* SIR E. ASHMEAD BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)The principal subject to which I propose to call the attention of the House this afternoon is the question of the present position of China and of our relations with other Powers with regard to that Empire. But before touching that subject I feel bound to say a few words with regard to statements that were made last night on both sides of the House as to what has recently happened in the island of Crete. I do not propose to speak at length on this subject because the House is fairly familiar with my views, but a statement was made last night, which, if passed over in silence, might become, in the public mind, established as a fact. There was an attempt made last night by all the speakers who took part in the debate upon this question to put a couleur de rose view upon the condition 187 of affairs of Crete, and to say that all sections of the population, both Moslems and Christians, of Crete were now well satisfied and well governed. That is an entire mistake. I regret that it should be a mistake, because I should be very glad indeed, if, after such a period of trouble and turmoil and suffering, the Cretan population were in the enjoyment of good government, and were contented. But, as a matter of fact, the condition of the great majority of the Mussulmans in Crete, unless some change has come over their position within the past week, with which I am unacquainted, and which I think is not likely, is more desperate than it has ever been before. As I have already told the House—and I venture to repeatit—the Cretan population comprises some 80,000 or 100,000 Cretan Mussulmans, who have been driven from their homes, have had all their property and their land taken from them, their houses destroyed, their plantations and trees cut down or burnt, and who have been cooped up for two years in seaport towns, living upon a mere pittance of half an oke of bread a day, allowed them by the Turkish Government. These things have been suffered by these Mussulmans, owing to the action of the Powers, and especially England, because the Cretan problem ought to have been settled two years ago as easily, and much more satisfactorily than it is supposed to have been settled now. There has been some talk of these men returning to their homes, and in fact, they have been invited to return. But they have no homes to go back to. They would be scattered about in a helpless minority among villages where they would have no protection. They would be at the mercy of the men who had robbed them, who had chased them from their homes, and who had murdered many of their coreligionists. Only yesterday there was a mournful telegram in the papers regarding the refugees from Sitia, one of the districts in the south-eastern portion of the Island. There was a dreadful massacre in Sitia in 1887–1100 Mussulmans murdered in cold blood by their Christian neighbours. Yet, I do not remember hearing one single word said in this House with regard to that massacre, except by my humble self, and my hon. 188 Friend the Member for King's Lynn. Now look at the other side. An Armenian agent was most regrettably murdered, and that matter has been brought to the attention of this House on many occasions by various speakers. The murder of one man, a Christian, is therefore a subject for constant complaint, but the murder of 1100 Mussulmans is not worth a word. More Cretan Mussulmans were massacred without any conflict at Sitia in 1897 than Bulgarian Christians were slain at Batok in 1876 after its capture in severe fight by Turkish forces. Yet Europe rang with the story of Batok, while the horrors of Sitia have been quietly ignored. The Powers have sent Prince George to Crete, and his appointment will be a perpetual monument to the Turks of Christian injustice, especially after their late victorious war and most moderate terms of peace. I wish to say at the present moment that I believe that Prince George's intentions are good. I had the opportunity lately of hearing the views of the present Lord High Commissioner of Crete personally, and I believe thoroughly that when H.R.H. distinctly affirms that he means to see justice done, he intends to do so. But, however good his intentions may be, he is quite helpless. What can he do without force? What can he do without money? Can he restore these 80,000 Mussulmans to their homes? I invite my right honourable Friend Mr. Brodrick, whom I hope I may be permitted to congratulate upon the distinguished position he now holds, to answer that question. How are these wretched people to be protected when they go back to their homes, and what power has Prince George, even with the best of intentions, of protecting them? That problem now resolves itself into a question of two essentials. It is a question of money and it is a question of military force. It would be possible to grant this protection if a certain number of the troops of the Great Powers were sent to certain positions in the interior where they could be easily appealed to by the Mussulmans to protect them from violence. But then there is the question of money. How can they return to their homes without money? They have got no money, and it is proposed to send them back from the sea- 189 port towns to their villages in the country without money and without means of obtaining shelter. Taking £12 as the cost of sending back each family, and reckoning five to a family, a sum of at least £150,000 is required for the sending back of these people. That sum ought to be provided by the Great Powers, or at any rate, the Great Powers should see that it is provided. It is their bounden duty to do so, because they are responsible for the sufferings of these poor and wretched people. Unless the Powers do so, these people will go back to starvation, or they will emigrate. If they emigrate, they will go to other parts of the Turkish Empire, and will carry with them a bitter memory of the wrongs they have suffered, and will avenge those wrongs upon the Christians at the first opportunity. The troubles in Armenia were begun by Mussulman refugees from the Balkan Peninsula—by men who had seen their homes destroyed and their families murdered by Russians. When these got the opportunity of avenging themselves upon their wretched unfortunate Armenian neighbours they did so. If this is, indeed, the state of Crete, as I know it to be, what a lesson you are giving to these people of the injustice of Christian powers. You have allowed all these things to happen in Crete through your own divisions, and through European jealousies, and now you are going to permit these 80,000 Mussulmans of Candia to be ruined and to be forced to emigrate. That is the lesson you are giving to the world, and especially to the Mussulman world, of the way in which the great Powers of Europe maintain justice. There is an idea on the other side of the House, and, perhaps, also, but to a lesser extent, on this side of the House, that all the injustice which is committed in these countries is perpetrated by Mussulmans upon Christians. There can be nothing more untrue, nothing more inaccurate. The whole history of Turkey in Europe during the present century is the history of injustice done by Christians to Mussulmans. All these countries which are now independent, and over whose independence so many rejoice, were once possessed of a large Mussulman population. In Greece, for instance, when she obtained her liberty, there were nearly a million of 190 Turks living there, but you can hardly find a hundred Turkish families in Greece to-day. In Thessaly, the few Mussulman landed proprietors who have ventured to remain have been treated by the Greek Tribunals with the greatest injustice. One of the leading Greek judges in Thessaly, in answer to a remonstrance about the injustice with which the Turks were being treated, said he was merely taking his revenge. As a matter of fact, the bare idea of obtaining any justice in Greece is an absurdity. In Bulgaria, there were two millions of Mussulmans when she obtained her independence; to-day there are barely 400,000 who remain. The rest have been chased away, ruined, plundered, and destroyed. It is the same in Servia. Thousands of the Mussulmans there were murdered, the rest were exiled, and went, as so many others have gone, to the Turkish provinces in Asia Minor. After this you are surprised that they exhibit a spirit of fanaticism, and show a desire to have their revenge, for the wrongs they have suffered, upon the Christians in those parts. The fact is that these small Christian nationalities have not been a success, and are not a success. They are eaten up by military spirit—they are consumed with officialism. Half of the population are either officials or soldiers; they are all in debt, and certainly they all want to get that which belongs to somebody else. The Servian maltreats the Bulgarian, and then they both join to maltreat the Greek. They are all ready to attack each other, and they are a grave danger to the peace of Europe. So far from their being the ideal countries which many persons in England think them to be, these small Christian nationalities prove to be so great a nuisance that probably Europe will have to take some steps to consolidate them, or establish some European control amongst them. My object in raising this subject was to urge Her Majesty's Government to do something practical for the Mussulmans in Crete, and so doing they will do great good to the Christians in Turkey. It is no use saying that everybody is satisfied with the condition of Crete. The English people may believe it, because they will believe anything if they are are told to do so by the newspapers; but 191 you cannot make the ruined Mussulmans of Crete, who are being forced to emigrate, believe this. You cannot make the eighteen millions of Mussulmans in Asia Minor, to whom these men will be forced to fly for refuge, believe it either. Therefore, in the interests of the Christian peoples of Turkey, and for the reputation of the Great Powers, and of England herself, I beg the Government to take the advice of their able officers on the spot, and do something practical to save these Mussulmans from absolute ruin. There is one thing that the Government can do. They can refuse to allow Sir Herbert Chermside to be hustled out. There is no one whom the Camerilla of Athens hate more than Sir Herbert Chermside, because he knows everything in connection with the Island. It may be denied, but there have been intrigues against him for some time past, and there was a report that he was about to be recalled. I sincerely hope that that is not true, and that he will remain as long as he possibly can for the protection and benefit of the Mussulmans of Candia. Sir Herbert Chermside is a most able and impartial officer, and is trusted by both Moslems and Christians. There is one further subject I wish to mention. I wish to make a protest—I shall probably be the only person who makes it—against the grossly illegal way in which the final evacuation of Crete was carried out. The Government had no policy of their own in Crete; that has been admitted. And so our gallant Admiral took the matter into his own hands, and he removed the Turkish troops from Crete, and lowered the Turkish flag. That action was a very sailor-like and, perhaps, natural way for a British Admiral to deal with such matters. But his action was none the less grossly illegal, and a most serious breach of International law; unless, indeed, we say that there is to be one law for the Mussulmans and another for the Christians. It cannot be denied that the hauling down of the flag of a sovereign by force, when you are not in a state of war, is an act of gross illegality. I wonder what the Government would say if Russian and French Admirals were to try the same procedure in Ireland. The position of Turkey and Crete, and England and Ireland are very similar. In both cases you have a Government by 192 right of conquest, a minority which differs from a majority, and a bitter antagonism of religion. Supposing there was a rebellion in Ireland, and the Loyalists were driven to the coast towns, and that the Russian, French, and German fleets proceeded to those coast towns, and, not being in a state of war with England, proceeded to insist upon the English troops departing and the English flag being hauled down; what would be the opinion of the people of this country, and what would be their view of an act of such gross illegality as that? These are considerations worth consideration. I hope the Government will remember them in their policy of intimidation which they have adopted towards the Turkish Government, and which is approved of by honourable Gentlemen opposite, and by many honourable Gentlemen on this side. Two facts should be remembered. The first is that we are the greatest Mussulman Power in the world, and we must consider the feelings of our Mussulman subjects. Those subjects have been amongst the most useful and loyal of the Empire. During recent years there has been a great movement towards unity and solidarity amongst the Mussulman population. That was shown the other day, in the speech of the German Emperor, the new ally of Her Majesty's Government, and a speech coming from such a high authority is worth considering. In that speech the German Emperor said he trusted that the 300 millions of Mussulmans in the world would regard the Sultan of Turkey with respect and veneration. It was a strong thing to say, but it was said, and it represents a great fact; it represents the fact that the Sultan is now looked up to as the Caliph of Islam by three hundred million of Mussulmans throughout the world, and of those three hundred million people nearly one hundred millions own the sway of Her Majesty. Can you persuade those Mussulmans in Crete that there is not one law for the Christian and another for the Mussulman? Take the action of Admiral Noel in hauling down the Turkish flag! I challenge my honourable Friend to deny that that was an act of the grossest illegality, and an act entirely without precedent, except in a state of war. The second thing to think about 193 is your position in Egypt, and I warn the Government most seriously that they are laying up for themselves a tremendous danger in Egypt by the hostile policy they are taking with regard to Mussulmans—dangers which they may not foresee, but which are none the less real. I venture to predict that their action with regard to Turkey of late, if we should be involved in trouble with any great Power, would bear terrible fruit in Egypt. These are considerations worth regarding, and it is better to think about them now than to be cajoled by the very doubtful adulation which they receive from Christian fanatics for the anti-Turkish action of Admiral Noel. I apologise for dwelling so long on this subject, but probably I am the only person who will say what I have said, although many feel it. I have some special knowledge of affairs in the East, both from study and from personal experience, and I assure the House that I am convinced of the injustice of the recent conduct of the four great Powers towards the Mussulmans of Crete. The question which I wish to call the attention of the House to is the present position of affairs in China. On the 1st March last, I had the honour to move in this House the following Resolution: "That it is of vital importance to British influence and commerce that the independence of Chinese territory should be maintained." That Resolution was formally accepted by the Government, and it was unanimously adopted in this House after considerable debate. This, therefore, may be fairly described as the national policy until that resolution is altered. I am aware, Sir, that in some quarters there was a good deal of ridicule thrown upon that Resolution, but that ridicule was either of persons very indifferent or very ignorant; either from those on the one hand who were too nerveless to advocate any policy at all, or those who were in favour of a policy of reckless grab, regardless of consequences. I still think that the policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire is the only possible policy for this country at present, and the only possible policy for a free, commerce-loving nation like England. There was a good deal of talk about "spheres of influence" last year—that is a very catching phrase, and, indeed, so catching 194 was this phrase that even so cautious and dexterous an opportunist as the honourable Baronet, the Member for the Berwick Division of Northumberland, was, to a certain extent, captured by it, and trimmed his sails very close to that ill-omened breeze. My honourable Friend, the noble Lord, who has recently been visiting in China, and whom I hoped to have seen to-day, was also very much taken with this idea of spheres of influence. With that sailor-like spirit, not unlike the action of Admiral Noel, he was in favour of immediate action in China, and would have begun partition at once, by seizing Chusan and even Shanghai. I venture to differ from the new Leader of the Opposition in his somewhat ironical comments upon the noble Lord's visit.
§ SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN (Stirling)No, I made no ironical comment.
§ * SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTWell, that is a matter of judgment of which I admit the Leader of the Opposition is a better judge than myself, but I rather understood that the right honourable Gentleman wished to depreciate the noble Lord's visit.
§ SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMANNot at all. I wished to find out whether the noble Lord had been sent by the Government to China, because there was so much about China in the newspapers, and I was only anxious to know the truth.
§ * SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTFor so distinguished a Member of this House, especially for one who comes from the North of the Tweed, it shows an extraordinary credulity and want of information to imagine that the noble Lord was sent out to China by the Government. But whatever may be the views of the right honourable Gentleman, and I think my estimate of the effect of what he said is a correct one, I do congratulate the noble Lord on his visit. I do that for two reasons, because, in the first-place, think it is likely to conduce to the strength of the Empire and to the information which this country possesses; in the second place, I congratulate the noble Lord because his visit has undoubtedly led to his own enlightenment upon the condition of China. The noble Lord himself treated my Motion of last year with a good 195 deal of good natured obloquy, but since then he has entirely accepted it. He now says that the only policy is the policy mentioned in that Resolution, viz., to keep China independent. Therefore, I may well congratulate the noble Lord upon his visit. Any other policy, in my opinion, means ruin and disaster to China and to British interests. In my opinion the adoption of the policy of spheres of influence (and when I speak of spheres of influence I mean spheres in which the different Powers should have some real control) mast tell in the long run in favour of the Power which has the greatest military strength, and especially military strength that can be brought to bear upon the country in which those spheres of influence exist. Now, Russia possesses a considerable force in and around Manchuria. When the Trans-Siberia Railway is finished Russia will be able to pour thousands of soldiers into Manchuria and Northern China. Pekin would then soon be in Russian hands, and in the great and rich provinces of Manchuria and Chi-li Russia, would find a splendid recruiting ground for her armies, and splendid material for the conquest of Central and Southern China. If Russia possesses the power to do that, the question of spheres of influence on the part of other Powers will be utterly worthless. We shall be utterly unable to defend our sphere of influence in Yang-tse-Kiang Valley. That is an enormous sphere of influence; it embraces millions of square miles. How should we be able to defend such a territory, excepting just along the coast line, against 500,000 Russian soldiers, which is the force Russia could easily recruit in Northern China. Another reason is that while our sphere of influence would be open to the trade of all nations, the spheres of influence of other nations would be closed against us. A further argument against it is that it is very doubtful whether we should have the support of the United States, if we went in for a policy of partition. I believe we are sure of the support of the United States if we maintain the tertorial integrity of China, but we should not have their aid if we adopted the policy of spheres of influence. These are weighty reasons in favour of the reso- 196 lution of March 1, 1898. There is a phrase of which we have heard a great deal lately from the Members of Her Majesty's Government, viz., that of the "open-door" In my opinion that is one of those catchpenny phrases which are used to tickle the ear and mislead the understanding. If the policy of the open door means merely a verbal pledge given by certain Powers that they will not exclude British commerce that is worthless. Some of these Powers, especially Russia, have actually military control over the provinces to which the open door applies. The moment that Russia, gets complete control of Manchuria, you may rely on it that the open door in Manchuria will be slammed in our face. Step by step Northern China will be Russianized, and British trade will be rigidly excluded. If the House wishes to know what the commercial policy of Russia is, it has only to look at what has happened on the Black Sea. Within the last twenty years the Black Sea has been turned inti a Russian lake and deliberately reserved for Russian commerce. There have been the usual iron-tariffs of Russia, directed especially against this country. In addition, every ship traversing the Black Sea for commerce must now fly the Russian flag, and must be owned by a Russian. That directly aims at British ships, and within the last two years that rule has been extended, and now applies not only to ships going from one Russian port to another in the Black Sea, but to all ships going from the Baltic to any Russian port in the Black Sea. Every ship in the Black Sea is obliged to carry the Russian flag and to be owned by a Russian owner, or it is not allowed to land its cargo. I refer, of course to Russian ports. A special duty of 8s. a ton has been put on British coal, with the result that our coal trade with Russian ports in the Black Sea, which was 250,000 tons, has now fallen to under 50,000 tons. The moment Russia gets control of Manchuria and other parts of China the same condition will apply, and a verbal promise or a written pledge will not be of the slightest value. Our only policy in the interests of British trade is to keep China free from Russian military and 197 political control. No one grudges Russia full freedom for commerce or as many commercial outlets as she wishes, but do not allow her to use such outlets to deprive her neighbours of their independence, or for thrusting her own military autocracy and commercial monopolism on peoples who loathe it. There is not the slightest hindrance to Russian commerce in the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles, and the idea that Russia is endeavouring to obtain fresh ports in order to have a real output for her commerce is a fiction of the imagination. I have now dealt with the policy of the "open-door." There is another phrase which Her Majesty's Government have from time to time used, or at all events hinted at, for they have not actually used it. It is said that with regard to Manshuria it is "too late." That, I venture to say, is the argument of cowardice and despair. It is not yet too late, but it will be too late when the Trans-Siberian railway is complete. At the present moment the whole position is absolutely at our mercy. There are a few thousand Russian troops in Manchuria, but there is at present no force capable of holding the country against us if we choose to exercise our power. We are nearer the base; English soldiers are practically nearer Manchuria than Russian soldiers—except, of course, the troops already there—and we command the sea. It is not too late. We hold the position in the hollow of our hand if we only have the courage to act. With the aid of Japan and possibly of the United States, we could not only save Manchuria and Northern China, but we could, if we choose, wipe every Russian authority, military and political, out of Manchuria. But when the Trans-Siberian Railway is completed, it will be too late, not only to save Manchuria, Chi-li, and Northern China, but too late to save any part of the Chinese Empire which Russia may choose to attack. The military forces of Russia are enormous. She could easily raise an army of 500,000 men in the Provinces of Manchuria and Chi-li alone. Northern China could provide very formidable soldiers under Russian leaders. Neither England nor Germany has a force sufficient to deal with such an army as that. But why should we not use Japan. I will put it in a different way. Why should we not use the 198 support which Japan is only too anxious to give this country. We have heard there is some prejudice in high quarters against non-Christian and yellow races. In my opinion there is more liberty in Japan and a great deal more general happiness than there is in Russia. It may be said that Russia is nominally Christian, and that the Japanese are nominally Buddhists; but surely that is no reason why we should deprive ourselves of the Japanese alliance when it would enable us to turn the situation in our favour, and save China. The time for action has arrived. It must be real and determined action, and not the shifting, shuffling policy followed in China last year, such as the withdrawal of British ships from Port Arthur. The Government have now realised by what has happened in the Soudan and by the Fashoda incident, the advantage of a determined policy. They have had a real success in the Soudan, a success shown by the congratulations and support of the hon. Members opposite, though the Leader of the Opposition and other speakers now appear inclined to pour a coul douche on the Soudan triumph. It is, however, a great success, and I congratulate Her Majesty's Government upon it. It is a success which has done them a great deal of good in the country, and which possibly has saved their political position. It is worth remembering, too, that it was a success due to the fact that the policy which was followed was not the policy of hesitating statesmen, but of clearheaded and far-sighted soldiers. It has has been a great success, and I hope the Government will remember to what it was due. They will note also that the Opposition, which encouraged them in every move of their feeble policy, are now turning on them because of their failure in other respects. The cheers of the Opposition are dearly bought by Ministers. Ministers have during the last three years had many such cheers from the other side owing to their policy in the Transvaal, and their hesitation about the Soudan—cheers led by the honourable Member for Southampton, and even the right honourable Gentleman the late Leader of the Opposition. The Gentlemen who formerly cheered Ministers are now attacking them on the very same policy. The 199 Government have only to contrast the effect produced upon the interests of this country and upon their own position in the world by their action in the Soudan, and in connection with Fashoda, with the effect produced by the abandonment of Port Arthur, to realise the difference between the two policies. It is possible that the strength recently shown by the Government is due somewhat to the alliance or understanding which certainly has been established with Germany, and regarding which the Government are very naturally reticent. I will not press them to divulge more than they feel they can impart to the House. I remember two years ago I ventured at a moment when everything German was exceedingly unpopular in this country, to urge that view as the only means of securing our position. I am glad the Government have now adopted it. Even the Colonial Secretary has been converted, and is taking great credit for his conversion. By that understanding, if it be effective, the Government have undoubtedly secured political predominance in Europe. If they use that understanding with Germany and back it up with an alliance with Japan, they will have the whole position in the hollow of their hand. The only practical policy of this country is to maintain the territorial independence of China. It is the only policy which will save it from falling under the despotism of Russia, which will safeguard our interests in the Yang-tsze Valley and maintain peace. You need not interfere with Russian railways or concessions, but you must take steps to secure that Russian political and military influence are not extended over Northern China. You must have Consular agents in Manchuria to report what is being done there, you must get an understanding with Russia not to send more troops there. Steps must be taken in conjunction with other Powers to secure the commercial freedom and territorial independence of China and the re-organisation of its military and political system. The policy of Russia in China is clear. It is to maintain in China, just as she did in Turkey, a Government as feeble and as backward as possible, in order, on the one hand, that China may be unable to offer effective resistance, and on the other hand that such a corrupt and feeble 200 Government may alienate European sympathy. It is the policy of the vulture which keeps the corpse rotten in order to gorge itself whenever opportunity offers. The Government have got to see that effective influence is brought to bear upon the Government in Pekin and upon the island in Pekin, to which Lord Salisbury referred, in order to secure the regeneration of China. The regeneration of China is not impossible. The Chinese are a capable and an honest race. I believe the Chinese merchants have the best reputation of any in the East. They only want protection and encouragement. It may be slow business, but it must be deliberate and determined business. It can be done in conjunction with the United States, Germany, and Japan. The policy of drift must be abandoned, otherwise we shall have to abandon the whole of China to Russia. I am quite confident that I shall be accused by some gentlemen of being a Russophobe. It is an old charge, and one which I will meet with equanimity, but when right hon. and hon. Gentlemen accuse me, let them also deal with the facts which I have put forward. I invite them to disprove my statements. It is my argument that, it is to the interests of this country and of China as well as of the commercial liberty of nations that the integrity of China should be maintained. I am sure we shall hear something about the Eirenicon of the Tsar. I do not wish to throw any doubt on the motives of that eminent and illustrious personage. I believe he is a young and capable ruler, but he is no more capable of opposing the fixed and traditional policy of Russia than he is formist Conscience, who are never so posals may be very excellent, and I am quite sure they will be well received in Radical quarters and by certain representatives of the Nonconformist conscience, who never are so happy as when they are patronising or being patronised by a military autocrat, who is offering incense at the shrine of the most ruthless persecutor of all dissent. I do not wish to throw any doubt on the good motives of the Tsar, but I will say that I should like to see, as a prelude to this movement, some improvement in the condition of Russia itself. I should like to see some shred of liberty given to the millions of persons, Russian and 201 alien, who now groan under a tyranny darker and more hopeless than that of any Oriental monarch. I will leave that consideration to the Nonconformist Conscience, and to the Radicals, who are now stumping the country on the subject. If Russia wishes peace, why does she not give some practical evidence of her desire? Why is Port Arthur being fortified? Why was it occupied at all under circumstances of great deceit and breach of faith? When we first protested against the visit of the Russian fleet to Port Arthur, the assurance was given that it was only there for winter quarters for a few months. Why is Newch-wang being invaded and occupied? And why are Russian settlements being established in Manchuria? In Newch-wang, in 1897, British trade amounted to 350,000 tons out of 711,000 tons, and Russian trade was only 1,400 tons, and yet that port is now being invaded by Russia. Why is the clang of arms being heard in every quarter of Russia? Why has the Russian Naval Budget been increased by two millions to be devoted to new construction? Why is the Black Sea fleet kept with steam up ready for instant action? According to the Times correspondent Port Arthur and Talienwan are being fortified most extensively, and with the utmost speed. Everywhere there is seen military activity on the part of Russia. Another Times correspondent, who visited the Russian arsenals, reports that military and naval preparations are going on with tenfold greater energy, and that he did not anywhere hear a word about peace. If the Russian forces were withdrawn from Port Arthur, then we might believe the Eirenicon was real. While I do not doubt the personal motives of the Tsar, it cannot be denied that this movement coincides exactly with the necessities of Russian policy. Russia is not ready for war, and will not be until the Trans-Siberian Railway is complete. Her army is not yet armed with the newest weapons, there is considerable agricultural distress in the country, and French financial credulity in regard to Russian loans is almost exhausted. The Tsar's proposal suits Count Mouravieff. While, no doubt, our Government will be perfectly justified in giving every consideration and help to the movement, they should 202 also take every care that it is genuine, and not merely used for the purposes of delay? Why should our Government hesitate. They have the power, and they can have allies, if they only show courage and determination. England seeks no accession of territory in China. We are willing to give to every other Power the same advantages which we get ourselves. We do not ask for exclusive rights. Our policy in China, if it be the policy of maintaining the independence of that country—is clear open, and unselfish. It has for its aim the protection of an ancient and remarkable country, of vast regions and teeming populations, from falling under a military autocracy and under the control of a commercial monopolism and exclusiveness. It has for its objects the opening up of China to the whole world, and the invigoration and reorganisation of that country. With these objects in view, and with the overwhelming force which we can now bring to bear on this question—our own power, the power of" Japan, the support of the United States, and, probably, also the support of Germany—we can adopt a firm policy without any practical risk of war. Russia is too wise to risk war if our policy is firm, but if we have an undecided policy we may drift into war. But if we are forced to the arbitrament of the sword, in my opinion, the struggle would be short and decisive, and the result that would be achieved for British interests, for human liberty, and for the peace and prosperity of the world, would be worthy of the sacrifice entailed. I beg to move, Sir.
