by counting the military age of a horse from five years to 13 years. Foreign countries only count from six to 13 as the military age. I doubt if we have 3,000 trained artillery horses of military age in this country; that is to say, you have no trained horses for the Militia and the Volunteers; but I believe that in the actual Army, for the purpose of the mobilisation, you have only 3,000 trained horses. Now I am convinced that in times of peace you require a larger establishment of trained artillery horses, than that. I know that India, a poorer country than this, is made to pay for horses for six guns and six waggons, in addition to spare horses; and if they are obliged to do that in India, and she is made to pay for these larger batteries, it is because they are necessary for efficiency; and if we do not keep up the same supply here, I consider that we are starving the Army upon that particular point. The honourable Member, in his defence of this point, mentioned Germany, and suggested that the Germans do exactly the same as the War Office have been doing, and propose to continue to do. I very much doubt that. If he means that the German Artillery drill under the same conditions in which a four-gun battery, with one waggon, on the lower establishment, is supposed to train Artillery in this country, then I doubt his statement. The Artillery force in every Artillery station in Germany is very large. In Germany, so far as I know, there are never fewer than 11 batteries in any Artillery station, and the advantages of the concentration of Artillery for purposes of drill and training are so great that the French hardly keep fewer than 22 batteries in any Artillery station. Drill and training under these circumstances are very different from what they can be here in our four-gun batteries on the lower establishment. I confess I disbelieve both that our system adapts itself easily to mobilisation in time of war, or that it adapts itself to training in time of peace. I said just now that successive Governments have begun to admit this fact and to promise an increase. Three years ago the present Leader of the Opposition promised an increase of the Artillery, and he said that, in order to bring the number of our guns into closer approximation with Continental standards, he proposed an increase of one battery of Royal Horse Artillery and seven batteries of Field Artillery—that is to say, 48 guns on mobilisation. But he reduced the depots. The training, he said, was to be at the batteries, and he reduced many batteries to four-gun establishments. At that time we pressed the right honourable Gentleman—my honourable Friend the then Under Secretary for War joined with me in pressing him somewhat severely on this point—to say whether he was increasing the Artillery by a single horse or by a single man.

*MR. WYNDHAM

Or by a single gun.

*SIR C. DILKE

Yes. And in response to that pressure the right honourable Gentleman said— The net result of these modifications will involve no appreciable alteration in the total establishment of officers, men, and horses, while, at the same time, giving us a total increase of eight batteries. That frank admission was taken note of, and in 1896—the following year—there was a general concurrence of opinion that it was somewhat regrettable that the phrase "increase of Artillery" had been used in that statement. What has happened now? Last year the Marquess of Lansdowne admitted all our arguments about our weakness in Artillery, and agreed that it was vital to the country that our strength in Artillery should be increased. He said— We are determined that the Artillery arm shall not be deficient. The Government, both in another place and here, attacked the arrangements which had been made by the previous Government with regard to the depots, and made some announcement, which I have never thoroughly understood, as to a partial restoration of the depôt system. I regret that my honourable Friend did not make that matter clear to-night, as I think the House does not understand to what extent there has been a, reversal of the policy of the late Government on that point. In attacking the present Leader of the Opposition for applying the Infantry system to Artillery, Lord Lansdowne said— You cannot in Artillery shift the men from one unit to another without serious risk to efficiency. In consequence of that statement the Under Secretary for War announced in this House an increase in Artillery of 15 batteries—an increase so large that it was to take three years to accomplish: live batteries in this financial year, five batteries next year, and five batteries, I suppose, the year after that. What I cannot for the life of me understand is that, though we have increased the Artillery by between four and five batteries this year, and are going to increase the Artillery by five more batteries next year, we have not increased the Artillery by a single horse. There is no change in the number of horses shown in the details of the Estimates; and I ask the Government to enlighten us on this point by issuing returns showing the actual condition and age of the horses in the four-gun batteries. If they cannot give n full return, could we be given tomorrow night some information with regard to certain batteries, such as the 44th, which has been at home for some years; the 88th, which has lately been raised; and the 17th, which a year ago came back from India, and has been reduced to the four-gun establishment? I want to know the number of horses of military age in the four-gun batteries which are fit to take the field, deducting, of course, the officers' chargers. These batteries are totally inefficient for war. They exist only for the purpose of furnishing drafts to others. I submit that from the point of view of the training of men these batteries are inefficient, and that the kind of batteries which are kept up in India for the training of men are as necessary here as they are in India. The mystery of the increase of Artillery without an increase of horses only deepens the more the Estimates are studied. There is one page in which the matter is dealt with in a general form, in which there appears an increase of 31 horses, but in the details the number is exactly the same. If any honourable Member will turn to one of the two pages where horses are named, he will find that every single item is exactly the same, horse for horse, as in the Estimates of last year, and that there is not, when you come to the details, an increase in the establishment of a single horse. I cannot understand how five new batteries can be raised before the 31st of March, and five batteries in next year, without an increase of horses, unless a great many batteries are to be reduced from the higher to the lower establishment, but the horses as shown for each establishment in the Estimates are the same for the two years. It has been admitted that we have an insufficient number of guns for our Militia and for our Regular Army, and that as regards horses our establishment at home is vastly smaller than it was many years ago, and is ridiculously small as compared with the establishment in India. The only point that remains: to be considered is whether there exists any other force of Artillery in this country, or whether any other force of Artillery can be created. The guns of the position batteries of the Volunteers have not been mentioned tonight, but I fear they would only serve the purposes of fortress Artillery on the North Downs, on Box Hill, and at Caterham—positions which would be taken up by the Volunteers in the event of a dangerous war. A suggestion has been made that it might be possible to establish in this country, for the purposes of home defence, for the purposes of drill and manœuvres, and for the purposes of training men and drawing upon them in time of war, batteries which would be cheaper than the batteries of the Regular Army. A Militia Field Artillery, such as the Swiss have been able to make, might be created, and it seems to me possible to adopt a system under which a portion of the men would be Regulars and a portion Volunteers, and by which some cheaper Artillery might be provided as a second line. Whatever scheme is adopted by the Government, I, at all events, submit to the House that matters cannot stand as they are in connection with the Artillery, and that a case has been made out for pressing this subject upon the attention of the Government until, in this conspicuous in- stance, the British Army is brought up to the standard which, in view of the expenditure which is spent upon it, the country has a right to demand.

MAJOR RASCH (Essex, S.E.)

