§
Motion made, and Question proposed—
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £256,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1899, for a Grant in Aid of the Expenses of the British Protectorates in Uganda and in Central and East Africa.
§
Motion made—
That the Item A (Uganda, Grant in Aid), be reduced by £100:—(Sir Charles Dilke.)
§ *SIR C. DILKEI propose to move the reduction of the Vote of £197,000 as a grant in aid of Uganda by £100. A short time ago the honourable Baronet the Member for the Berwick Division and late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs alluded to our connection with Uganda, and stated that within the last few years British influence had gone to Uganda and had turned that country upside down. 701 Now, certainly it is the fact that six years ago the British East Africa Company found peace in Uganda, and at the present moment the position is what may be described as a pandemonium, and four different wars are going on in Uganda at the same time. There is a war with the old King Mwanga, who has returned to British territory from German territory; there is a., war with a Roman Catholic Chief called Gabriel; then there is a war carried on against the revolted Soudanese troops; and lastly, there is a war raging with Kabrega, the King of Unyoro. At the present moment we are free to face with this extraordinary disturbed condition of things in Uganda, and the result is that there is a great increase in the monetary Vote which we see in the Supplemenary Estimates now before us. The Vote of last year was already a very large one. The normal Vote for Uganda would be very considerable apart from the railway loan, but the Vote of last year has not been found sufficient, and we are now presented with this Supplementary Estimate. Now, in regard to the Foreign Office administration the question is a grave one. It is in consequence of the errors committed in Uganda. It is in consequence of trying to govern Uganda without a Civil Service composed of persons who know the native languages of the country. The Foreign Office, in conducting the affairs of Uganda, has relied on odds and ends of administrators picked up anywhere, in no way trained to administer such a country. And we were only saved from absolute disaster by the pluck, the spirit, and the energy of the young British officers whose services had been lent by the War Office. During the course of last year Ave have seen the military successes secured by these young British officers, and the immense resources displayed by them, but we have not seen the smallest dawn on the horizon of any permanent peace in Uganda, or of any real settling down in the country. Now the state of things which still prevails in Uganda—and I speak from personal communications with a good many persons who have been there, and I have seen letters from many others who are there—the state of things in the Unyoro side of the protectorate is almost inconceivable. The government is so loose, and there is 702 so little order in administration, that practically the hordes of people that we are obliged to employ on our side are entirely beyond our control. The young British soldiers employed there have shown pluck and resource, and have pulled us through, so far as military success in the field is concerned, but there is no approach to order or civilisation. I will mention one incident as a type of the kind of raiding which is occurring on the Unyoro Frontier. The people of Uganda, as the Committee are aware, are divided into three sections—the protestant section, the Roman Catholic section, and the Mohammedan section. The Protestant, Katikiro, as he is called—the Prime Minister of the Protestant side— the other day took over and signed a receipt for a thousand Unyoro women who were captured in one of our last raids in that neighbourhood. This took place in the presence of British officers, and shows how impossible it is for us to control these people. The pretence is set up that all the people who are slaves in Unyoro were originally persons taken from Uganda. That, I believe, is not the fact. I believe there have been raids from one side and the other, and that there are a good many prisoners on each side, but in this particular case I am informed that these people were raided and handed over to the stronger side. I do not think it will be possible for the Under Secretary to contend that the state of things in Uganda is satisfactory, and I doubt whether the right honourable Gentleman will be able to inform the Committee that there is any speedy prospect of restoration to anything like settled government. In the capital of Uganda no doubt we have been able to maintain a certain semblance of order, but on the Unyoro side we are without any hold on the country, and if we are to gain hold in the future it will have to be bought by a large expenditure of money, and by military expeditions. At the present moment the Foreign Office are mainly relying in Uganda upon the Baluch Regiment. That regiment has been much overworked, and I cannot believe that the Foreign Office are likely to be able to restore order in the whole of Uganda and Unyoro without resorting to larger military preparations. Now. Sir, I 703 should like to ask if the Foreign Office propose that this House shall accept the present state of affairs in Uganda and Unyoro as satisfactory or likely to become so, or whether they will undertake that an independent inquiry shall be held into the origin and present condition of affairs in these countries. There was comparative peace in Uganda and Unyoro before we got there, and the state of constant war which has prevailed there of late is to some extent of our own creation. The Foreign Office admit themselves that the Soudanese troops were left for a long time with insufficient pay, and this has been a contributory cause of these disturbances. I want to know whether the Foreign Office propose that some independent inquiry should take place into the condition of things in Uganda at the present time, as only such an inquiry can, I think, be satisfactory to this House. I do not mean an inquiry of the kind held in connection with the former disturbances, after Colonel Lugard's leaving, a report of which was never presented. I mean an independent inquiry of a kind which would be satisfactory to this House and to the country, and the nature of which would be laid before the House. This Vote includes something more than the military expenditure and the cost of the four wars in which, during the last year, we have been engaged; it includes the whole cost in the present year of the Martyr Expedition, which is going down the Nile in the direction of the Soudan. This is, therefore, the proper time for the Committee to ask the Foreign Office for some statement as to the nature and the intention of that Expedition. The Foreign Office last year misled us—I think we may say misled the House—with regard to the Macdonald Expedition. There was a separate Vote for that expedition, and I should not be in order in discussing it on this Vote, but I am referring to the fact that many of us think we were misled with regard to that expedition, as showing that it is necessary for us to scrutinise with some care another expedition of a similar kind. I presume the Macdonald Expedition was paid for out of the money voted last year, but the cost of the Martyr Expedition down the Nile is to be defrayed entirely from this Vote. This, 704 then, is the right opportunity for us to ask for information from the Government with regard to that expedition. AS I understand, four companies of the Soudanese troops who have remained loyal in Uganda—who have not risen in revolt—have been taken with the Martyr Expedition, which has the whole of the boats that were on the lake. The expedition is to proceed down the Nile to Fashoda by water, with the exception of trans-shipment round the cataracts. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has described to us the intention of the Government as being to control the waterway of the Nile, and I presume we shall be told that the object of the Martyr Expedition is to establish that control. Some of us would be very glad if we could obtain more information as to the real intention of this expedition. We know that on one bank of the Nile the Belgians are in possession under a lease. We have been told that the Belgians have journeyed some distance beyond the tract leased to them, and statements have been made that they have been in the neighbourhood of two places further in the direction of Khartoum than the tract in respect of which they possess a lease. What orders have the Martyr Expedition with reference to both banks of the Nile beyond the point where the leased territory ends? Are the Martyr Expedition to control the opposite bank of the Nile to that which has been leased to the Belgians? These are matters possessing special importance, from the declaration of the honourable Baronet, the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir E. Grey), that control of all portions of the Nile is essential to the welfare of Egypt, and he said the progress of science had shown that irrigation in these districts which the Martyr Expedition is traversing would affect the supply of water in Egypt. There is no river in the world which has so slight a fall as the Nile and its tributaries in the district of the Bahr-el-Ghazal. The country is flat beyond belief, and is absolutely soaked with water. The whole country at all periods of the year is one vast morass. How is it conceivable that any interference with the Nile or its tributaries can take place in the thousands of miles of morass which the Martyr Expedition is now 705 traversing? At all events, I think the House has some right to ask for some distinct statement from the Government as to tile objects, the direction, and the scale of the Martyr Expedition. We have not had one word of explanation up to now. We are left entirely to private letters from officers who desire that their names shall not be made known. Not one single word has been said by the Government with regard to the Martyr Expedition. The information which was given us last year with regard to the Macdonald Expedition was misleading, and I think the Committee are entitled, before passing this Vote, to receive a clear explanation from the Government as to the Martyr Expedition. I have been informed that one of the main objects of the Martyr Expedition is to increase the number of our troops in Uganda by recruiting Dinkas and Shilluks. These men are the most warlike tribes in that country, and if this is the object of the expedition I should have no fault to find with it; but the House ought not to be left to mere conjecture on this subject. We ought to have a full explanation from the Government, not only as to whether they will grant an inquiry into the disastrous state of things existing in Uganda and Unyoro, but also as to the objects of the Martyr Expedition. I beg to move the reduction of the first item of the Vote in reference to Uganda by £100.
