HC Deb 07 June 1898 vol 58 cc942-73

Amendment again proposed— Page 1, line 5, after the word 'reserve,' insert the words 'whose character on transfer to the Army Reserve is good.'"—(Mr. Warner.)

Question put— That those words be there inserted.

Agreed to.

Question put— That clause 1 as amended stand part of the Bill.

* MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER (Belfast, W.)

was understood to ask whether the Government would give some explanation to the House and to the public as to the ground upon which the clause was brought in. It seemed a most revolutionary step. If it was the object of the right honourable Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to preclude discussion on the Bill it seemed to him (Mr. Forster) that the exact course adopted would have been followed.


The honourable Member is imputing motives.


said it was a very serious matter. As a matter of fact, this Bill had never been explained to the House of Commons, and had never been explained to the country. This clause had never been explained. Continuing, the honourable Member was understood to say that on one of the former occasions when it was before the House it was brought in at 10 minutes to 12, and on another occasion at five minutes to 12, so that the House had never had an explanation. He felt confident that the right honourable Gentleman would give the information asked for—and would not content himself with falling back upon military authority. Unless he did, he (Mr. Forster) would state to the Committee what happened in Committee at which the Secretary of State for War was himself present two years ago, when a Bill precisely similar to this was under discussion. The Committee would then realise what was the precise value of the appeal to the prestige and authority of the War Office.


I am very anxious to avoid, as a defence of the clause, any appeal to military opinion on a question where the honourable Member differs from the military authorities of the country; but I really feel that the embargo he has placed upon all reference to military authority in support of a change connected with the Army, simply because the honourable Member does not recognise that authority, is a very strong line to take.


If the right honourable Gentleman appeals to military authority, I will ask permission to state the circumstances to which I have alluded, and with which the right honourable Gentleman is well acquainted.


I have no objection to the honourable Member stating that certain Bills which commended themselves to high military authorities did not commend themselves to the gentlemen who generally act with the honourable Member on these questions in the House, but who, I am glad to say, are not with him to-night; but I do not wish to base this proposal on any question of authority. The matter rests on a very simple basis. The first object of the Reserve is for national defence, and for that a very large number of men could be turned out. The second object for which we have to provide is an emergency which, fortunately, occurs very rarely—a great foreign war. For that we are able to call out 80,000 of our Reserve. For that, with certain exceptions, the War Office has been able to show that the number of men necessary for the two Army Corps which the country might be desirous of sending abroad in case of foreign trouble are available. But these two matters of military organisation are not those which are most frequently before the War Office. Our most frequent demand is for a force for small wars in all parts of the globe in great extremes of climes. Let the House consider that during the last 12 months we have had 20 regiments on the North-West Frontier; we have had to send extra troops to South Africa; we have sent two battalions to Crete; and at the same time we have had to provide for a small war in the Soudan. In that war four British battalions have already been engaged, and four more will shortly be sent for the final advance on Khartoum. No other country in the world would have attempted these many operations without calling out the Reserves. We alone attempted to do so. There is no doubt that these operations for small wars carried on with regiments of full strength are carried on at the expense of the twin battalions at home. You have to fill them up with men over 20 years of age from the battalions at home, and you would in any case have to do that, because you cannot in tropical climates send them out at the age of 18, and you must keep them in England until they arrive at the full age. Therefore it comes to this, that common sense shows us that for the purpose of small wars we ought to be able to draw to some extent upon the Reserves without calling out the whole of the Reserves. In previous campaigns it has been necessary to improve the strength of these battalions by transferring largely from one regiment to another. We have come before the House, and we have asked leave by this Bill to improve in various ways the position of the battalions at home, and to keep up a certain maximum. In order to do this we have framed this Bill, in which we appeal to this House to give us the right to call out a limited number of men from the Reserves, to whom we propose to make a special payment, for the purposes of these small wars. We are going to send four battalions to Egypt, and they must be men over 20 years of age—19½ years is the lowest age which we are allowed to send, but we prefer 20. Naturally that is a commonsense principle. We have a certain number of men who have already served in the Army, and who will come back to the ranks matured men to strengthen your battalions for the purposes of these small expeditions which we are called upon constantly to undertake. My honourable Friend has said that this is an unfortunate proposal, and he says that we want to secure its adoption without the country knowing of it. But the Government have no object of that kind in view, for our object is that the country should know in every respect what we are doing in this matter. We believe that this measure is not only the best method we could adopt at the present moment, but also that it is the proper course to take to fortify ourselves for the small wars in which we engage. This measure will cost between £40,000 and £50,000, and for that sum the country will get the services of 5,000 matured men, which is the number necessary to make up these small expeditions. Under any other circumstances it would cost 10 times the sum to maintain the additional men necessary to keep our regiments up to a proper state of efficiency. I therefore appeal to the Committee to allow this clause to pass, for it has for its object the filling up of a very considerable gap in our military organisation. The Bill has at its back the support of our military authorities, who even my honourable Friend who has spoken will admit have the best interests of the Army at heart. These proposals have been adopted by the Cabinet, after careful consideration of all the circumstances and all the alternatives, as being the most expeditious, and at the same time the most economical and the most effective, method which could be devised.

* MR. BROOKFIELD (Sussex, Rye)

I think that, whatever may be said for or against this Bill in this House, nothing will prevent the whole country from opening its eyes to the present serious mismanagement of the Army. Sir, my honourable Friend is right, I think, in concentrating all his energies against this particular clause. I frankly own that I think the Bill is in some respects a good one; and apart from this clause, to which my honourable Friend the Member for Belfast is opposed, there is a very useful provision which it would not be in order for me further to discuss now, though perhaps that opportunity may come. Sir, my right honourable Friend taunted the Member for Belfast with the allegation that his friends were not acting with him in this matter. Might I ask my right honourable Friend whether his friends are acting with him this evening? It is a remarkable fact that when any military subject is under discussion that bench in front is as completely empty as if we were talking upon a matter concerning Scotland, or something equally uninteresting. I think the right honourable Gentleman referred just now to the great interest taken in this question, but I have never seen it evidenced by the presence of any embarrassing number of Cabinet Ministers in the House during discussions upon the Army Estimates. Sir, I consider the Government can fairly be reproached with this, that just before the autumn they undoubtedly led the country to suppose that great military measures might be expected, and that large measures of Army reform might be looked forward to. We were even told at one time that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was to take charge of the Measure in this House, and that my right honourable Friend was to be allowed only a subordinate share in the matter. But when the great moment came for a manifesto upon the policy of the Government, it was soon found that no such intention was to be carried out. And now, Sir, with regard to this clause, to which my honourable Friend objects. If his friends are not acting with him upon this matter, it is not because they are not in agreement with him. It is his misfortune that the military man of the present day,—I do not mean those military men whose connection with the Service is more or less remote, as the right honourable Gentleman once reminded us—


I never said that.


