§ *SIR ELLIS ASHMEAD-BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)The great importance of our commercial and political relations with China, and the remarkable interest which has been shown by the people of this country in the recent crisis in the Far East, will be sufficient justfication for the Motion which I have placed upon the Paper to-night. I do not wish to take up the time of the House at any excessive length on this question; I wish to deal with it rather generally, because it is of the first importance that we should establish a general principle in dealing with this matter—a principle which will be a guide for the future, and which will enable the people of this country to understand whether or not British interests in the Northern Pacific and in China are being maintained. The essential principle of British interests in Northern China and in the Northern Pacific is, in my opinion, the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Chinese territory. Unless this is done other arrangements can merely be temporary makeshifts, and disturbances may arise at very 299 short notice. The pledges, for example, as to "free commerce" and "open ports," which have been given by the Russian Government to this country, in exceedingly ambiguous terms, would obviously be of no value whatever, even if they were maintained in the letter, provided that the Russian Power was allowed to overrun and control any important portion of Chinese territories. The most remarkable fact of recent years—certainly of the last 20 years—has been the extraordinary advance of the Russian Power, and especially in the Northern Pacific, in North-East Asia. The Russian Power, nobody can deny, has enormously increased, both by sea and by land. Russia is now absolute mistress of the Black Sea; and the Russian Power has increased in proportion as the Turkish Power has diminished. Russia has even become a great Power in the Mediterranean. In regard to Central Asia, Russia has advanced across most difficult country into over 1,000 miles into the Pamirs, and 800 miles from the Caspian to the Serrakhs. Russia is now within 20 miles of Chitral territory. A fact of great importance to Europe is the greatly increased and improved condition of the Russian Army. The size of the Russian Army is nearly 6,000,000 on a war footing, and nearly 2,000,000 on a peace footing. When hon. Gentlemen reflect that all this enormous power is directed by a single man, who is only controlled to a certain extent by the desires of an ambitious military and political hierarchy—when they realise that this vast Power has pursued a fixed and determined policy for 150 years without the slightest check, they cannot fail to understand what a tremendous power this country may have to face. Russia is a Power which, I venture to say, represents a permanent danger to the liberties of Europe. The subject to which I wish to call the attention of the House to-day is the persistent movement of Russia across Northern Asia towards the Pacific Ocean. The object of this great movement, which has been going on for the past 50 years, cannot be considered as directed towards the acquisition of Siberian territory. The enormous efforts and sacrifices Russia has made to move across the wild, difficult, and frozen tracts of Eastern Siberia can only be regarded as a means 300 to an end. It is perfectly obvious that the end she has in view is the rich and populous districts of Northern China, and especially to establish herself as a naval Power in the Northern Pacific. Just as the movement of Russia, which was carried on for 20 years prior to 1880, and since then across the barren, worthless plains of Central Asia, was directed towards the populous and fertile regions of India, so this great, movement across Northern Asia has been directed across Northern China to the Northern States. We often here have to call the attention of the House, as elsewhere, to the necessary expansion of Russia. That is an argument which would commend itself to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. It is an easy-going, platitudinarian sort of statement that is based upon no particular reflection or knowledge of what is going on, but which is used on the one side by the Russian Power as an excuse for its aims, and on the other side by British statesmen, who are too neglectful, too ignorant, or too pusillanimous to defend British interests, as an excuse for abandoning their duty. There is no reason for an extension of that territory possessed by Russia over Northern Asia. As I have explained before, these regions in Siberia and North-Eastern Asia could be of very little value; but as a means to an end—as a means of obtaining control of Northern China, of those populous and fertile regions—then these sterile and frozen tracts become important. We now understand the object of the Russian Power. It is nearly 50 years since Russia reached the Pacific; and certainly it is not more than that period since she created Vladivostock. This question of the Russian advance in North-Eastern Asia might not be important if it were not for the fact that, wherever the Russian Power obtains control, all British commerce is practically excluded by ironbound, hostile tariffs. It is perfectly clear that these pledges of "open ports" and "free commerce"—if they are of any value at all, which is rather doubtful when the wording of them is closely considered—would be rendered entirely nugatory as long as the territory of the Hinterland of these ports is kept by Russia or any other Power. Hence the 301 independence and integrity of Chinese territory is essential to the interests of this country, while mere vague pledges of "free ports" or "open ports." and "free commerce," are perfectly useless if Russia occupies and controls those territories. As I have said, the great aim of Russia is to obtain the control of Manchuria, of part of Mongolia, and of the great province of Chi-li, which contains the capital of China. The people of these northern provinces are, it is well known, the most vigorous and the most soldier-like of the whole of the vast population of China—a population which amounts to nearly 400,000,000, and, as the House is well aware, our trade with China amounts to over £10,000,000 a year, exclusive of Hong Kong. Including Hong Kong, British trade with China amounts to over £39,000,000 a year. The population of Manchuria, which is said to be over-run by the Russian forces, amounts to over 8,000,000—some authorities say 20,000,000; the population of Chi-li—the adjoining province—is over 17,000,000; and Chi-li includes Pekin, the capital of China—of course, the centre of government—with its population of 3,000,000. I have asked the right hon. Gentleman who represents the Foreign Office in this House if he could give us any information as to the report that there had been an occupation or invasion of Chinese territory by the Russian forces. The answer has been on all occasions unsatisfactory. We have never yet been told that the Government, as the result of inquiries, have discovered that no such occupation has taken place. There was, for example, a distinct statement sent from several sources that a considerable Russian force, amounting to 6,000 men, had occupied Kirin, the capital of Manchuria. What we want to know from the Government is whether that statement is correct or incorrect; whether there has been any Russian military occupation of Manchuria, or of other portions of Chinese territory. If the right hon. Gentleman can tell us that there has not been this advance, then he will make a most satisfactory statement, and he will go far to relieve the anxiety which is felt. If, on the other hand, he does not know, and if the Russian occupation is proceeding steadily, but surely, from the present border line over Manchuria to Port 302 Arthur, then, of course, all the pledges that we have got are worthless. Russia will break these pledges as she broke her pledges regarding the Black Sea and Batoum, without even taking the trouble to retract them. The population of these districts are a very fine, soldier-like people. They would make splendid soldiers under Russian officers, and I would point out to the House, and to the Government, that if once this territory of North-Eastern Asia is occupied and controlled by Russia, it will be used directly as a feeding-ground for the Russian Army. Russia can always adapt other people who come to it—that is a very striking feature of Russian policy. She conquered the Turks in the last war by means of Poles and Circassians—not entirely, of course, but very largely. Russia is now turning the Turcomans, whose brethren Skobelef massacred with great slaughter 15 years ago, into splendid cavalry, to be used against India. I firmly believe she will convert the people of Northern China into a first-class infantry force. And when once Russia has control of these enormous fighting forces, derived from the country she is now about to absorb, then I wish to point out to the House all the Russian pledges and Chinese pledges with regard to Central China, will be absolutely valueless, because Russia will have the control of a military force which will enable her to over-run practically the whole of Chinese territory. Therefore, I submit the territorial independence of China is of the utmost importance. Sir, the key to the military and commercial future of Northern China is the Trans-Siberian Railway. At the present moment this country, if allied with Japan, holds all the cards in its hand. The British Government have the power, if they only have the resolve and courage to use it, to do exactly as they please with Northern China, in alliance, of course, with Japan. By sea, the English and Japanese fleets are absolute masters of the position. By land, with the aid of the Japanese Army, we are equally masters of the position. But the moment that great Trans-Siberian railway is completed, then the whole position will be changed. Then Russia, will be master of the position by land—unless we have erected permanent and stable barriers against Russia beforehand—for she will then be able to pour 303 such an enormous armed force into Northern China that nothing that we or Japan could put there could possibly compote with it. This Trans-Siberian railway is a remarkable work. I do not know what its total length is, but it is thousands of miles.
§ AN HON. MEMBER: Four thousand seven hundred.