§ COMMANDER BETHELL (York, E.R., Holderness)The right honourable Baronet who has just sat down has expressed the opinion that the House was misled last year with reference to the Macdonald Expedition. That expedition was broken up early in its career, and what it was ultimately intended for has never been disclosed; but I see no reason for supposing that the House has been misled. I, like my honourable Friend, should be very glad to know what the precise object of the Martyr Expedition is. We have had very little information on the subject, and there is practically none contained in the Blue Book. I do not see what object is served by keeping the Committee of the House of Commons in darkness about these expeditions. It would be absurd to deny that the state of Uganda has become very unsatis- 706 factory during the last two or three years, whether owing to the nature of the administration or the peculiar nature of the circumstances which have recently arisen. As I understand my right honourable Friend, he is rather disposed to attribute it to the administration which has been set up by the Foreign Office, who have not, as he thinks, got the proper material for undertaking such administration. I am inclined to think that whatever office had the task of exercising administration, the state of things could not, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, have been very much better. They have selected, so far as I can make out, very skilful officers, if we may judge from the results of the campaigns, which have been held. The blot on the administration seems to me to be that the head of the whole administration, Sir Arthur Hardinge, has really been too far away from the scene of operations to have a complete grasp of them. I think the representative of Sir Arthur Hardinge—the Administrator," I think he is called—cannot have the same sense of acute responsibility as he would have if he were the person in communication with the Foreign Office. It seems to me that a great mistake is made in keeping the ultimate authority in the hands of Sir Arthur Hardinge, and putting in Uganda an Administrator more or less under him. I think the mistake we are making in our African Protectorates is in not putting what the Committee may call big enough men, with ample power, to be responsible for their government. We have never been able in the history of this country to administer Colonies and Protectorates from Downing Street. You cannot do it. You never have done it, and assuredly you never will do it with success. We ought to select an able man for such a task, give him complete responsibility, general instructions, and very large powers. I think if that were done, peace and good rule would speedily prevail in Uganda. During the last three or four years honourable Members have spoken in this sense, and I think we may fairly say that the sense of the Committee of the House of Commons is very strongly in favour of the suggestion I have made, and I would urge my right honourable Friend 707 the Under Secretary to use his influence in getting it adopted. It is becoming more or less of a scandal that in a place like Uganda this sort of administration should go on from year to year, and I hope the Foreign Office will now buckle to the task, reform their system of administration, and see if the Protectorate of Uganda cannot be made as peaceful and as satisfactory as the other Protectorates which we have under our care.
§ SIR E. GREYPerhaps I might shorten matters if I added to the questions which have been already raised, one or two, or rather emphasised one or two, to which I would ask the right honourable Gentleman opposite to reply presently. With regard to what the honourable and gallant Member has said about some change in the administration of Uganda, I think we must all admit that the results hitherto in Uganda have not been satisfactory. I will come to the question of responsibility or of how far they were avoidable presently, but anyhow the results have been in themselves unfavourable. I am not quite are that I gather what change exactly the honourable and gallant Member wanted to introduce, whether government as a Crown Colony, with a Governor with larger powers, and, if so, what the nature of the Governor's powers would be. That point I must leave to be dealt with by the right honourable Gentleman opposite. I should like to join the right honourable Baronet who opened this discussion in inviting the right honourable Gentleman opposite to give us the largest amount of information that he can with regard to the Martyr Expedition. It is a subject on which there must be a legitimate desire that we should have as much information as can be given. But I was surprised to hear the statement that anything I have said previously could lead to the supposition that the Martyr Expedition was to be justified by the danger of that part of the Nile being taken for irrigation purposes, and so preventing Egypt from getting all the water she required. It is quite true that I stated there was danger of the water of the Upper Nile being taken for irrigation purposes, and thus depriving Egypt of the volume of 708 water necessary for her. But I was using that language as an argument for the expedition to Omdurman, and I was using it with special reference to the country which had been traversed between Omdurman and Egypt. When I made that point about irrigation I was not thinking of the Martyr Expedition at all. I went on to say that the frontiers between Egypt and British territory on the Nile Valley must be coterminous: but I did not use the question of irrigation with reference to that point at all. I held to that point—I hold to it—purely on political grounds. I think that if Egypt is to be at Omdurman or in the Nile Valley at any point—take any point you like—it is impossible for political views and for reasons of general convenience in connection with the trade and the control of the country generally that any other Power should intervene on the Upper Nile between Omdurman and Uganda. That undoubtedly, I think, is the case, but I think from all that' has happened that any danger of that taking place has now been removed; and I think that though in the end the two frontiers must be coterminous, the pace at which you may proceed with the development and occupation of that territory is now very much more at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government than it was before. Now, with regard to the state of Uganda before we came there. British influence did not go there for the first time when the late Government came into office. We found Uganda in a very disturbed state, and though I do not know what the historical annals of Uganda, had been before any British influence was there, I gather that, if there were any authentic records, it would be found that the state of the country was not very happy. Certainly, I say, Mwanga was a bad neighbour before we got there. He has been a source of disturbance since, and the record I have read of him is one of the worst of records. Well, Sir, in coming down to later times, and in coming down to these last records—which I have admitted to be painful reading—there is one thing, of course, which strikes all of us who have read these recent Blue Books, and that is the great gallantry of the young British officers, who have had to contend with great difficulties. I do not want to insist upon that point, which I am sure will be readily admitted by the 709 Committee, but I should like to read one sentence from the Blue Book, Africa, No. 7, 1898. This is with reference to one of the crises which Major Macdonald had to face. Mr. Wilson says in his report that at the Lubwa's Hill Battle—and owing to various causes, the fact has scarcely been appreciated until recently—
To oppose nearly six hundred regular and discharged troops, Major Macdonald had in the field only 17 Indians and 341 recently-armed Sohali porters.Sir, that is tremendous odds against which to contend, and you have to add to that that during a great part of these operations, in the crisis which was forced upon our force in Uganda, they had to lead hastily-raised and partially-trained troops, and in order to get them to fight at all, to expose themselves in the most courageous manner. I think we ought not to let this discussion pass without paying a full tribute to the gallantry and courage which have been shown—that strikes us so much in reading these reports. Of course, there is another thing which one feels all through. How is it that this struggle came to be so necessary? How is it it could not be avoided? How is it that there has been so much loss of money and so much bloodshed? Sir, it was not expected by the authorities on the spot. We in this House had never been led to expect that the state of affairs in Uganda was so critical that we should have to face such a large Supplementary Estimate as this for such a painful cause. The mutiny came upon the authorities in Uganda by surprise; it came upon us as a painful surprise. Now, Sir, I admit that responsibility and blame are not the same thing, but when one looks back at what the previous record of the Soudanese had been, when one reads the account given of them by Sir Gerald Portal and by Major Lugard, and other people who had been in Uganda, one cannot help feeling that the causes of this mutiny do require the strictest investigation; that it was not what we should have expected to happen if the Soudanese had been handled as Sir Gerald Portal and Major Lugard thought, apparently, they could be safely