I rise to second the Amendment. The Under Secretary for War has explained the position by saying that the War Office are going to reduce six-gun batteries to four gun batteries, and in that way to in crease the Artillery by five batteries. The honourable Gentleman absolutely calls that a strong point. In my opinion it is about as sensible as the action of the Irishman who cut off one end of a blanket to sew it on to the other. During the past 20 years the Royal Artillery has been increased by 12 batteries, but, notwithstanding that, the personnel, so far as horses go, has been reduced by 900. I submit that this is absolutely incomprehensible, either to the military mind, the agricultural mind, or to any other mind in this House. A General, who is now dead, once stated that the inefficiency of the land forces of the Crown was due to the fact that the money which Parliament voted was ignorantly and futilely spent by the War Office. That remark is equally true to day. The War Office have increased their expenditure by millions year after year, but they have not improved the efficiency of the Army. In 1897 the Army Estimates amounted to £18,000,000 sterling, in 1896 to more than £17,500,000, but this year they have reached the enormous total of £20,500,000. The War Office have nothing to show for this enormous expenditure. The troops in January 1895 exceeded by something like 7,000 men the troops in January 1899. It seems to me that the War Office has had only two successes during the last 18 months. One was the Peerage which was conferred on Sir Arthur Haliburton for the brief which he held for them in the columns of "The Times" last year, and the other was the success of the campaign in the Soudan. But the success of Lord Kitchener of Khartoum was practically due to the fact that he was 3,000 miles away from Lord Lansdowne and Pall Mall. In fact, the only things the War Office did for the Soudan campaign was to send out soldiers' boots which wore out in three weeks, and to refuse, after two applications, to send out a hospital ship to Alexandria—two things which exceed even the incapacity displayed by the War Office during the Crimean War. I will now refer to the force alluded to by the right honourable Baronet opposite. The House will remember some four years ago the present Leader of the Opposition, when Secretary of State for War, conceived the idea that he could strengthen the Artillery by reducing six-gun batteries to four-gun batteries, and improve its organisation by suppressing the depôt batteries altogether. The same brilliant success has resulted from the treatment of the Cavalry as resulted from the treatment of the Artillery four years ago. In consequence of the drafts to regiments abroad, the Cavalry regiments have been brought to a squeezed lemon condition. The Under Secretary for War has said that recruiting for the Cavalry is better this year than last year, and was better last year than the year before. That is all very well; but the honourable Gentleman did not tell us that the Inspector-General of Recruiting stated in his report that in order to obtain Cavalry recruits the height and age had to be reduced. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the proof of the efficiency of the War Office is a war; but happily we have had no war except the one in the Soudan, with which the War Office, fortunately, had very little to do. But we have had autumn manœuvres, which cost £200,000. I should like to say something with reference to the Infantry in the autumn manœuvres. The War Office were going to put into the field 65,000 men, but, as we all know, they did nothing of the kind. They only put 53,500 men into the field. The Infantry battalions were to have turned out 550 strong, but they only turned out 460 strong on the average. The establishment paid for by the country was 881. Now, Sir, I should like to know how it is that 881 men per battalion are paid for by the taxpayers of this country, when only 460 paraded. Do the remainder exist on paper only, like the Chinese Army Corps? Nine hundred waggons and 2,500 horses were borrowed from Lipton and Whiteley. Surely the War Office, in Estimates of £20,000,000 a year, can afford to keep sufficient horses and waggons in store to supply the transport of such a force as that! The heterogeneous character of the waggons used at the manoeuvres was the laughing stock of every military attaché who witnessed it. If the War Office cannot keep 2,500 horses in stock, surely they can keep 900 waggons, and paint them all alike, in order to prevent a repetition of the ridiculous condition of things which occurred last year. As to the War Office itself, I think the thanks of the country are due to the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who instituted and formed the Lansdowne Commission, which went into the organisation of the War Office this time last year. What do we find at the War Office? We find that an officer commanding a regiment is not allowed, without communicating with Pall Mall, to order repairs amounting to more than 3s. 6d. for each single man. A field-marshal cannot order the transfer of a gunner from one battery to another without reference to the authorities at Pall Mall. This state of things, in my opinion, is absurd. In regard to general recruiting, things, so far as numbers are concerned, look fairly satisfactory. But, of the 10,000 new recruits, no less than 72 per cent, are "specials," or men less than 5½ft. in height, less than 32in. round the chest, and less than 9Jst. in weight. I read the other day in a military journal called the "Broad Arrow," dated February 11th, that young thieves brought up before the magistrates had been let off on condition that they joined the Army. If that is true, I cannot conceive anything more calculated to lower the status of the Army. The truth is that recruiting will be more or less a failure until the War Office competes with the labour market. It is not food or barrack accommodation, but the low pay which deters young men from joining the Army. And here I venture to congratulate the honourable Gentleman the Under Secretary upon his speech at Dover. The speech which he made to his constituents at Dover, if I were an ordinary War Office official, I should call irresistible. In it he said that as far as he could see the British soldier ought to be attracted by higher pay and by the Government finding employment for him, if possible, after he left the colours. If the honourable Gentleman will only adhere to that, I can assure him that he will have a pleasant time of office, and will have done good for the Service as long as he remains at Pall Mall. Sir, I beg to second the Amend- ment proposed by the right honourable Gentleman opposite.

*MR. WYNDHAM

Perhaps I may be permitted to say a few words upon this matter, and as in reply to the right honourable Baronet and the honourable and gallant Gentleman I can only refer to the question of artillery horses, it will be no discourtesy to them if I do not at tempt to cover the whole ground raised. The right honourable Gentleman asks why we seem to have stereotyped the number of artillery horses, and he finds no apparent difference between the numbers this year and last year. The explanation is this: we treated the horses on our statement last year as we treated the men in the programme for the in crease of the Army; that is to say, we put down on last year's Estimates the total limit of the number of men—

*SIR C. DILKE

That explains one, but not the other. There is the other which shows the actual number.

*MR. WYNDHAM

The right honourable Baronet sees that point. In 1897 we had on the Estimates a net increase. Last year we put down on the Estimates a superior limit, and we stated how much we intended to take in the year. That has been done again this year, and, therefore, the numbers ought to be the same.

*SIR C. DILKE

That is as to establishment?

*MR. WYNDHAM

Yes, but as to the expending of money I think the right honourable Baronet will find on Vote 6, Transport and Remounts, this year we are taking some money for artillery horses. We are taking an increase on that Vote of £23,900, part of which will go to get 290 horses—

*SIR C. DILKE

But in what you have done in the present year there is no increase shown.

*MR. WYNDHAM

In the money? I am afraid that the Supplementary Estimates—

*SIR C. DILKE

I mean the number.

*MR. WYNDHAM

I have explained that the number is the same this year as last year, because the number last year—

*SIR C. DILKE

No, that is the establishment. Now I mean the actual number. It is only showing 31 more than last year.

*MR. WYNDHAM

Sir, is the right honourable Baronet speaking of the number of horses—artillery horses—in 1898–9, the financial year? The number of artillery horses in 1898–9 was 1,513 in excess of the numbers for 1897–8. Well, Sir, I am afraid I cannot answer this conundrum at a moment's notice. The broad lines are that the total establishment put down for this year is the same as last year, and that we are paying some money in this year's Estimates in order to add 290 horses to the five batteries.