§ * MR. JOSEPH WALTON (Yorks, W.R., Barnsley)Mr. Speaker, having regard to the vast commercial interests which we have in the great Eastern Empire, it appears remarkable that there should be no reference to the position of affairs in China in the Queen's Speech. Perhaps, wisely, Her Majesty's Government have felt that the mantle of Fashoda, which has been thrown over their China patient should, as far as they are concerned, remain undisturbed, but, Mr. Speaker, the time appears to have come when that mantle should be stripped off and the patient should undergo an independent examination to ascertain, as far as can be, her exact present condition. Now, at the close of the last Session, 203 there was one very important question about which we were unable to get from the Government a very great amount of information, and that was the burning question of the loan for the Nieuchwang Railway, in respect to which a contract has been concluded between the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Chinese Government. Russia at that time was offering strenuous opposition to the ratification of that contract, and we were informed on one of the last days of the session that the matter was under me consideration of Her Majesty's Government. We have not yet had a Blue Book on the affairs in China, which I hope will shortly be forthcoming, and, therefore, we have not that amount of reliable information which we require. Perhaps the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will inform the House of the circumstances which attended the negotiations? We learn, however, that the contract has been ratified with the stipulation that there is to be no mortgage whatever on the line north of the Great Wall of China, and that those who find the money are to have no power of foreclosure in default of payment of interest or capital. This surrender was made in face of the fact that Her Majesty's Government specially caused an assurance to be sent to the Chinese Government that they could rely on their support in resisting attempts to interfere with British contracts. I should like to ask the House to contrast these terms with the conditions under which Russia is covering Manchuria with a network of railways—terms and conditions giving her preferential rate tariffs when she passes her goods over the frontier of Manchuria by rail into China. These terms have apparently enabled Russia to practically place herself in military occupation of Manchuria. The Government, at the beginning of last Session declared that their policy was to maintain intact for this country the Treaty rights which we enjoyed under the Treaty of Tientsin, and they promised that no effort should be wanting on their part to prevent those rights being destroyed. Now that meant the equal treatment of all Governments and all nations. I venture to say, however, that when a British commercial company is compelled to accept conditions such as I have 204 indicated, in connection with the advance of money to build the extension of a railway to Niuchwang, and when Ave compare those conditions with the conditions which the Russians have obtained for their railway system, it is clear that we are not on equal terms and do not enjoy equal advantages. The contract which has been concluded between the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Chinese Government for the line is probably satisfactory to the Bank, and in a matter of this kind, if it were entirely a private one, one would have no-right to say a word, but when it becomes a question of the Government placing themselves in the position they have, the situation is completely altered. I do not doubt for one moment that the security obtained for the advance of money is perfectly satisfactory. I throw no doubt whatever on its adequacy, but I do suggest that the fact of the Government being party to an arrangement under which British traders have been obliged, through Russian interference, to take a contract on less favourable terms than have been granted by China to Russia, is an abandonment of the principle of equality of treatment in the district north of the Great Wall of China. The honourable and gallant Member for York has told us something in his letters of the position of affairs in Northern China. He has informed us that on landing at the treaty port of Niuchwang, where there is a prosperous trade of which three-fourths belong to Great Britain, he found the Russians practically in military occupation, treating the place as if they were in actual possession, and landing their cargoes of railway material without payment of any duty. He was escorted through the neighbourhood by a guard of Cossacks. Having regard to the distinguished services of this naval officer, I do think Her Majesty's Government might at least have managed to send an escort of blue-jackets to show him round the port and neighbourhood, in order to demonstrate that we have equal rights with Russia, whose presence there is not by any means due to merely commercial considerations. Now the practical effect of the diplomatic victories of Russia from time to time in regard to Northern China has been to give them a semi-military occupation for the purpose of laying down railways, 205 and, in consequence, they are placed in a position, when the opportune moment arrives, and it will not arrive until they have completed their great military strategic railway from Siberia into China, I say they will be in the position to annex Manchuria and Northern China, and then, when annexation comes, the "open door" will vanish in the same way as it did when the French annexed Madagascar and Tunis. It is a matter of the greatest importance commercially to this country that the "open door" should be kept open, and that nothing should be allowed to be done which would put any foreign power in a position in the future to slan the door in our face. And then there is the Peking-Hankow Railway concession for a line right down into the very heart of the Yang-tsze Valley. With regard to that, we were informed at the close of last Session that the terms and conditions of the concession, and to whom it had been actually granted, could not be stated to the House because the contract was then on its way from Shanghai to Peking. Unfortunately we have not had that information communicated to us in a Blue Book since then. I am glad the Prime Minister adopted the new diplomacy of the right honourable Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies in regard to the Fashoda incident. We have had it from Lord Salisbury that he considered the action thus taken in publishing Blue Books was of the greatest possible assistance in forming and bringing into focus public opinion in this country in support of the Government action and policy. Now, I would suggest whether the publication of Blue Books giving information so far as it can be given with due regard for the public interest in relation to Chinese affairs, would not conduce to the same end. We know with regard to this Peking-Hankow Railway, the concession for which was originally granted to a Belgian syndicate, that behind that syndicate are the Governments of France and Russia. The French Foreign Office, on the 27th June, issued a note claiming credit for the success of their diplomacy in having made French influence paramount in connection with that railway concession. I hope the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, whom I heartily congratulate 206 on his appointment, will, when he speaks, give us what information he can on this matter. The main point I wish to make is this. I wish to ask whether the Government have taken steps to have the same terms and conditions introduced into the Peking-Hankow concession contract as the Government of Russia compelled the Chinese Government to introduce into the Niuchwang extension line contract, so that no foreign Power can go right down into the heart of our special sphere of influence, and, by foreclosure, establish itself so as to have the control of the railway there. I read with amazement the statement of the Colonial Secretary at Birmingham the other day as to the unvarying success which had attended the conduct of foreign affairs by Her Majesty's Government. The First Lord of the Treasury yesterday, in referring to the statement made by the right honourable Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, in regard to what formed the Fashoda incident—and that statement made it perfectly clear that that incident was merely the climax of a series of surrenders made by our Government to the French in Madagascar, in Tunis, in Siam, and elsewhere, for had they not been encouraged by previous weak surrenders of British rights and commercial interests they would never have ventured to take up that impossible position on the upper waterways of the Nile—the right honourable Gentleman, I notice, claimed that the Government deserved credit for the firm stand they successfully made in regard to Fashoda. But I venture to suggest that the united feeling of the country, as then expressed, meant that the people were determined that the Government should not allow, by their policy, of drift another "Fashoda," of a still more serious character, to arise in China, and it is in that way that we are shown that the great majority of the people of this country, while not desiring a Jingo aggressive policy, are prepared to uphold the just and equitable rights of England in every quarter of the globe. With regard to France, we understand that Her Majesty's Government are endeavouring to settle in a friendly fashion outstanding difficulties between the two nations, and I venture to express a hope that in connection with those negotiations the question of 207 our mutual interests in Southern China especially will not be overlooked. I drew the attention of the House last year to the agreement of January, 1896, under which France and England engaged, each on behalf of the other, to use their best endeavours to secure for each other the most beneficial advantages and trade privileges in South-West China, in the provinces of the Yunnan and Zechuan. Yet when the Blue Book on China was subsequently published, we found that when we endeavoured to get the port of Nanning on the West River opened as a treaty port in order that we might send British goods from Hong Kong into South-West China without the necessity of transferring them or of sending them through Tonking, where they were subject to preferential tariffs, France violently opposed Nanning being made a treaty port. I trust that the news which has been published that Nanning is now open is another diplomatic victory to place to the credit of the Government. If so, I congratulate them heartily on it. I am anxious to know, however, whether the West River and its tributaries have been opened to their navigable limits, in accordance with the understanding which was announced in the House last year, that an arrangement had been come to under which the waterways of China should be open throughout the Empire, so that every riverside town can be traded with by British ships with British goods. Another question is the obtaining of a concession and the building of a railway to connect British Burmah and the Upper Yang-tsze. Instead of assisting us here the French opposed the undertaking. I am told, however, that the railway is a physical impossibility, but I venture to say that this has yet to be proved. At any rate, surveying parties have been engaged to ascertain whether or not there are physical impossibilities. I only regret to hear that the Government have not been generous enough to do that at the expense of the British Exchequer, for the railway would be of important military and strategic value for this country, because it would enable us to send troops from India into the heart of China as a counterpoise to the Great Siberian Railway, by means of which the Russians will be able to send their forces into the heart of the 208 country. With regard to Germany I see that whilst a short time ago they strenuously opposed the obtaining of a railway concession by a British syndicate to build a railway from Tientsin to Chinkiang latest reports are that this is to be done now by Germans and English jointly, that Germany is to construct that portion of the line that runs through or is adjacent to the province of Shantung, while English capitalists will construct the Southern portion of the line. If that is so I consider it is another successful achievement of the Government in the interests of British trade and commerce and the upholding of our just rights in China. But may I point out that it savours much more of the "sphere of influence" theory than of the "open door" theory. Another great line of railway is to be built from Canton to Hankow, and with regard to that I see reports in the newspapers to the effect that negotiations are proceeding for an amalgamation of American and English capitalists to carry out that great scheme. I need hardly say how heartily I should welcome the co-operation of our kinsmen across the Atlantic in any great civilising work of that description. And if we can get American co-operation in the work of developing China on the line of giving equal trade rights to all nations, that I think is the true policy for us to pursue. Having regard to the present position of affairs in China, Russia will, no doubt, stop north of the Great Wall until she has consolidated her position, but after that, unless steps are taken to come to a satisfactory understanding with her, she will almost irresistibly tend to extend her influence south until, possibly finally, in the plenitude of their ambition, France and Russia might even join hands and dominate the greater part of the Chinese Empire to the great disadvantage of British trade and commerce. As to the policy which ought to be pursued, it would be presumption on my part, as a new Member, to dictate one, but it does appear to me that the proper course is to endeavour to come to a fair and reasonable understanding with America, Japan, and Germany, as to what should be done in China, and then, that those Powers, should jointly and unitedly approach the Governments of Russia and France and endeavour to come to a fair 209 and equitable understanding, so that all nations may in future enjoy equal rights to trade throughout the great Chinese Empire. We have heard something of the Tsar's Rescript in the Debate on the Address. As far as I am concerned, I welcome that Rescript, and think it does infinite credit to the Ruler of All the Russias that he should take this practical step towards summoning a conference, but I do not hesitate to add that there cannot be any durable or lasting peace built up as the result of that conference, unless all the nations entering it are prepared to conduct their political and commercial policy on just and equitable lines. And as a preliminary to a successful issue from such a conference I believe that all nations should be willing to relinquish any preferential or exclusive tights that they have> recently acquired in the Chinese Empire. This is not a Jingo or a party policy. On the contrary, it is a just and equitable policy, and we must look to the Government of the day to maintain for England, in the great neutral markets like China, the right to trade on equal terms with other nations in the future that we have enjoyed in the past.