handled. Now, what have the causes been? It is on that point that I wish the right honourable Gentleman opposite to give us information. Last year, 710 of course, we asked for information, and we were told that an inquiry was being made. Well, Sir, that inquiry has been made, and we are still anxious to have authoritative information from the Government, who have the best sources of information, as to what the causes of the mutiny were. There appear to me to have been mainly three causes: First of all, that the pay of these Soudanese was much too small. Upon that I should like to know whether any representation was made by the officers on the spot as to how the pay the Soudanese were receiving compared with the pay which was being received by men in similar employment in neighbouring territory. I admit that you cannot hold the Foreign Office primarily responsible for discontent which exists, unless that discontent has been brought to their knowledge by the authorities on the spot. I should like to know whether the Foreign Office were informed by the authorities on the spot that the Soudanese were discontented with their pay, and whether strong representation was made by the authorities in Uganda that the pay should be increased. Well, Sir, then there was the fact that the pay was in arrears. I gather that this is to be accounted for by the fact that the Soudanese had to be paid in trade goods, and that the transport of goods from the coast is difficult, and was exceptionally disturbed, owing to the troubles between Uganda and the coast. The third cause was this, that these particular companies of Soudanese who began the mutiny had been overworked. There have been various suggestions as to who was to blame for that, but the fact remains that Major Macdonald—whom it is certainly not fair to blame for the overwork of the Soudanese, because whatever overwork took place was before he got there—was sent with instructions to go on a long and hazardous expedition, and to take certain companies of Soudanese with him. When he arrived in Uganda he found that certain companies of Soudanese had been told off to go with him upon this expedition, and these companies had been so overworked already that they were ready to mutiny when they were told that there was before them a still harder task probably than they had yet undergone. Now, Sir, these companies which were told off to go with Major Macdonald were appa- 711 rently the very companies of Soudanese who had been so hardly worked, and I hope that the right honourable Gentleman will be able to enlighten us as to how it came to be that these three particular companies of Soudanese who had had harder work than any of the other companies were particularly selected to go on this expedition. Of course, that point has not escaped Mr. Berkeley in the report he has made. He says—Major Turner's dispatches on the 9th July and subsequent dates indicate the difficult nature of the position he was in at this period, and there must necessarily have been various local considerations present to his mind in the difficulties he had to deal with, as to which I—that is, Mr. Berkeley—could only speculate, that made it desirable to call to so considerable, an extent on the services of Companies 4, 9, and 11.Here is the thing which, if it was not primarily the cause of the mutiny, was, at any rate, the exciting cause which at last drove the troops into open mutiny: and as to what brought it about, Mr. Berkeley says that he himself can only speculate upon the reasons which led to the services of these three particular companies being called upon to such an extent. Well, Sir, I suppose the Foreign Office must have had some information upon that point, and I am sure we should like to hear what their information is, as to what part the overwork of these three particular companies played in causing the mutiny, and whether that overwork could not have been avoided. And, Sir, with regard to the future, we are, of course, anxious to be assured that such measures are being taken as will prevent anything of the kind occurring in Uganda again. All the forecasts hitherto of what was likely to take place in Uganda have been, I think, too sanguine. For instance, on page 55, of the Blue Book, Africa, No. 7, Mr. Berkeley writes—this is in April—In these conditions it appears to me that no difficulty remains of a nature to prevent our devoting our main attention to domestic affairs, in so far as they have been disturbed by the recent crisis, with the reorganisation of the troops and their distribution to the best advantage, and to measures for the earliest possible relief of the forces belonging to the East Africa Protectorate.712 Well, Sir, I think that was far too sanguine an estimate of the state of things at that time: all that has happened since shows that that estimate was far too sanguine. We should like to know from the right honourable Gentleman opposite what more information he can give us beyond what is contained in the last Blue Books, especially what he can tell us about the mutiny amongst the Sohalis, which, I think, is the latest occurrence I have seen; and we should want him to assure us, first of all, that the Foreign Office has thoroughly investigated the cause of the mutiny which has taken place, and to state what measures are being taken to guarantee the Committee against any recurrence of these Votes. At present we are left in this condition, that we feel that what his taken place is most unsatisfactory, that we hesitate as to where the responsibility should be placed for what has happened, and that all the Estimates which have been put before us hitherto of what was likely to take place have been over-sanguine, so that we have little confidence as to whether these troubles are at an end. I would ask the right honourable Gentleman to do all he can to reassure us as to the future, and he can best do that, I think, by proving to us that the Foreign Office has thoroughly investigated and come to a clear and definite opinion about the causes of the trouble in the past.
§ MR. W. ALLEN (Newcastle-under-Lyme)Almost every Session for the last six years, I believe, there has been a Debate on Uganda, and we have been every year assured that the causes of the disturbances there were merely momentary, and that everything would go on eventually in a satisfactory way. The Government proceeded to make a railway there, and we were told that such a railway was the only thing needed to develop that great empire and to bring a great trade into Central Africa. Well, the Government got their Vote for this railway on these grounds, and now they are asking for this Vote on exactly the same ground that in future we shall do a great trade with Central Africa. It, seems to me that they are very much out is estimate on this occasion, and I think that the Government must have been very badly informed when they prepared their Estimate last year, for the 713 Supplementary. Vote which they are now asking for is actually more than the whole total of their Estimate which was laid before the House last year. Now, what is the meaning of this? It seems to me that the reason is, as was urged in a previous Debate to-night, that the Foreign Office is not the proper Department for dealing with these undeveloped States in Central Africa. They have not the men there who are capable of properly administering these countries, and of stating accurately what the condition of them is. I think this is shown by the fact that they were not even able to pay their troops an amount that was satisfactory to them, and practically by their action in this respect they brought on the revolt that has caused us a great deal of the trouble, and a great deal of this extra expenditure that the House is now asked to vote for. The late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said he did not know the state of affairs in Uganda, and he also said that the House did not know them; but surely it was the duty of the Government of the day, with their highly paid officials there, to have consulted them, for they are supposed to have a thorough knowledge of the administration in those districts. Surely it was their business to lay before this House a true representation of the state of affairs in Uganda and in Central Africa. They have failed to do so, and until they give some satisfactory answer to the questions that have been asked to-night by the right honourable Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, and by the right honourable Gentleman the late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, it does seem to me that the House should not vote these large sums of money for these wild districts and swampy marshes in Central Africa which, at the very best, are only speculative investments for this country.
§ *MR. BRODRICKI am rather astonished in connection with this matter, which so naturally engages the attention of the House, that we have not had a speech from the honourable Member for Northampton. The honourable Member for Northampton has been good enough, in the weekly journal which he directs, to make a most serious and most vehement attack upon the conduct of affairs in Uganda, and especially on the administration of the Uganda Railway.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREI rise to a point of order. Is the Uganda Railway included in this Vote? I should be delighted if it were, but I do not think it is.
TUB CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEESI do not think that any remarks upon the Uganda Railway would be in order.