*COLONEL BLUNDELL

considered that what we were deficient in in this country was not horses, but men. In India he did not suppose it possible to obtain horses when required, and they had to keep them, but here there were plenty, and they might either be paid for or pressed into the Service when the necessity arose.

GENERAL RUSSELL (Cheltenham)

observed that at the German Army Manœuvres four-gun batteries were employed, and, further than that, the waggons were not horsed. He believed that only the two batteries on the French Frontier had their waggons horsed, and then only to a very limited extent. It stood to reason that the expense of keeping up the waggons horsed on a war footing would be enormous. As far as his experience went, omnibus horses would be perfectly suitable for the work of the artillery waggons. No doubt, horses trained to firing would be better, but in his judgment omnibus horses would be extremely useful.

*SIR C. DILKE

May I be allowed to say that I shall not press this Motion to a Division, but that I am certain that the honourable Member must be mistaken in saying that we have 1,500 more artillery horses than last year.

*MR. WYNDHAM

I think I can correct that. I may read out the in crease in the establishment, but I do not know whether I should be in order in going further. There was on the 1st January of this year an increase on the establishment of 1,519 artillery horses; that is to say, the numbers on the 1st January last year were 4,200, and on the 1st January, 1899, 5,719; on the strength on the 1st January, 1898, 4,271 horses, and on the 1st January, 1899, 4,787, an increase of 516 horses. The facts are, Sir, that on the 1st January, 1898, the strength was 1,000 over establishment. I have explained before that that includes the increase for the 10 batteries, and, therefore, the difference between this year and last year is really greater than it appears. There is an absolute increase, Sir, of 516; since last year we were 1,000 over establishment. We are better this year—

*SIR C. DILKE

In horses altogether?

*MR. WYNDHAM

Yes; 516 are in the Artillery.

*MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER Belfast, W.)