§ MR. SPEAKERI understood the hon. Member rose to second the Amendment.
§ MR. WALTONNo, Sir, I did not propose to second it.
§ MR. SPEAKERHad I been aware of that I would not have called upon the hon. Member to address the House.
§ MR. BECKETT (York, N.R., Whitby)I will formally second the Motion in order to give the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs an opportunity of replying. But in seconding it I desire to disassociate myself from the opinions expressed by the mover with regard to the policy pursued by this country in the Far East. I was one of the numerous body of Members on those Benches who, last Session, did not quite approve of the policy of the Government. At the same time we think that the policy we advocated was very greatly misunderstood. We never wished to see an armed resistance offered 210 to the advance of Russia in the North of China. We believed, whether we liked it or not, her extension in Northern China was inevitable. But what we did wish to see was this. That Russia, in extending her territories, should not place herself in a predominant position at Peking, so as to swallow up and absorb the whole of the Chinese Empire to the great disadvantage of our commercial interests in the South. I do not think it was correct to assume that that was a Jingo policy, or one likely to land us into a war with Russia. We must therefore repudiate the views expressed by the honourable Member for Sheffield. I understand the honourable Member to object to the "sphere of influence" policy adopted by the Government, but we think, and I believe the country is of the same opinion, that the Government, in supporting this policy, are going entirely on right lines. I gather from what Lord Salisbury said last night that the Government are pledged to the policy of upholding our sphere of influence in China, and I believe, too, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer rightly re presented the views of the Government when recently he declared that "Bearing in mind the weakness of the central Government in China, Her Majesty's Government have thought that they would be, acting wisely in entering into negotiations with other European Powers so as to secure to the subjects of each Power full opportunity to benefit by every legitimate enterprise in those parts of China in which their own country is most nearly concerned." It is pretty well understood that the Government is prepared to advocate the establishment of spheres of influence to a greater or less extent, and in that policy they will, I believe, have the support, not only of many Members on these Benches, but also of the country at large. My honourable Friend said it was perfectly impossible to maintain our sphere of influence in the centre of China while a great military power like Russia was making continual advances in the North, unless we were to send an army there, and he added that we were not in a position to fight Russia. But surely our position in the Yang-tsze Valley is such as to make Russia hesitate before moving her forces further South. If she found us established 211 there and knew that we laid claim to a sphere of influence in that part of China, she would know perfectly well that to send her troops into that sphere would be made a casus belli with us, and she would be unwilling to take that risk. I believe Russia has quite as much to do in her own territory as she earn manage, and that she has no idea, at all events for some time to come, of taking any steps which will laud her in a war with this country. In China it seems to me we have no territorial ambition ourselves, but we wish to prevent other Powers exercising their territorial ambitions to our disadvantage; and this surely can best be done by the policy known as the "spheres of influence." We certainly do not wish to go to war with Russia, and we do not believe that by the advocacy of such a policy we shall land ourselves in any risk of going to war with Russia. The policy of joining our forces in order to resist any further encroachments by Russia in the North of China, advocated by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, would land us in war. Russia is determined to have Manchuria, and if we adopted the policy my hon. Friend advocates, it would mean we should have to exert the whole force of the British Empire to drive Russia out of Manchuria. If my hon. Friend wishes to see England establish in China a position similar to that which she occupies in India, that is an intelligible policy, but are we strong enough to do that? And even if we are strong enough, do we wish it? There is only one answer to that. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary or Foreign Affairs, whether he is able to tell us that any rapprochement has been arrived at with Russia with regard to China. We have seen in the newspapers that negotiations have been taking place with this object, and if Her Majesty's Government recognise hat the key to the Chinese question is lot in Pekin, but at St. Petersburg, I think there is some, prospect of a satisfactory result being arrived at. If my right hon. Friend could enlighten us on his point and assure us that our views with regard to China had been submitted to Russia and had received due consideration from, the Russian Govern- 212 ment, and that amicable relations with regard to Chinese policy were now being set on foot between ourselves and Russia, I think it would be a great relief to this country and would enable us to place more faith in a successful issue of the conference about to take place on the Tsar's Rescript. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend will be able to give us this assurance, but at all events, perhaps I may be allowed to congratulate him on the fact that it seems the Government has now entirely opened its eyes to the extreme importance of its future policy in China, and that there is no prospect of a repetition of the vacillation which certainly marred our policy towards China throughout last Session.
§ On the return of MR. SPEAKER after the usual interval,
MR. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis)Mr. Speaker, there can, I think, be no doubt whatever that the subject of the Government's policy, past, present, and future towards China, and the effect that policy is likely to have on British trade, is the foremost and most important of all subjects that can, be dealt with under the head of Foreign Policy. I attach, relatively, no importance whatever to questions of trade in Madagascar or in West Africa, because in those countries, if you are to trade at all, you have to trade under the most enormous difficulties. In those countries they are uncivilised. Their wants are very few; they do not even indulge in the luxury of clothes. Very different are matters when you come to China. There you have an immense nation, one-third of the earth's inhabitants, a nation of the most ancient civilisation, containing competent, admirable, honest traders, whose word is as good as their bond. In fact, I am told that if you want to bind a Chinaman you have to take his word in preference to his bond. You have an illimitable field for trade in China. Your trade is larger than that carried on by all the other nations of the world, and I think you have there an outlet for British enterprise far superior to any other that can be found throughout the world. Now I come to 213 the terms of the Amendment before the House, it proposes that we should
Humbly pray Your Majesty to direct your Ministers to take early and effective measures to assist the Chinese Government in maintaining the territorial independence of the Chinese Empire, and especially of the Province of Manchuria, in accordance with the resolution of 1st March, 1898, unanimously affirmed by this House.Now, Sir, as I seconded the resolution in March last year it might perhaps be supposed that I should be able absolutely and entirely to adopt this Amendment. What stops me from doing that are the words, "and especially the province of Manchuria." When we passed the resolution on March 1, 1898, the province of Manchuria was already gone and past praying for. It was gone on the day in January when Her Majesty's Government withdrew the British Fleet from Port Arthur. The day you did that you destroyed your only chance—and it was then an excellent chance—of coming to some arrangements with Russia by friendly negotiations as would have prevented the permanent occupation of Manchuria which, I am afraid, we must acknowledge is now being completed. On January 12 1898, when the Russian Ambassador first began to complain of the presence of the English warships in Port Arthur, you occupied the strongest position possible. And when the Russian Ambassador complained forsooth that two English vessels were in Port Arthur, where they had every right—international right, treaty right, and every other right—to be, I think the proper answer for an English Minister to have sent would have been not that they had the right to be there, but that it so happened he was going to send two more ships. In January, when that fatal act was committed—for which I have always observed the First Lord of the Admiralty has refrained from making himself responsible—Manchuria was gone, and therefore I, for one, am not prepared to make any affirmation with special reference to Manchuria, or, the thing having been given up when it was taken out of the region of peaceful negotiation, even to contemplate the making of war upon Russia to turn her out of Manchuria. Therefore I must make that reservation with regard to this Amendment. But if there is one 214 person in this House who is bound to vote for this Amendment it is the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, for it embodies the consistent policy of Her Majesty's Government before the resolution of 1898 was passed, while it was being debated in this House, and what has been their policy up to the present moment. When the resolution of March 1, 1898, was proposed, not only did the Government accept it, but the then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, now the Viceroy of India, went beyond it and said the cardinal principle of the Government was to maintain not only the integrity but the independence of China. As I see the right hon. Gentleman, the Under-Secretary is going to refer, I will give him the extract. The then Under-Secretary said—The principles which have underlaid the policy of the Government in each of these cases have been the same, and they are the principles which have been more than once stated by my right hon. Friend, the Leader of the House, outside these walls. The first is that to which I have alluded—the maintenance of the integrity and independence of China.Those were the words of the then Under-Secretary, and unless the right hon. Gentleman, the present Under-Secretary of State, is prepared to accept this Amendment he will have to throw over not only Her Majesty's Government, but by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, and he will have to repudiate declaration after declaration made by Her Majesty's Government, and to announce the reversal and the abandonment of a policy which has everything for its support, and no excuse for its abandonment. My hon. Friend behind me is entirely mistaken when he says that Her Majesty's Government have a tendency towards "spheres of influence." The utterances to which he refers have no reference whatever to the national policy of Her Majesty's Government; they refer to something different. He has read one extract. It will suffice for my purpose if I read another. On October 18, 1898, the Duke of Devonshire, speaking in Glasgow, said—We may see, or think we see, indications on the part of other nations to undermine those treaties, to establish in China spheres of influence where those principles of commercial exclusion which are so dear to some of them may be set up to our disadvantage. When 215 we have any tangible proof of any sack intentions, the Government will feel it to be its duty to oppose any proceedings intended to put them into execution to the utmost of its power.The policy of the Government has not been to create spheres of influence, but to maintain the integrity of China and to keep open the treaty ports throughout the Empire. Unless you maintain the integrity of China you must admit the dismemberment of China. If you allow Russia to have part, Germany to have another part, and Italy a third part, the result will be that in the fourth part of China you will still have the "open door," but that in the remaining three-fourths of China the "open door" will not be into China but into Germany, into Russia, into Italy, raid perhaps into France. To explain the misunderstanding into which my hon. Friend has fallen, I proceed to quote a further passage from the same speech of the Duke of Devonshire. The noble Duke says—Some definition and delimitation of spheres of influence should be made within which the citizens of each country interested may have some prior claim to concessions of this description, and that the citizens of other countries will undertake not to interfere with those claims. I do not say that any arrangement of this kind has yet been definitely arrived at, but communications in this sense have taken place, and I do not think there would be anything inequitable in such an arrangement.What the Duke of Devonshire meant was this, that if we were not then prepared, there should be a tacit agreement among the nations that in certain places, for instance, a prior right should exist to railway and other concessions. But that does not affect the general national policy. The noble Marquess at the head of the Government, in his speech last night, entirely supports what I have said. He stated—The noble Lord asks me for a candid statement of our future policy in China. I have often wondered whether the people who take the trouble to put these words together ever inquire what they mean. If they mean an explanation of the way in which we are going to pull China to pieces and establish our own dominions over the whole or a portion of it, I can understand that the question is intelligible; but I do not think it shows any great prevision on their part. Of course, we have no policy of that kind.216 That means that we have no policy of the "sphere of influence" kind, because spheres of influence do imply pulling China to pieces. The noble Marquess continued—We have only to take care that, the treaties which have been concluded with us are fully carried out, that, the interests of our Nation are duly regarded, and that nothing is done either by China or by other nations which can compromise the rights to which I have referred.A division of China into spheres of influence would most seriously compromise those rights. Every declaration of Her Majesty's Government has been in the direction I have indicated. Has any reason been shown for the abandonment of the policy? My belief is that it is the only consistent, honourable and safe policy for this country to adopt with regard to China. If there be Powers who go forth on a career determined to dismember that great country they will find it is by no means so easy as some people imagine. At any rate, it does not behove this country to take part in so unholy and so dangerous an undertaking. I wish to say one last word with regard to "spheres of concessions." That is the proper term; not "spheres of influence." These concessions for the most part are railways. The whole western part of China is a network of tremendous mountain streams in which the level of the water varies as much as 200 feet, and enormous engineering difficulties would have to be encountered. You will have to construct tunnels by the dozen, and Forth Bridges by the score, and in the end you would find the railway did not pay. If we agree to exclude ourselves from the western part of China so far as railway concessions are concerned, we shall lose nothing by it. The real intercourse between one part of China and another has always been conducted by water. The waterways of China are perhaps more complete than those of any other country in the world, and are superior as a means of communication to any railways that could be made, while concessions for the construction of the latter are without the slightest value unless they are to be in an absolutely flat part of the country. We have been told by an eminent authority that with regard 217 to high diplomatic appointments in the Far East they have been treated by the Foreign Office as of secondary importance, and have been reserved for those who have been failures elsewhere. I do not think that will apply to Sir Claude MacDonald. When Sir Claude MacDonald was appointed he was an untried and unknown man. Many persons must have had grave doubts whether he would prove equal to the serious task before him, but he has proved equal to it, and by procuring the opening of the port of Nan-ning he has secured one of the greatest successes that could have been anticipated in China. I think the policy of maintaining the integrity of the Chinese Empire, and British interests throughout that Empire, is the only possible policy for this country. I rejoice that it is the policy of the Government, and I trust that nothing will tempt them to swerve from its due and energetic prosecution.