§ *MR. BRODRICKI am sorry that I am out of order. I will, however, absolve the honourable Gentleman from the castigation which I was prepared to give him. That enables me to come at once to the more pertinent and direct attacks made by honourable Members, and more especially by the right honourable Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean. Now, in respect of that, let me say at once that, considering the amount of the Supplementary Estimate and considering also the whole of the circumstances of the Uganda Protectorate, I am not in the least surprised the right honourable Gentleman should have put this question before the Committee. Sir there is no doubt that the administration of Uganda has given cause in many quarters of the House for anxiety, but, looking at it now from the point of view at which we have arrived, and under the circumstances in which we are placed, I do not think that there is much cause for anxiety as to the present position of affairs. The Uganda Protectorate was in itself an enormous territory. I do not think that in any experiment which this country has made in the government of wild and uncivilised countries that there has been one in which the Government had less information and less precedents to rely upon than in the occupation of Uganda. I have heard very much said this evening about the inefficiency of the Foreign Office in conducting its administration, its incompetence, and its want of knowledge both in its administration and in the carrying on of warlike operations in Uganda. But, really, when we look at all the circumstances of Uganda, and when we look at other efforts that have taken place in Africa of a similar description, I am sure that at the present moment Uganda does not bear a very unfavourable comparison. Now, what are the other experiments which lie nearest to hand? Ton have neither looked at what has been done by the 715 British Government acting in some sort of way in the shape of influence, nor what has been done by British subjects. But whichever way you look at it—whether you look at the original operations in the Soudan in 1884, of which the right honourable Gentleman opposite will remember something; or if you look at the experiment made by the Chartered Company in Rhodesia; or if you look at the Congo State—you will find in all these cases, and especially in the last two, which are the nearest by way of comparison with Uganda, that there have been military operations, there have been rebellions, that there has been very lame expenditure of money, and that events have stopped the development of these provinces for a very considerable time. Even at this moment the Congo State is dealing with a mutiny which has led to the loss of a very considerable number of men, and also a very considerable number of officers. Therefore, what has happened in Uganda is not at all out of the common in Africa, and the question is whether all or any of these events were avoidable. I do not mean to trouble the Committee with any recapitulation of what was dealt with in the Debate which took place last year and the year before. I will come at once to the question of this mutiny. The right honourable Baronet opposite has asked me a very pertinent question about this mutiny. Among the causes given for the mutiny are that the pay was small and was in arrear; that there were constant expeditions which separated the men from their families; and that there were various other causes which made them feel that their duties were less pleasant and agreeable than they otherwise would have been. But there were other causes which, in the view of the Foreign Office, were the principal causes of this trouble. Honourable Gentlemen will recollect that a good many of these men had actually come from over the border, where there had previously been a great mutiny which was surrounded by the greatest possible difficulties, and represented a sort of disaffection which spread over nearly the whole of the troops in the district, and especially among those who took service under European nations. The general idea as to the primary cause is that a successful attempt might be made to overpower the European officers to what- 716 ever nation they belong. With regard to question of pay, I do not think there is any doubt that the pay was too small. But you cannot expect people on the spot to deal instantly with questions of pay, or to see at once the effect which a general rise in the scale of living may have on the particular men who have been engaged. Since these men were engaged a considerable rise in the value of human labour has taken place in that part of Africa. The construction of railway works has been pushed on, and a very considerable number of men have been engaged, some of them on very good terms. Again, we were not the only nation who were employing troops, and I think that had matters gone on for a very short time longer, we should no doubt have received reports in the direction which the right honourable Baronet has indicated from our officers with regard to the pay of the troops. Well, as far as I can make cut, no representations of that character had reached us at the time. There had been representations and suggestions made as to the organisation of the troops, and there have been some suggestions made as to the desirability of increasing the number of officers, which have since been carried into effect. I cannot, however, trace any representations of the character alluded to. But what is a far more serious matter than this question of pay were three subjects, each of which, undoubtedly, influenced these men very much in their conduct. The first was that the pay was not receivable in the particular kind which they desired. It-was no use giving them a cheque or money. All they wanted was trade goods, which, however, could not be brought up, as the transport had broken down, because the loss of animals had been so enormous, and the contract had entirely broken down. I think it is very doubtful whether it would have been expected, under any Administration, that these difficulties could have been got over. Then there was another difficulty, and that was the separation of the troops from their families. These men have been in the habit, as many African troops are, of taking their families with them wherever they went, and this matter, looked at from a military point of view, was very inconvenient. I believe that some of them cared very little whether they were accompanied by a wife or some 717 member of the family to carry their household goods, but some of them who had wives preferred to have a camp follower. Well, now, I don't think these people had any cause to complain. Major Macdonald met them, and conferred with them. He asked them what they would desire, and whether it was their wish that their wives and families should proceed with them to a certain point, so long as they could be maintained with safety? Ho also offered that, if they came forward, he would keep them, which was no part of the contract. But, so far as I can judge, there was already a mutinous spirit abroad, and what was said by Major Macdonald to the officers and non-commissioned officers was not properly reported to the soldiers. Of course, this misunderstanding went a long way towards disturbing them. Then there is the question of overwork. I daresay the Committee will bear with me for a few moments upon this question of overwork. No doubt these men were overworked, and they were overworked for this reason, that, since the expedition of Major Macdonald had been ordered from home trouble had broken out in the district with which these very officers were connected. There is no doubt that these men were very hard worked, and if there had been a telegraph by which they could have communicated with the authorities at home, and if we had been told that these men had been engaged on other expeditions, it is extremely likely that different arrangements would have been made to deal with them. Rut having regard to the enormous distance at which these events have occurred, the only thing which we could do was to leave the matter in the hands of the local authorities. In this case, as throughout all these troubles in Uganda, I cannot speak too highly of the way in which the local authorities have done their best to endeavour to meet the necessities of the case, and in all these troubles, which were unforeseen, we have no ground whatever for casting am- blame on the local administration. I do not think that any of these men, troublesome as they have been, have, in any case, blamed the local administration for what took place. We cannot foresee these outbreaks, and we cannot foresee a mutiny. The only thing that has boon done is that, undoubtedly, a considerable sum of money 718 has been spent in quelling this mutiny. VV e have been asked by the right honourable Gentleman opposite if we can now look forward with certainty to a quieter state of things? It is very difficult to prophesy with regard to Uganda. We can only act on the advice of the officers there, who believe that the country is at this moment very largely quieted down. But, undoubtedly, until the remainder of these Soudanese troops—some of whom are still at large—are completely disbanded and broken up, we may expect to hear of such attacks as that which Lieutenant Hannington was subjected to, and which took place the other day. I think the war in which Lieutenant Hannington, himself desperately wounded, managed to pull the Indian troops through, and the way in which those troops behaved when suddenly attacked by a very much superior force, and exposed to a heavy fire, was extremely gratifying, and deserves the highest praise. Well now, Sir, with regard to the general position. I have been asked to make some statement with regard to Colonel Martyr's expedition. I do not quite understand what the honourable and gallant Member for Holderness means when he speaks of "keeping the House in the dark." There has been laid on the fable, in "Africa, No. 2," the exact orders and instructions which were given to Major Macdonald, as lie then was, as regards the expedition which he undertook. It was extremely desirable that we should know not only the source of the Juba, but also that we should know the attitude of the tribes in that district. But although Major Macdonald's expedition was hampered by the mutiny, it did some very useful work. This expedition was not permanent, and Colonel Macdonald's mission may be considered to be closed. On the other hand, Colonel Martyr has gone further north, and his expedition has a very definite object. It has to explore, and, if possible, plant posts on the right bank of the Nile, connecting Uganda with the territory to which Lord Kitchener's troops have either penetrated or have nearly penetrated. It is intended that he shall ultimately join hands with Lord Kitchener, and that he should ascertain and occupy the territory to which by treaty we are entitled, and which con- 719 nects Uganda and the source of the Nile with the valley of the Nile. Colonel Martyr has already made very considerable progress, and the last we heard from him was by a telegram on January 23rd. I do not think it is very likely that we shall advance much further for the present, although it is not probable that there is much distance between him and Lord Kitchener, lie has, however, made very considerable and useful progress, and was forced to cross to the left bank of the Nile for a short time. But this is simply owing to the fact that at that time of the year the right bank of the Nile is, to some extent* under water. But, Sir, apart from Colonel Martyr's expedition, the view of the Government with regard to Uganda and with regard to this East African Protectorate is that until the completion of the railway it is not desirable either to occupy or to attempt to administer territories not hitherto occupied or administered. We do not desire in any way to increase the responsibilities which we have incurred for the moment, although it is reasonable, of course, that we should secure those tribes over whom we have obtained administration from any attack; but we thoroughly realise that any attempt I o establish administrative rule over a part of Africa three times as large as France, and support it by an adequate military force, is one which must be a question of time and opportunity, and we do not intend at this moment to push outposts in every direction, but to rest, as it were, upon what has been acquired, and fortify, so to speak, our position. I say this, that in the course of last year we have undoubtedly had, both in the Eastern territory and also on the North and West, to put down very considerable and formidable risings, and we have had to establish our authority with a certain amount of military force, and partly in consequence we have to ask now for this Supplementary Vote of £197,000 in Uganda. We have spent £175,000 of this total in relief of the mutiny which has taken place. I think the House will recognise that we have not been backward in the efforts we have made in this part of Africa. One point on which the Committee should fix its mind is that, as far as I know, up to the present, 720 the whole expenditure which has been incurred in Uganda has not been anything in excess of what the House was led to expect at the time when Uganda was first occupied. Without attempting to prophesy, I may say that there is undoubtedly a strong conviction on the spot that the time is not far distant when Uganda will pay its way, for the revenue even within the last three months has risen considerably. The amount of goods that are now being sent along the line is some indication of what we may expect to see in the future. At the same time elements of danger in the future are certainly not uncommon, but what I do earnestly hope is that we may realise our expectations. It may be that by employing rather a larger force and by attempting rather less we might-have avoided some of the difficulties last year. If that had been so we should have been a great deal wiser than any of those who are now attempting to govern similar provinces. In almost every case there has been the same difficulty, and naturally there is a desire not to start these Protectorates with an enormous military force. My honourable Friend was under, I think, the misapprehension that the administration in Uganda was hampered by its dependence on home authority.