I am sure that we are all pleased at seeing the honourable Gentleman the Under Secretary for War occupying his present official position, into which he has brought the same lucidity which distinguished his utterances as a private Member. I have heard, like other Members, the speech of the honourable Gentleman with great pleasure and satisfaction. I think there are some points in what the honourable Gentleman has said, which cannot fail to gratify all those who are interested in Army questions, and I think it would be reasonable to give full prominence to them. At the same time some of us are in sympathy with the right honourable Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean on one ground—that there has been an omission of a general review of our progress. I do not know that the situation actually demands it, but I think it would, in view of the very considerable changes which have been made, have been not altogether out of place. I think that the House and the country are to be congratulated upon one very remarkable circumstance. We are now in the presence of this fact, that the system which has been so per- sistently attacked in this House for many years is now perishing. The Cardwell system—the system, at least, which takes its name from Lord Card well—has now very nearly absolutely perished, and I think all that has been said tonight must make us desire that it should absolutely perish. I should like to justify that statement. The Cardwell system depends upon certain broad, great principles. There was the principle, in the first place, of a short service Army. Now, Sir, the right honourable (Gentleman opposite has not exaggerated when he said that the short service Army had ceased to exist. The right honourable Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said last Session that there were some of us unreasonable enough to hope for a short service Army which should mainly be composed of long-service men. Well, Sir, we were unreasonable enough to hope that, and we have now the gratification of finding that we have got what we wanted. The House will hardly believe the extent to which long service has taken the place of short service. Six years' men are practically no longer enlisted at all. I find we have now, or shall have within a very short period, almost as many men serving the long service term of over six years as there were serving in the first year for which I can find the annual return, namely, 1873. I think that is a very remarkable fact, and I should like the House to bear with me while I give only one set of figures, which they may compare in this matter. There are at the present moment serving in the Army—or there were two years ago, and I would point out that this return has very largely altered in my favour at the present time—69,700 men of over six years' service; that is, nearly 70,000 long service men. There are now considerably over that number, because great progress has been made during the last two years in getting men to extend their service. When we add to that 5,000 men of the First Class Army Reserve, who are to be called back to the colours, and 5,000 men of the A Division of the Army Reserve, we have 10,000 men added to that 70,000; and, allowing for extensions and re-engagements, we shall have in a very short time considerably over 90,000 long service men in the Army—the number serving in 1873 was 96,000, and the number will soon be 90,000 long-service men. On the other side we have, it is true, a very considerable number of short-service men, but from these short-service men, numbering 112,000, we must deduct men under 20 years of age, because, as has been pointed out over and over again, these are not the men on whom we rely to fill our battalions in case of war. After that deduction, we find only 110,000 short-service men serving in the Army at the present time. That is a very remarkable confirmation of the prophecy that we have always made, that an advance in efficiency would be found to consist in doing away with that feature, at any rate, of the Cardwell system. But, Sir, the Cardwell system depended on other features. There was the feature of deferred pay. That has gone, and we are told by the Secretary of State that no one regrets it going; and we hope and believe that it will be found to be of very great advantage to the Army that it should go. Then we have territorial recruiting. Territorial recruiting was a great feature of the Cardwell system—we thought, some of us, a very bad feature when carried to excess, and a very excellent feature when carried out in moderation. At the present moment, territorial recruiting as a system for the whole Army is merely a make-believe. Territorial recruiting exists now, as it always did, in certain districts of the country. It does not exist, not even in name, for the larger proportion of the Army. At the present moment, the men enlisted for the territorial regiments in the different parts of the county are something like, I think, 30 per cent, of the total enlistment. In England, there enlisted in territorial regiments 8,200 men, and 9,000 for other corps. In Scotland 950 men enlisted for territorial regiments, and 1,181 for other corps; Ireland, 1,471 for territorial regiments, 1,100 for other corps. Now, Sir, those figures, I know, do not exhaust the whole of the Army, nor do they exhaust the whole of the case, because we have regiments, such, for instance, as the Lancashire Regiment, which are supposed to get some advantage from their territorial recruiting; yet they are filled, just as the London regiments are, with men from all parts of the country, and from all parts of the world, and these men have no more real territorial feeling in connection with that locality than if they were foreigners. The territorial system has now gone back to the position in which it was before the Cardwell system was introduced, and only the name, as far as I can see, hampers to an extent a great many things which we should like to see done in the Army. We have had a very happy announcement from the Under Secretary this evening, which, I am glad to say, is another blow to the Cardwell system. The Cardwell system made one of its great features the destruction of regimental feelings by attacking regimental history, names, uniforms, and badges. The honourable Member has given us a most welcome promise to-night that there will be some measure of relief given to those regiments, those battalions, which combine to express a desire for it. I hope and believe that that will be, if I may so put it, the thin end of the wedge, and that this wise step having once been taken, we shall see, once and for all, the end of this warfare which has been conducted against the regiments' esprit de corps for so long a period. I do not wish to exaggerate this matter. I know that every other consideration must give way to efficiency; but I want to remind honourable Members that there are many of these regiments whose traditions go back for 120 years, aye, for 200 years, who have had the whole, or a very large part, of their identity taken away from them in 1881. I saw the other day that the Hanoverian Regiments have had restored to them the distinctions they possessed before the war of 1866; and I have always hoped that the day may come when such regiments as are distinguished in our Army for the part they took in the beginning of the century, or last century, shall have restored to them the identity which will enable men who serve in them now to know that they form part of regiments so distinguished in the past. We have got rid of short service, we have got rid of deferred pay, and we have partly got back our regimental distinctions. There still remains one of the worst features of the Cardwell system, and that is the system of drafting. Now, Sir, the honourable Member has said that drafting is inevitable, and the reason he says that is, that he has got the authority of the great lights of the War Office for it. Now, Sir, I should like at this time of the day to exercise my independent judgment, and I think we need not be too much alarmed at the authority of the distinguished gentlemen at the War Office. I think anybody who has read the Report of the War Office upon itself last year will think that the fact that any institution is supported by the persons who are concerned in that Report is about the best evidence you have got that it is in need of some reform. I think I have done enough in quoting these four cardinal instances, in which we have abandoned schemes which have been defended tooth and nail in this House, year after year, to show that we have a right to look at things upon their merits, and not to take alarm because we have the ipse dixit of some War Office authority for their existence. We have a great many opinions about this matter of drafting. I should like to quote the opinion of so great an authority as Lord Nelson. Speaking of the kindred Service, he said— The disgust of the seamen of the Navy is owing to the infernal plan of turning them over from ship to ship, so that men cannot be attached to their officers nor their officers care tuppence about them. Now, Sir, I think that authority is a good one. I have another authority, a very good one also. I was reading only two days ago an account of the operations of the American Civil War, by Captain Mahan. He says— There is no more unsatisfactory method of getting a crew than by drafts from the commands of other men. Human nature is rarely equal to parting with any but the worst. That is not only true, but it is an absolute statement of what takes place in our regiments at the present time—in our batteries and Cavalry regiments. The men who are supposed to be volunteers in many and many a case are the men whom the sergeant-major wants to get rid of; and, when you have got to the end of that tally, you come then to the men whom the regiment does not want to lose, and who are its best men. But we have a third authority against drafting. We have the authority of the Secretary of State for War himself. Lord Lansdowne's words have been quoted by the right honourable Baronet with regard to drafting in the Artillery batteries. Lord Lansdowne said that, in the Artillery, you could not continue this system of drafting without doing injury to the efficiency of the batteries. Now, |Sir, that opinion, I believe, is absolutely universal in the Artillery. I confess I hear it from every quarter, and I do regret that we are promised a continuance of this system. I do not even admit what the honourable Member has said, that this system must go on for ever and ever with regard to the Infantry. I believe that, until we have some great organic change, there is, perhaps, no other way of providing the Infantry battalion with men, but that necessity certainly does not exist in the case of Cavalry and Artillery, and I did hope that we might have some pledge from the Secretary of State with regard to both these arms, that we should have a real establishment of depots for Cavalry and Artillery. I know some of my honourable and gallant Friends are going to speak more at length than I desire, or ought to do, with regard to this matter of drafting in the Cavalry, but I should like to say one word about it. What is happening is this? There are Cavalry regiments which, at this present moment, are being made traps for the enlistment of young men. There are certain popular Cavalry regiments and young men are being invited to enlist in them; and they enlist because they know and like that regiment, because they wish to be in that regiment. When they get to it they are told that they have got to go to some other regiment which they have never heard about, and which they do not want to go to. We are told that all these men know about these arrangements. Why, not one out of 10 Members of this House knows about them. They know they are to