§ *SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI have no doubt that is right, because my hon. Friend has a special knowledge of this question; but taking it from Omsk on the western side of Siberia as a starting point, it extends over 3,600 miles at least to Vladivostock, and its completion will mark the turning point in the history of Central Asia. I should be glad if the Under Secretary of State will inform the House whether the Cassini Treaty is in force, and whether Russia has the right to take her railway across Chinese territory, through Nerthschinsk by Tsilsihar to Kirin, thus making the journey 750 miles instead of over 1,500, and saving Russian troops and commerce quite half the distance they would otherwise have to travel. I should like to know whether that Cassini Treaty is a document that is in force, and whether China has given Russia permission to make this short cut across Chinese territory, because it is perfectly plain that if it is true, Russia is bound to get the control of the whole of this enormous Chinese territory. Well, Sir, it is worthy of note in connection with this Chinese question that our difficulties in North-Eastern Asia are due to the change of our policy in 1893, when the right hon. Gentleman opposite and his Party were responsible for the Government of this country. Indeed, all the present difficulties in which we are involved, not only in North-Eastern China, but everywhere else, are due to the change which took place in 1893 in the foreign policy of this country. Sir, it must have occurred to everyone that, during the past five years—since 1893—this country has been steadily pushed down-hill in many parts of Africa, in Asia, and in other quarters of the globe. There is not a single case that I know of in which this country has been able to make effective response to foreign encroachment or aggression. I need only mention Africa — West, Central, 304 East, and South—Madagascar, Siam, Tunis, the North-Western Frontier of India, China—North and South—the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean. Everywhere there has been British retreat and British repulse. Why is this? It is not the result of accident. There are two reasons for it. In the first place, Sir, the deliberate attack, or encroachment, I would say, which has been made upon British interests by the great Russo-French combination, which has been, and is being, felt everywhere; and, in the second place, the injurious, the insane, and the most mischievous change of policy which took place in 1893. All this is the result of the injurious and most mischievous change in our policy, which took place in 1893, when this country began alienating its ancient allies, which has left it in a state of practical isolation ever since. It is the fact that ever since 1893 we have not had a single ally in either Eastern or Western Europe, or elsewhere, that is necessary to our foreign policy, and, until that great mistake is retrieved, until we return to the ancient alliances of this country, which are based, not on sentimental imagination and popular outcry, but upon mutual and common interests, there is no hope that this country will succeed. We have heard of the splendid isolation of England, but England cannot, against an armed Europe, stand alone; England, with the richest and most coveted possessions in the world, must be a, prey to the ambition of other nations. I think since 1893 this country has been unsupported, because of its sentimental policy in the Near East. That policy was commenced when the Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House were responsible for the Government of the country, and when they, with France and Russia, tried to coerce the Ottoman Empire. I do not wish to go into that matter now, but it can all be traced from that attempted alliance with Russia and France. The right hon. Gentleman smiles when I mention this, but he cannot for a moment deny that he endeavoured to set up an alliance with France and Russia, to coerce the Ottoman Empire, and that attempted alliance has been going on ever since, but has not shown any satisfactory results. The right hon. Gentleman was also responsible for the 305 alienation of Japan in 1893–94. Now this bears intimately upon the question which I now bring before the House: the other is the general question. I only want to recall to the attention of the House the fact that it is the isolation of this country which has caused the helplessness of both Governments in dealing with so many foreign Governments. But when I come to the alienation of Japan, I look to the policy that has led directly to our troubles in North-Eastern Asia. What happened in 1894? The Japanese Power, by their skill and courage, had established themselves supreme in Corea and Port Arthur, where they were an effective bulwark against Russia's encroachments southward. Russia could not advance southward, if the Japanese retained the positions which they had, then, the control of. I consider the rise of the Japanese power in the East has been very providential for this country. I do not know what our position would have been now if we had to face a combination of Russia and France, and possibly of Germany as well, in the Far East. There is a very great and strong power growing up in Japan, and by the help of Japan alone can we retain our position in the Northern Pacific. By their help alone can we keep Russia out of China. It might have been done five years ago, but for the shortsightedness and pusillanimity of the hon. Gentlemen who then held the reins of Government; they deliberately abandoned Japan to Russia and France. They need not have gone to war; there was no question of war. The British fleet could sweep the Russians from the sea then as it could do now. It was only for them to say that Japan must be left free in her action, and they would have held their hands. The result of our policy produced great dissatisfaction in Japan, and it gave Russia the opportunity she had been seeking and has been using ever since. What has been the result of driving Japan out of Corea? Corea is now under Russian control, Manchuria has been in danger of being overrun, and Port Arthur is in Russian hands. These are the results of the weakness of the policy which was followed by the Government of 1893. Now, the present Government is confronted with a similar crisis once again. They have 306 the cards in their hands if they chose to play them. By using the power of Japan, they can, if they choose, control the whole Chinese question and the Northern Pacific. It remains to be seen whether they will. There is only one satisfactory policy for this country, and that is to demand the territorial integrity of China. No pledge will be of any value if once the Russians gain control of Chinese territory. Russia would not dream of resisting such a policy if it was categorically and clearly pressed by the British Government. Now I wish to say a few words with regard to the action of Germany in China. I take a very different view of the occupation of Kiaou-Chau by the German forces to that which is taken by people generally. I think it was a brilliant stroke of policy on the part of the German Government, with a double object in view. The first object undoubtedly was to enhance the value of German trade. Germany, it may be noted, has kept in this matter strictly within the bounds of legality, because they secured their hold on Kiaou-Chau by a Treaty with the Chinese Government. They have not taken possession of the country, but taken a, long lease of it. But Germany had a great double object in view. Of course she wanted to benefit German commerce, but you see where the brilliancy of this stroke on the part of the Emperor is observable. The object was to impress upon us the Russian aims and to raise British aims in that direction. It is to our advantage, in the event of Russia moving southward, that we should have Germany at Kiaou-Chau. I do not suppose that the views of the German Sovereign will be very welcome in this House or in the country, but I think everyone will acknowledge that he has been as successful in his foreign policy in the last ten years as the British Government has been unsuccessful. It is a mistake to believe that this great ruler is hostile to this country. I believe he has seen the folly of the British policy of the last five years. I believe there was great excitement in Germany when there was a talk of a Russo-English alliance, and I believe Germany has tried to drive England out of that alliance in England's own interests. The German Emperor, by saving Turkey, as he undoubtedly did in 1896, saved India for England, because 307 if Turkey had fallen under the control of Russia, and the splendid fighting material of the country had come under the command of the Czar, we could not possibly hope to hold India against a Russian attack. I hold we cannot resecure our proper position, our strong and invincible position, among the nations of the world which we held in 1878, and from 1886 to 1892, until we return to the natural alliance with Germany. We have common enemies, no one in Europe will accuse England and Germany of being disturbing elements. It is very true we are great commercial rivals, but our position in regard to that will not be advantaged by making an enemy of Germany, but rather by making friends with her. With the old understanding which existed between this country and Germany, established by Lord Beaconsfield at Berlin in 1878, we were able to have our own way in the Councils of Europe. From that year to 1885 confusion was worse confounded by the policy adopted by the then Government. Again the German alliance was established by Lord Salisbury in 1886, and from that year up to 1892 we had a period of peace and contentment at home and abroad. In 1893 we adopted this policy of mad sentimentality, which has alienated the Empire from every nation, and we have had nothing but riot and disaster. I hope the British Government is not still hungering for the fleshpots of a Russian and French Alliance, for, of all fantastic chimeras, an alliance with Russia and France is the worst. That is the chimera which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Monmouthshire put before the House the first day of this Session. There are great defects in tahe way of such an alliance which it is hardly necessary to mention. As to France, there are the questions of West Africa, Madagascar, Tunis, Siam, Southern China, Mediterranean, Abyssinia, and Upper Nile to disturb the equipoise of an alliance with them. As to Russia, there is Constantinople, the Straits, Mediterranean, Manchuria, Korea, Northern Pacific, Pamirs, and the North-West Frontier of India, Abyssinia, Persia, and Herat. At all these points we are being pushed down the hill by these two Powers, which will show how absurd the chimera of an alliance with those countries will be. And I say that 308 the attempt to base British foreign policy on an alliance with Russia and France is totally illusory and injurious. There are signs of a reversionary character in the recent statement of the right hon. Gentleman as to what we believe to be the policy of the present Government. We are told that Russia has given certain pledges. The language of those pledges is extremely vague, and we should like to see those pledges in a form so definite that they could not be shirked or avoided. Now I will just read one sentence of the pledge shown to the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary—
Any such port would be open to the ships of all the Great Powers, like other ports on the Chinese mainland. It would be open to the commerce of all the world, and England, whose trade interests are so important in those regions, would share the advantage.Now, there is nothing in that pledge that I can see saying that the commerce of this country shall be placed upon an equal advantage with that of Russia, nor did I understand the Prime Minister when he said "a free port is very much better than a Treaty port." I should have thought that a Treaty port, as to which foreign Powers bound themselves by solemn pledges to maintain as an open port, would be better. Of a free port we have an unfortunate precedent, Batoum was to be a free port, but the pledge was broken directly. There was also considerable umbrage given as to the German Government and Kiaou-Chau, which we should be glad to see cleared up. I said just now there are some good signs, which we welcome, and should like to see approved and made more clear. There is the Anglo-German Loan, which is not Governmental, but which, I believe, the Government has had great influence in bringing about, but that is a mere makeshift if Russia is allowed to occupy Northern China. If Russia occupies the Hinterland it will greatly affect the position in the Nankeen Valley and the centre of China. I venture, in conclusion, to say the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China is essential for British commerce, and I add, as a corollary, that the territorial integrity of China can only be secured by an alliance 309 with Japan and an understanding with the German Power. I beg to move—That it is of vital importance for British commerce and influence that the Independence of Chinese Territory should be maintained.