§ COMMANDER BETHELLI quoted from the last Blue Book.
§ *MR. BRODRICKIt has been said that these administrators are very much tied by leading strings from Downing Street, but I should have thought, on the contrary, we should have had complaints from the opposite benches of the exaggerated powers given to those administrators. I think that, although in all matters of estimate as to the number of troops, and also as to the positions which we are to occupy, control must be exercised from home; I do not think honourable Members will be able to trace in all these questions, either 721 of rebellion or mutiny, that a single reference has been made at Downing Street as to what should be undertaken or as to what operations should next be made. I think, on the contrary, that the fullest responsibility has been given to those who administered those Protectorates, and I think that is a very salutary thing, and the only possible way of doing this work. You must trust the men on the spot, especially when it is a long way from the telegraph. I hope that the Committee will not suppose for a single moment that I am throwing on them the responsibility for any of these misfortunes. These seem to me to be incidental to African ventures, and, looking at the matter on general grounds, they could not have been averted. But I do not think that you can fix on any individual—at least, on these distinguished officers Mr. Berkeley and Major Macdonald—the responsibility for the mutiny which has occurred. I believe that all the officials in Uganda are thoroughly alive to the necessity of economising their forces, and also of acting with a due regard to the public purse. Although it is dangerous to prophesy, I cannot help thinking that we have turned the corner in Uganda, and experience has been gained by what has occurred in the past. As far as the military problem is concerned, we have acted, from first to last, in the closest possible touch with the War Office, who have advised on every single point, and who are responsible, to a large extent, for the action that has been taken, and the decisions which have been come to. If there is any other point on which the Committee desire information we are perfectly willing to give it. We have nothing whatever to conceal. We have gone on steadily forward from the first in the same direction, and, unless the results this year are very different from those which we anticipated, I think we shall have a very good report to make next year to the House of Commons. It will be a year of steady spreading out of our influence, of drawing together the various threads, of causing a subsi- 722 dence of all these difficulties. There are just now no disturbing elements. At the same time, our information is never full to the latest date, and if at times we are unable to give all the information which you should desire, it is not because tin Government is unwilling to give it, but because the circumstances of the case make it impossible to us.
§ *MR. MCKENNA (Monmouth)The argument of the right honourable Gentleman appears to me to amount to this—he admits everything, he pleads extenuating circumstances, and says the Congo State is worse. We are not concerned to answer for the mistakes that have been made in the Congo. For my part, I think that the Government of the Congo is as bad as it can be, and it ought not to be held up to us as an example that should be followed. The right honourable Gentleman has not made any answer to the honourable Member for Holder-ness as to the desirability of sending out representatives with more considerable powers than they seem to have had, and with more adequate means. It is true that the honourable Gentleman said that more adequate means will add something to the cost. Well, we ought to know what the cost of Uganda has been. I believe it is not the administration which is so costly, but the defects in the administration. In 1895 the cost was £49,000, in 1896 it was £49,000, but in 1897–8 it rose to £89,000 on account of the first outbreak of the war, and in 1898–9 it has amounted to £339,000; so that we have from these figures, normal expenditure £49,000, war expenditure £290,000. My submission is that, if we had undertaken a proper administration of Uganda, we would not have been liable to the charges for these wars. I entirely agree that the fault does not lie with any individual soldier. Every man in Uganda acquitted himself to the utmost of his ability, and did his work remarkably well. But they have not had sufficient means placed at their disposal. If you read the correspondence, and listen to what our officers say, it will be found that they had not a sufficient force at their command, that there were 723 on proper means of obtaining information, and that there were no proper means of resistance when the outbreak took place. Again and again in the correspondence the phrase is used, "I do not anticipate any further trouble." But what were the means allowed to our representatives for putting down the rebellion and mutiny? We find that they were so inadequate that Major Macdonald had to press the missionaries into the service, not as hospital attendants and interpreters, but as soldiers, and one of them, Mr. Pilkington, met with a most lamentable death. Now, with all our resources and magnificent intentions regarding this new African Empire, surely it is our duty to send to our representatives there the means of carrying out a proper administration, and, if we did so, we should have less to pay in the long run.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)I gather from the speech of the honourable Gentleman that he is not one of those who believe generally in the occupation of Uganda.
§ *MR. McKENNANo.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI am glad to hear it. No doubt mistakes have been made. And the principal mistake made is the mistake only too common in the initiation of great Imperial enterprises by this country—the mistake, namely, of underrating the work to be done, and of sending too small a force. But I do not see that you can charge that against the War Office or the Foreign Office more than against any other department. I do not believe tint the Colonial Office could have administered Uganda any better than the Foreign Office. I believe, with the honourable Gentleman behind me, that thy question of administration is really a question of the man whom you put in control. I think there has been a mistake at first in not putting a man of sufficient position and experience and strength in the conduct of affairs at the head of this great Protectorate. But, after all, I think that this possession, this country, will be regarded in the 724 future as well worth the sacrifices that have been made, because undoubtedly it is the key to Africa. We ought to remember that it is greatly to the credit of Lord Rosebery that this undertaking was due to him. A point which was exceedingly satisfactory in the course of the Debate is the spirit which permeated the speeches of honourable Members. In all, or almost all, at any rate,, there was a general recognition of the fact that the control of the Nile is absolutely necessary to the safety of Egypt, and, of course, that has a bearing on the Uganda question, because, as the honourable Baronet said earlier in the evening, the British dominion must be practically coterminous with the dominion of Egypt. As long as that policy remains the policy of this country, Egypt must be safe, and our dominion complete. It is only lately that this view has prevailed, for I remember that 14 years ago I vainly attempted to persuade Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House of its importance. I venture to say that Uganda is well worth all the sacrifices that have been made, and I agree with my right honourable Friend who represents the Foreign Office in this House that comparing the mistakes made in Uganda, and the sacrifices incurred, the net result of our administration in Uganda does not contrast unfavourably with our administration in other regions of Africa.
§ MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)I had not the least intention of taking part in this Debate, but the right honourable Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the course of his speech, attacked me because I had not spoken. Well, I do not know that I am obliged to speak every time that there is a Debate on Uganda, but as the right honourable Gentleman insists on my speaking, I shall take the liberty of making a few remarks. At the same time, I apologise to the House, for as I have so often spoken in the House on the question silence might have been more sweet than talking. But the right honourable Gentleman speaks as the representative of the Bench opposite, and it 725 appears that the Front Bench insist on my speaking. Now, the right honourable Gentleman has attempted to defend the Foreign Office, but I believe that if the Foreign Office were composed of angels instead of clerks they would in all probability not be able to manage this difficult job. The real fault is that they have attempted to do the whole thing on the cheap. I have not the slightest doubt that when they wanted more money and went to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to get the money, he told them that he would have to present a very bad Budget to the House, and that they must do without the money, as he could not spare it. It is rather the habit of honourable Members on the Benches opposite to swagger about the world as to having laid hold of Uganda, and other parts of Africa and elsewhere, but when it comes to paying for it they know well that the English public, being a practical people, would sooner have a pot of beer all round than become possessed of the whole Empire of Socoto. Many reasons have been given for the conduct of the black troops which rebelled. The Soudanese rebelled because they are some of the most unmitigated scoundrels on the face of the globe. I have read Emin Pasha's book; and I see an honourable Gentleman opposite who knows more of that country than any other man, and I am sure he will bear me out that the Soudanese are a most thoroughly disreputable and unreliable set of men. In taking over these Soudanese we did a most foolish thing. When you are in a barbarous country, and want to give the inhabitants the benefits of civilisation, it is the worst thing possible to do that by means of Soudanese mercenaries. The right honourable Gentleman said that the reason why these Soudanese mutinied was that they did not get what they wanted; that they did not want cash as pay, but goods. But they wanted some thing besides goods; they wanted women. These people carry their women about with them, and that is the reason why their families are so large I am told that there are 60 Soudanese in a company, and that for every company there are 500 women and children, whom they insist on taking about with them 726 always. I regard the whole business of Uganda as an object lesson against our interfering in those tropical countries of Africa. The honourable Baronet the Member for Forest of Dean has pointed out how the Chartered Company shunted the whole business on to us. We took it over, and ever since that there has been a long succession of wars, and what we wanted now was to get possession of great possessions beyond Uganda. We defeated Kabarega, who was said to be a bad neighbour. You may depend upon it that go where you will in Central Africa you will have an exceedingly bad neighbour; and if you go on saying "because I have a bad neighbour I will take all his country that I possibly can get," then we must have expeditions right on to the head waters of the Nile, and use Soudanese troops in these expeditions. But I understand these Soudanese are family men and did not wish to be started off to look for the sources of the Juba River. Therefore, they decided not to go. The reason why we have rebellions in Uganda is because the Ugandese have patriotism which we think is confined to Englishmen. They like their independence, they have a Government—it may be a bad Government, but they want it. They want to be Ugandese, and to remain without our interfering with them. Then there was Mwanga, who had alternately been a Pagan, a Roman Catholic, a Mohamedan, and a Protestant. He boxed the compass in religions just as it suited' him. At one time Mwanga was put forward as one of the noblest of the human, race. That was when he was with us. But when he turned against us, he became the most perfect scoundrel in the world. You must remember when you are talking of this rebellion that you must not put it all on to the Soudanese. You have got besides big rebellions at Unyoro and other districts. Then, in regard to Major Macdonald's expedition, the right honourable Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs said the object of that expedition was to find the sources of the Juba River. Why should we, being in Uganda, go to find the sources: of the Juba River? What was the use of employing troops which we had for 727 the protection of Uganda in going on an exploratory expedition? It is not surprising that there should be a mutiny amongst the troops after they had started on this unknown exploration. But, says the right honourable Gentleman, we sent these men in search of the Juba River in order to fulfil an engagement with Italy. That I cannot understand.
§ *MR. BRODRICKWhat I said was that the Juba River was between our own and the Italian sphere of influence, and that it was extremely desirable that the sources should be properly mapped on that account.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREHere you make a frontier; a river is to be the frontier, and you send an expedition to see whether such a river exists! That is the sort of thing I complain of. Then we have the Martyr Expedition, which went to occupy territory we did not know the value of. Nobody had ever been there, but we came to the conclusion that it was a desirable thing to seize the territory between Uganda and Sobat, and we sent Major Martyr with a number of these Soudanese and all their families in order to make a march through that unknown territory. Major Martyr had four companies with him of 60 men each, and yet he was to occupy the whole of that country, to annex it, to place posts, and come out at Sobat, hundreds of miles away, in order to aid Lord Kitchener! That is simply going mad. It is the most ridiculous proposal ever made in the whole world. But the right honourable Gentleman defends this most ridiculous proposal. He says we are not going to occupy or administer the country until the railroad is made. Well, if so, what in the name of Heaven are we doing there? We sent out a few men whom we admit are not sufficient to occupy the country and run up the expenditure from £49,000 a year to £339,000, and yet we are not to administer it until the railroad is made, which may not be for seven or eight years. Heaven knows what we are going to spend when we do occupy and administer the country if we are spending £339,000 while we are marking time.
§ *MR. BRODRICKWe are doing more than marking time; we are occupying the territory which has already been taken up and establishing posts.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREThe right honourable Gentleman has told us that the Soudanese are being sent to occupy new territory and establish new posts in the territory, and when I complain of this the right honourable Gentleman says, "We are only marking time till the railroad is completed." The right honourable Gentleman positively contradicts himself. The right honourable Gentleman tells us, "Let us hope that the thing will turn out well," and that a very great deal of merchandise is already going over that portion of the railroad which is made, and that the revenue is increasing. Would he have us believe that the Ugandese are paying for goods which have been carried 200 miles by railroad and the rest of the way on the backs of carriers? I want to see some return for this £339,000. Another curious statement was that when the conduct of the Foreign Office is complained of the right honourable Gentleman says, "We at the Foreign Office are not responsible, for we leave everything to the people in the country." Very well, but what then is the good of the Foreign Office? What authority have they over these men in Uganda? That is one of the things I complain of. We say that there ought to be an able man, but this able man ought to be under the control of the Foreign Office. And then the right honourable Gentleman shirks the responsibility of the Foreign Office by saying, "We don't meddle with them." The right honourable Gentleman threw out the hint that if we wanted to attack anybody in England we ought to attack the War Office. The War Office will be obliged to him, I am sure; but we find the Vote under the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office cannot evade the responsibility. Things have gone exceedingly bad for them; money wasted and squandered in the most reckless way; and as it comes under the Foreign Office Vote it is the Foreign Office we ought to attack. The right honourable Gentleman hopes we have turned the corner. 729 How? You have got a few Soudanese there, but most of them are at the Juba River. You have got one Indian regiment, but I do not know whether you have any Sikhs there at present. I think they have returned to the coast. You have got some local levies and some Zanzibar porters, who are armed. Well, this is a country three times as large at France, and I ask, is it probable that these people, smarting under grievances, are to be held in check by Soudanese whom you cannot trust? And yet the Government deliberately go on in this way on the cheap. But still, if you do go there, and if you do spend our money, surely it is ridiculous to put yourself in a position in which there must be rebellions without having yourself the troops to quell them, and going on adding every year a vast sum of money to the taxes which is absolutely wasted, and might as well be thrown into the sea. What have you to show for this £339,000 which has been spent? Why, Uganda is in a worse state than it was before the money was expended. Therefore, I entirely concur with my right honourable Friend who has moved a reduction of this Vote by £100, but I should have been more contented if he had moved for the reduction of the whole amount. No doubt this Vote will be supported by a solid phalanx of Conservatives on the other side, but this protest we must make. I now apologise to you, Mr. Lowther, for detaining the Committee so long, but the responsibility for my doing so rests entirely with the right honourable Gentleman opposite.