be transferred, it is said! I speak absolutely without fear of contradiction from any Cavalry officer when I say the men do not know, and, even if they did know, it does not make a pennyworth of difference, because when they get to these regiments they are transferred, willing or not—they go to other regiments either as volunteers or as ordered men. I know regiment after regiment, and know what is going on. Here is a case. I will not give the exact numbers, but will keep sufficiently near them, so that anybody who knows the facts may follow me. A regiment is asked to furnish 30 men. They are to be men of certain service and of a certain age. The regiment has, say, 40 or 50 men only on its whole strength who are available on these conditions. What happens? Volunteers are asked for. Some half-dozen or dozen men come forward and say they will go: perhaps somebody has told them they had better go. But that does not supply what is wanted. What happens? The men who do not volunteer, the efficient men of the regiment, are ordered to go. In Scottish regiments, in English regiments, and no doubt in Irish regiments, it is the same. How demoralising this is anybody with any knowledge at all of the results must see. It has actually got to this state of things, that Cavalry officers in a Dragoon Regiment receive orders from the War Office telling them that they are to send away men who are merely spoken of as "serving under their command" to a corps of Lancers, say, and a Cavalry officer has thus men put under his command who belong to some totally different regiment. That, to begin with, is very wrong in principle, and very deleterious to the interests of the Army, and, what is more, I believe it is absolutely illegal. After that matter I should like to refer to another matter. In 1881 an Army Act was passed giving a soldier an absolute right, after the first three months from his attestation, not to be liable to be transferred to any other corps without his own consent. In the definition clause of that Act the meaning attached to the word "corps" is given. That definition states that the expression "corps" was— In the case of Her Majesty's regular forces such a military body, whether known as a territorial regiment or by any different name, as might from time to time, be declared by Royal Warrant to be a corps for the purposes of the Act, and was a body formed by Her Majesty, and consisting of associated bodies or battalions of regular forces, with or without the whole or any part of an establishment. I ask any fair-minded man what was meant by that definition. In the year in which these great changes were made in regard to territorial regiments I find that a modification of that clause appears in the Royal Warrant. The Warrant commences— We hereby declare that on and after 27th of September 1881 such military bodies as are mentioned in the Schedule shall be declared to be corps for the purposes of the Army Act. Then follows a full list of Cavalry and territorial regiments. There is not the slightest doubt in the world that the intention of Parliament was, when this change was made, to stamp as "Corps" the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, and the Cavalry regiments, and to group territorial regiments not associated one with the other. Now, taking advantage of the word "corps," the War Office has taken upon itself to link together a number of regiments which have never been recognised as associated bodies, between which there is no exchange of officers, and which are not amenable to any common authority except the Commander-in-Chief. It is a very objectionable thing that, without consulting the House of Commons, the privileges conferred upon a soldier should be taken away by a side wind in order to get the War Office out of the hopeless muddle into which they have got. Before I leave this question of Cavalry and Artillery I should like to call the attention of the House to the fact that these two schemes, which have now absolutely broken down, were denounced on the very day they were first mentioned in this House, and the representative of the War Office was told by many of us that they would not and could not succeed. Now we are asked to do some more patching. In 1870 the whole thing was gone through. The Cavalry Depot was done away with, and the same good reasons were given for its demolition. It was replaced, and done away with again, and now, in some modified way which I do not understand, it is to be replaced again. Surely we may exercise an independent judgment in these matters, and not accept the statements of she War Office. I should like to say one word with reference to the recruiting returns. We are congratulating ourselves upon the very large number of recruits which have come in, but there is a contra to our satisfaction in this matter. The honourable Gentleman spoke as if the number of "specials" did not matter very much. Since 1895 the proportion of "specials" has gone up from 19.9 per cent, to 33 per cent. What are the dimensions of a man so small that he cannot pass the ordinary Army test? They are not the class of men we ought to have. We ought not to have 33 per cent, of our regular troops so small that only by physical means can they be extended 5ft. 2½in in height and 32in. around the chest. Some of these men do develop into soldiers; a great many do not. One of the most serious features of the Army at the present moment is the waste which occurs in the first few years of a soldier's life. That waste is something alarming. In 1897, which is the latest return available, out of 12,000 men discharged from the Army, 4,411 were under 21, and when we add to that the number of desertions of men with under two years' service, namely, 3,057, we get a very large and disproportionate waste among the young soldiers. I do not think it is satisfactory that we should be told year after year that we must accept this large proportion of "specials." Many Members of the House who are not acquainted with the matter are, no doubt, under the impression that all is said and done when a regiment, when called upon, goes into action. Now it cannot be too clearly understood that not a single regiment on the home establishment goes into action, or will ever go into action, if the War Office can help it. The number of men unfit is a great grievance at present. We have splendid material, we turn out splendid regiments. What we complain of is the enormous expenditure, and the large amount of unavailable material, and material which will never be available for active service. One word with reference to the return alluded to by the right honourable Baronet, which was given last year, and refused this year. I must protest against the refusal of that return. I think I can make a good case why it should be given. It gives us particulars as to the actual composition of all the battalions at home. No other single return issued by the War Office gives any information worth a snap of the finger, and the return promised to me containing the figures en bloc will not be of any importance. The return which we now ask for, and which was given last year, is given in every country in Europe as a matter of course. The composition of every battalion is known, the number of men is known, the service of each, the date they came in and the date they go out are all known. The only reason we are given why this return is refused to us is because it is feared it would give information to foreign nations. That is an absolutely absurd reason. The only people from whom the information is withheld are those who ought to know—the House of Commons. The information can be procured by any person who chooses to give time and trouble to it, and there is not a military attaché in London who cannot obtain it without the slightest difficulty. I may say that I myself, a military outsider, have on two separate occasions given a large proportion of this return before it was published, and when we got the exact figures it was found that my only error was that I had understated the case. What possible objection can there be to giving this return? It told us more about the condition of the Army than all the speeches made in this House. We are told what is going to be done, and what is contemplated. What we want to know is the present actual condition of the Army. We learnt last year that regiment after regiment, with an establishment of 770 men, had effectives varying from 200 to 300 men, that we required in 20 regiments 700 men to complete them, and in others 800 men. Now the country did not know that before. They were deceived on that point, and the War Office knows, of course, perfectly well that by the publication of this return the country was for the first time enlightened on this matter. I want to keep that information before the country. I want to ask a plain question. Why are you refusing this return? We had a War Office Committee last year, and a remark was then made by a very distinguished gentleman in the War Office upon this question of returns. I want the House of Commons to appreciate it. The remark which this gentleman was pleased to make was this— The House of Commons asks for excessively curious and minute returns … Now most of the inquiries are made about something or other that some local person has made a noise about. That was Sir Ralph Knox's way of describing the matter. The facts are otherwise. This House has not been at all exigeant in the matter of returns. It has con- tented itself with a great deal too few reports, and it is nothing less than an impertinence to suggest that the House of Commons, in desiring to know something about the Army, is simply giving effect to local prejudices. I do not know whether the opposition to giving us this return came from that quarter, but I do think the House of Commons has a right, in the first place, to resent a suggestion of that kind, and, in the second place, to insist upon having the return. We want to know this year and next year how things really stand, and I see no reason whatever why we should not have the information. I hope the Under Secretary of State will tell us the reason why this return has been refused, and what mischief was done to the nation by its publication last year, and why, when a large section of the House desires to have it this year, we should not get it? It is a return made up weekly in every orderly room in the kingdom, and there should be no difficulty about it. There are other matters of detail, which will come on under other Votes, and I do not desire to occupy the time of the House longer at the present stage. My main intention is that we should have courage and look facts in the face, and not take the authoritative statements of the War Office in regard to them, and that in pursuance of that doctrine we should consider whether the present system of drafting cannot be remedied, and whether every regiment should not be allowed to continue its own regimental life without this perpetual breaking up. I believe, with the right honourable Baronet opposite, that no effective remedy will take place until the whole system is altered. It is repugnant to our own common sense, and is against the feeling of every officer zealous for the Army. It is by no means ah imaginary grievance, and I have no hesitation in saying that those who feel most the pinch of these bad arrangements are not officers who are careless as to the welfare of their regiments, not officers sluggish in the Service, but the very best men in the Service. Day after day and week after week I hear expressions, which are painful to hear, from men who have given up the best of their lives to the Service, and I hear laments over the conditions under which they are com- pelled to work, and I trust, after the very satisfactory statement the honourable Gentleman has given us to-night, that we may now make some progress.