§ *MR. T. W. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis)In seconding the propositions contained in this Resolution I cannot go so far as to adopt the whole of the expressions the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sheffield has used in his speech. If it is important to maintain the integrity of China against one Power, it must be equally important to maintain it against another. Undoubtedly China is the most important of all the subjects that were not mentioned in the Queen's Speech, and naturally there was every justification for bringing it forward at this stage. Before Parliament met the papers were full of information of an extremely satisfactory character to the British people, with regard to what was to take place between China and England. When Parliament met, explanations were given by Lord Salisbury in another place, which, perhaps, were not quite so satisfactory, but which still enabled us to hope things would come round to our satisfaction. But I feel, and I think everybody feels the same, that things are in a much less satisfactory condition now than they were at the date Parliament met. Let us not be told now that negotiations are proceeding, and that the Foreign Office must shroud itself in mystery and silence. I fear the Foreign Office has long been disposed to regard China as a low, vulgar place, connected with trade a long way off, having no Court or active amusements for the young gentlemen who are sent out there as Attachés. But from the point of view of commerce, there is no country so important to us as China. When I say this, I do not except India, and I do not even even regard Africa. In Africa there is this tremendous bar to British commerce, that the people do not wear clothes, and where the people do not wear clothes, there is very little you can sell them. In Africa you have to make your market, but in China it is already made. In that country there 310 are 400,000,000 inhabitants, or one-third of the inhabitants of the whole world. There is an ancient civilisation, a most complete system of education, and the population to a man are born traders. In addition to that, the taxes of the ports are light, and the taxation of the Chinaman himself is perhaps the lowest in the world, amounting only to 2s. a head. I say that in China you have a population ready and willing to take those manufactures which we find it so difficult to dispose of in other parts of the world. I say, seeing the way the markets have been closed to us in all other parts of the world, the only hope we have in this country for the expansion of our commerce is in China, now being attacked by the Powers. The trade of China is already £53,000,000. I take the latest figures I have—those of 1895—and of this trade £35,000,000 is conducted by Great Britain. It is not one-tenth of what could be, should be, or will be, carried on with China, if only her independence is maintained, and adequate pressure is put upon the Chinese to remove those barriers which alone impede the commerce of to-day. I would point out that in this the interest of India is to be considered. Her manufactures will also find a ready market in China, and that the future of Australia is not unconnected with the development of China. There were hopes up to the time of the China and Japan war—there was every hope that China was awakening from her exclusive ideas for the benefit of commerce. There are, I believe, 200 miles of railway in China. It is not a great length, but it is very long considering that the last railway in China was broken up and destroyed, after being in use some years. There was every hope for China in 1894 and 1895, when, taking advantage of the war, Russia and France came forward to China as her friends, and they acted as her friends, they saved her territory, and undertook to find her money; whether they found it, is another matter, but they acted as the friends of China, but Russia was more especially her friend. The result of that was the Tientsin Convention, or, if that be denied, an arrangement to that effect. We have seen ever since that that which was supported in the Tientsin Convention has been carried out, and Russia has so hypnotised China, and 311 obtained such an influence that she is predominant and autocratic at the Court of Pekin. This is no surprise. We have had it all told to us by, perhaps, the greatest authority on all foreign affairs, who has ever been known to write a book upon them. I allude to the right hon. the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He wrote a book entitled "Problems of the Far East," and, I may say that book was finally revised by the right hon. Gentleman whilst still Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1895, and it has therefore all the authority of official omniscience and private perspicacity. What he said on the point I have just alluded to is this—
Russia does not render this assistance from any superfluity of unselfishness, or for no end. She has her price, and she will receive her reward. That reward will involve still further enfeeblement of the victim, for whose inheritance she is waiting, and to whose invalid gasps she prescribes with tender hand the dose that imparts a transient spasm of vitality, to be followed presently by an even more profound collapse.That traces the matter indeed. The unfortunate victim, ill unto the throes of death, and the faithless doctor, waiting for his legacy, coldly administering the dose of poison which will bring home to him the inheritance for which he is waiting. But that is the method. It is the mere consequence of the assistance given. I could read many short passages from this admirable work, the next of which shows what the situation of Russia is there—The foreign policy of China chiefly concerns Englishmen in its relation to St. Petersburg and to Downing Street.This comes from Downing Street!—The successive advances made by Russia—largely at China's own expense—have taught her to regard that Power as her real enemy, whom, however, she fears far more than abhors. It is Russia who threatens her frontiers in Chinese Turkestan and on the Pamirs; Russia who is always nibbling in scientific disguise at Thibet; Russia who has designs in Manchuria; Russia whose shadow overhangs Corea; Russia who is building a great transcontinental railway, that will enable her to pour troops into China at any point along 3,500 miles of contiguous border.The House might really doubt whether this is a voice from Sheffield or a voice from the Foreign Office. But it is a 312 very serious assertion, made by a serious personage, of the actual character that Russia has towards China. I have one more extract to read, perhaps the best of all, which shows how England ought to regard the proceedings of this faithless physician—A Russian port and fleet, for instance, in the Gulf of Pechili, would in time of war constitute as formidable a danger to British shipping in the Yellow Sea as they would do to the metropolitan province and the capital of China. Permanent Russian squadrons at Port Lazareff and Tusan would convert her into the greatest naval Power of the Pacific. The balance of power in the Far East would be seriously jeopardised, if not absolutely overturned, by such a development, and England is prohibited, alike by her Imperial objects and her commercial needs, from lending her sanction to any such issue.Those are the words of the British Foreign Office, as embodied by my right hon. Friend who sits below me. Now mark, a Russian port and fleet in the Gulf of Pechili. Port Arthur bounds the Gulf of Pechili on the north, and occupies a most commanding position. Yet the right hon. Gentleman tells us that would constitute a formidable danger to British shipping in the Yellow Sea. "Permanent Russian squadrons at Port Lazareff and Tusan"—they are on the outer side of Korea—but Port Arthur, where Russia actually is, and, so far as we can tell, is going to permanently remain, is on the inner side of the peninsula, and is in a much stronger position than the other two. But the hon. Gentleman says—Permanent Russian squadrons at Port Lazareff and Tusan would convert her into the greatest naval Power in the Pacific.That must not be taken quite seriously; that is where the poet shows himself, or rather, I would call it, poetic licence. No number of ports in Korea, including Port Arthur, could convert Russia into the greatest naval Power; that part must always belong to England, and when it ceases to belong to her she will give up her interests in India and China, and elsewhere. But here the matter is put with a degree of candour and bluntness—I had almost said with brutality—entirely unusual in any official at all, but most unusual with an official connected with the Foreign Office. From this there is the moral to draw, that in October, 1895, the 313 Government was absolutely as fully aware of the danger of Russian action in China as they now are. In October, 1895, Her Majesty's Government fully agreed with my hon. Friend the Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield. Whether they so agree now, and are prepared to take such steps to protect China from advances so directly injurious, we shall learn in the course of the afternoon. Under the hypnotic influence, almost, one might say, under the dominion of Russia, as she is, it becomes necessary for the Government to consider what steps they should take to ensure for her the position she is entitled to hold. And here, I think, the Under Secretary is a little unfortunate, because, after all, the object of the Government must be to conciliate China, but the right hon. Gentleman set about it in a very curious way. He wrote a letter to the papers to show that China was an effete and rotten Power. Now that is not the way, if you wish to obtain facilities to approach China. I think it is an unfortunate expression to make use of towards one's friends. In fact, I think the right hon. Gentleman has not an adequate idea of his own importance when he uses these expressions, because words which are harmless in others are naturally calculated to have a serious effect when coming from him. Now I come to the mere active aggression of Russia and Germany; and I am bound to say that, so far as we know, Russia has been absolutely correct. Russia has sent men-of-war to Port Arthur. She might have sent them to Portsmouth. So far as we know, there is no intention on the part of Russia permanently to occupy Port Arthur, or to seize any territory that surrounds that port. So far as we know, the conduct of Russia, with regard to Port Arthur, has been absolutely correct. But in the case of Germany it is black piracy which the hon. Gentleman below me so much admires. Germany seized Kiaou-Chou with, I venture to say, the slenderest excuse which was ever put forward by any nation for such an act. In my opinion, so far from that act being calculated to be a cheek to Russia, it was done in concert with Russia, Germany using herself as the jackal of Russia. I venture to say that it will be found that the foreign Powers are working together, in the same sense the right hon. Gentleman has indicated. 