§ *MR. H. M. STANLEY (Lambeth, N.)Mr. Lowther, I must admire your courtesy, and the way in which you have given such a large amount of latitude to almost everybody who has spoken about Uganda or about the railway. You have been so very courteous to the other honourable Members that I hope you will allow me just five seconds' time in order to explode that ridiculous statement which has been so often made here in regard to the Congo State. I will do it in one sentence, and say that there is not one word of truth, not one solid fact, to bear out the statement that the administration of the 730 Congo has been either disastrous or one of evil example. The Uganda expenses have been referred to, and the honourable Member opposite has stated that they' have at last come to a very large figure indeed. But the honourable Member opposite and the honourable Members behind him seem to have forgotten that it was their own Party that took over the control of British East Africa and Uganda from the Chartered Company, into whose hands Lord Salisbury had placed it. They seem also to have forgotten that it was their Party who first introduced the subject of the railway to Uganda. I myself do not blame them for the latter course, but I do blame them for the precipitation with which they took British East Africa and Uganda out of the hands of the Chartered Company.
§ SIR E. GREYThe British East Africa. Company themselves gave notice that they would give them up.
§ *MR. H. M. STANLEYIf the right honourable Baronet will permit mo to say so, I know a great deal more about this subject than per haps the right honourable Baronet thinks, for I was present when the letter from Lord Rosebery was delivered to the Chairman of the British East Africa Company; it was read to me first, of all men living, and I know that Lord Rose bery asked Sir W. Mackinnon how much' money he would require per annum to administer Uganda. Sir W. Mackinnon's answer was "£50,000." I waited till the second letter came from, the Foreign Office, and that was read to me as well, and it said, "I am sorry that I cannot give you £50,000." And now where are you? Why, you are ready to give half a million if necessary, and we knew that would come. It seems to me that Gentlemen opposite should bear in mind this part of their African policy. It has just been stated here that a country like ours, with all our magnificent resources, a country with our command of men cannot keep Uganda in order, and cannot make that railway as it ought to be made. Now, on this subject I would just like to say one little thing, and that is, that people who live in glass houses should not throw 731 stones. That little State just mentioned has finished its railway at a much more rapid rate than will be the ease with the Uganda Railway; in fact, I cannot congratulate the Government upon the way in which they are proceeding with this railway.
*THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEESI have already ruled that the subject of this railway cannot be discussed here, because no money is being asked for it.
§ *MR. H. M. STANLEYI will not transgress your ruling further, but, as the railway leads to Uganda, I naturally inferred that I might be able to arrive at Uganda in an intelligent kind of way. My honourable Friend opposite, the Member for Northampton, says that Uganda is a question of money, and my honourable Friend down below me here says it is a question of men. Now, there are a few things to be taken into consideration in dealing with a country like Uganda, which is so far removed from the sea, and which is generally so inaccessible. No expedition goes to Africa without it takes a very large amount of supplies in order to feed its people for two or three years, as the case may be, or, at least, for a sufficient period of time to take them to some point where they can refresh themselves and renew their supplies. It seems to me that you have forgotten to take into consideration the fact that almost as fast as a certain number of porters can carry goods those goods would be consumed by the needs of the soldiers, and to supply the necessities of life you would require a very large reserve. Now, Sir, it is no wonder to me that the soldiers in Uganda became discontented. The country was warned at the time that the men who had been brought to Uganda were a very discontented set, and were a rebellious set, given to political agitation and disturbance, and fond of looting, and yet, notwithstanding this, they were taken to Uganda. But still, if some consideration had been given to the feelings of these people, they might have turned out good men. Unfortunately, circumstances prevented them 732 from being treated as we should like to see them treated. Their white commanders falling sick were advised to return home, and new officers unacquainted with the men were brought to the front. In the next place, when you should have given them some little liberality in the shape of increase of pay or increase in kind you found that you had not the means. Then, on account of the rebellion of Mwanga and others, a good deal of hard work was, imposed on the Soudanese, and the forced travelling, lasting for several months, brought on much illness and suffering. Finally they were sent to meet Major Macdonald, in order to be taken to some region which they had never heard of. I will not dwell on that, but say that there is no reason in the world why Uganda should remain long dissatisfied if you can only settle the question as regards these rebellious Soudanese. I think, at any rate, that most honourable Members in this House will agree with the right honourable Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs that we have now turned the corner as regards Uganda, and that in the future, if our highway of communication is again threatened, and necessity should arise, we shall be in a position to meet that necessity properly. In the meantime, I think the forces in Uganda should be kept in sufficiently large numbers to deal with such necessities as native risings in Uganda, mutinies, or interference from the neighbouring tribes—perhaps some flying body of dervishes trying to enter the country. If you had a real good force, such as the neighbouring State for instance has, you might very likely be able to keep Uganda in order, and satisfy honourable Gentlemen opposite that Uganda was advancing like other countries on the road towards prosperity My honourable Friend the Member for Northampton, after protesting against this expenditure in Uganda, has apologised for the frequency of his speeches. I quite agree with him that he rises too often to speak about a country of which he knows comparatively nothing, but for the satis- 733 faction of my honourable Friend I would just like to say that if I look into other parts of Africa, I find that certain countries are making a very good thing out of their trade with Africa, and I have no doubt that in time we also shall be able to do the same thing with Uganda. Commercial companies in the Congo State, and the Congo railway, are making immense profits, and I do not see why traders in Uganda should not find trading profitable. When I was in Australia some four years ago a very large deputation came to me to ask what were the prospects of trade in Uganda and East Africa, and what was the possibility of commerce there. This deputation represented some 1,500 squatters who desired to emigrate to that part of the world. I advised them not to think of moving at present, but that by-and-by, when things were more settled and the railway laid down, I should be able to advise them when it was time for them to start.
§ Well, I think that before another Session is over we shall be able to tell those good people in Australia that they may go there, and possibly two or three Sessions later be able to show a good report of the progress that has been made in Uganda in the meantime, I think that by the exercise of a little patience and perseverance, and a little prudence in retaining a sufficient number of troops in Uganda, there need be no cause to fear the ultimate progress of the country. I am sorry that I was not courageous enough to rise to my feet on Friday night, because I had a very large amount of information to give to the right honourable Baronet over there, and also to the right honourable Gentleman the Member for Montrose, in regard to the Nile, but I hope I shall have an oportunity of doing so some other time.
§
Question put—
That Item A (Uganda, Grant in Aid) be reduced by £100."—(Sir C. Dilke.)
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes 66; Noes 185.—(Division List No. 22.)
