LICENSING EXEMPTION (HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT) BILL. (Hansard, 23 February 1899)

§ MR. CALDWELL, Lanark, Mid)

I must express my surprise that this Bill has been brought up for reading a second time without the Attorney-General giving any explana- 419 tion whatever with regard to the necessity for it. The question is not in any sense a Party one, no matter what Government might be in power. Although the Bill is a very short one, I believe I shall be able to show that most important questions are involved in regard to it. In the first place it is an acknowledgement that this House, which in its corporate capacity, has from time immemorial been exercising rights which belong to it, has been acting in an illegal manner in its corporate capacity, and has been in fact guilty of shebeening, and in consequence of that shebeening is liable to awful penalities. In order to do this this House of Commons is asked to go cap in hand with the Bill to the other House with a view to relieving us from the penalities which we have incurred through our past actions. The Bill even goes much further than this, because if it be the case that the Licensing Laws apply to the House at the time when this House is sitting in Session, then by implication it necessarily follows that the Sanitary Acts, the Police Acts, and the Building Operations Acts apply within the precincts of the House as well. The facts relating to this Bill are extremely few and simple. From time immemorial this House has exercised the right of selling or permitting the sale, within its precincts of intoxicating liquors. These have been sold to various classes of people. They are sold to Members of the House, to officials and servants of the House, to counsel, solicitors, and witnesses engaged before its committees, to the Members, to those in the Ladies' Gallery, and to the general public. Now, the House of Commons m carrying out its right of regulating the procedure of persons within the precincts of the House has been acting through the medium of the Kitchen Committee, but it is not the Kitchen Committee who are the sellers of these intoxicating liquors. It is the House of Commons which provides for their sale, and which makes up the balance of loss, if any there be, and which keeps the balance of profit if profit there be, on these transactions. Therefore, it is a question as to whether this House in its corporate capacity has the right to regulate its own procedure in the conduct of persons within the House itself. Now it is said that the necessity for this Bill has arisen owing to some 420 remarks of the Lord Chief Justice in a case which was brought before the Court of Queen's Bench. That case had been submitted first of all before the local magistrate, and the local magistrate decided that the House of Commons, being the Palace of Westminster, was not brought within the purview of the Licensing Acts. We, therefore, have got the decision of the local magistrate that the Licensing Acts do not apply to this House. Then the case came before the Queen's Bench Court on appeal, and on the case stated there, the Lord Chief Justice and Justice Wills said that two questions were involved; the first was whether any offence against the Licensing Acts had been committed at all, and the second was, assuming the answer to be in the affirmative, whether the respondent, who happened to be the servant who sold at the bar, was the person who had committed the offence. As to the first question it was argued by the Attorney-General that no offence had been committed, and the reason was that the Commons House of Parliament was wholly outside the law which prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquor without a license. The Lord Chief Justice said that, in the view which the Court took of the second question, viz., whether respondent had been guilty of any offence, it was unnecessary to express any definite opinion upon the first. So far as legal decision stands we have one decision in favour of the authority of the House to sell, and there is no contrary decision by the Court of Queen's Bench. I quite understand that the Attorney-General will say that there were indications from the Lord Chief Justice with regard to the first question as to the legality of the sale, but I think if the Attorney-General looks into the matter he will find he did not present to the Court of Queen's Bench the real argument, that this House in its corporate capacity has an undoubted right to regulate the conduct of persons within its walls, and has exercised that right from time immemorial, and that that right is inherent to the House of Commons, which no legal court can take away. If that be the constitutional right of this House, it was not necessary that this House should be exempted from the Licensing Act any more than it would be necessary to exempt the Royal palaces of the Queen, which are outside all Acts of Parliament 421 that may be passed. The Attorney-General did not present the case in a constitutional way. The Lord Chief Justice told us what the argument of the Attorney-General was, because he said that he was very far from satisfied that no offence had been committed, and he was not impressed by the argument of inapplicability which the Attorney-General used. The Attorney-General drew his arguments on the grounds of inapplicability, and the construction of the Act of Parliament, but he did not found it on the constitutional right of this House. I have no doubt that the learned Attorney-General will see that one reason for the inapplicability of the Licensing Act was this: that under that Act the name of the licensee was required to be placed outside the door of the place where the liquor was sold. I suppose the name that ought to be put outside here would be that of Lord Stanley, Chairman of the Kitchen Committee. If the Licensing Acts apply, then the policeman would have a right to come to the bar to see whether any Member was asking for more liquor than he was in a fit condition to receive. But I say that it is not a question of the construction of a statute—whether it can apply or not, or as to the inapplicability of an Act of Parliament. The same thing might occur in the Law Courts, or in the case of County Councils, or of Municipal Councils. The real argument is this, that this House in its corporate capacity has always maintained an exclusive right and jurisdiction to deal with its own legislative Chamber, and with the conduct of persons within that Chamber, and that it is essential to the supremacy of this House in doing its work of legislation that it should not be liable to go to any local body, however important, to ask permission from them to sell spirituous liquor if it is thought advisable that that liquor should be sold. We are, therefore, in this position—that not only is it a matter of constitutional right, but it is a right which we have always exercised. We are in quite a different position from any other body in the country. If anyone misconducts himself in the Gallery of this House, or within the precincts of this House, is it not a fact that this House exercises jurisdiction over 422 such person? There was a recent case where this House held that it was a breach of its privileges to serve summonses, or other legal documents, upon a Member of the House in the outer Lobby; because it claims this right—that the House in its corporate capacity, when sitting for the purpose of carrying on the business of legislation, has an undoubted right to exercise jurisdiction within its own precincts. Take, for instance, the case of a Royal palace; we remember when the Queen invited the Members of the House of Commons down to Windsor. The Queen might have allowed refreshments to be obtained on the grounds, on payment by Members. Would the Attorney-General say that if the Queen had permitted this within the walls of Windsor a licence would have been necessary, and if it was not obtained that the Lord Chamberlain could be brought up for illicit selling, or for a breach of the Licensing Act? Could a charge of shebeening have been brought against the Lord Chamberlain? We know the various rights that Royal palaces have in Scotland. Before imprisonment for debt was abolished, the palace authorities had a right of asylum there, and protection from imprisonment. There was no exception in the Act of Parliament; the palace, and all the officials thereof, had an undoubted prerogative which applies to all royal palaces, and no Act of Parliament can take these prerogatives away unless it specially mentions them. Why did not the Attorney-General argue his case in that way? I must say that I admit he did not bring that point forward. Take the case of the Law Courts. The Supreme Court of this country has jurisdiction, peculiar to itself, within the walls of those courts, and it has the right of punishing for contempt of court anyone that it may consider has acted, against the rights and dignities of that court. The Law Courts are licensed, I suppose, because some counsel or other had the idea that a license was necessary, and I suppose it was some counsel or other who thought it was necessary for the House of Commons. But I will point out this—that the very same privilege that applies in the case of a Royal palace applies in the case of the Law Courts, and applies 423 very much stronger in the case of the House of Commons—