I was referring to the right honourable Gentleman opposite. I say that the "up-to-date" military man of the present day has two opinions—one which he expresses to the public in classical parlance, and another which he expresses to his friends at mess or elsewhere in military forms of language entirely different. I do not know that we have any more conclusive example of this than in the two classes of utterances that fall from time to time from the Commander-in-Chief. With regard to the present proposal to which I desire to address myself, I would, in the first place, point out that it is a complete confession that the great territorial system which he has upheld has broken down. Now, I differ from honourable Members who are opposed to that system; and for my own part I have always wished to uphold it. But I should like to ask what sort of a regiment a colonel would like to command, when he proceeds on active service, for a small expedition. I should imagine that he would prefer men with some fellow-feeling to unite them together. By this particular arrangement he would have a most extraordinary mixture of what may be called the tag-rag-and-bobtail.


No, no; they will all be men of good character.


If that is so, it has been inserted in the Bill by an Amendment.


I beg the honourable Member's pardon, but that is already provided in the Bill. It was accepted when the honourable Member was not in his place.


Well, I am not sure that men of good character would be preferred. But the main objection I have to the clause is—and at present no one will dispute this—that it is a formal affirmation and confession before the country at large of the truth of what we have always contended, that we have no battalions at home fit to perform ordinary military duty. I should have thought that it was within the scope of ordinary military duty to send efficient battalions abroad to engage in savage warfare for a few months and returns covered with glory and medals. But, Sir, our home regiments are not even capable of that now. It is now to be definitely laid down on the highest official authority that these men are not fit for active service.


I said that the regiments as they stand are not intended for active service.


Soldiers are not intended for fighting! Well, I accept that explanation. I think it is fair to point out that even those foreign countries which have been spoken of do not have recourse to this particular system or to this extraordinary expedient. Sir, I feel very much inclined to say all that I feel on this subject, but I am restrained by discipline from expressing my actual feelings, and I think, Sir, it will be more convenient, perhaps, to leave to the right honourable Gentleman the responsibility of putting this Measure forward. I think he is piling up a most tremendous record, and I think that he is certainly playing the game of the honourable Member for Belfast, and of the right honourable Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean, as much as any Member of this House. I will admit one thing, and that is that the expedient proposed is not an expensive one, but an economical one. I will go a great deal further, and admit at once that I think it is the best expedient the right honourable Gentleman could adopt, so long as he remains wedded to and determined to adhere to the present system. I admit that freely, but it does not alter my opinion that the present system is utterly and radically wrong, and though I may not be prepared to take the responsibility of opposing this one expedient and alternative, I still hope that the country and the House will duly note the extreme straits to which the Government are reduced to provide for even small warlike expeditions.

* MR. ARNOLD - FORSTER (Belfast W.)