314 Russia herself is working for her own interests, and against British interests and Chinese interests, in that part of the world. But there is a third party. While Russia and Germany are active, France was preparing to take action. The attitude of the three Powers, the declarations in the French Chamber, and the actual acts on the part of one Power and another undoubtedly raised feelings of great apprehension in this country. Suddenly the apprehensions were quieted by that most remarkable telegram in the Time, of the 17th January. We were told in that telegram that England had agreed to make a loan to China, to enable her to clear off the remainder of the Japanese indemnity, which it was extremely important should be paid off by the end of 1898, inasmuch as, if it is paid by that date a large portion will be wiped off. We were told that we must make a loan to China, and the importance of that was this—not that there was any financial advantage to be gained by making the loan, but that undoubtedly England making, as she would have done, the loan under these circumstances, and under the favourable conditions set forth, would have obtained thereby very considerable influence in the Councils of the Court of Pekin, and would have been able to exercise that influence in the way of opening traffic and communications and securing the commerce of China, not for herself alone, but for the enjoyment of the whole of the nations of the world. That would have been a great advantage to England and to the world. It was felt to be a great advantage, but there were other conditions attaching to it. One was that two seaports were to be opened—Talien Wan and Nan-ning. When I saw that announcement, with regard to those ports, I felt that these were great points over which a difficulty would arise. Talien Wan is close to Port Arthur; it is in the same peninsula up in the north-east. But why should England ask for Talien Wan? It was not, and could not have been, for the sake of trade. The whole peninsula has no trade. But supposing it was for trade. There is already a Treaty port in the peninsula. Talien Wan, therefore, could hardly be supposed to be claimed as a trade situation, inasmuch as there was already a Treaty port there, and the trade of the whole peninsula was small. 315 The demand for the opening of Talien Wan as a Treaty port had one aspect. It was a direct challenge to Russia, that her aspirations and desires for annexing the peninsula were to be resisted. The same with Nan-ning on the West River. As has been said by M. Decrais in the French Chamber, France will resist the opening of Nan-ning, as Russia resists the opening of Talien Wan. I looked upon these two challenges with the greatest possible interest, and not without a great deal of anxiety. Now, what was the result? One challenge we know was taken up. Russia displayed her hostility at once to our demand for Talien Wan, and we gave it up. Lord Salisbury explained that the place was of no importance as regards trade, which was probably a fact. I can only give the explanation I have already suggested, that it was a sort of attempt to force the Russian hand and discover what they meant; and by Russia's refusal we discovered that they meant to stay. The demand for Talien Wan was given up; we retired from Talien Wan. The same with Nan-ning. We do not know what negotiations have taken place with France. What we do know is that it has dropped out of the English programme. This was a feeler for France, just as the case of Talien-Wan was a feeler for Russia. Here, too, England was warned off the territory the French desired to have influence in. That telegram of the 17th January was received with the greatest possible satisfaction by the people of England, and that satisfaction was more than increased when on the very day of the telegram the Chancellor of the Exchequer, speaking in the country, explained that what Her Majesty's Government meant to have was an open door in China for English trade. He said that he desired to speak plainly, and, speaking plainly, he said that England would keep open that door at the cost of war, or, as he has since explained, "at the risk of war." We know now that the Chancellor had not read his Times that day, and he did not know of that telegram. It was, of course, assumed that a Government declaration of that sort, made by so prominent a Member of the Cabinet as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, must have been made after discussion in the Cabinet and with 316 the assent of the Prime Minister; otherwise it would be difficult to suppose that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should go down to the country and make what was a contingent declaration of war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was followed by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who explained that we were entitled to, and meant to have, compensating advantages equivalent to those given in China to other people. Even the Attorney General at Ventnor is reported—although I doubt it—to have used unusually bellicose language for a man of the law. He said he would rather die suddenly in a fight for China over this matter than starve slowly to death through being prevented from trading with China. At least, that was the effect of the report, but I very much doubt whether the report was absolutely correct. The effect of all this bold language was that the English people were satisfied that some satisfactory arrangement had been concluded with China, and would, if necessary, be defended and maintained by force of arms. Great was the disappointment when, after the meeting of Parliament, the exact situation of affairs was explained—that Talien Wan would not be open as a free port, but that it did not matter, because there was no trade there; and Nan-ning was given the go-by in absolute silence. We were told by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary that England had, at the request of China, offered a loan and accepted certain concessions, but that it was not considered essential, and so was withdrawn. What was essential? Was any part of the concessions essential? What do the concessions amount to? If all that was essential had been accepted by China, why is it that the loan fell through? I seek in vain for an answer to these questions. I repeat, if it be that China has accepted all the essential conditions, and has only rejected those which were not essential, why is it that the loan has fallen through? It is because Russia has put her veto upon it. My right hon. Friend near me suggests that the Times disclosed the matter prematurely. Is it not clear that the disclosures of the Times came from a Russian source? The Times suggested that it came from the Chinese Council. 317 But it was to the advantage of Russia to prevent that loan being made, and the publication of that telegram was a way to prevent it being made. Indeed, it has prevented it being made It has been suggested that though we have not got concessions from China, still we have got concessions from other Powers—from Russia and from Germany. We are told that Russia has given written assurances, which my hon. Friend below me characterised as extremely vague, that any port she is likely to employ for commerce should be a free port. We are told that Germany has given similar assurances. These are written assurances. The Berlin Treaty was a written assurance. By the Berlin Treaty Russia gave an assurance that she would make Batoum a free port; and the contemptuous abrogation of that Treaty was the subject of one of the most eloquent passages, written by Lord Rosebery in 1886 that a Minister for Foreign Affairs has ever penned in this country. That shows the value of Russian assurances. I do not know that German assurances are worth much more. There was, for instance, a Treaty of Prague, which gave certain guarantees to the inhabitants of the Danish Duchy, but from the day the Treaty of Prague was signed down to the present time that article had never been given effect to. As regards France the story of Madagascar is conclusive against accepting any written assurances from that country. It has been said that Russia has no intention of initiating policy towards China. What was the policy? In Madagascar France has absolutely trampled upon our rights. They are levying duties which Lord Rosebery says they have no right to levy, and they pay no attention to our remonstrances. The right hon. Gentlemen says we cannot go to war with France on account of that, because the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean would not support him if we did. I am sorry to tax the patience of the House, but the fact is we find ourselves in this situation: that the Power which annexed Madagascar and Tonkin, which is prepared to annex Nan-ning—at any rate, is prepared to oppose the opening of Nan-ning; on the West River, as a free port—that the Power which has annexed Alsace-Lorraine and 318 Heligoland and Kiaou-Chau, with the approval of my hon. Friend—
§ *SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTIt has not annexed them.