§ MR. ROBERT A. YERBURGH (Chester)I desire to allude to the policy which has been laid down by the hon. Member for Sheffield. What the hon. Member did was to invite the House and the country to adopt a policy with regard to Russia which would have the immediate result of a war with that country. [Sir E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT dissented.] Well, I listened with great attention to what fell from my honourable Friend, and I could not possibly carry away any other interpretation of his words. With regard to the views laid down by certain Members of the House, there were two policies possible for the country to pursue; one of active opposition to Russia in her designs on Port Arthur, and the other was that the policy, which led to the acquisition of Port Arthur by Russia should have been followed by the acquisition of some other portion of China by England. They did not foresee what would be the result of the Russian occupation of Manchuria, because after Russia had acquired Port Arthur, they indulged in 218 recrimination which could not possibly be effective, and which must have had the result of embittering the relations between us and that country. What do we say who associate ourselves with the action of Her Majesty's Government? They say, "If you are not prepared to oppose Russia you must come to an understanding with them. You have to be near her for all time, and surely it would be a fallacy not to come to an understanding with her." That was the policy advocated in this House, and I am glad to say that that view has now been adopted by Her Majesty's Government, because I find that one of the leading Members of the Cabinet, whose language in regard to Russia was not altogether diplomatic, speaking on the 8th December—I allude to the Minister for the Colonies, said—
I believe an agreement with Russia is desirable, and I would even say it is necessary, unless very serious complications are to be avoided.I find in these words which fell from the lips of the Secretary for the Colonies ample justification for the action taken up by myself in this matter. What was the next point? That you should be prepared to frankly recognise what has been called "spheres of influence." For my part I am not disposed to quarrel about words, but I cannot see any practical difference between "spheres of influence" and "spheres of interest." Your influence must lie where your interests lie. And where is the difference? Sir, we ask you to frankly recognise, not on our part with any idea that we should embarrass ourselves with territorial responsibility in China, but in order that we should be in a position to help China, if necessity arose, to maintain what was the most valuable and most important part of her dominions, and, Sir, I find that principle has to a great extent been adopted by Her Majesty's Government, if we can believe the reports we see on apparently good authority in the newspapers. Sir, let us take the case of Manchuria. A contract was entered into to finance a railway and a protest was entered by Russia. The result of this negociation is this, that so far as I can understand, the Russian protest was effectual to this extent: that the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank are not to have any mort- 219 gage over this line which runs through Manchuria. That is the Russian protest against foreign powers having financial rights over Manchurian railways. There was another instance in the Province of Shang Tung, where the German authorities registered a protest against a British syndicate with British money carrying a railway through territory within their sphere of influence. That protest was effectual, but now an arrangement has been arrived at by which Germany constructs that portion of the line in her sphere, and we construct that portion of of the line which goes through our sphere. Her Majesty's Government have, to a certain extent, recognised spheres of influence. We know behind that Germany has preferential mining rights in the province of Shang Tung. Now, Sir, that, in my opinion, is the position at the present moment. My hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn appears to have discovered some mysterious difference between spheres of influence and spheres of interest.
MR. GIBSON BOWLESThat was not my point. My distinction between spheres of influence was merely intended to represent spheres of concession.
§ MR. YERBURGHI have always understood that one of the greatest dangers of allowing the capitalists of any foreign country to control the commerce of territory in which we are interested was that the mortgage would give those foreign capitalists territorial rights in that country. That is the ground on which Russia has objected to the Shanghai Bank proposal. Of course, it was rather raised as an excuse for acquiring territorial rights, but there is the question of the open door. I quite agree with my hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn that it is quite possible that you should maintain the policy of the open door combined with spheres of influence, and combined with mining and railway rights, and the words used by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies, speaking in November at Manchester, showed that, to a certain extent, to be in the mind of Her Majesty's Government, because he said—
The policy of the open door may receive some modification if applied to the question of concessions.220 Then he went on to express his—Fear that although no market has hitherto been closed to us, that some of these doors will be closed, or may be closed, in the future. I say at once I am not without anxiety on the point, and it is a most important question for consideration. We can find a better guarantee than any paper agreement in an understanding with the other countries, Japan, Germany, and the States.With that I would like to say I place myself in entire agreement. Now, Sir, there is the question of our own sphere. I suppose that it will not be admitted by my hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn that we have this sphere of influence.
§ MR. YERBURGHI only wish I could assume the large belief of my hon. Friend. I understood that the Government had by an agreement with China secured the Yang-tse region for our sphere of influence. I have always understood that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be able to explain that point. But whatever meaning can be placed on that undertaking, we have the express word of the present Viceroy of India that this engagement is considered by Her Majesty's Government to be of a binding nature, and I accept that to the full. I would like to ask this question: Does the Government propose, having placed China under this obligation, and having recognised that Russia and Germany in their particular sphere are to have preferential mining and railway rates, that they are to exercise the same rights in our sphere? My next point is to ask whether the connection with that railway, which has been mentioned, running from Pekin, so far as it goes on our sphere of influence, is to be allowed to be placed under mortgage to any foreign capitalists? I wish to ask whether we are to exercise in our sphere the rights claimed by Russia and allowed in her sphere, and also by Germany in her sphere? Another point is as to whether the Government has got in their mind the desirability of conducting a thorough survey of the gorges of the Yang-tse river. It is well known that one of the great difficulties with regard to the 221 development of the central portion of China is the difficulty of transport. Consul Sittu, in the report of a journey he made, says—
The three rivers, the Min, the Fou, the Yang-tse above Chung King, are in the most promising undeveloped commercial area in China, perhaps in this world, and I feel sure that it is only the general ignorance of foreign goods and the extreme difficulty of getting them, that prevents a largely increased consumption.I should like to ask whether the Government are ready to follow the advice given by their representative. There is one more point I would ask the Government, and that is whether they could possibly see their way to giving more interest at the present time to the study of Chinese in this country, for other countries are now seeing the advisability of this. I would ask if Her Majesty's Government cannot see their way to follow the example sot them by many other countries. I do not propose to trespass any longer on the time of the House, but I would like to congratulate the Government upon the many successes which they have undoubtedly obtained of late. I would like to associate myself with what has fallen from the Member for King's Lynn, and it appears that the Government, by the action they have taken with regard to the railway which is being made from Tien-tsin to the Great Wall, in seeing that they have taken note of the undertaking of the Chinese Government not to allow any foreign power to interfere, have shown that they consider the interests of this country extend, not only beyond the Yang-tse, but that they extend beyond the great Wall of China.
* THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. ST. JOHN BRODRICK,) Surrey, GuildfordSir, my hon. Friend who introduced this discussion and who moved the Amendment to the Address, prefaced his remarks on China by some observations with regard to what had happened in Crete. My hon. Friend, so far as I can judge, is almost alone in the House in experiencing some difficulty in finding any satisfaction in the improved condition of affairs in Crete. This is partly because he regards the whole progress made in Crete as being in the wrong direction. 222 [Sir E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: No.] My hon. friend illustrated this by pointing to the fact that every change that has been made in Eastern Europe by which provinces have been removed from the direct jurisdiction of the Sultan during the last twenty years have always been a triumph for Christian persecution over Mussulman tolerance, and that it had always resulted in militarism, officialism-and other—
§ MR SPEAKERThe right hon. Gentleman will not be in order in discussing the Cretan Question on this Amendment. When this matter was discussed by the hon. Member for Sheffield, he was speaking to the main question, but the Amendment has since been moved.
§ * MR. BRODRICKWell, Sir, you have relieved me from the necessity of following a series of remarks made by the hon. Member for Sheffield which I think will find no echo in any part of the House. Being thus relieved from the duty, I shall have great pleasure in confining what I have to say to his remarks on China. Sir, my hon. Friend claims, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn also claims, that the Government having accepted last year a Motion of the hon. Member for Sheffield that—
It is of vital importance to British commerce and influence that the independence of Chinese territory should be maintained.we are consequently bound to accept the Motion which he has put on the paper to-day. I do think that that conclusion is an unwarrantable one. In the first place, it is obvious that the Motion which was accepted last year was one of an academic character, indicating the general policy of the Government, but the Motion which he asks us to accept to-day is of a very different character. It is one in which we are asked to pledge ourselves to assist the Chinese Government to maintain the territorial independence of the Chinese Empire, with special reference to the province of Manchuria. If that means anything it means a direct guarantee of the integrity of the whole of the Chinese Empire against all Powers who may desire in any way to make an attack upon it. My 223 hon. Friend proceeded to illustrate the methods by which he proposed that we should proceed by asserting that now, and now only, is our time to take action, because when the Trans-Siberian Railway is completed it would be too late; that for a year or two we have our chance, because the Russians in Manchuria were comparatively weak at present and we might order them out. My hon. Friend got a little warmer, and ho said we might sweep them out.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI did not use the expression "order them out." I said that in combination with Japan and the United States it would be within our power to sweep them out, but I did not advocate that policy. I was advocating the maintenance of the independence of Manchuria, and I said, if we increase our actual strength by combination with these other Powers it would be possible for us to sweep the Russians out.