I must confess I am astonished I have talked to soldier after soldier, and they have all expressed the same opinion that the clause is detestable in principle, and is likely to prove even more detestable in practice. The test will be in the day of battle, when this country's for tunes are concerned, and no man has a right to lightly put away that responsibility by a cheap expedient. It was remarked to me to-day that this is a Bill that might be fairly given a trial, and if it should be found to fail after two years, then we can censure the right honourable Gentleman for his failure. But I would like to explain to the Committee what is the form of test which alone can be applied. I suppose a good many members of the Committee have no idea really what the Bill is. It purports to strengthen the British Army, but it does not strengthen the Army by a single man. The right honourable Gentleman has said that the regiments at home are not intended for war without sufficient Reserves. I entirely contradict that statement, which has no relation with either the principle or the practice of our Army. For 25 years the Army has never, with, one single exception, been reinforced by the Reserve; and during the whole of that time it has been the duty and the practice of the home battalions to fight, and by one expedient or another they have been patched up to fight. Great wars which constitute a national emergency are rare. This clause is intended to strengthen the British Army, but does it? It does not strengthen the Army by a single man. It takes money our of one pocket and puts it into another. This is how it does it. Five thousand men are to be registered at 6d. a head, and on receipt of a 6d. telegram they are to leave whatever occupation they are engaged in to rejoin the Army. Let the Committee observe the facilities this will give to the soldier anxious to obtain employment, and let them imagine the enthusiasm with which employers will take on men who are liable at any time to have to leave their work in response to a 6d. telegram. I believe, such is the generosity of treatment by the War Office, that there will always be found men who will take that stipend. When the War Office get their 5,000 men, what will happen? An expedition may be sent to Wei-hai-Wei, the Soudan, or somewhere. The condition of the Bill is that there must be a state of war, and that that war must be outside the United Kingdom—abroad. An honourable Member has an Amendment on the Paper to say that men should be recalled to rejoin their own regiments. I think the right honourable Member himself was once under the impression that that was a possible expedient, but it was not possible, and the facts forbade it. The number of men discharged from a battalion in the year does not exceed 120, and this being a voluntary Bill, we cannot get more than five or six men back when we are wanting 600. What is the number that is likely to be required? The latest information I have on that subject is the information given to me by the right honourable Gentleman himself. According to a statement of the right honourable Gentleman of the number of men who would be required by the different battalions at home—and I believe it seriously under-estimated the facts—there is only one battalion in the whole of the British Army at home which would require less than 500 men to complete its war strength. There are eight battalions which would require 600 to 650 men. 20 which would require from 650 to 700, 18 requiring from 700 to 750, 15 requiring from 750 to 800 and two which would require over 850 men to enable them to be fit for war. What shall we be told? I shall not be misrepresenting the right honourable Gentleman when I say that the right honourable Gentleman will say these figures are not representative, but are abnormal. They are the actual figures given by the War Office in January last, and every succeeding month and year is more abnormal than the month or year that preceded it. Fifty per cent, of the strength of the battalions will be required at least. I have with me a Return furnished the other day of battalions which have actually been sent upon expeditions. I find that the strength of the battalions despatched to the Afghan Frontier was from 970 to 1,020 men. If it is said that India is abnormal I will go to Egypt. The Seaforth Highlanders were supposed to go to Egypt 1,000 strong. If the War Office did not make the battalions up o 1,000 it, ought to, but it dare not. I will take one of the battalions as it actually existed in January this year; I will take the Royal Lancashire Regiment, which happens to be the first that catches my eye. In January last that regiment required 739 men to complete its war strength. There were 240 men efficient in barracks. About 740 men will be introduced into the battalion just enjoying the freedom of civil life for the first time since they were boys, and who will be absolutely unknown to their comrades. They will be older than the non-commissioned officers under whom they will serve, and the men will be mere chickens to them. These 740 men, picked haphazard, will rejoin the regiment in which they formerly served as the only one worth thinking about, and consider nothing is done in their new regiment as well as it was done in the old. These men are to be put on a transport, sent over the sea, and placed in the face of the enemy; they have to serve a twelvemonth—it may be more and may be less. They will be brought from casual wards, caretakerships, and other humble occupations. They are offered a shilling a day for twelve months, to be mulcted in a larger sum than they lost under similar circumstances when they were serving before, and they will have to fight side by side with men they have never seen before. I do not envy the commanding officer who finds himself in command of a battalion made up in that way. I do not say it would not do its duty in the day of battle. I know the British soldier, and can say that under whatever disadvantage he may be placed he will show the great qualities he possesses. But the War Office has no right to place this strain upon him. Lord Nelson talked about the infernal system of drafting sailors from ship to ship, but that was nothing to spoiling regiments in the way the right honourable Gentleman is so anxious to see brought about. If I turn to history I find that the teaching of history since the earliest days of battle is uniform. Get the men to have confidence in each other and in their officers, who are proud of their organisation, and they will stand by you in time of trouble. In proportion as you increase those incentives to hero- ism in action, you will increase the effectiveness of these men in battle. Can you conceive a more deliberate method of denying yourselves those advantages than the one suggested in this Bill? I have spoken to many officers about this Bill, and they tell me that it will not work. They say they do not want to bring mixed battalions into action; they want their own battalion. We are told that the whole system depends upon the maintenance of an efficient reserve, but that becomes a farce if this Bill is to be carried. We are also told that the prospects of a soldier are to be improved; but where does the improvement come in? This little Bill is not the first of its kind. We had another Bill of the same kind two years ago. Some of us in the House asked the Secretary of State for War about it, and the Secretary of State was kind enough to say he should like to meet us and explain to us the object of that Bill. The Secretary of State for War met some 60 or 70 Members of the House. The occasion presented itself—we did not seek it, it was forced upon us. The right honourable Gentleman the Secretary of State for War told us—with the authority of the War Office, of course—that this was a very fine Bill, that it was very wrong to oppose it, that it was the only thing consistent with their system, that all military opinion was in favour of it, and that we should take a very grave responsibility upon ourselves if we ventured to oppose it. The spokesman of the Members was instructed to ask the right honourable Gentleman what was the precise meaning of the Bill. We asked whether it meant that men were to go back to the Reserve for their first year only, and we were told that was the meaning of the Bill. We said that could not be the meaning of the Bill; that it could not seriously be contemplated to take a man five months after his discharge and send him back to the Reserve for a couple of months. It was admitted that the Bill could not be worked on that plan. We asked if it meant that a man was liable for the remainder of his Reserve service; and we were told yes. We said we thought it could not mean that, because we thought it was hardly possible to contemplate taking a three years man and making him serve for nine years in India against his will. We were told "No, it could not." We were told by the Secretary of State for War that it was not his Bill at all; that he did not know what it did mean. We pointed out that he had actually introduced the Bill into the House of Lords, that he had made a speech and carried the Second Reading, that his name was on the back of it, and that we had been told that the Bill had been carefully considered, and was essential to the welfare of the British Army. But what happened? That Bill, which was so essential to the welfare of the British Army, but the meaning and intention of which the War Office could not explain, was laughed out of existence. We have never had an explanation of that Bill. Nobody knew then what it meant, and nobody knows now. That has been a lesson, that the greatest and highest and must respectable authorities of the War Office should think it worth their while to receive 6O or 70 Members of this House and produce reasons why they should vole in favour of the Measure, which tiny were compelled to confess, although it was then1 own Measure, they did not understand! I confess that on that occasion I was singularly shaken in my belief in the authority of the War Office. I am, no doubt, open to many of the censures which the right honourable Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has addressed to me, but I am not open to censure in this case. Among the many convictions I hold in regard to this Bill, I hold none more strongly than this, that, if it could be voted upon by ballot, it would be rejected with a unanimity which would astonish the War Office. I believe this Bill is not sustainable on any theory of the welfare of the Army, or of the welfare of the country. I may be asked, what is the alternative? we have our answer, and we have given it over and over again. The first alternative is to give up the statement which the right honourable Gentleman has given to the House to-night as the theory of the War Office—that the battalions at home are not intended for war. I say that, in a nation such as ours, with duties and responsibilities such as ours, the Army at home must be prepared for war.


What I said was that the battalions at home were not intended to be sent on active service without being reinforced by the Reserve.


That seems to me a distinction without a difference, and I may point out that the regiments in the Army at home have always been sent abroad without calling out the Reserve.


This Bill is intended to stop what the honourable Member desires to perpetuate.