MR. COURTNEY WARNER (Stafford, Lichfield)

I propose to ask a few questions from the Under Secretary of State for War, and I will follow him, if I may, in taking the Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry one by one. He made one curious statement, to which I take exception. He suggested that if there were war the drafts to India would be kept down. I think every Member of the House will see at once that the moment war broke out the first thing would be the strengthening of our Indian Army as much as possible, and the drafts would have to be very much larger to India than if there were no war. Artillery drafts would be drawn on most. With reference to the batteries of Artillery mentioned by the honourable Gentleman, he did not give a single battery to the 200,000 Volunteers and the 100,000 Militia. In the event of war they would not have a single battery to help them, and as they would have no Cavalry they would be really only a paper army. When the extra batteries are raised the Reserve of Artillery would not be enough to fill up at home, because the batteries abroad would continue to require drafts. The reserve of horses is spoken of as being quite sufficient to fill up the Artillery, but there is the Cavalry to fill up, and also the Army Service Corps and transports. If all these horses are to be taken up for the Artillery we should not have a single horse for the Cavalry and the Army Transport Corps, or any transport service whatever, and we all know that we must have a certain number of trained men and horses even with the Army Service Corps. Then I should like to refer to the system of drafting. It is a most pernicious system to take a man from one regiment and put him into another. The Under Secretary of State did suggest that he was doing all he could to prevent this system of drafting, and I hope it will be done away with before very long. There is one other point to which I wish to refer. We have now more Infantry, taken as a whole; that is to say, we have an increased Regular Army prepared for foreign service, but we have a decreased Militia and Home Reserve. The Militia is to me a very important force, and its importance has been recognised by the War Office in two ways; in the first place as a Reserve, and in the second, as a feeder for the Army. I think everything is being done to reduce the Militia to the smallest possible dimensions. If the Under Secretary of State for War would consent to a little elasticity in the area over which each regiment is now allowed to recruit, there might be an improvement. At present each regiment is tied down to its own county. In some places there are regiments which can recruit any number of men, but have not got officers up to the full establishment. In other places the Militia regiments have all their officers, but are short of men. They cannot get them in their own county, but if they were allowed to go to another county where the Militia regiment was full they would be able to keep up their full strength. For instance, in London, regiments are always full up, and some of the Militia regiments in the country who have got their officers would be able to fill up their men by being allowed to recruit in London. The same thing applies to Liverpool, Glasgow, and other large towns. In consequence of this shortness of men the establishment is being reduced to six companies in certain regiments. In answer to a Question last night by the honourable Member for South Molton, the Under Secretary of State said he would postpone the reduction of the Devon Militia. I want to point out that reduction to six companies of a Militia regiment is the worst thing you could do. It makes the expenses of the officers very much greater, and it is in officers that the Militia is short. If you reduce the regiment to six companies you reduce the officers by 25 per cent., so that you make the mess expenses 15 to 20 per cent, greater. That is not the way to get officers. I should suggest that instead of reducing these regiments, two six-company regiments should be amalgamated, making a 12-company regiment. It would be better for recruiting, much less expensive to the officers, and would not be detrimental to the efficiency of the regiment. I hope some of these suggestions may be of some use. I have to thank the Under Secretary for carrying out one reform that I asked for many years ago, and I am very grateful for it. It is that the glengarry is about to go. I am glad that that inconvenient head-dress is to be removed. There is one other thing everyone should be grateful for, and that is the provision of shoes for the Regular Army. The enormous amount of marching the modern style of drill requires results in the supply of boots being always rather short, and shoes will be very acceptable for use in barracks. I am glad to hear they are to be given to every man, and they are certain to be appreciated. I do hope something will be done to prevent Militia regiments, which really have had very little given to them, being reduced any further than at present. We had additional pay given to the Regular Army, but no additional pay given to the Militia. If it is a question of money there is a certain amount spent every year in counting 20,000 men twice over. The Militia Reserve is merely paid to be taken into the Army if they are required. I believe that every man in the Militia would go into the Army if required in time of war. So the Reserve is absolutely useless. I can speak with a certain amount of knowledge, because at the time of the Crimea, the Militia battalions were merely skeleton battalions, nine-tenths of the men having been transferred to the Army. Well, I think that is a very good reason for looking after the Militia as a reserve force you can draw on. Give a little better pay, better clothes, and some small luxuries, which would encourage the men to join the Militia, or, if you cannot give them more pay, give them a little better bounty. I hope that what has been said by the honourable Member for Belfast will be taken to heart by the War Office authorities. It is a very expensive way to keep a soldier for one year before he really becomes a soldier, although, no doubt, it makes a very large army on paper. I hope there will be fewer "specials" taken on in future, and that the money spent on them will be used in keeping on men who are efficient soldiers. Even if you have to pay a little more, it will be for the good of the Army. As for what has been said about small battalions, that is another thing which I hope will be taken into consideration. When last year it was proposed that the new battalions should be raised, I asked the Under Secretary for War whether he would not consider the desirability before raising the new battalions of filling up the old ones. It would be a very much better thing if we kept our battalions up to their full strength. It would be easier to teach them, better for their drill, and far less expensive to the country. Of course, I know the argument that you want a skeleton ready to be filled up with reserve men. But you have got plenty of skeletons, and a reserve of officers to insrease your regiments to eight-company battalions. There is one other point to which I want to direct attention, and that is, steps should be taken to do away with the small Line depôts These are very expensive, and very detrimental to the men who go there. Besides, small depots are most unpleasant to the men, who are obliged to be put in places which are very inimical to their health. The small depots should be amalgamated and made into large depots. It is very much easier to train 1,000 recruits than to train 10 batches of 100 men each. The number of recruits being trained at some of these small depôts does not sometimes exceed 50. That is an expensive way of training recruits. And when the whole depot appears on parade it sometimes does not amount to a body 200 strong. Considering the number of officers and sergeants who must be kept at these depôts, that is a most expensive way of training recruits. Instead of having a sergeant putting one or two men through the goose-step—it does not require great intelligence or skill to put recruits through the goose-step—it would be better if the depots were made larger and the recruits trained in larger numbers. That would be an enormous benefit to the country. Then, if the depots were amalgamated the rifle ranges could be placed nearer them. At present the men have long distances to go to get to the ranges at all, but if only the depôts were made larger, it would pay the country to obtain ranges closer to them. There is only one other point I would like to ask about. The right honourable Gentleman the Under Secretary for War mentioned that a lot of ranges had been arranged for, but I did not quite know what he meant when he spoke of some ranges that were going to be inspected, or had been inspected.

*MR. WYNDHAM

The honourable Member is putting two parts of my speech together. I spoke of half a million under the loan of 1897 being set apart to acquire new rifle ranges for the Army. The other figures which I gave were applicable to the ranges for Volunteers. In April, 1894, there were 1,172 ranges, of which now over 667 were approved of, and there were 354 ranges which had not yet been inspected, but would be inspected.

MR. COURTNEY WARNER

The ranges provided for the Volunteers are being inspected, but the 20 new ranges for the Army are, I understand, in course of construction. I should like to know what progress has been made with the construction of these new ranges. I was given to understand some time ago that these ranges had been arranged for, but I find that the only arrangement made is that it has been decided to buy land for the ranges, but that no progress has been made in buying the land, and that, in fact, no arrangement has been made beyond the War Office sending somebody down to inspect the land, and to see whether it is suitable for ranges. I nope that these 20 new ranges which are in process of construction or inspection, or something of the sort, will soon be brought to a completion.