§ * MR. BRODRICKI am afraid my hon. Friend, though he may be the best judge of his own intention, is certainly not the best judge of his language, for I took special notice of his words. We were, according to my hon. Friend's argument, in our own person, without consulting Japan, America, or the other Powers, to order them out, and we were to say "Go" Then it came into his mind that being strong, we could afford to be merciful, and ho said it would be better to put Russia in a position which could save her honour if she wished to retire. He hinted that the United States would give us some assistance, and pointed out that the Emperor of Germany, whom he now speaks of with all the zeal of a convert, having himself been suspicious of Germany in his earlier days, might also help us. All this may be surprising to Members of this House who have not been in the habit of listening to the speeches of my hon. Friend as I have for the last nineteen years. From the earliest moment my hon. Friend sat on that bench, I have always recognised that he has had a feeling with regard to Russia that no oratory from this Bench could ever quench. He believes in the energies of Russia and her designs, and his conviction of the measures which should be used to counteract them is so great that there are no engagements into which he would not persuade us to 224 enter to counteract them. Last Session I recollect that ray hon. Friend drew, in the same speech, a picture to the House in which he told us that but for the Emperor of Germany Russia would have obtained possession of the Turkish Empire; and then she would have seized India. The picture which is before his mind continually is this, that Russia intends to seize Constantinople, and that Constantinople is the key of Calcutta. He further, in the same speech, asserted that Russia, having seized Manchuria, would sweep over the whole of China. He never waits to ask himself—in fact, I do not think it even occurs to him to ask — whether the resources of Russia, with her vast Empire, are such that she is prepared to undertake the government of 600,000,000 or 700,000,000 of fresh subjects. He does not seem to recognise that Russia's present undigested Empire is such as to relieve us from some of the anxieties to which he refers. Now, Sir, with regard to our attitude in China, I should like to say that I first object to this Amendment because it refers in separate terms to the enterprise of one particular Power. The Government recognises as fully as any Member of the House could desire the absolute necessity of the maintenance of British interests in China, however they may be threatened. I shall endeavour to show in a few moments that the recognition on their part has not been without effectual results, but if I may venture to say so, I do not believe that the protection of our interests, the maintenance of our trade, or the realisation of our aspirations in China, is advanced by gibbeting any Power, or by speaking of any Power with jealousy, hostility, and almost, with hatred in this House. There arc many Gentlemen who speak on platforms, and possibly there are a few in this House who look upon this matter from the point of view of the time when we were alone in China. Undoubtedly the fact that we were pioneers in China gives us not only rights, but has also given us substantial advantages which we should be very foolish to throw away. As regards trade in China, Great Britain was first in the field, and we were the first to send ships up the rivers of China. We were the first to build railways there, and we were the first to survey the coast, I We were also the first to establish any- 225 thing like a pure administration, which had the effect of largely increasing the Chinese Revenues by taking in hand the Imperial Customs. Therefore, I can quite understand the feeling under which many people in this country are labouring, but they are under the same feelings as the labourers in the vineyard, who came early in the morning, showed towards the labourers who came late. Now, Sir, I do not think anyone by any action to acquire concessions in China, will manage to level down our position there as regards trade to that of other Powers. Undoubtedly we have got to learn this lesson — that we have to maintain in an age of competition that which we acquired in a day of monopoly. I think the House should recollect this, because we cannot look upon the opening up of China, and the way in which it has been opened up, as being a bar to our trade, provided proper securities are given, such as we have at the present moment. We are the greatest free-trade nation in the world, and we must look to the development of that vast country, by whomsoever it is undertaken, as being favourable to our own trade. Of course, as a Government, we cannot bring statistics in so short a time to show that. I think that all the greatest commercial authorities in this country will admit that if the most-favoured-nation treatment is given to this country in common with others, the secret of success in China will be that we can look forward to the day when every river shall be opened, and when China shall be studded with Railways by whomsoever they may be made. This brings us really to the actual point which is in most people's mind, and that is: What has been the results gained during the past year with regard to the concessions we have obtained and the privileges we have acquired? An impression seems to have grown up that we have been squeezed out of China, and the honourable Member for Northumberland (Sir E. Grey) used that expression last Session. I should like, so far as I can do so in n short time, to show how far that impression is fairly grounded. Month by month during the last year what has been done in that direction? In the first place we obtained from the Government of China the non-alienation of the Yang-tsze Valley. We have been asked 226 whether we have allowed any concession whatever to be taken in the Yang-tsze Valley, and in respect of that permit me to say a word as to the expressions of which so much use has been made, "sphere of influence" and the "open door," as to what may seem to be the meaning of these terms. In the course of the last few days we have heard pro tests from some Gentlemen who sit opposite against spending time in deciding what the exact meanings of "Jingo" and "Imperialist" are. I might spend half an hour in explaining the various meanings attached to "sphere of influence" If you mean simply a particular region in which you are justified in being heard when any change connected with it is made, that means comparatively little; but you may push the term "sphere of influence" until it means practically a protectorate, and at the present time I do not think that the lawyers have decided the meaning of the word "protectorate." But if you mean by "sphere of influence" that the Power, and only the Power, which claims it should be allowed to construct any useful work of any sort or kind within it, then the term is completely novel to diplomatic discussion, and I do not think it is necessary to labour the definition of the expression. The pledge given he China with regard to the Yang-tsze Valley is regarded by Her Majesty's Government as being of the highest possible value, and in connection with it there arises the great question of the opening of the waterways. I heartily concur in the remark that fell from my honourable Friend behind me a few moments ago, that the question of open waterways in China is of far more immediate importance than the introduction of railways into the country. The effect of the opening up of the waterways is at once obvious. In regard to the Yang-tsze itself, the hon. Member for Chester asked whether any special survey had been made or was to be made with respect to navigation. We recognise that there are considerable advantages to be gained by surveying the Yang-tsze further up than it is possible at present for vessels to go, and the Government propose to send an officer for the purpose, and are prepared to Dear the cost of the survey with the vie of seeing whether any further steps can be taken to render navigation pos- 227 sible. As to the pledge given by the late Under Secretary for Foreign, Affairs in regard to the opening of the waterways in China, I am glad to say that in September the Chinese Government published an Edict by which all the waterways which had been opened to boats would be open to ships. Again, with respect to treaty port rights, the advantage again of last year was the promise to open new treaty ports. The four treaty ports which were mentioned in the month of March or April as being about to be opened, have either been opened or will be opened within a month or two from now; that concession has, therefore, now become effective. Beyond that, the open-of Nan-ning, which opens the whole of the West river for several hundred miles from its mouth, has been ratified by the Chinese Government within the last few days, and I think I may fairly say that the advantages so anxiously looked for in various quarters of the House are gained by the fulfilment of the promise, which will have an immense effect upon trade. Beyond this, the two ports that are occupied, respectively by Germany and Russia, are both open as treaty ports.
§ SIR E. GREY (Northumberland, Berwick)Is not Kiao-chau a free port.
§ MR. BRODRICKYes; it is a free port, which, of course, is better. Ta-lien-wan is at present a treaty port. When I come to the question of railways I come to a thorny subject. My brief tenure of office at the Foreign Office has been greatly enlivened by letters from gentlemen who are seeking concessions in China, and who have urged the Government to put down their foot, and to insist upon concessions being given. Now I think that this is a question which should have the consideration of the House. The Government desire by every means in their power to facilitate the granting of concessions to British subjects, but it is perfectly obvious that the granting of concessions is and must be in the last resort a matter for the Chinese Government itself. We cannot go there and, as an act of pure piracy, insist that over a large extent of country every mine, every line of railway, every public improvement for which money is provided shall be handed over to any concessionaire, but we have, of course, used 228 our diplomatic influence to see that Great Britain received a due share of this development. With regard to the Peking to Niuchwang Railway, I do not think the arrangement come to has been an unfair one. The syndicate has power to pledge that portion of the line which does not pass through Manchuria, and which is regarded as ample security for the capital to be expended on the new line. The capital expended on the old line more than secures it. In addition to that I think it is a matter of satisfaction that substantially every pledge which was made to the syndicate has been carried out. Under the exceptional circumstances of the case the Government have thought themselves justified in allowing the syndicate to state in their prospectus that they have taken note of the assurances given by the Chinese Government. That prospectus was put before the public a few days ago, and we shall soon be able to see by the subscriptions which will come in whether this great step in railway development in China is likely to prove attractive to British investors. In two railways we find ourselves co-operating with other Powers. A good deal has been said this afternoon by my hon. Friend, the member for Barnsley, and my hon Friend, the member for Chester, as to the position of the Pekin and Han-kau Railway, the Concession for which has been given to a Belgian Syndicate. That Concession was not submitted to Sir Claud MacDonald for the verification of its terms before it was granted. The Yamen were no doubt within their right in taking what course they thought fit, but they did not reserve in the Concession any special, power as against the mortgaging of the line. Her Majesty's Government thought that under the circumstances they were justified in asking the Yamen to deal specially liberally with respect to other railways which were before them at the time, and they received in due course, in the month of August, assurances that any applications made by British subjects would be favourably considered. Those assurances have since been carried out. The Kau-lung to Canton, the Shanghai to Nanking, with extensions to Hangchow and Ningpo, and the Puhon to Hsin Yang, and the Sinkiang Railways have all been granted to British concessionaires, and, in addition, the fact 229 that the British firms, are acting in connection with German firms in carrying out the line from Tien-tsin to Chin-kiang, I think it is practically arranged that the line from Hunkau to Canton, in which Great Britain is more or less interested, should be worked by a British and an American Syndicate. Altogether the total mileage for which concessions have up to the present been granted to British investors is 2,800 miles, and I think it may safely be assumed that the expenditure upon railways for which concessions have been obtained will exceed 20 millions sterling, and I do not think you have any reason to be surprised at the Yamen saying that, notwithstanding the fact that some of these concessions have been granted Rome considerable time, they have not yet been taken in hand, they do not propose to grant further concessions, at all events, until they are taken in hand. I may mention a subject which has been referred to several times, which is, that we have received power to advance the Burmah railway, which is a great military railway, and of considerable value to this country, into Yun-nan, a distance of 700 miles. Valuable mining concessions have also been given to the Peking Syndicate, and the valuable coal-mining concessions have been granted to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. I have stated these facts because, at all events, I think they show that as regards the progress of. British industry and the keeping open of the paths of interest to British Capitalists in China, the Government have no reason to be dissatisfied with Sir C. Macdonald's operations in pushing forward so many schemes to a successful issue, especially when one has to consider the difficulties that have to be met in a State where every one works many hours of the day with little result, where orders are constantly issued which it is never intended shall be carried out, and rules laid down which are never expected to be obeyed in the slightest degree. In the course of last year the British Government obtained the lease of 200 square miles behind Hong-Kong, and the lease also of Wei-Hai-Wei. We have also obtained a very important concession in the shape of a pledge that the successor of Sir R. Hart, the head of the Customs, so long as British trade is maintained above the level of that of any 230 other country, shall be a Briton. That is a very important concession, and I must say, looking at all this, that there is very little foundation for the fear of the honourable Baronet that we have been squeezed out in respect of these matters. If that impression is held in this House I make bold to say it is not held in any of the Chancelleries in Europe, and, least of all, in China itself. Looking back at the efforts of the past year I did think that some of the strictures passed upon the Government early in the year would be modified at its close. I quite agree that in the early months of the year, when every Power was pushing forward it was difficult to know what work was being done, and what would be the result of our particular action. Last year there was continual changes in the Chinese Government. And, we have been told that in this scramble the British nation was too diffident, or British statesmen less astute than others, and that, therefore, we had been left behind. I think my right honourable Friend told me that since 1893 British interests had been pushed down the hill all over the world.