§ *MR. GIRSON BOWLESThat Power has occupied Kiaon-Chan under circumstances involving the assumption of sovereignty over the port and the adjacent land. And, finally, there is the Power that has conquered Tartary and has occupied Port Arthur. Undoubtedly at this moment Russia is absolutely predominant in Chinese councils. She has three military attachés there at three different ports, with power to train the Chinese troops, and she has the most absolute domination over the Chinese Councils at the Tsung-li-Yamen, and unless something is done soon it will be absolutely impossible to resist the execution of anything that Russia wishes to be done throughout the length and breadth of China. Now, sir, this shows what we have lost. We might have held that position. We might even have regained it when we partly lost some of that position had we been able to carry through the work, but, as it is to be carried our there now, England has no influence whatever. This loan is initiated and carried through by the private firms of Shanghai and Hong-Kong, assisted by a certain number of Germans, and it is a loan which will give to this country no influence whatever in the Councils of China. Now, Sir, I have endeavoured to point our the importance to England of having free access to china for the purpose of trade and I am bound to say that as regards the shipping trade, speaking of the shipping trade as distinguished from the manufacturing trade, this action of Russia and Germany does not altogether hurt us. It is not so damaging as it seems when you come to look at it. If Russia does firmly establish herself at Port Arthur, and if Germany does the like at Kiaou Chau, they will undoubtedly apply to these ports their own particularly exclusive selfish system of trade. The result of this will be that primâ facie these ports will be no more able to compete with Hong-Kong and Shanghai, than Archangel is able to compete with Liverpool and London. As far 319 as the trade is concerned, the annexation of these ports, if the Russian and German system is applied, will only result in the ports having but little trade, and the trade of China will continue to flow on through its accustomed channels. But as my hon. Friend has most judiciously pointed out, there is the land behind the ports, and if the occupation of the ports is to be extended to what is called the Hinterland—although why we cannot call it the "interior" I do not know—it will be far more galling, far more oppressive, and far more destructive to trade than even the Chinese system, which has now so constantly for many years strangled the trade of China. I think our shipping will still find its access to Shanghai and Hong-Kong, and I do not think that any of it will get to Port Arthur or Kiaou-Chau. The great injury that will be inflicted upon our trade will only be so far as the interior behind these ports, is concerned. But in the last resort—let the House never forget this—that England is, and always must be, when it comes to force, the strongest power on the Chinese coast. Yes, she is now. I do not count battleships when I say that. I want to know how many rounds of ammunition they carry, and how much coal they can carry, and how far they can steam, before I can compare one battleship with another, and know that in all these respects we have an enormous advantage in our battleships. There is not a German ship there that can carry more than 3,000 miles in her inside. They have got to coal four times before she can reach Kiaou-Chau, and every place that she can possibly coal at is in the possession of this country. Again, we can reinforce our Chinese fleet from the Pacific, Indian and Australian seas, before cither German or Russian ships can get half-way. When we bear in mind that every English battleship carries twice or three times as much ammunition and coal as an ordinary battlehip of the same class, we can well understand that we are by far the strongest Navy in that part of the world. I am not in the least afraid of the competition with which the right hon. Gentleman threatens me with regard to the Siberian Railway. Railways are of no use for carrying large bodies of men. You have to get your railway 320 stock backwards and forwards. You are hemmed in by such conditions that it is only the very smallest number of men you can carry in a given time by a railway, and that you can treat with some contempt, but with as many ships as the ocean can bear you can carry 10 times the troops and 20 times the stores as you can by a railway. Therefore I am not a bit afraid of the competition of the Siberian Railway. There is only one road, and that road is the seas, and I say we shall always be able to send more men in less time to that part of the world than any other country. But, Sir, we have been periodically reminded in connection with this matter—and it is desirable also that we should not forget it with regard to another matter, namely, Africa—that we cannot conduct a war with a European Power in a far-distant country without having the fear of a war in Europe continually before us; and that is an essential consideration which must not be neglected. If you are going to offend Russia in the Far East, it means that eventually you will have to face the possibility of a war in Europe with Russia; and here it is I believe that is to be found the secret of our diplomatic weakness for so many years past. It lies in this: that every Minister when he is confronted with the possibility of having to go to war with a European Power in some distant place, immediately also becomes confronted with the fact that with a European Power he can scarcely do anything by way of coercion. Our defensive powers are, no doubt, sufficient to keep these islands from invasion, but what offensive power can we use towards our enemy? You will find that a Minister becomes aware that, having given up, by the Declaration of Paris, the principle for which we so long contended, by means of which we so long vanquished the whole of Europe, having parted with the power of coercing the enemy by reason of the possible rise of the price of things in this country, and having parted with the power of acting with any European nation at sea, which is the only place where we can act at all, that recollection of our impotence to coerce constantly occurs to every Minister when he asks himself, What can be done if we go to war? That consideration has been present 321 in the minds of Ministers in this Chinese affair also, and I can only hope that some day this House will be invited to reconsider that subject and get rid of the paper which has so weakened the policy of this country in the past, and which is likely to further weaken it in the future. With regard to China this country has no selfish aim. It is prepared to compete with the whole world, but what we do ask is, the maintenance of China as an independent Power, and her protection against these aggressive countries which would annex her only in order to close her. Sir, if once Germany Russia, and France take possession of portions of China—if the territory of China is ever divided between these three countries—a system far more exclusive than any Chinese system ever was will be imposed, and imposed mainly against the commerce of this country. In this conviction, and it is a conviction that I feel most strongly, I have no hesitation in giving my support to the Motion of my hon. Friend.
§ *SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT (Monmouth, W.)I have been asking myself for the last two hours what is the object of the speeches to which we have listened, and how far they and the Resolution before the House will contribute towards the solution of a question which everyone admits is one of supreme importance in the interests of this country. The mover and seconder of this Motion, though they promote the same cause, contradict each other at almost every point. There are two great potentates in Europe who will have occasion to rejoice to-morrow. The Emperor of Germany is patronised by the member for Sheffield. He is denounced by the Member for King's Lynn. The Member for King's Lynn is impartial in his hostility to both the great Powers, he rebukes the Member for Sheffield for the eulogies he has passed on the Emperor of Germany, and he dissociates himself to a great degree from the censure the hon. Member has passed on the Emperor of Russia. I venture to hold the opinion, in spite of these two hon. Members, that the great interest of England is that we should be on friendly terms with both Russia and Germany in the East and in every part of the world. 322 The speech of the Member for Sheffield is of that kind we are quite accustomed to. He has long laboured under a disorder which is common in this country, called "Russophobia," from which he has never recovered, though I am glad to say that it has worn itself out a great deal in the public opinion of this country. No one has spoken more strongly, more responsibly, in that sense than the present Prime Minister of England. I think it is only two years ago that he stated that he could see no ground upon which England should regard Russia as its enemy. What is the charge which is now made against Russia? I venture to say that such speeches as we have listened to are doing, and will do, infinite mischief to this country throughout the world. What is the sort of attack that is made upon Russia by the Member for Sheffield? He says, "Russia is making a movement in the East of Asia." So she is. She is making a great railway through her own territory—and that is a thing which is necessarily hostile to England.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTI said nothing of the kind. I said where Russia was attacking English interests was in obtaining control in Northern China.
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTYes; but what evidence is there of that, excepting that she is making a railway through Siberia? I should like to know what would have been said if Russia had complained of England making the Canadian Pacific Railway through her own territory? He says, Russia would never have made a railway through such wild and desolate territory excepting for some hostile intention; but I do not doubt but what there is as wild and desolate territory in the Hudson Bay as any in Siberia, and yet it is not alleged that we had any hostile intention in making the Canadian Pacific Railway. Then the hon. Member goes on to talk about thee extension of Russia in that direction, and he denounced me upon that subject. But really, if that is a fault, I am not alone responsible for it. I think the First Lord of the Treasury said not long ago, and said quite truly, that it is the most natural thing in the world that 323 Russia should desire an ice-free port upon the Pacific. Why in the world is she to be treated as an enemy of Great Britain because she desires an ice-free port?
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTIt is through Chinese territory.
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTIf China chooses upon terms which are fair to other countries, to give Russia access to an ice-free port, why should not she? Then the hon. Member says that all the misery we have endured is because we have no allies in Europe. No allies in Europe! We who are always acting in the Concert of Europe! Why, we have a universal ally; and yet the hon. Member for Sheffield can say that we have no allies. The great evil which has befallen Europe is that crime which he tells us was originated by the last Government, of allying ourselves with France and Russia. Yes; the hon. Member addressed himself upon that subject directly to me. He said that I had always stated that in Eastern affairs alliance with France and Russia was a natural alliance, and the only efficient alliance; that is quite true, and I have always pointed out that that was the alliance by which Canning secured the emancipation of Greece, and at this moment, when the Member for Sheffield is declaring that an alliance with France and Russia is a fatal policy for England, this week or next a loan issued by England, France, and Russia will be effected by the existing Administration. That is a commentary upon the Member for Sheffield's denunciation of the alliance between England, France, and Russia. What is the object of the loan? It is to deliver Thessaly from the Turk; but that is not what the hon. Member for Sheffield desires. Why, he was himself an invader of Thessaly! Then there is another great crime that the late Government committed. They did not join Japan. To do what? To support Japan in making war upon China. Yes, he says, to make war with Russia. But at that time Japan had occupied Port Arthur. Of course, the enemy was Japan. In my opinion that was a perfectly wise course which was adopted. We desired not to be the enemies of Japan, nor the 324 enemies of China, and even when we were exhorted to do so the late Government declined to be a party to coerce Japan, and at this very moment, I venture to say, ever since that time, Japan has looked upon Great Britain as her friend. If you want a closer alliance with Japan it is perfectly open to Her Majesty's Government to enter into one. We left it perfectly free to them. We declined to make ourselves partisans in that contest between Japan and China. The Member for Sheffield says that Germany is not hostile to England. I hope and believe that to be the case, but the hon. Member charges the late Government with having caused hostility between Germany and England.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTHostile feelings.