SIR H. FLETCHER: (Sussex, Lewes)

I beg to thank the Secretary of State for War and his Under Secretary for having at last been able to unearth from the pigeon holes of the War Office the great question of transport for the Volunteers. I have brought this question before the House for many years, and a Committee sat on it some years ago. Now I am informed by my honourable Friend that provision is being made in order that when a Volunteer corps produces a waggon or waggons at a, drill, or in camp, or at inspection certain allowances in the way of money will be granted. There is no doubt the question of transit has affected the Volunteer force very considerably, and we who are interested in that force have now reason to hope that the difficulty is about to be overcome. There is another matter in connection with the Volunteers which I wish to mention. I congratulate my honourable and gallant Friend and the War Office for having seriously taken up the question of ranges. Those who, like myself, have been associated with the Volunteer force for forty years know that that question of ranges has been a most serious blot on almost the existence of the Volunteers for many years past. I may remind the House that it is not altogether a question of the money which the War Office proposes to give in the way of travelling allowances to take them to the ranges. The great question of the ranges is that they should be in as close proximity as possible to the headquarters of the corps. I would point out that the time of the Volunteer is valuable. He is not able to separate himself from his civil employment for many hours of the day. And if the range is some hours distant, by railway even, from his business quarters, you may say a whole day is occupied by a man in going through his class-firing. Up to the present time an allowance has been made for a distance of five or six miles from headquarters. I gather from my honourable Friend that the War Office proposes that a travelling allowance should be given for a distance of 12 miles. That, no doubt, will be very satisfactory indeed. I hope the War Office will continue to use every effort to provide ranges at such distances as will enable the Volunteers to carry out their musketry course in an efficient manner. I can speak from long association with the force and all connected with it, and I say that this boon in regard to transport which is to be given to the Volunteers will be of the greatest benefit; and if the ranges question is satisfactorily dealt with, I have no fear but that the Volunteers will continue to make themselves more efficient than ever.

SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN (Stirling Burghs)

I have very few observations to make on the general question of the Estimates, but I wish, at all events, to rise for the purpose of congratulating the honourable Gentleman not only on his appointment to the office he holds, but also on the admirable way in which he has discharged his duty to-night. He has not a very exciting or a very revolutionary programme to uphold. His principal duty was to point out how far the schemes of previous years were developed in the course of the months that are past. For that very reason I find there is very little to say on this occasion, because the new proposals are so few, and the original scheme which is in process of application was so fully discussed last year that I do not think much time need he spent on that question. It is very satisfactory to me to find that some parts of the scheme of last year, which I regarded with most distrust, have not turned out to have had any prejudicial effect, or, at any rate, to such an extent as might have been feared. I regarded with considerable alarm the proposal to bring men back from the Reserve to serve with the colours, but I am glad to find from the statements made either in the Reports of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, or in the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War, that in the first place, it appears that the 4,500 men who have come back from the Reserve to the colours were all men who came from civil employment at the time.

*MR. WYNDHAM

Nearly all of them.

SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

Or nearly all of them. The greatest number of them were in civil employment. This appears to me to be a pretty good answer to those alarming rumours we have heard of the large number of Reserve men who were wandering about the country in a hopeless search for employment. Of course, it was thought that when a door of this kind was opened to them it would be the loose and unsettled men who would be the first to enter; but it now turns out that the largest number of the men had been in civil employment. The second fact which it is satisfactory to find is, that it is not anticipated by the War Office that this provision with regard to the return to the colours of Reserve men will have any effect in materially diminishing the number of the Reserve; that there is such a number of men changing from the establishment and passing into the Reserve that they will make up the diminution on the other head by the men rejoining the colours. Still, I deprecated that proposal last year, and I continue to do so, not only on the ground that it takes away from the very Reserve which we have been laboriously creating all those years past, but also on the ground that, when you take a Reservist and bring him back to complete his 12 years' service, you turn him out into the world without a pension and in a more helpless condition than he was in before. When a Reserve man of the ordinary type goes out he has his Reserve pay, or, as now, a gratuity. He has been, after all, only a few years in the service, and he enters civil life. A long-service man, serving his 21 years, or whatever term he may prefer, goes out on his pension. But this Reservist, this 12 years' man, after being brought back to complete his term, is discharged without, any prospect at all. That is of itself an unfortunate position. In the old days 13 years was considered the term of service, after which a man had the right to demand a full long service and a pension, if he chose to use his right. I do not think it is a satisfactory arrangement that a man should be so treated, and I venture to think that if some years hence we hear alarming stories of our workhouses being full of old soldiers, it will be these unfortunate Reservists, who have been discharged after 12 years' service, who will largely constitute the men so unfortunately situated. Well, the recruiting appears to have been most satisfactory during the past year. In fact, so far as I have been able to look into the returns and reports, the condition of the Army, as a whole, is most satisfactory. It has been improving in almost every particular. The number of recruits is something startling, as also the comparative facility with which they have been obtained. I know what has been always said against those who are known as "specials," that it is desirable to keep down the number of the "specials" as much as possible. But, after all, a well-grown youth, with good physical characteristics, and capable of development, is about the best possible soldier we can have. I am not sure that, although we have the trouble and expense of maintaining him for a year or a short time while he is not fully useful—I am not sure that in the end he does not make a better soldier than the other man. My honourable Friend who has just sat down referred to certain concessions that had been made to the Volunteers, which I was very glad to hear of. The Volunteers are always under the impression that they have been somewhat scurvily treated by the authorities at headquarters. I have never been able to say that that is true. At the same time, their own efforts have been so patriotically ungrudging, and they have done so much out of their own pockets, that they certainly deserve every concession that can be made to them, consistently with maintaining their perfectly voluntary and unpaid character. The honourable Gentleman is to be congratulated on having found something to be done for them which will not have any evil effect on their character. The honourable Gentleman does not refer to what, I think, is after all one of the most remarkable features of these Estimates, and that is the total sum of them. The Estimates are over a million larger than last year, and last year's were greater than those of the year before. And so we go on. This is not the time or the occasion on which to discuss that, I am fully aware. I always bear in mind the fact that your Army and your Navy Estimates depend upon the policy of the country. It is not the War Minister or the Marine Minister who is to be either blamed or praised for heavy Estimates. It is those who direct the policy of the country who are responsible. If you undertake great obligations in all parts of the world, if you extend your Empire in, no doubt, a very pleasing and gratifying manner, and with a great deal of approbation on the part of the masses of the people of the country—if you go on doing that year after year, you have, and you must have, an increased expenditure on the Army and Navy. It cannot be too often repeated and pressed on the mind of the country that our Army is now almost at the extreme limit of its powers to bear and discharge those great duties which the honourable Member referred to. These constant duties consist in garrisoning stations in unhealthy climates, duties exceeding anything imposed on the armies of all the other countries on the face of the earth, besides being ready for the great emergencies to which the honourable Gentleman referred. When Her Majesty's Government, on their responsibility, declare that this large increase of money is required, I am not one who ever refuses these grants of money when so demanded by the responsible Ministers of the day. But I hope it will be observed in the country and in this House that the Estimates and the charges for military defences and for the guarding of the interests of the Empire are constantly increasing, and that the only way to prevent such increases, if it be desirable, is by modifying in some way or other the general policy of the country.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. A. J. BALFOUR,) Manchester, E.