§ MR. BRODRICKI do not think the position of the British Nation is dependent upon an Omdurman. At all events not in China. We look back on the past as a successful year, and we have nothing to fear in the future. In his motion the honourable Member asks the Government to under take what has never been asked of any Government before, namely, that there should be no alienation of Chinese territory, the largest territory in the world with a Government which is the weakest in the world. That may be our wish, our study, our policy, but we are dealing with a Government which has revolutions going on, sometimes lasting for years, in outlying portions of its territory that might result, and I think my honourable Friend intended they should result in the near future in Her Majesty's Government undertaking the government of China itself, a proposition which I do 231 not think would be welcome to any party in this House. The Government will continue to see that British interests, whether of trade or prestige, are duly regarded in China. For the past year we have pressed forward in that direction, and I claim that we have a better record during the last twelve months than could reasonably have been expected by the House; we have a record of which any other Government in the position of Great Britain would be proud, and I can only say we shall continue to pursue that policy. No door has yet been closed to us, and, as far as I know, it is not proposed to close any door to our trade. We shall not abandon any claim we make for China. Spheres of influence have been claimed by foreign governments, but we believe that the safety of our position in China lies more in coming to terms with our competitors in matters which are of mutual interest than in agreeing to such motions as the present, thereby exciting the antagonism of those who, like ourselves, are interested in China.
§ SIR E. GREYSir, more than one of us who sit on this Bench have reason to regard the performance of to duties which now fall to the lot of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, with sympathy and interest, and I hope I may be allowed to offer him my congratulations on having been chosen to fulfil the important place which he now holds in this House. I am sure we all felt sure when we heard of the right hon. Gentleman's appointment, from our previous experience of him in this House, that the duties which would fall to him to discharge would be discharged with courtesy, ability, and in the businesslike spirit on which the House sets such high value. I think we have had this afternoon a full example that our anticipations were justified that the right hon. Gentleman, in the office he holds, will, like his predecessors—even if we have differences of view on certain occasions—at any rate earn and maintain and continue to hold our sincere respect. I do not wish to introduce much into this debate, but I am obliged to revive one 232 or two points which have been controversial, because in one or two speeches made on the subject in the autumn, there has been a tendency to disseminate an impression of the history of this question which is not in accordance with the facts. I will not elaborate our criticisms on the policy of the Government a year ago, because that has been done by the hon. Member for Chester this afternoon from the point of view we ourselves take. Substantially it amounts to this, that there being two possible policies at the earlier stage, one, that of resisting Russia, and the other, of agreeing with her, the Government, in one way or another, by want of decision, managed to combine the disadvantage of both. That was one criticism. But the version that has been given of it, by one right hon. Gentleman at least, is not that at all. It has been represented as if those policies meant either going to war to prevent Russia having Port Arthur or acquiescing in her having Port Arthur. The Government were wise, statesmanlike people who rejected the policy from the first. I hold that if the Government had only said at this time last year that they acquiesced we should have been spared the controversies and anxieties of many months. I think these criticisms still hold good. We think that at the beginning much ground was lost, much unnecessary apprehension was caused on a subject which might have been avoided, and the present interest to-day is to consider how much of the ground previously lost has since been made up. We have been in doubt from the beginning of the value of some of the recent assets with which the Government has presented us. For instance, the value of Wei-hai-wei is a matter upon which we were left in doubt up to the end of the last session, because the Government had not completed their inquiries, and had not full information before them. That doubt has been increased as time has gone by. The right hon. Gentleman opposite told us at one time that Wei-hai-wei had no commercial possibilities because the physical position of that port was such that nobody in his senses would dream of attempting to make it a commercial centre. At a more recent period, it was said that the commercial value of the port depends mainly on the question of 233 railway communication, and that if a railway were made the commercial possibilities would be considerable. I do not advocate that we should disturb in any way the good understanding between ourselves and Germany by any overlapping in the development of commercial interests. I think it ought to be clearly explained to us whether Wei-Hai-Wei has commercial possibilities or not, and whether it is or is not to become a commercial centre. Then as to the naval value of Wei-Hai-Wei, and as to the cost of making it into an important naval centre, and as to the amount of money which the Government intend to spend upon it; those are points, of course, upon which we should like to have the fullest information which the Government can give. The chief value of Wei-Hai-Wei, I think we have always been told by Lord Salisbury, was not so much its naval or commercial possibilities as the opportunity which it offered us of bestowing moral courage on the Chinese Government. It was a policy of giving the Chinese Government moral courage. Well, Sir, the moral courage was not very apparent after Wei-Hai-Wei was first taken. I think only two months afterwards the moral courage received by the Chinese Government took the form of a revolution in the Palace, and the practical deposition of the Emperor from all power; and I gather from the latest utterances of the Government on the subject that they are still in doubt as to what is going on inside the Palace, and that while they were in doubt as to what goes on inside the Palace of Pekin they can form no opinion as to the future—as to the probable course of future events in China. I suppose, therefore, the policy of moral courage is at present in the air, and the Government do not know what is the position of affairs in the Palace of Pekin, or upon what party in the Palace that moral courage had better be bestowed. Well, Sir, having asked these questions in regard to Wei-Hai-Wei, I come to the question of the concessions. The right hon. gentleman opposite said that I had stated that we 234 were being squeezed out of advantages in China. Well, Sir, I have not got my words before me; I certainly had an apprehension that we might be squeezed out, but I do not think I ever permitted myself to say that the chapter was finally closed. I think the object of our Debates last Session was rather that the chapter was not closed, and that we were anxious that better advantage should be taken of the opportunities that still remain. Well, Sir, a good many of the concessions with which we were presented last Session I think were put to us in rather high colours. Their value, I think, was rather overdone. The concession, for instance, of the non- alienation of the Yang-tse Valley I think was really a most flimsy concession. It was inflated by a good deal of eloquence when it was presented to us, and for the time I think it impressed a certain portion of the House, but when the eloquence had evaporated and further knowledge came to hand, it appeared that this concession had no substance in it at all. And what we feel is that we want, not so much a quantity of concessions, as quality in them. Now, the thing which more than anything else; s wanted to render concessions in China of value is, as I think the hon. Member for King's Lynn said to-night, an improvement in the administration of the country. If you could improve the administration at Pekin, if you could put it in the hands of honest, capable, sensible officials, undoubtedly you would have done more to improve the possibilities of trade with China than any number of paper concessions whatever. And as to the value of these concessions in the future; how far you reap the value of these concessions must depend upon how far there is any progress in the strengthening of, and the introducing of more Western methods into, the administration by the officials in China. But I welcome one or two of the concessions which the right hon. Gentleman has told us this afternoon. I welcome one or two as undoubtedly having more substance, I think, than any which we have heard of before; the opening of Nan-Ning I think especially so, not only on account of its own im- 235 portance, but because when the demand for the opening of Nan-Ning was put forward some time ago it was enveloped in a great deal of mystery. We have never been able to understand why it was that the opening of the port of Nan-Ning was not earlier constituted, and I hope the fact that the port is now open means that certain relations, which I suppose obstructed the opening of the port before, are now on a smoother and more satisfactory footing. With regard to the railways, these have been granted at such a pace that the Yamen itself has apparently become suspicious, and has put forward a not unnatural request that some substantial work should be done before some concessions are granted. I think that is only a natural request. Sir, undoubtedly there must be great opportunities if or the development of railways in China, in the first place I think as feeders of the great waterways; but the tendency in time is for railways to take the place of waterways, as the country becomes opened up, and railway development must, in the long run, be in the right direction. But the right hon. Gentleman, the First Lord of the Treasury, speaking upon this subject last night, said he felt a certain amount of apprehension with regard to the magnitude of the concession which had been granted. I am not sure that I understood all that was in his mind with regard to apprehensions. But, Sir, there is in the progress which may be made in the development of China, the commercial development of China, much reason, much food, for reflection. We are told that the commercial possibilities of China are enormous. We are told that its resources, in coal for instance, are of unknown magnitude in extent and first-rate in quality. I do not know far that is true, but development proceeds rapidly, and as it proceeds we may have to be prepared for some disturbance of trade in Western countries. That is no reason against development, but it is something which is worth bearing in mind in regard to 236 the future. Another thing which occurs to me is this: that all these concessions though they do not carry with them any territorial obligations, yet do carry with them, in a vague and indefinite way, a possibly future liability to extend our obligations abroad. In this way. The Government is asked, Ave will say, to support some British traders in obtaining a concession in China. It may be a real concession; it may be a mining concession. That concession is obtained by the support of the Government, and confers upon the Government undoubtedly no direct obligation. The traders who have obtained it go there and enter upon that concession at their own risk. It does impose a certain obligation upon in Chinese Government which grants that concession. Very well, the commercial pioneers who have got the concession will engage in developing it in the interior of China, and they may find difficulties placed in their way; they may find an anti-foreign element, or they may find difficulties amongst the officials which render it difficult for them to get back the fruits of their concession. Some difficulties of that kind are sure to arise in the future, and when they do arise the British Government will not be able to stand on one side. It will be bound to put pressure on the Chinese Government to ensure that the obligations into which it has entered by granting that concession are carried out. That is a different thing entirely from territorial obligation, but at the same time it is an extension of the obligations of the British Government abroad, vague and indefinite if you please. I do not use that in the least as showing that I regret these concessions having been made, but I do use it because I think we ought to bear in mind that when we are dealing with any question of the expansion of British trade, that inevitably, with the expansion of British trade, though in the most legitimate manner, inevitably there does come liability to an extension of our obligations in the future. I have never 237 believed that the theory that trade follows the flag was a sound theory which would be worth acting upon by itself, but I am convinced that with the expansion of trade which will undoubtedly take place in China there will come inevitably a more intimate interest on the part of the British Government with regard to possible complications and difficulties which may arise. Sir, that, I think, is worth bearing in mind—that this is inevitable, and I think it is additional reason why we should welcome the repeated declarations of the Government that it is their desire to avoid territorial obligations. We have had some discussion with regard to spheres of influence. Last Session we were endeavouring to distinguish between spheres of influence and spheres of interest. I have never been able to grasp that distinction. It seems to me rather like a space of the Fourth Dimension. For the moment one thinks one can grasp it, but it perpetually eludes one. There is a difficulty which I do grasp, and that is one explained by the honourable Member for King's Lynn this afternoon: a sphere of influence in any sense in which it is' contemplated by the Government is not to carry with it that sort of obligation which is bound to be carried with it in Africa. It is to be a sphere rather of concessions. You may mutually agree with some other Power that you will refrain from asking for concessions in one part of China, provided they, in their turn, refrain in another part of China in which you are interested; but it carries with it no obligation for the government, of the country or the political affairs of the territory involved. It would be a most serious thing if the Governments of Europe, who are most interested in the development of the China trade were to to think that they could further their interests by undertaking territorial responsibility. I am convinced that for any Government—not merely for ourselves, but for any of the European Governments—to undertake responsibilities for the preservation of order, for 238 the managing of the millions of men in any part of China, would inevitably plunge them first of all into disastrous competition with each other, and finally into disorder, by having undertaken work which is too great for them. I differ entirely from the honourable Member for Sheffield, and I concur with some of those who spoke after him, that one great object of our policy should be to have an understanding with Russia. Sir, what are Russia's aims with regard to China? She has got her open port, her naval port, and her commercial port. She must have with