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTIf there was hostile feeling, there would be a hostile policy, and if a hostile feeling has been loudly expressed in Germany, it has been, I think, rather in the time of the present Government than of their predecessors. And if the events connected with the raid in South Africa sufficiently prove that there never was such a hostile policy I should like to know whether the language of the hon. Member does not lead to a hostile feeling towards Russia; and whether that is advantageous to this country. In my opinion, Lord Salisbury was quite right when he said that the great hope of a settlement, whether in the near East or the far East, is in a good understanding between England and Russia. I believe that to be a wise and sound policy, and Lord Salisbury has perceived that the attempt to deal with the Eastern Question in a spirit of jealousy, hatred, and hostility, such as the hon. Member for Sheffield has expressed to-night towards Russia, is a policy which has been tried for half a century and has failed. It is only by acting in a friendly spirit with great Powers like Russia, France, and Germany, whether it be in the near East or in the far East, that you can really advance the true interests of this country. But the extraordinary thing in these alliances, as they present themselves to the mind of the hon. Member for Sheffield, is that he has but one test of that 325 alliance which England ought to seek, and that is an alliance which is founded upon a love of Turkey. Why is it that, to-day, he says the alliance ought to be between England and Germany, and with Germany alone? Why, it is because, as he pointed out, that Germany has come to the rescue of the Moslem populations throughout the world. That is the ground on which he vouchsafed his patronage to the Emperor of Germany. We cannot accept that as a test of the policy to be pursued. We are not enamoured of the Power which has the favour of the hon. Member. Tinning to the Member for King's Lynn, he also has got his favourite—what shall I call it—predominant idea, and that predominant idea is to denounce the Declaration of Paris, and the freedom of the neutral flag. That comes up always in his speeches upon the condition of Europe.
§ MR. GIBSON BOWLESI beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon; I believe this is the first occasion on which I have mentioned it in the House.
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTWell, Sir, I confess that astonishes me quite as much as it would do to hear from the President of the Local Government Board that it was the first time he had ever alluded to bimetallism. But I pass that by. I will regard it as a solitary lapse on the part of the hon. Member. But while I confess that I deplore and deprecate such language as has been used by the honourable Member for Sheffield, and the Members who supported him, towards Russia and Germany, I do ask the Government—and it is for that reason that I have risen—that they will give some clear statement upon this matter, which will prevent mischief being done by such speeches as those we have listened to, and which will set at rest the public mind. I have criticised the Government—and it is the only criticism that I have to pass upon them in this matter—because when this question began they allowed scares to prevail in the public mind. They allowed, I may almost say they encouraged, an alarm for which there was no foundation at all. Well, of course, we know very well the state of mind of the man who maketh and loveth a scare. The probability is that it answers his purpose, but that should not be the position of a responsible 326 Government. They ought to come forward, when they know there is no danger and no mischief, and tell the English people that that is the fact. What I criticise and complain of is this, that for some weeks all the newspapers and many right hon. Gentlemen in their speeches, have been calling upon the Government to do something to avert the infinite mischief that was going to befall British trade in consequence of the action of Russia and Germany in China. As soon as Parliament met, we were told by the Prime Minister that all this excitement has arisen from a "confusion of ideas," and that there was no foundation for such apprehension at all. Lord Salisbury said—
I am bound at the same time to say, lest it should be supposed that we have been maintaining a desperate diplomatic battle in favour of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, that nobody has ever yet suggested the slightest intention of infringing any of the rights we enjoy under that Treaty.What are those rights? They are all contained in the last words of the Treaty of Tien-tsin that England shall enjoy in China every advantage that any other country possesses. Well, if that be so, and the statement of the Prime Minister is true, as I am sure it is, that nobody has ever suggested the slightest intention of infringing any of the rights we enjoy under that Treaty, why is the country allowed to be alarmed on the subject? The Prime Minister adds—And I venture to hope, knowing the soundness of judgment of the statesmen by whom Europe is governed, that no such intention will ever be entertained.Is that true? If that is so, why are we to have speeches of the kind we have been listening to inciting the minds of the people in this country, first against Russia and then against Germany, when there is not the slightest intention on the part of those nations to do anything of what we have reason to complain. With reference to this affair of Port Arthur the Prime Minister said—We have received spontaneously from the Russian Government a written assurance that any port which they might obtain leave to employ for the outlet of their commerce would be a free port, free to the commerce of this country. Now, a free port is much better than a Treaty port. So, having ascertained that Ta-lien-wan was to be a free port, it interested us very little indeed to know whether it was to be a Treaty port or not.327 Well, now, Sir, if that is true, why in the world is the public mind to be disturbed upon these subjects. I saw this morning that the Times was beginning to sound the alarm again as to the present condition of things. It was for that reason that I put a question this afternoon to the right hon. Gentleman, asking him to present to Parliament documentary evidence which would satisfy the country upon this question. We have had vague statements, but surely matters of such supreme consequence as this must have been reduced to writing, and there ought to be no secrecy with reference to the interests and to the commerce of this country. We cannot too soon see this assurance in black and white, and then we can judge of what is intended in the case. As regards Port Arthur, the hon. Member for King's Lynn quoted certain eloquent passages from a publication ascribed to the Under Secretary of State, and he spoke of them as the language of the Foreign Office. I do not think that is exactly correct. I think that they were expressions used by the right hon. Gentleman when, what shall I call them?—when he was suffering from that infantile disorder from which the hon. Member for Sheffield in his maturer years has not yet recovered. It was like an attack of the measles, or Russophobia, from which the young and healthy easily recovers. I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman upon his convalescence. He speaks of those ports and places with entire satisfaction, in his official capacity, and tells us that Russia has done nothing in respect to Port Arthur which she is not perfectly entitled to do without violating our Treaty rights. Then why are we to have any alarm on the subject of Russia and Port Arthur? The hon. Member for Sheffield thinks that we ought to join Japan and make war against Russia before the Siberian railway is finished—a railway through her own territory. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs went on to say—Russia has sent ships of war to Port Arthur, and if blame is to be attached to her for doing so, Her Majesty's Government must be included in the accusation, for a fortnight ago we did exactly the same thing. That is a right we enjoy in common with other Powers under the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and in the exercise of that right our Admiral from time to 328 time orders ships to visit that port. He did that two or three weeks ago, and if the occasion arises he will do so again.If that is so, what is the meaning of all this alarm, of all these panic fears, as to the action of Russia in this matter? It is perfectly obvious—and nobody has better expressed it than the First Lord of the Treasury on more than one occasion—that the advantage of other countries is not necessarily our loss. Personally, I have followed this matter very closely, and I have followed without jealousy, and even with admiration, the progress that Russia is making in the development of her commerce and her manufactures at home. That is the case with Germany also; but as we have the world for our customers, it is a great advantage to us that our customers should be prosperous, and there is nothing more beneficial to our trade than that other countries should have the means and the power to purchase from us. You may depend upon it that whatever their tariffs may be, if they are wealthy countries they will have to come to England for the goods they require. What is the meaning of all this jealousy? In my opinion, it would be more worthy of some upstart parvenu nation than of an ancient people with enormous wealth and unbounded dominions. Why do we have this sort of language which we have listened to to-night? There are some things in these negotiations which have surprised me. I never understood why, if Talien-wan was of so little value, it was ever asked for. It was certainly a thing that was not particularly agreeable to Russia, and that seems to me to be a matter that requires explanation. Then there was that curious condition—that China has agreed not to part with the valley of the Yang-tse-Kiang. It is quite evident that if any nation approached us and asked us not to part with the valley of the Thames the condition is one that we might readily agree to. But whether it was a discreet thing to ask China not to part with the valley of the Yang-tse-Kiang is open to doubt, and it seems to me to be a very curious condition to speak of as a concession. It looks very like giving to China a letter of license to part with all the rest of her territory. But it is not my object at all in this matter to criticise the Government or to weaken 329 their hands. On the contrary, I desire to strengthen their hands against their own supporters to-night, and against this Motion; but what I do ask of the Government is that they will make to the House a frank statement of the actual position of things. If you want to remove the mischief of such speeches as those we have listened to; if you want to remove the evil of this perpetual, I will not say nagging, but denunciation of other countries when there is no foundation for it at all, you ought to tell us, as the Prime Minister told us in reference to Russia, and as he told us in reference to Germany. Lord Salisbury said—Similar assurances have been made to us by the German Government with respect to the territory they have recently occupied; indeed, the German Government went further, and were more flattering to us, for their Ambassador informed me they had come to the conclusion that our manner of dealing with such things, at all events in the Colonies, is better than theirs, and that in this instance, at any rate, they intended to imitate our methods.We want to see a record of that assurance. It ought to be presented to Parliament at the earliest possible time, so that we may be assured that there is no real foundation for alarm of this character, and that we should not damage ourselves and our interests in this country by these groundless attacks upon other nations, who, its far as we know, and as far as the Prime Minister tells us, are acting towards us in a perfectly friendly spirit. If that be so, we shall go on, in concert with them, in developing the trade and the civilisation of the world. I believe that that is a much more worthy course for such an Empire as that to which we belong to adopt than the attempts to create jealousies, whether it be against the conduct of Russia when there is no foundation for it, or whether it is against Germany when there is no occasion for entertaining those opinions. For that reason I do hope the Government will be able to give us the same assurances the Prime Minister gave us on the first night of the Session—namely, that there is no real reason to believe that any real interests we have at heart are imperilled, and that there is no ground whatever for cultivating this odious spirit of jealousy and hatred against nations with whom we ought to be friendly.