Surely, Sir, such an interruption as that is instructive. Why, this Bill will do more than anything that has yet been done to perpetuate drafting, and to shovel in strangers into a battalion by hundreds. The system of shoving men in is to be continued be the Bill, the whole aim and object under which is to shove them in pell-mell, and it has no other object on earth than that. What I want to point out is that whatever may be the intention—it may be intended that the regiments never could fight without the Reserves being called out—all I can say is that they have constantly fought without the Reserves being called out, and my desire is that they should continue to do so. My own belief is that you are attempting the impossible; and as long as you have one system for our great Colonial Empire, and another for the defence of our island at home, you cannot get the thing right. That is my belief, and it is a belief that is shared by others. But it is not an impossibility to keep up efficient battalions for the protection of this great Empire, and for carrying out its wars. The right, honourable Gentleman says it will cost £25,000. Well, let it cost £25,000, let it cost £500,000. If it is a necessity to our position, as it undeniably is, let us have it. But have we really come to that? Why, there is no country in the whole of Europe so poor or so small which is not faced with, and does not face, that alternative. The right honourable Gentleman tells us that there is no army in Europe kept up to its war strength, but if he will look at the condition of things in France, Austria, and Germany, he will find that he is mistaken. This is not a question of impossibility at all, because if we make up our minds that we want 10 battalions kept up in this country, fit to go anywhere and do anything, we can do it. It is done with the Navy, and to tell sensible people that it cannot be done in the Army is simply trifling with us. The fact of the matter is that the War Office is wedded to a shadow which did once exist, but which exists no longer. I laugh at the suggestion that the thing cannot be done, and that suggestion cannot have any weight with a reasonable body of men. Let this great Empire rouse itself to the effort, pull itself together, put a penny extra on the income tax, go even to the extent of reorganising the War Office—that last awful extremity—but do what is required. And I will say again what I have said before. You will have to regard the personal feelings and idiosyncrasies of the officers and men. The longer I live the more convinced I am that the amount of irritation—causeless irritation—that is inflicted upon the officers and men of our Army by the vagaries of the War Office is tremendous. There is no man in this House or in the country who knows more about the War Office than the right honourable Gentleman, but I believe there are few men who know less about the British Army. I hope I have not said more than I ought to say, but I judge the right honourable Gentleman by what he says and what he leaves unsaid, and he tells us things which represent to my mind a state of mind which clearly shows that he knows nothing of what is going on in the minds of officers and men. His mind is permeated with War Office knowledge and War Office routine, but it is not acquainted with the details of anything which is actually going on in the Army itself. If I have made my case clear I venture to appeal to honourable Members to give me the support of their votes, because if I can get one Member to tell with me I will go to a Division upon the matter. I am tired of hearing honourable Gentlemen telling me that they agree with me in principle in Army matters, and saying strong things outside the House, and then thinking that they serve their country by voting against their own views, for the purposes of Party, inside the House. My impression is that no good ever will be done, or ever has been done in recent years, for the benefit of the Army unless it has been enforced by public opinion; and although this may be a small beginning, if I only get four or five to vote with me, I am convinced that I shall have behind me among the officers and men a large amount of support and sympathy, far larger than the right honourable Gentleman perhaps would believe to be possible. I move to omit clause 1.

MR. BILL (Staffordshire, Leek)

I am very unwilling at any time to give a hostile vote against a Government which has done so much for the welfare of the soldiers, but I must say that I most certainly think that in the clause which the Government have pressed upon the Committee they are carrying out the right thing in the wrong way. Everyone must admit that it is an admirable thing to have a small force ready to go anywhere at short notice, but it is my profound opinion that the Government, have made a great mistake in endeavouring to carry out this idea in the peculiar way they propose. Just assume for a moment the force required to go on an emergency to the West Coast of Africa—an emergency which may arise at any time, either next week or the week after—and supposing that this proposed system were in force, what sort of troops would we have to rely on in that emergency? Why, there would be four or five regiments sent out filled with Reservists just at the time when it is most desirable that every unit should perfectly homogeneous. What is the one indispensable consideration for a force sent out under these circumstances, which probably will be in immediate action as soon as it arrives? Why, that non-commissioned officers and men should be thoroughly accustomed to each other, and should be used to working together, and should be ready for immediate action. But under the provisions of this proposal it is absolutely impossible that any regiment, sent out, filled, as it would be, at the last moment by men knowing nothing either of one another or the non-com- missioned officers, should have that power of concerted action, which it is essential that it should possess. Therefore, taking all these circumstances into consideration, although I regret very much having to oppose the Government, I shall certainly support my honourable Friend the Member for West Belfast if he goes to a Division.

* SIR J. FERGUSSON (Manchester, N.E.)

I should be sorry to reproach the honourable Member for West Belfast for the course he has taken, for it is quite certain that our forces are not what we want them to be, and I do not believe that anybody in the War Office could be, found to say that they are in the position we desire them to be. This House may go on voting men, the War Office may call for the men, but they do not come, and it is only by rather a strain of the regulations that they are brought into service at the proper time. All that is true, and it is also true that we are obliged to send regiments on an emergency which have to be made up in a very promiscuous fashion. Only the other day battalions from various quarters were sent up the Nile, and things turned out as might have been expected with British soldiers: still, it was rather a happy-go-lucky system; it will hardly bear speedy repetition, and it is certainly not a system on which any military Power ought to rely to bring about a vindication of its authority. But, admitting all this in be the case, when my honourable Friend the Member for West Belfast proposes to reject the first clause of this Bill, I would ask him what it is he proposes to do in the present year if his Amendment is carried? Next year, doubtless, there will be a necessity for sending out small expeditions, and if this Bill be rejected, as the Bill of two years ago was dropped, we shall have no possible means of making up the required force but the old and bad one of drawing on other corps. I could not for one, having as I have very deeply at heart the sense of the necessity for the country being protected, join my honourable Friend in voting against the proposals of the Government, although they do not seem to be the very best that could be made. We ought to have our Army in a state of such efficiency that it would be ready to meet small and temporary requirements. To me it seems a marvellous state of affairs that, considering the enormous sums of money we spend on our Army, we should not be possessed of even a couple, of brigades ready to go anywhere at a moment's notice. They need not necessarily be kept doing nothing, for they would be the first for foreign reliefs. The country is not prepared, or the Government is not prepared, to propose that which is necessary to carry that out. I have not the slightest doubt but what the country would prefer to pay market value for the class of men we want. It cannot be an unknown quantity; it cannot be anything so very extravagant in order to attract men, especially with the inducement of the honourable associations of a soldier's life. We should be left to the danger of disgrace if we did not make adequate provision for our Army. This is all part of the same thing. We cannot afford to have a small force to meet every temporary emergency. We cannot afford to keep small armies for operations against various tribes; and it seems to me marvellous for men here, who have gone on in this way for many years, who have had opportunities for remedying some of the abuses, that, after all the emergencies which we have had, the Government do not make adequate provision for maintaining our supremacy in the various parts of the world, and make those arrangements which are absolutely essential for the maintenance of that supremacy. It is all part of the same indifference, the same false feeling of security, from which one day, I am afraid, we shall have a very rude awakening. I certainly am not prepared to vote against the Measure, however it is prepared, because I think the want of it will be considerable. Therefore, I shall vote against the Amendment of my honourable Friend, and I think I shall not be without some support.