735| AYES. | ||
| Allen, W.(Newc.-under-Lyme) | Jacoby, James Alfred | Schwann, Charles E. |
| Allison, Robert Andrew | Kearley, Hudson E. | Scott, C. Prestwich (Leigh) |
| Atherldey-Jones, L. | Kilbride, Denis | Soames, Arthur Wellesley |
| Austin, Sir John (Yorkshire) | Labouchere, Henry | Souttar, Robinson |
| Billson, Alfred | Lambert, George | Stanhope, Hon. Philip J. |
| Bolton, Thomas Dolling | Lawson, Sir W. (Cumberland) | Steadman, William Charles |
| Burt, Thomas | Leng, Sir John | Strachey, Edward |
| Caldwell, James | Logan, John William | Sullivan, Donal (Westmeath) |
| Cawley, Frederick | Lough, Thomas | Thomas, David A. (Merthyr) |
| Channing, Francis Allston | Macaleese, Daniel | Walton, Joseph (Barnsley) |
| Clough, Walter Owen | MacNeill, J. Gordon Swift | Warner, Thomas Courtenay T. |
| Colville, John | M'Cartan, Michael | Wedderburn, Sir William |
| Commins, Andrew | M'Ghee, Richard | Weir, James Galloway |
| Daly, James | Mendl, Sigismund Ferdinand | Whittaker, Thomas Palmer |
| Dalziel, James Henry | Monckton, Edward Philip | Williams, J. Carvoll (Notts.) |
| Davitt, Michael | Morley, Chas. (Breconshire) | Wills, Sir William Henry |
| Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles | Norton, Capt. Cecil William | Wilson, Fredk. W. (Norfolk) |
| Dillon, John | Nussey, Thomas Willans | Woodhouse, Sir J. T. (Huddersf' |
| Duckworth, James | O'Connor, T. P. (Liverpool) | Yoxall, James Henry |
| Goddard, Daniel Ford | Palmer, Sir C. M. (Durham) | |
| Hayne, Rt. Hon. C. Seale- | Pickersgill, Edward Hare | TELLERS FOR THE AYES— |
| Hedderwick, Thomas C. H. | Power, Patrick Joseph | Mr. M'Kenna and Mr. Thomas Bayley |
| Holland, W. H. (York, W.R.) | Provand, Andrew Dryburgh | |
| Hutton, Alfred E. (Morley) | Samuel, J. (Stockton-on-Tees) | |
| NOES. | ||
| Archdale, Edward Mervyn | Barnes, Frederic Gorell | Blundell, Colonel Henry |
| Ashmead-Bartlett, Sir Ellis | Barry, RtHnA.H.Smith-(Hunts) | Bond, Edward |
| Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John | Bartley, George C. T. | Bousfield, William Robert |
| Bagot, Capt. J. FitzRoy | Barton, Dunbar Plunket | Bowies, T. G. (King's Lynn) |
| Baird, J. George Alexander | Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir M. H. (Bristol) | Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John |
| Balcarres, Lord | Beckett, Ernest William | Butcher, John George |
| Balfour,Rt.Hn.A.J. (Manch'r) | Bethell, Commander | Carlile, William Walter |
| Balfour, Rt. Hn. G. W. (Leeds) | Bigwood, James | Cavendish, R. F. (N. Lancs.) |
| Banbury, Frederick George | Bill, Charles | Cavendish, V.C.W.(Derbysh.) |
| Cecil, Evelyn (Hertford, E.) | Gretton, John | Penn, John |
| Cecil, Lord H. (Greenwich) | Gull, Sir Cameron | Phillpotts, Captain Arthur |
| Chaloner, Captain R. G. W. | Hall, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles | Pollock, Harry Frederick |
| Chamberlain, J. A. (Worc'r) | Hamilton, Rt. Hon. Lord Geo. | Powell, Sir Francis Sharp |
| Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry | Hanbury, Rt. Hon. R. W. | Pryce-Jones, Lt.-Col. Edw. |
| Charrington, Spencer | Hare, Thomas Leigh | Purvis, Robert |
| Chelsea, Viscount | Haslett, Sir James Horner | Pym, C. Guy |
| Clare, Octavius Leigh | Hatch, E. Frederick Geo. | Rasch, Major Frederic Carne |
| Coghill, Douglas Harry | Heath, James | Rentoul, James Alexander |
| Cohen, Benjamin Louis | Henderson, Alexander | Richardson, Sir T. (Hartlep'l) |
| Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse | Hermon-Hodge, R. Trotter | Ritchie, Rt. Hon. C. Thomson |
| Cook, Fred. Lucas (Lambeth) | Hoare, E. Brodie (Hampstead) | Robertson, Herbert (Hackney) |
| Cooke, C. W. R. (Hereford) | Hoare, Samuel (Norwich) | Rothschild, Hon. Lionel W. |
| Cornwallis, Fiennes S. W. | Hobhouse, Henry | Round, James |
| Cripps, Charles Alfred | Howell, William Tudor | Russell, Gen.F.S.(Cheltenham) |
| Cross, Alexander (Glasgow) | Hozier, Hon. J. H. Cecil | Rutherford, John |
| Cross, H. Shepherd (Bolton) | Hubbard, Hon Evelyn | Savory, Sir Joseph |
| Curzon, Viscount | Jeffreys, Arthur Frederick | Scott, Sir S. (Marylebone, W.) |
| Dalbiac, Colonel Philip Hugh | Johnston, William (Belfast) | Sharpe, William Edward T. |
| Dalrymple, Sir Charles | Kemp, George | Sidebottom, William (Derbysh. |
| Davenport, W. Bromley- | Kennaway, Rt. Hon. Sir J. H. | Simeon, Sir Barrington |
| Denny, Colonel | Kenyon, James | Sinclair, Louis (Romford) |
| Dickson-Poynder, Sir John P. | Kenyon-Slaney, Col. William | Skewes-Cox, Thomas |
| Disraeli, Coningsby Ralph | King, Sir Henry Seymour | Smith, J. Parker (Lanarks.) |
| Donkin, Richard Sim | Knowles, Lees | Smith, Hn. W. F. D. (Strand) |
| Doughty, George | Lafone, Alfred | Stanley, Henry M. (Lambeth) |
| Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers- | Laurie, Lieut.-General | Stanley, Lord (Lancs.) |
| Douglas-Pennant, Hon. E. S. | Lawrence,Sir E.Durning-(Corn | Stock, James Henry |
| Drage, Geoffrey | Lawrence, W. F. (Liverpool) | Stone, Sir Benjamin |
| Duncombe, Hon. Hubert V. | Lawson, J. Grant (Yorks.) | Strauss, Arthur |
| Dyke, Rt. Hon. Sir W. Hart | Leigh-Bennett, Henry Currie | Strutt, Hon. Chas. Hedley |
| Egerton, Hon. A. de Tatton | Llewelyn,Sir Dillwyn-(Swansea | Sturt, Hon. H. Napier |
| Fardell, Sir T. George | Lockwood, Lt.-Col. A. R. | Sutherland, Sir Thomas |
| Field, Admiral (Eastbourne) | Loder, G. Walter Erskine | Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester) |
| Finch, George H. | Long, Rt. Hon. W. (Liverpool) | Talbot,RtHn. J. G. (Oxf'dUniv.) |
| Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne | Lopes, Henry Yarde Buller | Thornton, Percy M. |
| Firbank, Joseph Thomas | Lowe, Francis William | Tollemache, Henry James |
| Fisher, William Hayes | Loyd, Archie Kirkman | Valentia, Viscount |
| FitzGerald, Sir R. Penrose- | Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred | Ward, Hon. R. A. (Crewe) |
| Flannery, Sir Fortescue | Macdona, John Cumming | Warr, Augustus Frederick |
| Fletcher, Sir Henry | Maclure, Sir John William | Webster, R. G. (St. Pancras) |
| Flower, Ernest | M'Calmont, H. L. B. (Cambs.) | Webster,SirR.E. (I. of Wight) |
| Folkestone, Viscount | Middlemore, J. Throgmorton | Welby, Lieut.-Col. A. C. E. |
| Fry, Lewis | Mildmay, Francis Bingham | Williams, J. Powell- (Birm.) |
| Galloway, William Johnson | Monckton, Edward Philip | Wilson,J.W. (Worcestersh.N.) |
| Garfit, William | Monk, Charles James | Wyndham, George |
| Gilliat, John Saunders | Moon, Edward Robert Pacy | Wyndham-Quinn, Major W. H. |
| Godson, Sir Augustus Fredk. | More, R. Jasper (Shropshire) | Young, Commander (Berks,E.) |
| Goldsworthy, Major-General | Morrell, George Herbert | |
| Gordon, Hon. John Edward | Morton, A. H. A. (Deptford) | |
| Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir J. Eldon | Muntz, Philip A. | TELLERS FOR THE NOES— |
| Goschen, Rt.Hn.G. J.(St, Geo's | Murray, Rt. Hon. A. G. (Bute) | Sir William Walrond and Mr. Anstruther |
| Goschen, George J. (Sussex) | Nicol, Donald Ninian | |
| Gray, Ernest (West Ham) | Orr-Ewing, C. Lindsay | |
| Green, W. D. (Wednesbury) | Pease, H. Pike (Darlington) |
§ Original Question again proposed.