§ *THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. G. N. CURZON,) Lancashire, SouthportI quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition as to the tone which ought to animate the speeches on either side of the House in this Debate, and I shall endeavour not to depart from that tone. I shall, I hope, also satisfy, at any rate to the best of my ability, the request for information that he has made. I do not know that this is precisely the most favourable moment to have a general discussion on the Chinese question. Much of our proceedings, and some of our negotiations, at Pekin and elsewhere, are still incomplete, and it is, therefore, difficult for me either to present a connected narrative of events to the House, or to give what the right hon. Gentleman has asked for—namely, a full statement of the policy of the Government. It is a sound rule, not merely of the Foreign Office, but I think of common sense also, that while a policy is still in course of development, and while negotiations are still proceeding, some considerable reserve should be maintained in public and Parliamentary utterances as to what is happening; and I am sure I shall not be held to be open to blame if in some respects I am not able to depart from that reserve. At the same time, I quite recognise the propriety of the request of the right hon. Gentleman, and I shall endeavour so far as is possible, within the limits open to me, to make a clear statement of what the views and action of the Government have been. Sir, I accept the contention which has underlain the whole of the speeches to which we have listened, namely that this country enjoys a preponderant interest in China. That, indeed, is one of the commonplaces of modern politics and history which it is needless either to demonstrate or to endorse. We were the first people to unlock the door of China to foreign trade; we were the first Power to survey her coasts; we were the first to drive away pirates from her seas. We were the first to stud the whole line of her coasts with ports open not only to ourselves but to the commerce of the whole world. We were the first people to send steamers up her waterways, to build railways for her, to 331 exploit her mines, and to carry for thousands of miles into the interior of the country the benefits of European manufactures and comforts. And let it not be forgotten that we were the first Power to give to China the nucleus of a pure administration, at the same time that we added a great amount of annual revenue to her Treasury by instituting an Imperial Custom Service in that country. I think it may be truly said that so far as China is not at present an Eastern anachronism, but has within herself a vital, living force, it is in the main due to the initiative and action of this country. Well, Sir, all these circumstances, on which I need not further dwell, explain the preponderant interest and priority of claim which we have in that country. But may I here utter a word of caution? These circumstances do not seem to me to constitute an exclusive interest in China. They do not justify us in regarding with jealousy or suspicion the action of any other competitors who are, perhaps, just as competent and as well equipped as ourselves, but who may have arrived somewhat later on the scene. We may, perhaps, regard with pardonable compunction the encroachment of these rivals upon a sphere of activity which was until recently almost entirely our own. But in so far as it is a legitimate and pacific encroachment we have no cause of complaint; and I submit that we should, on the contrary, endeavour to gird our loins to meet the new condition of affairs and to retain in an age of competition what we won in an age of monopoly. Now, with regard to the speeches we have heard in this Debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield made a most impartial speech. If impartiality consists in distributing the blame equally between the two sides of the House, I never heard a less partisan speech; but I doubt whether it would be in our power, or the power of any Government, whatever its intentions might be, to act up to the high level of the patriotism and courage of my hon. Friend. Sir, at the same time, the Government have no difficulty in accepting the Motion which has been placed on the Paper and moved by my hon. Friend. We agree with him that the integrity and independence of China are matters of intense solicitude to the 332 Government, as they must be to any British Government, and that they may be considered to be the cardinal bases of our policy with reference to that country. Passages have been quoted this afternoon from writings of my own, and I was surprised to find that an hon. Gentleman of so much wit and originality as the hon Member for King's Lynn, who sits behind me, should have devoted so much of his speech—and in my opinion the least dull portion of his speech—to extracts from writings, for which I should not have thought à priori that he entertained so much, respect. Well, Sir, as has been pointed out, I am not one of those who have any very great belief in the inherent stability of the Chinese Government. Pressed as China is on every side, and incapacitated for successful resistance as she always hitherto has been by defects in her Government and institutions, I can well foresee that she is confronted in the future by even greater dangers than those which she has had to meet in the past. But, at any rate, our policy is and must be to prevent her disruption as long as we can, and to secure for her that fresh lease of life to which her immense and magnificent resources entitle her. We are, therefore, opposed to the alienation of any portion of Chinese territory, or to the sacrifice of any part of Chinese independence. That is a policy from which the Government have abstained, and which they have no desire to initiate. I can conceive, Sir, of circumstances arising in the future, circumstances gravely affecting, and, perhaps, seriously imperilling, our interests in China, which might tempt us, and even compel us, to depart from that attitude of reserve. But the seizure of Chinese territory, the alienation of Chinese territory, the usurpation of Chinese sovereignty, is not primarily any part of British policy; and that which we repudiate for ourselves, it is not likely that we should regard with a welcoming eye if attempted by others. With regard to the questions put to me by my hon. Friend, he said he was disappointed that I had not been able to give him, in reply to more than one question, more information as to what was passing in Manchuria. But I assure my hon. Friend that we have given him the whole of the information which is in our possession. 333 We have received no confirmation of the rumours to which he alluded, and I think he may rely upon it that our representatives in that part of the world are fully acquainted with their duty to send us all the reliable information they receive. The second point on which my hon. Friend asked questions was with regard to the Cassini Convention. He asked me whether that document was in force; but, according to our information, it has never existed. We have had, from the first time that questions were asked upon the subject in this House, the most emphatic assurances from the Russian Government that there was no truth in the rumours of the existence of that Convention. I pass from these smaller points to an endeavour to satisfy the request of my right hon. Friend. I propose to give the Committee a short but, I hope, a succinct history of recent events. The whole of these events date in reality from the Chino-Japanese War of 1892."The whole face of the East was changed by the results of that war. It exercised a most profound and disturbing effect upon the balance of power, and upon the position and destinies of all the Powers who either are situated or have interests around the China Seas. Now, Sir, I am not going to be tempted to embark on a discussion of the question raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield, as to whether the late Government were or were not wise in taking up an attitude of abstention at the close of the war. I am so anxious to eliminate from what I have to say anything in the nature of Party dissent that I would prefer to put that question aside altogether. But I think there can be no doubt, and the Leader of the Opposition will not deny it, that the steps taken at that time by the Governments of Russia, Germany, and France in the interests of China have had an immense effect in that part of the world in increasing the interests and pretensions of those Powers and in establishing a lien on the gratitude of China. Well, Sir, it was from the results of that war that recent events have arisen. A further instalment of the war indemnity was due to Japan at an early date, and it was the endeavour on the part of China to raise the money for that purpose that brought about the negotiations of which so much has been heard. With regard to the subject of the Loan, I think there has been some misapprehension. 334 We were asked to make a Loan. We did not, in the first place, offer to do it of our own accord. The initiative was taken, not by us, but by the Chinese Government, but when the request came to the Government from China the Government decided, not merely that they were better qualified to lend the money than any others, but that in the interests of commercial expansion, which we have always had in view, and in the interests of sound finance, the assistance was what might very properly be given. The Government offered to give assistance to China by means of a Loan of £16,000,000 on terms which, it cannot be denied, were of the most generous kind. We asked in return certain advantages which were not of a selfish or exclusive nature. On the contrary, the advantages we asked for were specially chosen so as not to offend the susceptibilities or clash with the interests of any foreign Powers; but they were of a character to benefit the trade, and interest, not only of China herself, but of all countries, as well as our own. Nevertheless, these efforts on our part did not prevent suspicion from being aroused, or agencies being set in operation, which proved inimical to the granting of the Loan in its original form. The Chinese Government withdrew their original request, and I should imagine that no one in this House, not even my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, would argue that we ought to have forced our money down the throat of China at the butt, as it were, of the ramrod. Of course, these negotiations and the conditions attached to them lapsed, or rather passed into another groove. But we received from the Chinese Government an assurance that the Loan, which they ceased to ask from us, should not be invited from another Government; and negotiations, which I have heard this afternoon have been carried to a successful issue, have been proceeding in the interval for raising a Loan through the ordinary channels, by means of certain very influential banks. Moreover, the Chinese Government, further influenced by considerations which have been placed before them by the British Minister in the discussions at Pekin, intimated their desire to make certain concessions which should be beneficial, not merely to British 335 trade and British influence, but equally so to all foreign trade and influence. I am a little surprised that the