* GENERAL RUSSELL (Cheltenham)

I venture to think the principle laid down by the Under Secretary of State for War is entirely false as regards the duties of our main army. Are we to call up the Reserve for any small expedition that we may have in Africa, or any other part of the world? The right honourable Gentleman stated that all foreign armies call out their Reserves when they go on active service, but no foreign countries are in the same position as ourselves, except, perhaps, in a limited degree, France and Russia. I read an account this morning in connection with a conflict that took place in Central Asia, in which a Russian force was concerned, but I do not believe that on that occasion Russia, called out her Reserves; neither do I think that France calls out her Reserves when she is fighting tribes in Algeria. I do not see why we should not have a sufficient force to go anywhere on duty on emergency. This Bill is a make - shift Measure. The Government does not like it, the Opposition does not like it, this House generally does not like it, the Army does not like it, and the Service Members do not like it at all. At the same time, like the honourable Gentleman who has just sat down, we do not wish to take the responsibility of opposing any Measure which the Government has brought in, under the present circumstances. The only other alternative is to follow out the present system, which has been denounced as objectionable; that is, drawing out the vitals of every regiment on home service in order to fill up the regiments which are being sent out upon these frequent expeditious in which we are constantly being engaged. The inducements now held out by the present Government for soldiers to enlist are not by any means sufficient, and I cannot but regret that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not see his way to giving something useful to the British Army instead of taking this 6d. off the tobacco tax. The Under Secretary of State for War has acknowledged that we ought to have a certain number of battalions fit to go on active service, but that would require a large amount of money. This Measure now before the House is certainly a cheap expedient which does not add a man to the Army or increase its efficiency in any shape or way. It is contrary to all the principles laid down; but, as I said before, I would not like to undertake the responsibility of opposing it, for this reason: it is the only expedient of this Government, which announced, with a great flourish of trumpets, that they were going to produce a great reform in the Army. We have promises as to the reorganisa- tion of the War Office. A Committee has sat upon that matter, and has made recommendations which, we trust, may be carried out. There is the addition of 1¼d. a day to the pay of the soldier, and the promise of a number of battalions, and this Bill is all we have got. I think the principle is wrong, and I sincerely hope that we shall have a further instalment of a better Measure next year, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer May be more liberal, and when this poor country may have some six or eight battalions fit to go at a moment's notice anywhere where the interests of the British Empire may require.


I have a good deal of sympathy with my honourable and gallant Friend who has just sat down in the circumstances in which he is placed, but I shall give my vote in this matter from a somewhat different motive. It is not altogether out of affection for Her Majesty's Government that I support this clause, but because I believe that it would not be difficult to show to an unprejudiced mind that the proposal is a modest and effective proposal upon one hypothesis. Let me lay it down; it is this: that there is not to be any considerable change in the foreign policy of the Government involving larger demands upon the military forces of the Crown. As it seems to me, we are face to face with this fact, that the whole military system of the country is able, but not much more than able, to meet its present requirements—what I may call the normal requirements—of the country. I am bound to say that if we are to have difficulties upon the West Coast of Africa, and engagements up the Nile at the same time, complications in South Africa at the same time, and full demands made upon our army in India, and proposals for the garrisoning of strong places in the Eastern seas, I am bound to say that I think the recruitable population of this country will not be able to meet the requirements of these sudden demands made upon them, and we shall be obliged to take strong measures and tap another class of society, if I may be permitted to use so homely a word. But that is a serious question which I cannot discuss just now, and I only introduced it to show that the proposal which is before us is a moderate and efficient proposal, in the opinion of those responsible for the present military system, and the honourable Gentleman put this in its proper way before the House when he used the word which I have employed. Now, in this matter I have considerable knowledge, and my memory goes back a long time. A great deal has been said about authority in this matter, and general officers of great military and administrative experience were represented as being persons whose opinions ought not to have much weight in this House. The honourable Member opposite has gone a greater length than I have ever known attempted before, by reporting to the House what professes to be an account of some private meeting between certain Ministers and certain Members of this House. I knew it is a somewhat unusual thing in Committee—


I specially asked the right honourable Gentleman if he had any objection to my stating the facts. I have no responsibility in the matter.


I do not suppose that the honourable Member would feel any responsibility. I merely referred to the matter as being a novel incident in these debates. I have been acquainted with a great number of these high officers, whose tenure of office extends over a great many years. They have been men of all sorts of temperaments, as we are in this House. Some of them were accustomed to look forward in a sanguine spirit, and some to look backwards in a regretful spirit; but I have never known one who did not agree in saying that some such proposal as this was necessary to complete and make effective the military system of the country. What is the common sense of the matter? It is simply this: we have our Army arranged for good or for evil, in such a way that we have a unit at home supporting a unit abroad, providing it with drafts and keeping it efficient. We ought to have an equal number of units at home as well as abroad, but we may say we have been for many years short in the forces at home which have to sustain the efficiency abroad. In the middle of this state of circumstances arises some small war, and men are required to be sent abroad, very often to a tropical climate. The men must be found somewhere. But what has been done hitherto has been that the men required were taken from the unit serving in this country. That is nothing new in the British Army. We often hear of this transference from regiment to regiment. It has always been the practice when one battalion required to be strengthened to fill it up by men obtained from other battalions. I have heard officers assert that there never was a battalion yet in the British Army from which the men would not be ready to go into another battalion for the sake of £1 sterling. That may be an exaggerated way of putting it; but it recognises this, that there has never been a close, cast-iron system, but always elasticity of the kind I have referred to. As I say, when this demand for an expeditionary force arises, men have to be taken from battalions serving at home. If you take men from the Reserve, there is the difficulty of distributing the men's position in the Reserve. It is that that has prevented some proposal of the kind being made; it is the fear of aggravating the difficulty to the Reservists of finding employment. The Government came to the conclusion—and I think it was a wise conclusion—that if you make 5,000 men liable to this special service in the first year in the Reserve, in the year in which they are least settled—during the greater part of which, at any rate, they will not have settled down into civil employment—that is the time in which least harm will be done. Confining the liability to service to the first year is, I think the Committee will conclude, the commonsense view of the matter. That is what is put before us. The Government are to have the power of giving an additional bounty to a limited number of men in the first year who will be available for filling up the gaps in any expedition that is necessary. That appears to me a way of meeting the difficulty which occasions the least evil, and is most likely to be efficient. Of course, if this demand were to come on a large scale, if we are to go on year after year with all the accumulating obligations—I am not blaming anyone for it, I am dealing with facts—we must maintain our fortified stations and coaling stations all over the world. I believe that if this liberty was given to the authorities a great many of those evils, those disturbances of our military system which have been so obvious in past years will be avoided, and not only the expeditions when they were required would be able to go out in a perfectly efficient condition, but the condition of the Army at large would be disturbed to an infinitely less extent than under any system that has yet been tried.