I really do not in the least intend to intervene in detalied Debate on the Army Estimates, but the right honourable Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition at the close of his speech has implied that the great and growing Estimates, naval and military, have some special connection with the Foreign Policy pursued by Her Majesty's present advisers. That, I think, is not the case. No doubt it is true, and I think my honourable Friend in his interesting speech referred to the fact, that the responsibilities of the Empire are growing; but the main responsibilities of the Empire must be the same under this or any other Government. They are the responsibilities of preserving our great Colonies, our great outlying dependency of India, and our great trade routes. These are the inevitable responsibilities of Empire, and the fact that you add a few square miles here or there does not affect the total of these responsibilities to any practical extent whatever. In order to carry out these responsibilities, you must have undoubtedly an Army and a Navy capable of meeting any army or navy that may be brought against them, and by which those Imperial responsibilities may be imperilled. The amount of our armaments depends not in the least on the Foreign Policy the Government may pursue, but partly upon those considerations, those allocations of responsibility which I have referred to, and still more upon the military and naval policy pursued by other nations. It is from that policy our dangers arise. It is to meet these dangers that we have to ask the House to vote these vast sums. Nobody regrets more than Her Majesty's present advisers the magnificent sacrifices we have to ask the taxpayers of the country to undergo, but so long as our Imperial responsibilities remain what they are, and so long as we have to contend against the forces which may be arrayed against us, so long is it absolutely neces- sary that we should ask the country to make those sacrifices. It has nothing whatever to do—as the right honourable Gentleman would lead us to suppose—with our action, say, in the Soudan, or here, or there. It depends on far larger considerations, which no modification of the Foreign Policy of the Government could, so far as I can see, materially diminish or materially increase.

*MR. WEIR (Ross and Cromarty)

There are certain matters connected with recruiting expenses to which I wish to draw the attention of the House. Last year these expenses amounted to £22,100; this year the amount is £28,000, an addition of £5,900—

*MR. SPEAKER

The honourable Member is going into the details of the Estimates. That can only be done in Committee.

*MR. WEIR

I want to call attention to the expense of recruiting, and to the importance of not spending money in the Highlands of Scotland—in sending men round there to seek recruits. On page 10 of the Report on Recruiting it is stated that a battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders marched through Argyllshire and the Western Highlands for the purpose of getting recruits. I am sure every Member of the House who has a desire to see that the money of the nation is not spent foolishly will agree with me that to send down this battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders for the purpose of obtaining recruits at a cost of something like £100 for each recruit is foolish. I can tell the honourable Member the Under Secretary for War that it is simply throwing money into that sea to spend it like that. The Highlanders will not enlist as soldiers, although you may get some of them for the Navy, so long as their grievances are unredressed. That is shown by the result of this experiment of sending down kilted men with flags flying, ribbons streaming, and pipes skirling. They only managed to get six recruits, at a cost of £100 each recruit. And one of these was released from his engagement, for he was the only support of his widowed mother. It is a wicked expenditure of public money, and I think it ought to be stopped. I shall not go into the details of this question, but will deal with the matter when the Vote comes on in Committee. There is a diminution in the Scottish Militia of 1,285 men. In 1895 the Scottish Militia numbered 13,281, but in 1899 they are only 11,996. The War Office officials ought to open their eyes to the fact that it is a difficult matter, especially in the Highlands, to get men to join the Army. They get their Highland regiments filled, not from the Highlands of Scotland, but from the slums of the cities. I deplore the fact that our Highlanders are not joining the Army; I should be only too glad to see them do so. What the Government should do is to encourage the men to live in their native glens, and in that way you would soon find the material to draw from to fill up the ranks of the Army. Then, again, there is the exependiture of money at Fort George. I shall not deal with it now; but I call the attention of the Government to the fact that sums are provided in this year's Estimates for barrack accommodation throughout the Empire. Well, at Dingwall, the capital town of Rossshire, there are barracks for the men, but there is no accommodation for the staff. The result is that the staff have to go to Inverness and to Fort George, and the men have to follow them. Now, Dingwall is the county town and the headquarters of the Rossshire Buffs, the Seaforth Highlanders, and the Militia, and they ought to be located there. Men are far more likely to join the Army if their depot is in their own county. You must remember that the men love the Gaelic. Notwithstanding that the Government discourages the language, the Highlander loves his Gaelic, and if the depot of the regiment is where there is Gaelic speaking, there is a far better chance of getting a larger number of recruits from the county. I am sure every military man will agree that it is far better for a regiment to be composed, if possible, of men from one county, speaking the same language, knowing each other, and standing shoulder to shoulder on the field of battle. They will do their work with far more spirit, and face death, if needful, more courageously side by side with their fellows. But these men are taken away from their county town to Fort George. I visited that place last autumn, and found that the men were treated in the most shocking manner. They were put in the casemates to sleep—foul, damp holes, not fit for dogs. There is a tendency to treat Scotland in the matter of barracks with parsimoniousness. If you want men to join the Army they must be properly housed and cared for. It was arranged the other day that the Rossshire Militia should go up for the annual training, not in the month of April, as formerly, but in the month of July—the very time that these men are engaged at the fishing. If they are taken away from the means of earning their livelihood, it spells starvation and misery for them and their families. They go to the east coast fishing in the spring and summer, and do not get back to their homes till the autumn. I am informed that the officer, for his own convenience, wants the men to be drilled in the month of July—the very time the men are absent at the fishing. Such want of thought and consideration for the people of the far north I cannot understand. Is it because they are so far removed from the capital? Highlanders ought to have every consideration from the War Office. Look at General Macdonald, the hero of Omdurman, look at Dargai, and many another field: Highland regiments are always in the forefronts I say that it is a, shame that any one officer should arrange for the drill of a whole regiment of Militia to suit his own convenience regardless of the men's interests. That is not the way to encourage enlistment. I should rejoice to see Highlanders join the Army. They are brave, sober men, and they should be taken care of. Since I am unable to go into details until the respective Votes are dealt with, I shall refrain from making any further observation on them. But these points I hope will be considered by the War Office. It is an unpleasant thing to come here and rate Ministers for neglecting the Highland people. But I say it is in the interest of the country and of the Army that every care and consideration should be given to these brave men who have done such noble deeds and rendered such noble service to their country. Until you give them more consideration, I tell the Government it is no use to send to the Highlands detachments of kilted men—fine fellows no doubt—to recruit. Highlanders will not be attracted by the skirl of the pipes or by banners and ribbons and fine talk. I am glad to say they are not to be captivated by a glass of whisky or a pot of beer like some of the men in the towns. They are not so foolish. Why the last detachment only got six recruits—

*MR. SPEAKER

I must call the attention of the House to the fact that the honourable Member is repeating the same arguments over and over again.

*MR. WEIR

I shall not proceed further. I only wanted to impress on the Government these two points about the barracks and the manner and expense of recruiting. I shall speak on the details when the Estimates come on.

On the return of Mr. SPEAKER after the usual interval,

*CAPTAIN NORTON (Newington, W.)

Mr. Speaker, as the remarks which I desire to make in connection with the Debate would perhaps be more appropriate in Committee of Supply, I waive my right to speak at the present moment.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

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1. ARMY ESTIMATES, 1899–1900. 14,789 words