hon. Member for King's Lynn, in his survey of the situation, made no allusion whatever to these concessions, which have been published in this country and read out in this House, and which, I think, are a very material factor in the consideration of the whole question. Now, it is not necessary for me to repeat at length what I have already said on previous occasions, but may I briefly recapitulate the advantages which have been secured? In the first place, the opening of internal navigation on all rivers in China to British steamers from the middle of the ensuing summer, which means that we shall be able to take British merchandise in British ships, not merely to the ports recognised by Treaty, but to every riverside town and station in the whole of the interior of China. Secondly, there is the provision upon which I think the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition put a rather forced interpretation—an interpretation certainly which the Government do not endorse—as to the non-alienation of territory in the Yang-tse region to any other Powers. Why was that stipulation asked for? The Yang-tse Valley is, as everybody knows, that part of China the commercial development of which has been peculiarly the work of the merchants and financiers of this country. It is the main and natural outlet for British commerce in China, and, moreover, it is worth remembering that the Hinterland—if I may use the term—of the Yang-tse Valley is contiguous with the upper regions of our own territory in Burmah, and it is the ambition of many in this country that at some future date, if not, at any rate, at the present time, there shall be railway connection between the two. The third provision was the assurance that the office of Inspector General shall continue to be held by an Englishman—perhaps I should say a Briton—so long as British trade is in the ascendant in China. Sir, this, I think, may be regarded as a tribute not merely to the predominance of British trade, but to the character and services of that eminent man, Sir Robert Hart; and when I mention that, according to the statistics of the Imperial Customs in China for the year 336 1897, Great Britain carries 82 per cent. of the total trade in China that passes under a foreign flag, and pays 76 per cent. of the dues and duties collected upon that trade, it must be obvious to the House that if we ever forfeit that predominance it will be entirely owing to our own fault. The fourth assurance was the opening of a port in Hu-nan in two years' time. It may be asked, Why should there be a delay in this? The reason is very simple. The delay is due to the fanaticism and the notoriously turbulent character of the population of that province, into which Europeans can hardly be said to have penetrated, but which, I believe, is regarded as a vast field of potential wealth in the future. Well, Sir, these, briefly summarised, are the four concessions made by the Chinese Government. I venture to say that they are considerable and valuable concessions. They have been secured without any financial risk or obligation on the part of this country, and I think we are entitled to regard them both as a tribute to the friendliness of the Chinese Government and to the ability of the British Minister at Pekin. When Sir Claude Macdonald was appointed, there were some of my hon. Friends on this side of the House who doubted the wisdom of that appointment, and somewhat severely criticised it in the House. I think those of my hon. Friends who took that line will now admit that a more vigorous and capable representative we have rarely if ever had at Pekin; and that the application of his independent and resolute personality to the time-honoured mechanism of Chinese diplomacy has, I venture to say, been attended with most beneficial results. Sir, I pass now to the other events which have been happening in China. The first of these was the action of Germany, who, in reparation for an outrage inflicted upon some of her missionaries, acquired a long lease of the port Kiaou Chau, and declared their intention to make that a free port. I may say, Sir, that in addition to that assurance the German Government have given repeated assurances to Her Majesty's Government that they have no desire to disturb the integrity or to shake the peace of China, or in any way to conflict with the interests and susceptibilities of Great Britain.
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTMay I ask whether the correspondence which shows these facts will be presented to Parliament?
§ *MR. CURZONThat is a question which I answered on behalf of the Secretary of State this afternoon. He hopes to lay the correspondence at a later date, and, of course, he will endeavour to include that to which the right hon. Gentleman refers.
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTYou will excuse me. I can quite understand that if there are further negotiations going on which are the subject of this particular matter, there might be some difficulty in publishing the correspondence. But I gather that what is before Parliament is concluded, and, therefore, we could have these papers. For instance, if satisfactory assurances have been given by Russia and by Germany on this point, why should we not have the papers?
§ *MR. CURZONOf course, I cannot speak for the Secretary of State, but I will represent to him what the right hon. Gentleman has said, and I have little doubt that, when the papers are laid—and that will be as soon as possible—communications on this matter will be included. The next point is the action and attitude of Russia; and on this point what happened was as follows: A discussion having arisen upon the desire of Russia to possess an ice-free outlet for her commerce on the seas in the far East—a desire with the legitimacy of which sympathy has been frequently expressed in this country—an assurance was voluntarily given by Russia that any such port would be open, subject to the same conditions as regards shipping and commerce, as those which prevail in other open ports on the Chinese coast. Now, Sir, a slight controversy has arisen as to the exact nature of these assurances, which have, more than once this afternoon, been described as ambiguous and vague.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTNo; this is the first time We have had that assurance.
§ *MR. CURZONWell, the misapprehension, if any, arose from a doubt as to whether the Russian Ambassador, in re-presenting the views of his Government, had, in the first place, spoken of an open port or a free port. The Russian Government 338 have not precluded themselves from declaring in the future that the port shall be a free port, but their present assurance is that such a port shall, in any case, be an open port. The difference between the two is this: A free port is one like Hong-Kong, at which no tariff whatever is imposed on commerce. An open port is a Treaty port, like all other ports on the Chinese coast, in which the tariffs are assimilated, and in which no higher dues can be exacted from British or foreign commerce than can be exacted from anyone else coming to the Treaty ports. I hope I have made these points clear. This is the triple series of events that has taken place in China—first the negotiations for the Loan, which has now taken a different form from that originally contemplated; secondly, the action of Germany, resulting in the assurance that Kiao Chau shall be a free port; and, thirdly, the assurance of Russia as to the constitution of an open port. Sir, the principles which have underlain the policy of the Government in each of these cases have been the same, and they are the principles which have been more than once stated by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House—outside these walls. The first is that to which I have alluded—the maintenance of the integrity and the independence of China. The second is the preservation of our Treaty rights; and here, once again, there seems to be much dispute as to what those Treaty rights are. There are three Articles in the Treaty of Tien-tsin of 1858 which must be borne in mind. The first is Article 24, by which it is agreed that British subjects shall pay on all merchandise the duties prescribed by the Tariff, but in no case shall they be called upon to pay other or higher duties than are required from other foreign nations. The next Article, 52, provides that British ships of war, coming for no hostile purpose, shall be at liberty to visit all ports within the dominions of the Emperor of China, and shall receive every facility for obtaining provisions and water, and for the making of repairs. The third is Article 54, which confers what is commonly known as most favoured nation rights. It is as follows—
It is hereby expressly stipulated that the British Government and its subjects will be 339 allowed free and equal participation in all privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been, or may be hereafter, granted by the Emperor of China to the Government or subjects of any other nation.These three Articles are the main charter of our position in China, and we cannot consent—and I do not think any British Government would consent—either to their abandonment or infraction.
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTHave they been threatened?
§ *MR. CURZONI think I have answered that question. The fact that they may not actually have been threatened or infringed already does not dispense the Government from exercising vigilance as to what may happen in the future. These Articles give the Government the right to oppose any exclusive privileges or special tariffs that may be sought for by others. They establish, in fact, equality of treatment and opportunity as the principal basis of our relations—I might almost say, the principal basis of international law—in reference to China. Sir, the third principle of our policy is that of free commerce. Our belief is that the integrity of China, which we are asked by this Motion to safeguard, is most likely to be secured by throwing open China to the interests and intercourse of the whole world, and not, so to speak, by closing her into separate water-tight compartments, each bearing a separate label or appellation of its own. The more Powers, and the more civilised Powers, that you interest in China, the more likely you are to be able to sustain her integrity and welfare. The concessions which were originally asked for, and those which have been granted to Her Majesty's Government, have been animated by this spirit, and they will be interpreted in that sense. I should like to say that I hope in the remarks I have made I have said nothing at all divergent from the spirit in which I was invited to approach this question by the Leader of the Opposition. I would add that the Government frankly acknowledge the generous and loyal support which upon this question they have received from right hon. and hon. Members opposite, both on the platform and in both Houses of Parliament, since the Session began. The confidence and that 340 support, of course, place a great responsibility on the shoulders of the Government, but they also, I think, may give us some confidence in believing that in pursuing the policy which I have endeavoured to sketch in outline the Government are not acting merely as the nominees of a Parliamentary majority, but as the trustees of the entire nation.
§ The Resolution was then agreed to.