There are one or two matters which seem to me to be deserving of a word of comment. I should like, in the first place, to recognise how much the Army owes to the courage and continuous attention the honourable Gentleman who opened this Debate has devoted to this subject. We may, or may not, agree with him, but, at all events, he is a consistent advocate for that which he believes to be for the benefit of the Army. Because I say that, it does not follow that I agree with him in all that he says. I think it would be hard to say that he has not taken exceptional opportunities of making himself as well acquainted with the position of the Army as is possible for a civilian to do. But I wish my right honourable Friend would only keep his mind open. I think we soldiers, we military Members, are in danger, in the course of this Debate, of being told that we are giving our consent to a suggestion with which the Army is not in assent. I will have, on the other hand, to recognise that if this is to be put forward as a permanent solution of the difficulties with which the Army is confronted, it would be ridiculous and absolutely inadequate. We must understand that the ideas contained in this Bill are temporary—only intended to meet existing necessities. [A VOICE: "Why?"] My honourable Friend says why. It is because we are face to face this year with conditions which make the suggestions in this Bill of considerable imporance in attending to the immediate necessities of the military defences of the Empire. From that point of view this Bill deserves some consideration. If the House were willing to adopt the larger and wider views of my honourable Friend they could not be carried out this year or the next. We must allow for the position of any Government or any Minister who has to deal with immediate and pressing necessities as they stand before us at the present moment. Honourable Members on the other side of the House may think they will put the Government into difficulties. Well, we have a certain amount of loyalty concerning the condition of the Army; and I am sure my right honourable Friend who spoke last would have welcomed that loyalty on certain occasions. This Bill has in it some elements of good. The main element of good for immediate purposes is that which has been dwelt upon by the right honourable Gentleman who has spoken. It does attempt to limit the transfer of men from one battalion to another, and make possible the filling up of the gaps by an appeal to Reserve men rather than appeal to the men of other regiments. The Bill deserves credit and support from that point of view. Let me say plainly that I think it is a makeshift forced upon us by the unsatisfactory state of the Army. I do not in the least blink that fact. There is no question whatever that no soldier would be satisfied with this, if it was to be the absolute outcome of the military ideas put before us. The right honourable Gentleman who has just sat down is perhaps one of the ablest critics of Army affairs we can have, but in this case he went upon the hypothesis that the population of this country will not demand greater strength than at present. There is no person in this country who will venture to think that it is safe to base a military policy upon that. We all expect that the needs of this country will be amplified and increased, and we do not expect that the present numbers of the Army will suffice for the future needs of the Empire. I would also remind the Committee that we are, for the time being, building up the military system, with a belief in the Reserve forces. So far so good. I hope and trust that the country will not place too unlimited a confidence in them, and value them at a higher price than they are worth. The Reserve is a most valuable additional force, but we must remember that the Reserve is not in a high state of training, that it is not constantly called out, and that it is not up to the requirements. Yet we build the whole of the fabric of the military system upon the idea that this Reserve is absolutely able to do all that we require in times of need. I do not want to underrate the value of the Reserve, but I say that the great danger is to overrate the value of the Reserve. I would remind members of the Committee that we have been rather accustomed to see our Reserve forces called out for rapid and quick expeditions, which have generally been crowned by quick victories after one or two engagements, and yet we have never seen them tested by the necessity of great discipline or long endurance, which may be vitally important to this country. Therefore I do think we soldiers are entitled to remind the Committee that absolute faith in the Reserve is hardly a thing that is likely to lead to the absolute efficiency of the Army. As a soldier I am not prepared to oppose the suggestion of the Government, in which I recognise a certain clement of usefulness and value. I recognise that in the immediate circumstances of the present case it obviates some of the difficulties our regimental officers have declaimed against. But do not let anyone connected with the administration of the Army think for a moment that because we soldiers support this Bill we are satisfied with it as a great measure of military reform. We regard it as a makeshift only forced upon the Government by the unsatisfactory condition in which the Army stands. It will not make a big mark in military history. In criticising the Government we have not forgotten the promise of increased pay of the Army. I recognise fully the value of the proposals in the Bill. I attach the greatest value to the proposal to transfer from one battalion to another, and I recognise the difficulty in which the Government stands. At the same time I do not consider this anything more than a temporary Measure, though I am not prepared to vote against it.


I have listened to the speeches made by the honourable and gallant Members, and to that of the late Secretary for War, who sits on this side of the House. I am bound to say that if there was any justification for voting for the honourable Member for Belfast's Amendment they would find it in that speech. Here are honourable Members in this House who are soldiers, and who are at liberty to have their own opinions. The honourable and gallant Member for Manchester, with whom I will commence, told this Committee in the plainest way that this is a wretched makeshift on the part of the present Government, and the worst thing he ever heard of, and yet he is going to vote for it. Having informed the Committee his opinions of the Bill, he is going to vote against the Amendment of the honourable and gallant Member for Belfast. Now, we have heard from the right honourable Gentleman the late Secretary for War a statement containing his reasons for supporting the Government. He says that he will do so because it limits the amount of money the Government are going to spend. That is practically what the right honourable Gentleman's suggestion is.


I do not recognise the words at all.


The very curse of all military legislation has been that we have made the efficiency of the Service absolutely subservient to Party politics. I will never be a party to that. The Government are asking the country to believe that they are getting 5,000 men for defence duty, and they are not adding one man to the Reserve. It is wholly a farce and a sham, and to the whole of the first clause of this Bill I object. I congratulate the honourable Member for Belfast on having brought to the notice of the House the Amendment. I trust the honourable and gallant Member for Shropshire will recollect one thing—that he is a soldier first and a politician afterwards. I myself well remember that I am a soldier first and a politician afterwards. There are some 73 of us in the House, and instead of this extraordinary break-up of Members who have been in the Army, we should combine together in going to the Government, and then we could carry any Reserve we liked in order to secure the efficiency of the Army. I firmly believe that Members who have been in the Army and know its wants will be acting against the best interests of the Army if they do not vote for the Amendment of the honourable Member for Belfast.