that the control of the country which communicates with those ports. She must have the control of her communications. That she either has got or is rapidly getting. That we ought to be prepared now to assume. The honourable Member for King's Lynn, I think, says it is now past praying for. Well, Sir, we ought to be prepared to admit and to recognise that in the most friendly spirit. Now, there appears to be an impression that Russia will not be content with that; that she will continually press forward to absorb first of all the North of China, and eventually the whole country. Well, Sir, Russia having got what she has, has undoubtedly changed the balance of power tremendously from what it was. She has now become a great land Power contiguous to the North of China. In time, when her communications are complete, her power of threatening Pekin will be enormous. If honourable Members are convinced that she intends to use that power in order to establish, so to say, a Protectorate over the whole of China, through her influence at Pekin, then, Sir, I think they are mistaken. I think we had every reason to expect that the Russian Government should be striving, and naturally striving, to get an outlet—a warm-water outlet, both naval and commercial—in the north of China; and that we have equal reason to see that the development of her own territories is a task which is now occupying her attention to a degree 239 which I think it has never done before. As far as we can judge, her desire is to develop her own possibilities on friendly terms with other nations. If that is so, Sir, then there can be no difficulty in coming to an understanding. If that is so, there can be no reason why the two nations should not work in harmony with regard to affairs in China. But the two things which will be necessary undoubtedly are, that there should be good faith and perfect frankness. I think Her Majesty's Government blundered in the first place when they put forward their demand for Talienwan last year. It gave rise to most natural suspicions in the mind of Russia, of designs which had never entered into the mind of Her Majesty's Government, but which most naturally entered into the mind of the Russian Government. The method of the Russian Government which followed still further made the relations between the two countries difficult. I think both Governments have learned from experience the necessity of more open and perfect good faith and more frankness between them, and if that is so, I do not see why we should have a recurrence of difficulties which we have encountered in the past. If that be the cardinal element, as I think it is, in the policy of Her Majesty's Government, what is their object going to be? Their object, I think, is not spheres of influence; their object, they have told us, is the "open-door" Sir, we are all attracted by the policy of the "open-door" My only hesitation in speaking about it with enthusiasm is lest it should be too big a policy, and too good a policy, to be true. Our fear last year was that Her Majesty's Government was continually telling us that they were maintaining the policy of the "open door," were maintaining the appearance but were allowing the ground underneath their policy to be undermined. I do not think it can be better put than it was put by my honourable Friend, the Member for Fife, on one occasion, when he said that while maitaining the "open-door" they were 240 allowing the keys to be taken by other people. Well, Sir, now I should like to be quite sure that there are no infringements at present upon the policy of the "open-door" The one I have specially in my mind is this: Is it now possible for vessels, under the British flag, to take goods from Odessa to Talienwan? Russia restricts her trade between ports actually Russian to her own flag. Is that extended to Talienwan, or is it possible that goods may be carried from Odessa, we will say, to Talienwan, while under the British flag? Sir, this policy of the "open-door" is one upon which we are all joined in support of the Government, and we have welcomed lately some signs that this policy of the "open-door" is taking more hold on the inclination of other nations beside ourselves. It has undoubtedly the greatest advantages of any possible policy. It goes to the very root of foreign politics. It would, if it were accepted by other nations beside ourselves, be the most potent solvent of international jealousies and rivalries. Well, Sir, why has it not been adopted before? And why are there some signs which seem to me to make it more worth while now than perhaps at other stages to strenuously give our support to a Government which declares its intention of pursuing that policy? The reason, I think, is this. Other nations in the past were convinced that the policy of the "open-door" in a neutral market, or their own Colonies, might as a result be a British monopoly of the trade. The competition, and the successful competition, of more than one nation—certainly of Germany, and certainly of the United States—has proved to the whole world that the open door in a neutral market, or in a foreign Colonial market, does not now mean a British monopoly of trade. That, I think, has had its effect on the minds of other nations. And I think another idea shows signs of weakening and breaking down, the idea on the part of some nations particularly, that when they have a colony or possession abroad they 241 could artificially create a monopoly for themselves of the trade of that colony. We have never believed in that possibility, but it has been tried by some of our rivals. They have tried in parts of the world where their influence was supreme to place heavy duties on all competitors, so that they should have a monopoly of the trade. They have found that even if it were possible to have a monopoly of the trade, it is not possible without diminution of the trade, and that it makes the possession of the colonies a very expensive matter. Well, Sir, if those two ideas are making way in people's minds, I think there is great hope for them. Then there is the policy of the "open-door," and I still welcome that policy as the only one which, with regard to China, can be a complete security against international rivalries and international difficulties, and also the only one which will, in the long run, lead to the quickest development of the great resources of China. We wish—and I think the Government wish—that we should share in that development with other nations on equal terms, and I hope that, as wears go by, the development of China, being, as it is, a slow process, and there being time for these things to sink into the minds of other nations—I hope, as years go by, that it will be found that the policy of the "open-door" must win more rapid and still more strong adherence among other nations, and I am sure that in that, based upon more enlightened views of their own self-interest, is to be found the best guarantee which is possible for peace.
§ * MR. MOON (St. Pancras, North)I venture to introduce in a few words what I think is one additional view of the situation created by recent events in China—I allude to the great possibilities which may arise from support of the Reform Party in China. The Reform Party have looked forward to the sympathy of Englishmen, and I think they have also looked forward to receiving the sympathy and assistance of the 242 English Government. The tendency to progress in this direction appears to me to be supported by a very considerable body of evidence. Shortly after the conclusion of peace with Japan, Chinese officials began to look with more favour on some of the American and English missionaries who were working in their country. I venture to mention one or two of the Provinces. In the Province of Shensi, since 1896, the Chancellor of Education put down a subject for essay, "The Reform Society in Peking," with the result that the students crowded to the missionaries, who could alone, by word of mouth or by the Christian Literature Societie's periodicals, give them any needed information. I will mention one other Province, Sir. In the Province of Kiang-Su some of the students are inviting missionaries to teach them English, and offered to pay for the requisite teaching; while a Junior Reform Society has actually commenced the publication of a Reform Magazine. Well, Sir, I need not say there are similar movements elsewhere, in the formerly fanatical Province of Hunan, for instance. I think this is important, not merely as showing an inclination to adopt those Western methods, in favour of which the honourable Baronet who has just sat down spoke so strongly, not merely as a step in the improved administration of China advocated by the honourable Member for Lynn Regis but also as a course which is likely to give a solidarity to China which will be very effectual towards securing the policy of the "open-door." We have seen what the effect of Western methods in Japan has been, and I think that if they were to be encouraged in China a result would be produced which would provide a more natural and less artificial way of keeping the door open. I venture, before sitting down, to say with what satisfaction all of us must have heard much that fell from the lips of the Under-Secretary. Manchuria, I think, we must regard as finally abandoned to Russia, except a small portion in 243 the south-west. It is rather late in the day, perhaps, to point out the great extent to which Vladivostok is now an artificially ice-free port. The great ice-breakers, which have been brought to such perfection, are very much favoured by natural conditions at Vladivostok. These ice-breakers, which do not split, but crush the ice, are assisted by the wind, which blows permanently in the winter from the northwest. The harbour runs north-west to south-east, and the passage made by these very strong ice-breakers can be kept practically free from ice during the winter months. Now I think that this is a chapter of history which we may regard as closed, and I quite agree with what fell from the lips of the honourable Baronet, that we ought to come to an agreement with Russia, and GO arrive at some limit to her expansion.
§ * MR. A. D. PROVAND () Glasgow, BlackfriarsI think the House has been disappointed by the speech of the right honourable Gentleman be Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He has told us nothing that we have not learned from the newspapers. Indeed, some of the news we have obtained from the newspapers ho evidently forgot, or did possession of. The right honourable possession of it. The right honourable Gentleman desires the House to be satisfied with the large number of concessions that have been given to British traders. Speaking with some knowledge of China, in which I spent several years—I am still engaged in trade there—I venture to say, without any hesitation whatever, that no money of our investors should go into railway enterprises except those near the seaboard. With reference to Western China, railways will only be built where some Government finds the money for the purpose or gives a guarantee to those who do. The railway concessions obtained have, with the exception of a few in the Eastern parts of the country, been got, not with the object 244 of making money by making railways, but of making money by a quicker pro cess—that is to say, out of the concessions themselves. Of course, the fact remains that if any Government builds a railway or guarantees the capital, it would open up the country and be beneficial to every one of us. There are several inaccuracies in the information given to the House. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs said that Talienwan is a treaty pert. It is not a treaty port; it is a Russian port. Shanghai is a treaty port—all nations are equal there; but all nations are not equal in Talienwan. He also said Kinchow was a free port; that is not so; it is a German port in much the same way as Taiienwan is a Russian port. Hong Kong is the only free port in China. Well, Sir, the right honourable Gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs also told us that no door has yet been closed in China to our trade, and we have been assured by Ministers, not only in the country, but also in this House, that the Government have protected our trade. I will give one instance where the door has not only been closed, but closed by ourselves. The port of Cheefoo was opened by us some years ago. We had certain advantages there, which we shared with all other countries, regardless of nationality. Well, Sir, about twelve months ago, without, so far as I am aware, any request being made to us, the First Lord of the Treasury—whom I saw in his place a few moments ago—wrote to Germany formally declaring that, in establishing ourselves at Wei-hai-wei, we had no intention of injuring the rights and interests of Germany in the Province of Shantung. He also added that it was especially understood that we would not construct any railroad into the interior of that Province from Wei-hai-wei which we leased. The right honourable Gentleman will not venture to tell this House that our position in Shantung is the same as it was before 245 that letter was written. Since then Germany has asserted her prior rights in regard to building railways, mining and all other commercial advantages, and the door has been closed in the Province of Shantung to the commerce of this country. In view of this state of things I think we are entitled to some explanation why that letter was written by the First Lord of the Treasury to the German Government, particularly having regard to the fact that Members of the Government have been continually going about the country declaring that we we have obtained the same advantages as every other country in China. I think we have also a right to complain that no papers have been put on the Table in reference to China. There have been most important questions discussed, and perhaps settled, during the last twelve months, and yet it is nearly twelve months since any papers relating to China were placed on the Table. I think, Sir, it is perfectly fair to assume that the Government withhold these documents in order to shelter themselves from legitimate criticism. That our interests in China have been neglected there is not the smallest doubt in the world. The German Minister in Pekin of years ago said that Great Britain distinguished herself by the alacrity with which she retired in the face of the advances of France and Russia. As for the opinion of the mercantile community, if you go from Hong-Kong in the South to Nenchwang in the North, or from Shanghai in the East to Hankow in the West, you will not find a single defender of the policy of the Government. I would add further that the British community in China do not blame our Minister at Pekin, but those who sit on the Front Benches of this House. It is they who accept all sorts of assurances, which, when examined, are found to amount to nothing at all. The assurances in the papers we have accepted from the Chinese Government for years past have made us the laughing stock of diplomatic circles in Pekin. I submit it is the duty of the Government to place on the Table all those documents to the possession of which the House is entitled. 246 There may be confidential papers which cannot be placed on the table—no Member in this House desires them; but we are entitled to every other document which will give us information as to the negotiations which have been completed or are now pending. Meanwhile the right honourable Gentleman has placed nothing before the House which has not already appeared in the newspapers.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI am quite satisfied with the discussion, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
§ Amendment by leave withdrawn.
§ Original Question again proposed.
§ Amendment proposed.