* GENERAL LAURIE (Pembroke and Haverfordwest)

From my point of view there are two very strong objections to the Measure. In the first place, it is proposed to take 5,000 men from the Reserve, and asking them to told themselves in readiness to serve at a moment's notice. I ask any Member of this House if he would give any man a job with the full knowledge that at any moment he might be taken from him? And yet we profess to be trying to find employment for our men when they go to the Reserve. Recollect that this will not merely affect 5,000 men in their first year of service. When a man leaves the Army it is his first year that shapes his career in civil life for the future. In that twelve months you will almost compel him to be a casual and a loafer, and the habit once acquired will go on for the rest of his life. Practically, your Reserve men in after years will be all of that class. That is the way in which it will affect the Reserve very seriously. The other point is, will it give you an eeffctive fighting force? There is the question as to whether it is worth while to spend money in getting a force that will be a failure. It will be a composite force of men who do not know one another. Our experience of composite forces has not been satisfactory. We tried one in the last attack on the Redan at Sebaistopol, and again at Majuba, and in both cases it ended in disaster. Surely it is better to spend money on a force that will be effective. We are spending £45,000 with the object of getting a satisfactory result. That is a point this House ought to fully consider and decide. I maintain that we shall not have a satisfactory result from the expenditure of this money. Recollect, again, that it is for small wars that this proposal is made. Small wars are generally carried on with barbarous races, and in dealing with barbarous races you require greater cohesion to stand against them than you require when fighting against civilised forces. Take what happened lately. Your wounded are cut up at once; they are never spared; and you require men to thoroughly know one another and feel that they have a common interest, and will not desert one another when wounded, when you send them on expeditions such as that. I say, therefore, in expeditions which you send against barbarous races, such expeditions, of all others, should be composed of a cohesive and homogeneous force of men and officers who thoroughly know each other. My belief is that this will injure the Reserve and not effect the purpose you desire. I object most strongly to the Hill.

COMMANDER BETHELL (Yorks., E.R., Holderness)

I am bound to say that when I first heard the proposal of the right honourable Gentleman I was delighted with it. It seems to me a modest and sensible method of enabling us to carry on a small war without any great expense. For the life of me I cannot find any objection to it. I have read every book on the subject. I cannot see what objection there is to the proposal. Is it true that the men will not be trained? Is it true that there will be so little cohesion that the men will not be reliable? What have we been doing now for the last 25 years? Have we not been successful? If it was cheaper, that would be an advantage. What is the alternative? There are two. Either we must spend five times as much to keep some five or six battalions ready to take part in these little wars of ours, or we might do what my honourable Friend opposite suggests—we might take our military system to pieces, and put it together again, to meet this particular contingency. I think that would be a wrong thing to do. I think our present system, although it has some blemishes, is one that has answered very well. So far from joining my honourable and gallant Friends in their criticism on this proposal, I heartily congratulate the right honourable Gentleman upon it. I think it is one of the happiest suggestions that have ever been made in Parliament, and I am only surprised that the right honourable Gentleman did not propose it long ago. Perhaps I may be permitted to say, without presumption, that we naval and military men make a great mistake when we think we are always quoting the opinion of the Navy and Army in these questions. I believe it is a mistake to suggest to this House that the Army as an army, and the Navy as a navy, object. In my belief, we weaken our position by quoting the Services as we do in that way. I congratulate my right honourable Friend upon his proposal, and only hope it will operate with the success which is anticipated for it; but, if it does not, it can be altered, I daresay, without much inconvenience.

MR. WARNER (Stafford, Lichfield)

I had no intention of speaking upon this subject until I heard the speech of the honourable and gallant Gentleman who has just sat down, which, I think, showed that this Bill is very much misapprehended by honourable Members of this House. There are many objections, in my opinion, to this Bill, one of which is that men who have been out of training for some six months, and who have lost, to a certain extent, their efficiency, are called up to strengthen our Army. That is the first objection. Another and more serious one is—


I would just like to point out that it is the men who are only in the first year of their Reserve service who will be required, and they must be perfectly trained.


I think the honourable and gallant Gentleman has mistaken the meaning of my observation. I said men who have been out of military training for six months, and who have lost, to a certain extent, their habits of discipline. Hut another objection is that at a time when we wish to strengthen the Army here is a Bill the effect of which will be to rob our Reserve force of some of its very best men. The object of this Bill is to avoid the necessity of increasing our battalions up in their full strength. Instead of making our battalions ready to send abroad by means of fresh blood, you take men out of the Reserve, which we do not want to decrease, at a time when this country certainly looks forward, at no distant period, to the possibility of war. The policy of keeping the Reserve up to its full strength is a good one, but this Bill robs the Reserve of a number of its men whenever there is a little war, and it subjects the men to an amount of active service, and, as I think, weakens the Reserve to a very serious extent. That in my opinion, is a serious objection to this Bill, and I shall certainly record my vote against it if it goes to a Division.

* COLONEL BLUNDELL (Lancashire, Ince)

If, some time ago it had been understood what havoc was created in the Cardwell system by Sir William Mansfield, when he induced the Govern- ment to send no man for service in India under 20 years of age—if that had been understood, and every commanding officer had been allowed to engage men in his own regiment, giving the Reserve pay and half as much again to Reservists who engaged for all wars, you would now have had regiments which could call on their own men for their own work. The only objection to that system was, it was suggested that the men could not find employment in the same way as the men in the Reserve service, who were only liable when the Reserve was called. Now, a great deal of nonsense has been talked about the Reserve men supposed to be tramping about the country, a great many of whom are not soldiers at all, but pass themselves off as Reserve men. In my opinion, the nucleus of a regiment must have sufficient to absorb and assimilate the Reservists. Now, speaking of Lord Haliburton—admirable public servant as he is—his letters showed that he thought the soldier should be as interchangeable as the parts of a rifle itself. It is the natural thing for the officer at headquarters to do. As men who have to act with young soldiers know, they are much influenced by regimental sentiment, and when they have been some years in the Service that is not so much the case. In our Service we have some of the most distinguished officers. I admit, and we have a Reserve of 8,000—not merely a good Reserve, but the best Reserve in the whole world for its numbers; but, at the same time, the nucleus which has to take it in is not sufficient, and I strongly advise the Government to do all that they can to make it sufficient.


With regard to what the honourable Gentleman has stated, it is quite clear I conld not approach the matter of which he spoke. I did attach great importance to the argument which I used, and thought it was strongly relevant to that which was addressed to me by the honourable Gentleman when he said we are to be pressed to accept this Bill because it had received the approval of the War Office. I pointed out that we had received similar assurances on similar occasions, and I asked the right honourable Gentleman for permission to give the particulars which I gave, and therefore I have nothing with which to reproach myself in that matter. I am strongly in favour of the Motion which I move, and although I am indebted to the honourable and gallant Gentlemen who have spoken in favour of it, I regret that they find themselves unable to give me the advantage of their votes. I am content, however, with the expression of opinion which has been given. The right honourable Gentlemen on both Front. Benches support each other when matters of administrative detail are in question, but, with all due deference to them, I confess that in this matter I retain my own opinion.

MR. BROADHUEST (Leicester)

Many of us are inclined to support the Government in the more moderate proposal which they put forward rather than support the proposal of the honourable Gentleman, that a permanent body of

men should be kept at Aldershot waiting and anxious for a job. May I ask the right honourable Gentleman whether the first clause in any way makes any inroads in the constitutional safeguards by placing in the hands of the executive Government the power of calling out an increased number of men without our consent?


There is no question arising as to constitutional safeguards. This House votes a number of men every year, and this merely provides that the Government may call out 5,000 men.

Question put— That clause 1, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 121; Noes 46.—(Division List No. 125.)

Arrol, Sir William Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir John E. Pollock, Harry Frederick
Atkinson, Rt. Hon. John Goschen, Rt.Hn. G.J. (St.Geo's) Powell, Sir Francis Sharp
Balfour, Rt.Hn. A. J.(Manch.) Goschen. George J. (Sussex) Purvis, Robert
Barton, Dunbar Plunket Gray, Ernest (West Ham) Richardson, Sir T. (Hartlep'l)
Beach, Rt.Hn. SirM.H. (Brist'l) Greville, Captain Ridley, Rt. Hon. Sir M. W.
Bemrose, Sir Henry Howe Hamilton, Rt. Hon. Lord G. Ritchie, Rt. Hon. Charles T.
Bentinck, Lord Henry C. Hanbury, Rt. Hon. R. W. Robertson, Edmund (Dundee)
Bethell, Commander Helder, Augustus Robertson, Herb. (Hackney)
Bhownaggree, Sir M. M. Henderson, Alexander Robinson, Brooke
Blundell, Colonel Henry Hozier, Hon. James H. C. Round, James
Bond, Edward Hutton, John (Yorks, N.R.) Royds, Clement Molyneux
Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John Jessel, Capt. Herbert M. Russell, Gen. F. S. (Chelt'm)
Burt, Thomas Kemp, George Russell, T. W. (Tyrone)
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H. Kenyon, James Savory, Sir Joseph
Cecil, Lord Hugh Kenyon-Slaney, Col. Wm. Scoble, Sir Andrew Richard
Chaloner, Capt. R. G. W. King, Sir Henry Seymour Sharpe, William Edward T.
Chamberlain, Rt.Hn. J.(Birm.) Lafone, Alfred Shaw-Stewart, M. H. (Renf.)
Chamberlain, J. A. (Worc'r) Lawson, J. Grant (Yorks) Sidebottom, Wm. (Derbysh.)
Charrington, Spencer Lees, Sir Elliott (Birkenhead) Skewes-Cox, Thomas
Cochrane, Hon. T. H. A. E. Lockwood, Lt.-Col. A. R. Stanley, Lord (Lancs)
Collings, Rt. Hon. Jesse Loder, Gerald Walter E. Stone, Sir Benjamin
Compton, Lord Alwyne Long, Col. C. W. (Evesham) Strauss, Arthur
Cooke, C. W. R. (Hereford) Long, Rt, Hon. W. (Liverp'l) Talbot, Lord E. (Chichester)
Corbett, A. C. (Glasgow) Lowe, Francis William Talbot ,Rt. Hn, J. G. (Oxf'dUny)
Courtney, Rt. Hon. L. H. Lucas-Shadwell, William Tollemache, Henry James
Cripps, Charles Alfred Lyttelton, Hon. Alfred Tomlinson. W. E. Murray
Dalrymple, Sir Charles Macartney, W. G. Ellison Vincent, Col. Sir C. E. H.
Dixon-Hartland, Sir F. D. Maclean, James Mackenzie Wanklyn, James Leslie
Dorington, Sir John Edward Maclure, Sir John William Ward, Hon. R. A. (Crewe)
Douglas, Rt. Hon. A. Akers. McArthur, Wm. (Cornwall) Warr, Augustus Frederick
Duncombe, Hon. Hubert V. McCalmont, Mj-Gn.(Ant'm,N.) Webster, Sir R. E. (I. of W.)
Fergusson, Rt. Hn. SirJ. (Manc.) McKillop, James Wentworth, Bruce C. Vernon
Finlay, Sir Robert Bannatyne Marks, Henry H. Williams, Colonel R. (Dorset)
Fisher, William Hayes Melville, Beresford Valentine Williams, J. Powell (Birm.)
Fison, Frederick William Milton, Viscount Willox, Sir John Archibald
FitzGerald. Sir R. Penrose Milward, Colonel Victor Wortley,Rt.Hon. C. B. Stuart-
Flannery, Fortescue Mount, William George Wyndham-Quin, Maj. W. H.
Foster, Sir W. (Derby Co.) Nicol, Donald Ninian
Gedge, Sydney Orr-Ewing, Charles Lindsay TELLERS FOR THE AYES—
Gilliat, John Saunders Parkes, Ebenezer Sir William Walrond and
Goldsworthy, Major-General Pender, James Mr. Anstruther.
Gordon, Hon. John Edward Phillpotts, Capt. Arthur
Bainbridge, Emerson Horniman, Frederick John Stanhope, Hon. Philip J.
Bill, Charles Jameson, Major J. Eustace Steadman, William Charles
Billson, Alfred Jones, Wm. (Carnarvonshire) Strachey, Edward
Bolton, Thomas Dolling Laurie, Lieut.-General Sullivan, Donal (Westmeath)
Brigg, John Mendl, Sigismund Ferdinand Tanner, Charles Kearns
Broadhurst, Henry Morgan, J. L. (Carmarthen) Wallace, Robert (Edinburgh)
Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn Norton, Caps. Cecil William Warner, Thomas C. T.
Burns, John Nussey, Thomas Willans Wedderburn, Sir William
Caldwell. James Owen, Thomas Whittaker, Thomas Palmer
Clough, Walter Owen Pease. J. A. (Northumb.) Wilson, John (Govan)
Colville, John Pickersgill, Edward Hare Younger, William
Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Pirie, Duncan V. Yoxall, James Henry
Doughty, George Roberts, J. Bryn (Eifion)
Duckworth, James Robson, William Snowdon TELLERS FOR THE NOES—
Goddard, Daniel Ford Roche, Hon. J. (Kerry, K.) Mr. Arnold-Forster and Mr.
Hayne, Rt. Hon. Chas. Seale- Samuel. J. (Stockton-on-Tees) Brookfield.
Holden, Sir Angus Smith, Samuel (Flint)
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